

2014

Does Sun Tzu's The Art of War influence China's military behavior? A case study of the 1962 Sino-India War

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**Does Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* influence China's military behavior? A case study of the
1962 Sino-India War**

by

Yifei Zhang

A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Major: Political Science

Program of Study Committee
Richard Mansbach, Major Professor
Robert Urbatsch
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Iowa State University
Ames Iowa
2014

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee chair, Professor Richard Mansbach, and committee members Professor Robert Urbatsch, and Professor Xiaoyuan Liu for their guidance and support throughout the course of this research. Also, I would like to thank Sun Tzu for his masterpiece, and Professor Terry Smay for his edition.

In addition, I would also like to thank my friends, colleagues, the department faculty and staff for making my time at Iowa State University a wonderful experience. I want to also offer my appreciation to those who were willing to participate in my surveys and observations, without whom, this thesis would not have been possible.

Finally, thanks to my family for their encouragement.

ABSTRACT

This study has been developed to test the feasibility of using Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* to analyze and predict China's future military behavior. The author systematically introduces Sun Tzu's teachings as contained in his book, lists expectations of the Chinese army's performance in the 1962 Sino-Indian War under the assumption that it was influenced by the thoughts expressed in *The Art of War*, and compares what actually happened in that war with these expectations. Most of the expectations were borne out in the actual war, and this indicates that the thoughts expressed in *The Art of War* could possibly be used as a practical tool for penetrating Beijing's military thoughts.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THESIS FORMATTING

Significance of the Research

This article will test whether Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* has influenced China's military behavior during war. If we can verify the influence of Sun Tzu's teachings on China's strategy-making, tactical implementation, and defensive policies, we might have an effective and reliable approach for analyzing and predicting China's behavioral preferences with respect to its future military operations.

China's economic rise has been very rapid. In 2010, China surpassed Japan in GDP¹ to become the world's second-largest economy, trailing only the United States. According to Goldenman Sachs, "China will be the world's largest economy by 2027 and China's economy will be twice the size of the American economy at that time. Unless immediate action is taken to improve American's trade imbalance, this could happen much sooner"². Expressing a more optimistic attitude, the latest projection by BNP Paribas for the post-crisis world asserts that "the time when China will have a larger economy than the US is 2020."³ This report also states that "China's pursuit of competitive regionalization has not been an unsuccessful one,"⁴ and "China's military budget accounts for 2.1% of its total GDP,"⁵ an indication that it may be seeking a

¹ World Development Indicators database, World Bank, July 1st, 2011, p. 1.

² Sam Williford, *This Time American Decline Is Real*, America's Economy Report, January 4th, 2011.

³ Martin Jacques, *Understanding the China Phenomenon*, Economy, Nov. 26th, 2011.

⁴ Jonathan Holslag, *China's Roads to Influence*, Asian Survey Vol. 50, No 4 (July/August 2010), p. 641-662.

⁵ "The World Bank", "Military Expenditure (% of GDP)", <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>.

dominant status in East Asia. As we can observe, China will undoubtedly be unique in at least two aspects. First, this is the first time in the modern era during which a developing rather than an already-developed country might possibly become the largest economy in the world. Second, this is the first time in the modern era during which a potentially dominant power comes from a location outside the sphere of western civilization.

The United States has surely taken notice of the possibility that China could comprehensively transcend the United States during the 21st century. In fact, “after taking office, the Bush Administration struggled to define its stance on the most critical long-term strategic issue facing the United States: whether to view China as a future military adversary, a rival player in the global capitalist system, or as a possible partner.”⁶ The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton published a long article *American’ Pacific Century* in *Foreign Affairs*, publicly announcing that “the United States was returning to Asia.”⁷ Since 2012, President Obama and the White House have on various occasions cited and approved the strategies described in her article. It seems that the stronger China becomes, both economically and militarily, the more tension the United States, the only superpower in the world, will feel.

Can China rise peacefully? The answer may not be an optimistic one. Realists such as Paul Kennedy argue that “rising power and hegemony invariably go to war.”⁸ John J. Mearsheimer also refuses to accept an optimistic answer to that question, and predicts that “China and the United States are likely to engage in an intense security

⁶ Michael T. Klare, *Revolving Up the China Threat*, Issue of The Nation, October 24th, 2005.

⁷ Hillary Clinton, *America’s Pacific Century*, Foreign Policy, November 2001.

⁸ Peter Hays Gries, *Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a China’s Threat Inevitable?* European Journal of International Relations 11(2), 2005, p. 235-265.

competition with considerable potential for war.”⁹ In Mearsheimer’s perspective, the irresolvable problem is that China will never accept US military forces in its backyard when it becomes powerful, and has enough influence to prevent it. At the same time, it is a non-negotiable policy for both the United States and Japan to prevent Chinese control of Taiwan, whose strategic significance in controlling sea lanes in East Asia is a life-or-death matter. This kind of anti-China balancing coalition will undoubtedly continue to perturb the security competition between Beijing and Washington. Another deep thinker, Jerry W. Legro, has sensitively expressed another vital point, that “a rising China is not only a matter of power, but is also related to its national goals.”¹⁰ He cites two possible goals of the western countries: the first goal is to incorporate China into the international system in a way that makes the system operate in a universally-acceptable manner; the second one is to transform China into a domestic democracy, which, while seemingly most unlikely, has been somewhat successful in the former Soviet Union. Thus, according to Legro, China’s national goal should include resistance to “Greek gifts” from western countries.

As a result, it is of great significance for political scientists to find a useful tool for analyzing and predicting China’s military behavior during war to help prepare for new political changes that may be caused by this rising power. In this paper, I postulate that Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* is influential to Beijing’s decision makers and that knowledge of this work can be used to help predict China’s military practices during future wars. I will analyze the 1962 Sino-India War as a research study for testing this assumption.

⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *China’s Unpeaceful Rise*, *Current History*, Apr 2006, p. 160.

¹⁰ Jerry W. Legro, *What China Will Want: the Future Intentions of A Rising Power*, *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol.5No.3, Sept 2007, p. 515-534.

Introduction to *The Art of War*

The Art of War, written by Sun Tzu who lived more than two thousand and five hundred years ago in China's Spring and Autumn Period, enjoys similar popularity in military theory to Clausewitz's *on War* and Miyamoto Musashi's *Book of Five Rings*. According to the *History of Han Dynasty*, the official historical record of the Han Dynasty written by Ban Gu, *The Art of War* originally consisted of eighty-two chapters, but only thirteen chapters remain after more than two thousand years. *The Art of War* constitutes a strong cultural pillar for the Chinese people, similar to the spirit of democracy and independence that forms a part of America's culture heritage and is firmly rooted in its people. Most Chinese children, many even younger than 5 years, know that "all the warfare is based on deception," "the art of war based on force is the most important thing for a country," and "know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat." These principles are taught by parents and further imbued by the social environment and media in China when children are still very young. At the age of about seventeen years, young people in China are required to attend military training before they enter a university. Classes in military training are also based on *The Art of War* and taught by professional military staff. Thus, even Chinese who may have never read *The Art of War* are significantly influenced by Sun Tzu either directly or indirectly.

In its contemporary form, *The Art of War* consists of thirteen chapters with each discussing various vital aspects of war. Each chapter presents a single principle, followed by one military tactic, strategy, or measure describing application of that principle.

Chapter One, for example, refers to “Laying Plans.”¹¹ It describes the definition and characteristics of war, including the “great five” factors determining a war’s outcome and the importance of the calculation that forms a basic foundation for victory in a war. The most famous teaching in this chapter is “doing many calculations leads to victory and few calculations to defeat.” Chapter Two, as its name “Waging War”¹² suggests, refers to war mobilization and the relationship between waging war and making economic preparation after calculation of the “great five”. It introduces to military leaders the method for “making the army becomes stronger even after a war.” The most important concept of this chapter is “it is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of a war who can thoroughly understand the profitable way to carry it on”. Chapter Three, “Attack by Strategy”¹³, compares victory through non-destructive strategies with that through destructive attack, and concludes that using stratagem is often more profitable than using only violence in a war. In this chapter, the best-known idea in *The Art of War* is stated as, “if you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear even one defeat in the results of a hundred battles.” In summary, those first three chapters describe the physical, economic, and psychological preparation for war.

Chapter Four, “Tactical Dispositions”¹⁴, discusses real situations that could occur in a war and the methods to deal with each. Chapter Five, “Energy”¹⁵, discusses ways for maintaining the energy of soldiers. Chapter Four and Five

¹¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Foreign Language Teaching and Researching Press, 1988, p. 20.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 24.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 28.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 32.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 35.

together form a structural system containing all the environmental and psychological factors affecting a battlefield.

Chapter Six, “Weak Points and Strong”¹⁶, is about military tactics, such as the time to advance or to retreat, the tactic of outflanking, and using scattering in the battlefield and thereby create a false appearance to confuse the enemy. How to defeat your enemy with fewer troops is a core topic in this chapter. Chapter Four, Five, and Six talk about art of command.

Chapter Seven, Eight, and Nine, “Maneuvering”, “Variation in Tactics”, and “The Army on the March”¹⁷, introduce a systematic series of principles and methods for transforming disadvantages into advantages and showing how to adjust strategies for different enemies. Chapters Ten and Eleven, “Terrain” and “The Nine Situations”¹⁸, mainly discuss how to take advantage of geography. Chapter Twelve, “The attack by fire”¹⁹ will not be analyzed, which will be explained below. Chapter Thirteen, “The Use of Spies”²⁰, introduces five kinds of spies who can serve as eyes and ears of an army.

As a book revealing military rules and methodology, *The Art of War* has intrigued Western historians and strategists since the late 1800’s. For example, in the book *21st Century Needs Sun Tzu*, Colonel Orlando Dale Critzer, a leading professor at the United States Army War College, says “Sun Tzu’s theories provide

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 38.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 43, 48, 51.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 56, 61.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 69, 72.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 75.

military planners and strategists with a non-prescriptive approach to achieve success in modern warfare and demand careful examination before recommendations are made requiring the use of the Nation's military to senior leaders. Several of the prospects of warfare addressed in *The Art of War*, remain relevant today, and will continue to be so, well beyond the twenty-first century.”²¹

However, my question is: Could *The Art of War* be valuable in analyzing and predicting China's behavior in war? In other words, do Sun Tzu's thoughts influence Beijing's decision makers or not? The significance of answering this question is to test the utility value of Sun Tzu's thinking in one important respect. If the teachings of *The Art of War* affect China's behavior in war, those studying China's strategy-making and defensive policies should place more emphasis on that book because it could be a meaningful instrument for penetrating Beijing's thinking. Otherwise, we may not find it useful to focus on that “outdated” book to analyze or predict China's behavioral preferences in war, and to use *The Art of War* as a textbook in military colleges.

The Choice of the 1962 Sino-India War for the Study

“Case study analysis aims to identify cases that reproduce the relevant causal features of a large universe and provide variation along the dimensions of theoretical

²¹ Colonel Orlando Dale Critzer, *21st Century Needs Sun Tzu*, United States Army War College, 2012, p. 1.

interest.”²² Unlike a large-N study, in a case study these two goals must be achieved through selection procedures appropriate to the purpose.

We apply the “most-similar” selection technique for this case because I want the outcome of the selected war to have been mostly determined by China’s use of military thoughts and not by China’s hard power level. Although it is impossible for us to totally isolate all the other factors influencing warfare from strategy and tactic, we can choose the country whose population, size, economic capability, and military force were similar to those of China before the war. In considering the wars in which China was involved after 1949 (the year when the People’s Republic of China was established), the 1950-53 Korean War between China and the United Nations’ army and the 1969 Treasure Island War between China and the Soviet Union were not good cases for study because the gaps in economic capability, military force, and international status of the two antagonists were too large. Such large gaps would make the conclusion less persuasive because inconsistency between expectations based on principles of *The Art of War* and what actually happened might result from Beijing’s incapability for implementing Sun Tzu’s teachings in the desired manner. The same unbalanced situation occurred in the two Chinese self-defense wars against Vietnam in 1979 and 1984. In those cases China was much the stronger side in terms of population, weapons, and economic strength. The Sino-India War in 1962 may be a suitable choice but levels of population, size, economic capability and military force of both sides in 1962 must first be examined to verify its validity.

²² John Gerring, *Case Study Research Principles and Practices*, Cambridge Press, p. 102.

In analyzing the four factors of hard power (population, size, economic capability and military force) directly influencing the war, we will use GDP to represent economic capability and the number of military personnel and trench-mortar capability to represent military force. Other factors such as tanks, aircraft, and heavy weapons could be ignored in that war because there was only “one Soviet-Made M Matters helicopter, one Imperial Otter conveyer, and two M-3A3 tanks in the list of items captured from India. Most of the captured weapons were machine guns and mortars, including two hundred and forty-seven 7.7 mm caliber light machine guns, five hundred and fifty-two 9 mm caliber submachine guns, and thirty-seven 90 mm caliber rocket tubes.”²³ A random sample of the capture list weapons indicates that the main Indian players in the war were soldiers with such guns and various types of cannons. At that time, China’s main tanks and aircraft were located in the Inner Mongolia region in preparation for a possible attack from the Soviet Union. Also, “considering the elevation of the Tibet Plateau and the drastic climate of the border area, it was not feasible for either side to use aircraft or tanks on a large scale.”²⁴

China and India had approximately equal populations. “China’s population, 665.77 million, ranked first in the world and India ranked second with 454.58 million. These values were far higher those of the third largest country, the United States with 186.54 million.”²⁵ In addition, not including disputed areas, China had an area of about 9,601,000 sq km while India occupied about 3,288,000 sq km. With an approximately

²³ “Infantry’s Equipment of China and India in the 1962 War”, April 28th, 2007. http://military.china.com/zh_cn/djil/zhongyin/01/11045907/20070428/14071194.html.

²⁴ “PLA Taught A Lesson to Indian Army Using Weapons in World War II”, August 6th, 2013.

<http://www.360js.com/junshilishi/shijiezhanshi/20130805/22701.html>.

²⁵ “Population in 1962 by country” http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo_pop-people-population&date=1962.

equal population, China was much larger in area than India.

China and India's GDP levels were similar in 1962. According to World Bank data, "in 1962 China's GDP was 46.464 billion dollars while India's GDP was 41.741 billion dollars."²⁶ In the same year, "the GDP of the United States was 579.748 billion dollars, representing 38.45% of the global GDP"²⁷ and exceeding both China and India by a great deal.

The military force and weapons of China and India were approximately equal in 1962. "Until October 15th 1962, India had one group army, one division, four brigades, and twenty-one battalions along the east part of the entire border with China. Twenty-two thousand military personnel were present. At this same time, eighteen thousand PLA military personnel from two divisions and four regiments were in position on the other side of the border."²⁸

The number of trench mortars on each side was also somewhat equivalent. Different sorts of mortars were widely used by both China and India because of terrain limitations. "In the Kechilang River battle, the Chinese army used ten 120 mm mortars and thirty 82 mm mortars to fight against India's four 75 mm mortars, four 106 mm mortars and twenty-four 88 mm mortars."²⁹ In fact, small-scale battles using dozens of trench mortars were typical in much of the war because the valleys of south Tibet divided the full army into smaller fighting units. The gap in performance characteristics and

²⁶ "World Bank", "GDP in 1962 by country"

[http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=GDP+1962&language=EN&format=.](http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=GDP+1962&language=EN&format=)

²⁷ "World Bank", "GDP in 1962 by country"

[http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=GDP+1962&language=EN&format=.](http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=GDP+1962&language=EN&format=)

²⁸ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 137.

²⁹ "PLA Taught A Lesson to Indian Army Using Weapons in World War II", August 6th, 2013.
[http://military.china.com/history4/62/20130805/17981648.html.](http://military.china.com/history4/62/20130805/17981648.html)

numbers of mortars on both sides was insignificant and had little impact on the war.

In summary, the Sino-India War in 1962 was chosen as a suitable case to study because fewer differences existed between China and India than among other pairs of countries. Thus, the “most-similar” technique could be applied and effects of strategies and policies were more likely to be decisive.

Research Method

In the main body of this study I will analyze each chapter of *The Art of War* and reflect upon what should have happened if China was influenced by Sun Tzu’s teachings. Then these expectations will be compared with the actual events of the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Finally, I will make a comprehensive estimation regarding whether China’s behavior was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962.

There are seven principles that constrain these expectations and comparisons: *First, the geographical and climatic environment of the Sino-Indian border in 1962 was both objective and unchangeable.* All expectations should not exceed the limits set by the reality of nature. *Second, the realism principle that “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but the interest defined by power is a universally valid objective”³⁰ will comprise the basic logic of my analysis.* All stated expectations rest on the premise that war was the last resort for both countries. This premise will be assumed as the underlying reason for the Sino-India War in 1962. *Third, I will analyze **The Art of War** written in classical Chinese based on my*

³⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 15 edition, Revised, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 4-15.

personal understanding of Sun Tzu's expression. Anyone who is familiar with the ancient Chinese documents should understand that no consensus has been reached with respect to interpreting those classical Chinese words, much less their underlying thinking and ideas. Thus, citations may come from different translations that satisfy the author as being “honest,” “understandable,” and “elegant.” To establish my credentials for judging other scholar’s translations, I can point out my publication³¹ named in China’s national magazine and based on the original text of *The Art of War*. I also won the “Best Thesis Award” at the University of International Business and Economics in 2012 for another paper³² based on *Strategies among Warring States* (Edited by Liu Xiang, Xi Han Dynasty). Both *The Art of War* and the *Strategies among Warring States* were written in classical Chinese before the Tang Dynasty, so those two papers attest to the author’s high level of capability in understanding classical Chinese. *Fourth, when I analyze Sun Tzu’s doctrines of war principles, I will cite at least one earlier scholar’s ideas to corroborate my understanding.* Although the problem of subjectivity running through the whole study cannot be completely eliminated, I will list out at least one research study with similar or identical conclusions in the analysis of principles and values given in each chapter. *Fifth, I will only analyze contents that have not been outmoded.* I must rule out the contents of *The Art of War* that were too primitive even in 1962. For example, Chapter Twelve of *The Art of War*, the Attack by Fire, will not be discussed for two reasons: (1) in testing whether *The Art of War* influenced Beijing’s military behavior in the 1962 Sino-Indian,

³¹ Yifei Zhang, *The Impacts of The Art of War on the Diplomacy*, Zong Heng Zhong Yuan, People’s Daily Press, July, 2009.

³² Yifei Zhang, *The Use of Diplomatic Strategies of Small Countries in The Warring States—Historical Experience and Revelation for Reality*, UIBE Press, June, 2012.

the potential choices available to the Chinese army must both be reasonable and follow from Sun Tzu's teachings. In other words, the actions of either following Sun Tzu's teachings or not following them must make logical sense. If either choice was extremely infeasible or unreasonable, the choice actually made by the Chinese army would be irrelevant with respect to Sun Tzu's thoughts. Compared to artillery and machine guns, attack by fire as discussed in Chapter Twelve was not a reasonable or effective choice in modern war as it was in Sun Tzu's time. It is reasonable to assume that the reason why the Chinese army did not use fire attacks in 1962 was essentially due to the infeasibility and non-relevance of such attacks in modern warfare. Thus, Sun Tzu's two choices, attacking by fire and not attacking by fire, were not equally reasonable in 1962. It would make no sense to create expectations, observe the process of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and say the Chinese army did not follow the teachings of Sun Tzu if those teachings were not applicable. For the purpose of this study, to predict Beijing's military behavior, because the possibility of fire-attack in future war was virtually zero, non-consideration of Chapter Twelve is of little importance. (2) The abandonment of Chapter Twelve did not significantly affect our conclusion. If I state the expectations that "the Chinese army would use at least one of the five ways to attack the Indian army by fire," and "the Chinese army would meet the five possible developments in the attack by fire," I could count both of them in the list of expectations that were not borne out. As the following sections indicate, the number of expectations not borne out is still much smaller than that of those borne out, so the two conclusions at the end of the study are virtually unaffected. *Sixth, I will follow the principle that "unique evidence does not prove" when I describe*

my expectations of the use of tactics and strategies. This principle is cited from the field of criminal psychology. Again, each chapter of *The Art of War* was structured on the basis of one principle followed by tactics, strategies, or implications. It is relatively easy to determine whether China's tactics or strategies were consistent with my expectations of tactics or strategies based on Sun Tzu's teaching because they were well-defined measures with specific purposes. However, if we want to compare the real events and the expectations based on a principle or value of Sun Tzu, the more details and evidence we find, the more persuasive the assertion that China's army was operating under that principle in 1962. A single strategy or measure taken in the battlefield was not sufficient to support a claim that the principle was critical in the war. *Seventh, justice in the outcome is more important than the process through which it is achieved.* One of the biggest obstacles for western readers in appreciating Sun Tzu's thinking lies in his distinction between the nature of methodology and the purpose of war. For example, Sun Tzu says "all warfare is based on deception," while at the same time stating, "the purpose of a war is to end the dispute with the least number of casualties and send laborers back to the farm lands as soon as possible." Here, in Sun Tzu's opinion, the prosperity of the economy, dependent on a peaceful interstate environment and a stable interior society that provides food for the people, represents the highest level of justice. We must keep in mind that, in the teachings of *The Art of War*, the means used in a war are not always as moral as the resulting outcome.

The thirty-four expectations listed below will be tested and analyzed in the chapters designated.

Chapter 1:

- China considered Tibet to be a core interest without which China's security would be threatened.
- Both before and during the war's implementation, China would use diplomatic methods to serve both justice and morality to make soldiers feel that they were protecting their people and their nation's glory.
- The Indian army would be attacked unexpectedly before winter.
- China would choose to fight the war in mountainous areas with numerous valleys and narrow passes.
- The commander responsible for preparing war plans and deploying war resources must be the most capable general in western China. He should be wise, sincere, benevolent, brave, and strict in training, reward, and punishment.

Chapter 2:

- If India was defeated, China would force the Indian government to sign an unfair peace treaty and would demand a great deal of reparations.
- During the war, the Chinese command would establish a plan for destroying and depleting the Indian army's military provisions.
- China's decision makers would make every effort to end the war as quickly as possible.

Chapter 3:

- The Chinese commander would enact strict disciplines, forbidding unnecessary destruction, killing, and other inhuman behavior.

- The Chinese army would plan to divide the Indian army into small pieces and concentrate its forces so as to fight each battle with superior numbers.

Chapter 4:

- The Chinese army would make its defensive lines in both east and west battlefields impermeable before launching an attack.
- The Indian army's tactical mistakes were likely to present good opportunities for Chinese army attacks in terms of five essentials (morality, time, terrain, human resources, and methods). In the absence of such mistakes, the Chinese army would continue strengthening its defensive lines without making offensive plans.
- Commander Zhang Guohua, the Chinese army commander, would not seek to achieve fame for his victory.

Chapter 5:

- China would combine both direct and indirect methods in developing strategies.
- China would both make prompt decisions and use deception to keep soldiers energetic.

Chapter 6:

- China would use active strategies but reactive tactics.
- The Chinese army would avoid tough fights by attacking undefended Indian positions and increase the Indian army's attacking difficulties by defending only easily-secured positions.
- China would conceal the true nature of its actual military deployment, including preparation, routes, time schedule, distances, commander identities, and tactics, and

spread false information.

Chapter 7:

- The Chinese army would not launch attacks to distant or remote targets.
- The Chinese army would follow the “seven dos” and “ten don’ts” in shifting attacks and defenses.

Chapter 8:

- China would evaluate the potential advantages and disadvantages of the war before it actually occurred.
- China would be inclined toward solving territorial disputes by preparing for a war and not relying on the possibility that the enemy was a peace lover.
- The “Five Dangerous Faults” would be strictly avoided by the Chinese Commander.

Chapter 9:

- The Chinese army preferred to camp in high places.
- Chinese strategists could keep a good sense of the enemy’s situation by observing details of battle.

Chapter 10:

- The Chinese army would adjust its tactics to six kinds of terrain.
- The Chinese army commander would be authorized with the highest decision-making power in battle, with no interference by Beijing.
- The Chinese commander would love his soldiers but not indulge them.

Chapter 11:

- The Chinese army would develop strategies and tactics for use in different situations relating to nine varieties of ground. On desperate ground, the Chinese army would be extremely capable under the four premises.
- The Chinese commander would keep his soldiers ignorant of his true intentions.
- China would block passages to and from India to prevent it from receiving foreign assistance.

Chapter 13:

- Operations of the Chinese army would be guided by five kinds of spies.
- Chinese spies would be both rewarded and punished in the most extreme manner.
- Chinese intelligence would investigate personal information about Indian officers.

This study suffers from two main problems.

First, both the expectations and analysis rely heavily on my subjective experience rather than on objective standards or consensus. However, as mentioned above, no consensus has ever been reached with regard to interpreting the classical Chinese words, much less the thinking and ideas behind those words. Thus, even the most professional work relating to books written in classical Chinese comprises an interpretation of the language and perspectives. Based on the processes of a war and the citation of *The Art of War*, this drawback is inevitable. Political research in ancient China and the West differ from each other in terms of methodology, and they both should draw on each other in seeking complete truth. Development of implications to convey rich thoughts about politics has been adopted as a widely-accepted method in studying ancient Chinese

literature such as *Analects of Confucius*. Western scholars can find this difficult to understand because no reasoning process could be found in such development. However, clear-cut logic can be a natural enemy to philosophical or political implication. The clearer one's words are, the fewer implications they may convey. Ancient Chinese literature tends to reveal its ideas through implication rather than through logic.

Second, two logical problems exist in reaching conclusions. The first logical flaw lays in seeking the exclusive significance of *The Art of War*. Even if we find that each phase of the war fits into Sun Tzu's doctrine, we cannot absolutely conclude that the strategists and policy makers were definitely influenced by *The Art of War*. On one hand, we cannot exclude the possibility of influence by other military theorists; on the other hand, the use of strategies is only one factor that may affect a war's outcome. Although I have chosen a war between the two most similar countries, it is impossible for us to exclude influence by other factors, such as weapons, weather, and even luck.

In addition, even if we could show that *The Art of War* was influential in the Sino-Indian War, we can hardly ensure both its contemporary utility and significance. However, in fact, we need not prove the exclusive advantage of *The Art of War* because what we particularly value is a kind of thought system rather than the origin of such a system. In other words, given the assumption that each phase of the war was conducted under Sun Tzu's doctrine, we can say *The Art of War* was influential even if the strategists were actually affected by Clausewitz or some other writer. In our case, *The Art of War* has become a symbol of a thought system.

Literature Review

As China has become more and more important in the world's power game, scholars have increasingly begun to do research on Chinese traditional culture to learn more about the philosophical system and native wisdom of the Chinese people. *The Art of War* unquestionably plays an indispensable role in the research on Chinese classical military theory.

Emerson M. S Niou, and Peter C. Ordeshook relate the principles of game theory with respect to *The Art of War*, stating that Sun Tzu's strategic system contains "the shared frameworks of individual decision-making models and game theory."³³ They attempt to build a bridge to connect the two strategic systems, both based on deception. In fact, they have progressed to the degree that both perfect and imperfect information games have independent relationships with the doctrines stated in *The Art of War*. However, they neglect the time span. There is a 2500-year interval between emergence of game theory and the suggestions provided in *The Art of War*. Thus, many connections between those two systems stated in their research may be far-fetched. For example, Sun Tzu's admonition that "all warfare is based on deception" is interpreted by them as an implication that game theory is opposed to simple decision theory. However, although "兵不厌诈(all warfare is based on deception)" refers to the importance of deception in war, it literally means "generals should not be satisfied with the strategies which were nothing but only deception." The emphasis on complexity opposed to "simple decision theory" is thus not appropriate.

³³ Emerson M. S Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, *A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31 No. 2, May 1994, p. 161-174.

D. C. Lau provides many meaningful comments on *The Art of War*. He cites other Chinese classical documents to elaborate on the principles and methods provided in *The Art of War*, including the case of “Cao Gui’s victory to the Qi Kingdom in *Tso Chuan*,” “the understanding of the essence of war in *Tai Ping Yu Lan*,” and “the comparison of explanations about the relationship between war and internal politics in *Kuan Tzu*.”³⁴ In fact, the documents written in classical Chinese, including the official records of the history of the last dynasty, the collections of ideas of various scholars, the research papers of ancient Chinese common people, and the literature about all kinds of technologies in various social areas, form a virtually perfect system of mutual complementation. The Chinese people consider citation from other classical documents to be a symbol of being erudite and authoritative. D.C. Lau is an expert on Chinese classical documents, and his comments are beneficial in attempting to achieve mastery through a comprehensive study of the subject. However, this qualitative research lacks a purpose and the ideas are too decentralized to form a powerful tool for giving utilitarian suggestions or innovative recognition.

The article *Applying the Research of The Art of War on People’s Liberation Army’s Actions toward Taiwan, 1978-2005* by Zhou Minhuan is a milestone of research on *The Art of War* with respect to mainland China, and it implies that ‘the Chinese army has already begun to use the theories of Sun Tzu to consider and solve problems of security at the strategic level.’³⁵ We can also see that Taiwan has understood the military

³⁴ D. C. Lau, *Some Notes on the “Sun Tzu”*, Bulletin of the School of the Oriental and Africa Study, Vol. 28 No.2, 1965, p. 319-335.

³⁵ ZhouMinhuan, *Applying the Research of The Art of War on People’s Liberation Army’s Actions toward Taiwan, 1978-2000*, Mainland Researching Center of National Zhoang shan University of Taiwan, July 6th, 2005, p. 16.

policy of mainland China from the time when Chairman Hu Jintao came to the power. The author believes that the so-called “rising peacefully” policy of mainland China follows the principle mentioned in *The Art of War*, i.e., “to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting,”³⁶ and the purpose is to dominate East Asia without using China’s army to fight, thereby gaining the status of hegemony without declaration. However, Zhou’s identity as a Taiwanese may distort the author’s judgment of the “rising peacefully” policy. Today is not the mid-age in which a power like the Empire of Attila might rise in silence because of lack of widespread communication. Today, since China is too big to be ignored by the outside world, its signals may result in reaction by the United States, the current hegemony.

Additionally, Ma Ludong observes the “peaceful spirit in *The Art of War*”³⁷ and proclaims that Sun Tzu was a pioneer in raising the idea that peace could be achieved by war. Sun Tzu’s calculation that pursued the fewest casualties was not only a way to decrease the cost to a country but also a reflection of the spirit of humanity. After all, using limited violence to stop mass violence is the last method of resort by a benevolent strategist. Ma clarifies the peaceful spirit in *The Art of War* in three aspects: the significance of morality in war, the rational use with respect to violence, and the use of passive tactics. The only shortcoming in his conclusions is that they might be too ideal to be applied to actual military strategies that are extensions of realistic power politics.

The literature mentioned above shares two common problems: first, their

³⁶ Sun Zun (translated by Lionel Giles), *The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 11.

³⁷ Ma Ludong, *The Peaceful Spirit in **The Art of War***, Journal of Henan Normal University, 2010, p. 1.

conclusions are not very feasible in the real world. Although it may be unnecessary for research to be instructive for real-life problems, I wish to find a tool useful in reality by testing the influence of Sun Tzu's thoughts. Second, those scholars focus on the content of *The Art of War* before testing the book's effectiveness in their own fields. Unlike their work, my research is an observation on the effectiveness of *The Art of War* in analyzing and predicting China's behavioral preferences in war.

Background Information

1. The origin of the Sino-India border dispute: the Simla Conference

Strictly speaking, the seed of the border dispute between China and India was sown in 1914, after the Simla Conference, although the border on the Tibet Plateau had already been moved twice before. China became tougher in this regard after it entered the Republican era in 1912. "After the Qing Dynasty was replaced by the Republic of China, the commercial and political privileges gained by Britain from the Indo-Tibet border conflicts in both 1888 and 1903 were no longer recognized. In fact, in 1912 the Beiyang Government of China even sent an army to conquer the Britain-inclined Tibetan government, forcing it to obey Beijing's orders."³⁸ The Simla Conference was the first official conference attempting to restore order to chaotic Tibet after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty that represented an outdated order. Many issues of the Sino-Indian relationship after 1950 turned up for the first time during the Simla Conference, including the well-known "McMahon Line" whose legality may be the core issue of Sino-Indian

³⁸ Ya Hanzhang, *Dalai Lama Biography*, People Press, September 1984, p. 248.

border disputes after World War II.

“Threatened by Britain in 1912, the Beiyang government was forced to receive Ambassador John Jordan’s diplomatic note stating that Beijing should not interfere with Tibet’s internal affairs and that Chinese soldiers were not to be allowed to garrison in Tibet; otherwise, Britain would not admit the legitimacy of the Beiyang government.”³⁹ “Desiring the possible support of Britain, the Republic of China designated Chen Yifan and Wang Haiping to attend the Simla Conference to conciliate the border dispute.”⁴⁰

At the Simla Conference, October 13th, 1913, McMahon provided 6 requirements to Chen Yifan, one of the Chinese representatives: “First, the Chinese government admitted that Tibet was an independent kingdom governed by the Dalai Lama who was in charge of both religious and diplomatic issues. Second, the border of China and Tibet were the geographic lines from North Kunlun Mountain and Aerdanda Mountain to Damuer Mountain, from Tuoshan Mountain to Banamagasong Mountain, and from the Meirugang Stone, Yellow River headstream to Bai Tower. Also, the past taxes collected by Chinese government from the area in the south of Guoluo, Huoerke, Zhandui, and Baima Mountains should be returned to the Tibetan government. Third, new commercial contracts would be signed by both Britain and the Dalai Lama without interference from the Chinese government. Fourth, Chinese businessmen would need a Tibetan passport to enter Tibet. Fifth, no religious rules would be changed. Sixth, the Chinese government

³⁹ Ibid. p. 251.

⁴⁰ Qiabai. Cidan, *Brief Tibet History*, Tibet Ancient Publishing House, October 1989, p. 663.

must pay for the past damage created by its military garrison in Tibet.”⁴¹ Beijing was furious about these requirements and told Chen Yifan that “it is totally impossible for the Chinese people to accept such a disrespectful and ridiculous treaty.”⁴² What was unknown to Chinese representatives was McMahon’s bargaining strategy. He was not at all surprised to receive Beijing’s refusal to accept his requirements. These irritating requirements would serve his real purpose, to make a new border between China and India, seem not to be too harsh.

“From March to May in 1913, a British explorer, F.M Bailey, following the instructions of McMahon, explored the area in the north of Assam Plain, Receiving the report of Bailey, McMahon persuaded the representative of Tibet’s local government, Paljor Dorje Shatra, to abandon ninety thousand square kilometers of land and then incorporated that area into India, a colony of Britain at that time.”⁴³ That maneuver was also added to the draft treaty of the Simla Conference that was not signed by China’s representative. Without the permission of Beijing, a boundary of 90,000 square kilometers of Tibet, divided by McMahon, was named the “McMahon Line” and became occupied by India in 1914. Even more thought-provoking, McMahon required that Tibet not publicize the “McMahon Line”, and it was never revealed to the public until 1960 in the *Map of North India Border*, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India. In 1960, the British government also published the *Map of Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and Surrounding Countries* in which the McMahon Line was labeled as a non-calibrated border in support

⁴¹ *Report for Simla Conference*, Central Committee of China Survey Research, May 19th, 1959.

⁴² *The cable from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Chen Yifan on April 28th, 1914*, recorded in *Tibet local historical data collection*, p. 310.

⁴³ Neville Maxwell (Senior Scientist of Oxford University), *India’s China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 42.

of India. That boundary was the origin of the Sino-India border dispute.

2. The Comparison of the “Tibetan Strategy” of both India and China after World War II

After India achieved independence in 1947, a new “India-centric” theory emerged. Many India elites at that time thought that “the economic development, diplomatic achievement, and national security of the Mid-east, Southeast Asia, and even China would depend on India’s decision making.”⁴⁴ Nehru said in his book that “India would inevitably become the economic and political center from Southeast Asia to West Asia and play the most important role in the issues of the Pacific Ocean.” “To become the center of Asia”, as mentioned in *India’s Strategy Analysis*, “the dominance of the roof of the world (Tibet) could on no condition be neglected.”⁴⁵ Many debates occurred around a question regarding “whether India at that time wanted to convert Tibet to a buffering zone between India and China”, but for Beijing, what really mattered was not whether India had that intention but what measures should be taken once India expressed the intention.

According to two books written by Rangger and Nehru, *India’s Defense and Foreign Policies* and *The Discovery of India*, three national goals with corresponding responses were established. The first goal was to dismiss the threat from the north to create a secure environment for India’s economic development. Three levels of objectives with respect to this first national goal were designed. The highest-level objective describes either the submission or the independence of Tibet. A submissive or an

⁴⁴ Rangger (India), *India’s Defense and Foreign Policies*, New Delhi Press, 1988, P. 26.

⁴⁵ Nehru (India), *The Discovery of India*, World Affairs Press, 1956, p. 712.

independent Tibet could not threaten India from the north in terms of Tibet's "national strength." The middle-level objective was based on the existing disorder and inconsistency between Tibet and Beijing that could lead China to become entangled by contradictions related to central and local government, and thereby not be able to attack India. If these two objectives could not be realized, the low-level objective was to provide India with the land in the south part of the "McMahon line", providing India with a permanent military basis with which to protect itself in the mountainous areas, and not in the extensive plains in northern India.

From Nehru's perspective, after the first national goal was achieved, the second national goal that would make India locally important and globally influential was to initiate a "Non-Aligned Movement" in the developing countries. The final goal was to make India become Asia hegemony and one of the upper-level powers in the United Nations. To achieve the first national goal, Nehru started to implement his "Forward Policy" stating that "India should establish as many posts as possible in areas controlled by China to silently change the relative strength of the Indian and Chinese Armies."⁴⁶ That policy pursued the "fait accompli". As Nehru said "the fait accompli covers 90% of the legality."⁴⁷

In contrast to India's perspective on Tibet, China considered the territorial identity of Tibet to be a matter of sovereignty. Beijing's strategic choice on Tibet was neither flexible nor multiple. While India could anticipate different levels of goals, China had to defend Tibet in terms of national integrity associated not only with security but also with

⁴⁶ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 92.

⁴⁷ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 189.

dignity. If Beijing decided to abandon the territory of Tibet that had been a part of China since the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368), or appeared at all indifferent to Tibetan affairs, the legality of the Communist party would be damaged, a price Beijing could not afford to pay. As a result, whenever the Tibetan area became unstable, resulting from overwhelming local power, rebellion, or foreign invasion, Beijing always made a quick decision to send out its army.

After the People's Republic of China was established on October 1st, 1949, the incorporation of Tibet was immediately placed on the agenda. "On November 23rd, 1949, only fifty-two days after the founding ceremony, Mao Zedong ordered the Northwest Military Bureau to make military plans to liberate the Tibet area."⁴⁸ "On January 14th, 1950, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping began to implement a plan of attacking from multi-directions, meaning that the British-inclined Tibetan local government would be attacked from Xinjiang, Kangding, Sichuan, and Qinghai provinces."⁴⁹ After the Changdu battle in October, 1950, the Dalai Lama agreed to sign the peace treaty and accepted Beijing's proscribed status of central government. "*The Agreement about the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet between the Central Government and Tibetan Local Government* was signed on May 21st, 1951."⁵⁰ In addition, "the rebellion of the old Tibetan aristocracy, on March 10th, 1959, was suppressed on March 28th. Both the short decision-making process and the effective military operation reflected the determined attitude of the central government toward Tibet."⁵¹ Moreover, although China was inclined to solve the border

⁴⁸ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 47.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 48.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 52.

⁵¹ Zhang Ruifen, The Reasons for the Tibetan Rebellion in 1959, *Journal of Hainan Radio University*, No. 1, 2010, p. 1.

dispute with India in a peaceful way, Beijing's attitude suddenly toughened in 1960 when Indian leaders generated the "Forward Policy" that aimed at a fait accompli of occupation of Tibet. Although the "Forward Policy" did not bring meaningful benefit to India, it affected China's bottom line.

In summary, we can find that New Delhi's "Tibet Strategy" was much more flexible than that of Beijing, because its highest objective was only to make Tibet a buffering zone between India and China. Beijing, however, had to defend Tibet as a part of its own territory while leaving no room for abandonment. However, it was also clear that both India and China treated Tibet as a core item of national security.

3. The process of the 1962 Sino-Indian War

The first phase of the 1962 Sino-Indian War lasted from October 20th to October 29th. "Both the east end and the west end of the Sino-Indian border became battlefields after the Chinese army launched the attack to the Indian posts at 7: 30 am on October 20th, 1962."⁵²

In the east line, "the Chinese army pretended to attack Changdu, Linzhi and Shannan while its real targets were Kelangjie and Dawang."⁵³ At the beginning, "the Chinese 115th Infantry Regiment wiped out the Indian army defending the Qiangdeng and Kalong areas."⁵⁴ This caused Indian intelligence to believe that China's main attack direction would be from Changdu. When India's supporting troops, "the Assam 5th

⁵² Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 150.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 157.

Infantry Battalion, was ambushed in Shaze and Lieutenant Colonel Raton Singh captured,⁵⁵ the judgment that the Chinese army would attack from the direction of Changdu was confirmed by high-level Indian decision makers. However, “the main Chinese force was marching on a circuitous way via Zhangduo while some small units continued to create false impression for the Indian army so that its attention was diverted.”⁵⁶ “When the Chinese 154th Regiment suddenly appeared in Longpu, the vacuous rear area of Indian had few soldiers available to fight. The Brigade Commander of the Indian 7th Brigade, P. Dalvi, decided to surrender on October 22nd, 1962.”⁵⁷ After Chinese army occupied Longpu, all Indian posts in the north of the east section of the “McMahon Line” were eliminated. “The Chinese command ordered five regiments and one battalion to attack Dawang, the tactical target of the Chinese army at the east line, at 10:00 am on October 23rd.”⁵⁸ “After the battle of Dawang on October 24th, at the east line, 1897 Indian soldiers were annihilated. 75 cannons, 122 machine guns, 1104 different firearms, 3 helicopters, 11 cars, and 74 radio stations were captured by the Chinese army. 151 Chinese solders fell in battle and 344 Chinese soldiers were injured.”⁵⁹

At the west line, the Chinese command adopted the strategy of “destroying India’s reinforcements on their ways.” Because of the geographic significance of Hongtou Mountain (it was only 8 kilo-meters away from the border and connected two sections of the west Indian defensive line), “the Chinese West Army Commander, Kang Qianzhi, decided to besiege Hongtou Mountain, which was defended by the Indian 114th Brigade,

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 163.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 164.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 170.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 172.

⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 174.

to attract reinforcements from other Indian posts. Then, those relief troops would be destroyed through mobile warfare on their way to the Hongtou Mountain.”⁶⁰ That strategy worked even better than planned by Kang Qianzhi before the battle. The troops in the Indian 14th post and the posts around Bangong Lake were all sent out to save the 114th Brigade on Hongtou Mountain, leaving those posts empty. When the reinforcements were ambushed en route, the empty posts were occupied by the nearby Chinese armies. “From October 20th to 29th, 1962, in the west line, 296 Indian soldiers were annihilated. 37 Indian posts were occupied. 26 cannons and 292 firearms were captured. 37 Chinese soldiers were killed in battle and 56 Chinese soldiers were badly injured.”⁶¹ Up to that point, India’s “Forward Policy” had failed. Also, “the failure forced India to accept military assistance, including weapons and training, from the United States.”⁶²

The second phase of the 1962 Sino-Indian War began on November 14th, 1962, when the Indian army in Wanong area bombarded Chinese positions, and it ended on November 21st, 1962.

Refusing to accept Zhou Enlai’s three peace proposals, Nehru claimed “India has had a new army which is strong enough”⁶³ on November 12th, 1962. In contrast to the first phase, the second phase of the Sino-Indian War was started by India. After two days’ bombing, “Indian army launched the massive attack on November 16th.”⁶⁴ However, India’s military operation might possibly have been detected by Chinese intelligence because the “Chinese army had arranged a military encirclement for India’s attack from

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 185.

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 197.

⁶² Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 424.

⁶³ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 205.

⁶⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 435.

November 10th to 15th.⁶⁵ We can determine that the Chinese army started to make preparations six days ahead of India's offensive activity. Even more telling, all Indian troops were besieged at the beginning of the second phase. "On November 10th, the Chinese 11th Division started to move from the Cimu area to the south. At 7:30 pm on November 14th, the 157th Regiment left Seru, Xiaxin, and Geru for Shengezong. The 154th Regiment left Jiangga and Dili on November 15th for the west bank of Xielizangbu Lake. The 163rd Regiment left Tingbu on November 14th for Jiashankou. The 165th Regiment arrived at Dongxin Bridge on Guo River at 6:00 pm on November 16th. By 4:30 am on November 18th, the attacking body of the Indian army was encircled in all directions. In the process of these movements, fifty-two Indian soldiers were killed and two captured. Also, Dengban was occupied at 6:00 pm on November 17th."⁶⁶

As a result, when an Indian massive offensive was launched, "the Indian troops who intended to surround the Chinese 163rd Regiment found that they had been surrounded by the Chinese 155th Regiment and all Indian posts in Xishankou area were destroyed by the Chinese 165th Regiment. In the Xishankou battle, more than five hundred Indian soldiers were killed on November 18th."⁶⁷ "At 9:10 am, on November 19th, the Indian Sikh United Troop, responsible for blocking the Chinese army along the highways in the Mubao area, retreated southwards after 127 soldiers fell in battle."⁶⁸ "Until 2:30 pm on November 19th, the massive offensive of the Indian army was suppressed. 445 Indian soldiers were wiped out and 236 Indian soldiers were captured.

⁶⁵ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 221.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 222.

⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 225.

⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 227.

The number of casualties from small fights was not included in these totals.”⁶⁹

On November 19th, the Chinese army began to counterattack. “The Indian army defending Bomdila City escaped after resisting for seven hours. The Chinese 33rd Regiment occupied the downtown area of Bomdila City at 7:00 am on November 19th.”⁷⁰“On November 20th, the Chinese 33rd Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Regiment advanced toward the Chakul area to threaten northern India. In the fight around Duolong Bridge, the Chinese army let Indian captives allure the Indian army to surrender, creating a situation in which 36 Chinese soldiers captured 241 Indian soldiers.”⁷¹“After the Dalongzong area and the Pudong area were occupied by the Chinese army at 8:00 pm on November 21st,”⁷² India had no strategic passes left to defend and the Northern India Plain, including New Delhi, was exposed to the Chinese army.

Unexpectedly, Beijing decided to cease fire even though in an advantageous situation, surprising the Western World. “At 11:50 pm on November 21st, the Chinese command ordered all the troops in frontline to stop to detect the possible operation of the Indian army. Later, Beijing sent the order that all Chinese troops in frontlines should stay where they were without advancing southwards any more from 0:00 am, November 22nd.”⁷³“Until February 1963, the Chinese army has been back of the line of actual control on November 7th, 1959. Also, 3213 Indian captives were sent back to India on March 8th, 1963.”⁷⁴ The editorial on *British Workers Daily* said “now, China shows its sincerity toward solving the dispute in a peaceful way” while the editorial on *American*

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 227.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 230.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 234.

⁷² Ibid. p. 235.

⁷³ Ibid. p. 236.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 291.

Progressive Labor said “Beijing’s decision of the way to end the Sino-India War is of the significance of mutual respect.”⁷⁵

As a result, the line of actual control in 1959 has been observed from 1963 up until today. Numerous negotiations and small conflicts between India and China have occurred during the past half-century.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 279.

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF CHAPTERS OF *THE ART OF WAR*

The following sections will analyze each of the chapters of *The Art of War*. Each section will assess the degree to which the actual conduct of the 1962 Sino-Indian War conformed to Sun Tzu's teachings enumerated in each chapter.

Chapter One: Laying Plans

In Chapter One, Laying Plans, Sun Tzu said: "the art of war is of vital importance to the state. National security is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which on no account should be neglected.

The art of war is then governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. These are: (1) the moral law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) the commander; (5) method and discipline. The moral law causes people to be in complete accord with ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. The commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness. By method and discipline, the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of the roads by which the supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure are to be understood.

These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them won't fail. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise—which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral Law? Which of the two commanders has more ability? With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? On which side is discipline rigorously enforced? Who has more troops? On which side are officers and men more highly trained? In which army is there the greater consistency both in reward and punishment? By means of these seven considerations, I can forecast the victory and defeat. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it will conquer:—let such a one be retained in command. The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed. While heeding the profits of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.

All warfare is based on deception. Hence when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are so near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, he may be arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared. Appear where you are not expected. These military devices, leading to

victory, must not be divulged beforehand. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus, doing many calculations leads to victory and few calculations to defeat. How much more no calculations at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.”⁷⁶

Three concepts are provided in Chapter One: the attitude toward war, a five-factor model of constructing war plans, and the general principles involved in laying such plans. Each concept is followed by a corresponding methodology. Chapter One is somewhat special because it introduces the general principles used throughout the book and is relatively abstract compared to the following chapters.

First, Sun Tzu argued that a state should place national security ahead of any other issues. Sun Tzu began his teaching by emphasizing a proper attitude toward war: a general can never be too careful when war plans are laid because security “is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.”⁷⁷ This implies that a state should master its security issues independently, considering them under the most extremely realistic principles. While this attitude seems self-evident to many scholars, it is in reality taken for granted by many countries. For example, “Iceland entrusted the Americans with the defense of Iceland without spelling out how it would be used in war in 1951,”⁷⁸ “on August 9th, 1945, the Japanese Emperor decided to accept the provisions of the surrender, which signified the end of the war and the start of the US occupation of Japan”⁷⁹, and

⁷⁶ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 3-5.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 3

⁷⁸ Valur Ingimundarson, *The Struggle for Western Integration*, Forsvarsstudier, March 1999, p. 35.

⁷⁹ Kris Koch, *The US Occupation of Japan*, IR 163, March 24th, 1999, p. 4.

“European countries were establishing a Military Planning Team for the collective security of the EU in 2004.”⁸⁰ All those decisions would be astonishing to Sun Tzu. In his eyes, Iceland committed suicide no matter how rational their possible strategy. Japan had been destroyed, and it would be foolish for any European country to be too intimate with allies. According to the above words, all of our analysis should be based on the realistic principles stated by Sun Tzu. No realists, including Kenneth Waltz, would accept or feel secure under the domination, occupation, or supervision of others, because the bottom line of realists is self-help.

Liberal or constructivist scholars may argue that the policies of Iceland, Japan, and the European countries are less foolish than they appear because those countries have set up many balancing institutions underlying their “irrational choices” to ensure their own security. However, all these arguments would be meaningless to Sun Tzu, because what mattered to him was not whether foreign countries would necessarily do harmful things to themselves (the level of rational choice) but who could stop them if they chose to do so (the level of Sun Tzu which is closer to the irrational reality). By demonstrating childish and weak attitudes, in Sun Tzu’s eyes those countries were not qualified to enter the door of the game of war because they had not yet been awakened. They were qualified unless Iceland had never asked another country for its defense; Japan would rather be totally destroyed than to accept occupation; the European countries kept their secret trump cards for themselves only. As Professor Wu Xubin says, the so-called “on no account” concept (a subject of inquiry which on no account should be neglected) has

⁸⁰ Zhu Ming, *The European Union’ First Collective Military Institution*, PLA Daily, April 6th, 2004.

ruled out other possible approaches to dealing with security issues related to war. “A state must master its security by itself, through all the steps from recognition to methodology, and put war plans ahead of any other national plans; this is non-negotiable and the basis of the teachings of Sun Tzu.”⁸¹ Military scientist Wu Jiulong (a professor in the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences) also confirms Sun Tzu’s basic attitude toward security and war by claiming “when considering life or death, no theories but only the most conservative and cautious instinct could save lives. No friends, no childish hope, and no *what if* idea can be relied upon, and everything should be considered in terms of the worst possible situation.”⁸² Apparently, countries like Iceland, Japan, and European Union in the examples cited are not capable of managing “the worst situation” that in fact maybe only a slight possibility.

Second, Sun Tzu indicated that the “The Five-Factor Model” should be applied to every thought of laying plans. This model can be used not only to analyze and predict the outcome of war but also to estimate military personnel requirements.

The five main factors in a war are: moral law (justice and morality), heaven (times and seasons), earth (geographic environment), commander (central planner with wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness) and methodology (strategies, tactics, and management). These factors take into consideration both natural and human resources and the concepts of both real and abstract variables. These factors should be known and used by both sides in laying plans to establish a functional framework for the game of war.

These five factors are also bases on which comparison of both sides in a war can

⁸¹ Liu Ling, Wu Xubin, *The Practical Comments on Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, China’s International Broadcasting Press, 1995, p. 185.

⁸² Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 28.

be made in predict its outcome. “Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral Law? Which of the two commanders has more ability? With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? On which side is discipline rigorously enforced? Who has more troops? On which side are officers and men more highly trained? In which army is there the greater consistency with respect to both reward and punishment?”⁸³ By considering answers to such questions, we can construct the matrix of Table 1 to clarify the methodology resulting from considering the five factors.

Table 1 Major Factors and Resulting Considerations in a War

Factor	moral law	Heaven	Earth	Commander	Method
Essence	Morality justice	times, seasons	environment	wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness	strategy, tactics & management
Methodology/ implication	imbue morality to personnel	implement war in right time	find an advantageous place	appoint capable commander and cultivate commanders	make strict discipline and train, award and punish in time, make proper plans

Sun Tzu implies that an army managed by a capable commander with wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness (in training, reward, and punishment), one with more soldiers, one that chooses the best time and place for fighting, and one properly imbued with a sense of justice and morality is more likely to win a war.

Moreover, these five factors provide important criteria for judging and appointing a commander. In Sun Tzu’s opinion, the five-factor model and its seven resulting considerations should be basic concepts for a good commander to use. Generals who are not familiar with this framework should not be considered for commanding positions. In addition, the same five factors can be used as criteria for evaluating military personnel

⁸³ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 4.

and for commander appointment in general. As one of the seven considerations shows, an army must have a capable commander and evidence of capability lies in actions within the five-factor and seven-consideration framework. As Professor Chen Lin points out, “Sun Tzu was wise to list out those factors at the beginning of his book, interacting with the next part of the first chapter and revealing the basic tool used to predict the outcome of war.”⁸⁴

Third, Sun Tzu advanced the principle that All warfare is based on deception.

From the *The Art of War*, we can find at least three proposed methods based on this principle: you must pretend to do the opposite of what you actually plan, to take advantage of the emotional state of your enemy when emotions blinds him, and to calculate every detail that might affect the enemy’s behavior. We have discussed the relationship between the nature of purpose and method earlier in introduction, so it shouldn’t be necessary to deal with any moral obstacle that may exist with respect to proposing the use of deception. The sincerity of the commander is reserved only for loyalty to his state and his deception is outside-directed, so the two aspects are not contradictory. Sun Tzu examined the ideal character of a commander and acknowledged that such a leader must draw upon his experience and intuition in exercising his creative and independent judgment. “Victory is the only objective in the war. The tools of deception calculated in intelligence, knowledge of the enemy, speed, and diplomacy can all be used to achieve victory.”⁸⁵

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent

⁸⁴ Chen Lin, *Deep Strategic Thinking-The Implications of Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, Times and Art Press, 1996, p. 24.

⁸⁵ Colonel Orlando Dale Critzer, *21st Century Strategy Needs Sun Tzu*, United States Army War College, 2012, p. 24-27.

analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

1. China considered Tibet to be a core interest without which China's security would be threatened.

This expectation was borne out. First, China's first reaction toward India's "Forward Policy" was war, not negotiation. After the rebellion in Tibet was suppressed in 1959, Nehru felt nervous about the possibility of China's expansion southward. The "Forward Policy" which claimed that "the occupation covers 90% of legality"⁸⁶ and pursued a *fait accompli* was made in 1960. The implementation of this policy in the west section of the Sino-Indian border made Beijing feel so awkward that the Chinese government proclaimed that military conflict would definitely happen around the "McMahon Line" if India did not change their aggressive policy. This was contrary to India's illusion that "no military measures would be taken by the Chinese army if India only sent patrols into Tibet because China was as peaceful as India."⁸⁷ In October 1962, that illusion was destroyed when the People's Liberation Army appeared in the Tang La valley. No negotiations were held during 1960-1962. In fact, "Zhou Enlai officially claimed that India was naïve to expect China to negotiate regarding national security."⁸⁸

Second, China's preparation for that war was very adequate, proving Beijing's sensitivity to any possible threats of national security. In fact, "China had been in preparation for possible war against India since 1955 after the Bandung Conference where India treated China in the manner of the head of the third world."⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 189.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 190.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 299.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 290.

2. Both before and during the war's implementation, China would use diplomatic methods to serve both justice and morality to make soldiers feel they were protecting their people and their nation's glory.

This expectation was borne out. First, China publicized India's behavior in other countries to show that China was forced to defend itself. In addition to big military operations, as in the case of the illegal occupation of the Parigas area (in the north of the "McMahon Line") by the Indian army in April 1961, even the most trivial actions of the Indian army such as "30 Indian soldiers cross Zhuopu River and enter China today" (1961.7.5) and "one Indian Jeep carrying 9 soldiers rush in China's territory"⁹⁰ (1961.8.8) were publicized.

Second, the military authority continued to give reports of victorious information to common soldiers. Almost every soldier in the war knew that "Indian 7th brigade commander Prachanda was captured, 12th brigade and 4th artillery brigade were totally wiped out, and its 112th brigade, 48th brigade, and 65th brigade were basically defunct."⁹¹ Those reports made soldiers proud and promoted the belief that their people were protected.

3. The Indian army would be attacked by surprise before winter.

This expectation was borne out. First, China pretended to be weak, enticing and crushing the Indian army by surprise at the beginning of the war. Even on September 14th, one month before the war, "India's Dora outpost, closest to the Chinese garrison, estimated that at most 500-600 Chinese soldiers were available to defend if India were to

⁹⁰ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 93.

⁹¹ Ibid. p. 274.

attack the eastern part on the border. But in fact 4000 Chinese soldiers belonging to the Chinese 33rd Army had been prepared for at least 2 weeks”⁹². “When India’s 4th army launched an attack on October 20th, four of its battalions were immediately annihilated”⁹³. Second, “China chose a ceasefire on November 21st, 1962, before late winter came”⁹⁴.

4. China would choose to fight the war in mountainous areas with numerous valleys and narrow passes.

This expectation was borne out. First, “Indian intelligence discovered China’s plan that commanded the frontline troops to control the war west of Ladakh and south of the line from Linzhi to Changqu.”⁹⁵ Second, the information on the map used by the Chinese commander proved that that military plan India obtained from a Chinese traitor was correct. As we can see from the maps, the Chinese army made significant efforts, including giving up some territories outside the defensive line, to limit the war to its advantageous areas.


⁹² Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 344.

⁹³ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 150.

⁹⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p.474.

⁹⁵ P.B.Sinha, *History of The Conflict With China*, 1962, Secretary, March 31, 1993, p.86.

Figure 1 The military map used by the Chinese command in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.



5. The commander responsible for preparing war plans and deploying war resources must be the most capable general in western China. He should be wise, sincere, benevolent, brave, and strict in training, reward, and punishment.

This expectation was borne out. The chief commander of the Chinese army in the

war was Zhang Guohua, arguably the most suitable general to lead in Tibet. First, Zhang was one of the most experienced military leaders, famous in the Chinese army for his wisdom and strictness. “Before 1962, he participated in all the big wars in China from 1929 to 1953. In World War II, he led the fight in south China within the occupied areas. His nickname at that time was *smart iron*, meaning that he was adored by the soldiers for his wisdom and extremely strict in training and managing.”⁹⁶ Second, Zhang was possibly the only military leader able to use the five-factor model in Tibet. He had suppressed the Tibetan rebellion in 1959, making him the most learned commander with respect to fighting in Tibet. Without such experience, it would be difficult to imagine how a general could use the five-factor model on the battlefield there. At a minimum, lack of geographical knowledge and support of soldiers would be a big problem for a newcomer. We find that Zhang was qualified to be the most capable general in western China in terms of capability for using the five-factor model and seven considerations.

Chapter Two Waging War

In Chapter Two, *Waging War*, Sun Tzu said: “In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. When you engage in

⁹⁶ Zhao Shenying, *When Zhang Guohua was in Tibet*, Chinese Tibetology Press, 2010, p. 70.

actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be dampened. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor dampened, your strength exhausted, and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war who can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

The skillful commander does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated, while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen, and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. Hence a

wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single day of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store. Now, in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. Therefore, in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those who took the first should be rewarded. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. This is called using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.”⁹⁷

Chapter Two introduces the relationship between economy and military operation. Then, two following strategies are implied.

First, Economic strength is both the guarantee and the purpose of war. From Sun Tzu's perspective, war was one the biggest disasters for a country for three reasons: (1) war costs basic national savings even for the victorious side. “If the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain.”⁹⁸(2) The neutral states may be enemies when your strength has been exhausted. “Other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity.”⁹⁹(3) The heavier burden on people, such as the increase of taxes, the need of labor for transportation, and the booming prices of

⁹⁷ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 7-9.

⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 7.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

goods, can intensify the contradictions between society and government. “With this loss of substance and the exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, before initiating a war, the decision maker must consider those costs and the possible negative influence of war on his country. Before he becomes acquainted with the evils of war, he knows nothing of the profits of war.

Because war is expensive, the victor in a war must pursue compensation and profits. Sun Tzu said “they must have their rewards.....using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength;”¹⁰¹ economic strength is also the purpose of war. “After the Opium War between Britain and China in 1841, 21 million silver coins were paid by China to Britain. Also, 200 million liang in silver were paid by China when it was defeated by Japan in 1895.”¹⁰² “Although the amount of Germany’s reparation was changed twice after World War I, the amount Germany paid was greater than 112 billion marks and was totally paid on October 3rd, 2010.”¹⁰³ Reparation seems to always be the first item considered in a peace treaty after a war.

Second, the strategy of “feeding on the enemy” was advanced by Sun Tzu to spare the national economic strength. The loss in provisions by the enemy and the associated gain in provisions for us doubly hurt the enemy. To resupply, as indicated above, the enemy must exhaust more national savings, risk invasion by a third side, and suffer intensified social problems. At the same time, our national economic strength is saved,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 8.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.p. 9.

¹⁰² Huang Zhangjin, *China’s GDP in Qing Dynasty and the Reparation after Jiawu War*, Chinese Economy, December 18th, 2012, p. 2.

¹⁰³ Shen Shuhua, Guo Feng, *Germany’s reparations for World War I was paid*, International On-line, Sep. 29, 2010.

and this can help defend against a third side and ease social dissatisfactions. Professor Wu Jiulong points out that “the trade-off between military and economic strength is both the least obvious (it will not be directly revealed on the battlefields) and the most obvious (no one will forget about it) change in war.”¹⁰⁴

Third, Sun Tzu endorsed the idea of “quick victory”. Due to the cost and risk of a war, a wise commander will do everything he can, if a war is necessary to solve international disputes, to speed it up as much as possible. A time-consuming war can defeat both sides, as in the Crimean War from 1853-1856, the Russo-Japan War from 1904-1905, and the two world wars. In each of these time-consuming wars, as Sun Tzu said, “though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen to be associated with long delays.”¹⁰⁵ In other words, a wise commander would rather use blunt approaches to end the war as soon as possible than use sophisticated strategies that might extend the war. In addition, if the enemy is exhausted by the cost of a war, the winner may have few spoils of war with which to compensate his own costs. To save our economic strength and ensure the enemy’s reparation, a quick victory should be the highest pursuit of a wise commander. This policy is deconstructed into three main points by Dr. Colonel: “(1) in the shortest possible time, (2) at the least possible cost of lives and effort, (3) with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties (to ensure the productivity of the hostile country after the war to support payment of reparations).”¹⁰⁶

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

¹⁰⁴ Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 49.

¹⁰⁵ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Colonel Orlando Dale Critzer, *21st Century Strategy Needs Sun Tzu*, United States Army War College, 2012, p. 17-24.

1. If India was defeated, China would force the Indian government to sign an unfair peace treaty and would demand a great deal of reparations.

This expectation was not borne out. From 1959-1961, China suffered from an unprecedented famine in which 16.5 million people died (Ansley 1981). “In 1959 alone, agricultural production decreased by 15%.”¹⁰⁷ It was necessary for China to be fed from India’s food production to strengthen China’s economy and alleviate internal conflicts. However, on November 21st 1962, the Sino-India War was ended by China’s cease-fire and retreat without any reparations demands. The comments in the *Times* might represent the surprise of the international society at these events: “It was better to say China made everyone surprised than to say China relaxed the nerve of India.”¹⁰⁸ In spite of the announcement from Zhou Enlai that “China will cease fire on November 21st 1962 and Chinese’s army will retreat 20 miles from the actual border of 1959,”¹⁰⁹ India did not believe in China’s sincerity and could not understand the reasons for the Chinese army’s retreat because the Indian army had been defeated in both eastern and western battlefields. “The Chinese army had been so close to New Delhi at that time, making made the Assam local government urge New Delhi to place all its ministers on an emergency evacuation list to avoid unacceptable shame”¹¹⁰. Then, “China claimed that the goal of the war was to punish India’s aggressiveness and create conditions for possible future negotiations regarding the border dispute.”¹¹¹ “Almost every senator in New Delhi thought that China’s irrational behavior must hide a big conspiracy, although American ambassador Galbraith

¹⁰⁷ Meng Lingjie, Fan Ziyang, *The Research on 1959-1961 Famine in China*, Observation on Chinese Countryside, 2005, Vol. 1, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 471.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* p. 470.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 466.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 473.

in New Delhi tried to persuade them contrarily with a cost-benefit analysis. He believed it was unnecessary for a conqueror to tell lies in front of enemy's capital and China's preference was therefore understandable because of its tense relationship with the Soviet Union."¹¹²The war came to an end on November 21st 1962 and the "McMahon line" became the line of actual control after this date. However, no treaty was signed and no reparations were paid to the victor, China. On the contrary, China even returned most of the personnel and weapons captured during the war by the PLA. "The peace treaty, in which both sides admitted that *McMahon Line* was the line of actual control, was signed in 1996. Again, no reparation was mentioned."¹¹³

2. During the war, the Chinese command would establish a plan for destroying and depleting the Indian army's military provisions.

This expectation was not borne out. From three aspects, we could find China's inclination to feed itself but not at the enemy's expense: (1) the order from Beijing revealed China's plan of self-reliance. "At the beginning of the war, Beijing (Marshal Liu Bocheng) commanded Zhang Guohua to overcome any difficulties of transporting provisions to the front line."¹¹⁴ That order was totally different from the orders of the communist party in World War II which called on armies to be fed from enemy resources, for example, "to make our enemy become our rear-service department,"¹¹⁵ or China's traditional "feeding on the enemy" strategy which pursued "capture enemies' provisions

¹¹² Ibid. p. 474.

¹¹³ Yunzi David, *India's View of the Sino-India War*, 2002, p. 18.

¹¹⁴ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 141.

¹¹⁵ Li Xinshi, *China's Economic War in the Occupied Areas*, The History of Chinese Communist Party, 2nd Issue, 2011.

to release our army from the transportation.”¹¹⁶ (2) The performance of the Chinese army in specific battles proved that the Chinese command did not make the capture of military provisions a part of its military plan. “In the first stage of the war, the Namkachu battle ended with China’s occupation of Chang Du, Lin Zhi, and Shan Nan where India’s effective troops were destroyed but all of its provisions left aside. At 7:00 pm on October 20th, when Sexionglanggou was captured, no military provisions but weapons and 492 captives were transported back.”¹¹⁷ From these details, we can see that the prime target of the Chinese army was to eliminate India’s effective human strength but not its provisions.

(3) Beijing prepared a huge amount of provisions for the Chinese army fighting at the frontlines. “At the end of 1959, 4000 tons of provisions were transported from Xinjiang Province and 18,000 tons of local military provisions were issued to the combat troops.”¹¹⁸ During the war, “only 18,000 Chinese soldiers were fighting. On the west line, only 6000 soldiers were employed in 1959, and the actual combat troops on the battlefield were about 10,000.”¹¹⁹ Those 22,000 tons of provisions would be excessive for an army of 10000 soldiers who planned to feed on the provisions of the enemy. Military provisions didn’t conform to the principle “the more, the better”. If the provisions were much greater than what was needed, they could become burdensome to the mobile troops. Also, the Chinese command need not expend resources by sending an army to protect provisions not destined for the frontlines. Thus, that large amount of military provisions prepared in 1959 could represent evidence that a “feeding on the enemy” strategy was not employed

¹¹⁶ *Wei Shu.YanfengZhuan.*

¹¹⁷ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 165.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 146.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 143.

and that those provisions were provided for long-time use.

3. China's decision makers would make every effort to end the war as soon as possible.

This expectation was borne out. The time devoted to the Sino-India war could never be too short from China's perspective. On one hand, the relationship between the Soviet Union and China had become so tense after 1960 that China needed time to prepare for a possible war with that super power (as Sun Tzu said, "the other chieftains might take advantage of your extremity"¹²⁰); otherwise, China might become like Germany who fought in two lines in World War I; on the other hand, with a decrease in population and economic strength during the 1959-1961 famine, a long-lasting war might make China become like the Russian Empire in World War I that was turned out by a despairing people.

Thus, Zhou Enlai's clear announcement was that the goal of Beijing was to "punish India's aggressiveness and create conditions for possible future negotiations."¹²¹ In fact, before the war, Marshal Liu Bocheng had announced the overall strategy that "a quick victory was the best choice for China."¹²² Considering the threat from the Soviet Union, China not only wanted to urgently deal with economic preparation but also with the psychological pressure on members of their society who might become rebellious in an extreme situation. As a result, when the Indian army was badly defeated, China's strategic goal was achieved and Beijing chose to end the war voluntarily. The

¹²⁰ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 7.

¹²¹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 473.

¹²² Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 141.

entire war lasted for no more than one month.

Chapter Three: Attack by Stratagem

In Chapter Three, Attack by Stratagem, Sun Tzu said: “In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entirely than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment, or an entire company than to destroy them. Hence, to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence lies in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

The rule is not to besiege walled cities if this can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war will take up three whole months, and the piling up of mounds against the walls will take another three months. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men into the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men will be slain while the town remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the enemy Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

It is the rule in war, that if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army in two. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by a larger force. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:--(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, or being ignorant of existing conditions in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. When the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know

yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”¹²³

This chapter puts an emphasis on one principle followed by a tactical consideration and a strategic reminder.

First, Sun Tzu pursued victory and governed the occupied areas with a non-destructive strategy rather than by employing destruction or killings. He made the two statements “to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting”¹²⁴ for two reasons: (1) the general had to consider the reparations after the war as well as increasing internal burdens. As we have analyzed in the former section, destructive fighting would be expensive and futile for the national economy. The more destruction our army caused, the longer the war might last. The more money and lives spent on the war, the more unsatisfied our people would feel about their lives. The heavier the destruction, the less likely we can achieve fruitful reparations. (2) The general must consider public opinion within the occupied areas. Having experienced heavy destruction, the nationalism of the people in an enemy country would be greatly elevated. The parents and friends of those killed and injured would fight against us to the bitter end. The huge difficulty of governing and organizing the occupied country could be foreseen, and would definitely increase the burdens and casualties of our army. The tough enemy resistance and required increase in military budget were contrary to the goals of the war. “In World War II, the Japanese army had paid a high price in mainland China mainly because of

¹²³ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 11-13.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* p. 11.

brutally destructive activities like that of the Nanking Massacre and destruction of the houses of unarmed people. Even common people without weapons fought to the death with Japanese soldiers because their lands were burned and their family members killed by the Japanese army.”¹²⁵ A similar case could be found in the US’s conquest of Iraq in 2003. Using missiles and heavy weapons to destroy numerous buildings and farming lands of the common Iraqi people caused them to resist the American army with hatred. The burdens of military budget and increasing casualties forced president Obama to finally withdraw the army. From these two cases we can see that, once a first impression of brutality is given to the people in occupied areas, ensuing policies are likely to be ineffective in winning back public support. On the contrary, Britain sustained its reign in India for more than 400 years, partly because of their “least destruction” strategy and humane policies both during and after war. In fact, only two big uprisings against the British army happened during four centuries in India, and even Indians themselves provided assistance to the British army in fighting the Japanese army in Southeast Asia.

From Sun Tzu’s perspective, developing strategies to achieve victory without fighting was best; a diplomatic approach was the next best choice; using the army was not to be preferred, and destruction was the worst result of all.

Second, Sun Tzu introduced various strategies to deal with different levels of military forces of both sides. Based on the principle that “the fewer casualties, the better”, Sun Tzu pointed out that we could surround an enemy with one-tenth of our force, attack an enemy with one-fifth of our force, divide an enemy with half our force, and avoid or

¹²⁵ Ma Zhendu, Xing Xuan, *The Research on the Resistance of Chinese People in Nanking Massacre, The First Fifty Years of 20th Century*, April 28th, 2009, p. 8.

flee from an enemy that had greater forces than our own. If fighting is inevitable, the process should be implemented artistically: when surrounded, the enemy with one-tenth our strength is most likely to surrender with no casualties. Being attacked, the enemy with one-fifth our strength is most likely to abandon resistance when they find they will continue to lose if fighting continues. This option results in the fewest casualties (they are not as frightened as the enemy only one-tenth in size); being separated, an enemy half our size might be divided into smaller units one-tenth or perhaps one-fifth our size. If we insist on fighting with less or even equal strength has that of the enemy, we may suffer many casualties. The suitable strategies for these various levels of military forces on both sides can guide commanders in using their soldiers wisely and suffer fewer casualties on both sides.

The logic chain here is clear. From the perspective of realism, the goal of war (economic strength and political power) should not be forgotten at each step of the process of making war policy, and rational choices are more important than battle achievements. If we kill too many people in battle, whether soldiers or common people of the enemy country, we are likely to meet strong resistance that will require more money and lives of our countrymen. In such as case we fall into the dilemma described in Chapter Two: internal conflicts are intensified, other countries may take advantage of our extremity, and we stray far from the war's goals. Consideration of the size of armies on both sides confirms that Sun Tzu approved the value of long-term planning focused on the war's final goals.

Third, Sun Tzu clearly described the three kinds of ignorance leading to defeat

and five essentials leading to optimum victory. Following a statement regarding the benefits of less destruction and killing, Sun Tzu emphasized two guarantees for a victory that “takes the enemy’s country whole and intact”. One guarantee was to make sure that soldiers trust the commander so that his orders would be unconditionally obeyed. The commander must therefore avoid the three kinds of ignorance leading to defeat to make himself like the sun or father of the entire army. When commanding the army either to advance or retreat, he should know whether the order is consistent with morality, laws, terrain, or weather. When governing the army, he should be aware of existing conditions in an army. When employing officers, they should be familiar with the principles and the circumstances that might require them to adapt. If the commander was ignorant of these teachings, the soldiers’ distrust of the commander might result in destruction or killing innocent people both during and after the war.

The other guarantee was to insist that the commander evaluate the possible success of his war plans. Sun Tzu told commanders that the “best victory” (the one without fighting or as little destruction and killing as possible) could be achieved by designing strategies based on the following five essentials: to know when and when not to fight; to know how to handle different army sizes; to animate the same spirit throughout the entire army; to prepare to attack an unprepared enemy, and to be free from central government interference. With these five rules, a commander could evaluate whether to conduct war and how to implement a war with strategies ensuring a non-destructive victory.

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent

analysis suggests that it would have been characterized by the following behavior. In fact, both Chapter Two and Chapter Three of *The Art of War* revealed the same truth, that a commander of an army should pursue a victory representing the least cost and the most benefits. First of all, a war of long duration should be avoided. Then, strategies like “feeding on the enemy”, “winning a quick victory”, “non-destructive policy”, and “dealing with different rates of forces of both sides wisely” would be effective.

1. The Chinese commander would enact strict discipline, forbidding unnecessary destruction, killing, and other inhumane behavior.

This expectation was borne out. “To keep the stability of Tibet area, special ethnic policies were made after the 1959 rebellion was extinguished. All military in the war was transferred from other provinces to avoid the dissatisfaction of the Tibetans.”¹²⁶ Also, military discipline was strictly observed by the army, ensuring the enactment of a “forbearing and conciliatory policy.”¹²⁷ “The discipline was embodied in *Three Main Rules* (you should obey your officer unconditionally, you should take nothing from common people, you should submit all your captures) and *Eight Points for Attention* (you should have a pleasant attitude when speaking with others, you should trade things fairly with native people, you should return what you borrow from native people, you should pay for what you damage, you should not beat unarmed people or use dirty words when you talk with them, you should not destroy private farming lands, you should not tease women, you should not mistreat captives) that had been pursued by

¹²⁶ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 146.

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 310.

the PLA since 1947.”¹²⁸

2. The Chinese army would plan to divide the Indian army into small units and concentrate its forces so as to fight each battle with superior numbers.

This expectation was borne out. “By distributing forces along the terrain and attracting the Indian army into narrow valleys, the Chinese army maintained superiority of forces three to four times that of the Indian army in each battle.”¹²⁹ “Tactics such as *ambushing the enemy at the entrance of main highway, surrounding the enemy at night when they are sleeping, and enticing the enemy by escaping to different directions* were widely used.”¹³⁰ Moreover, in the report made by Commander Zhang Guohua after the war, he pointed out that “our army was skilled in dissecting the enemy into many small groups, especially at the beginning of the war. Indian forces could not concentrate on one direction, and each group of the Indian army was prevented from cooperating with other units. When both flanks of the Indian army were broken into, they would lose hope and surrender. That happened in the battles of Hongtuo Mountain, Xilipucha, 4400 highland, and India’s 89th stronghold. This made their casualties less than what they might be if they choose to resist.”¹³¹

Chapter Four: Tactical Dispositions

In Chapter Four, Tactical Dispositions, Sun Tzu said: “The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity

¹²⁸ Liu Hualiang, *Writing Without Rhetoric*, November 11, 2011.

¹²⁹ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 306.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 307.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* p. 308.

of defeating the enemy. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. Staying on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have the ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position that makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. The consummate leader

cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.

With respect to military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.”¹³²

This chapter described the relationship between defense and offense, and the relationship between a reputation for winning a war and the actual effects of winning a war. Five methods for creating military tactics were also introduced.

First, Sun Tzu argued that defense must precede offense. The reason why a good commander should lay defensive plans before making offensive ones was self-evident for Sun Tzu. He took sayings such as “the best defense is to attack” as both irresponsible and risky, and claimed that “to secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy was provided by the enemy himself.”¹³³ Thus, from Sun Tzu’s perspective, the first goal in battle was to “secure ourselves against defeat,” not to defeat the enemy, because whether the enemy could be defeated was beyond our control and we could only begin making arrangements on what we are able to do.

¹³² Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 15-16.

¹³³ *Ibid.* p. 15.

However, this was not a cowardly principle, because “making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.”¹³⁴ In other words, Sun Tzu’s foothold for making tactics consists of three steps: (1) we should defend ourselves cautiously without leaving the enemy any opportunity to defeat us; (2) we must wait for the enemy to make tactical mistakes; (3) we should seize opportunities provided by the enemy’s tactical mistakes to defeat him. To defeat the enemy, we must assure that we cannot be defeated before any tactics are used. No responsible commander will risk his soldiers’ lives attacking well-defended enemy forts. That would bring too many unpredictable possibilities into the war and unnecessarily expend military resources, contrary to the principles discussed in Chapters Two and Three. In addition, defensive plans are more accessible and easier to make than offensive plans. When considering how to secure themselves, even the most foolish people will have some capability because it is instinctive for animals to protect themselves. However, “one may know how to conquer without being able to do it.” Professor Wu Jiulong indicates that “Sun Tzu believed offensive plans were not easy to implement successfully unless the enemy made mistakes that exposed his shortcomings.”¹³⁵

Second, Sun Tzu appreciated the general who pursued the meaningful goal of winning an easy war but not the reputation for winning tough battles. In contrast to the common view that a great commander should possess numerous medals on his chest and enjoy the greatest fame in his country, Sun Tzu thought the best commander had “neither

¹³⁴ Ibid. p. 16.

¹³⁵ Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 54.

reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage”¹³⁶ and would encourage his officers to fight a war with the most rational calculation on which their loyalty and their art rests.

From Sun Tzu’s perspective, the commander who was a student of *The Art of War* should not and could not gain a big name either during or after a war. (1) A good commander should not make himself famous, because lack of fame might make it easier for him to deceive an unprepared enemy. If a commander was so famous that he drew much attention by enemy intelligence, both his defensive and offensive efforts might be more easily detected. Also, arrogance arising from a commander’s fame could make it much easier for him to make mistakes. This conflicted with Sun Tzu’s approach to developing tactics as described above. (2) A good commander was not likely to be famous. Based on the analysis in the first three chapters, we could observe that a commander who persisted in the teaching of Sun Tzu would make the war short, minimize the number of destructions and casualties, and strive to win the easy battles through capitalizing on the enemy’s mistakes. Although short, non-destructive, and easy victories had beneficial effects with respect to various different aspects of our country’s welfare, those types of victories tended to be not exciting, astonishing or stimulating for either common people or military personnel. As a result, a good commander’s reputation could be unenhanced even though he had achieved meaningful benefits for a country.

By using these three steps in making tactics (defense-wait-offense), all victories should be easy ones for a well-trained commander, because he was only inclined to attack at a moment when the enemy provided him opportunity. At other times, the only job for

¹³⁶ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 16.

that commander was to defend without showing his missteps to the enemy. As Sun Tzu claimed, “In war, the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.”¹³⁷

Third, Sun Tzu combined different military methods in developing tactics. An important and reasonable question may be asked at this point: because all warfare is based on deception, how can we distinguish between the mistakes our enemy makes and deception our enemy may create to entice us?

Sun Tzu answered this question by proposing a routed five-step system in which each step is interconnected with the others. The system consisted of *measurement, estimation of quantity, calculation, balancing of chances, and victory*. Logically, a commander should be able to stand at an enemy’s position and judge the reliability of the enemy’s tactical mistakes with respect to various aspects by measuring the reasonableness of the enemy’s mistakes (whether the motivations of the enemy making the mistakes were consistent with the enemy’s goals), estimating the size of the enemy’s army (whether it was rational to arrange the army in a particular way on a battlefield), calculating the five essentials (from the enemy’s standpoint, whether the behaviors were good for enemy morale, times, terrain, commander’s personality, and previously-applied methods), balancing risks (whether the enemy was prepared to create risks for his victory), and considering the meaning of victory (even if the enemy’s behavior was not beneficial for this particular battle, did it serve his strategic goals?) If it could be found that the enemy’s mistakes were based on rationality, those mistakes or opportunities should be taken

¹³⁷ Ibid. p. 16.

advantage of. Otherwise, they might be traps. For example, if the capital of an enemy country was attacked, the enemy in front of the battlefield might rapidly turn back to save their capital, leaving clefts in their defense and thereby reduce enemy morale. That kind of mistake (at the tactical level but not the strategic level) was probably reliable because the enemy behavior and emotional reaction were normal and he had no alternative but to provide us with opportunities.

If the enemy's behaviors were neither beneficial nor necessary from his point of view, we should be prudent and take actions based on the assumption that our enemy might be pretending weakness, outrage, or confusion to entice us with such "baits". For example, if the enemy's army retreated without experiencing any natural disasters or attacks from other directions, we could be ambushed if we were impatient and excitedly chased them. To some degree, familiarity with the enemy's commander is irrelevant with respect to these five steps because we must assume a rational enemy to avoid underestimating him. Professor Liu Ling points out that "this system is used to penetrate the enemy's true attempts, especially when the enemy's commander is also familiar with *The Art of War*."¹³⁸

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

- 1. The Chinese army would make its defensive lines in both east and west battlefields impermeable before launching an attack.**

This expectation was not borne out. At the beginning of the war, the Chinese army

¹³⁸Liu Ling, Wu Xubin, *The Practical Comments on Sun Tzu's Art of War*, China's International Broadcasting Press, 1995, p. 289.

was in the state of blitzkrieg and not interested in establishing a “Maginot line” in Tibet. The Indian army was astonished by the speedy attack of the Chinese army when their posts were suddenly abandoned. According to the Indian government’s disclosed report of the 1962 war, at the beginning of the war, India erroneously judged China’s tactics. In fact, Indian intelligence had the same expectation that “the Chinese army would strengthen its defensive lines before launching an attack.” However, “the Chinese were steadily pushing forward their posts, occupying more and more empty areas. The basic assumption behind the *Forward Policy* was the belief, especially of the Intelligence Bureau, that the Chinese were not likely to use force against any of our posts.” “Instead of going back to defense when they encountered an Indian post, the Chinese started surrounding the post to cut off its land route of supply and even open fires at a number of places.”¹³⁹

2. The Indian army’s tactical mistakes were likely to present good opportunities for Chinese army attacks in terms of five essentials (morale, time, terrain, human resources, and methods). In the absence of such mistakes, the Chinese army would continue strengthening its defensive lines without making offensive plans.

Half of this expectation was borne out. We find that the Chinese army only launched the attack when the Indian army made mistakes related to the five essentials of the war. However, because the Indian commander continued making mistakes and giving the Chinese army opportunities to attack, we could not find what the Chinese army would do when no such opportunities existed.

In such a short war, the Indian commander repeatedly made three types of tactical

¹³⁹ P. B. Sinha, A. A. Athale, *History of the Conflict with China, 1962*, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 19-20.

mistakes with respect to Sun Tzu's five essentials (morale, times, terrain, human and methods) given in Chapter One, and these mistakes were capitalized on by the Chinese army. First, incapable Indian officers were sent to the frontlines. The Indian government conceded that "the humiliating debacle on the Sela-Dirang-Bomdila front was caused entirely by the failure of the military commanders in the spots. Maj Gen A. S. Pathania and Lt Gen B. M. Kaul shared the maximum blame. But Gen Thaper and Lt Gen Sen were guilty of their irresponsibility, by refusing to issue orders to Pathania when Kaul was not available at the corps HQ."¹⁴⁰ Second, the Indian commander chose the wrong places to defend. The Indian government expressed regret by stating "nobody seemed to consider locating 48 B de at Thembang (with the troops positioned in depth along the the Poshingla track) instead of Bomdila. If feasible, this would have kept the enemy far away from Bomdila or the vital road to Dirang and Sela."¹⁴¹ Third, the morale of the Indian army was negatively affected by social media because of the disclosure of information that should have been kept secret. "It is the result at the tactical level which catches public attention and makes the headlines-the battle is always the pay-off."¹⁴² Those three tactical mistakes negatively influenced the Indian army during the entire war.

3. Commander Zhang Guohua, the Chinese army commander, would not seek to achieve fame for his victory in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

This expectation was borne out. The reasons why a short, non-destructive, and easy victory was beneficial for China need not be repeated here. It is, however, necessary to test whether commander Zhang Guohua became well-known for victory in the 1962

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 19.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

Sino-Indian War even though he had earlier become famous for his military capability displayed in the Sino-Japan War from 1937-1945.

If a commander who gained a great reputation by winning a long, destructive, and difficult war (not good in Sun Tzu's eyes) such as the Sino-Japan War in World War II was not known for his victory of a short, non-destructive, and easy victory, Sun Tzu's theory as to what constitutes a good commander would be further upheld. The author did a survey, using a sample of thirty randomly-chosen students in the School of International Relations of the University of International Business and Economy (Beijing), on January 16th 2014. The survey contained only one question: "who was the commander of the Chinese army in the 1962 Sino-Indian War?" Unexpectedly, not one of those Beijing students whose major was international politics knew the answer. General Zhang Guohua, who won a beneficial war for his country, received "neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage"¹⁴³ as Sun Tzu had stated.

Chapter Five: Energy

In Chapter Five, Energy, Sun Tzu said: "The control of a large force obeys the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is affected by maneuvers direct and indirect. That the impact of your army

¹⁴³ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 16.

may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, as unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle-you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible at his onset, and prompt in his decision. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates

strength. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something that the enemy may snatch at it. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.”¹⁴⁴

This chapter was the elaboration of one of the five essentials in Chapter One, i.e., methodology. Sun Tzu advocated the use of combinations of direct and indirect methods in designing tactics or strategies. He also listed two fundamental methods of creating necessary energy for the army to execute its tasks.

First, Sun Tzu identified the art of war as the talent of combining direct and indirect methods in a correct way. The direct method referred to easily-foreseen

¹⁴⁴ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 17-19.

battlefield tactics or strategies and covered the most common methods people could learn through experience and intuition. Most often, the direct method was simply to fight back or attack from the right frontage. The indirect method could be described as embodying unexpected approaches to achieving tactical or strategic goals. Indirect methods tended to be more confusing and deceptive, and the most successful tactics and strategies in military history had almost always been of the indirect type. For example, when the German army attacked Moscow in World War II, the direct method was to defend the walled-city, concentrate local troops in the capital, and fight with the invaders to protect the dignity of sovereignty. This method could be foreseen because the first reaction of a country would usually be to fight back against the enemy when the capital, the symbol of a united country and its economic and political center, was threatened. However, the Russians used an indirect approach to defeat the Third Reich. The capital of the Soviet Union was abandoned and the Russian army retreated to East Siberia. This unexpected strategy worked. German soldiers were defeated by the cruel winter in Russia and the goal of destroying the effective strength of the Third Reich was achieved. Incidentally, this strategy was also consistent with Sun Tzu's teaching that defense must go before offense. Sun Tzu believed that "in all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory."¹⁴⁵

The combination of the two kinds of methods actually constitutes the art of war. First of all, both the direct method and the indirect method were indispensable. Without the unromantic direct method, most tactics could not be implemented, because routine

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 17.

collisions between soldiers and weapons were unavoidable in achieving strategic goals. The boring confrontations in battles were the principal mainstreams of a war. However, use of the indirect method was the essence of a commander's art of war. Without unexpected tactics or strategies, the outcome of a war was mostly a failure by both sides due to the heavy burdens on the national economy and increasing public dissatisfaction, unless the disparity in national force of the two sides was so large that the stronger side only needed to move forward without using strategic niceties to destroy the enemy.

In addition, the combination of the two methods was infinite. As Sun Tzu's metaphor indicated, five musical notes (in ancient China, only five notes, gong, shang, jue, zhi, yu, were used) were enough to create endless music, and five primary colors were sufficient to constitute inexhaustible hues. From this perspective, on one hand, creating military tactics and strategies was similar to composing music or drawing pictures, both of which depended on hard work and talent; on the other hand, superior tactics and strategies were analogous to fantastic music and pictures that must contain both fundamental factors and appealing parts. Professor Chen Lin states that "the direct method is the most commonly seen tactics and strategies in various situations, while the indirect method is a sort of creativity which is beyond the limit of the routine consideration of the basic understanding of human nature and military theories. Thousands of artworks of war which are made of direct and indirect methods could be created and used."¹⁴⁶ A combination of direct and indirect methods was the basis for the emergence of an army's energy, as we will discuss below.

¹⁴⁶ Chen Lin, *Deep Strategic Thinking-The Implications of Sun Tzu's Art of War*, Times and Art Press, 1996, p. 167.

Second, Sun Tzu pointed out that the sufficient energy of an army results from prompt decisions and successful deception. Sun Tzu emphasized a soldier's psychological nature in battle by focusing on two issues that help keep sufficient energy for our soldiers.

To conserve soldiers' energy, decisions made by commander must be prompt with respect to changing battle situations. If the orders of the commander could not remain current with respect to battleground changes, opportunities could be missed; if the commander was too reluctant to make timely decisions, morale might decrease through the impatience of unknowledgeable and nervous soldiers; also, if the commander was not capable of finding suitable measures within a short time period with respect to variable situations in terms of loyalty, time, and number of soldiers, new situations might emerge, and a heavier workload of calculations and adjustments would result with respect to subsequent battle ground situations. Under such conditions, soldiers could be dominated by negative emotions such as being pitiful, terrified, panicked, and tired because of the lack of energy and direction for continuing to fight. The metaphor of Sun Tzu was vivid: "energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger."¹⁴⁷ In a similar way, if the bending of a crossbow was maintained for too long a time without release, the finger holding the bowstring would experience much pain.

Moreover, soldiers would also feel energetic when the enemy was deceived by their deceptive movements. To create a commander's deception, soldiers were required to pretend to be weak, disordered, or scared, although they were actually none of these. By engaging in such deceptive movements, soldiers could gain a sense of achievement,

¹⁴⁷ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p.18.

especially when such deception was effective and the enemy became panicked and chaotic at the last second. That sense of achievement could be another source of energy for the army. As Sun Tzu said, “simulated disorder postulated perfect discipline, simulated fear postulated courage and simulated weakness postulated strength.”¹⁴⁸ Then, the combined energy of the whole army, not of individuals, could be used as logs or stones to perfectly fit the environment. Professor Wu Jiulong also agrees that “the highest level of the energy of the whole army comes from the resolution of commander and the flexible application of cheating skills.”¹⁴⁹

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

1. China would combine both direct and indirect methods in developing strategies.

This expectation was borne out. First, with respect to diplomacy, the Chinese government lodged a direct protest to India’s “Forward Policy” on China’s standing of justice while pursuing International support in an indirect way in its application of real politics. “The Chinese officials made a vain attempt to dismiss a vast wealth of evidence on the ground that it came from British resources and merely represented the ambitions of British Imperialism. In fact, the Chinese side themselves tried to seek support for their stand from both official and non-official British records.”¹⁵⁰

Second, in military arrangements, the Chinese commander tended to implement direct fights in battle confrontation with the Indian army while using an indirect method

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 18.

¹⁴⁹ Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 80.

¹⁵⁰ P. B. Sinha, A. A. Athale, *History of the Conflict with China, 1962*, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 59.

to launch the coup de grace. The emphasis on the capability of Chinese soldiers in direct confrontation could be found in Marshal Liu Bocheng's understanding of the relationship between tactic-making and direct confrontation. On October 8th, 1962, He warned the military personnel in Tibet that "some officers might believe that victory comes after tactics such as *dividing and encircling the small units of enemies* and *breaking through the middle of the enemy's formation*. That understanding was incorrect, because those tactics represented flexible patterns which could only create conditions for the victory. Tactical success was not victory itself. The correct understanding of victory should focus on the death, damage, and enemy captives. Even if we had surrounded the enemy, the preparation for having a tough fight was still necessary."¹⁵¹ From the performance of the PLA during the war, we found that Marshal Liu's description of the war was carried out. Both direct and indirect methods functioned effectively. At the strategic level, the Chinese army exceeded India's expectations. "The basic assumption of this *Forward Policy* was the belief, especially of the intelligence bureau, that the Chinese were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in the position to do so."¹⁵² However, "instead of going back when they encountered an Indian post, the Chinese started surrounding the post to cut off its land route of supply, and even opened at a number of places."¹⁵³ At the tactical level, the Indian army was overcome by the Chinese army during the entire war. Almost every movement of the Chinese army was beyond Indian intelligence's expectation. For example, as we introduced in background information, in

¹⁵¹ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 141.

¹⁵² P. B. Sinha, A. A. Athale, *History of the Conflict with China, 1962*, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 20.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

the first phase of the war, “the main Chinese force was marching on a circuitous path via Zhangduo while some small units continued to create false impression for the Indian army so that its attention was diverted. When the Chinese 154th Regiment suddenly appeared in Longpu, the vacuous rear area of Indian had few soldiers available to fight. The Brigade Commander of the Indian 7th Brigade, P. Dalvi, decided to surrender on October 22nd, 1962.”¹⁵⁴

2. China would both make prompt decisions and use deception to keep soldiers energetic.

This expectation was borne out. First, China reacted quickly to India’s actions and made active decisions promptly. “China’s leaders decided for war with India in 1962” in “a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet” and “a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border.”¹⁵⁵ From the end of 1960 when Nehru turned up the “Forward Policy” up to October 20th, 1962, when Chinese army launched the attack, the decisions and plans by Chinese leaders kept being issued to the frontline, which armed the soldiers with a feeling of tension. “The unremitting political mobilization imbued the the soldiers with the patriotic sayings such as *our heads could be cut off while our body would keep on heading, our country raised us for one thousand days to use us in one day* and *your home would be destroyed without your protection*, which instigated the army being energetic.”¹⁵⁶ Moreover, “the military training lasted to

¹⁵⁴ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 170.

¹⁵⁵ John W. Garver, *China’s Decision for War with India in 1962*, p. 2.

¹⁵⁶ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 143.

the final day before the war” and “the transportation of military provisions and the construction of basic facilities were all participated by the combat militia.”¹⁵⁷ All those prompt and compact decisions within one year made adapted soldiers to the wartime life very quickly and the surge energy of the army was aroused.

Second, principles of successful deception were learned by common soldiers and made them psychologically energetic. Although Chinese military officers were not allowed to leak military plans and strategies to the soldiers before each battle, the deceptive strategies, except for their classified parts, were always reported to the common soldiers after each victory, adding to their enjoyment through a sense of achievement and making them trust the decision makers more and more in the ensuing battles. That reporting system was an important aspect in enhancing the army’s energy. After each battle, the reporters would generally report three things: the deceptive strategies used in the last battle, the numbers of captives and captured weapons obtained from the last battle, and names of the heroes who died in the last battle. For example, after the Longka battle in the first phase of the war, “soldiers of the Chinese 155th Regiment were all told of the strategy of *making a feint to somewhere and attack in another place* in the battle, the fact that 112 Indian soldiers, 81 hand-mortars, 9 machine guns were captured, and the stories of the heroes, Yang Yanan, Xu Ruiqing and Liu Hanbin, who died in the battle.”¹⁵⁸ Pride in their commander and sadness for their lost comrades-in-arms were two powerful incentives for the soldiers both in keeping them energetic and unafraid of death. “That kind of report was also made after the Shaze battle, the Dawang battle, and the Xishankou

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 146.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 161.

battle.”¹⁵⁹ “After the 1962 Sino-India War, Commander Zhang Guohua also made a report to the entire army, describing the strategies used in the different battles, the list of captives, and the glorious exploits of heroes in the war.”¹⁶⁰

Chapter Six: Weak Points and Strong

In Chapter Six, *Weak Points and Strong*, Sun Tzu said: “Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. By holding out advantages to him, we can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. If the enemy is taking his ease, we can harass him; if well supplied with food, we can starve him out; if quietly encamped, we can force him to move.

Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not there. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended. You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that are impregnable. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 162, 172, 224.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 303-318.

Divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he is sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment were merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical

strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred Li apart, and even the nearest are separated by several Li! Although the soldiers of Yue State exceed Wu State in number, they shall advantage it nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. Though the enemy is stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme him, to discover his plans and the likelihood of his success. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics — that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory. But let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. Military tactics are like water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. Water

shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe that he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He, who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. The five elements are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.”¹⁶¹

In this chapter, Sun Tzu focused on methods for making both the defense and attack of our army more effective, by taking advantage of the enemy’s weak points and strengthening our strong points.

First, Sun Tzu argued that a state’s overall strategy must be active while its specific tactics must be reactive. Considering war as a game of deception, Sun Tzu split the overall strategy and tactics in battles. To “impose our will on the enemy but not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on us,”¹⁶² a state must state clear national goals and make feasible plans to achieve them. The overall strategy should never be interrupted or easily influenced by other states’ wills. However, from sayings such as “if the enemy is taking his ease, we can harass him; if well supplied with food, we can starve him out; if quietly encamped, we can force him to move,”¹⁶³ we see that Sun Tzu’s tactics were aimed at the various behaviors and situations of the enemy. The tactical plans of Sun Tzu were designed to convert enemy strengths into weaknesses or to cause enemy activity to be chaotic by forcing him to change his original plans. Professor Wu Jiulong concluded that

¹⁶¹ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 21-24.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* p. 21.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* p. 21.

“to harass the enemy’s camps, perturb the enemy’s plans, and direct the enemy’s actions, we should set our tactics based on the enemy’s situations but not by our own wishful thinking. However, that does not mean we will follow the enemy’s nose. All the reactive tactics should serve for our clear macro goals.”¹⁶⁴ Professor Chen Lin also points out that “the big strategies should be made in the office while the micro tactics should be made in the field.”¹⁶⁵

Second, Sun Tzu identified methods that made both our offense and our defense absolutely effective. From Sun Tzu’s perspective, “you can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended. You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that are impregnable.”¹⁶⁶ However, a reasonable question arises: were the places that were undefended or impregnable necessarily significant? The enemy might leave some places undefended because they were not essential. Impregnable points with terrain ideal for defense might not be tactically important for us to defend. In other words, when undefended places and impregnable positions were also significant as battle sites for us to attack or defend, our offense and defense based on Sun Tzu’s teachings only then could be effective and meaningful. Perhaps the more significant places were defended by the enemy, or the impregnable positions were not important to us; however, we had methods to mobilize and deceive the enemy. From Chapter One, we knew “when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out

¹⁶⁴ Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 86.

¹⁶⁵ Chen Lin, *Deep Strategic Thinking-The Implications of Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, Times and Art Press, 1996, p. 243.

¹⁶⁶ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 21.

bait to entice the enemy. Feign disorder and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is of superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temperament, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak and he may become arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.”¹⁶⁷ From that chapter, we also knew that “if the enemy is taking his ease, we can harass him; if well-supplied with food, we can starve him out; if quietly encamped, and we can force him to move.”¹⁶⁸ In addition to these clarified instructions, we can comprehend endless implications from other chapters. For example, as we have previously analyzed, Chapter Three emphasized the significance of military provisions. On the condition that the enemy lacked food, we might leave provisions in other places to entice the enemy to capture our provisions, and such enemy activity could leave significant places undefended. Also, we could send out false information that some easily-defended places were important for us because our provisions were stored there. The enemy might then be exhausted by attacking those geographically-impregnable positions, and our really significant positions would be secure.

In summary, through both above-board instructions and indirect implications, we could ensure that our attack was successful because the places we were to attack were undefended, while our defense would be invulnerable because the enemy would attack our impregnable positions.

Third, to ensure the feasibility of the tactics, Sun Tzu accentuated maintaining the confidentiality of military plans before they have been successfully implemented. At the

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 5.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 21.

tactical level, the process of making our offense and defense effective consisted of three steps: the first was to establish the tactical goals; the second was to make deceptive plans to immobilize the enemy; the third step was to attack undefended places or to defend impregnable positions. The whole operation might be ruined by the release of even a minor relevant detail about such matters as the number and nature of prepared weapons, routes, time schedules, distances, personal information about our commander, and tactical designs. Sun Tzu suggested that “in making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.”¹⁶⁹

However, “saying nothing” was not enough for Sun Tzu’s standard of confidentiality. His adept instruction was to “say something false.” The best way to conceal our real thinking was to draw the enemy’s attention in the wrong direction and confuse them with contradictory, adulterated, and arbitrary feints. “By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into factions.”¹⁷⁰ Then, various tactical choices followed, because “should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 23.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 22.

adversary to make these preparations against us.”¹⁷¹ As Professor Wu Jiulong concluded, “in Sun Tzu’s mind, both the weak points of the enemy and the strong points of ourselves could be created.”¹⁷²

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

1. China would use active strategies but reactive tactics.

This expectation was not borne out. In both strategies and tactics, the Chinese army was so active in the war that the initiative in battles constantly belonged to China. At the strategic level, the Chinese army started the war immediately after its preparation was accomplished. “Both the east end and the west end of the Sino-Indian border became battlefields after the Chinese army launched the attack to the Indian posts at 7: 30 am on October 20th, 1962.”¹⁷³ It seemed that the Chinese government was reactive to the aggressive “Forward Policy” of the Indian government. However, after 1960 when India’s “Forward Policy” was enacted, the Chinese government had at least one other available traditional strategic choice for solving the territorial dispute: Beijing could improve the Sino-India relationship with the “rally-around-flag” strategy. In fact, that strategy worked in the 1950’s. “After Geneva Conference in 1954, Beijing treated Nehru as a real friend. As the *People’s Daily* said, with the contradictions between the third world countries and the imperialism countries, China and India were fighting with the old colonialism side by

¹⁷¹ Ibid. p. 22.

¹⁷² Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 102.

¹⁷³ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 150.

side.”¹⁷⁴ Although the “Forward Policy” was not enacted at that time, the border dispute was never ameliorated. After Dalai Lam’s rebellion was wiped out in 1959, Nehru even provided political asylum and “a warm welcome to Dalai Lama, which irritated Chinese government.”¹⁷⁵ Thus, the “Forward Policy” might have been an excuse for Beijing to start the war. The last resort seemed to be an active choice but not a reactive action.

At the tactical level, the Chinese army ignored the fighting capability of the Indian army. “Instead of going back to defense when they encounter an India post, the Chinese started surrounding the post to cut off its land rout of supply and even open fires at a number of places.”¹⁷⁶ Also, by examining the deceptions used by the Chinese commander to mobilize the Indian army, we can see the active rather than reactive use of tactics. As we have discussed on the process of the war, in the first phase, the Chinese 115th Regiment mobilized the Indian main force in the direction of Changdu to create clefts in the Indian defensive line, giving the Chinese 154th Regiment a great opportunity for occupying the empty Longpu area. In the second phase, the Chinese army surrounded Hongtuo Mountain to attract and ambush the supporting troops. Those tactics were not at all reactive.

2. The Chinese army would avoid tough fights by attacking undefended Indian positions and increasing the Indian army’s attacking difficulties by defending only easily-secured positions.

This expectation was borne out. First, we can see that many occupied Indian

¹⁷⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 291.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p. 293.

¹⁷⁶ P. B. Sinha, A. A. Athale, *History of the Conflict with China, 1962*, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 19-20.

positions had similar records or reports that they were undefended when the Chinese army turned out. For example, “When the Chinese 154th Regiment suddenly appeared in Longpu, the vacuous rear area of Indian had few soldiers available to fight. The Brigade Commander of the Indian 7th Brigade, P. Dalvi, decided to surrender on October 22nd, 1962.”¹⁷⁷ Also, “those tiny (Indian) outposts had not been hastily pushed up east of the upper Shyok and Chushul. The vacant areas would have been occupied easily by the Chinese, without firing a shot.”¹⁷⁸ Strategically significant positions, such as Longpu, Shyok and Chushul, were at first well defended by the Indian army, but the defensive troops were enticed to go out either by the false weak points of Chinese defense or by the abandoned military provisions.

Second, in mobilizing the Indian army to move out of their original arrangement, the Chinese army successfully created some new and significant battlefield sites under the control of the Chinese army and too difficult to be conquered by the Indians. We could find complaints about these sites in the reports of Indian army. The restricted reports from the frontline said “it is obvious that the logistic problems of Leh (one of the vital hubs of the Chinese defensive line in east section) were enormous (for the Indian army). It was situated at a distance of over 820 km from the nearest railhead, Pathankot. The route from Strinagar to Leh (389 km) was not fully developed, and was subject to vagaries of weather.”¹⁷⁹ Moreover, in Lahul and Spiti, where Chinese weapons were stored, “the slopes of the mountains are characteristically stony and bare. The whole Lahul and Spiti

¹⁷⁷ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 170.

¹⁷⁸ P. B. Sinha, A. A. Athale, *History of the Conflict with China, 1962*, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 20.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 10.

area is a cold desert whose bare and rocks and steep slopes stare the visitor in the face. The highest village of Spiti is Gette, situated at a height of about 4270 meters, one of the highest in the world.”¹⁸⁰

3. China would conceal the true nature of its actual military deployment, including preparation, routes, time schedule, distances, commander identities, and tactics, and spread false information.

This expectation was born out. Using passive concealment (saying nothing) meant that Chinese intelligence did not leak any details about China’s plans or other relevant information. Using proactive concealment (saying something false), China’s commander distracted, enticed, and misled Indian intelligence.

Those two approaches to concealing the true nature of China’s actual military deployment could be observed in two aspects. First, the excellent performance of the Chinese army, as described above, especially its ambidextrous capability to mobilize and entice the enemy, was mostly based on its deceptive skills. The reason why India’s significant positions were undefended was that the Indian troops were deceived and left those positions. The proactive use of deception helped Chinese intelligence conceal its real intentions.

Second, the performance of the Indian army inferred that the Chinese army comprehensively concealed its information. From disclosed reports of Indian intelligence, we could find only information about the geographic features at the frontline. Not even the code designations, much less the military plans of different Chinese troop units, could

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 12.

be found in those reports. One of the reports even conceded that “He (B. N. Mullick, the Intelligence Bureau Chief) wanted to model it (Intelligence Agency of India) after the PLA of China, more egalitarian, flexible, and closer to the people.”¹⁸¹

Chapter Seven Manoeuvring

In Chapter Seven, Manoeuvring, Sun Tzu said: “In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. After that, comes tactical manoeuvring, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical manoeuvring consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way and though starting after he, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation.

Manoeuvring with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. If you set a fully equipped army in marching in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred Li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. The stronger men will be in front; the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only

¹⁸¹ Ibid. p. 22.

one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. If you march fifty Li in order to outmanoeuvre the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only you're your force will reach the goal. If you march thirty Li with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country — its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops must be decided by circumstances. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest. In raiding and plundering be like fire, in immovability like a mountain. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunder bolt. When you plunder countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of manoeuvring. The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags. Gongs and drums, banners, and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point. The host thus forming a single united body, it is

impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy: — this is the art of retaining self-possession. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished— this is the art of husbanding one's strength.

To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array— this is the art of studying circumstances. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard. Such is the art of warfare.”¹⁸²

This chapter introduces Sun Tzu's principles regarding transitions between attack

¹⁸² Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 25-28.

and defense. Distance was considered to be a virtual standard for choosing targets. Then, “seven dos” and “ten don’ts” followed.

First, Sun Tzu criticized ignorance of distance in choosing targets. The risk of losing the baggage-train or provisions and supplies, resulting from a distant attack, worried Sun Tzu so much that he argued “if you set a fully equipped army in marching in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late.”¹⁸³ Furthermore, for many reasons there was always potential risk in attacking a distant target, e.g., because we should not trust our allies when our army was powerless; we might be stuck in an unfamiliar natural environment; or it probably would be difficult to find guides in our enemy’s territory. From Sun Tzu’s metaphors that “let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest. In raiding and plundering be like fire, in immovability like a mountain. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt,”¹⁸⁴ we could identify two implications: (1) It was better strategy to slowly encroach on the enemy’s territory rather than attack deeply at the enemy’s rear, because this ensured a shorter attacking radius to maintain compactness of military supplies and attacking power. 2) The attacks to a nearby target must be smashing and lethal. In summary, Sun Tzu approved focusing on nearby targets and violent attacks.

Second, Sun Tzu developed seventeen principles, including “seven dos” and “ten don’ts”, for shifting between attack and defense. From Sun Tzu’s perspective, “the whole army maybe robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of

¹⁸³ Ibid. p. 25.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 26.

mind.”¹⁸⁵ The estimation and utility of soldiers’ collective psychological state formed another basis for victory. Thus, the general who was proficient in the art of maneuvering would “ponder and deliberate before he makes a move.”¹⁸⁶ The things to be pondered and deliberated could be enumerated as the “seven dos”: (1) avoid the enemy when its spirit is keen; (2) attack the enemy when it is sluggish and inclined to retreat; (3) await the appearance of disorder amongst the enemy with disciplined troops; (4) await the appearance of hubbub amongst the enemy with calm soldiers; (5) go near to targets while the enemy is still far away from them; (6) wait at ease for attacks from a toiling enemy; (7) wait for a famished enemy with well-fed soldiers; and “ten don’ts”: (1) do not intercept the enemy whose formations are compact and ordered; (2) do not attack an enemy drawn up in calm and confident array; (3) do not advance uphill against an enemy; (4) do not oppose an enemy coming downhill; (5) do not pursue an enemy who simulates defeat; (6) do not attack soldiers whose weapons are keen; (7) do not swallow bait offered by the enemy; (8) do not interfere with an enemy eager to return home; (9) when you surround a walled city, leave one side unblocked; (10) do not press a desperate foe too hard. Those seventeen principles also comply with the principles mentioned in former chapters. For example, if we block all sides of the enemy’s walled-city when we surround it, our enemy could be stimulated to resist to the end, increasing casualties on both sides, in opposition to “the least destruction and killing principle” discussed in Chapter Three. However, if we leave one side of a city unblocked, an enemy would most likely concentrate its escape in that direction, making it easier for us to pinpoint and ambush scared and tired soldiers at

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 27.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 27.

that position. When the enemy escapes from the walled city, they will have no shelters or other defenses and become more likely to surrender. Even if an enemy continued to resist, it will be easier for us to wipe them out because they will lose the sense of security derived from the presence of defending walls.

Both professor Liu Ling and Wu Xubin believe that “the current military theorists have underestimated Sun Tzu’s piercing thought that *the whole army maybe robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind*, and overstated the status of weapons and technology.”¹⁸⁷ They valued the principles in Chapter Seven by indicating that “a good general should not only be able to avoid a strong enemy and attack the weak points of it, but also be able to follow the rules of target-choosing, time-choosing, and comparison of both sides. Principles such as *discipline and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy, and to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished* revealed Sun Tzu’s consideration of the influence of the enemy’s psychological state on the outcome of war.”¹⁸⁸

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

1. The Chinese army would not launch attacks toward distant or remote targets.

By Sun Tzu’s standard, the targets should be within thirty Li (1.5 km).

This expectation was not borne out. In the first phase of the war, *The Command of Annihilating the Invasive Indian Army* was issued to the entire Chinese army on October

¹⁸⁷ Liu Ling, Wu Xubin, *The Practical Comments on Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, China’s International Broadcasting Press, 1995, p. 420.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 422-425.

17th, 1962, indicated that all of the tactical targets for Chinese troops could be found further south of the “McMahon Line”. For example, “the Chinese 115th Regiment and 157th Regiment were ordered to occupy Longka and Qiangdeng; the Chinese 154th Regiment was ordered to destroy the Indian army in the Shaze and Keningqiao areas; the two artillery battalions of the Chinese 308th Regiment were directed to support infantries in the Laze and Tala areas; the Chinese 11th Division was sent to the Mama, Boshankou, and Baodingshankou areas to ensure supply. All troops were directed to gather in the Tianwendian and Heweitian areas and destroy the Indian army there.”¹⁸⁹ No targets were as close as 1.5 km from Chinese defensive lines.

In the second phase of the war, *The Scheme of the Fight in Xishankou, Derangzong and Bangdila*, a report similar to the *The Command of Annihilating the Invasive Indian Army*, was issued on October 29th, 1962. The tactical targets settings again did not conform to Sun Tzu’s standard. The report stated, “five companies of the Chinese 136th Regiment, the 306th, 308th, 540th Artillery Regiments as well as the 154th, 155th, 157th, 163rd, 165th Regiments were ordered to launch a long-range raid against the Indian army in the Xishankou, Shengezong, and Lvemadong areas. The Chinese 32nd Regiment and the 33rd Regiment stationed themselves at Tingbu, Buketang, Boxinshan and Dengban to block the supporting Indian troops from Bangdila.”¹⁹⁰ All of the targets were more than 1.5 km from the “McMahon Line”.

2. The Chinese army would follow the “seven dos” and “ten don’ts” in shifting attacks and defenses.

¹⁸⁹ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 148.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 219.

This expectation was also not borne out, although the tactics of the Chinese army did conform to the second and fifth items of the “seven dos”. As discussed earlier, when the vacuous rear of the Indian posts was attacked after the armies embodying them were drawn out through use of Chinese bait, the Indian army units were always ambushed when returning to save their nests, supporting the idea that the Chinese army was inclined to “attack the enemy when it was sluggish and inclined to return.”¹⁹¹ The use of “make a feint in one direction and attack in another” strategy was in agreement with the principle of “go near to the targets while the enemy was still far from them”¹⁹² because the Indian soldiers were enticed to distant places. Thus, when the Chinese army approached empty posts, the Indian army was still far away from them.

However, the other five points of the “seven dos” were not followed. First of all, The Chinese army did not avoid the enemy when the enemy’s spirit was keen. Although in spite of the fact that “Nehru claimed the Indian army had been well trained, armed, and instigated on October 12th, 1962,”¹⁹³ the Chinese side launched a proactive attack against this keen Indian army two days after Nehru’s announcement. Also, the Chinese army did not wait for negative Indian army developments like disorder, hubbub, chaos, or famine. As analyzed in Chapter Six, at the tactical level the Chinese army ignored the fighting capability of the Indian army and the Chinese commander had neither time nor motivation to wait for such changes by the Indian army. In both strategy and tactics, the Chinese army was so active in the war that no reactive strategies or tactics were

¹⁹¹ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 28.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993 p. 137.

employed.

As for the “ten don’ts”, the performance of the Chinese army varied. First, the Chinese army did intercept the enemy when its formations were compact and ordered. As discussed in Chapter One, most battles occurred in mountain valleys, and it was reasonable to presume that the armies of both sides had to be compacted because of the nature of the terrain along the Sino-Indian border. Since the Chinese attacks were subject to this constraint, the first point of the “ten don’ts” could not be followed.

Second, the Chinese army did attack a calm, confident, and well-armed enemy. In fact, Beijing was eager to destroy the most confident Indian troops to psychologically impact the whole Indian army. Marshal Liu Bocheng ordered the frontline troops to “look for the most crack Indian troops which had attended the World War II to fight and to ensure the victory of the first battle.”¹⁹⁴ Thus, the second and sixth points of the “ten don’ts” were not followed.

Third, there were no records found regarding whether the Chinese army “advanced uphill against the enemy or opposed the enemy when it came downhill”. However, I believe it was not feasible for the Chinese army to follow those two principles because mountains and hills were located everywhere along the Sino-Indian border. The shifts between offense and defense would occur too frequently for soldiers to remain active if the Chinese commanders strictly followed these third and fourth points.

Fourth, we have no idea about whether the Chinese army would respond to simulated defeat or swallow bait offered by the enemy because the Indian army never

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 141.

simulated defeat or prepared bait in the form of provisions, weapons, and empty positions to entice the Chinese army during the entire war. The fifth and seventh points were thus not testable.

Fifth, the Chinese army neither interfered with an enemy eager to return home nor pressed a desperate foe too hard. Although “the Chinese command found the Indian army in Tisipuer, Tezu, and Zhuohate which were located outside the actual-control line and were inclining to escape on November 21st, 1962,”¹⁹⁵ no orders of pursuing and attacking were issued. On the contrary, the cease-fire order was given on that same day.

“According to reports from a Chinese spy describing the situation in New Delhi on November 21st, 1962, the army commander of the Indian 4th Army, Kaur, had flown away from the capital. People of New Delhi were crowded into the streets and docks. Government officers could not be found and the prisons in the Police Bureaus were opened. The post offices, banks, and stores were all shut down.”¹⁹⁶ However, the desperate foe was not pressed. The Chinese army did not attack the capital of India. Thus, the eighth and tenth points of the “ten don’ts” were followed.

Sixth, we cannot be sure whether the Chinese army did leave one side unblocked when it surrounded a walled city, but we could find numerous battle records indicating that defeated Indian soldiers escaped from the occupied cities. For example, “the alive Indian soldiers escaped into the woods at 5:50 pm (on November 17th, 1962), and the PLA occupied Dengban City at 6:00 pm.”¹⁹⁷ Also, “70 Indian soldiers escaped to the

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 274.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 222.

southwest, and Maierde was occupied at 6:00 pm (on November 18th, 1962).”¹⁹⁸ Thus, the ninth point of the “ten don’ts” might have been followed.

Chapter Eight Variation in Tactics

In Chapter Eight, Variation in Tactics, Sun Tzu said: “In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army, and concentrates his forces. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position, you must fight. There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must not be attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, and commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. The general who does not understand these may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of varying his plans, even though he is acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

¹⁹⁸Ibid. p. 226.

Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:(1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;(2) Cowardice, which leads to capture;(3) A hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;(4) A delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;(5) Over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.”¹⁹⁹

In this chapter, Sun Tzu introduced a method for evaluating an enemy's situation in response to which various tactics would be developed. He also proposed his insightful understanding regarding the possibility of a war. Finally, a general's potential five dangerous faults were enumerated.

*First, Sun Tzu highly valued the comprehensive projection of the enemy's situation before the war. Under the premise that the general could “receive his commands from the sovereign, collect his army, and concentrate his forces,”*²⁰⁰ Sun Tzu raised five common situations as examples: (1) difficult country, referring to rugged and forested locations; (2) intersecting country, referring to locations exhibiting convenient transportation; (3)

¹⁹⁹ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 29-30.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 29.

isolated country, referring to geographically-closed or distant positions; (4) hemmed-in country, referring to narrow and tortuous places that could be easily defended by a small number of the enemy; (5) desperate country, referring to places from which escape would be hopeless. The detailed introduction of tactics for these situations was described by Sun Tzu in Chapter Eleven of his book in which he emphasized the significance of projection before the war because he hoped generals could distinguish “the roads which must not be followed, armies which must not be attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, and commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.”²⁰¹ Thus, pre-war consideration of both potential advantages and disadvantages was highly valued by Sun Tzu. From his perspective, “If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.”²⁰²

Second, Sun Tzu thoroughly abandoned the hypothesis of rational man (which is highly praised by current political scientists like Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Ney) with respect to issues of war. In contrast to the basic assumption of many liberals that people are usually rational in decision-making, Sun Tzu was preoccupied by the belief that people were hardly rational, especially in making significant decisions. That preoccupation formed the pessimism of Sun Tzu’s war theories that advised commanders to make preparations for worst-case situations regardless of the enemy’s actual choices. He did not care about the most rational choice (based on cost-benefit analysis) by the

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid. p. 30.

enemy, peace treaties with hostile countries, or use of international mediators for disputes. In his view, the army was the country's only actual ally. The "self-help" principle, relying on ideas like balance of power and public opinion, was extended into a more extreme "worst situation" principle. The core question was no longer "will the enemy attack?", but "what could we do if the enemy attacked, even without a reason?" Thus, Sun Tzu claimed "the art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable."²⁰³

Third, Sun Tzu expressed his worries about the quality of commanders by concluding five dangerous faults that might affect a general's performance. The use of Sun Tzu's teachings was bidirectional for both sides in the war. Thus, before we implemented the principles and methods directed toward our enemy, we must prevent ourselves from being taken advantage of by the enemy. Here, a commander should eradicate intrinsic weaknesses from his own personality and temperament before formulating schemes for exploiting the enemy commander's weaknesses. For a good commander, the five dangerous faults described by Sun Tzu served as both a spear and a shield, and could be used both to dissect the enemy's commander's characteristics as well as to warn him about his own.

As Sun Tzu said in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, "the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril,"²⁰⁴ and "the general is the bulwark of the state. If the bulwark is

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 9.

complete, the state will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.”²⁰⁵ From Sun Tzu’s perspective, the five most dangerous faults of a general were “(1) recklessness, which leads to destruction; (2) cowardice, which leads to capture;(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;(4) a delicacy of honor, which is sensitive to shame;(5) over-solicitude for his men.”²⁰⁶ In other words, a qualified general (by Sun Tzu’s standards) should be a man who was cautious, courageous, composed, strict, and without vanity. Through caution, some destructive actions of the army could be avoided; through courage, soldiers would be influenced to fight to the end and to avoid capture; through composure, he would retain command capability even under the pressure of rumors or insults; strictness would support soldiers in remaining organized even under the worst conditions; lack of vanity would restrain him from pursuit of personal honor at a sacrifice of national interests. Professor Wu Jiulong finds that “a general of those five faults was doomed to be defeated at war.”²⁰⁷

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

1. China would evaluate the potential advantages and disadvantages of both sides in the war before it actually began.

This expectation was borne out. We will especially discuss tactic-making with respect to various situations in Chapter Eleven. Here we will only try to determine whether Chinese decision makers had evaluated the circumstances of both sides starting the war in 1962.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. p. 12.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 141.

Beijing's evaluation had three principal aspects. First, India had an advantage with respect to diplomacy. "Although Khrushchev claimed he would never keep neutral if China was involved in a war on October 13th, 1962, he did nothing during the war until December. During the war, India kept using Soviet Union helicopters and conveyors to transport provisions."²⁰⁸ "When Beijing criticized Moscow's policy, the Russians took India's side without hesitation."²⁰⁹ As for the Western World, "on October 29th, the American ambassador promised Nehru that Indian soldiers would receive advanced weapons they needed in the war against China, and Nehru accepted that."²¹⁰ Second, India and China possessed similar military forces on both sides of the border. "Until October 15th 1962, India had one group army, one division, four brigades, and twenty-one battalions along the east section of the entire border with China. Twenty-two thousand military personnel were present. At this same time, eighteen thousand PLA military personnel from two divisions and four regiments were in position on the other side of the border."²¹¹ Third, Chinese soldiers were more politicized. "By reporting the military operations of Indian army and mourning over the casualties in the border conflicts, Beijing successfully stimulated the hatred toward the whole Indian army."²¹²

2. China would be inclined toward solving territorial disputes by preparing for a war and not relying on the possibility that the enemy was a peace lover.

This expectation was borne out. After 1960 when Nehru's "Forward Policy" was

²⁰⁸ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993 p. 137.

²⁰⁹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p.316.

²¹⁰ Ibid, p. 424.

²¹¹ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 137.

²¹² Ibid. p. 142.

advanced, India had become one of the imaginary enemies of China. Contrary to optimistic projections, like “with lower fighting capability, strategic inferiority, and the predictive economic burden, India would not progress across the actual control line if it was rational,” “the Chinese command enacted *The Instructions of Counter-Attack the India’s Invasion* on June 18th, 1962, in which Nehru’s aggressive plans and the true essence of the Forward Policy was revealed to the whole army.”²¹³ Also, that document “required the troops in frontier to prevent the rebellion escaping and to prepare for India’s massive military operations.”²¹⁴ In contrast to the nervousness of the Chinese army, “the Indian intelligence Bureau based their military plans on the assumption that the Chinese were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in the position to do so.”²¹⁵

3. The “Five Dangerous Faults” would be strictly avoided by the Chinese commander.

This expectation was born out. First, the Chinese commander was extremely cautious in launching attacks. Before receiving the final decision from Beijing, “Commander Zhang Guohua followed the Three-Step-Principle of self-defense: (1) to warn the invasive enemy, the Chinese soldiers must first shoot at the sky; (2) if the enemy continues to progress, the Chinese soldiers could only shoot from the forts without coming out to fight; (3) if the enemy retreated, the Chinese soldiers were not allowed to pursue.”²¹⁶

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ P. B. Sinha, A. A. Athale, *History of the Conflict with China, 1962*, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 20.

²¹⁶ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science

Second, the Chinese commander was composed. “Although the Indian army kept harassing the Shannanlangjiu Area and establishing military posts in the north side of actual control line from April 28th to May 18th, 1962,” Zhang Guohua was not provoked by such insults. In fact, “in his report to Zhou Enlai, Zhang pointed out that the war was inevitable but we should not open the first shoot to avoid a worse situation in diplomacy.”²¹⁷

Finally, Commander Zhang Guohua’s courage and strictness have been discussed in Chapter One (the expectation that “the commander responsible for preparing war plans and deploying war resources must be the most capable general in western China. He should be wise, sincere, benevolent, brave, and strict in training, reward, and punishment” was borne out,) and his lack of vanity has been discussed in Chapter Four (the expectation that “Zhang Guohua, the Chinese army commander, would not seek to achieve fame for his victory” was borne out.) We will not further repeat these discussions here.

Chapter Nine: The Army on the March

In Chapter Nine, The army on the March, Sun Tzu said: “We come now to the question of encamping army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. When an invading force crosses a river in its

Press, December 1993, p. 100.

²¹⁷ Xu Yongliang, *Zhang Guohua in the Southwest Border*, Military History, Vol. 1, July 2nd, 2011.

onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. So much for river warfare. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marshes. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to dark. If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, and this will spell victory. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. Country, in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires, and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, ponds

surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.

When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering bait. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambush. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate plot. When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. If the enemy sees an advantage to

be gained and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. Clamor by night betokens nervousness. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined to fight to the death. The sight of whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, which is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.

He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive and, unless submissive, they will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will

still be useless. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory.

If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.”²¹⁸

As Sun Tzu said at the very beginning of this chapter, “we come now to the question of encamping army, and observing signs of the enemy.”²¹⁹ Sun Tzu introduced his methods for dealing with an encamping army, and described some of the most common signs in battles that might indicate enemy movements.

First, Sun Tzu coordinated the camping of an army with a four-use system. In that system, the camping environment was divided into into four categories to which different methods should be applied. (1) In mountain warfare, our army should be camped in high places, facing the sun; (2) in river warfare, we should get as far away as possible from the water after we cross a river, deliver our attack when half of our enemy has achieved crossing, and moor our crafts higher than the enemy, facing the sun; (3) in salt-marsh operations, we should camp near the water and grass; (4) in operations on plains, we should take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to our right and at our rear, so that the danger would only come from the front and safety lies behind.

In addition, methods used should follow three principles: (1) “all armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to dark.”²²⁰ This principle revealed Sun Tzu’s consideration of soldiers’ psychological traits. He thought low places could make soldiers

²¹⁸ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 31-35.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 31.

²²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 32.

lack of a sense of security because they might feel they could be ambushed from higher ground, and a dark environment would tend to make soldiers feel pessimistic and homesick. (2) The commander should choose the place to camp from the perspective of a common soldier. Such a soldier, for example, might like to live on hard ground where he would be relatively free from disease, to live in front of a slope where he could act at once in emergency, and to live away from a river where he might be submerged by a flood. (3) The places to camp should be away from dangerous positions such as precipitous cliffs, deep narrow hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires, and crevasses. However, such places should be carefully explored out and searched “for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.”²²¹

Professor Wu Xubin thought “the commander must take two things into considerations when camp in the march from one place to another: the security of army and the feeling of soldiers. The army should be encamped in sunny and high places where accesses are easily controlled.”²²²“The camping places are better to be peaceful and fruitful, so that people could have a good rest and the supply could be replenished.”²²³

Second, Sun Tzu described some common signs implicating different movements of the enemy to increase a general's sensitivity to details. Three types of information could be captured through observation in battle: (1) we should judge psychological and physical states through penetrating observations and consequently adopt effective tactics. As Sun Tzu pointed out, an enemy close to us and remaining quiet might feel relaxed because of

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Liu Ling, Wu Xubin, *The Practical Comments on Sun Tzu's Art of War*, China's International Broadcasting Press, 1995, p. 55.

²²³ Ibid. p. 56.

their advantageous terrain and perhaps ripe for a sneak raid; if the enemy was trying to provoke a fight from a distance, it might experience anxiety and we perhaps could exhaust its energy by waiting; if an enemy's soldiers leaned on their weapons, they were probably hungry; if soldiers drink very quickly when encountering water they are undoubtedly thirsty, and by blocking their water supply we might add to their anguish; if the enemy did not pursue close-by benefits, he was most likely exhausted and we need not fear confrontation with him; if birds gather in the enemy's camps, they are empty and we could send our army to occupy them; if the enemy's soldiers clamor at night, they are probably nervous and good candidates for harassment; if the enemy's soldiers whisper in small groups, they might be dissatisfied with their commander and might possibly be recruited as spies; if the enemy's commander frequently and generously rewarded his soldiers, the enemy resources might become depleted and we might use our own resources as bait for them; if the enemy's punishment increases, it may lead to his dire distress and perhaps induce him to capitulate; if the enemy enacts contradictory policies or orders during a short period, this may indicate faulty enemy intelligence and perhaps subject him to being misled and confused.

(2) We might determine an enemy's movements by observing environmental or ecological changes. Sun Tzu found "the rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambush. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds

of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping.”²²⁴

(3) We could clarify the enemy’s tactics through interpreting the deceptive signals it sent out. For example, “Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat.”²²⁵“Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.” When some (of the enemy’s soldiers) are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.”²²⁶

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, the precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

1. The Chinese army would prefer to camp in high places. (The 1962 Sino-India War involved mountain warfare, not a river, salt-marsh or plain warfare. We have discussed this point in Chapter One.)

This expectation was borne out. From the 51st minute to the 52nd minute of the Chinese official documentary *The War between China and India*²²⁷, we could find the Chinese soldiers in different positions building their camps on the top of hills, and the rocks chiseled off from the high places fell down on the sunny side of hills. Those details shown in the monochrome video record are the best evidence that the Chinese army did follow Sun Tzu’s principle that “camp in high places, facing the sun.”²²⁸

2. Chinese strategists could keep a good sense of the enemy’s situation by observing details of battle.

²²⁴ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 33.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ “YouTube”, “NYC View”, “The War between China and India” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1NGI96pSQHc>

²²⁸ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 31.

This expectation was borne out. First, the Chinese command did judge the enemy's psychological and physical state through penetrating observation, and implemented effective tactics based on such observation. From the report from Commander Zhang Guohua after the war, we know that the Chinese command made an arrangement named "hard head, soft tail, alarming back and relaxed stomach"²²⁹ which meant putting the superior forces in the front line, the exhausted army at the rear, the sober reserves alongside, and the alluring baits at low positions that were good for ambush. That arrangement resulted from the fact that "the Indian army preferred to camp on the slope of the hills and to attack our flanks." "That cliché tactic meant the Indian army was still immersed in the victory of World War II and underestimated the Chinese army."²³⁰ Thus, the Indian armies in Xishankou and Shengezong areas were, in fact, defeated by their own arrogance, as observed by the Chinese command.

Second, the Chinese command was able to pierce the enemy's tactics through the deceptive signals it sent out after a few failures. In Commander Zhang Guohua's report, he conceded the failure of "tracking and eliminating the small units of remaining Indian forces after some battles such as Kelangjie Battle."²³¹ Commander Zhang pointed out that "when the Indian army was defeated, its remaining small units always tried to cheat our officers by counter attacking momentarily. The counter-attack from the few Indian soldiers made our officers reluctant in pursuing. (Normally, the remaining Indian soldiers should escape hastily but not attack, so the Chinese officer would doubt the main Indian forces

²²⁹ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 308.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

were around.) Then, the confusion and hesitation of our officers gave them enough time to rush out.”²³² However, after several failures of eliminating the Indian forces in posts, the Chinese command gradually began to understand Sun Tzu’s words that “driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat,”²³³ and “gave the Indian remaining army no time to breathe in the afterwards pursuits.”²³⁴

Chapter Ten: Terrain

In Chapter Ten, Terrain, Sun Tzu said: “We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) Accessible ground; (2) entangling ground; (3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you will be able to fight with advantage. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 33.

²³⁴ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 308.

may deliver our attack with advantage. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be to your disadvantage. These six are the principles connected with Earth. The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.

Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) rout. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the former. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or not he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization.

When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a rout. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.

The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack,

we have gone only halfway towards victory. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also knows that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.”²³⁵

In this Chapter, Sun Tzu mainly introduced methods for taking advantage of terrain to avoid defeat, and also described two qualities of a good general.

First, in discussing avoiding six kinds of calamities, Sun Tzu classified terrain of battle into six types, and introduced corresponding methods for taking advantage of different types of terrain. From Sun Tzu’s perspective, (1) accessible ground referred to places where both sides could freely travel; (2) entangling ground referred to places hard to reoccupy once abandoned; (3) temporizing ground referred to places in which neither side could gain by making the first move; (4) narrow passes referred to places where a few soldiers could block a huge army; (5) precipitous heights referred to places with elevations higher those of surrounding valleys or plains; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy referred to places requiring long marches before attacking the enemy. The methods for dealing with these types of terrain varied: (1) on accessible ground, we should occupy the raised and sunny spots before our enemy, and carefully guard our line of supplies; (2) on entangling ground, we should never return if our enemy had been well

²³⁵ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 37-40.

prepared and defeated us; (3) on temporizing ground, we should be alert to attractive baits the enemy might use to entice us, and set our own baits for the enemy to attack half way along the path to battle; (4) in narrow passes, we should garrison the army to await the enemy, if we arrived first; or if the enemy forestalled us in occupying passes, we should go after the passes only at a time when the enemy was weak; (5) for precipitous heights, we should occupy the raised and sunny spots first; otherwise, we must entice away the enemy located on heights before attacking; (6) in positions at a great distance from the enemy, we should not provoke a battle easily, and especially not march a long way to launch an attack.

Sun Tzu's methods for dealing with various terrains could, however, function well only in the absence of six calamities. These calamities could occur in different situations: (1) if our soldiers were forced to attack a ten-times-stronger enemy in front, a flight could occur; (2) if our common soldiers had much tougher personality than the officers, insubordination could occur; (3) if the officers had much tougher personality than the soldiers, collapse could occur; (4) if a high-ranking officer followed his own emotions rather than his commander's order to fight, ruin could occur; (5) if a general lacked authority, issued unclear orders, and assigned no fixed duties to his officers and soldiers, disorganization could occur; (6) if the general did not correctly estimate his enemy's strength, allowed his own inferior force to engage a larger one, and neglected to place the right men in the front rank, a rout could occur.

Second, Sun Tzu emphasized that generals should have highest decision-making power in battle, regardless of orders from the central government. In Sun Tzu's opinion,

the highest decision-making power in battle must be held by the general rather by the central government for three reasons: (1) generals were more professional in military matters than bureaucratic personnel. Politicians decide whether to fight and generals decide how to fight. Politics should not affect military decisions; (2) generals were closer to battles in which situations might change at any time. Thus, generals were more conscious of battle details and more able to deal with the emergencies in timely fashion. The terrain of battle might be the most visual example of a general's advantage over the central government or the monarch with respect to battle knowledge; (3) the only thing that should exist in a general's mind should be victory. A general responsible for his men's lives and the country was always under great pressure. If he was at the same time negatively affected by distrust, improper interference, or latent rules in the bureaucratic system, he would "surely be defeated."²³⁶

In addition, Sun Tzu used the word, "love", to describe a good general's feelings toward his soldiers. In his opinion, an experienced general would manage his army with both discipline and affection. Sometimes the power of love, by helping a general both win the trust of his soldiers and sustain a good relationship between them and the general, could be converted to combat effectiveness. Sun Tzu suggested that generals should "regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death."²³⁷ However, Sun Tzu also distinguished "love" from either "indulgency" or "kindness". From a realistic perspective, the purpose of love is to achieve

²³⁶ Ibid. p. 39.

²³⁷ Ibid.

victory. Thus love by itself was meaningless unless it was converted to fighting capability. When love became indulgence, a general's authority would fail. When love became kindness, a general could no longer enforce his orders. In other words, a general could die for his soldiers due to his love for them, but could not spoil his young men and make them "useless for any practical purpose."²³⁸ Professor Wu Jiulong cites Caocao (another famous militarist)'s comments on *The Art of War* to indicate that "the kindness of a general could not be focused on the whole army (the soldiers would be spoiled), and the punishment on the soldiers could not be authorized to one man (that man might be too busy to practice the punishment). Otherwise, the soldiers would be extremely outraged when the kindness for them was lowered even a little. Then, they would be useless in fighting."²³⁹

Chapter Ten also discussed the significance of knowing the enemy. We will analyze this more carefully in Chapter Thirteen, The Use of Spies.

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

1. The Chinese army would adjust its tactics to six kinds of terrain.

This expectation was not borne out. As discussed in Chapter One, the 1962 Sino-Indian War occurred in "mountainous areas with numerous valleys and narrow passes." Thus, our observation priorities will be focused on the fourth and the fifth types of terrain: narrow passes and precipitous heights.

Although the Indian army forestalled the Chinese army in occupying the passes,

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 182.

the Chinese army did not attack the passes only when the enemy was weak. In fact, the Chinese army immediately launched attacks when they found the enemy in narrow passes, especially at the beginning of the war. We can examine the performance of the Chinese army in the Langjiu Area as an example. “The Langjiu Area (the area where the Tagelais Mountain located) was long and narrow, and at the west end of the *McMahon Line*.”²⁴⁰“India had decided to set Tagela Mountain as the Sino-Indian border since the beginning of 1959, but Nehru did not take action in this regard until August of that year. The Indian army established the first post in Jianzemani (at the Langjiu pass).”²⁴¹“The reaction of the Chinese side was so swift that Nehru had to give a second report to the Indian People’s House revealing that the Assam rifles were pushed two miles back by a Chinese troop of about two hundred people. A first report stating that the first post had been established in Jianzemani was given in the same month.”²⁴² We found the Chinese army never waited for an opportune moment when the Indian army became weak. In fact, “the Indian 4th Division of the Indian 33rd Army was at Tezpur (close to Jianzemani).”²⁴³ The Chinese army paid a price for this rash advance. “Two days after the Chinese victory, the Indian army returned and reoccupied Jianzemani post. The Chinese army was powerless to push the Indian army back again.”²⁴⁴

The Chinese army did not entice the enemy away from precipitous heights before attacking. We could find records of two tactics used by the Chinese army to the already-occupied precipitous heights. The first tactic was to surround the heights to cut

²⁴⁰ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 325.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 327.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 325.

off supplies. This tactic could be observed in Dhola Battle. “Dhola was two miles in the South of the *McMahon Line*, where the elevation was very high and the terrain was extremely rugged.”²⁴⁵ “In the three months after India established the Dhola post, the Chinese army took no action. Different from the west line, every post in east line was peaceful.”²⁴⁶ However, “the Chinese army got close and garrisoned in the spots where the whole Dhola post could be controlled. This was the most common tactic used in the west line to resist India’s *Forward Policy*,”²⁴⁷ and it “made the provisions of the Indian army in east line in the soup.”²⁴⁸ The second tactic was to attack continuously without giving the enemy time to breathe. We could observe this costly tactic in the Sela Battle. “Sela was a height of fourteen thousand and six hundred feet which was one thousand feet higher than the surrounding mountains.”²⁴⁹ The Chinese army chose to operate continuously to exhaust the defensive army. However, “the Indian Gore Rifle Regiment repelled the attacks for so many times.”²⁵⁰

In the 1962 Sino-Indian battles occurring in mountainous areas, the Chinese army did not follow the teachings of Sun Tzu with respect to terrain when it confronted the occupied narrow passes and precipitous heights.

2. The Chinese commander would be authorized with the highest decision-making power in battle, with no interference by Beijing.

This expectation was not borne out. The interference from Beijing with respect to both strategies and tactics constrained the performance of the chief-commander to a large

²⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 328.

²⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 330.

²⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 331.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 334.

²⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 414.

²⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 415.

degree. After the war, Commander Zhang Guohua, under political pressure, had to attribute the victory to Beijing by saying “the instructions from the party, the orders from the central government, and the teachings of Chairman Mao were the fundamental guarantees for the final victory”²⁵¹ in his report. From another perspective, his words could be considered to constitute a complaint, proving the existence of political interference from distant Beijing.

In addition, in reading the materials Beijing used to broadcast the brilliance of the communist party, we discovered that tactics developed by the political leaders superseded the opinions of the chief-commander at the front line. The reason why no conflicts between Beijing and the chief-commander occurred might be that Zhang Guohua knew it was both useless and infeasible to disobey orders from Beijing, even if he found them to be wrong. “The involved troops were required to follow Chairman Mao’s strategic instructions. Their fight must work for the national political and diplomatic interests.”²⁵² The instructions from the Central Military Committee were so accurate that they covered almost every aspect of tactical use. For example, Liu Bocheng, the vice-chairman of the Central Military Committee, told the troops in the front line that “our army must avoid confrontations with the enemy in the rugged areas and walked a longer but safer way,” “when we attack along rivers, our army must be on both sides of them,” and “our forces must not be divided on any conditions.”²⁵³ Other members of the Central Military Committee, such as Luo Ruiqing, Helong, and Xu Xiangqian, had also been given

²⁵¹ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 141.

²⁵² *Ibid.* p. 141.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

direction to interfere with the front-line command both before and during battles.

3. The Chinese commander would love his soldiers but not indulge them.

This expectation was borne out. The love (sincerity, benevolence and sense of trust) and strictness of Commander Zhang Guohua toward soldiers were discussed in Chapter One and Three and we will not repeat that discussion here.

Chapter Eleven: the Nine Situations

In Chapter Eleven, The Nine Situations, Sun Tzu said: “the art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground:(1) dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground;(4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground. Ground whose possession imports great advantage to either side is contentious ground. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. Ground forming the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens — all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a

large body of our men: this is hemmed- in ground. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay is desperate ground. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. On serious ground, gather in plunder. In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. On desperate ground, fight.

Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear, to prevent cooperation between his large and small divisions. to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad and the officers from rallying their men. When the enemy's men were scattered, they were prevented from concentrating; even when enemy forces were united, they could be kept in disorder. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I would say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." Rapidity is the essence of war: Take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. The following are principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. Carefully study the well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. Keep your army continually on

the move, and devise unfathomable plans. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei. The skillful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found in the Ch'ang Mountains. Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer, yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yue are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of

chariot wheels in the ground. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach. How to make the best of both strong and weak is a question involving the proper use of ground. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going. To muster his host and bring it into danger: — this may be termed the business of the general. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way,

it is facile ground. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country — its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.

When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their cities and

overthrow their kingdoms. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy. Place your army in deadly peril and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits and it will come off in safety. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you may control the situation. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.”²⁵⁴

In this chapter, Sun Tzu introduced nine situations and methods for dealing with them. He also described a useful way for keeping soldiers energetic and united. Finally, Sun Tzu emphasized the significance of ensuring secrecy to maintain a general's orders

²⁵⁴ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 41-47.

and the importance of isolating the enemy through diplomacy.

First, Sun Tzu classified battle situations into nine types and developed corresponding methods to deal with them. In his book, Sun Tzu used various terminologies to describe the essential features of the nine situations and to describe the grounds on which these situations might occur. (1) When we fight for our own territory, the territory was called “dispersive ground”; (2) when an army penetrated into hostile territory but not to a great distance, it was on “facile ground”; (3) when both sides were near a place beneficial for whoever occupied it, that place was called “contentious ground”; (4) when both sides could travel freely through a place, they were travelling on “open ground”; (5) when three contiguous states competed for ownership of a key location in their midst, they were fighting for a “ground of intersecting highways”; (6) when an army penetrated into the heart of a hostile state, leaving a number of fortified cities behind it, it was on “serious ground”; (7) mountainous forests, rugged and steep areas, and marshes or fens through which both sides avoided marching were called “difficult ground”; (8) when a small number of enemy might suffice to prevent and crush a large body of our men by relying on narrow gorges or tortuous paths, we were stuck on “hemmed-in ground”; (9) when our soldiers were doomed to destruction unless they fight to exhaust their last drop of blood, they were on “desperate ground”.

Sun Tzu argued that: (1) On dispersive ground, to decrease our destruction, we should not fight; (2) on facile ground, to avoid being surrounded, we should not halt; (3) on contentious ground, to react to enemy strategy, we should not be the first to attack; (4) on open ground, we should not try to block the enemy’s way because we might block our

own way at the same time; (5) on ground of intersecting highways, we should take advantage of the conflicts between the other two states to facilitate our alliance with one of them; (6) on serious ground, as a strategy of “feed on the enemy” suggests, we should replenish our provisions from the enemy’s resources; (7) on difficult ground, if we must march across it, we should both advance and retreat slowly; (8) on hemmed-in ground, to minimize the number of deaths, we should resort to stratagem rather than costly attacks; (9) on desperate ground, rather than dying without even trying, we should exhaust our last forces in fighting, which might create an opportunity to break through the plight.

Second, Sun Tzu found that soldiers’ desperation could produce supreme strength.

Based on his personal experience (Sun Tzu was a general of Wu State during China’s *Spring and Autumn Period*; he talked about his military experience of fighting against Yue State in this chapter), Sun Tzu found that soldiers would put forth their utmost strength in positions where escape was impossible, and they would sometimes lose their fear of death in such desperate straits. The psychological state of the army would tend to become stable when no choices other than death were left to them. The utmost strength resulting from the courage of dying might thus help them achieve success on desperate ground. In other words, psychological desperation that may produce supreme combat effectiveness might in reality solve the predicament. To complete this theory, Sun Tzu stated four premises for the successful use of soldiers’ desperation to break from desperate ground: (1) Omens and superstition must be prohibited so that the desperate soldiers believed in and relied on human power rather than help from preternatural saviors, like gods; (2) soldiers on desperate ground must not be overburdened with money

so that they would not set their hearts on enjoyment after war; (3) we must have an outside supporting army for our desperate soldiers to ease their pressure to some degree; our troops must “come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right;”²⁵⁵ (4) on desperate ground, officers must stay with their soldiers and encourage them to fight to the end through both words and actions, so “the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.”²⁵⁶ Professor Liu Ling and Wu Xubin indicated that “soldiers would resist to the end when they found that the enemy wanted to eliminate them anyway; soldiers would be inclined to follow any given orders in such an abominable situation.”²⁵⁷

Third, Sun Tzu thought a good general must be able to keep soldiers totally ignorant of his plans. To make the army ignorant of plans is necessary for three reasons according to Sun Tzu’s theory: (1) an ignorant army was less likely to disclose military plans to enemy spies; (2) an ignorant army was much easier to command because they did not make personal judgments with respect to targets and tactics; (3) when soldiers must place soldiers in danger under desperate circumstances, an ignorant army was more likely to follow orders. In summary, a good general should be “a shepherd driving a flock of sheep,”²⁵⁸ and soldiers should know nothing about where they were going and what their purposes were. Professor Li Ling believes “the ignorance of the soldiers could make them united and obedient. The human nature was to pursue interests and avoid risks. Thus,

²⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 44.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Liu Ling, Wu Xubin, *The Practical Comments on Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, China’s International Broadcasting Press, 1995, p. 65.

²⁵⁸ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 44.

soldiers might be reluctant to execute risky orders, if they knew the plans of a general.”²⁵⁹

Fourth, Sun Tzu warned generals to cut off assistance from the enemy’s allies. To prevent the enemy’s allies from joining against us, we should “block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries.”²⁶⁰ In Chapter Three, we discussed the tactics of preventing concentration of the enemy’s forces and keeping superior numbers in each battle. Here, “Sun Tzu argued that it was easier for us to capture the commander of the enemy when we concentrate our forces on one direction, regardless of the length of battlefield.”²⁶¹ When the enemy becomes impatient for assistance from its allies, clefts in its defensive line might develop. We may “then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards, emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose us.”²⁶² Professor Li Ling points out that “by blocking the passes and stopping all emissaries, our soldiers would also feel secure and concentrate on the only enemy in one direction.”²⁶³

If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

- 1. The Chinese army would develop strategies and tactics for use in different situations relating to nine varieties of ground. On desperate ground, the Chinese army would be extremely capable under the four premises.**

This expectation was not borne out.

²⁵⁹ Li Ling, *The Comprehensive Research on the Thirteen Chapters of Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, Zhong Hua Book Company, Beijing, 2006, p. 283.

²⁶⁰ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 47.

²⁶¹ Wu Jiulong, *The Collated and Annotated Art of War*, Chinese Military Science Press, 1996, p. 220.

²⁶² Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu’s The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 47.

²⁶³ Li Ling, *The Comprehensive Research On The Thirteen Chapters of Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, Zhong Hua Book Company, Beijing, 2006, p. 286.

With respect to the Chinese side in the 1962 Sino-India War, we could not test the performance of the Chinese army on dispersive ground, open ground, intersecting highways, and hemmed-in ground for several reasons: (1) as discussed in Chapter One, the war spread mainly on the south side of the actual control line. Thus, China did not fight on dispersive ground, so testing for such a condition was not possible; (2) as discussed in Chapter One, the war occurred in “mountainous areas with numerous valleys and narrow passes,” so we could not examine performance of the Chinese army on open ground; (3) During the war, we did not have “three contiguous states competed for the ownership of a key place in middle of them.” Thus, the performance of the Chinese army on ground of intersecting highways was untestable; (4) in “mountainous areas with numerous valleys and narrow passes,” hemmed-in ground represented virtually the same condition as desperate ground, so the discussion of Chinese army performance on desperate ground was applicable. The other five situations were all observable and in opposition to Sun Tzu’s teachings.

First, on facile ground, the Chinese army halted. As mentioned above, when an army penetrated short distance into hostile territory, the army was on “facile ground”. Because Sun Tzu did not define “a great distance”, determination as to whether the army was deep into hostile territory would depend on its mobility. As long as an army doesn’t reach a position where it is incapable of quickly drawing back into its own territory, it would not be deep into hostile territory. As for the war under discussion, “after the Dalongzong area and the Pudong area were occupied by the Chinese army at 8:00 pm on

November 21st,²⁶⁴ India had no strategic passes left to defend, and the Northern India Plain, including New Delhi, was exposed to the Chinese army, which meant the Chinese army had achieved domination from Tibet to the Northern India Plain, and that range had thus become a facile ground. However, “At 11:50 pm on November 21st, the Chinese command ordered all the troops in frontline to stop to detect the possible operation of the Indian army. Later, Beijing sent the order that all Chinese troops in frontlines should stay where they were without advancing southwards any more from 0:00 am, November 22nd.”²⁶⁵

Second, with respect to contentious ground, the Chinese army was the first to attack. As mentioned above, when both sides in a war are close to a place beneficial to its occupier, that place is called “contentious ground”. Based on the analysis of both India’s and China’s Tibet strategies, we could see that Tibet satisfied the definition of contentious ground. However, as we proved in Chapter Six, China was active in Tibet with respect to both strategies and tactics. “Both the east end and the west end of the Sino-Indian border became battlefields after the Chinese army launched the attack on the Indian posts at 7:30 am on October 20th, 1962.”²⁶⁶

Third, with respect to serious ground, the Chinese army did not replenish its provisions from the enemy’s resources. As mentioned above, when an army penetrates into the heart of a hostile state and leaves a number of fortified cities behind, it is on “serious ground”. Sun Tzu approved the strategy of “feed on the enemy” on serious

²⁶⁴ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 235.

²⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 236.

²⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 150.

ground. However, in Chapter Two we examined Beijing's inclination to not feed its army at the enemy's expense even at the end of the war when the Chinese army had been close to New Delhi. That discussion will not be repeated here.

Fourth, with respect to difficult ground, the Chinese army did not either advance or retreat slowly. The Kelangjie Battle comprised a battlefield that covered 100 sq. km, "from Lazela Mountain to Niangmujiangqu."²⁶⁷ "That area was compact with high gorges and dense woods and the average elevation was above one thousand and five hundred meters, with some elevations greater than three thousand meters. The slopes were precipitous with 45-60 degree slopes. With heavy fog and snow, the roads were tortuous and plants such as shrubs and lianas blocked most of the paths."²⁶⁸ On such difficult ground, where mountainous forests, rugged steeps, marshes, and fens were everywhere, the Chinese army was ordered to move as quickly as possible. The soldiers were required "not to fear bitterness and death," and "not to miss the opportunities in the battle."²⁶⁹ In fact, the speed of the Chinese army astonished the Indian officers. "Dalvi said he was thoroughly petrified at 5:00 am on October 20th when the first Chinese shell flew above his head."²⁷⁰ In fact, "within only twelve days, the Chinese 18th Army was concentrated, crossing the unconquerable snow mountains."²⁷¹

Fifth, according to the war conduct described in the introduction, the Chinese army never found itself on "hemmed-in ground" or "desperate ground". However, the reason for this might be either that the Chinese commander was intelligent enough to

²⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 151.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 152

²⁷⁰ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, Joint Publishing, 1971, p. 400.

²⁷¹ GuoZi, *Mao Zedong and the Sino-Indian War*, Bai Nian Chao Military Review, July, 21st, 2010, p. 13.

prevent his soldiers from entering such grounds or that he didn't approve of Sun Tzu's methods for inspiring a soldier's utmost strength and therefore refused to send his soldiers into a desperate situation. In a battlefield with numerous valleys, like the Sino-Indian border, it would have not been difficult for a commander to "throw your soldiers into positions where there is no escape."²⁷² If the Chinese commander believed that "soldiers when in desperate straits, lose the sense of fear," "if there is no place to refuge, they will stand firm," or "if there is no help for it, they will fight hard,"²⁷³ he would not ignore the use of abundant naturally-formed valleys that comprised desperate ground to stimulate his soldiers. Thus, I prefer to believe that the Chinese commander simply refused to motivate his soldiers in that risky way.

2. The Chinese commander would keep his soldiers ignorant of his true intentions.

This expectation was borne out. Before the war, publicized policies provided to the soldiers were totally different from Beijing's orders. At the beginning of 1962, the Chinese commander in Tibet had, on one hand, to inform soldiers that "our government had tried all kinds of efforts to solve the territory dispute in a peaceful way, but the Indian army did not accept our sincerity," and "the Chinese government would never be the first shooter along the border."²⁷⁴ These policies could arm soldiers with a sense of both justice and morality while still conforming to orders from Chairman Mao Zedong that "we must fight the inevitable war with India," "the war must be proceeded in both west and east sections of borders," and "we were going to crush all Indian posts rather than only to push

²⁷² Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 43.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ GuoZi, *Mao Zedong and the Sino-Indian War*, Bai Nian Chao Military Review, July, 21st, 2010, p. 5.

the Indian army back.”²⁷⁵ In other words, the Chinese commander kept his soldiers ignorant as to his true intentions and psychologically put his soldiers on the just side of the war. At the same time, the soldiers’ will to fight was instigated when they heard that the Indian side had refused to solve the dispute in a peaceful way.

3. China would block passages to and from India to prevent it from receiving foreign assistance.

This expectation was not borne out. The Indian government successfully received foreign assistance. “Howard. Benjamin, an officer of the American Far-East Military Intelligence Center, commented the 1962 Sino-Indian War as the most foolish war of India. He disclosed that the Indian government had received the equipment for thirteen infantry divisions and two air divisions from the Soviet Union. The Committee of Asian Military in NATO decided to provide India with all-American equipment for eighteen infantry divisions only three days after the Soviet Union’s equipment arrived in India.”²⁷⁶“Richard. Andrews Brigadier, who was one of the American military consultants in India during the war, conceded that the communist China defeated the Indian army with support from the two strongest military countries.”²⁷⁷ Those materials, disclosed after the war, proved that the Indian paths for emissaries were not cut off. China’s indifference with respect to India’s foreign assistance might result from three causes: (1) China was not capable in the 1960’s of blocking southern India by sea. The American 7th Fleet was unbeatable for the young Chinese navy to fight on a distant ocean; (2) China did not want to give any third country aboveboard excuses for participation in the war.

²⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 5-6.

²⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 13.

²⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 14.

Although both the Soviet Union and NATO provided military assistance to the Indian government secretly, they were not officially involved in the war. If China blocked their paths to India, that Sino-Indian war might become a war between China and the two super-powers, an outcome likely fatal for China; (3) China knew that the two super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, would never at that time have given up India. In 1960's, India was a "must-save" country with strategic implications for both of the super-powers. For the Soviet Union, who had broken with China since 1959, India could distract China in the south; for the United States, if India could dominate the Tibetan area, the threat of a united communist China would be delayed for several years. Thus, if the Chinese army blocked India's paths of emissaries, foreign assistance (perhaps even a foreign army) could arrive in a more direct and stronger way.

Chapter Thirteen: The Use of Spy

In Chapter Thirteen, The Use of Spy, Sun Tzu said: "raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and

emoluments, is the height of inhumanity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, and no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads". It is the sovereign's most precious faculty. Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district. Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's spies, and using them for our own purposes. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the enemy. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp.

Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports. Be subtle! Be subtle! And use your spies for every kind of business.

If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.

Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the personal information of the chief-commander of the enemy, the attendants, the aides-de-camp, the door-keepers and the consultants of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to Yi Zhi who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Jiang Shang who had served under the Yin. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying, and thereby they achieve great results. Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army's ability to move."²⁷⁸

In this chapter, Sun Tzu described classification of spies, principles of use of spies,

²⁷⁸ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Sun Tzu's The Art of War*, PaxLibrorum Publishing House, 2009, p. 53-55.

and various kinds of information that spies were required to detect.

First, Sun Tzu introduced five kinds of spies. As one of the most important elements in war, spies had the following identities and functions: (1) local spies, referring to the inhabitants of a hostile district who were employed to serve as guides for our army; (2) inward spies, referring to enemy officers who worked for us; (3) converted spies, referring to enemy spies used by us; (4) doomed spies, referring to lobbyists who delivered deceptive information to the enemy and who were doomed to be executed if found out by the enemy; (5) surviving spies, referring to scouts who were required to bring enemy information back to our command.

Sun Tzu also discussed how the five kinds of spies could be used in a systematic way. He considered converted spies as forming a basis of use of other kinds of spies. He thought that we must discover the inward spies of the enemy, those in our camp working for the enemy. We could tempt them with bribes, lead them away, and make them comfortably housed. “Thus, they will become converted spies and available for our service.”²⁷⁹ With the help of converted spies, we could learn of means for both hiring local spies in the hostile district as well as inserting our own inward spies into the enemy’s camp. Converted spies could also create opportunities for doomed spies to pass on deceptive information to the enemy, and to assist surviving spies in bringing back vital information.

Second, Sun Tzu emphasized the two most important principles of using spies. The essential principles of using spies pertained to both their reward and punishment. The

²⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 55.

purpose of rewarding spies was to retain their loyalty, while the purpose of punishing spies was to maintain secrecy. Thus, both reward and punishment of spies should be quite extreme. Although “none should be more liberally rewarded”²⁸⁰ than spies, “if a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.”²⁸¹

Third, Sun Tzu listed core information that spies were required to detect. Before crushing an army, storming a city, or assassinating an individual, our spies, especially surviving spies, were required to bring back personal information, such as names, ages, personalities, life experiences, habits, and conditions of family members. This would include “the chief-commander of the enemy, the attendants, the aides-de-camp, the door-keepers and the consultants of the general in command.”²⁸² From Chapter Three we knew that “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”²⁸³ Thus, obtaining personal information about such people in vital positions of the enemy’s command helped our intelligence analyze their personal tendencies to predict the enemy’s actions. The more information our spies brought back, the more concrete the basis for designing our functional tactics and penetrating the enemy’s strategies.

Because of the lack of access to classified materials, I would have to in great part

²⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 54.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid. p. 55.

²⁸³ Ibid. p. 13.

test my expectations through deductive analysis for this special chapter of *The Art of War*. If the Chinese army was influenced by *The Art of War* in 1962, precedent analysis suggests that this influence would have been characterized by the following.

1. Operations of the Chinese army would be guided by at least one of the five kinds of spies.

This expectation was borne out. Despite a lack of disclosed materials from the Chinese government, we could still find some clues regarding the use of spies from known facts that could indirectly confirm this expectation.

First, local spies were most probably used by the Chinese army to lead the way. After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, “the rights of the Chinese communities in India were further limited because the Indian authorities suspected that many Chinese people living in India were working for the Chinese army during the war. The Chinese leather workshops were forced to close. At the end of 1990’s, the Indian Supreme Court gave orders to close six hundred Chinese workshops in Tangra in the name of environment protection.”²⁸⁴ Although the Indian authorities could not provide convincing evidence for such suspicions, they would most likely not have been determined to close a great number of Chinese workshops, with a resulting loss of Indian employment, unless they found unusual clues related to presence of local spies.

Second, inward spies, converted spies, and/or doomed spies were most likely used by the Chinese army during the war. “John Raul, an American intelligence officer claimed that because of the intimate contact between the United States and China at the end of

²⁸⁴ Bijan.Kuma, *The Homeless Chinese People in India*, Global Times, April 1st, 2012.

1960's, President Nixon ordered the military authorities to destroy some materials which were relevant with China in the Sino-Indian War and not favorable for the president's far-east strategy, while he expressed his sincerity to the Chinese Communist Party publicly."²⁸⁵ We could draw at least three implications from these statements: (1) destroying such materials would please the Chinese government. The end of the 1960's represented the eve of the president's travel to China, so President Nixon wanted to do something that really benefitted the Chinese government to win its trust and enable him to implement his Far-East strategy while still in the atmosphere of the Cold War. Also, John Raul has pointed out that "the intimate contact between the United States and China" was the reason for Nixon's choice. If the disclosure of the destroyed materials was advantageous for China, he could praise China's benevolence to achieve a good impression in the eyes of the Chinese people. At the very least, he could keep them in hand. By connecting his purpose of associating with China to his destruction of materials regarding the Sino-Indian War, it seemed assuredly true that the disclosure of those materials would be disadvantageous for China, and that President Nixon in destroying them could gain favor with the Chinese government. (2) The content of those materials was still functional and relevant for the Chinese government at the end of the 1960's. This implication could be deduced from the previous one. If the content of those materials had been outdated, the Chinese government in the 1960's would not care about them. (3) Those materials must contain information about China's secret forces in India. John Raul said the materials were relevant to China in the Sino-Indian War. If they described

²⁸⁵ GuoZi, *Mao Zedong and the Sino-Indian War*, Bai Nian Chao Military Review, July, 21st, 2010, p. 13.

China's battle arrangements or anything else publicly known during the war, they would hardly have been functional at the end of the 1960's because the war ended in 1962. The functional materials thus must have been related to China's undercover arrangements that were still serving China in India at the end of the 1960's. It seemed likely that American intelligence obtained some materials about China's secret forces in India, perhaps relating to inward spies, converted spies, or doomed spies, who were in some way still working for China while unknown by India. President Nixon most likely publicly destroyed the materials to show his friendship to the Communist China.

Another piece of evidence related to China's use of converted spies was its use of "summoning tactics." This tactic consisted of two steps: (1) the captured Indian officers were always well-treated and well taken care of. "According to a recently disclosed report of Zhou Enlai, after captured, Carlyle, an Indian Corporal, got medicines from Captain Liu Jingzhong's hands and was deeply touched; Karasy, an Indian Captain was issued with a Chinese cook, although Chinese officers ate with soldiers; Chelong, an Indian soldier, even claimed he would like to be a captive in Chinese camp for the rest of his life because of China's humane treatment."²⁸⁶ (2) After captured Indian officers were spiritually conquered, they would be invited to summon the Indian soldiers to surrender. For example, "in Kalong battle, Rick, a captured Indian Lieutenant Colonel, used his propaganda in frontline to have fifty-one Indian soldiers surrender." In terms of Sun Tzu's definition, Lineament Colonel Rick had become a converted spy working for China.

Third, surviving spies were used by the Chinese military during the war.

²⁸⁶ Li Xingcun, The Captured Indian Military Personnel in the Sino-Indian War, Global Times, December, 2rd, 2008.

“Before the war, the arrangement of the Indian army and its features had been known by the Chinese command. In Kelangjie Area, three thousand Indian soldiers from the Indian 7th Brigade of the Indian 4th Division, the Assam 5th Infantry Camp and the Artillery Camp were laid out. Those soldiers were mostly from Nepal. They were strong and well-trained. In 1944, the Indian 7th Brigade fought in Italy and won outstanding exploits for three times.” Also, “the Pangzhepu United Army was deployed in Cheguobu, Banggangding and Sezhang Lake; the Jiapute United Army was deployed in Chedeng, Kalong and Qiangdeng; the supply center of the Indian 7th Brigade was in Zhangduo where a dropping ground was built to receive the provisions from the air. The command of the Indian 7th Brigade must be within the area from Lelong to Jipu. The formation of the Indian army was like the shape of a Chinese character “丁”, which had a broad frontline and a narrow rear.”²⁸⁷ That kind of information could be detected only by surviving spies in battle because any prearranged plan could be changed at the last second before the Indian army entered the battlefield. Scout troops in the Chinese army also undertook some of those missions.

2. Chinese spies would be both rewarded and punished in extreme manners.

This expectation was logically borne out. First, Chinese spies were extremely well-rewarded. As discussed above, captured Indian officers who were agreeable to working as converted spies were treated so well so that they sometimes even summoned their own soldiers. It was reasonable to assume that Chinese spies enjoyed better or at least equal treatment and be handsomely rewarded once strategic and tactical goals were

²⁸⁷ Zhu Hua (The director of Institute of South Asia), *The History of Sino-India Border Defense War*, Military Science Press, December 1993, p. 153.

achieved. Second, Chinese spies should be punished in an extreme manner if they broke the rules. The punishments and the rewards should logically correspond. Without a balanced system of reward and punishment, spies would either be spoiled by overwhelming rewards or be forced into betrayal by extremely severe punishment. To keep spies both effective and sober while they worked under great psychological pressure, it was reasonable for Chinese intelligence to threaten and apply extreme punishment to those failing in their duty.

3. Chinese intelligence would investigate personal information about Indian officers.

This expectation was logically born out. First, if the expectation that China had inward or converted spies in India was indeed borne out, it would be extremely likely that Chinese intelligence solicited such important information, because the analysis of an Indian officer's personal information could form a most significant basis for predicting his army's actions and perhaps taking advantage of his weaknesses in developing effective strategy. Second, personal knowledge about captured Indian officers might have been used to induce them to help the Chinese command summon Indian soldiers or to disclose personal information about other officers. Third, Commander Zhang Guohua stated the specific names of Indian officer sat various levels in his reports to Beijing before each battle,²⁸⁸ and knowledge of such names implies that he was probably given their personal information.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 218-219.

CONCLUSION

This paper presents a tool, based on Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, for analyzing and predicting Beijing's military behavior. The influence of Sun Tzu's book is tested using a case study of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. From a set of thirty-four expectations based on the teaching of *The Art of War*, twenty-one were borne out in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, ten of them were not borne out, and three of them were untestable because of a lack of facts or materials.

According to the observation of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Chinese army did followed most of Sun Tzu's teachings in *The Art of War*: (1) China considered Tibet to be a core interest without which China's security would be threatened. (2) Both before and during the war's implementation, China used diplomatic methods to serve both justice and morality to make soldiers feel they were protecting their people and their nation's glory. (3) The Indian army was attacked by surprise before winter. (4) China chose to fight the war in mountainous areas with numerous valleys and narrow passes. (5) The commander responsible for preparing war plans and deploying war resources was the most capable general in western China. He was wise, sincere, benevolent, brave, and strict in training, reward, and punishment. (6) China's decision makers made every effort to end the war as soon as possible and to transfer the focus of the war effort to economic development. (7) The Chinese commander enacted strict discipline, forbidding unnecessary destruction, killing, and other inhumane behavior. (8) The Chinese command had plans to divide the Indian army into small units and concentrate its own forces so as

to fight each battle with superior numbers. (9) Commander Zhang Guohua, the Chinese army commander, did not seek to achieve fame for his victory in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. (10) China combined both direct and indirect methods in developing strategies. (11) China both made prompt decisions and used deception to keep soldiers energetic. (12) The Chinese army avoided tough fights by attacking undefended Indian positions and increasing the Indian army's attacking difficulties by defending only easily-secured positions. (13) China concealed the true nature of its actual military deployment, including preparation, routes, time schedule, distances, commander identities, and tactics, and also spread false information. (14) China evaluated potential advantages and disadvantages of both sides in the war before it actually began. (15) China was inclined toward solving territorial disputes by preparing for a war and not relying on the possibility that the enemy was a peace lover. (16) The "Five Dangerous Faults" were strictly avoided by the Chinese commander. (17) The Chinese army preferred to camp in high places. (18) Chinese strategists kept a good sense of the enemy's situation by observing details of battle. (19) The Chinese commander loved his soldiers but did not indulge them. (20) The Chinese commander kept his soldiers ignorant of his true intentions. (21) Operations of the Chinese army were guided by at least one of the five kinds of spies.

However, in contrast to Sun Tzu's teaching, (1) China neither forced the Indian government to sign an unfair peace treaty nor demanded a great deal of reparations after India was defeated. (2) During the war, the Chinese command did not establish a plan for destroying and depleting the Indian army's military provisions. (3) The Chinese army did

not make its defensive east and west battlefields impermeable before launching an attack. (4) China used both active strategies and active tactics. (5) The Chinese army launched attacks toward distant or remote targets. By Sun Tzu's standard, the targets should be within thirty Li (1.5 km). (6) The Chinese army did not follow the all of the "seven dos" and "ten don'ts" in shifting attacks and defenses. (7) The Chinese army did not adjust its tactics to six kinds of terrain. (8) The Chinese commander was not authorized with highest decision-making power and no interference by Beijing in battle,. (9) The Chinese army did not develop strategies and tactics for use in different situations relating to nine varieties of ground. (10) China did not block passages to and from India to prevent foreign assistance.

In addition, because tactical mistakes made by the Indian army occurred throughout the entire war, we could not test whether the Chinese army would continue strengthening its defensive lines without making offensive plans in the absence of the Indian army's mistakes. Also, because of a lack of source material, we could only logically presume that Chinese spies would be both rewarded and punished in an extreme manner, and Chinese intelligence would investigate personal information of Indian officers. Thus, the three expectations that "the Chinese army would continue strengthening its defensive lines without making offensive plans in the absence of the Indian army's mistakes," "Chinese spies would be both rewarded and punished in an extreme manner," and "the Chinese intelligence would investigate personal information of Indian officers" were not testable by observing the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

In summary, facing the fact that about two thirds of the teachings in *The Art of*

War were followed by the Chinese army in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, I have two conclusions for this paper: *first, the thought system embodied in **The Art of War** could influence Beijing's military behavior; Second, much of the content of **The Art of War** could be used to analyze and predict China's future military policies and operations.*

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