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THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

SEAPOWER AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Basil Germond

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

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The Maritime Dimension of European Security

Seapower and the European Union

Basil Germond
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Preface

Eight years ago I was invited by Professor Anne Deighton to present a paper at a conference hosted by the European Union Institute for Security Studies, whose objective was to assess the EU's global security actorness. My paper, titled 'The Naval and Maritime Dimension of the European Union', discussed the importance of seapower for the Union's security and defence policy. It is fair to say that at the time I was probably the first ever scholar to discuss such a topic; indeed, the Council of the EU had barely mentioned the possible use of naval components during European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP) operations. My paper was nonetheless well received and I continued on this research path. The subject attracted attention in 2008 when the Council of the EU launched counter-piracy operation Atalanta at the Horn of Africa, which prompted me, in May 2009, to present a paper at the University of Cambridge advocating the need for the EU to define a proper Maritime Security Strategy. This was probably the first time that concrete elements for an EU Maritime Security Strategy were discussed in detail.

At the time of writing, the Union has become a rather well-established naval and maritime actor, carrying out counter-piracy and maritime capacity-building operations and actively dealing with maritime safety, fisheries protection, port security, maritime surveillance, and counter-immigration at sea. Its policies, mechanisms and activities related to the maritime domain are now backed by a Maritime Security Strategy, which was eventually adopted by the Council in June 2014. In an age of uncertainties influenced by information technologies and the networking of societies, the maritime domain remains the main global lane of communication, which is vital for trade and security. The EU is thus at a crossroads; it has the necessary strategy and mechanisms to become a global maritime security actor (or even a sea Power), but the decision remains in the hands of member states. Will they devote enough resources to enable Europe to act as a true global maritime power? Will they seize the opportunity the EU offers to pool resources, which is the only way for Europe to remain in a position to influence the destiny of the global maritime domain?

This book describes the trends in maritime strategy and seapower politics as well as recent developments in the field, at both conceptual and practical levels. It thus aims at providing readers with the necessary tools to make up their mind about the EU's potential as a global maritime actor as well as the need for it to become a sea Power.

Basil Germond
Lancaster, November 2014

List of Acronyms

AA	Anti-air/air defence
ABM	Anti-ballistic missiles
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare
BALTRON	Baltic Naval Squadron
BlackSeaFor	Black Sea Naval Force
BMM	BlueMassMed study
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
CeCLAD-M	Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Mediterranée
CFCA	Community Fisheries Control Agency (now EFCA)
CFP	Common Fishery Policy
CFPA	Common Fisheries Protection Agency
CHENS	Chiefs of the European Navies
CISE	Common Information Sharing Environment
CRIMGO	Critical Maritime Routes (Gulf of Guinea)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (formerly ESDP)
CTF	Combined Task Force
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTIB	European Defence Technology and Industrial Base
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEA	European Economic Area
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEZ	Exclusive economic zone
EFCA	European Fisheries Control Agency (formerly CFCA)
EMSA	European Maritime Safety Agency
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPN	European Patrols Network
ESA	European Space Agency
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP)
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUBAM	EU Border Assistance Mission

EUCAP	European Capacity Building Mission
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMM	EU Monitoring Mission
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUNAVCO	EU Naval Coordination Cell
EUNAVFOR	EU Naval Force
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
EUROSUR	European external border surveillance system
FIRC	Foreign-imposed regime change
FNFA	Force Navale Franco-Allemande
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
Helcom	Helsinki Commission
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
ICCAT	International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IMP	Integrated Maritime Policy
IR	International Relations
IUUF	Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
LHD	Landing helicopter dock
LNG	Liquefied natural gas
LPD	Landing platform dock
LRIT	Long range identification and tracking system
LST	Landing ship tank
MAOC-N	Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics
MARPOL	Maritime Pollution Convention
MARSUNO	Maritime Surveillance in the Northern Sea Basins
MCM	Mine countermeasures
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MSO	Maritime security operations
MSS	Maritime Security Strategy
NAFO	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEAFC	North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PT MARSUR	Project Team Maritime Surveillance
R2P	Responsibility to protect
RIMPAC naval exercise	Rim of the Pacific naval exercise
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade launcher
SAR	Search and rescue
SIGINT	Signal intelligence
SLCM	Submarine launched cruise missiles
SLOC	Sea lines of communications
SSBN	Ship submersible ballistic nuclear
SSN	SafeSeaNet system
SSR	Security sector reform
STECF	Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
TAAF	Terres Australes et Antarctiques Françaises
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force
UNMEE	UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
VMS	Vessel monitoring system
WEU	Western European Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

Over the past ten years, the European Union (EU) has become more proactive and visible on the world stage. Indeed, in addition to its traditional economic leverage, the EU has enhanced its practice of projecting normative, civilian, and even military power beyond its external boundary. One crucial aspect of this process, although neglected by the academic literature, is the importance and the role of the sea regarding the EU's external policies and security.

The publication by the European Commission of a Green Paper in June 2006 and then of a Blue Paper in October 2007 on a 'Maritime Policy for the European Union' (Commission, 2006a; 2007c) shed light on the crucial importance of the sea for Europe in general and for the EU in particular. These documents specifically highlight the richness coming from the sea, namely, the halieutic and energy resources, the tremendous means of transportation (for commerce and industry), and the growing touristic activities (2007c: 3–4). Furthermore, safety and security issues such as the protection of maritime transport, the monitoring of the EU's maritime borders, and port security have been recognised by the Commission as critical issues. At the intergovernmental level, the Council of the EU has regularly stressed the importance of naval forces for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP), at least since the formulation of the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999, which set up targets in terms of military capabilities (e.g. Council, 2004: 3). In 2014, the Council eventually adopted a Maritime Security Strategy that acknowledges the importance of maritime security and set up ambitious objectives (Council, 2014c). Thus, the EU now asserts the importance of the sea for European security in its broadened acceptation (supranational, transnational, national, societal, human, energy, and environmental security), although the European Security Strategy (ESS)

approved by the Council in December 2003 did not directly emphasise this. This reflects both the evolution of the concept of security in the post-Cold War era and the changing practice by the various member states, which originated in the vanishing of the Soviet threat and the evolution of the perception of risks and threats by individuals, communities, and states.

The maritime dimension of European security has not appeared ex nihilo in the post-Cold War era. It is rooted in Europe's geography and history. Indeed, due to the geographical position and characteristics of Europe, the surrounding seas have impacted the security of European nations and political entities since Men were able to build merchant vessels and warships. Actually, the importance of the sea is not linked to the process of globalisation (be it understood as a recent phenomenon or as an older trend going back to the Renaissance and the era of great maritime exploration), but is intrinsically linked to the relationship between the Europeans and the sea itself. Indeed, as soon as they made use of the sea for trade and travel, they also used it for fighting, that is to say, either preventing enemies from using the sea (for commercial or military purposes) by securing, denying, or disputing command of the sea, or exercising command of the sea in order to produce effects upon the enemy's territory, for instance, commercial blockades, transport of troops, and power projection (Corbett, 1911: 15–16, 91–94, 161). Naval historians usually go back to Ancient Greece so as to find evidences of this, but it is certainly an older phenomenon; according to Egyptologists, the most ancient, known naval battle goes back to the 12th century BCE (Coutau-Bégarie, 2002: 836; Nelson, 1943), but predynastic Egypt could well have been involved in some sort of naval battles from circa 3500–3000 BCE (Vinson, 1994; Wood, 2012).

The economic importance of the sea (notably for fishing, but also for coastal transport) is certainly even much more ancient, but strategically speaking, the sea became an important theatre only after it was possible to build ships capable not only of navigating but also of fighting in a capricious and hostile milieu. According to Thucydides, the first triremes appeared in the 7th century BCE, during the 'first naval battle' between Corinth and her colony Corcyra (Thucydides, 431 BCE: I/13). They were proper warships able (thanks to their 170 oars positioned on three levels) to reach a peak speed of about 10 knots and to carry out tangible tactical manoeuvres (Morrison et al., 2000). Thus, although it was (and still is) impossible to 'occupy' the sea (contrary to the land), it then became possible to secure and then exercise 'command of the sea'. In sum, as soon as it became possible to use the sea for commercial

and military purposes, seapower began to influence history, although maritime trade in general and the naval aspects of war in particular remained limited until the end of the Middle Ages. Command of the sea was at best limited in scope and time; for example, the depiction of the Mediterranean as *Mare Nostrum* by the Romans originated in their control of all the littorals, not in their command of the Mediterranean Sea as such. Nevertheless, since the fall of the Roman Empire, various nations have taken advantage of the sea, and thus become sea Powers, among others the Venetians and the Hanseatic League during the 14th and 15th centuries, the Spanish and the Portuguese during the era of great maritime explorations, the British during the 18th and 19th centuries, and the US since the beginning of the 20th century. For them, the importance of the sea came from the wealth it brought (mainly through maritime trade) or from what it made them possible to achieve diplomatically and militarily (e.g. gunboat diplomacy, blockades, expeditionary warfare). In turn, their security was dependent on their control of the sea. States have always had to face three types of challengers at sea whose importance has varied over history: other states' navies, state-sponsored privateers, and non-state actors such as pirates and smugglers. If corsairs have now seemingly disappeared from the scene, fighting non-state criminal actors operating at sea in peacetime constitutes a large portion of states' maritime security activities.

With this context in mind, the aim of this book is twofold: first to offer a critical analysis of seapower in general and of the maritime dimension of security in particular, accounting for the recent developments at both the academic and the practical level, and second to examine the various aspects of the maritime dimension of the EU's security in the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, despite the expansion of the security studies agenda, naval scholars have continued to primarily focus on states' naval capabilities and strategies, to frame studies within a rather 'realist' analytical framework, and to adopt methodologies from history as well as war and strategic studies. With the expansion of transnational maritime-related issues such as illegal immigration, terrorism at sea, trafficking activities, piracy, security of energy supplies, and marine environment degradations, it is crucial to broaden and deepen the maritime studies agenda, so as to include these 'new' or resurgent maritime issues, to go beyond state-centric analyses, and to adopt a holistic approach to sea-related security that extends beyond the traditional concept of security and contributes to the expansion of the maritime security studies agenda. The first part of the book (chapters 1–5) offers a critical reading of seapower in the 21st century,

by discussing seapower through the prism of various traditional and critical International Relations (IR) theories, including critical geopolitics. Navies are then discussed as vectors of seapower after which maritime power and forces projection as well as maritime security and safety are reviewed in light of the recent political and strategic developments. These first chapters constitute an innovative analytical framework for the study of seapower and the maritime dimension of security, framed within traditional security and strategic studies as well as critical security studies and critical geopolitics. Building on this framework, the second part of the book (chapters 6–10) focuses on Europe in general and the EU in particular, discussing elements of the EU's seapower, the naval and maritime dimension of the EU's security, the EU's (maritime) geopolitical discourse, as well as the concept and practice of EU's maritime frontier. The spatial scope includes all the EU member states. However, the study is not restricted to the very EU dynamics alone. It also accounts for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and individual member states since their maritime policies and activities are interconnected with those of the EU. Europe's allies and partners (such as Turkey and the US) are also given attention. Finally, the comprehensive analysis of the maritime dimension of the EU's security through theoretical, institutional, operational, geopolitical, and discursive angles results in policy-oriented recommendations regarding the implementation of an effective and fully fledged EU Maritime Security Strategy.

1
Seapower and International Relations

Since its popularisation by US Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan at the end of the 19th century, the concept of seapower has been used indiscriminately and has also given rise to many debates. Indeed, this concept is particularly difficult to delineate and to use accurately, for it can be understood in many different ways. Although Mahan developed a proper 'philosophy of sea power' (Sempa, 2002: 105) destined to explain, advocate and justify naval programmes and naval militarism in the US, he did not precisely define the concept of seapower as such. His *Influence of Sea Power* identifies six conditions affecting the seapower of nations: the geographical position, the physical conformation, the extent of territory, the number of population, the national character, and the character of the government. Thus, Mahan explains *how* seapower is constituted, but not *what* seapower practically is (or means), except the connection between a flourishing maritime trade that generates the nation's wealth and a powerful navy to protect it (Mahan, 2007: 589). Geoffrey Till pointed out that we can interpret seapower in two different ways: either as an input, that is to say the sum of various naval and maritime-related assets, or as an output, that is to say 'the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people or things by what one does at or from the sea'. Seapower can be understood as a means or as an end (Till, 2004: 4). In the post-War and post-Cold War era, seapower has been discussed in academia through the prism of strategic studies (e.g. Gray, 1992, 1994; Luttwak, 1974; Till, 1987, 1994, 2004), history (e.g. Grove, 1990; Speller, 2014), and diplomacy and foreign policy (e.g. Booth, 1979; Cable, 1985). The concept of seapower and its relevance for international relations can, nevertheless, also be examined through the lens of competing approaches in the discipline of International Relations (IR), whose purpose is after

all to explain, understand, improve, guide, or change the practice of international relations.

Navies and power politics

The traditional conception of security is mainly framed within the realist approach to international relations. The realist school of thought puts the emphasis on the centrality of states, which are unitary actors and constitute the main unit of analysis (or referent object). Like human beings, states are depicted by realists as self-interested and diffident, and thus motivated by national interest and driven by power. Within the anarchical international system, each unit/actor/state must put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself and to ensure its own security, since no one else can be counted on to do so. Thus, the function of every state is the same, namely power maximisation, and every state's highest goal is survival. Consequently, security does matter at the level of the states (national security), which are both the threatening subjects and the threatened objects in international relations. In other words, the main threats realists are talking about are military capabilities of foreign states. Considering the world as a zero-sum game and placing the emphasis on relative gains, the realists suggest (in a nutshell) two main options to respond to the threats posed by foreign states: states can either build up their own national military forces (self-help capabilities) or take part in coalition building so as to balance potential enemies. Strategic alliances and coalitions are the product of specific interests at a specific time, not of ideology or any feeling of a common belonging. In both options the idea is to remain in a position of force and be ready to face any foreign threat, which corresponds to the Latin adage *Si vis pacem para bellum* (If you want peace, prepare for war). In sum, (structural) realists explain the world by looking at the material forces and their distribution within the structure of the international system. They explain power politics and the development of military forces as well as their use (or the threat to use) as a result of 'national interest and cost–benefit analysis' by states (Devetak et al., 2012: 164).

Until the end of the Cold War, with security being reduced to the questions of war and peace, international security was primarily the subject matter of strategic studies, where the realist vision dominated. In this context, the question of seapower was mainly discussed by scholars in the field of naval studies (both naval historians and strategists). Their focus was not so much on the sea as a milieu but on the naval forces as instruments of the states. From a realist perspective, seapower is

understood as a sum of assets, that is to say a powerful navy, an efficient merchant fleet (although today the states that possess the most powerful navies are no longer those that possess the largest merchant navies), and some invariable geographical factors which contribute to states' power. According to this vision, the importance of seapower mainly comes from what navies can do at sea, or from the sea, to contribute to states' national and economic security. Seapower is about power maximisation and navies are tools at states' disposal for fulfilling their national interest and pursuing power politics. Their main role is to secure the control or command of the sea, and then to exercise this command. Navies and states' power are intimately linked. Navies have traditionally been an indicator of states' power and, as mentioned by Till, have contributed to their prestige (2004: 116). Scholars and practitioners have ranked navies according to quantitative indicators, such as the number of ships, their tonnage, the type and power of weapon systems, and ultimately the type of missions they can fulfil (the ideal situation from a power politics perspective being a balanced fleet that allows fulfilling any type of missions). However, from a realist perspective, more than the navies' capabilities in absolute terms, 'what is [. . .] important is the position of each navy relative to the others' (Jackson, 2010: 12), or in other words the naval balance between states. Traditional naval scholars have mainly focused on the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of naval warfare. As pointed out by Rear Admiral J. Richard Hill, classical writers such as Mahan, Colomb, Corbett, or Castex were all interested in war and dominance; their focus was on the command of the sea and the importance of the decisive battle (Hill, 1986: 34–35). Accordingly, in his *Future of Sea Power*, Eric Grove basically defines seapower as a 'form of military power that is deployed at or from the sea' (Grove, 1990: 3).

Naval build-up before the First World War and the naval arms race during the Cold War illustrate the realist vision of seapower. In both cases, powerful states developed their navies so as to be in a position of strength in comparison with their competitors in case of hostilities – the more ships the better and the more powerful weapon systems the better. Since the 1960s, despite the huge effort put in by the Soviets in developing their navy, the US and NATO member states had kept a favourable balance of power at sea, which was an important factor that contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union – the cost of developing and maintaining an operational navy of that size eventually became an economic burden for the Soviet Union. Despite the recent resurgence of a potential 'Russia threat', in the post-Cold War era, the realist vision has been challenged by the expansion of the security agenda,

notably the taking into account of various so-called 'new threats', which mainly result from the growth of non-state actors (e.g. terrorism at sea, piracy), as well as the increasing occurrence of foreign interventions (mainly humanitarian and peace support operations) not always motivated by pure considerations of power. Accordingly, the European Union's involvement at sea in the 21st century cannot be grasped through the single lens of realism as will be discussed in the second part of the book.

Seapower and the liberal order

The liberal school of thought refutes the inherent selfishness of states and argues that liberal democratic states (in particular) have a strong interest in cooperating, as they share common goals beyond survival. Anarchy still prevails at the international level but cooperation is, nonetheless, possible since states understand that it is in their (economic) interests to cooperate with like-minded partners. If states' security is indeed crucial, the survival of states is not permanently at stake. In other words, states have various interests beyond national security, and one of the most important is economic wealth. Liberals believe in market economy and free trade, so states should naturally develop peaceful relations with those adopting a free market and create institutions and regimes that can help enforce liberal norms all over the world and promote economic globalisation. International military cooperation (including naval multilateralism) is a natural by-product of liberal principles and further contributes to the stability and prosperity of the international liberal order. In addition, some correlation has been drawn between liberalism and maritime politics, with some authors arguing that liberal democratic elites have historically had a tendency to favour the development of navies and to elaborate national policies towards the sea (Grygiel, 2012: 33), which echoes Hew Strachan's point about the 'symbiotic link between sea power, liberal democracy and ideas of grand strategy' (2005: 39).

From a liberal perspective, seapower should be understood as a collective final cause (i.e. the promotion of liberal norms) and should not (only) be seen through individual/national material lenses (i.e. national security). This vision better corresponds to the second definition of seapower proposed by Till, that is, seapower as an output. Seapower offers the capacity to influence others' behaviour and to shape the international system. It is a way for Western liberal democracies to safeguard maritime commons and more broadly to secure control of the sea and promote free trade and liberalism. In the extensively debated 2007

document 'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower', the US Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps produced a manifesto for linking seapower and liberalism: 'Seapower protects the American way of life' (3) and the US seapower 'joins with others to promote security and prosperity across the globe' (19). In other words, what matters is the order of effect, not the order of battle (Lindley-French and van Straten, 2008: 67). As opposed to realism, naval multilateralism is a natural means to an end, and not a stopgap solution for not having sufficient national naval capabilities. As free trade is paramount to the liberal project, the freedom of the seas is crucial, and naval forces contribute to securing the seas. For example, the US, NATO, the EU, and their partners operate forces off the Horn of Africa, in the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Persian Gulf to counter piracy, to prevent potential terrorist activities at sea, or to deter so-called 'rogue' states such as Iran. It is interesting to note that even the Chinese navy has collaborated with Western counterparts at the Horn of Africa. Promoting the liberal world order implies dealing with non-liberal states and non-state actors, which includes conducting foreign interventions aiming at regional stability and the promotion of liberal norms (including good governance at sea). Thus, naval forces contribute to power and forces projection; they are a crucial component of expeditionary forces, as illustrated by recent foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) operations such as in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011). The liberal vision of seapower is thus more comprehensive at the level of both its goal (not only national security but also the stability of the liberal order in general and the promotion of liberal values) and its missions (not only combat missions in case of war and deterrence and naval diplomacy in peacetime but also a variety of 'lower key' activities such as counter-piracy under the banner of maritime security).

This vision has been prominent since the end of the Cold War and fits particularly well with the EU's narrative, but some hints of the liberal understanding of seapower can be traced back to the Cold War era and well before. The idea that the sea is a collective good and that the freedom of the seas is necessary for economic development and the prosperity of states has been advocated by Mahan but also Themistocles, Thucydides, and Xenophon (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 39). It is widely accepted that the sea and seapower have facilitated the process of globalisation throughout history and that seapower 'can never be quite separated from its geo-economic purposes' (Tangredi, 2002: 21–22). The first American naval squadron to ever sail in the Mediterranean was sent in 1801 to protect American merchant ships against the pirates of Tripoli, which can be

considered one of the first contributions of the US Navy to the stability of the liberal world order. However, the liberal vision of seapower has especially developed after the end of the Cold War as a consequence of the strengthening of the Western liberal (and globalised) world order. Cooperation between like-minded navies is considered the norm as expressed by US concepts such as the Global Maritime Partnership or the 1,000-ship Navy (Morgan and Martiglio, 2005), although, in the current context, such initiatives have often been perceived as a sign of US (naval) hegemonic aspirations and, thus, have not attracted as many followers as expected.

The liberal approach has also been challenged by the 'rise' of China, which has led to a certain revival of naval realism. China, which is dependent on the seas for trade and especially energy security, has explicitly stated its goal to have a navy able to back its national interests and has begun to modify its strategic thinking from a land Power to a sea Power in the making (Xiaoqin, 2012); the most striking sign of this is the commissioning of its first aircraft carrier in 2012. This has the potential to increase competition at the maritime geopolitical level with India (one of China's main competitors, which lies in between China and the resource-endowed Middle East) and with the US in both the Asia Pacific region and at the global strategic level. This may translate into a new naval arms race, or even a clash, which brings us back to the realist vision of seapower (Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, 2005). On the other hand, both China and the US may develop shared objectives when it comes to the freedom of the seas and maritime security, as shown by China's involvement in counter-piracy operations at the Horn of Africa. China's participation in the 2014 RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval exercise hosted by the US Navy also shows the willingness on both sides of the Pacific to develop some form of naval cooperation and to keep cooperative channels open.

Hegemony and seapower

Marxist-informed approaches to IR put the emphasis on inequalities within the international system. The notion of exploitation is at the core of critical thinking that aims not only at pinpointing inequalities and injustice but also at changing the world (hence the label 'emancipatory theories'). Like realists, many critical theorists postulate that states are selfish, but this is not so much due to the inherent selfishness of human beings but rather to the fact that states are controlled by (capitalist) elites which reproduce at the international level the exploitation

that is taking place at the domestic level. The notion of the 'international liberal order' is criticised for it is considered a synonym for class exploitation through the collusion of capitalist elites. Critical theories challenge realist claims (since class exploitation rather than power maximisation by states is considered as the main driver of IR) as well as liberal claims (since free trade and capitalism are considered as the source of inequalities and conflicts rather than the solution). Security is not understood as national security but as (social) justice.

From that perspective, seapower is seen both as a means (input) in the hands of capitalist elites to perpetuate the global system of exploitation and inequalities (output) as well as a product of this system, resulting in a vicious circle. Powerful states can afford powerful navies; powerful navies contribute to perpetuating exploitation, which in turn maintains those states in a position of dominance. Seapower is a power used to influence and an important tool that contributes to the stability of the global liberal order. Seapower was instrumental in maintaining the *Pax Britannica* and so it is in maintaining the current US hegemony through the 'command of the commons', which, in addition to being a major source of US military power, 'underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing' (Posen, 2003: 46). From that perspective, the influence of seapower goes beyond the primacy in war and military power; it is intimately linked to the domination of the world order and the spread of globalisation and liberalism.

Framed within post-structuralist or social constructivist thinking, deconstructive approaches to security are interested in the link between the production of knowledge and power. Studies have focused on security discourses, binary representations, and securitisation processes. Among those approaches, critical geopolitics analyses the discursive practices by which dominant discourses spatialise world politics in such a way as to represent and construct a certain world. This approach highlights and deconstructs the links between the production of geographical representations (e.g. 'us' versus 'them'/'safe' versus 'dangerous'), the power to define (i.e. categorising countries and regions), and the normalisation of certain practices (e.g. foreign interventions) that ultimately strengthen the dominant order.

A Foucauldian definition of power (i.e. power is a relationship, neither an essence nor a possession) can thus be applied to seapower. Seapower is a relationship of domination resulting from the command of the sea by certain states and based on certain representations that have become dominant. Binary oppositions, geographical constructions, and the securitisation of the seas contribute to the dominant discourse that has

normalised the Western domination of the seas. In discourses, many threats and risks are now linked to the sea, such as piracy, arms and drug trafficking, terrorism, illegal immigration, overfishing, and energy insecurity. In turn, this securitisation of the maritime domain contributes to the normalisation of the Western supremacy on the seas. The EU's geopolitical discourse and the normalisation of its practice of projecting power beyond its external boundary within its maritime margins will be discussed in the second part of the book.

Seapower and the expansion of the security agenda

The end of the Cold War and its bipolar structure of the international system has induced a complete redefinition of the concept of security that has impacted tremendously on security studies. It is widely accepted that there has been a broadening and a deepening of the security (and security studies) agenda (Krause and Williams, 1996). Broadening the security agenda refers to the horizontal inclusion of an extensive range of risks and threats, including non-military and non-state ones: economic threats (e.g. unemployment in the North, poverty in the South), environmental threats (e.g. environmental degradations and scarcities, effects of climate change), human rights violations, migrations and their potentially threatening consequences, transnational criminality, and international terrorism to name a few. The deepening (or widening) of the security agenda refers to the vertical expansion of the agenda, including a move down a level from national security, so as to include the individuals and the societies (human security and societal security) and a move up a level from national security, so as to include the world as one community (global security) and regional security (e.g. the EU's security).

The majority of the so-called 'new threats' (e.g. poverty, religious extremism, and international terrorism) do not constitute new phenomena, but their perception (by individuals, communities, and states), the way they impact the system and the states, and also their treatment (i.e. the responses by states and international institutions) are not the same today as in the past. The 'new threats' and the way they are tackled have to be understood in the current context of (hyper)globalisation linked to the rise of the information society. In the post-Cold War era, there has been a destatisation (or denationalisation) and a deterritorialisation of security, at the level of both the threatened object and the threatening subject (see Table 1.1). Firstly, at the level of the threatened object, the notion of security is enlarged, inside states to societies and individuals and outside states to regional institutions or even to

Table 1.1 The post-Cold War security matrix

	Destatisation	**Deterritorialisation**
Threatened object	• Within the state (societies, individuals) • Outside the state (regional institutions, international system)	• Individuals' security outside the state is taken into account • The security of the one depends on the security, or on the securing, of the other
Threatening subject	• Transnational threats (e.g. organised crime, terrorism, piracy) • Environmental degradations, resource scarcities	• Threats were born and proliferate beyond one's external boundary • Threats seem remote but impact 'us' directly or indirectly

Source: Germond (2010: 43)

the whole international system (destatisation). Moreover, one does not care only about individuals within the state, but also about individuals within foreign states (e.g. the 'responsibility to protect' doctrine). The security of the one depends on the security – or on the securing – of the other (deterritorialisation). Secondly, at the level of the threatening subject, it is less a question of facing another state, but rather of responding to non-state threats, such as terrorism and organised crime, or of responding to environmental risks such as climate change (destatisation). Besides, these risks and threats are essentially transnational and 'protean' (Arcudi, 2004: 24, 53). They materialise outside the state framework by using the whole world as one single network (the System of systems); they appear and proliferate 'elsewhere' but impact 'us' later, since they are not static and localised, but ubiquitous (deterritorialisation).

Consequently, states have been forced to redefine their strategic concepts and security policies, moving away from a purely realist approach to security. In order to respond to the destatisation and the deterritorialisation of security, to protect the threatened object, and thus to fight the threatening subject, the emphasis has been put on the projection of security beyond the national borders, as well as on the soft, non-military, and environmental dimensions of security. It does not mean that territorial defence and nuclear deterrence, which, in the naval field, translates into coastal/sea lines of communication (SLOCs) defence and sea-based nuclear deterrence, are irrelevant today. Nuclear deterrence remains an important feature of the international system. Territorial defence, even though not at the top of states' agendas, remains a possible mission that is still taken into consideration. The perception of its importance varies from

one country to another; for example, Finland still puts its main emphasis on territorial defence, due to the perception of a Russian menace. Recent events in Ukraine may well modify this trend in the foreseeable future, for Russia's 'unleashed' geopolitical ambitions has required NATO to operate a geostrategic move back to Europe (NATO, 2014), including in its traditional role of conventional deterrence at sea.

In other words, the traditional (realist) concept of security (and defence) has not been erased following the expansion of the security agenda, but new dimensions have been added to it. The concept of seapower allows taking into account these new developments, as it partly reflects the comprehensiveness of the maritime dimension of security beyond naval power. It is important to understand that seapower cannot be reduced to a 'form of military power that is deployed at or from the sea' (Grove, 1990: 3). Grove chose this narrow definition for practical reasons when he wrote *Future of Sea power*, but immediately specified that 'the relationship of naval power with the various forms of sea use must also be considered' (3). Indeed, what primarily differentiates naval power from seapower is that the latter makes a clear reference to the sea as a geographical and geopolitical milieu. Seapower has therefore not only a 'naval' component, but also a 'maritime' one. According to Till, we can in fact use 'maritime power' and 'seapower' interchangeably (Till, 2004: 6).

Seapower is not a notion exclusively linked to war and military power. It encompasses various non-military aspects, such as maintaining good order at and from the sea. Navies are used to performing a large range of peacetime missions, including naval diplomacy, humanitarian operations, search and rescue (SAR), and police or constabulary duties. This is particularly true in the 21st century but does not constitute something new at all. As Strachan pointed out, naval battles have been more the exception than the rule; today, as in the 19th century, 'sea power [serves] national policy, more than it [serves] strategy' (Strachan, 2007: 30). However, there has been a shift from national policy towards a more globalised vision taking the transnationalisation of threats into account. Good order at and from the sea cannot realistically be achieved through national policies only. The sea cannot be 'occupied' and thus is harder to monitor and control by public forces compared to the land. It is a space of liberty for 'rogue' non-state actors, who can operate in a wide space without facing many police constraints. From a legal perspective, the sea remains a zone of liberty, resulting from the compromise between a territorialisation of the sea along the coast and a quasi-total liberty on the high seas. Non-state actors benefit from this relative lack of constraints and the porosity of maritime borders. Consequently, global maritime

security 'requires cooperation among many different countries, services, agencies and institutions, since a single state (or a single security entity) alone does not have the capability to cope with such non-territorial threats' (Germond, 2008b: 175).

The maritime dimension of security: A new framework for analysis

Following the expansion of the security studies agenda, naval scholars have continued to mainly focus on the military aspects of seapower as well as states' naval capabilities and strategies. The expansion of maritime-related issues – illegal immigration (and human smuggling), terrorism at sea, arms and drug trafficking, piracy, security of energy supplies, and marine environment degradations – has been taken into account, but approaches have mainly remained state-centric. Which maritime-related threats do states face? What can states and their navies do to cope with transnational threats? Although those questions are still relevant, it is now crucial to broaden and deepen the maritime studies agenda, which requires modifying the object of analysis. Rather than states, navies and international actors, one has to focus on the sea as a milieu, and the concept of seapower is supposed to facilitate this approach provided it is understood and used comprehensively. This requires a new framework for analysis, since traditional approaches should be complemented by new approaches to security, as well as critical and deconstructive approaches, so as to grasp the broader and deeper picture of the maritime dimension of security in the 21st century, four components of which will be considered in this book as summarised in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2 The maritime dimension of security and its four components

	Components of security	***Role of the sea***	***Key traits and goals***
1	The projection of security	The sea as a means to project security	• Interventions • Exercising sea control
2	The non-military dimension of security	The sea as an object to secure	• Maritime security • Controlling human activities at sea
3	The environmental dimension of security	The sea as an object to protect	• Sustainable development • Controlling human activities at sea
4	Securitisation and representations	The sea as a battle-ground of ideas	• Discourses • Definition of 'truths'

The projection of security is the first component. It grasps the fact that the sea is a means to project security (via power, forces, and norms) 'outside', beyond one's external boundary and territorial waters, all around the world, which has constituted a major part of Western security strategies and policies in the post-Cold War era (e.g. exercising control of the sea and foreign interventions). States conceive of the sea as a means (with navies being a tool) to project security including the projection of military power (realist vision) and normative power (liberal vision). In other words, seapower contributes to both national security and the promotion of the liberal international order. However, the sea, as a permanent element of the ecosystem and geography, also constrains states' power, leverages and, eventually, security.

As noted above, the nature of the sea has facilitated the proliferation of ill-disposed 'rogue' or criminal non-state actors operating at or from the sea. Consequently, states have to control human activities at sea or, in other words, to secure and protect the sea, which constitutes the second and third components of the maritime dimension of security. The distinction between these two components echoes the difference between soft security (i.e. combating transnational threats at sea, policing the 'global commons') and the environmental aspects of security (i.e. protecting the marine environment). Indeed, it is quite different to consider the sea as an object to secure (against non-military and transnational threats) or as an object to protect per se (against environmental degradations such as dumping of nuclear and chemical wastes, clearing of mines that remain from the world wars, oil discharges, tankers' collisions, or overexploitation of sea resources). The second component refers to maritime security whereas the third concerns maritime safety, marine environment protection, and sustainable development; both components can be related, for example, in case of accidents involving pirates, which can have serious environmental consequences.

The fourth component of the maritime dimension of security is at the level of ideas, representations, and their practical policy implications. As a geographical milieu, the sea lies at the centre of the battle of ideas. The way the sea, seapower, and the command of the sea are represented and the way maritime-related risks and threats are constructed must be understood and analysed within the broader securitising and geopolitical discourses. Using deconstructive approaches allows pinpointing the practical implications of those representations, notably in terms of legitimisation or normalisation of naval and maritime policies and activities through the 'power to define'.

These four maritime components of security can obviously converge or even mix. They form the conceptual background which will frame the rest of the book. The next chapters examine aspects of these four components with an emphasis on their relevance for European security and for the analysis of the maritime dimension of European security, starting with a discussion of the geographical and geopolitical dimensions of seapower.

2
The (Critical) Geopolitics of Seapower

Seapower and geography

Geography is an important determinant of international politics and security. Human and states' agency is inevitably limited by geographical constraints. Some scholars have claimed that geography constitutes one of the factors influencing the development of seapower. For example, Colin S. Gray stressed that the capacity of the US to exercise its power abroad derives 'inexorably from the enduring facts of physical, political, and strategic geography' (Gray, 1994: 165). Michael S. Lindberg emphasises the role of geography 'to determine a state's relationship with the sea, its maritime importance, its vulnerability to threats emanating from seaward and its need for naval power' (Lindberg, 1998: 38). According to Jakub Grygiel, 'geography, from geological factors such as the layout of a coastline to more ephemeral characteristics such as geography-influenced strategic culture, shapes the ability of a state to develop a navy and to wield seapower' (Grygiel, 2012: 35). Here, the influence of Mahan's writings seems evident; three of the six 'elements of seapower' he defined in his *Influence of Seapower* have directly to do with geography or geopolitics (i.e. geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory), and two others with geography-informed ideational dispositions (i.e. national character, character of governments) (Mahan, 2007: 29–81). This could lead us to believe that Mahan was deterministic in his account of geography. However, Jon Sumida claimed that this interpretation results from a superficial reading of Mahan's extensive work and demonstrated that 'Mahan's main concern in the *Influence of Sea Power* series was the critical importance of decision making by statesmen and admirals, not the power of geographical factors to determine the course of history' (Sumida, 1999: 57). Actually, one has to be

Table 2.1 Geographical factors influencing seapower

Types of geographical factors	*Nature of the influence (examples)*
Physical factors	• Shape, nature, and length of coastline • Easy access to main SLOCs
Geopolitical factors	• Security and stability at one's land borders • Access to/control of naval bases/chokepoints
Ideational factors	• Continental versus maritime strategic culture

very careful when discussing the influence of geography upon seapower. Geography does constrain seapower to some extent, but ultimately political decisions, the broader economic context, as well as non-geographical structural, systemic, and ideational factors are important, if not major, determinants of seapower. That said, three types of geographical factors influence seapower to some extent: geological and physical geography factors, geopolitical and human geography factors, and geography-informed ideational factors (Table 2.1).

Geological factors, such as the shape of a coastline or the depth of a strait, constitute very long-term features of the Earth. Their evolution is so slow that they can be considered as quasi-permanent on a human timescale of hundreds to thousands of years, although they are actually in motion on a geological timescale of millions to billions of years. In terms of seapower, the presence of a coastline is an evident prerequisite. Island states or those with a very long coastline seem more likely to turn towards the sea for their economic development and defence (e.g. Athens in Ancient Greece, Great Britain, and the US). The presence of a coastline is a necessary condition for seapower but not a sufficient one. For example, Indian seapower had not developed before the beginning of the 21st century, because of colonisation till 1947 and then a lack of financial and technological resources. Japan's seapower developed only after the Meiji revolution, that is to say, following a radical political, social, and ideational transformation. The nature of the coastline also matters. For example, some types of coastline are easier to defend (e.g. those which prevent amphibious landings). The global situation of a country (i.e. where its coastlines are located on a world map) is also important. If the coastlines grant direct access to the principal SLOCs this constitutes an advantage. If the access to the high seas is controlled by other states, it may undermine one's capacity to develop seapower. For example, Russia's access to the high seas either passes through enclosed seas (namely, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Japan) or is in

a relatively hostile natural environment (such as the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea). In the case of the Arctic, the coastlines were usually considered as hostile, but with the rapid melting of the polar ice cap, this situation is about to change (which shows that climate is not a permanent feature but is subject to change even on a human timescale). Finally, it must be noted that the presence of a coastline represents both an opportunity for trade and defence (since it is a gateway to the high seas) and a challenge (since it is also an entryway for invaders and criminal actors), what Grove described as the strategic ambivalence of the coastline (1990: 48), already noted by Friedrich Ratzel in 1911 (37).

Geopolitical and human geography factors are geographical features related to political circumstances. In other words, geological factors are illustrated with topographic maps of the world whereas geopolitical factors can be understood looking at political maps. For example, it is widely accepted that states not facing an enemy at their land borders nor domestic instability are in a better position to develop seapower (or at least naval power), what Mahan calls the geographical position (Mahan, 2007: 29–35). On the contrary, the presence of continental threats may hinder seapower. Indeed, 'the vulnerability of a naval power to an attack on its land borders weakens it seapower because its attention and resources are likely to focus on the continental realm' (Grygiel, 2012: 19). Much-discussed examples include the successful development of British seapower in the 18th and 19th centuries compared to France, which had to face land threats on its borders. Similarly, one factor explaining the rise of the US as the sole maritime superpower since the second half of the 20th century is the security of US land borders. If the situation on the Mexican and Canadian borders ever changes, it may affect the US capacity to sustain an effective seapower politics (Friedman, 2001: 5). Following that argument, internal instability in China (notably in Tibet and Xinjiang) may become an important factor when assessing the potentiality for China to become a sea Power. Another geopolitical factor includes the access to a good network of naval bases and the control of chokepoints. In this case, it is not geography that constrains seapower but previous military victories or political achievements that create the necessary conditions to harness the power of geography. Indeed, the access to bases and the control of chokepoints depends on earlier political decisions. For example, the purchase of the Chagos Archipelago (including Diego Garcia) by Britain in 1965 resulted from the political and strategic decision to provide the US with an operational base in the Indian Ocean. Here again, geography matters but human agency eventually supersedes it as the main determinant of seapower.

A series of geography-informed ideational factors also influence seapower. Ideational factors such as strategic culture are difficult to define precisely, as they consist in immaterial ideas, values, and preferences, often subconsciously endorsed. Moreover, if individuals' values and ideas can relatively easily be grasped, it is harder to account for such factors at the level of societies and states (what Mahan called the national character and the character of governments, 2007: 50–58). Trying to define a country's strategic culture and to compare it with that of another country can even become controversial as it involves putting entire societies and nations into one 'box', thus creating artificial categories. That said, deep-rooted cultural traditions influence the formation of national interest and the foreign policy decision-making processes, as discussed by the proponent of the cognitive model of decision-making, as well as by constructivist scholars (Jervis, 1976; Weldes, 1996). As to seapower, it is believed that countries that have traditionally been turned landward may well have developed a continental strategic culture that can prevent or limit the development of seapower, because the political and organisational structures of the state (i.e. decision-makers and bureaucracies) are not in an intellectual position to develop a proper maritime strategic culture, which is key to successful maritime policies. For instance, the case of the continental nature of the Soviet naval strategy is well referenced (Brooks, 1986; Hudson, 1976). And even after Admiral Gorshkov acknowledged the need for the Soviet Union to develop its seapower, Soviet leaders continued to mainly regard the navy 'as a seaward extension of the Army' (Friedman, 2007: 41). In sum, the adoption of a continental rather than a maritime strategy is, among others and to some extent, informed by geographical considerations, which may push nations and states towards either a maritime or a continental strategic culture and preference (Gray, 1994: xi). As will be discussed in the second part of the book, 15 years have passed between the inception of the CSDP in 1999 and the adoption of an EU Maritime Security Strategy in 2014, which was in part due to the 'sea blindness' of the EU's bureaucracy.

Geopower and the seas

Classical geopolitics postulates that geographical 'permanence' constrains politics and international relations, 'for geography does not argue. It simply is' (Spykman, 1938: 236). Without ignoring human agency, geopolitics takes geography into account, tries to find ways to bypass geographical constrains or to adapt to them so as to fulfil political or

strategic objectives. Classical scholars of geopolitics, such as Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, and Nicholas Spykman, have developed theories about world politics which have a profound geographical determinism. Interested in providing guidelines to the politicians (what we would today call policy recommendations), they have advocated (in one way or another) expansionist and imperialist policies (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 22), hence the bad reputation geopolitics has had since the end of the Second World War. The realist concept of relative gains (i.e. the world is a zero-sum game) also underlines classical geopolitics; 'the scramble for empty space [is] at an end' (25) and it is now a question of who controls the 'pivotal' zones. Classical authors have emphasised the importance of controlling geographical space and specific areas. Ratzel coined the notion of *Lebensraum* (which was eventually adopted and transformed by the Nazi regime), Mahan emphasised the mastery of the seas, and Mackinder stressed the importance of controlling the heartland and Spykman the rimland. Even if paternity has never been acknowledged, Georges Kennan's containment strategy is very much influenced by classical geopolitical thought as well (Streusand, 2002: 60). As to Mahan's advocacy of seapower, it must be noted that John Sumida contested the fact that Mahan was a proponent of developing a navy and a merchant fleet in order to dominate the world, since he was well aware of the transnational nature of seapower and of the need to cooperate (Sumida, 1999: 52–54).

In practice, imperialism in general and the control of pivotal zones in particular have been linked to the development of sea or (at least) naval power. Thus, Mahan's theses fitted well with the practical objectives of those fostering navalism, such as Theodore Roosevelt who advocated the development of a powerful US oceanic navy well before he met Mahan but then used Mahan's reputation 'to try to influence his superiors' before he became US president (Karsten, 1971: 597). Ratzel was among the advocates of the development of the German imperial navy within the influential lobbying group called the 'fleet professors' (Herwig, 2012: 187). Ratzel's ideas about geography and seapower are discussed in one of his lesser-known books in the English-speaking world (certainly due to the lack of any translation), *Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse* (Ratzel, 1911), which will be further discussed in chapter 9. The link between geopolitical thought and navalism is framed within the debate about the relative strategic advantage of seapower over land power. The preponderance of seapower is based on the following assumptions: 'command of the sea tends to yield a more absolute and extensive superiority at sea than command on land does on land [and] command at sea yields possibilities for influence on land superior to the

influence at sea that can flow from command on land' (Gray, 1994: 14). Recent history is full of examples tending to prove that sea Powers benefit from strategic advantages in war and peace, the most recent being the US success story since the beginning of the 20th century, both in war (First and Second World Wars, Korean War – the exception being the Vietnam War) and in peace (Cold War strategic competition and post-Cold War foreign interventions) and from an economic point of view (national wealth, economic growth). Seapower is an enabler of US hegemony and is instrumental in explaining the enduring US economic performance, which in turn contributes to sustained US dominance on the world stage. In other words, the stability of the current liberal international order cannot be separated from the maritime preponderance of the US.

Mackinder transcended the debate between seapower and land power, as the question was for him to discern 'which countries in a new age would be better positioned to develop preponderant sea power' (Gray, 1992: 5), which implies that (heart) land powers that can develop some sort of naval power (not least thanks to the development of railways that allow them to concentrate and mobilise resources) may eventually dominate the world. Imperial and then Nazi Germany, followed by the Soviet Union, attempted to put this theory into practice. The maritime nations, led by the US, ended up victorious, and it can be argued that neither Germany nor the USSR ever came close to becoming a sea Power. As to Britain, the preponderant sea Power of the 19th century, 'a crisis occurred when it was no longer possible for the British to translate control of European waters, for which geography helped enormously, into control of the world shipping routes on which Britain depended' (Friedman, 2001: 65–66). In other words, the decline of British naval mastery can be explained by Britain's failure to control the maritime domain beyond Europe rather than the rise of any continental competitors.

The 'rise' of China in the 21st century (which has economic, financial, technological, and political dimensions) has revived the debate about land versus seapower. China is still undoubtedly a land Power. Although physical geography does not prevent the development of China's seapower, geopolitical (continental threats) and ideational (continental thinking) factors may well limit its growth. Kaplan reminds us that 'since antiquity China has been preoccupied with the threat of land invasions [and only] with the collapse of the Soviet Union, such worries dissipated' (Kaplan, 2009: 48), allowing China to devote more resources towards seapower and maritime projection. China's growing maritime interests (such as controlling vital SLOCs) and regional ambitions (such

as resolving the Taiwan issue according to Beijing's terms, and the South China Sea and Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes) also require the development of naval power. The question remains whether any further development of China's seapower would inevitably result in a confrontation with the US.

In sum, whereas geography is only one factor among others that constrains seapower, states have tried not only to overcome geographical constraints but also to make the most of what geography could offer, hence the importance given to maritime geopolitics or geopower. Those considerations now apply to the EU, which is active in projecting material and normative power within its maritime margins and beyond (cf. chapters 8–10).

Critical geopolitics: The sea and the battle of ideas

Framed within post-structuralism, critical geopolitics seeks to research and unveil the link between the production of geographical knowledge (i.e. the spatialisation of world politics) and the power to define (i.e. the construction of 'one' world and 'one' truth and its naturalisation). Geraroíd Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, two pioneering scholars in the field, conceptualise geopolitics 'as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft "spatialize" international politics in such a way as to represent it as a "world" characterized by particular types of places, people and dramas' (1992: 192). In other words, 'geography is not a natural given but a power–knowledge relationship' (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 10). Studies framed within critical geopolitics aim to analyse the representation of space and to pinpoint the construction of threats and identities along an inside/outside line. Indeed, geopolitical discourses tend to systematically represent the 'inside/us' as the 'realm of peace and stability' and the 'outside/them' as the 'realm of conflict and insecurity'. Binary identities are thus reinforced by a discursive framework articulated along the division between the 'inside/us/threatened' and the 'outside/them/threatening'.

Geopolitical representations are framed within the influential discourse on the projection of security. This discourse proposes that security should systematically be projected beyond one's own boundaries. The key idea is the need to tackle the risks and threats as far away as possible, at the source, and as soon as possible. Projection is not restricted to military interventions but also concerns non-military issues (such as illegal immigration, drug smuggling, piracy), which legitimises the exercise of the monopoly on the use of violence beyond one's external boundary, including at sea. There is also a strong normative component,

that is to say, the projection of one's values and norms – a practice which is particularly developed in the West, due to the rather messianic nature of the liberal order. This rhetoric can be found in almost every security policy document released by Western states, the EU, and NATO in the past decade and a half (cf. chapter 4). Identities are constructed along an inside–outside symbolic *and* geographical line. There is an 'us' and a 'them', and despite ongoing economic and societal globalisation, geography as a reality *and* an imagery is still a determinant factor in identity building and policy making. Moreover, threats are also mainly constructed along these binary oppositions. The dominant discourse on the projection of security is backed by a geopolitical subdiscourse, based on simple geosocial representations, such as 'us–stable–safe' versus 'them–unstable–dangerous', which further normalises the idea that security (of the 'us') will be obtained through interventions (projection of security and norms) into the 'them' territory/space, that is to say, beyond one's own boundaries/territorial waters. In other words, one's own security depends on the ability of the 'us' to influence the 'them'.

The way the sea has been represented in the collective imagery has always been mixed if not paradoxical. On the one hand the sea bears positive meanings, such as fascinating immensity, unrestricted freedom, resource-rich space, courage, and solidarity (of the sailors). On the other hand, the sea is also represented as a hazardous milieu, linked to negative connotations such as unpredictability, the unknown, an inhospitable otherness, the infinite, and the unregulated. Both positive and negative representations of the sea tend to contribute to the 'us versus them' framing of maritime geopolitics. The sea is an 'empty' space of liberty and at the same time an unregulated space, prone to the proliferation of criminal non-state actors. The sea is a source of resources for the human beings but at the same time an inhospitable milieu.

The sea is the land's other. Compared to the land's stability the sea is unpredictable, uninhabitable, and largely ungoverned, thus, in imaginaries, mainly a place for adventurers or heroes. This representation has recurrently been present in the literature since Antiquity (Mentz, 2009). Philip E. Steinberg (1999: 411) especially emphasises the Romantics' tendency to identify the sea as 'a wild other' while honouring 'it as a space to be respected and, in some instances, idealized rather than vilified'. The sea is also a frontier space between the 'us' and the distant 'them'. Being represented as an 'empty' space, that is to say, a *mare nullius* or at least a *mare liberum*, the sea is constructed as a medium through which power projection is facilitated. These representations 'have served to support and constitute a system of power/knowledge that has maintained the

systematic colonization, exploitation, and domination of lands lying beyond the ocean's vast expanse' (Steinberg, 2001: 38).

The myth of seapower had developed well before the writings of Mahan. It is based on the (exaggerated) perception of seapower as an enabler of national security and economic wealth. For instance, N. A. M. Rodger (2004) traces the myth of English seapower to the Elizabethan era when seapower started to be associated with liberty, financial gains, and Protestantism by English people and politicians. The discrepancies between the facts of English seapower and the way it was collectively imagined is explained by the lack of reliable knowledge as well as the persistence of cognitive representations that contributed to the reproduction of the myth across generations of British public opinion (173–174). In the 21st century, seapower is still largely perceived as an enabler of security and economic wealth. The later image is reinforced by the dominant discourse on globalisation, namely, an interconnected world where the sea facilitates the constant, global, and uninterrupted flow of trading goods. In other words, the sea is to goods what cyberspace is to information.

The image of a prospering liberal international order is associated with the need to maintain the freedom of the seas (*mare liberum*). But this freedom is never granted, as long as there are 'forces' opposed to the Liberal project. Consequently, the need to 'control' the sea is normalised. On land, the state is the guarantor of civil liberties (which constitute the basis of the Liberal project). Likewise, the freedom of the seas is guaranteed through a certain level of control. Depending on the actors taking part in the act of representation (such as naval planners, politicians, economic actors, environmentalists), this control should take different forms, such as navalism, the territorialisation of the sea (i.e. a push for a greater control by the states over their exclusive economic zones [EEZs] or even beyond), or an increased regulatory role of supranational bodies (like the EU). Now, it must be noted that the disruption of the freedom of the seas transcends the notions of war and peace, from Germany's systematic attempts to disrupt transatlantic trade during the two World Wars to Somali pirates' limited and localised interference in the 21st century. The widespread adoption by politicians and public opinion alike of a comprehensive notion of security (that goes beyond national security) has further contributed to the myth of maritime power projection, since security has now to be searched upstream. As security means more than the absence or resolution of conflicts, maritime power projection goes beyond the participation of navies in projection operations (such as the 2011 Libyan campaign) to include counter-piracy, counter-trafficking, counter-immigration, or marine environment and fisheries protection

operations far away from states' boundaries and often conducted within coalitions and/or under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), NATO, or the EU. Beyond securing the freedom of the seas, the management of the 'global commons' (notably the access to its resources) has led to the adoption of a managerial approach mainly within a multilateral framework, what Steinberg (2001: 176–180) calls the stewardship of the oceans, when 'individual states, the community of states, and/or non-state actors are permitted to exercise social power in the interest of stewarding marine resources' (177). In addition, managing the social interactions taking place at sea (policing the seas) also requires interagency and international cooperation.

In sum, the dominant maritime geopolitics discourse is mainly framed by liberal principles, such as the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea (or good order at sea), the freedom of the seas, and stewardship. In practice, it translates into legitimised projection activities, which include classical power and forces projection, exercising the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea, and the promotion of norms and values.

Maritime geopolitics subdiscourses

Maritime geopolitics has given birth to several subdiscourses based on specific national interests and strategic cultures, as well as regional specificities. They have evolved from place to place and over time, although they are influenced by the dominant maritime geopower discourse discussed above. Four subdiscourses deserve closer attention: concentric circles, global reach/forward presence, backyard, and chokepoints subdiscourses (Table 2.2).

The concept of concentric circles implies that the degree of control a state (or its navy) should be able to exercise over maritime spaces evolves outwards from the coast in concentric circles: coastal waters, EEZs, adjacent zone, and high seas. Each zone implies a certain degree

Table 2.2 Maritime geopolitics subdiscourses

Subdiscourses	***Maritime spaces***	***Aspirations***
Concentric circles	Coastal waters, EEZs, high seas	Control or denial
Global reach/ forward presence	Global waters, overseas bases	Projection
Backyard	Delimited portions of the sea	Territorialisation of the sea
Chokepoints	Straits, canals, peninsula	Control or denial

of control, from exclusive and total in the coastal waters to limited, reactive, and shared once one progressively moves away from the coast. From a geopolitical discursive perspective, maritime concentric circles have allowed states to claim strategic 'rights' over certain portions of the ocean considered and constructed as the 'first line' of defence, or at least as a zone that is vital to control for defence, security, and economic purposes. For example, China has developed a 'geographical construct [that] places the Chinese mainland at the epicenter of maritime Asia' (Yoshihara, 2012: 294). This has led China to think in terms of a three-tier concentric circles maritime strategy, with the first circle extending to the first island chain, from Japan to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia (where China's navy aims to be able to operate in a position of dominance). The second circle extends to the second island chain, from Japan to Guam, Indonesia, and Australia (where China seeks to acquire capabilities to operate on an equal basis with the US Navy). And the third circle extends towards the US coast and India (where China wants to be present so as to defend its national interest, especially in the Indian Ocean due to energy security considerations). Thus, the second and third circles overlap other naval powers' own circles (such as India's one), with all the risks that entails. Whereas sea control is aimed at within the first or second circles, a sea denial strategy may be applied within far-off circles. Chapters 8 to 10 will discuss the extent to which the EU has developed a concentric circle maritime geopolitics in discourses and practice. It is also interesting to note that the concentric circles subdiscourse draws from the popular narrative on naval modernisation, that is, navies are (ideally) supposed to 'develop' following a linear line from 'brown' navy to 'green' and, eventually, to a 'blue' navy, or in other words, from a coastal defence navy to a (global) projection navy (Germond, 2014). 'Blue water' navies are thus represented as means to control additional circles further away from the coasts.

Given the inherent flexibility of naval forces and the relative liberty that characterises the maritime milieu, the narrative on seapower tends to emphasise on the 'global reach' it grants naval Powers. In other words, a 'projection' navy offers the possibility to operate all over the 'global commons', which, given the current reach of naval weaponry (e.g. cruise missiles) as well as drones and carrier aviation, offers almost unrestricted access to any theatres of operations. In addition to strategic and operational advantages, the 'global reach' subdiscourse stresses the deterrent or coercive power of forward deployed naval forces ('showing the flag', 'gunboat diplomacy'). As a prime example, the US Navy has endorsed the concept of forward presence, which dominates the

current US narrative on seapower. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* places 'forward presence' (of US naval forces) at the core of the US maritime strategy. This reflects in the recurring use of similar expressions throughout the document: forward deployed forces, forward based forces, persistent presence, global presence, forward presence, global distribution of forces, globally postured forces, global presence using distributed forces, and so on (US Navy, 2007). Geopolitical imageries contribute to this narrative. The sea is recurrently represented as an empty space, which grants naval powers in general and the US in particular with the *means* to operate far away from home; its corollary being the *right* to do it, or, in other words, a certain continuation of the 'Manifest Destiny' at sea. The US construction of its forward presence as something 'granted' demonstrates its operating 'with an unmeshed geography' (Kelly, 2003: 367), in which the US power is material (global reach capabilities) as well as symbolic (representation of the US Navy as ubiquitous), one dimension reinforcing the other and vice versa.

Whereas the sea grants naval powers with 'global reach' capacity, in Ken Booth's words: 'one man's distant waters is another man's maritime backyard' (Booth, 1985: 44). It is thus necessary to exercise a certain degree of 'control over one's own backyard' (Admiral Eberle, quoted in Cable, 1983: 43). At the level of geopolitical discourses, this translates into a 'maritime backyard' narrative, which constructs portions of the seas as being for one's own exclusive use. This territorialisation of the sea goes beyond what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants states with (i.e. territorial waters, EEZs, continental shelf rights) to include large portions of the oceans, whose location and extent vary from state to state. In other words, this subdiscourse can be assimilated with an expression of the 'Monroe Doctrine' at sea, which constructs one's maritime frontier as an hybrid space, which is legally situated outside one's polity but functionally lies inside one's geopolitical zone of interest (Germond and Smith, 2009: 579), that is, one's backyard. Big Powers such as the US (Pacific Ocean), China (South China Sea), India (Indian Ocean), Russia (Arctic Ocean), and even the EU (the Mediterranean) have all adopted geopolitical imageries along the 'backyard' or 'frontier' narrative. A recent iteration of the maritime 'Monroe Doctrine' can be found in India's narrative, whose current 'maritime backyard' discourse is similar to the US discourse in the 19th century. Indeed, in the 19th century, the US, while stressing that the 'New World' territory was out of reach for European imperialism, tolerated the preponderance of the British Royal Navy, for the US had no

means to balance the Royal Navy at that time and actually needed the British to maintain order in 'their' maritime backyard and to prevent incursions from anyone else. Today, India's narrative constructs the Indian Ocean as its own backyard. But this does not prevent India from welcoming a peaceful (or like-minded) US Navy that can guarantee security (and perhaps also deter or balance China) so long as India is not in a position to do so (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008, 2009).

The implementation of the 'concentric circles', 'forward presence', and 'maritime backyard' strategies is, to some extent, dependent on the control of certain maritime chokepoints. These positions (usually straits, canals, or peninsula) command access to certain portions of the oceans. They are usually located along important SLOCs where they constitute a point of congestion. Examples include the Strait of Malacca (and the Kra Isthmus), the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Cape of Good Hope, and Cape Horn. With the melting of the polar ice cap, the geostrategic importance of the Bering Strait is also likely to grow. The strategic importance of chokepoints has given birth to a specific geopolitical subdiscourse, which emphasises the need to either control those chokepoints or at least make sure no one else can control them exclusively, so as to secure one's own use of the sea as a means of transportation and communication. A recent example can be found in China's 'string of pearls' narrative, which represents the sea route from China to the Indian Ocean as vital for China's economic and energy security and thus legitimises China's acquisition of (or access to) naval facilities along it: in the Spartly Islands, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Pakistan (Pant, 2012: 365). That said, China's 'expansionist' maritime narrative is still balanced by the 'Zhang He' narrative, which rather puts the emphasis on China's benign intentions. Indeed, Ming Dynasty Admiral Zhang He's travel and sojourn 'in maritime Asia without attempting military conquest [is used as] a metaphor for China's current peaceful ascent in the maritime domain', including in the Indian Ocean (Yoshihara, 2010).

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Geography does constrain politics in general and seapower in particular, at least to a certain extent and in conjunction with ideational factors. In turn, states have developed geopower politics, whose maritime dimension has always been crucial. Maritime geopower politics have been normalised through a series of geopolitical representations, which,

although they have varied over time and between places, recurrently put the emphasis on the need to control the seas so as to, eventually, control the land. The following chapter will discuss the role of naval forces in fulfilling seapower politics. Chapters 4 and 5 then discuss the practice of seapower as a means to project security, secure the sea, and protect the sea.

3
Naval Forces as Vectors of Seapower

The term naval forces implies seagoing ships (and their air, space, and land support) operated (or sponsored) by states. Thus, beyond navies, naval forces encompass coastguards, branches of the police and customs operating at sea, as well as civilian-manned support fleets such as the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. In the past, privateers would have fallen into that category as well since they were backed by states. Seapower has traditionally been related to naval forces' ships. French Admiral Michel Tripier, in the foreword to his book on naval missions, boldly claimed that the sea shall not be considered as the kingdom of Poseidon, 'a two-bit monarch: potbellied, limply enthroned between mermen, mermaids and sirens amid kelp, shellfish and dolphins' (1993: 9) but the kingdom of Archimedes. Indeed, human beings have been able to use the sea as a means of transportation and to exercise command of the sea since they have been able to operate ships, and this was made possible thanks to the well-known buoyancy principle attributed to the great Greek physicist:

> Any object, wholly or partially immersed in a fluid, is buoyed up by a force equal to the weight of the fluid displaced by the object. (Archimedes of Syracuse; see reprint 1897)

As discussed in chapter 2, naval forces are not the only and even not the main *element* of seapower. However, they are definitely one (if not the most) important *vector* of seapower. It is through them that states can claim, secure, exercise, and dispute command of the sea as well as exercise the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea. The nature of the maritime milieu grants naval forces with various liberties, which in turn grant them with a high degree of flexibility, versatility,

and interoperability. Those characteristics have predisposed naval forces to adapt quickly and efficiently to the strategic and exogenous changes that have taken place in the post-Cold War era, despite ongoing budgetary restrictions.

The characteristics of the maritime milieu and naval forces' specificities

Naval forces are characterised by the milieu in which they operate, that is, the sea. The maritime milieu is fundamentally inhospitable for human beings and thus does not constitute their traditional habitat. The seas are useful and thus important for human beings primarily due to economic considerations, namely, maritime transport (which counts for about 90% of global trade by weight), fisheries (which contribute to about 25% of the world population's protein intake), and the exploitation of offshore deposits of natural resources, mainly oil and gas (which represents the majority of undiscovered petroleum). The sea is uninhabitable and thus cannot be occupied in a classical military sense. The sea can only be commanded or controlled (Corbett, 1911; Turner, 1974) and the strategic importance of the sea shall be understood only through its relationship to the land. In other words, naval operations are always conducted having in mind their impacts on the military, political, or economic situation on land, be it fisheries protection, counter-piracy, coastal defence, naval bombardments, *guerre de course*, or even naval battles between two high-sea fleets. This was well summarised by Corbett who wrote, referring to a war context:

> Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases – either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do. (1911: 15)

The final cause of naval forces is to exercise direct or indirect effects onto the land. However, the fact that they operate at sea implies a certain number of liberties for naval actors at the practical, legal, and political levels (e.g. Till, 1994: 193). Firstly, the sea grants naval forces a vast liberty of manoeuvre. Indeed, the oceans and the seas that represent about two-thirds of the Earth's surface constitute an extended, wide, and extensible lane of communication. The sea is crucial in economic terms and also allows deploying forces to distant theatres

without facing major material obstacles. However, naval officers and sailors are well aware that this idea of 'total liberty' must be qualified, for there are physical obstacles at sea: meteorological hazards still constrain naval forces, not only in reputedly hostile zones such as the Arctic Ocean and the Strait of Magellan but also during routine operations (e.g. transiting through the Bay of Biscay in winter can still be hazardous for small units, some of them having to call at Brest in case of very poor weather). High seabed constitutes another physical constraint in coastal areas or in certain shallow seas such as the Baltic and the Aegean seas.

Secondly, from a legal perspective, the sea is a space of great liberty compared to the land. Indeed, under the UNCLOS, signed in Montego Bay in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, beyond the 12 nautical miles of territorial waters navies are authorised to operate without major legal constraint. In practice, warships can operate very close to the coast of foreign states without violating any international rules or treaties as long as their passage remains 'innocent' (Articles 17–25). This plays in favour of naval presence and naval diplomacy. For example, in 1996, the US 7th Fleet was deployed in the Taiwan Strait to respond to a series of Chinese naval exercises carried out to put pressure on the electoral process that was taking place on the island. Such deployments can be ad hoc (i.e. in response to a particular event) or part of prepositioned or forward deployed forces. US prepositioned forces perfectly illustrate the legal liberty granted by the seas: prepositioned all over the world in perfect accordance with international law they allow the US to maintain a worldwide presence in peacetime (which can both deter potential enemies and reassure allies of US involvement), to collect (human, electronic, and cyber) intelligence in view of future operations, and to quickly intervene in case of crisis, as elaborated by the US Navy in the seminal document 'Forward . . . From the Sea':

> Presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, gains U.S. familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities. (Department of the Navy, 1994: 3)

Chapter 6 will show that although the Europeans' forward presence is much more limited than the US one, the potential exists thanks to a substantial network of overseas territories and access to friendly states' naval facilities.

Thirdly, governments enjoy a great political liberty when it comes to deploying naval forces due to their low visibility in the media. Indeed, unlike land and air deployments, naval operations generally result in relatively low media coverage, and thus are often ignored by the public opinion and even by the parliamentarians (although this is less the case in traditional naval countries such as the US or the UK). This is all the more the case since deployed naval forces do not necessarily imply a major use of force (e.g. police operations, counter-terrorism, peace support operations, naval presence). In sum, governments can use naval means, including very close to foreign states' territories, without having to justify their actions so much in the eyes of the citizen. This is also true in peacetime, when naval forces take part in counter-immigration operations without catching the public's attention. Hedley Bull wrote that naval forces provide visibility, as they 'convey threats, provide reassurance, or earn prestige' (Bull, 1976: 6). This is true, since naval forces are symbolic of states' power and 'rank', hence the importance of naval presence and naval diplomacy. However, in the information age, it is clear that naval forces can still avoid catching too much attention from the media. This is all the more true with social media that must be fed by individuals using their mobile phones to get pictures, something which is harder to accomplish in the case of naval deployments when states virtually hold the monopoly on the diffusion of pictures. For example, the high-profile deployment of HMS *Illustrious* to the Philippines in the aftermath of the 2013 typhoon generated interest in the British media, but pictures and videos used to illustrate the humanitarian operation were mainly released by the Royal Navy itself since no one else was 'there' to take pictures. Naval forces are thus a rather discreet tool at governments' disposal. This advantage can in turn represent a weakness in the case of prestige operations, such as when Western navies take part in disaster-relief operations as mentioned above. Indeed, despite the Royal Navy's effort, this operation remained rather unnoticed, especially outside the UK. A similar situation is found in the case of the EU's counter-piracy operation Atalanta at the Horn of Africa, which, despite some evident success, has not much raised the profile of the EU as a naval actor in the eye of the public opinion.

In sum, due to the milieu in which they operate, naval forces benefit from liberties in three key areas: manoeuvre/reach, legality of action, and media coverage. In addition, the following three traits characterise naval forces in general and their operational use in the post-Cold War era in particular. Firstly, naval forces are very flexible in terms of manoeuvre

(i.e. global reach) and at the legal and political levels too. They are thus very well adapted to respond to the current strategic objectives and missions assigned to them, whose priority has been put on the projection of security beyond one's external boundaries, particularly high-intensity interventions, peace operations, humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy operations, and so on. Thus, the freedom to use naval forces and their flexibility are an asset for projection operations that necessitate power and forces projection means (that only naval forces possess – cf. chapter 4) but are also carried out at the edge of international law, which necessitates legal and political flexibility.

Secondly, naval units are particularly versatile. Each unit is used to operating with varied objectives, under varied conditions, and in varied geographical areas. For example, a multipurpose frigate can, over the course of one year, participate in several operations and exercises in varied and distant locations. This versatility allows quickly setting up a naval strike force for ad hoc operations from units that were initially not (or not particularly) intended to participate in that very operation. This allows reacting at short notice to various (unexpected – or unplanned for) scenarios:

> Warships can easily change their military posture, undertake several tasks concurrently and be available for rapid re-tasking using organically held resources [. . .] At the tactical level an individual warship of frigate size and above will have offensive and defensive capabilities in all dimensions (air, surface, subsurface and the electromagnetic spectrum). It can, therefore, operate in a variety of operational settings. Warships can be formed into task groups and task forces in which their individual characteristics combine to provide a mutually supportive, powerful and versatile combinations [sic] of offensive and defensive capabilities. (MoD, 2011: 2/3–4)

In other words, naval forces are by nature rapid and versatile reaction forces. In a period of budgetary restrictions, it is convenient to have at one's disposal forces ready to be engaged in case of crises, but which otherwise can be engaged in peacetime missions (such as maritime security or humanitarian operations). Naval forces can meet these demands thanks to their modularity and versatility. The difference between flexibility and versatility is that flexibility refers to the various ways naval forces can be employed while versatility refers to the wide range of missions that can be carried out together or sequentially by the same

ship. Both of them constitute an important asset for the European naval forces that have suffered from significant budgetary cuts since the end of the Cold War.

Thirdly, naval forces are extremely interoperable. In other words, it is easy to amalgamate units from different nations to create a multinational task force. Indeed, the particular nature of the maritime milieu, with its freedom of manoeuvre and legality of action, grants naval forces a higher degree of flexibility and versatility than enjoyed by the other armed services. Consequently, they are in the best position to put interoperability into practice, since naval units can operate easily with foreign counterparts and within combined task forces (Sokolsky, 1998). In the case of Western Europe, the practice of working together during the Cold War, using NATO standards and training together during NATO exercises, was developed more systematically within navies than the other armed services as the small number of units in service within each navy has required cooperation for the sake of efficiency. Cooperation was then facilitated thanks to the above-mentioned specificities. Moreover, naval culture and traditions imply a greater feeling of belonging to the same 'brotherhood' that makes the understanding of others and the willingness to cooperate easier. This clearly helped to achieve a certain degree of interoperability (Germond, 2008b: 175). Multinational naval cooperation is not limited to NATO member states though. Navies all around the world share common procedures and, when it comes to maritime security, common objectives as well. The current collaboration at the Horn of Africa between NATO and Chinese naval forces in the context of counter-piracy illustrates this capacity to operate together whenever there is a political will.

Naval missions

In the literature, the terms 'naval missions' and 'naval functions' have been used rather interchangeably. However, the term 'mission' refers to the idea of assigned objectives (i.e. objectives assigned to the naval forces) while the term 'function' refers to the inherent role, or even nature, of naval forces. The range of missions that can be assigned to naval forces is very large, which is due to the mobility, flexibility, and freedom of action inherent to the milieu in which they operate. Some of these missions are very old, such as commerce raiding that was practised since antiquity. Others are more recent, such as submarine-based nuclear deterrence and marine environment protection to name but two.

Naval missions directly follow security and defence objectives formulated at the highest level of states or international organisations (e.g. NATO and the EU).[1] In other words, the political authorities assign general goals and functions to naval forces (such as the defence of territorial waters, the projection of power and forces) and set up the conditions under which they will be engaged (e.g. in response to an attack by a foreign state, in response to a regional crisis). Those missions (the ends) are defined in connection with the Grand Strategy objectives, which depend on the international context, the current threats to regional, national, societal, human, energy, and environmental security, as well as the moral and political situation prevailing at the domestic level, including ideational elements such as continental versus maritime strategic culture. It then remains to decide which resources to allocate to naval forces so that they can fulfil the assigned objectives. The aim is to align means (human, moral, and material resources) with the ends (roles and functions of naval forces). The means, which often limit the ends, depend on economic and technological rather than political and ideological considerations, although budgetary constraints also influence Grand Strategy. Decisions related to naval missions are usually taken at the ministerial level (in collaboration with the general staff and admiralty). In democratic states, they can be subject to parliamentary (or even citizens) approval/validation. Until recently, only the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were involved in the naval missions' decision-making process. Due to the expansion of the security agenda, other ministries are involved, such as Agriculture and Environment (for fisheries protection), Transport (for maritime safety and security), and Home Office and Justice (for transnational criminality and illegal immigration). International organisations such as NATO and the EU can also be involved in the process of definition of naval missions through uploading nationally defined naval missions into their own strategy or downloading their strategic objectives into states' ones.

In 1979, Ken Booth proposed a 'trinity' of naval functions that quickly became seminal (15–25). It was notably reused and modified by Eric Grove in 1990 (234). This model differentiates three types of naval functions: military, diplomatic, and constabulary. The simplicity of this model constitutes its main strength. This trinity is popular among practitioners as well. It was notably endorsed by the UK MoD in the 2011 British Maritime Doctrine, which specifies three corresponding roles for the Royal Navy: war-fighting, maritime security, and international engagement (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Trinity of naval functions
Source: Booth, 1979; Grove, 1990; MoD, 2011

This triangular model creates some artificial barriers between the missions though. Indeed, once those functions or missions are translated into practical operations, it can become difficult to differentiate military from diplomatic functions and military from constabulary functions, something that Booth originally acknowledged (17). For example, 'gunboat diplomacy' falls into the category of diplomatic functions. However, the use (or at least the threat to use) force implies much more than 'showing the flag' and can also have different international legal consequences:

> There is [. . .] an overlap between gunboat and naval diplomacy, and between gunboat diplomacy and war. Gunboat diplomacy sits on a spectrum between naval diplomacy at one end, where friendly port calls and collaborative military exercises aim to build closer relations with allies, but without threatening other states, and war at the other. Within this spectrum lie those activities often classified as gunboat diplomacy, which can include military exercises in disputed waters or with capabilities designed to deter or threaten. The separation between these categories is often fine. (Le Mière, 2011: 57)

Similarly, in disputed waters and unstable regions (such as the South China Sea), where mistrust and animosity characterise coastal states' relationships to a certain extent, the boundary between constabulary and military operations is easily crossed when it comes to protecting one's EEZ against illegal fishing from another state. For example, Chinese naval and paramilitary forces operating in the contested waters of the South China Sea have regularly used force (albeit in a limited way) and threatened to use force against Filipino fishermen in the past decade (Dupont and Baker, 2014).

Despite these limitations, this trinity constitutes a good starting point, since it establishes theoretical boundaries between three levels of intensity of the use of force by naval forces, namely, police operations

in accordance with national and international law, the threat to use force or a very limited use of force sometimes in contradiction with international legal norms (naval diplomacy), and war-fighting operations (up to high-intensity warfare). This model also differentiates between three main goals (or final causes) of naval forces: exercising the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea (constabulary functions); avoiding future recourse to the use of force, deescalating crises, deterring competitors, and reassuring allies (diplomatic functions); and winning wars or intervening militarily in other states' domestic affairs (military functions). In practice, each of these three functions is divided into subfunctions which need elaboration. Within the category of military or war-fighting functions, various subcategories have been defined by scholars and practitioners. One submodel has been traditionally endorsed (see, for example, Moineville, 1982), which differentiates between three military subfunctions: combating the enemy's naval forces (*Guerre d'Escadre*), disrupting the enemy's trade (*Guerre de Course*), and contributing to land operations (littoral warfare), what we can also represent with a triangle (Figure 3.2).

This submodel offers a structured account of the various military missions. However, it overemphasises attack over defence. For example, coastal defence (e.g. repelling carrier strike forces and amphibious forces) would be considered as a counter-attack against the enemy's forces rather than a defensive response to an attack against the land. Eric Grove adopted three similar categories of military subfunctions: sea control, sea denial, and force projection (1990: 234–235). Sea control, as a naval function, bears similarities with *Guerre d'Escadre*, since securing control may well require eliminating the enemy's forces, following what Mahan would call the decisive battle. Sea denial, that is to say, denying the enemy the control of the sea without securing it for oneself, may well require disrupting the enemy's trade (e.g. German *U-Boote* during the two World Wars). Force projection naturally implies intervening into the enemy's territory.



Figure 3.2 Military subfunctions

That said, this taxonomy also set up some artificial boundaries between categories of missions. For example, carrying out a projection operation requires, beforehand, securing control of the sea at least in the theatre of operation. In other words, it is not possible to exercise command of the sea (carrying out an amphibious operation) without having previously secured command of the sea, which shows that the theoretical differentiation between various military functions is rather artificial.

Other practitioners have emphasised the need to differentiate between offensive and defensive functions or between active and reactive functions. For example, Admiral Tripier proposed five pairs: to transport versus to seize or destroy goods, to transport versus to capture or destroy forces, to assail the enemy's territory versus to defend against such attacks, to control the sea in the theatre of operations versus to deny this control, and nuclear deterrence at sea versus attacking the vectors of deterrence such as SSBNs (1993: 15–16). Again, it is important to stress that exercising control of the sea in the case of land attacks requires securing control in the theatre of operation beforehand. This can become very quick and easy, or even instantaneous, when the enemy is not in a position to operate at sea. For example, in 2003, the British and US naval forces did not have to deal with prior naval threats before proceeding with the invasion of Iraq since they already controlled the Gulf, the Red Sea, and most adjacent zones.

Diplomatic functions aim at avoiding the use of force (e.g. nuclear deterrence) or limiting escalation (e.g. blockades). Here, one has to differentiate between deterrent, coercive, and ideational functions. At the bottom end, naval presence constitutes a form of deterrence by ostentation. For example, port calls, which is a frequent practice, contribute to 'showing the flag', which is a way to showcase one's intrinsic power as well as one's potential projection capabilities. More precisely, port calls help in building trust and good relationship with partners (confidence-building measures). Port calls will reassure allies of one's support and notify enemies and allies' enemies of one's commitment. Another form of naval presence involves prepositioning forces in potential theatres of operations. This is mainly a prerogative of the US Navy which is currently close to the 'ideal' situation consisting in a global prepositioning of forces. This requires not only projectable forces but also logistics, bases, and partners willing to allow operational calls for replenishments. At a limited level, this is what China is trying to achieve with its 'string of pearls' strategy (cf. chapter 2). Prepositioned forces offer both an operational advantage in case of conflicts and a means to evidence one's determination and commitment, which is a form of deterrence (e.g. the US 7th Fleet in East Asia or 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean). Similarly, SIGINT (i.e. to collect

signal intelligence) by ships in a particular region (e.g. the US Navy in the South China Sea) is a way not only to prepare for potential conflicts but also to demonstrate one's strategic interest in this particular region and one's determination to act according to national interests. At the top of the chain, deterrence also includes sea-based (or more precisely submarine-based) nuclear deterrence, which is the ultimate stage of deterrence, given that such deployments actually aim at not using one's nuclear arsenal. That said, in the (unlikely) case of deterrence failure, the engagement of nuclear weapons would fall beyond the boundaries of deterrence (i.e. to avoid the use of force) to enter the subcategory of offensive military missions (i.e. nuclear power projection onto the land).

Coercion implies a limited use or show of force. Classical naval coercion includes 'gunboat diplomacy', a European practice born in the 19th century, which consisted in exercising political pressures on weaker states (such as Imperial China) by deploying ostentatious naval forces close to their territory and proceeding with some selected naval bombardments, so as to pose a constant threat to those states (a sort of Damocles' sword). This practice has not died out, although its form has been softened. For example, the deployment of the US 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 to respond to China's naval exercises in these waters is a deterrent action (to deter China from using force against the island). However, China's own naval exercises in the strait very close to Taiwan's coast (including missiles launches) was a coercive action, for they aimed at pressuring the election process in Taiwan. Naval coercion also includes targeted small-scale operations. For example, the US Navy's strikes against terrorists' training camps in Afghanistan in 1998 following a series of terrorist attacks again US assets illustrate the thin boundary that lies between 'diplomatic', 'police', and 'military' missions. In fact, international law cannot prevent these coercive actions from happening, since the sea is a space of liberty. Booth reminds us: 'As an old Admiralty maxim had it, "the sea is one"; hence a country with a navy is potentially a neighbour of all countries with coasts' (1979: 379). Naval Powers' privileges have only been confirmed if not strengthened by the UNCLOS due to the liberty that the convention grants navies with beyond the (short) 12 nautical miles of territorial waters. In the same vein, blockades lie at the edge between war and peace, as illustrated by the US response to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Blockades allow enforcing one's interests, given one has the naval operational capabilities to maintain it. The danger is that there is a possibility that the crisis might escalate, for example, when other major naval powers oppose the blockade.

The final expression of naval diplomacy is at the level of ideas, norms, and image building. As an instrument of states' power, naval forces

possess a strong symbolic power. They can be considered as states' foreign policy showcase. With the growing importance of public diplomacy – to influence public opinion at home and abroad and to create a positive and benevolent image of one's country and foreign policy – naval forces' soft power (namely the power to influence and the power of attraction, not coercion) is an interesting tool at defence ministries' disposal. Whereas port calls, joint exercises, and other forms of naval collaboration help build a certain image, they mainly contribute to 'please' allies and partners and to deter enemies. On the contrary, emergency and humanitarian aid provided by naval units play only the soft power card, for they demonstrate benevolence, and it is expected that the public will be taken aback. Indeed, it is counter-intuitive to imagine large warships (including aircraft carriers) participating in emergency relief operations. The contrast between public's expectations and the reality is thus supposed to create a positive effect on image building. US, British, French, and other navies' involvement in such operations is not trivial and more and more resources are devoted to this foreign policy tool.

Finally, constabulary functions can be divided into two broad subcategories. Firstly, police missions consist in enforcing coastal states' law and international law in the territorial waters and the EEZs, and international law on the high seas. Policing the seas means combating criminal actors but also more generally speaking promoting good governance and the rule of law at sea. Within territorial waters and EEZs, naval forces carrying out police missions contribute to states' ostensible presence at sea in view of not only deterring criminal actors but also affirming one's own territorial claims in case of contested sovereignty, such as China's paramilitary forces operating in the South China Sea. In practice, police missions include protecting one's natural resources (petroleum and fish), protecting maritime trade (against pirates or terrorists), preventing the illegal use of ships (by terrorists, drug, arms and people smugglers, as well as illegal migrants). Secondly, constabulary missions that do not require any use of force or even the potential use of force can be labelled as 'maritime fire fighters' missions. They include SAR, maritime traffic monitoring, tackling oil spills and other forms of marine pollution, oceanography, and hydrology.

Naval forces and the construction of extrinsic power

Naval forces are emblematic of states' intrinsic and extrinsic power. Intrinsic power delineates the boundaries of what a navy (or a state) can achieve. It can be calculated by looking at the order of battle and the

order of effect. Extrinsic power is not based on navies' actual capabilities but on the image they project to the outside world (and to some extent to one's own public opinion). Naval deployments show force and determination, but by their mere existence naval forces project an image of (or show off) power. Since navies have traditionally been an indicator of states' power, they contribute to the states' prestige (Till, 2004: 116). Consequently, acquiring large ships that project an image of power has often been favoured by developing states without much concern for operational considerations. For example, during the Cold War, Latin American medium Powers, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, continued to operate outdated cruisers up to the mid-1980s, not much for tactical and operational reasons but for what those 'imposing' units represented in the collective imaginaries. Peru still operates one *De Zeven Provinciën*-class cruiser, the *Almirante Grau*, which acts as the Peruvian Navy flag ship and is the world's last gun-cruiser still in service. The Falklands War, with the sinking of the cruiser *Belgrano* which was totally helpless when confronted with Britain's attack submarines, illustrated the irrelevance of those outdated cruisers lacking modern warfare capabilities. As of today, the symbol of one's extrinsic power is the aircraft carrier, which represents one's capability to intervene (namely, power and forces projection) far beyond one's territorial waters. Their prohibitive cost as well as the level of know-how and competences required to operate them (especially the air wings) limits the number of states that can or could acquire one in the early 21st century, especially among small and medium Powers. That did not prevent Brazil from replacing its ageing *Colossus*-class aircraft carrier with former French *Foch* at the turn of the millennium, and Thailand from buying a Spanish-built light carrier (commissioned in 1997), which is currently being used as an helicopter carrier. Except for disaster relief operations (notably in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami) and to transport the Royal Family she has rarely left her base due to financial constraints, which illustrates the primarily symbolic purpose of her acquisition.

Extrinsic naval power, as an ideational form of power, rests not only on the symbolic power of ships but more generally on the ranking of navies, that is to say, a process of comparison and categorisation, that ultimately contributes to the ranking of states in the collective imaginaries. When it comes to categorisation and ranking, more than the navies' capabilities in absolute terms, 'what is [. . .] important is the position of each navy relative to the others' (Jackson, 2010: 12). Ranking is a process of 'othering' and it substantially contributes to the construction of states' international reputation. Ranking has important consequences in terms

of categorising navies and more importantly their states: 'simply put, there is a general correlation between ranking of a nation's navy and a nation's status in the international system' (Hickey, 2006: 46). The idea that the international order is highly hierarchical is widely accepted, and the ranking of navies contributes to reinforce this belief. Kearsley (1992: 175) explains that ranking navies combines the desire 'by both authors and practitioners of naval power alike to compare and contrast navies on a global scale with the desire of obtaining a linear list that reflects an international maritime pecking order' (quoted in Lindberg, 1998: 32). In the 21st century, through the ranking process, 'one' reality is constructed: a global projection navy is 'superior' compared to a 'small' navy because the 'ideal' situation (towards which it is 'normal' to tend) is to possess projection capabilities. The consequence of this construction is that a 'small' navy's 'natural' path appears to follow a linear evolution towards more projection capabilities, be it autonomously or in coalition by means of interoperability and specialisation (Germond, 2014).

In sum, naval forces' extrinsic power intends them to be an instrument of naval diplomacy (see above). In addition, they contribute to constructing perceptions about states' power (ideational element). As stressed by Luttwak (1974: 39–52) and Booth (1979: 57–67; 1985: 188), naval forces are definitely an important symbol of states' power. But this does not prevent states from discreetly operating them when necessary.

Naval and maritime strategy

While naval missions result from the objectives assigned to naval forces (that eventually contribute to Grand Strategy objectives and general foreign policy goals), 'naval strategy and doctrine are the ways, or methods by which naval forces accomplish strategic or operational objectives' (Rexrode, 2004: 9). In other words, as shown in Figure 3.3, Grand Strategy objectives delineate naval missions (the ends), naval forces are the means to the ends, and naval strategy is the method by which the means best fulfil the ends (the missions). Fulfilling those missions is then a means to Grand Strategy or political objectives. As such, from a Mahanian perspective, the main purpose of naval strategy is to concentrate (naval) forces in order to win a 'decisive naval battle' and thus eventually to secure command of the sea, which in turn allows using the sea for military and/or commercial purposes, which contributes to national wealth. Building from that, Corbett stressed that ultimately, as conflicts are resolved on land, the main purpose of naval strategy is to exercise command of the sea so as to produce effects on land.



Figure 3.3 Naval strategy as a method

Volumes have been devoted to the study of naval strategy, from Philip Colomb and Alfred T. Mahan at the end of the 19th century to Julian Corbett at the beginning of the 20th century, Admiral Castex in the interwar period, and a myriad of authors after the Second World War, including, among others, Bernard Brodie, Admiral Gorchkov, Eric Grove, Colin S. Gray, and Geoffrey Till to name but a few. Most of the scholarly debates have revolved around the following recurrent questions: Is command of the sea achievable? Is it more accurate to talk about sea control to account for the limited extent in time and space up to which control can be achieved? How to secure command or control of the sea? What to do when command or control is secured? If it is not possible to secure command of the sea, what alternatives remain (such as sea denial, fleet-in-being strategy, *guerre de course*/attrition strategy)? Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this book. However, below are some important remarks concerning the links between naval and maritime strategy and the prevalence of peacetime considerations in the formulation of maritime strategy.

Naval forces being a core constituent of seapower and one of the main actors at sea, semantic confusion or indiscrimination is not rare among scholars when it comes to differentiating maritime strategy from naval strategy. For example, while defining the difference between military strategy, naval strategy, and naval policy, Milan Vego employed the terms 'naval strategy' and 'maritime strategy' as nearly synonyms (1999: 2), which creates more confusion in the section of his book devoted to the clarification of terms. French strategist Hervé Coutau-Bégarie intentionally used both 'naval strategy' and 'maritime strategy' as potentially interchangeable expressions, while explicating, nonetheless, that the latter covers 'something' broader (2002: 533).

Maritime strategy is not equivalent to naval strategy; the two notions refer to different strategic scopes. Indeed, the term 'naval' refers to the fleet (as an institution or as a means to the end of achieving the naval missions), while the term 'maritime' refers to the sea (as a milieu, as a domain, as a space) and has a much broader meaning. The difference between maritime strategy and naval strategy was already acknowledged by Corbett:

> By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movement of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces. (Corbett, 1911: 15)

However, on the first page of the first chapter of his book, the aim of Corbett was less to define the very difference between the two types of strategies than to introduce his leading argument stressing that 'it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone' (15). Nonetheless, Corbett's definition is still echoed by contemporary strategists, such as, for example, Colin S. Gray:

> Naval strategy [refers] to the use of naval engagements for the object of war at sea: that object has to be the right to use the sea at will or the ability to deny such use to the enemy. Maritime strategy, by contrast, refers to the use of prowess at sea for the course of events in a conflict as a whole. (1996: 5)

Both Corbett's and Gray's definitions infer a state of war or at least a time of conflict. However, as discussed in the previous sections, naval forces, due to the extensive range of missions assigned to them, are mostly engaged in peacetime operations. It is thus important to include this factor in the definition of naval and maritime strategy. Grand Strategy is a notion that largely transcends the concept of war and peace and goes beyond the classical definition of strategy as 'the use of the battle for the purpose of the war' (Strachan, 2007: 30). Maritime strategy is a notion of war *and* peacetime and fulfils objectives in terms of Grand Strategy and national policy. Strachan clarified the different scope of the two terms:

> To British ears, naval strategy implies that it is something that the Royal Navy does, and therefore carries the ultimate sanction of armed force.

> Maritime strategy by contrast is broader, potentially embracing all the nation's uses of the sea, economic as well as defensive. (2007: 29)

Naval strategy refers to the use of naval assets (the fleet) in order to fulfil military objectives, such as disputing, securing, denying, maintaining, and exercising command or control of the sea. Maritime strategy refers to the use of any assets (naval, land, air; military, civilian; political, economic, normative, ideational, etc.) in order to use the sea (or seapower) in an efficient way, so as to fulfil Grand Strategy and/or national policy objectives. Since the end of the Cold War, the scope of maritime strategy has further expanded following the expansion of the security agenda and the resulting diversification of naval missions as summarised by John B. Hattendorf:

> Maritime strategy is the direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation's interests at sea. The navy serves this purpose, but maritime strategy is not purely a naval preserve. Maritime strategy involves the other functions of state power that include diplomacy; the safety and defence of merchant trade at sea; fishing; the exploitation, conservation, regulation and defence of the exclusive economic zone at sea; coastal defence; security of national borders; the protection of offshore islands; as well as participation in regional and world-wide concerns relating to the use of oceans, the skies over the oceans and the land under the seas. (Hattendorf, 2013: 7)

In fact, Hattendorf rightly spotted that maritime strategy is not only about securing and exercising control of the sea; it is also about the control of human activities at sea (7–8). In other words, maritime strategy is as much concerned with peace as war, if not more. Thus, the emphasis now on constabulary functions implies strategic and conceptual adaptations. For example, the 2007 US *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* is the first Three Sea Services strategic document. The inclusion of the Coast Guard into the strategy process reflects the growing importance given to maritime security and the fungibility of war-fighting and peacetime naval assets. As Booth reminded us, the three sides of the naval missions triangle (cf. Figure 3.1) are not equal and their importance has varied depending on the historical period (1979). If military functions were prominent during Mahan's era, diplomatic functions were at the forefront during the Cold War when Booth wrote his *Navies and Foreign Policy* (1979) and *Law, Force & Diplomacy at Sea* (1985). In the 21st century, constabulary functions have gained in importance

(together with the two other functions), which has been taken into account by states when formulating comprehensive maritime strategies or, like the UK, by developing a proper National Strategy for Maritime Security (HM Government, 2014). The EU is logically more interested in maritime security considerations rather than naval strategy (as discussed in the second part of the book). The following two chapters discuss two dimensions of 'control' that are particularly relevant to the understanding of seapower in the 21st century: exercising control of the sea by projecting power, forces, norms, and security through the sea (chapter 4) and controlling human activities at sea in peacetime, namely, maritime security and safety (chapter 5).

4

Beyond National Security – Maritime Power and Forces Projection

For state actors, the sea constitutes a medium that allows projecting security beyond one's own external boundary, for which the projection of power and forces is central (e.g. forward presence, carrier air strikes, and amphibious operations). However, projecting security through the sea goes beyond national security objectives to include human, societal, regional, and global security concerns, since naval operations are not restricted to interstate wars (e.g. humanitarian operations, naval diplomacy). In addition, projecting security is also about projecting norms into the maritime domain and onto the land.

The projection of security

The concept of projection is central to the expanded notion of security that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War. However, it did not emerge suddenly after 1991 and has been the concern of military planners since ancient times. It was traditionally referred to as the projection of (military) forces or the projection of power, and thus mainly linked to the notion of war; projecting forces and power was of strategic, operational, or tactical value, with the aim of forcing the victory in war. This is still the case today in the event of military operations. However, projection has also become a notion of peacetime. Projection is not restricted to military operations and should be understood comprehensively as the 'projection of security'. This expression is relatively new and has mainly been used since 1999 to acknowledge the EU's move towards a global security role beyond its external boundaries, in line with Javier Solana's 1999 speech in Berlin:

> We also have to be prepared, where necessary, to use all legitimate means to project security and stability beyond our borders. (Solana, 1999)

As argued by Anne Deighton, the projection of security should be understood in relation to internal security: 'a state, or the EU, cannot project security without itself being secure and, conversely, it may have to project a security policy to preserve internal security' (Deighton, 2000: 48). As a response to the broadening and deepening of the security agenda, the projection of security goes beyond national security interests and objectives.

To secure the threatened object, and consequently to fight the threatening subject (cf. chapter 1), the post-Cold War security policies put the emphasis on the projection of security 'upstream', that is to say, preemptively, rather than in response to an attack/issue (which corresponds to the conceptual evolution from defence to security), and beyond states' boundaries (which corresponds to the deterritorialisation of security). In other words, one's own security depends on others' security and on one's own capacity to 'bring security' to others. States assume that projecting security outside, abroad, and 'upstream' allows obtaining security inside, home, and 'downstream'. Consequently, the projection of security as defined by states and regional organisations in the 21st century has two components: a spatial one, that is, the need to tackle the threats as far away from home as possible, and a temporal one, that is, the need to deal with crises and threats at an early stage or as soon as possible. In terms of security, the bigger the distance (d) between 'home' and the place where threats are tackled the better and the smaller the period of time (t) needed to tackle the threats the better. For any type of security threats i (e.g. piracy, terrorism, regional conflict), it is possible to define a security index S_i by the formula:

$$S_i = S_o \frac{d_i / d_o}{t_i / t_o}$$

where S_o is the reference security index for a type of threat i, d_i is the distance from 'home' at which threat i is tackled (i.e. projection distance) with d_o as an average distance, and t_i is the time period for tackling such a type of threat (i.e. tackling time) with t_o as average time. This formula allows us to grade the security threats according to the distance from 'home'. It gives a security index of S_o for a standard threat and will double for twice the distance or half the time. It will also tend to zero if the threat lasts long or if it materialises within one's boundary. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1, which represents the evolution of the security index S_i as function of tackling time t_i for different projection distances d_i. It shows that the security index decreases with time wherever the threat is located, but also that keeping the threat abroad by tackling it beyond



Figure 4.1 Evolution of the security index and the projection of security

one's external boundary helps maintaining security for longer times, which is reflected by a higher security index.

The concept of projection of security has been put into practice by the (Western) states, which have modified their security policies and strategic concepts following the end of the Cold War. The current security policies did not appear ex nihilo but result from a gradual process that commenced in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and that has rapidly expanded after the 1991 Gulf War. From the beginning, the basic orientations of this process were clear: the need to project security beyond one's own boundary, the importance of the non-military dimension of security, and the necessity to cooperate within multilateral structures for the conduct of military and peace operations as well as to respond to the challenges posed by non-state actors operating in a growingly networked world.

However, this process underwent some phases of uncertainty, engendering debates on the strategic orientations to follow. For example, the Europeans did not respond efficiently to the Bosnian Crisis (1992–1995), since at that time they had not yet achieved the political transition that allowed them to intervene in Kosovo some years later (within the framework of NATO). Moreover, the rhythm of assimilation of the new concept of security has differed from state to state. Thus, before 1999 or even 2003, there was no general concordance between the different European states' security policies. Today, all European states have agreed on the

need to project security beyond their own boundaries, although the means to employ and the intensity of the operations are still subject to many divergences. This does not necessarily mean that projecting security forms the basis of the European strategic culture but it is certainly the principal element that is recurrent to *every* nationally elaborated security strategy in Europe. Indeed, the need to project security 'outside' in order to get security 'inside' is highlighted in the great majority of the main strategic documents released by the European states since 2001 (Germond, 2008a). Below are just a few examples of security strategy documents highlighting the need to project security (UK, Spain, Germany).

> The capacity to deliver effective military force in peace support and intervention operations, alongside our EU and NATO allies, is a vital component of our security policy. [The current threats] require a clear focus on projecting force, further afield and even more quickly than has previously been the case. This places a premium on the deployability and sustainability of our forces. (Ministry of Defence, 2003c: 4, 7)
>
> Among their missions, armies created for national defence now have the principal task of projecting stability. [. . .] This potential for projection, which allows us to meet the enemy as quickly as possible and wherever necessary, characterises the present phase in which defence is seen and understood as an active, flexible and dynamic instrument. (Ministerio de Defensa, 2003: 47–48)
>
> German security policy also has to take account of developments in geographically remote regions, insofar as they affect our interests. These are not static, but contingent on international constellations and developments. In the age of globalization, interests can no longer be defined solely in geographical terms. [. . .] German security policy is forward-looking. The new risks and threats to Germany and Europe have their origin in regional and global developments, often far beyond the European area of stability. (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 21–22)

NATO, which already played a precursory role in 1991 with its new strategic concept that placed a particular emphasis on crises management, further specified the need to operate 'out-of-area' in its 1999 strategic concept:

> The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability

> in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. [. . .] An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. (NATO, 1999: §20)

Thus, according to NATO, projecting security is linked to crises management (including peace enforcement). Hence, NATO prefers to use the expression 'projecting stability' rather than 'projecting security' in order to put the emphasis on peace operations (Moore, 2007: 2). Anyway, crises management, stabilisation operations, and peace enforcement require acting far away from home in order to achieve security objectives, as explained by the then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in 2004.

> Our missions are changing. Projecting stability has become a precondition for our security. NATO's core function of defending its members can no longer be achieved by maintaining forces only to defend our borders. We simply can no longer protect our security without addressing the potential risks and threats that arise far from our homes. (De Hoop Scheffer, 2004)

In the case of the EU, projecting security is conceived as a more comprehensive concept, encompassing both a soft and a normative element (i.e. bringing development, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance to others) and a 'harder' one (i.e. peace operations, including civilian and military missions). The 2003 ESS confirmed the Union's new security posture:

> In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. [. . .] With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. [. . .] This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. (Council, 2003b: 6–7)

Projecting security could entail the imposition of peace as well as the imposition of liberal values; it is thus part of a normative, if not transformative, project. The projection of security is linked to the practice of intervention and 'continues to be inextricable from the promotion of liberal democratic values' (Moore, 2007: 5). The promotion of peace and stability aims at increasing one's own security by tackling the (alleged)

source of threats, which can be located far away from home. Since it often induces the projection of liberal, democratic, and security norms, it also contributes to the stability and prosperity of the liberal world order in general.

However, intervening abroad does not necessarily transpose into a gain in terms of security, as illustrated by the 2003 Iraq War, which engendered more insecurity for the intervening actors than security, not only for the Western troops deployed in Iraq but, more insidiously, in motivating potential terrorists and anti-Western movements worldwide by exacerbating the rhetoric of the 'clash of civilisation', as predicted by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt even before the beginning of the war (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 59). The current situation in Iraq and Syria also illustrates the limits of the strategy consisting in projecting power and liberal values to tackle religious extremism.

From a Western perspective, fulfilling national security interests can hardly be separated from the promotion of the liberal world order. The dominant discourse on the projection of security is backed by a geopolitical subdiscourse, based on basic geosocial representations, such as 'us–stable–safe' versus 'them–unstable–dangerous', which also normalises the idea that the security (of the 'us') will be obtained by intervening (or projecting security) into the 'them' territory, that is to say, beyond one's own boundaries/territorial waters. In other words, one's own security depends on the ability of the 'us' to influence the 'them', including normatively. The projection of security consists in spreading development, good governance, liberal values, and security norms, but also in intervening for crises prevention and management (or even for enforcing peace), which requires 'traditional' forces and power projection capabilities. In this very case, the role of maritime power and forces projection is crucial, though it is not limited to war operations.

The sea and the projection of security

The dominant discourse on projection has influenced the formulation of naval missions in the post-Cold War era. Western navies' focus is clearly put on projection operations, which requires power and forces projection capabilities. In the 21st century, Western navies are expected to be able to contribute to the general effort aiming at projecting security as far away as possible beyond ones' own boundaries. Even police operations at sea can take place far beyond states' territorial waters. For example, EU-financed and coordinated counter-immigration police operations have taken place as far away as the coasts of Senegal. In other

words, the role of most Western navies has evolved from defensive and regional escort duties to projection activities (including expeditionary warfare, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and counter-immigration). Since this type of operation is increasingly multinationally integrated, operating within coalitions is becoming critical for Western navies.

One of the principal characteristics of the sea, which is crucial to understand its relationship with human beings, is that it constitutes a lane of communication. As highlighted by classical thinkers, notably Mahan, the development of maritime trade has had tremendous impacts on nations' wealth. Moreover, in terms of security, the sea (as a lane of communication, and thus as a means of transportation) allows projecting power far away from home, all over the world. International law has granted the high seas the status of international waters (under the UNCLOS regime states' sovereignty extends to 12 nmi and, for economic purposes only, to 200 nmi). It is thus not only possible but also legal to use the high seas as a highway to project security beyond one's own coasts.

The maritime milieu is fundamentally inhospitable for human beings and thus does not constitute their traditional habitat.[1] Consequently, the uninhabitable character of the sea implies that one cannot occupy the sea in a classical military sense. Whereas Corbett uses the term 'command of the sea' to describe the level of domination a naval actor can exercise on all or part of the sea, US Admiral Stansfield Turner introduced the geographically and temporally restricted notion of 'control of the sea' (Turner, 1974). Eventually, this implies that the sea is strategically important only through its relationship with the land, as discussed by Sir Julian Corbett in 1911 (cf. chapter 3) and Colin Gray in 1994.

> Because the human race occupies and can live only on the land, sea power derives its strategic meaning strictly from its influence over events on land. (Gray, 1994: 3–4)

This has been constantly verified throughout history, especially in wartime. The operations at sea serve to influence the situation ashore, to influence the course and the outcome of the war, which, ultimately, can only be resolved on land. That said, the notion of projecting security through the sea is much broader than the notion of maritime power projection, which Till describes as 'the use of sea-borne military forces directly to influence events on land' (Till, 2004: 193). Indeed, projecting security through the sea means two different things: either direct actions against the land by naval assets (mainly maritime power and

forces projection, such as amphibious operations, naval bombardments, carrier air strikes) or using the sea in order to influence the situation ashore (such as forward presence, blockades, humanitarian and peace support operations). Projecting security through the sea does not mean securing command of the sea, but exercising command by producing effects onto the land that are beneficial for one's own security. Securing command of the sea is a prerequisite but not the end.

Projecting security through the sea is a notion of peacetime as well as wartime that transcends states' national security interests. As shown in Table 4.1, maritime projection operations can be divided into three groups, viz. preventive actions (e.g. port calls, forward presence), peace operations (e.g. humanitarian interventions), and war operations (e.g. amphibious operations, carrier air strikes, sealift). The different kinds of operations can be combined, since the boundaries between them are very permeable. As mentioned, naval forces are particularly flexible and versatile, and their resources are highly fungible, which proceeds from the freedom of manoeuvre as well as the political and legal liberties which naval forces are granted (Germond, 2008b: 175; and cf. chapter 3).

First among the category of maritime projection operations are preventive actions. Projecting security norms and securing regional allies has become a widespread practice. It requires confidence-building measures, such as port calls and naval dialogue with foreign navies (including multilateral naval exercises). The European navies have developed this practice in the framework of NATO and its standing naval forces, notably in the Mediterranean area with the NATO–Mediterranean Dialogue and the Barcelona Process. Hence, NATO standing naval forces regularly visit non-NATO Mediterranean countries, exchanging information and practising joint exercises. The multinational on-call naval force EUROMARFOR (bringing together French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish units) is also involved in such confidence-building activities, notably towards North Africa, but also increasingly with Indian Ocean

Table 4.1 Maritime projection operations

Preventive actions	***Peace operations***	***War operations***
• Port calls • Joint exercises • Forward presence • Naval diplomacy • Maritime capacity-building	• Logistical support/sealift • Blockades and embargos • Offshore operational command • Delivery of humanitarian aid • Evacuation of nationals	As for peace operations + • Theatre air and missile defence • Amphibious operations • Air strikes • Naval bombardments • Close air support

partners such as the Tanzanian navy due to EUROMARFOR's participation in counter-piracy efforts at the Horn of Africa. A more developed form of confidence-building consists in maritime capacity-building operations (such as, for example, EUCAP Nestor at the Horn of Africa). These initiatives not only increase non-Western states' capacity to police their own maritime space (thus reducing the potential for criminal activities) but they also contribute to building trust among partners and develop common procedures. Such activities' profile is low, but their impact should not be underestimated, notably the projection of security norms. Confidence-building measures, capacity-building, and the development of common procedures are the first step towards the development of security communities. The naval signals, procedures, and tactics of the US and NATO have become global (Tangredi, 2002: 27), which facilitates interoperability, but also reinforces Western leadership over maritime affairs.

Preventive actions also consist in deterring (or compelling) other states (or non-state actors) by prepositioning naval forces. This practice constitutes the heirs of traditional naval diplomacy, although it is not conducted exactly in the same spirit and manner as in the past. Indeed, whereas 19th-century naval diplomacy put a relatively more important emphasis on 'gunboat diplomacy' rather than on 'showing the flag', 21st-century naval diplomacy consists in a complicated mixture of confidence-building measures (such as port calls), prepositioning of forces (i.e. forward presence), and eventually coercive actions (notably limited precise missiles strikes, such as those carried out by the US Navy against al-Qaeda targets in August 1998 in Sudan and Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). Since naval forces are highly flexible and versatile, their prepositioning (forward presence) provides valuable deterrent as well as operational tools. Hence, prepositioned naval units can rapidly engage in higher-intensity operations and serve as a nucleus for further deployments. It could consist in standing overseas naval units (e.g. British and French forces permanently positioned in their overseas territories) or ad hoc deployments whenever and wherever required. With an extensive network of bases and allies, logistical means, as well as technological and numerical superiority, the US and NATO are in a position to preposition forces virtually anywhere on the globe.

The second category of projection operations consists of humanitarian and peace support operations, whose number has significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, notably under international mandates (e.g. UN Interim Force (UNIFIL) off the Lebanon coasts deployed to

prevent arms smuggling), but also on a national basis (such as in case of evacuation of nationals). In the context of peace operations, naval forces mainly offer logistical support, that is, transporting humanitarian aid, heavy material, and (in case of large-scale operations) the personnel. They can also provide operational protection, notably theatre air defence, as well as offshore command facilities (Germond, 2008a: 179). For example, in 2000, as part of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE; a peacekeeping operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea authorised by the Security Council), the Dutch amphibious ship *Rotterdam* (capable of undertaking the landing of a battalion and heavy equipment, and delivering humanitarian aid and ensuring command functions) perfectly illustrated the usefulness of this type of highly versatile ship for low-intensity operations.

Navies are also growingly involved in post-war and post-disaster reconstruction and assistance operations. Indeed, 'given [their] capability to move personnel and equipment ashore in remote areas lacking infrastructure or in insecure areas devastated by war or natural disaster, it is clear that there is an important operational niche that can be filled by [. . .] naval forces', an illustration of which is the US Navy's involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations following the 2004 Tsunami in Southeast Asia (Wirtz and Larsen, 2009: 3). The above-mentioned deployment of HMS *Illustrious* to the Philippines in 2013 is another example of naval assets' versatility.

The third category of projection operations consists in war operations, during which the role of naval forces is crucial in terms of theatre access, air defence, air strikes, and logistics. Examples include Iraq (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011). It may be difficult to differentiate peace from war operations, especially at sea. The criterion of the operation's political objective is very subjective. Indeed, the distinction between stopping human rights violations (responsibility to protect [R2P]) and imposing regime change in the target country (FIRC) is often very subtle, and Western governments tend to avoid labelling operations as 'war', preferring terms such as 'peace operations', 'stabilisation operations', or simply 'interventions'. In any case, from a theoretical and non-political point of view, beyond a certain level of military intensity, any intervention falls under the category of war, even if not by name.

During war operations, the sea is used to project power and forces in a traditional way. If the command of the sea is not secured, at least in the theatre of operations, the naval component of the intervening force (or coalition) must secure it. In recent war operations, such as the

2003 Iraq or the 1999 Kosovo wars, the command of the sea was already secured. Then, the navies can exploit the command of the sea to produce effects onto the land. During operations such as Desert Storm in 1991, Allied Force in 1999, or Enduring Freedom (first phase) in 2001–2002, although rather discreet (and therefore not under the media's attention), the naval forces played a crucial role in terms of prepositioning of forces, war logistics, power and forces projection, blockades, and embargo. During military operations, naval forces perform the following three main tasks:

1. Projection of forces: dispatching soldiers and material to the theatre of operations, disembarking them, protecting this disembarkation, and the deployment of the task force. It requires, depending on the scale of the operation, amphibious capabilities (helicopter carriers, landing helicopter docks [LHD], landing platform docks [LPD], landing ship tanks [LST]), strategic sealift capabilities (roll-on/roll-off, bulk carriers), as well as a combat escort adapted to the potential threats, notably when operating close to the littoral (the escort might encompass aircraft carriers, anti-submarine warfare [ASW] and anti-air/air defence [AA] frigates, submarines, and mine sweepers).
2. Projection of power: attacking the enemy on land from the sea, that is to say, close air support, naval fire support, or even a strategic air campaign. These tasks can be performed by carrier aviation, cruise missiles, or naval artillery. Deploying such a task force also requires an adequate escort, whose size and composition depends on the tactical or theatre threats. The distinction between the projection of forces and of power is not always clear in the literature. The definition composed by the WEU Assembly, which insists on the criterion of the deployment of ground forces to differentiate forces from power projection, is by far the most relevant (Assembly, 2003: 6–7).
3. Strategic transport, sealift, and logistics: sustaining forward deployed land or naval task forces by shipping material, ammunition, or personnel. It requires roll-on/roll-off, bulk carriers and replenishing ships (that could belong to the civilian sector), as well as an escort if the threats have not been previously eliminated. During major operations such as the Vietnam War and the 1991 Gulf War, naval forces transported about 95% of the freight. For example, in 1991, 99% of the personnel were transported by air, but almost 95% of the freight by sea (Prome, 2000: 18–19). Indeed, for major operations, airlift is not sufficient; it allows dispatching rapidly a lot of personnel, but not sufficient quantity of heavy equipment.

Despite scholars' overemphasis on the doctrine of air power since the end of the Cold War and now growingly on cyber warfare, the sea remains an important vector for power and forces projection in particular, and for the projection of security in general. The media and consequently the great majority of the population and (more detrimentally) of the parliamentarians put the emphasis on (or devote their attention to) air power and land operations, a phenomenon known as 'sea blindness'. However, cruise missiles and fighter-bombers are vectors of power projection, which are often sea-based (carrier aviation, submarine launched cruise missiles [SLCMs]). Moreover, the inherent nature of the maritime milieu grants naval forces with a large freedom of manoeuvre, legality of action, and a certain political liberty (cf. chapter 3), which make them particularly suitable for the governments as a tool for projecting security, not only in the case of high-intensity operations, but also in the case of peace operations and preventive actions. The US Department of Defense recently coined the concept of Air–Sea Battle to describe 'integrated operations across all five domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace)' during peacetime and crises (Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013: i). This demonstrates the crucial role now played by the navy and the maritime domain during war and peacetime operations.

During the Cold War, Western navies were integrated within the Euro-Atlantic system of defence and, in case of conflict, would have contributed to the war effort by performing logistical tasks and defending Europe's maritime approaches as well as the Euro-Atlantic SLOCs in a bid to secure the command of the Atlantic. Apart from the US Navy and to a lesser extent the British and the French navies, the other European navies were reduced to coastal defence and a regional escort/ASW role (e.g. Spain, Germany) or to a specialised role within NATO (e.g. Belgium with minesweeping). In parallel, the UK and France deployed submarine-based nuclear deterrent forces since 1968 for the Royal Navy and 1971 for the French Marine Nationale. These two navies have also maintained some sort of global reach and some projection capabilities independently of the Atlantic Alliance, notably due to their numerous extra-European interests (in the first instance, colonial interests, then national sovereignty, such as monitoring the maritime approaches and EEZs around their overseas territories, or the protection/evacuation of their nationals abroad). Other states, like Belgium till 1962 (Congo War) and the Netherlands, have kept overseas capabilities (although much limited) for similar reasons.

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, purely defensive tasks became less relevant. Without an enemy opposing a powerful, predictable,

and long-term naval competition, the probability for European naval forces to be engaged in coastal defence or the defence of Euro-Atlantic SLOCs highly diminished. However, with the emphasis now on the projection of security, European navies have increasingly been asked to participate in coalition operations, where their mobility, flexibility, and interoperability offer operational, organisational, and political advantages. Recent developments in Ukraine shed light on the importance of coastal defence capabilities, and European naval forces might well have to take the defence of Europe more seriously into account in the foreseeable future following NATO's apparent geostrategic reorientation (NATO, 2014).

Using navies to project power and forces is not something new. It does not constitute a revolution in naval strategy and has traditionally been practised throughout history, although the scope and intensity has certainly increased in the past decades. For example, in 1853, the projection of expeditionary corps by the French and British navies via the Black Sea during the Crimean War allowed striking Russia on its own territory, whereas a land campaign would have taken more planning time and required the (unlikely) involvement of Austria and Prussia. Even during the Cold War, when the European navies were primarily prepared for sea control and coastal defence, the main operations (apart from exercises) were conducted in the framework of overseas interventions (Indochina, Algeria, Suez, Belgian Congo, Falklands), whereas no direct confrontation between two high sea fleets took place. The case of the Falklands War is debatable, for the crossover/chase/confrontation between British nuclear submarines and Argentinian principal surface ships can be considered as a confrontation between two fleets for the control of the sea, whose most tragic episode was the sinking of the cruiser *Belgrano*. However, the main confrontation took place between the British surface forces and the Argentinian air force based on land.

In the post-Cold War era, Western (and now many non-Western) states have put the emphasis on the projection of power and forces in their strategic documents (see, for example, Germond, 2008b). The level of involvement in projection operations depends on each state's capabilities (order of battle), budgetary constraints, and domestic political context (that dictates the degree of intensity of interventions in which a government wants, or is ready for, its country to participate). There are basically three levels of maritime projection intensity: comprehensive projection, limited projection, and low-intensity projection. The next sections discuss European case studies which will show the extent to

which European navies are involved in projection operations and illustrate the importance of coalition operations.

Comprehensive projection: The case of the UK and France

Both the UK and France stress the importance of maritime power and forces projection, from peace support operations to high-intensity warfare. Due to their history, their naval traditions, and their worldwide interests, the two countries logically place a special emphasis on the importance of projecting security through the sea as a means to secure their national interest within and beyond Europe's maritime backyard and to contribute to international security.

When in November 1990 John Major succeeded Margaret Thatcher, the budgetary effort to maintain a proactive defence policy was not sustainable anymore. The strategic review *Options for Change* (MoD, 1990) settled the issue by opting for reduced, but more flexible and more mobile, armed forces (MoD, 1991: 6). The challenge was in responding to strategic requirements (such as the projection of security beyond Britain's boundaries rather than the very defence of the UK against the Soviet threat) in a period when the notion of 'peace dividends' still prevailed. It was a question of 'doing more with less'. *Options for Change* was thus criticised both by the right wing of the Tories and by Labour, which reproached it for taking much more account of the fiscal imperatives than of the strategic context (Freedman, 1999: 15). In practice, the absence of threats against the Euro-Atlantic SLOCs made possible the decommissioning of superfluous naval units (Taylor, 2004: 8), which raised criticisms within the British naval community. However, between 1990 and 1994, some ships corresponding to the new missions (notably forces projection) were ordered, such as the helicopter-carrier HMS *Ocean*. In fact, British authorities had already taken into consideration the importance of the navy for the projection of power and forces in the 1980s, due to the lessons learned from the Falklands War (Freedman, 1999: 84).

The coming to office of Tony Blair in May 1997 accelerated the process of reforms. In fact, before 1997, the Labour had condemned the lack of long-term vision of John Major's reforms and especially the lack of concordance between the missions assigned and the means provided to the armed forces. Thus, once returned to office, Labour fulfilled their promises by launching a large-scale defence review (Freedman, 1999: 100–101). The new defence minister, George Robertson, commissioned

the Strategic Defence Review, which ended in July 1998 with the publication of a White Paper. The latter clearly put the emphasis on the projection of security outside the UK, and then assigned to the Royal Navy the mission of contributing to force projection, humanitarian, and crisis management operations.

> Maritime forces are inherently well suited to most force projection operations. [. . .] In almost all operations, maritime forces will be essential to help deliver ground forces to the theatre. And they can make a vital contribution to humanitarian and disaster relief operations. (MoD, 1998: 142)

Less than one year after the release of the Strategic Defence Review, the Royal Navy engaged in operation Allied Force (Kosovo) by operating for the first time cruise missiles (launched from the attack submarine *Splendid*) and by making a moderate use of carrier aviation from HMS *Invincible* (i.e. 102 combat air patrol/defensive counter air sorties – no ground attack missions) (House of Commons, 2000: paragraphs 137–138). During the first phase of operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (October 2001–March 2002) the US Navy, which conducted the majority of the air strikes, was seconded by the Royal Navy, which operated SLCMs (Prime Minister, 2001). Then in 2003, during operation Iraqi Freedom the Royal Navy conducted both strategic air strikes (with cruise missiles) and an amphibious operation in the Al Faw peninsula, south of Iraq (MoD, 2003a: 6, 8, 10–21; MoD, 2003b: 15–20, 29). Taking those developments into account, the 2003 Defence White Paper stressed that naval actions from the sea towards the land are more and more crucial.

> Our emphasis in the maritime environment is increasingly on delivering effect from the sea onto the land, which includes a land attack capability, supporting forces ashore and on securing access to the theatre of operations and protecting the crucial sea lines of communications from the home base. (MoD, 2003c: 12)

The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, released a few months after the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition came to office, stressed that UK naval forces should contribute to the projection of military power so as to 'deter or contain threats from relatively well-equipped regional powers, as well as dealing with insurgencies and non-state actors in failing states' while also 'projecting UK influence (for example

through their visible presence or supporting building the capacity of regional partners)' (HM Government, 2010: 21–22), which shows doctrinal continuity even in a period of budget cuts and naval decommissioning. The importance of projection missions was also made clear in the 2011 British Maritime Doctrine (MoD, 2011).

In France, projection is predominant among the tasks of the Marine Nationale, all the more since France keeps specific international 'obligations', due to its claimed status of 'Great Power' (French Parliament, 2002: 32). In 1994, the right-wing Balladur cabinet published a Defence White Paper, which clarified France's position in a period of strategic uncertainty. Taking the new strategic environment into account, the missions assigned to the navy were rather ambitious, notably in terms of crises prevention and forces projection (Premier Ministre, 1994: 119). When Jacques Chirac became president in May 1995, he initiated crucial military reforms (notably the professionalisation of the military), which completed the adaptation of the French military to the post-Cold War strategic environment, following on from the 1994 White Paper. The return of the left to the office between 1997 and 2002 (Jospin cabinet) curbed military spending, but at the doctrinal level the emphasis on projection capabilities and the role of the carrier and amphibious groups were maintained. During the Kosovo campaign, the French Navy engaged the aircraft carrier *Foch,* whose aircrafts conducted the ground attacks devoted to France, with a success rate among the best (Sénat, 1999). In Afghanistan, the navy's aircraft offered air cover and reconnaissance to the French troops deployed on land (Sénat, 2001: 5–6).

In sum, since the middle of the 1990s, the strategic orientations of France were clearly defined, notably the importance of projecting security through the sea, but the means had remained limited, and only after the right won the 2002 elections the budgetary effort had better corresponded to the ambitious naval missions, consisting of maritime projection, strategic mobility, and the capacity to strike the land from the sea (Loi, 2003: 1749–1750). Then, the need to reduce the budgetary deficit during the presidential mandate of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) induced a reduction in defence spending, which was reflected at the strategic level with the publication of a new Defence White Paper in 2008, which announced the postponing of the second aircraft carrier programme, as well as a reduction in the number of deployable personnel (Premier Ministre, 2008: 210–214). Under François Hollande's presidency, armed forces' budget suffered further cuts, which will ineluctably reduce the Navy's ability to perform the missions assigned to it. Thus, although the naval missions have remained similar, the French Navy,

like the Royal Navy, now has to 'do more with less'. In other words, in both countries, there is a discrepancy between the emphasis put on comprehensive naval projection at the strategic (missions) and doctrinal levels and the budgetary realities, which eventually determines the means at one's disposal and the capacity to fulfil the missions.

The transatlantic gap in term of power and forces projection and sealift capabilities is well documented. European power projection capabilities (especially aircraft carriers and cruise missiles) are limited. This is due to both financial constraints (research and development, construction and operational costs are prohibitive) and political constraints (it is difficult to justify the need to maintain or further develop such capabilities in a period of rising tax, growing debt, and stagnating economic growth). Consequently, only France and the UK have substantial maritime power projection capabilities (at least for the time being). Italy lags behind notably when compared to the objectives assigned to its naval forces on paper, although it operates two light carriers. On the other hand, in terms of forces projection capabilities (notably major amphibious ships including LPDs), European capabilities (in aggregate) are still substantial, which corresponds to some extent to the missions assigned to their naval forces. Strategic sealift remains problematic though, especially in case of a short notice deployment, due to the limited number of roll-on/roll-off vessels and container ships directly at the disposal of European naval authorities. With further budgetary cuts to expect, the question remains whether major European navies will still be in a position to fulfil high-intensity projection missions in three or four decades. This will ineluctably impact on the EU's seapower as well.

Limited projection: The case of Germany

Germany offers a perfect example of the post-Cold War transition in terms of naval missions, especially concerning projection. Indeed, compared to France and the UK, Germany's evolution is far more dramatic, for during the Cold War the *Bundesmarine* performed only coastal and SLOCs defence tasks within the Baltic and the North seas. Then, after the end of the Cold War and following NATO's newly defined strategic priorities, Germany engaged in a debate concerning the utility and the legal basis of out-of-area operations. The idea grew that Germany has not only the possibility but also the duty to carry out worldwide responsibilities, which demonstrates that member states download strategic objectives and policy priorities from NATO. Between August 1990 and July 1991, the German Navy was deployed for the first time within

the framework of conflict resolution during the WEU naval operation in the Gulf to maintain the freedom of navigation (Lussow, 2001: 31). A July 1994 decision by the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court authorising the deployment of German troops in Somalia and ex-Yugoslavia (within the UN framework) was interpreted as 'a green light for Germany's military engagement in such peace-keeping efforts' (Wiegandt, 1995: 890). This constituted a radical change that the 1994 White Paper formulated in elaborating the new missions of the *Bundeswehr*, with an emphasis on crises management and out-of-area operations:

> The new concept of the Navy takes into account the changes of the military–strategic environment. [. . .] Participating in crisis reaction, conflict prevention and crisis management operations has become more important [than the defence of the Baltic Sea]. The German Navy can contribute to the political objectives of international crisis management in the European waters or nearby. (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 1994: §644)

That said, until the mid-1990s, the absolute priority of the German government was to overcome the burden of the reunification, and the defence budget was not a priority. The arrival of a left-wing coalition in September 1998 did not modify the new strategic orientations expressed in the 1994 White Paper. On the contrary, Gerhard Schroeder personified a 'Germany without complex', and his government not only carried on with the reforms, but accelerated them. It notably created the German rapid reaction forces (*Krisenreaktionskräfte*) and launched a comprehensive evaluation of Germany's security policy, which brought about the publication of many important strategic documents, all placing an emphasis on the projection of security beyond the German borders and insisting on the interventionist role of the navy. Thus, further naval doctrinal documents have placed a great emphasis on the transition from an escort navy to an expeditionary one:

> Beyond the traditional assets of the Navy in coastal waters, adjacent waters and the high seas (Escort Navy), the capacity is developing to carry out in priority enduring operations very remote from the adjacent waters within the framework of various threats scenarios (Expeditionary Navy). (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2004: 2)

There is no geographical limitation to the deployment perimeter of the German Navy, which has to be able to participate in high-intensity operations in remote areas (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2003: 13). Under Angela Merkel's leadership, 'expeditionary operations were to determine the structure and the capabilities of the armed forces' (Noetzel and Schreer, 2008: 217); the Navy's importance in terms of projection was thus confirmed in the 2006 Defence White Paper:

> The Navy is [. . .] becoming well-positioned to conduct sustained operations also on a multinational scale and under threat off foreign shores. This is the Navy's contribution to the containment of crises and conflicts where they arise and, if called for politically, their management. The special legal status of the high seas stands the Navy in good stead in that the sea can be used as a base for operations, with all forces interacting to deliver a desired effect in countries of deployment. (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 95)

This requires capabilities to operate from the sea, a great mobility to reach remote theatres of operations, as well as the necessary means to face potential attacks:

> The Navy should be able to carry on high seas operations, to be integrated in coalitions, including a forward long-standing presence in international waters or near the coasts. (Flottenkommando, 2007: 11/3)

In practice the German Navy has participated in some out-of-area operations, most notably the UNIFIL off the Lebanon coast and EU operation Atalanta at the Horn of Africa. The doctrinal changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War also reflect in the official renaming (not to say rebranding) in 2005 of the German Navy as the *Deutsche Marine* instead of the *Bundesmarine*. This change of name is not benign; it reflects the new status of the German Navy, that is, a limited projection navy that exercises responsibilities and flies the German flag far away from Germany's coasts, with implications in terms of image-building and soft power within and outside Germany.

Small navies and projection

Despite limited resources and seemingly less international responsibilities, small European navy states have also adopted the rhetoric about maritime projection (mainly downloaded from NATO strategic

concepts). In Belgium, the 2000–2015 Strategic Plan explains that the Maritime Component (of the Belgian armed forces) should be able to project a force of 650 soldiers 'in a hostile environment, from low to highest intensity' (Ministère de la défense, 2000: 47). In Portugal, the 2001 Livro Branco da Defesa Nacional states that the Portuguese Navy should prioritise its participation in crisis prevention and management operations, and that priority should be given to the acquisition of forces projection capabilities:

> [One has to privilege] participation in crisis prevention and management and peace support missions, as well as in autonomous interventions everywhere our interests require it. [Such priority] will be fulfilled with the acquisition of a versatile amphibious ship. (Ministério da Defesa, 2001: 33)

That said, the projection narrative also put a strong emphasis on multinational operations and multilateral frameworks. For example, Norway has stressed that 'multinational solutions will become increasingly important as a strategy for the further development of Norway's Armed Forces' (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2004: 7–8) and non-NATO Finland reassessed the importance of participating in multilateral operations and decided to increase its navy's contribution to international crisis management (Finish Government Report, 2004: 125). As long as a 'small' navy can operate within a larger coalition it transcends its initial ('inferior') status and 'evolves' closer to the 'ideal' situation (i.e. a projection navy). Subsequently, the status of 'small navy' ceases to be negative. Consequently, multinational naval operations are positively represented by 'small' navies (Germond, 2014). For example, Sweden implicitly recognised that multinational naval operations are necessary to fulfil the country's national interest:

> The navy should be able to participate in marine operations together with other countries, in Sweden and within and outside our region. Through them, Sweden will be able to effectively contribute to the protection of shipping and other maritime activities. (Regeringskansliet, 2009: 2)

However, multinational naval operations and exercises are seen as a way not only to overcome resources limitation but also to learn from others. For example, the advantage of operating alongside a senior partner has become a leitmotiv of the Republic of Singapore Navy:

> We find a lot of value from learning from others and as a small navy, we can learn a lot from the US Navy. [. . .] Ultimately we are all Sailors and operate at sea so there are many similarities; just the scope of operations is different. (Choo, 2011)

Singapore participated in the 2014 rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise hosted by the US Navy along with other small (and very small) navies such as those of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Tonga. Such exercises represent very valuable opportunities for small navies to train within larger coalitions and to benefit from others' experience. Small European navies are also engaged in multilateral naval cooperation, which bring them experience. For example, more powerful and modern NATO navies have acted as senior partners for Baltic and Eastern European navies since the end of the Cold War (cf. chapter 10). The EU is also becoming a framework of choice for such cooperation. Small navies tend to be particularly keen to engage in counter-immigration operations under the aegis of the border control agency FRONTEX (cf. chapter 7). Being able to operate within a coalition becomes an objective as such against which performances can be evaluated. In Ireland, the key performance indicators (KPI) to monitor Irish armed forces' achievements against the 2011–2014 Strategy Statement include:

> Flexible and adaptive conventional land, sea and air military capabilities, capable of operating jointly and interoperable with like-minded states. (Department of Defence and Defence Forces, 2011: 33)

For some 'very small navies', specialisation is the only way to contribute to larger coalitions, such as for Estonia and Lithuania:

> Navy keeps its focus on mine countermeasures capabilities. The Navy will continue to develop mine clearance capabilities that are necessary for participating in international operations and for guaranteeing host nation support. (Eesti Kaitsevägi, 2009: 10)
>
> Having become a member of NATO, Lithuania specialises in the area of MCM and develops appropriate capabilities that will be a part of NATO's MCM force. (Ministry of National Defence, 2006: 43)

Those navies may specialise at the expense of other coastal defence capabilities, but are confident they can rely upon NATO in case of an attack. That said, at the time of writing, the situation in Ukraine is a source of particular concern for small regional navies such as those of

the Baltic States but also Romania and Bulgaria, hence the importance of confidence-building measures within the Atlantic Alliance to reassure Eastern European members of the Alliance's commitment to their security. Indeed, recent events showed that small Eastern European navies are not in a position to defend their territorial waters when facing a determined enemy such as Russia. NATO's support thus becomes crucial, and reassuring Eastern European members of the Alliance's commitment to their security was thus an important goal of the September 2014 NATO Wales summit (NATO, 2014).

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Projecting security through the sea means either direct actions against the land by naval assets or activities conducted at sea in order to influence the situation ashore. Thus, projecting security through the sea is much broader than maritime power and forces projection. It is a wartime as well as a peacetime concept. Consequently, operations whose aim is to use the sea in order to project security outside are diverse, ranging from port calls, forward presence, and humanitarian aid, to carrier air strikes and amphibious operations. It can also imply norms projection, which, from a Western perspective, contributes to the stability of the international liberal order. The projection of security through the sea thus fits with both the realist and liberal perspectives, whereas critical scholars emphasise the impacts of projection in terms of domination and exploitation.

In the post-Cold War era, all European states (with rare exceptions) have put the emphasis on the importance of using the sea in order to project power, forces, or more generally security. However, the intensity of the operations in which the different European states are participating differs according to internal political factors, financial resources, as well as the order of battle. In all cases, multilateralism and interoperability are the norm for projection operations. It means that the majority of the operations consisting of projecting security through the sea are conducted multilaterally, within coalitions (e.g. under a UN mandate), or within NATO and, as will be discussed in the second half of this book, now within the EU. The following chapter will show that states have also to secure the maritime domain against non-state threats, which requires projecting police, constabulary, civilian, and normative power within territorial waters and much beyond.

5
Maritime Security and Safety – Securing, Policing, and Protecting the Seas

This chapter focuses on the second and third components of the maritime dimension of security introduced in chapter 1, namely, securing and protecting the seas, which requires controlling human activities at sea. Numerous non-state and transnational criminal actors are active at sea. Combating terrorism at sea, piracy, illegal immigration, and human smuggling, as well as drug and arms trafficking has become high on states' security agenda following the securitisation process that has occurred in the post-Cold War era. In addition, marine environment protection and marine resources management have also topped many governments' policy (if not security) agendas. Although the seas are not easy to police, states have developed a wide range of tools to exercise the monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence at sea, far beyond their territorial waters. However, as 'fishes cross the borders', criminal actors use the maritime space to their advantage, by exploiting legal disparities and inefficient coordination among services within and between the different countries. Thus, for states, the challenge lies in coordinating maritime security actors at the national and international level.

The sea as an object to secure

As discussed in the previous chapter, projecting security through the sea means either direct actions against the land by naval assets or activities at sea in order to influence the situation ashore. Securing the sea is not about projecting power and forces, although its final cause is to improve security ashore as well. It encompasses all actions tending to combat non-military threats at sea and/or coming from the sea. The goal is not to use the sea in order to project security, but to secure the sea in order to protect the land against threatening non-state actors who operate at sea. In other

words, whereas states use the sea in order to project security, threatening non-state actors can also use the sea to project 'insecurity'. This, in turn, requires states in collaboration with civilian stakeholders to secure the sea, that is, to exercise the monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence at sea.

The very nature of the maritime milieu facilitates the proliferation of transnational threats. The sea is uninhabitable and one cannot occupy it in a traditional military or constabulary manner. Thus, it is relatively difficult for the public authorities to control the sea, which 'represents a space of liberty for criminal non-state actors, which can operate in a vast space without facing many police constraints' (Germond, 2007: 352). In addition, the UNCLOS, which entered into force in 1994 (and is now considered as a codified form of customary international law of the sea), has formalised the legal division of the sea between distinct areas where states have different rights and responsibilities (e.g. high seas, EEZs, territorial waters). This 'bordering' or 'territorialisation' of the sea can play in favour of criminal non-state actors, as it is often easier for them to cross the borders than for the states to cooperate at the operational and judicial levels. Indeed, states are still reluctant to allow foreign Powers to operate within their territorial waters, even in the case of countries sharing similar values and security interests. For example, during the 2004 Olympic Games in Greece, the NATO naval force that operated to secure the waters near Athens (mainly against risks of terrorism) was authorised to operate only in the international waters, that is, to say outside the Greek territorial waters. And besides this limitation, the command of the force was even transferred to a Greek officer certainly for political reasons (perception by the Greek public opinion).

Even on the high seas, one is (legally) not supposed to inspect ships by force without the consent of the flag state, which is lawfully the only one that holds this right except in some regulated cases such as the presumption of piracy, suspected slave trade, unauthorised broadcasting, ships without nationality, and the right of hot pursuit on the high seas (UNCLOS: art.110–111), as well as in the case of a specific UN Security Council resolution authorising the boarding of certain ships under certain circumstances. For example, during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon states 'to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations' (UN Security Council Resolution 787, 1992: §12). States are increasingly interested in further developing counter-narcotics, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism,

and counter-human smuggling regimes, which has led to the signature of several multilateral boarding agreements. However, there is currently no general international law obligation or norm that specifically authorises the boarding of any suspected ships in any circumstances (Hodgkinson et al., 2007). As of today, the high seas principally remain a space of liberty.

On the other hand, the nature of the maritime domain also grants the naval and constabulary forces with some significant liberties (cf. chapter 3). They can indeed operate without any constraints of movement (except for meteorological hazards and physical constraints such as high sea beds) and are thus a very flexible tool to police the seas. Moreover, although above-mentioned legal constraints limit their freedom, naval forces and coastguards can operate discreetly, which grants them a certain political liberty. Police operations at sea are often not reported in the media, and there are very rarely any images made publicly available. Although the sea has always been a source of fascination in the collective imaginaries, what happens at sea remains highly unnoticed, which may represent an asset for states in their struggle against transnational criminal actors. It is worth noting that Western navies tend to be 'much gentler with pirates' and criminals than others such as the Russian Navy (Archibugi and Chiarugi, 2011: 232–233), which shows the relevance of ideational factors (such as human rights values) when discussing seapower.

Securing the sea, that is to say, combating transnational threats at sea or coming from the sea, requires day-to-day police activities, sometimes in blue waters. It is mainly a notion of peacetime, as it does not constitute a reaction to an aggression by another state and does not (normally) imply war operations. However, it can cause to operate (legally or not) within other states' territorial waters, or at least within other states' zones of interest and influence (or non-influence, like in Somali waters). On the one hand, securing the sea is the transposition at sea of Max Weber's notion of the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Weber, 1992: 6). But, on the other hand, it goes beyond this notion and beyond the classical definition of police activities, as it requires operating outside territorial waters, sometimes within foreign states' territorial waters. Traditionally, maritime security activities have not been restricted to territorial waters. For example, the first US squadron ever sent to the Mediterranean, in 1801, had the mission to protect American merchant ships against pirates proliferating at that time on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Tripolitania). Today, policing the sea far away from the national territory is even much more common, since

transnational threats such as terrorism, trafficking activities, piracy, and illegal immigration are increasingly tackled far away from home.

Maritime security

The notion of securing the sea is linked to the concept of maritime security that has become prominent since the end of the Cold War. Following the expansion of the security agenda, the term has been used to describe the non-military dimension of security at sea, namely, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and all sorts of counter-trafficking activities. Maritime security refers to the many maritime dimensions of security apart from warfare and transcends the concepts of national, human, and global security, as explained by the US three Sea Services:

> The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these irregular and transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. (US Navy, Coast-Guard and Marine Corps, 2007: 14)

The events of 9/11 and the subsequent focus on preventing any sort of terrorist activities have triggered an interest in maritime security while contributing to the securitisation of the sea. Indeed, tackling terrorism at sea (notably the movements of terrorists and their means) in the context of the War on Terror has brought navies to the forefront. It has also highlighted the interconnected nature of criminal activities at sea and the need to further develop cooperative behaviours and structures between the various state agencies involved in maritime security.

Combating transnational threats at sea requires the establishment of rules (normative level) and then the setting up of controls and repression (operational level). It also requires a decent intelligence network, for the sea is wide and complex to monitor. For example, hundreds of ships are entering the European waters daily and only some of them may transport illegal cargo. Thus, in addition to national means of intelligence, organisations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), and Europol are playing an important role upstream (information gathering and sharing, risk analyses). At the operational level, navies and coastguards hold a central position, as they enforce coastal states' law and international law in the territorial waters, in the EEZs (including those of overseas territories that, in the case of some European states, constitute the widest

part of their EEZs), and in international waters (right of hot pursuit, struggle against piracy, control of the ships flying their flag, and the enforcement of other international rules and conventions). In addition to the repression of illegal activities (enforcement), naval and coast-guard forces carry out presence and surveillance operations in order to deter criminals and terrorists by ostensibly showing public power, for sovereignty at sea must be claimed, exercised, and even defended (Till, 2004: 328).

Securing the sea seldom implies a struggle with foreign navies. It may be the case if illegal activities are sponsored or supported by a state or to prevent a foreign navy from diverting or arresting one's own fishing boats in international waters as in the case of the 1995 'Turbot War' between Spain and Canada. Those cases, however, remain rare, at least in Europe. Dealing with criminal non-state actors can, nevertheless, require substantial means. Firstly, in order to adapt the response to the threat, it is necessary to deploy a wide-ranging set of weapons (from 12.7 mm machine guns to 100 mm naval guns) and ships (fast crafts dedicated to the interception of contravening ships and fast enough to observe a *flagrante delicto*, offshore patrol boats enduring enough to follow and intercept runaways) (Till, 2004: 345–348). Secondly, illegal activities also (and often) happen in areas under foreign sovereignty and where the costal state has neither the means nor the will to (re)act (such as in the Strait of Malacca or at the Horn of Africa). In this case, if non-riparian Powers want to intervene far away from their home bases, they may have to deploy frigates whose capacities largely exceed those of simple patrol boats, as in the case of EU and NATO counter-piracy operations at the Horn of Africa. In certain regions of the world, such as Southeast Asia, the distinction between maritime security operations and more 'aggressive' or even 'illegal' ones can be blurred, as the case of China's paramilitary naval forces' encounters with Filipino fishermen in the South China Sea illustrates.

In the 21st century, maritime security has gained considerably more importance on the agenda of the Western navies and other relevant bodies (such as customs, police forces). Depending on the organisational structure within each state, the role of the navy is more or less central. For example, in France, constabulary missions represent about a quarter of the navy's activities. Police tasks can be fulfilled by a separate coast-guard service (as in the case of the US, Germany, and Sweden), by many different military and civilian bodies (as in France, Italy, and Spain), or by the navy itself (e.g. in Ireland and Norway). In the case of small navies such as in Ireland or in Malta, police functions represent their main field of competences.

Concerning the repartition of competences and police missions between navies and other services, it seems that when the navy fulfils the majority of the constabulary tasks, a risk exists that military forces might intervene too much in the day-to-day struggle for citizens' security, which can be strongly resented by the population (militarisation of human security). Moreover, some navies could be ill-prepared for police tasks, which they consider as subaltern and not prestigious. Legal problems could also occur when it comes to inspections, detention, and prosecution, 'navies [being] not generally well-versed in the judicial and evidentiary nuances that attend the prosecution of [suspected criminals]' (Haywood and Spivak, 2012: 64). On the other hand, navies offer an efficient chain of intelligence, command, and control, and exercise a strong deterrent effect. However, having a separate coastguard service improves the 'professionalisation' of staff, since police tasks are not considered as secondary by the personnel (D'Oléon, 1996: 143; Till, 2004: 342–345). Coastguards may, however, lack the capabilities to operate far away enough from the coast, whereas maritime security activities growingly take place far from one's own territorial waters.

In sum, the emphasis now put on maritime security grants naval forces an essential role in the field of police and constabulary missions or, in other words, the practice of day-to-day security. Since the end of the Cold War, this has allowed them to justify some spending to the parliamentarians who are now more concerned about public opinion when it comes to military expenditure. For example, in 2004, the Danish social democrats were opposed to the project of acquiring new *Viking*-class submarines and, supported by all the political parties, decided to reallocate this budget to SAR helicopters instead, as it seemed better adapted to an expanded security agenda, practically phasing out the Danish submarine service (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2004).

Traditionally, police and constabulary tasks have been neglected by naval practitioners, strategists, and academics, since they do not correspond to the 'noble' image by which navies have usually been represented, that is to say, prestigious, chivalric, and romantic naval battles on the high seas. However, since the end of the Cold War, due to strategic realities, this perception has changed. Indeed, great naval battles are even less likely to happen than during the Cold War. Current scenarios put the main emphasis on projection operations, but also on counter-insurgency, antiterrorism, and, more generally, the struggle against criminality and the promotion of good governance at sea. Navies must participate in police operations, but in order to secure the sea, purely military means are not sufficient and the struggle against transnational

criminality requires varied bodies and services to operate at sea, which are not restricted to 'military navies'. Although securing the sea is a continuous and comprehensive process that requires law enforcement and good governance at sea, one can, however, discern four major fields of activities: counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, counter-trafficking, and counter-immigration.

Terrorism at/from the sea

Theoretically, there are four potential expressions of terrorism at sea: firstly, it can consist in hijacking, such as, for example, the *Achille Lauro* case in 1985 or the *Silco* case in 1987. This type of activities is generally performed by terrorist groups with regional/national objectives, and is rare certainly due to the relatively smaller symbolic and practical effects (in terms of destination) compared to airplane hijacking. Secondly, it can consist of direct attacks against civilian or even military ships. Recent examples include the case of the destroyer USS *Cole*, which was hit by a craft full of exploding devices in October 2000 while she was replenishing in the port of Aden in Yemen. The attack made a breach in the hull above the waterline. In 2002, the French tanker *Limburg* was attacked in similar conditions off Yemen's coast. In 2004, the passenger ship *SuperFerry 14* suffered an explosion outside Manila harbour causing the death of more than 110 civilians. Terrorists could target tankers transiting through chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which could negatively affect the global oil market. Thirdly, terrorists can use hijacked or 'personal' commercial ships to create human and ecological disasters either by making them to collide with cruising ships, tankers, and so on, or by filling them with explosive devices (including 'dirty bombs') and blowing them up in civilian port terminals. Fourthly, terrorists can use ships to transport or infiltrate operatives or material (notably exploding devices). For example, in June 2003 in Greece, the freighter *Baltic Sky* (flying the Comorian flag, but property of a shipping company registered in the Marshall Islands, with a Ukrainian and Azerbaijani crew), was intercepted with about 700 tons of explosive devices on board; its suspicious behaviour (roaming without precise destination in the Mediterranean) had alerted NATO. The very role of this ship remains mysterious as of today.

That said, the significance of these threats must be qualified. The post-9/11 narrative stresses the potentiality of deadly terrorist attacks at (or from the) sea. However, the small number of terrorist actions at, from, or using the sea does not allow one to conclude that this is a major

threat. Martin Murphy reminds us that 'most terrorists are not used to the sea', and indeed operating at sea requires precise and numerous technical and operational knowledge (Murphy, 2007: 70). And practising adequate training discreetly is difficult. Although using the sea for terrorist purposes may not be more challenging than learning how to hijack and fly an airplane, it will not constitute the first choice. Indeed, compared to airplane hijacking and attacks, the ratio between the difficulties to prepare and execute the operation and the results (in terms of visual impact, number of victims, and thus political impact) is much lower (69–71). However, the constant increase of security measures in airports could perhaps modify this ratio. Moreover, one has to remember that terrorism at sea does not only consist in using ships to bomb other ships or to target civilian harbours, but terrorists can also use the sea as a line of communication, in order to deliver/infiltrate operatives and material. This is far less 'impressive' on a media scale but is, nonetheless, a risk states take into account. This specific aspect is thus particularly highlighted in US and European maritime security documents. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent 'War on Terror', the Europeans have been active with their US partner in the struggle against terrorism at sea, notably with monitoring operations such as NATO operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and US-led operation Enduring Freedom at the Horn of Africa. Preventing terrorism at (or from the) sea also translates into land-oriented legal and technical policies, such as containers security and seaports monitoring (Lehr, 2008).

Piracy

Under the law of the sea, 'piracy' describes actions performed in international waters (UNCLOS, 1982: art.101); and actions performed within territorial waters are termed 'armed robbery against ships' (IMO, 2009: Article 2.2). Coastal areas that are sufficiently well policed at sea and on land (such as in Europe) are not the theatre of such activities, since this prevents potential pirates from benefiting from rear bases, which are essential to prepare and execute attacks at sea. The main risky zones in terms of piracy and robbery at sea listed by the IMB in 2013 are located in the waters near Indonesia (including the Strait of Malacca), the Horn of Africa and Somalia, Nigeria, and Benin (International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], website). As discussed by Germond and Smith (2009), piracy threatens several dimensions of the expanded security agenda, namely, human, economic, energy, national, and environmental security.

In terms of human security, yachters and sailors are subject to kidnapping and ransoming. Pirates can be extremely violent and ruthless. The use of light weapons and small arms (including rocket-propelled grenade launchers) can result in numerous casualties. Psychological consequences of kidnapping and bad detention conditions (post-traumatic syndrome) should also be taken into account. States are responsible for assuring the security of their citizens, or at least, legally speaking, of the ships flying their flag. Usual national policy involving hijackers (terrorists and pirates alike) is to pay no ransom. However, although ransoms are generally paid to pirates by shipping companies, states are often involved in the process. In any case, as piracy is now highly publicised by the media, states must demonstrate that they are doing something to prevent further attacks or to rescue kidnapped citizens. Prevention and deterrence (in the form of naval operations, the establishment of safe corridors, convoys, private security companies, etc.) have appeared to be better options than reacting to attacks (rescue operations, payments, etc.).

In terms of economic security, piracy has a cost. Piracy at the Horn of Africa has resulted in major cargo losses, and millions of dollars have been paid as ransoms. Pirate raids harm maritime trade, which is damaging to the world economy, as about 20% of global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden. Beyond the ransoms that may be paid in case of kidnaping, piracy creates delays, not only for attacked ships, but also for all ships that have to divert to avoid certain areas. Some shipping companies decided to favour the Cape of Good Hope route during the peak of piracy at the Horn of Africa, which imposed extra costs in a period when sea cargo was already expensive. Upstream, the cost of insurance for shipping companies increases, and certain operators have even had to make special extra payments to sailors when they transited through the 'pirate-infested' areas. In addition, shipping companies must also pay the cost of any other security measures, such as installing water cannons or hiring armed guards through private security companies. These extra costs, totalling hundreds of millions of dollars, pass on to other firms and eventually to consumers.

Piracy also constitutes a threat in terms of energy security. A significant share of the US and the EU's oil imports transit off the Horn of Africa. The hijacking of the Saudi super tanker *Sirius Star* in November 2008 demonstrated that even these types of ships (with high sides) are no longer secure. Piracy thus has to be included in the equation when it comes to securing energy supplies from the Gulf. In addition to the Americans and Europeans, the Chinese and the Japanese are similarly concerned with piracy, not only in the Somalia region but also around

the Strait of Malacca (although Southeast Asian pirates have tended to prey on smaller ships and tankers seem beyond their reach so far). Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea tend to limit their activities to oil theft but there is a clear potential for more (and more disruptive) piratical activities in the region since criminal networks behind those attacks seem well organised.

Due to the location of Somali pirates' activities and bases, the risk that pirates develop links with terrorist groups has been raised (Chalk, 2008; Murphy, 2007). Pirates are already linked to warlords and militias in Somalia and Yemen; some of these groups have even been recognised as terrorist organisations, such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Such a link may also develop in the Gulf of Guinea due to the presence of terrorist groups in the West African region. As long as pirates make gains, the risk exists that terrorists will become progressively more interested in pirates, who could provide them with ships and cargo. Although such direct links are difficult to prove, the potential clearly exists, especially after one pirate gang, in September 2008, captured a Ukrainian freighter, the *MV Faina*, which was loaded with military hardware, including grenade launchers, dozens of Russian-made tanks, and ammunition. Given these types of attacks, the ongoing civil unrest in Somalia, and the extensive resources devoted by Americans and Europeans to counter terrorism, this potential piracy–terrorist–insurgency triangle is taken into consideration when formulating counter-piracy strategies. This triangular relation may also be at play in the Gulf of Guinea, where piracy is on the way up.

Finally, piracy constitutes a risk to the marine environment. Indeed, the hijacking of oil and chemical tankers by pirates using heavy machine guns and even RPGs may well cause the hulls of tankers to crack, releasing dangerous chemicals into the environment. Given the terrible effects of tankers' accidents (such as the *Erika* in 1999 or the *Prestige* in 2002), one can only fear such accidental effects of deliberate attacks without even mentioning the potential use by terrorists of hijacked tankers to create massive pollution. It is also important to mention that Somali pirates have proliferated in a context of increasing illegal fishing activities in the Somali waters, which may well have given militia leaders an opportunity to diversify their own illegal activities (e.g. Menkhaus, 2009: 22–23).

While the number of pirate-related attacks in Southeast Asia has been decreasing for the past years, the Horn of Africa remains a hot spot (although the number of attacks has drastically decreased since 2011) and piracy and robbery at sea is still on the rise in the Gulf of Guinea.

The unprecedented number and intensity of attacks off Somalia since 2007 have engendered states' responses both at the normative level (UN Security Council resolutions authorising the repression of piracy and robbery at sea in the territorial waters of Somalia as well as on land, IMO coordination work on piracy and the creation of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to coordinate state and non-state actors' responses) and at the naval level (counter-piracy operations, such as EU operation Atalanta and NATO operation Ocean Shield, establishment of transit corridors). Non-state actors (such as shipping companies, the ICC, insurance companies, and private security companies) have also developed a wide range of responses to the threat of piracy (such as the IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre and 24-hour emergency helpline).

Trafficking and smuggling activities at sea

The majority of criminal activities at sea concerns arms, drug, and people trafficking/smuggling. Arms trafficking can include small arms, light weapons, and even weapons of mass destruction (or at least some of their components); it is thus linked to warlordism, civil wars, insurgencies, and, obviously, terrorism, with consequences at both human and national security levels. Drug trafficking principally includes cannabis (from North Africa), cocaine (from South America), and heroin (from Asia and Afghanistan).

For organised criminals, the sea offers relatively safe and underpoliced transport routes. Then, the most remote coasts and the least policed areas (such as the Black Sea) are the most likely entry points into the EU (or any other destination country) for drug, arms, and other trafficked goods. That said, illegal cargo can be found in any ship entering any seaport around the world, hence the growing importance placed on port security. Upstream, coastguard or naval operations can be efficient. During the 1990s, drug seizures at sea rarely exceeded hundreds of kilos and were relatively rare (d'Oléon, 1996: 139). Since 2001, controls are more frequent, especially in the Caribbean, and the seizures are thus more important (dozen tons a year) (Commons Hansard, 2007).

People trafficking includes facilitating illegal immigration and for-profit human trafficking. In the great majority of the cases, illegal migrants must not be classified as the authors of the criminal activity at sea. The instigators are the human smugglers, who are the real criminals in this business. Migrants often die while crossing the Mediterranean on small boats, and smugglers are even ready to throw them overboard in order not to suffer a *flagrante delicto* when they see the police forces

approaching (Pugh, 2000: 29–30). Thus, the daily activities of naval forces (including coastguards) consist not only in deterring the smugglers and arresting the illegal immigrants, but also in helping endangered small boats and migrants (SAR). From a European perspective, the areas most concerned by human smuggling in general and illegal immigration in particular are the least policed regions, but also more generally the maritime routes towards Spain (the Strait of Gibraltar, the Canary Islands), France, Greece, Malta, and above all Italy (the Strait of Otranto and Sicily) (d'Oléon, 1996: 139–140; Lutterbeck, 2006: 59–82; Pugh, 2000: 32; Till, 2004: 323–324). The Adriatic route is currently declining due to the growing controls by Italy, to its assistance to the Albanians police upstream, and to the improving situation in the Balkans, but the Back Sea route is developing as an attractive option, since Bulgaria and Romania are now interesting entryways to the EU, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 10. All forms of trafficking activities at or from the sea are taken very seriously by states and international organisations such as the UN, the EU, Europol, and NATO. The need to integrate maritime surveillance means and to exchange intelligence and data is also recognised, but reluctance to share sensitive information and 'turf wars' may still limit state actors' efficiency.

Energy security and the sea

As mentioned in the discussions on terrorism and piracy, the sea is crucial in terms of energy security. Firstly, the majority of unexploited oil and gas fields are located under the oceans. With the gradual depletion of traditional deposits, states will increasingly seek their exploitation. It implies securing sovereignty rights over maritime territories that were previously not considered as a priority, or relying upon multilateral agreements. For example, the Arctic Ocean is of extreme importance to Europe, as the opening of new shipping lanes and the exploitation of resources in new areas may engender various tensions, including the delimitation of zones and sovereignties and the transit of vessels (cf. chapter 10). In the case of the UK, recent exploration and preliminary works off the Falkland Islands may raise tensions with Argentina regarding sovereignty over maritime areas. In the South China Sea, Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are involved in territorial disputes over the Spartly Islands, whose main driver is to gain access to prospective oil and gas fields under the seabed.

Secondly, SLOCs are the major supply lines for fossil fuels (oil, coal, LNG). Compared to land transportation (mainly pipelines but also road

and train transportation), SLOCs offer the advantage of not being dependent on the political stability of various states. In other words, at first sight, their security depends less on the stability of foreign countries. However, the SLOCs must still be secured, by protecting the transit through (or close to) the territorial waters of unfriendly or weak states (e.g. in the Oman Strait and the Gulf of Guinea), and by engaging in counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations (e.g. in the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz). Thus, naval forces are crucial enablers of the freedom of the seas, along with multilateral agreements. As discussed in chapter 2, big Powers are very proactive when it comes to monitoring SLOCs around crucial chokepoints, notably in the wider Gulf region.

The sea as an object to protect

The protection of marine ecosystems has gradually been recognised as an important issue. Protecting the sea is different from securing the sea for the very reason that the objectives are based on environmental (marine environment protection) and economic (assuring a sustainable use of the sea) rather than security considerations. However, since maritime issues are being considered comprehensively, then protecting the seas becomes part of the more global quest for good governance, the rule of law, and security at sea. Since polluters are being criminalised, thus protecting the sea is also being securitised. The most visible expression of this is the involvement of navies, which are often the only actors that can exercise the monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence at sea, including in the field of marine environment protection. However, it is quite different to consider the sea as an object to secure (against transnational threats) or as an object to protect per se (against environmental degradations such as nuclear and chemical wastes, remaining World War mines, oil discharges, tanker collisions, or overexploitation of sea resources).

The post-Cold War expansion of the security agenda has led to a certain securitisation of the environment. The security of the individuals depends on their natural surroundings. Polluted air or water, climatic change and its consequences, as well as resource scarcities can eventually engender insecurity for the individuals, the societies, and even the states: diseases, famines, natural disasters, but also conflicts over scarce resources, mass migrations, polarisation of existing inequalities within a society. While these considerations have remained either theoretical or proven at a very micro level, climate change and other current environmental problems (such as deforestation) have become so critical in the last decade that the environment has been securitised. For example,

a study by Andrew Holland and Xander Vagg (2013) shows that 71% of 155 countries have stressed in their official statements and security documents that climate change is a national security threat.

The environmental dimension of security at sea is particularly important, since the sea is highly vulnerable to pollution and halieutic resources are not infinite. Apart from the pollution originating on shore (such as chemical pollutants produced by agriculture and industry), a growing part of the marine environment problems originates in irresponsible human activities at sea, such as voluntarily discharging oil, operating outdated tankers, overfishing endangered species. Notable tanker accidents, such as the *Amoco Cadiz* (1978), the *Exxon Valdez* (1989), and more recently the *Erika* (1999) and the *Prestige* (2002), the dramatic melting of the polar ice cap, as well as the growing number of endangered fish species (including those consumed in mass such as cod), have all drawn the attention of the public opinion and of the politicians to the fact that the marine environment needs to be protected. That said, there are also purely economic considerations such as keeping enough halieutic resources and keeping the sea in good enough conditions to sustain economic activities such as fishing and sea tourism. As discussed in chapter 7, this is notably the vision adopted by the EU:

> The first goal of an EU Integrated Maritime Policy is to create optimal conditions for the sustainable *use* of the oceans and seas, enabling the *growth* of maritime sectors and coastal regions. (Commission, 2007c: 7; emphasis added)

Hence, protecting the sea should not be understood as a simple and single benign desire to take care of the marine environment. It is understood (and represented) as an economically rational need and not only as an ethical responsibility. That said, it does not prevent some actors (individuals, NGOs, even states or international bodies) from genuinely acting in favour of the protection of the marine environment. However, as far as budgets are concerned, economic priorities become the predominant driving force. In this case, the fact that economic considerations go along with environmental concerns could eventually be good for the marine environment, if it ultimately makes states act for its protection.

Protecting the sea is a two-phase process. The first phase is a normative one: marine environment protection regulations have to be defined and accepted by the different actors, namely, the states (however influenced by civil society stakeholders, such as environmentalists, the fishing industry, the shipping sector). Then, the second phase is an

operational one: norms have to be implemented or even enforced. This requires surveillance, control, and eventually repression. At sea, the role of coastguards and naval forces (including patrol aircraft) is important for surveillance, control, inspections, and eventually interceptions and arrests. Like in the case of the struggle against transnational criminal threats, many state services are involved, such as navies, police forces, or the fisheries protection agencies. Thereby, coordination at the national and international level is crucial, as it is evident that 'fishes cross the borders' without any legal consideration and that struggling against out-of-age tankers needs comprehensive, multilateral and multistakeholder approaches. For example, in Europe, the EU plays an important role during both the normative phase (passing EU regulations and harmonising norms within the EU) and the operational phase (coordinating national means for norms implementation, surveillance, and repression).

Marine environment protection and maritime safety

Addressing land-based pollution is difficult, as the sources are dispersed and hard to isolate (e.g. agricultural residues). In contrast, one can more easily pinpoint sea-based activities, which are consequently subject to various conventions (Basiron, 2002). One important convention is MARPOL (under the auspices of the IMO), which deals with pollution from ships, mainly oil. But regional organisations such as the EU can also edict norms applying to their waters and to the activities of their economic agents. Since 2001 (following the *Erika* and then the *Prestige* accidents), European norms against oil discharges and out-of-age tankers have strengthened, and good governance at sea is at the centre of the 2007 Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP).

The maritime component of the implementation of these norms, or else the direct role of naval forces, is still limited in the field of antipollution. Indeed, the main aspects, that is, controlling the ships and, upstream, the ship owners and the various economic agents, takes place on land. Naval forces and coastguards can, however, facilitate inspectors' work by carrying them on board ships and, in the case of oil discharges, they can observe *flagrante delicto*. In such cases, naval aviation plays an important role; maritime patrol aircraft allow tracking down oil trails, and possibly hunting down the contravening ship. Rerouting contravening ships has increased in parallel with a greater account of the importance of protecting the marine environment. Fines can then be very expansive.

International and European norms tend to protect halieutic resources by limiting overfishing as well as the fishing of endangered species. Then,

states have to put these norms into practice in their territorial waters and EEZs, as well as in the international waters when applicable. The European Common Fishery Policy (CFP), which came into force in 1983, is very ambitious; indeed, the objective is to ensure the sustainable exploitation of fish resources, that is to say, developing the European fishing sector while preserving the fish stocks (Commission, 2001: 5). The implementation of the EU CFP norms has always been controversial in states like France and Spain where the lobby power of the fishing industry is strong and often resents the EU norms as not fair for their business.

In practice, naval forces are of particular importance in the following three cases: Firstly, they can protect their nationals (e.g. fishermen) against a foreign navy in the international waters (as did Spain against Canada in 1995 during the 'Turbot War') (d'Oléon, 1996: 137). Secondly, they can defend national fishermen when they are attacked by foreign fishermen (as did France in 1994 when French fishermen had been attacked by Spanish colleagues during the 'Tuna War') (AFP, 1994). Thirdly, they can exercise the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea in case of illegal activities in their territorial waters and EEZs (such as coral fishing) or in the international waters (to repel infractions committed by ships flying the national flag and by all contravening ships in the case of international conventions norms). The primary mission of small states' navies is to monitor the fisheries. Thus, for example, fisheries protection activities accounted for over 90% of the Irish Naval Service operations in 2004 (Department of Defence, 2004: §4.11.5).

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Securing and protecting the sea means combating risks and threats at sea or coming from the sea. It is mainly a notion of peacetime, and, thus, it illustrates that, contrary to what Admiral Castex pointed out in the 1930s, command of the sea is not a notion restricted to wartime anymore, but a notion of peacetime as well, for securing the sea against criminal actors requires controlling the global commons on a permanent basis, at least to some extent and in partnership with other states and maritime stakeholders. Transnational and non-state threats have an important maritime dimension. This is due to the fact that the sea is above all a line of communication, and that it is difficult for states to control the maritime domain in an efficient, comprehensive, and enduring way.

Securing the sea is not exactly the same as enforcing the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, at least in its Weberian acceptation.



Figure 5.1 Three components of maritime security

Indeed, securing the sea often requires states to act outside their territorial waters, sometimes within foreign states' territorial waters, in order to cope with terrorism at (or from the) sea, piracy, as well as arms, drug, and people smuggling. Maritime security implies projecting power and norms into the maritime domain and thus fits with the liberal conception of seapower (cf. chapter 1). In their quest for maritime security, states engage various services and agencies, not only their navy. Thus, interstate coordination and multilateral operations (at the EU or NATO level) are crucial in order to secure and protect the sea. Indeed, criminal actors use the maritime frontiers to their advantage, by exploiting legal disparities, as well as inefficient coordination between services within and between the different countries. Consequently, cooperation in the field of the struggle against transnational threats at sea is an imperative requirement, although not so easily achievable.

As shown in Figure 5.1, maritime security revolves around three main domains of action: (1) adopting legislations adapted to the current threats and the nature of the maritime domain (such as port security regulations, pirates' extradition agreements, fisheries protection rules, and marine environment protection norms), (2) maritime surveillance and maritime domain awareness, and (3) enforcement by naval forces and other services (which in the case of the EU includes CSDP operations and the work of decentralised agencies). The next chapters will discuss the EU's maritime security policies, institutions, and activities in more detail.

6
The Elements of the EU's Seapower

As discussed in the previous chapters, the elements of seapower fall into two distinct, although interrelated, categories: the material elements of seapower (including physical, geopolitical, economic, and naval factors) and the ideational elements of seapower (including maritime culture as well as peoples' and institutions' cognitions). Eventually, material and ideational elements of seapower need to be backed by relevant institutional structures. Europe in general and the EU in particular possess many of the attributes of seapower and of a sea Power.

The material elements of the EU's seapower

From an economic point of view, the sea contributes to the EU's intrinsic power, as a means of transportation and a source of richness (halieutic and energy resources). The sea also contributes to the Union's ability to project its material and normative power beyond its external boundary. Geographically, the territory of the EU is located at the end of the European peninsula, which itself constitutes the far end of the Eurasian landmass. Located within what Halford Mackinder described as the Inner crescent (compared to the Heartland) and what Nicholas Spykman described as the Rimland (Mackinder, 1904; Spykman, 1944), the EU is by default turned towards the sea. In other words, there is a material (or geographical) cause of the EU's seapower.

At first sight, the four post-Cold War EU enlargement rounds might give the impression that the EU's centre of gravity has shifted towards continental Europe. Indeed, the 'geographical centre' of the EU (calculated by the French Institut Géographique National) has shifted towards central Europe following the various enlargements; it was located in

the middle of France in 1987, in Belgium in 1995, in the western part of Germany in 2004, and still in Germany but a bit further east since 2007 and eventually a bit further south since Croatia joined the EU in 2013. However, these enlargement rounds have merely reoriented the Union's focus from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Baltic Sea (Suárez de Vivero and Rodríguez Mateos, 2006). Indeed, the EU's enlargement over the last 20 years has reinforced rather than weakened the Union's maritime dimension, since a majority of the new members are coastal states. They have maritime interests in areas previously located beyond the EU's reach, such as the Black Sea and the north of the Baltic Sea. Norway (which is not a member of the EU but is, nevertheless, part of the Schengen space and a member of the European Economic Area) constitutes the EU's entryway to the Arctic Ocean along with Denmark (via Greenland). Since 2007, the EU has a coastline of more than 70,000 km (by comparison, the US coastline is just short of 20,000 km). As shown in Figure 6.1, the length of the EU's maritime border exceeds that of the land border. The EU's EEZs (including member states' overseas territories) covers 25 million km², which is the largest maritime territory in the world. In sum, although the EU's centre of

Figure 6.1 The geographical extent of the EU's maritime and land borders
Note: Norway and Switzerland are included within the 'EU's space' in this representation

gravity has not geographically moved towards the sea, there has been a geopolitical shift towards it (Germond, 2011).

Due to its geographical position and to the nature of its economy, the EU is highly dependent on the sea for its economic activities and prosperity. According to the 2012 final report of the Blue Growth Study commissioned by the European Commission, 'the importance of maritime economic activities in Europe is expected to grow by 2020 to an estimated [Growth Value Added] of €590 billion and to 7 million persons employed' (ECORYS, 2012: 8). The maritime economy has three general dimensions: the sea as a means of communication (commercial shipping), the sea as a place of leisure (tourism and settlement), and the sea as a repository of energy and halieutic resources. These three dimensions are relevant to the EU.

As to commercial shipping, '90% of Europe's external trade and close to 40% of its internal trade passes through its ports' (Commission, 2007c: 8). More than 3.5 billion tons of freight a year transit via more than 1,500 EU ports generating over €20 billion (Carpenter, 2013: 42–43). Economic activities linked to the shipping sector also include maritime services (such as insurance companies), sea port services, and the shipbuilding industry. Generally speaking, shipping from and to the EU mainly transits from or to either America or Asia. As of 2013, the US is the EU's largest trading partner and China the second largest one; most of this trade is sea-borne (mainly shipping of containers). In other words, as shown in Figure 6.2, the major SLOCs relevant to the EU are



Figure 6.2 SLOCs most relevant to the EU

those between Europe and America (North Atlantic route) and those between Europe and Asia (especially the Suez–Malacca route). The Euro-Atlantic SLOCs are currently under no major threat; NATO's maritime preponderance in the Atlantic is not contested. In other words, the West has secured command of the Atlantic Ocean. This may obviously change in the coming decade depending on Russia's foreign policy reorientation. It is unlikely that the West shall lose its command of the Atlantic any time soon though. The Suez–Malacca route currently presents more challenges in terms of maritime security (piracy at the Horn of Africa and in the Malacca Strait, terrorism at sea) and due to the presence of several non-Western regional competitors, such as India and China, and to a lesser extent Iran. The EU's maritime geopolitics will thus increasingly be turned towards securing the Euro–Asian SLOCs, including the sub-SLOC linking the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz.

Beyond trade, maritime and coastal tourism employs 2.35 million people, which represents 1.1% of total EU employment (Commission, 2012a: 10). As for energy, 'more than 80% of current European oil and gas production is drilled offshore, mainly in the North Sea, but also in the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Black Seas' (Commission, 2007d: 2). Moreover, a large part of the EU's energy imports (notably oil) is shipped through the sea, primarily from the Gulf via the Suez Canal. Concerning fishing activities, the EU produced approximately 4.669 million tons of seafood in 2011, and it possesses the second-largest fishing fleet behind China (82,047 fishing vessels in 2012 and 127,686 fishermen in 2011) (STECF, 2013: 13). The economic use of the sea constitutes an efficient cause of the EU's seapower in that the Union's power, in part, derives from its exploitation of maritime and sea-based resources and its use of the sea as a means of transportation.

The EU's flourishing maritime (or maritime-dependent) economy is backed by imposing naval forces, second to none but the US Navy (see Table 6.1). However, this comparison is somewhat flawed, since the EU does not possess an integrated navy, and the creation of anything close to an 'EU Navy' is not on the agenda. Thus, any 'EU naval forces' figure can only be used as a statistical instrument, namely, the aggregation of member states' naval assets. This instrument is rather limited but can, nonetheless, help in highlighting relevant points of comparison between the EU and other global actors in terms of naval power, as shown, for example, by Michael F. Kluth and Jess Pilegaard (2011) in a study comparing the US and EU aggregated naval power. Although the number of European ships is comparable to that of the US (except for aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines), there can be no comparison between

Table 6.1 EU–US–China naval assets: quantitative comparison – 2014

Type of ships	***EU***	***US***	***China***
Tactical submarines	50 (13 nuclear-powered)	58 (all nuclear-powered)	66 (5 nuclear-powered)
Aircraft carriers	4 (3 light)	10	1
Principal surface combatants	126	97	69
Patrol boats:			
– Navies	265	55	216
– Paramilitary	More than 1,400	159	~600

Data: Military Balance (IISS, 2014)

the sum of the EU member states' naval assets and the 'structurally integrated' US Navy. Moreover, as the US regularly reminds Europeans, their lack in defence spending does not only prevent Europeans from building enough ships (quantity), but it also prevents them from acquiring/developing/assimilating state-of-the art technologies (quality), notably in terms of network-centric warfare (Assembly of the WEU, 2005a).

However, as shown in Table 6.1, EU member states currently possess naval resources that are sufficient, in terms of both quantity and quality, to fulfil the majority of naval missions (including within NATO and the EU) assigned to their navies, except perhaps in the case of large-scale power projection operations. For the Europeans, the problem is of a different nature. It is rooted in the EU member states' inability to coordinate all the means at their disposal and to avoid inefficient and expensive duplications, including in terms of procurement. Europe's lacking vigour in the naval dimension – as compared to the US – is mainly a result of political decisions rather than resource limitations (Germond, 2007, 2011), which illustrates the importance of Mahan's point about 'the character of the government': seapower ultimately rests on political decisions, in this case the lack of political will.

Another element of naval power worth mentioning is the possession of overseas naval bases. Six member states possess overseas territories with naval facilities: Denmark (Greenland – a gateway to the Arctic), France (Caribbean, Guyana, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, La Reunion, and Mayotte), the Netherlands (Caribbean), Portugal (Azores), Spain (Canary Islands and Madeira), and the UK (Caribbean, Falkland, Diego Garcia, and Gibraltar). In addition, France and the UK have a number of foreign-hosted naval facilities, including in Singapore, Brunei, Bahrein and Cyprus (UK), Djibouti and Abu Dhabi (France). As shown in Figure 6.3,



Figure 6.3 EU member states' main overseas naval bases and foreign-hosted facilities

the European naval forces benefit from an extended network of bases and logistical facilities, which could grant the EU with virtual global reach capabilities, should the political will arise.

As discussed in previous chapters, seapower in general and naval forces in particular allow projecting security and normative power beyond one's external boundary. It is, however, debatable whether European navies have traditionally been involved in norms promotion. For example, Simon Duke argues that in the 19th century, although British imperial power was largely based on the power of its navy, the Royal Navy was not much used as a tool to spread British norms (Duke, 2010: 318), which actually fits with British colonial policy, which, contrary to that of France, did not aim at transforming colonised nations into British-like societies. However, once European Powers agreed to prohibit slave trade at the beginning of the 19th century, they also authorised the Royal Navy to use force against vessels involved in such activities. Then, 'the Royal navy devoted between sixth and a quarter of its warships to suppressing the slave traffic' (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 27), which shows how seapower, morality, and normative intentions can actually fit together.

As a union of liberal democratic states, the EU aims at stabilising the international liberal order as well as promoting the EU's values, such as democracy, human rights, and good governance. Since 2003, the EU has become a 'net exporter of security' (Posen, 2006: 178), carrying out peace operations in the Union's periphery and beyond. Military, police,

and security sector reform (SSR) operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) banner are carried out in accordance with the EU's so-called 'comprehensive approach' to security, according to which the EU seeks to tackle the causes of threats rather than only the symptoms, paying attention to the long-term structural problems and using a wide array of military and civilian tools, including development aid as well as the promotion of good governance, the rule of law, human rights, and democracy, if possible in collaboration with civil society and regional partners and within multilateral structures. The projection of security is thus linked to the promotion of European values. The EU's normative intensions (including the stabilisation of the international liberal order) are acknowledged and stressed unambiguously at the Union's highest decision-making level, that is, the Commission, the Council, and the Presidency:

> Our quest for European unity [. . .] is not an end in itself, but a means to higher ends [. . .]: a cosmopolitan order, in which one person's gain does not need to be another person's pain; in which abiding by common norms serves universal values. (Barroso's speech in Barroso and Van Rompuy, 2012: 6)
>
> Its financing instruments will strengthen EU's cooperation with partners, support the objectives of promoting EU values abroad, projecting EU policies in support of addressing major global challenges. (Council, 2013: 38)
>
> Europe and America are the Motherland of democracy. In the G20, almost all members are democracies. Now that we are winning in the battle for ideas, we must keep working together. (European Council, The President, 2011: 4)

In other words, according to the Union's narrative, a world made only of 'European-like' states would be more peaceful, would contribute to the EU's security, and, eventually, would benefit 'everyone' from a 'secure Europe' to 'a better world' (Council, 2003b). Hence, in accordance with the comprehensive approach to security, seapower is not only about '[shaping] the global economic system' (Rogers, 2010: 4); it has a normative component, since it contributes to the promotion of the EU's values and thus to a multilateral liberal world order. Even when the EU unleashes the full naval power at its disposal, such as with counter-piracy operation Atalanta, humanitarian concerns and the settlement of the political situation on land are emphasised. The EU has

endorsed the comprehensive approach to security in Somalia; thus its means are not restricted to naval assets deployed at the Horn of Africa, and include economic development tools, SSR and capacity-building operations, humanitarian aid, and political and diplomatic attempts to resolve issues in Somalia. The EU has also made sure that pirates are treated according to their rights by signing strict agreements over the transfer of pirates with third states, notably Kenya, because it is important for the EU that 'pirates [. . .] detained by the NAVFOR forces [are] prosecuted, convicted and serve their sentences in a way that is consistent with global human rights law, including in cases where this involves costs to the EU itself' (Riddervold, 2011: 399). It shows that the EU's seapower is in line with the Union's vision of itself (identity) and its role on the world stage, that is to say, a 'civilising power' that has the right and the duty to contribute to the stability of the liberal world order as long as it follows its basic values of democracy, human rights, and good governance. Chapter 7 will show that this philosophy of (sea) power is also applied in the case of police operations at sea, such as counter-immigration operations.

The ideational elements of the EU's seapower

In isolation, material elements of seapower are necessary but not sufficient if not backed by ideational ones. In Europe, the sea became really important on the political agenda, in the popular culture, and in the collective imagery only after the European Powers began their maritime expansion in the 15th century. Maritime expeditions and then maritime trade over the 'Seven Seas' excited curiosity among the population, inspired painters, writers, and poets. Maritime imageries can be positive and negative (e.g. Quilley, 1998), but the sea rarely inspires indifference. In Britain, maritime imageries have certainly been instrumental in empire-building (Quilley, 2011). Although any form of instrumentalisation of the sea and its representation by governments is at best difficult to prove, decision-makers have long been conscious of the importance of representations as a way to normalise practices such as imperialism. Artists were influenced by the events of their time, and in turn contributed to creating the necessary cognitive soil for maritime expansion. According to Baker (2010: 1), 'romantic-period writers [. . .] shared and were understood to share a renewed appreciation of the ocean as a geopolitical domain ruled by British naval heroism'; in other words, the ocean can be interpreted 'as the medium for history's preeminent culture of modern empire' (5).

Maritime imageries and their political implications have not been limited to the main European maritime nations (namely, Spain, Portugal, then the Netherlands and Britain). This means that even the countries which were not turned towards the sea in practice (such as Austria–Hungary or even Russia), nevertheless, understood their linkage to the sea; (economic) globalisation was on its way and the sea was inherent to the process, which means that Europeans in general began to assimilate the importance of the sea in economic and strategic terms, a process that did not develop, for example, in China, which decided not to take advantage of the sea and of its seapower at the time of Zheng He's naval superiority to expand beyond its traditional margins. Indeed, 'with the exception of the late Ming, Chinese people never valued the sea as an entity intimately linked to commercial activities' (Chang, 2006: 22). Moreover, seafaring was negatively construed and represented in China, as it was contrary to the idea of Chinese superiority and self-sufficiency and too much turned towards encountering foreign cultures. In sum, while 'China remained self-sufficient and land-based [. . .] Europe became acquisitive and seafaring' (Fairbank, 1969: 455). From this example, it clearly appears that what Mahan termed governments' and peoples' character is influenced by their very perception of the sea. European maritime culture has certainly contributed to the development of Europe's seapower, historically by states such as Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Britain, and now by the EU itself. Whereas the development of the IMP is 'a response to the impacts of globalization and emerging economies' (Suárez de Vivero and Rodríguez Mateos, 2010: 968), it is also deeply rooted in European maritime culture. Now, at the institutional level, the EU's maritime culture, or character, derives primarily from economic considerations:

> The seas are Europe's lifeblood. Europe's maritime spaces and its coasts are central to its well-being and prosperity – they are Europe's trade routes, climate regulator, sources of food, energy and resources, and a favoured site for its citizens' residence and recreation. (Commission, 2007c: 2)

The production of maritime narratives by the EU is thus mainly centred on economic prosperity and marine environment protection, that is to say, the so-called 'Blue Growth' (Commission, 2012a) discourse, which constructs the sea as an enabler of economic growth so long as the principles of sustainable development and good governance at sea are implemented. Thus, in its 'Guidelines' for member states, the Commission

encourages them to integrate their approaches and activities so as to strengthen maritime governance in the field of 'energy, climate change, environmental protection and conservation, research and innovation, competitiveness and job creation, international trade, transport and logistics' (Commission, 2008b: 3). However, safety and security aspects are central to the EU's maritime narrative, since 'the growth of maritime economic activities needs a safe and secure environment' (Commission, 2012b: 4). In other words, maritime economy needs maritime security, since economic actors look for certainties before making any investment. The EU's maritime security narrative has various subdimensions, including maritime safety, maritime surveillance (developing global maritime domain awareness at the EU level and monitoring Europe's maritime borders), good governance at sea, marine environment protection, and energy security, all under the banner of the Blue Growth dominant discourse.

The adoption of an EU Maritime Security Strategy by the Council in June 2014 (cf. chapter 7) confirmed the intrinsic connection between maritime economic growth, maritime security, and a broader maritime geopolitics in the EU's narrative. Indeed, maritime security is presented as prerequisite for the growth of maritime economy, and the EU is responsible for securing its maritime interests beyond its territorial waters. As will be further discussed in chapter 8, the EU's maritime (security) narrative contributes to the broader EU geopolitical discourse, which emphasises the need and the responsibility of the EU to proactively police the global commons. In turn this is linked to the EU's normative intensions. Indeed, as discussed above, the maritime domain is a medium that the EU can use to project norms and security beyond its external boundary. The representation of the seas (notably those surrounding the EU) as un-(or not enough) regulated spaces contributes to normalising the EU's projection activities in its maritime margins (and beyond).

The institutional dimension of the EU's seapower

Material and ideational elements of seapower must be supported by appropriate organisational structures and efficient decision-making processes. This is all the more important for a regional and supranational institution like the EU. The EU's foreign and security policy bureaucratic and decision-making structure has widely been discussed in the literature. It has recurrently been described as complicated (Cameron, 2012: 47) and even as lacking coherence (Gebhard, 2011: 102). The heterogeneity of the agency within the EU's structure has translated into

so-called 'turf wars' (Cameron, 2012: 47) as well as competing discourses (Carta and Morin, 2014). At first sight, this may prevent the EU from developing and implementing a coherent maritime and naval policy.

The EU's foreign and security policy has traditionally been conducted by two distinct bureaucracies, the Commission and the Council. The Commission represents the supranational component of the Union, which is supposed to act in the interest of the Union itself (understood as something more than the sum of its member states). The Council is the intergovernmental component of the Union, which is supposed to reflect compromises between member states and is thus subject to internal balancing. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which results from the merging of the Directorate General External Relations with the Council secretariat responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the CSDP by the Treaty of Lisbon has somewhat blurred the distinction between the supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of the EU's foreign and security policy. In theory, this has offered the EU the possibility to develop and apply a more consistent, cross-sectoral, and comprehensive approach to security, which is symbolised by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The maritime dimension of the EU's security extends beyond the institutional boundaries and responsibility of the CSDP; thus its machinery is rather complex. When mapping the various mechanisms involved in the maritime dimension of the EU's security, Aaltola et al. (2013) found no less than 11 institutional actors and 8 instruments to which one should add 6 decentralised agencies. The use of naval power and the launch of maritime capacity-building missions are of the competence of the Council (CSDP), while maritime security and surveillance activities are within the competences of the Council, the Commission (DG Transport, Maritime Affairs, Environment, Energy, etc.), the EEAS, and various decentralised agencies (fisheries, maritime safety, border control, etc.). With the adoption of a comprehensive approach to security, overlaps between the role of the Council and the Commission are more frequent. For example, the Instrument for Stability which grants the EU with flexible financial and political means in case of crises is implemented by the Commission but often in parallel with a CSDP operation.

In the case of naval operations, the role of the Council is central. Decisions result from states' converging interests. In other words, there is a need to reach a consensus within all the member states, since CSDP decisions require unanimity, which can reduce decisions to the smaller common denominator. Without a consensus (which includes

'constructive abstention' from any member state) the EU cannot deploy naval power. And even if a consensus is reached, member states are not obliged to participate in the operation, including financially. In practice, certain member states regularly dominate the debates within the Council, such as France, Germany, and the UK, which are the most powerful member states in terms of material power (notably economic and military power) and normative or ideational power, that is to say, their capacity to rally other member states to their point of view. For example, in 2008 the launch of counter-piracy operation Atalanta, the first ever EU naval operation, was made possible by the convergence of interests between the dominant players within the Council. At this particular period of time and in this particular context launching a counter-piracy operation was in the interests of France, the UK, and Germany as a result of a mix of power politics, geopolitical, economic, and domestic politics considerations. As a consequence, the EU (and in particular the French Presidency) was in position to build a consensus within the member states (Germond, 2013; Germond and Smith, 2009; Riddervold, 2011). In sum, at the Council level, the main determinant when it comes to launching a naval operation will be whether member states perceive the strengthening of the EU's global actorness via the development of its naval visibility as serving their own interests. That said, in the case of counter-piracy at the Horn of Africa, the adoption of a comprehensive approach to security by the EU (Council, 2011) has resulted in a cross-sectoral interplay between CSDP elements (naval operation Atalanta, maritime capacity-building operation Nestor, etc.) and non-CSDP elements, most notably the Commission's instruments in the field of development assistance.

At the supranational level, the EU possesses exclusive competences in some areas, such as trade, customs, and fisheries. Those competencies, although delegated by member states, result in an independent decision-making process, which is not subject to member states' short-term competing and diverging interests. In other words, the EU's interests can transcend those of the member states and decisions can be independently made and implemented at the supranational level (Commission, decentralised agencies, etc.). For example, in the case of fisheries protection, the CFP is the legal framework within which the Union must operate. However, although this offers a certain degree of coherence due to the high degree of integration fisheries policy benefit from, day-to-day activities in terms of fisheries monitoring is delegated to the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA; formerly CFCA) (cf. chapter 7) and maritime surveillance responsibility and competencies are shared among various EU bureaucracies, including the Council, the EFCA, the European

Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and the Commission. In other words, due to the complexity of the EU's structure and of the maritime domain, cross-sectoral policies and activities resulting in shared competences are likely to frame the development of the EU's seapower.

The proliferation of EU's institutions, mechanisms, and instruments linked to the maritime dimension of the EU's security has created a complex structure of decision-making and implementation processes. Even though the dominant narrative on maritime security is rather coherent, this obviously creates a risk of inefficient duplications and cost inefficiency, lengthy decision-making processes, and potentially non-commensurable activities, as in the case of disagreements within the Commission on the securitisation of development assistance under the banner of the comprehensive approach to security at the Horn of Africa (Zwolski, 2012).

Seapower rests on states' (and the EU's) capacity to mobilise material and ideational resources and direct them towards the maritime domain. The specificities of the EU as a somewhat sui generis actor in international relations can prevent the EU from fulfilling its sea Power ambitions or, on the contrary, contribute to it by playing the cross-sectoral and decentralised card, which may well be a way to not only rally more member states but also practically implement a wider array of policies, which fits well with the diverse security needs at sea that cannot be reduced to either the CSDP or fisheries, energy, transport, and so on. The next chapter discusses the development of the naval and maritime dimension of the CSDP and how institutional complexity has eventually led to the definition of a comprehensive maritime security strategy.

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Overall, it appears that the EU benefits from many attributes of a sea Power (physical, geopolitical, economic, military, cultural/ideational, and institutional). The EU's geography is oriented towards the seas, which determines part of its politics and policies. Beyond maritime trade, energy security, fishing activities, and tourism (mainly economic considerations), the EU member states possess considerable naval power (although ageing and declining in relative terms when compared to rising naval Powers such as China and India), and the EU's security (understood comprehensively) strongly depends on the control of the seas surrounding the Union and beyond. The definition of an EMP in 2007 and the adoption of an EU Maritime Security Strategy in 2014 (Commission, 2007c; Council, 2014c; cf. chapter 7) shows that the Union and its member states have eventually decided to grant the sea the attention it deserves given the EU's seapower characteristics.

7
The Naval and Maritime Dimension of the EU

The cross-institutional maritime dimension of the EU's security mirrors its overall institutional structure, that is to say, a combination of intergovernmental processes institutionalised at the level of the Council and supranational processes spanning across the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and various decentralised agencies. There is a naval dimension of the EU within the CSDP as well as a more comprehensive maritime dimension of the EU, going beyond the IMP, which encompasses military, civilian, police, economic, and normative subdimensions.[1]

The naval dimension of the CSDP

On paper, the CSDP has always had a naval component. Indeed, the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal that set up the targets in terms of capabilities stated that by 2003 the EU should be in a position to deploy forces that are 'militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements' (Council, 1999). However, 'initial EU military operations in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Balkans were so limited in scale that the use of naval assets was unnecessary' (Germond and Smith, 2009: 576). Indeed, as discussed in chapter 4, the role of naval forces during low-intensity peace support and humanitarian operations is mainly limited to sealift. CSDP operations in the Balkans could do with land transportation for heavy material and airlift for personnel, light equipment, and urgent needs. Overseas CSDP operations, notably in Africa, have not implied strategic sealift. Airlift was privileged for various reasons, including the rapidity of air over sea transport, the limited amount of material deployed,

and the operations' location. Operations taking place far away from the coast would imply land transport anyway, which could be risky and suffer from poor road networks and could even pose political challenges, especially if third countries need to be crossed, and are hence not the privileged solution. For example, during operation EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 'logistical support and the transport of troops from Gabon to the DRC and within the country were provided "on the spot" by tactical airlift capabilities based in Libre-ville and Kinshasa' (Major, 2009: 314). The argument about the limited quantity of material and personnel required does not apply to all operations; indeed, as soon as a certain quantity of material is necessary, sealift may represent the most cost-effective solution. For example, in the course of operation Artemis in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which consisted in a rather limited deployment in time and scope, '44 Antonov flights were needed from Europe to Entebbe, each with 85 tons of equipment, as well as some 220 flights with tactical transports to get it all to Bunia' (Ulriksen et al., 2004: 516), which shows what benefits sea transport could have provided, all things being equal.

The 2010 Headline Goals stipulated the need for maritime strategic transport (sealift) and amphibious capabilities (Council, 2004: 3, §5). Since then, the Council has recurrently acknowledged the possibility of higher-intensity CSDP operations in the future (such as peace enforcement operations necessitating power and forces projection) and stressed the potential importance of European naval forces (e.g. Council, 2006a: 2). In 2005, the Council commanded an 'EU Maritime Dimension Study', which concluded that 'naval forces are important as a guarantee of the freedom of the seas, as an element of diplomacy and as an enabler of the rapid deployment of forces' (Germond and Smith, 2009: 577). In particular, the study stressed that member states should be able:

> to generate the appropriate maritime capabilities, including combat capabilities, to act decisively, including in the case of re-emerging regular conventional threats. These capabilities will need to be able to operate on the high seas, but also in littoral areas and will increasingly need to be appropriately networked, with capability to plug into a Joint and even civil-military environment. (Council, 2007a: 11)

In addition, the study recommended the creation of a Maritime Rapid Response Mechanism (Council, 2007a: 12) that would offer the EU enough flexibility in efficiently generating mission-tailored forces whilst utilising to best effect finite resources without unduly increasing the

maritime burden on member states (Van der Burg, 2007: 3). This mechanism should provide the EU with enough naval means to undertake various missions, including purely maritime rapid response operations and initial entry operations (Council, 2007b: 9). The deterrent and diplomatic functions of naval forces (i.e. prepositioning forces and ostensible presence) are also considered by the EU Military Staff (EUMS) (Van der Burg, 2007: 3). Likewise, counter-terrorism at sea is taken seriously by member states. Many of them have contributed to monitoring operations within NATO (standing naval forces), some with non-NATO multinational naval forces, such as the EUROMARFOR and the Force Navale Franco-Allemande (FNFA) (forces without organigrammatical link with the EU, but placed in priority at the disposal of the Union as part of the Force Catalogue).

The EUMS, the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the highest political authorities of the EU (notably the Council) have all acknowledged the importance of the sea for the CSDP. However, until December 2008, when the EU launched EU NAVFOR Atalanta, its first ever naval operation at the Horn of Africa, 'the question remained as to when, how, and to what exact purpose EU naval capabilities were going to be employed' (Germond and Smith, 2009: 577). This operation has two main objectives: securing the delivery of food to Somalia (notably escorting World Food Programme ships) and protecting EU commercial shipping. EU NAVFOR is groundbreaking because it is the first CSDP naval operation, but as shown by Germond and Smith (2009), it is also a 'first' because operation Atalanta directly aims at defending a core interest of its member states, namely, maritime trade and the freedom of the seas.

Interestingly, this first EU naval operation is not a peace support operation as such; EU NAVFOR ships contribute to the comprehensive approach to peace and security at the Horn of Africa, but in particular they contribute to maritime security: 'the Council commended that ATALANTA continued to successfully contribute to maritime security off the coast of Somalia' (Council, 2010a: 4). In other words, with Atalanta, the EU has been policing and securing the seas at the Horn of Africa. The comprehensive approach to security implies that the CSDP is concerned with maritime security. This trend has been acknowledged by the Council in its 2010 Conclusions on a Maritime Security Strategy:

> The Union needs to actively contribute to a stable and secure global maritime domain by tackling the threats identified in the European Security Strategy, while ensuring coherence with EU internal policies, including the EU Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP). To achieve

> this, the interrelation between the civilian and military capabilities of the EU and Member States plays a key role, in accordance with the Treaties. (Council, 2010b: 1)

Since 2008, new concepts and mechanisms have been developed, culminating with the adoption of an EU Maritime Security Strategy by the Council in June 2014 (Council, 2014c). The strategy emphasises the comprehensive approach to maritime security whose naval dimension cannot be separated from other instruments and policies:

> The strength of the EU lies in the range of instruments at its disposal, including political dialogue with international, regional and bilateral partners, engagement in multilateral fora, development cooperation, human rights and justice, support for regional maritime capacity building and civilian and military CSDP actions. The EU Maritime Security Operations (MSO) Concept already provides options on how maritime forces can contribute to deterring, preventing and countering unlawful activities. (Council, 2014c: 9)

In other words, the naval dimension of the CSDP is intrinsically linked to the broader maritime dimension of the EU, whose centre of gravity lies outside the CSDP. However, whereas the comprehensive approach to security implies that the Commission and decentralised agencies are involved in maritime security, the CSDP will still be responsible for counter-piracy naval operations as well as SSRs and maritime capacity-building operations. For example, in line with its comprehensive approach to security, the EU has launched in July 2012 operation EUCAP Nestor, a regional maritime capacity-building mission in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. As a capacity-building mission, it aims at developing regional actors' capacities in maritime security, counter-piracy, and maritime governance by providing them with advice, mentoring, and training. The emphasis is put on strengthening the maritime criminal justice system, 'from the investigation of serious crime (e.g. piracy, trafficking of human beings, drug and weapons smuggling) to the arrest and detention of suspects, investigation and prosecution' (EEAS, 2013: 2). Similarly, EUBAM Libya, a border assistance mission launched in May 2013, helps Libyan coastguards to develop their capacities to monitor and protect their maritime border against transnational criminality and illegal immigration, as well as their SAR capabilities, which is supposed to positively impact the security of the EU's Mediterranean frontier.

The maritime dimension of the EU's security

Beyond the CSDP and its naval dimension, the Council, the Commission, and other EU bodies have taken a much broader view of the maritime dimension of the EU's security. This results from the adoption of an expanded security agenda as reflected in the 2003 ESS and the 2008 Implementation Report (Council, 2003b: 4–5; 2008a), which put the emphasis on a variety of non-military and transnational threats to the EU's security. One can sort out three categories of risks and threats associated with the maritime domain: (1) Transnational threats such as illegal immigration by sea, smuggling and trafficking activities at sea, terrorism (which can be maritime-related – cf. chapter 5), piracy and robbery at sea; (2) Environmental issues such as the overexploitation of sea resources and marine pollution; and (3) Energy security, since 'the seas around Europe are not only important as a source of oil and gas. They are also an enabler of energy transportation and they allow us to diversify energy transport routes, thereby reducing Europe's dependence on individual external energy suppliers' (Commission, 2007d: 2).

Hence, the maritime dimension of the EU's security cannot be reduced to the CSDP; it spreads across various policy areas, including Transport (maritime safety), Environment (marine pollution), Energy (energy security), Common Fisheries Policy (fisheries control) and Justice, Freedom, and Security (drug smuggling, illegal trafficking, and immigration). The CSDP is also part of the picture and is involved in maritime security initiatives, as in the case of maritime surveillance, counter-piracy, and maritime capacity-building. In an effort to coordinate and harmonise member states' and EU bodies' various policies, norms, and activities in the maritime domain, the Commission defined in October 2007 an Integrated Maritime Policy, which aims at horizontally integrating sector-based maritime policies and actions, 'based on the clear recognition that all matters relating to Europe's oceans and seas are interlinked, and that sea-related policies must develop in a joined-up way if we are to reap the desired results' (Commission, 2007c: 2). The objective is to 'enhance Europe's capacity to face the challenges of globalization and competitiveness, climate change, degradation of the marine environment, maritime safety and security, and energy security and sustainability' (2), in other words, to promote good governance and the rule of law at sea and to struggle against the transnational and non-military threats at sea.

At first sight, the IMP seems to balance the importance of economic, social, environmental, and security concerns. Indeed, it adopts a now

classical narrative which emphasises the three components of sustainable development (economic, social, and environmental) while acknowledging the importance of security. However, a careful reading of the 2007 Commission Communication (the so-called *Blue Book*) and subsequent Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs' documents shows that the IMP, at least in its first years, was far more focused on Blue Growth rather than maritime security, as unambiguously expressed in the following excerpt:

> The first goal of an EU Integrated Maritime Policy is to create optimal conditions for the sustainable use of the oceans and seas, enabling the *growth* of maritime sectors and coastal regions. (Commission, 2007c: 7; emphasis added)

During the consultation process that led to the formulation of the *Blue Book*, various stakeholders had emphasised the need to give security considerations a more prominent role in the IMP (e.g. CHENS, 2007). But, being a Commission-incepted policy, the IMP has almost 'naturally' focused towards economic concerns rather than security ones. That said, 'as has been the case since the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958, economic goals have raised political and security concerns and fostered political and security cooperation, even if it is not obvious at first sight' (Germond, 2011: 568). In the case of the IMP, environmental security issues, such as fisheries protection and marine environment protection, as well as the struggle against illegal immigration and criminal activities at sea, cannot be dissociated from the economic aspects, hence the importance of maritime security. In particular, maritime surveillance has been identified as a crucial instrument contributing to 'the safe and secure use of marine space' and relevant for fisheries monitoring, 'safety of navigation, marine pollution, law enforcement, and overall security' (Commission, 2007c: 5; 2008e: 6).

Maritime surveillance implies (among others) satellite and radio surveillance as well as exchange of critical data and information. Due to the cross-sector implications of maritime surveillance and the sensitivity of some of the assets employed, the Council has been involved in the process since the beginning. Noting that maritime surveillance ranges 'from the surveillance of human activities to the observation of the marine environment' the Council 'recognises the important role which may be played by navies in the field of maritime surveillance and maritime security in general' (Council, 2008c: 45). The Council has encouraged member states and the Commission to work towards

> an integrated approach to maritime surveillance, through a Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) in order to promote more interoperability and make best use of existing systems on a cross-sectoral basis, and facilitate safe and secure exchange of information while ensuring complementarity of efforts, thus improving safety, security cost-effectiveness and efficiency, maritime situational awareness, and the facilitation of maritime transport calling at a European port or passing through European waters or its approaches. (Council, 2009: 2)

In other words, the Council has championed the need to integrate maritime surveillance capabilities and activities 'across sectors and borders', considering it a 'priority objective' (2). In addition, 'information exchange between relevant civilian and military authorities at appropriate level' (3) has also been promoted.

Back in 2008–2010, the European maritime surveillance assets and structure were very fragmented: the SafeSeaNet system (SSN), a vessel traffic monitoring system which tracks more than 12,000 ships a day in EU waters (monitoring the Automatic Identification System [AIS] broadcasts from ships); the vessel monitoring system (VMS) for fisheries authorities (satellite-based); the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security programme, now known as Copernicus (satellite observation and sensors on the ground, at sea, or in the air); the European external border surveillance system (EUROSUR); and the Project Team Maritime Surveillance (PT MARSUR) in support of the CSDP. Thus, the first challenge clearly lies in integrating those systems and structures, with the aim of developing a European common maritime picture shared amongst EU bodies and agencies (including EMSA, Common Fisheries Protection Agency [CFPA], European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union [FRONTEX], European Space Agency [ESA], European Environmental Agency [EEA], Europol, and European Defence Agency [EDA]), member states, and their services (including coastguards and police forces, as well as national maritime surveillance agencies). In 2010, the Commission released a roadmap for maritime Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE):

> The aim of integrated maritime surveillance is to generate a situational awareness of activities at sea, impacting on maritime safety and security, border control, maritime pollution and marine environment, fisheries control, general law enforcement, defence as well as

> the economic interests of the EU, so as to facilitate sound decision making. (Commission, 2010: 10)

The Commission defined seven user communities (or categories of stakeholders): border control, fisheries control, defence, maritime safety and security, marine environment, customs, and general law enforcement (6). Stakeholders are invited to share information 'on a need to know and a need and responsibility to share basis' (10). In other words, user communities are encouraged to think beyond their own institution's needs and to acknowledge the necessity to share information. This may seem to be obvious and beyond question from a common sense perspective. However, bureaucratic reluctance to share information has been widely documented especially in the case of sensitive data and of civilian–military cooperation. Explanatory factors range from mistrust over motives and policy interests (Walsh, 2006) to bureaucratic competition/self-interest (Allison, 1971), divergent organisational culture (Slim, 1996; Weinberger, 2002: 264), fear that new cooperative arrangements may jeopardise previous investments (Fägersten, 2010: 503), as well as fear of dependency, exploitation, and even survival (Buterbaugh, 1999). Although one of the EU's advantages is indeed to favour trust and cooperation throughout the Union and between member states, developing a CISE for the maritime domain has proven challenging. One of the key elements of success seems to be the commitment to create a decentralised information exchange system, which should preserve member states' and agencies' autonomy. Existing systems are not supposed to be dismantled either: 'the competences of national authorities, as well as the mandates of EU Agencies set out in these legal instruments will thus be fully respected' (Commission, 2010: 11). As of 2014, two pilot projects have been implemented: Maritime Surveillance in the Northern Sea Basins (MARSUNO) and Maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean Sea and its Atlantic approaches (BlueMassMed). Both projects showed that 'decentralised and non-hierarchical architectural design, appears as an optimal solution' (BMM, 2012: 9) and that it is 'important to safeguard a sectoral specific development of standards' given the fact that 'community of users already have each of them their own organization, priorities and systems [which] actually work satisfactorily' (MARSUNO, 2011: 75). Difficulties have been encountered with classified sensitive security information and with data protection mechanisms though (BMM, 2012: 10; MARSUNO, 2011: 19, 22–23, 30, 42, 73). In July 2014, the Commission released a communication to the Council and Parliament stressing the need to further develop an EU maritime CISE

that 'will neither have an impact on the administrative structures of Member States, nor on the existing EU legislation' and will 'ensure that maritime surveillance information collected by one maritime authority and considered necessary for the operational activities of others can be shared and be subject to multiuse, rather than collected and produced several times, or collected and kept for a single purpose' (Commission, 2014: 3). From this communication it clearly appears that the main obstacle remains member states' concerns about information sharing and secret/sensitive data protection. Whether those concerns will be addressed rather depends on member states' interests and preferences, including domestic politics considerations.

The EU's comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach to maritime security culminated in 2014 with the release in March by the Commission and the High Representative of a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council; *For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy*, which served as a basis for the negotiation of the *Maritime Security Strategy* by the member states, eventually endorsed by the Council in June 2014 (Council, 2014c; European Commission and High Representative, 2014). Promoting good governance at sea (in the EU's territorial waters and on the high seas), enhancing the EU's leadership in maritime security, and fostering coordinated responses by member states are emphasised. Interestingly, this strategy clearly prioritises security concerns and acknowledges that the Blue Growth strategy would eventually benefit from a safe and secure maritime domain. In fact, the document starts with the following statement:

> The Sea is a valuable source of growth and prosperity for the European Union and its citizens. The EU depends on open, protected and secure seas and oceans for economic development, free trade, transport, energy security, tourism and good status of the marine environment. (Council, 2014c: 2)

The EU Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) elaborates on a number of identified maritime-related insecurities: piracy (which impacts economic and human security), terrorism at sea or from the sea (which impacts member states' national security besides being a human security issue), criminal activities including drug and people trafficking (which impacts human security and societal security), weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and trafficking (which impacts member states' national security), illegal immigration (which impacts societal security),

fisheries protection (which impacts economic security), marine environment protection (which impacts environmental and economic security), as well as the safety of maritime transport and maritime activities in general (including tourism). The denial of the freedom of the sea and maritime territorial disputes are also recognised as important risks and threats (Council, 2014c: 7–8). This extensive list of maritime-related threats reflects both the expansion of the security agenda and the comprehensive approach to security endorsed by the Union, which acknowledges the interlinked nature of the internal and external dimensions of maritime security (5), and a cross-sectoral, cooperative, and multilateral approach which makes the most of what member states and the EU already possess in terms of assets and mechanisms, especially the EU decentralised agencies (4). The promotion of cooperative habits with international partners (5) to support maritime security and governance is also emphasised in a way that clearly shows that the EU wants to use its soft power to promote its maritime security vision and norms. The maritime dimension of the EU has thus an ideational component as well; the promotion of the EU's maritime security norms is supposed to bring order and stability to the maritime domain, which should eventually contribute to the international liberal order by favouring trade and economic activities.

Maritime security may require specific CSDP operations (naval or capacity-building), but it also requires day-to-day activities in the field of maritime safety, fisheries protection, marine environment protection, port security, counter-immigration, counter-terrorism, and maritime surveillance. The MSS particularly stresses the importance of securing a CISE so as to benefit from operating global maritime domain awareness and eventually to promote 'better ocean governance' (European Commission and High Representative, 2014: 5). In sum, the EU MSS gives the Union both a geopolitical vision and a guide for integrating the EU's maritime security interests beyond its territorial waters with the Union global geostrategy, that is, 'assuming increased responsibilities as a global security provider, at the international level and in particular in its neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing its own security and its role as a strategic global actor' (Council, 2014c: 8). The geopolitical dimension of the EU's seapower will be further discussed in chapters 8–10.

The role of decentralised agencies

For the past two decades the number of EU agencies, or decentralised agencies, has proliferated, a phenomenon coined in the literature by

the term 'agencification'. The main aim of the agencies, which have a legal personality, is to contribute to achieving a consistent and coherent application of the EU's policies and norms throughout the Union, especially in the case of very technical and specific policies. The majority of the agencies concentrate on the implementation of the EU's policies, but many of them also hold a certain amount of decision-making power. In fact, agencies' competences usually include coordinating member states' assets in a specific domain, helping member states implement the EU's regulations, contributing to information sharing across member states, as well as developing norms and procedures so as to further promote uniform, integrated, and cost-efficient responses to some issues ranging from border control to railway safety and from defence procurement to environmental protection awareness. In practice, decentralised agencies rely on member states' existing structures to 'perform tasks on their behalf'. As a consequence, they 'manage to produce 'European' regulatory policy without eclipsing national regulatory authorities' (Keleman, 2002: 112). From the perspective of member states, this modus operandi maintains the autonomy of their own national agencies while allowing them to keep a certain degree of control over the EU agencies and the way they implement their policies.

Due to the policy fragmentation of the maritime domain, many EU agencies have competencies in the sphere of maritime affairs: the EFCA (formerly CFCA), EMSA, FRONTEX, and the EDA. In addition, the EEA is involved in marine environment protection and the ESA in maritime surveillance. Coordination between them, among member states, and between member states and the EU institutions is crucial, especially regarding maritime surveillance. The aforementioned BlueMassMed study (BMM) pilot project recommended that 'the European agencies working on the maritime domain are associated at their right place to the further development of maritime surveillance at European level, in particular as service providers' (BMM, 2012: 10). Currently, they continue to primarily work within the boundaries of the specific tasks they are mandated to perform.

The European Fisheries Control Agency

The Council established this Agency in April 2005 following the 2002 CFP reform. This reform accounted for the fact that the fishing industry had suffered from a steady decline over the preceding two decades, which was mainly due to excessive fishing efforts, destructive fishing practice, and illegal fishing (CFCA, 2007: 7). Hence, the Council decided that a decentralised agency would contribute to operationalising the

CFP by favouring a uniform and effective application of the relevant community regulations. The Agency's main functions and competencies consist of the coordination of national activities (including controls, inspections, and repression), the training of national inspectors, the provision of assistance to member states with regard to exchanging information, applying CFP rules uniformly and effectively, as well as developing new control and inspection techniques. At their request, the EFCA can also send contractual experts to member states for operational control missions. It thus appears that the Agency's missions and tasks are primarily limited to coordination. And indeed, the creation of the Agency has not generated a supranational body entitled to monitor, control, or repress fishing activities in the EU's fishing zones, which was not the goal, since it was agreed that 'the Member States are primarily responsible for control and enforcement of the rules of the [CFP] whilst the Commission is responsible for the monitoring and enforcing of the correct application of these rules by Member States. The establishment of the Agency does not affect this distribution of responsibilities' (CFCA, 2007: 5).

That said, the coordinating tasks of the EFCA in the field of fisheries monitoring and the leadership role of the Agency are extremely important for at least three reasons. First, due to the nature of the maritime domain, fisheries monitoring requires cooperation throughout the European waters and EEZs to be efficient, since 'fish do not respect national frontiers' and fish stocks are shared between many different EU and extra-European countries (CFCA, 2011). Second, member states and the EU are not only responsible for applying CFP rules on their own territory and in the waters under their sovereignty and jurisdiction, but are also responsible for fishing vessels flying their flag, irrespective of their zone of activity. This results from international agreements and European participation in regional fisheries organisations such as the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) (CFCA, 2011). For example, during the 1994 'Tuna War', the Royal Navy, which had been mandated to protect British fishermen in the bay of Biscay, had also received the mission to prevent them from committing any infringement, which led the British fishermen to complain that their navy did not back them enough, contrary to the French and the Spanish ones (Penman, 1994). Third, coordination and cooperation are not limited to interstate practices, but also take place at the intrastate level. Inside states, various agencies involved in fisheries monitoring must work together, such

as the navy, the coastguard, the police, and other civilian services. All these bodies must also work together at the EU level, which necessitates operational coordination. Moreover, cooperation is also required internationally beyond the EU with other regional organisations, such as the NEAFC and the NAFO, or with third states, such as Russia or Canada. At this level, cooperation is not easy, as fisheries issues can be tense, and fishermen expect to be backed by their national governments and navies in case of crisis. For example, in 1995, the Spanish Navy intervened to back its fishermen against the Canadian Navy. However, the current practice shows that the European navies tend to put the rules into force and stay neutral. Nevertheless, the coordinating role of the Agency might help to further improve good practices.

The European Maritime Safety Agency

This agency was established in August 2002 following the 1999 *Erika* and 2002 *Prestige* oil tanker disasters, which underscored the necessity to further develop and better implement European maritime safety regulations. It was decided to develop not only a new body of legislation but also a related agency to support the Commission and the member states (EMSA, 2008: 9). The goal was to ensure a 'high, uniform and effective level of maritime safety, maritime security as well as prevention and response of pollution by ships within the Community' (Council and European Parliament 2002: L208/3). In other words, EMSA's role consists in assisting the Commission 'in the continuous process of updating and developing Community legislation in the field of maritime safety and prevention of pollution by ships and should provide the necessary support to ensure the convergent and effective implementation of such legislation throughout the Community' (L208/1). The Agency is also tasked to provide member states with technical and scientific assistance to help them to apply Community legislation in the fields of maritime safety and the prevention of pollution by ships, to monitor the implementation of this legislation, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures (preventive tasks). In addition, the Agency can also provide operational means to respond to marine pollution (reactive tasks) (L208/1-9).

In practice, EMSA has been active in four main fields: visits and inspections carried out to monitor the implementation of the EU's legislation, technical/scientific assistance to member states and the Commission, assistance to facilitate cooperation between member states and between member states and the Commission, and assistance to member states to be prepared to detect and to respond to pollution (EMSA, 2008). The Agency's tasks include: 'the monitoring of classification societies, port

state control and the development of ship reporting systems in Member States. Furthermore, EMSA is operating the SafeSeaNet project, a pan-European electronic information system dealing with ship movements and cargoes' (Commission of the European Communities, Transport website), processing and sharing data received via ships' AIS, long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), as well as radar satellite images. As discussed above, EMSA's efforts towards real-time ship monitoring and maritime domain awareness is growingly integrated within the interagency and pan-European system of maritime surveillance currently under development.

Similarly to fisheries protection, the success of European policy in the area of maritime safety ultimately rests on the member states, which are responsible for implementing the legislation and for carrying out the controls and inspections. The conviction of France (one of the countries most affected by the *Erika* disaster) by the Court of Justice of the EU in 2004 for not having fulfilled its inspection quota reveals the limitations of EMSA's power when member states are deliberately reluctant to apply the rules and regulations. The IMP and the MSS constitute further integrated instruments that contribute to limit member states' freeriding behaviour though.

Maritime security per se does not constitute one of EMSA's main tasks, but given the link between maritime safety and port and ship security, the agency is de facto involved in counter-terrorism, since 'maritime security means the combination of preventive measures intended to protect shipping and port facilities against threats of intentional unlawful acts' (Council and Parliament, 2004b: L129/8). Since 2004, EMSA is competent to 'provide the Commission with technical assistance in the performance of the inspection tasks assigned to it [in order to enhance] ship and port facility security' (Council and Parliament, 2004a: Art. 2). Current developments in the area of maritime surveillance may also impact on EMSA's future competencies in the field of maritime security, be it an increased or, on the contrary, a more limited role if other agencies and mechanisms become more prominent in this area.

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (known as FRONTEX):

This agency was established by the Council in October 2004 and has been operational since July 2005. Although the maritime domain does not constitute FRONTEX's single (or even principal) priority, it is definitely the most visible of all the EU agencies that deal with maritime affairs,

due to the high visibility in the media and member states' political arena of counter-immigration policies and activities. FRONTEX's main tasks consist of coordinating operational cooperation among EU member states with regard to controlling the Union's external borders, contributing to the training of national border guards, performing risk analyses, following up on the evolution of research and technology (R&T) in the field of border control, and helping member states in need of technical and/or operational assistance (FRONTEX, 2008: 4). Counter-immigration is a sensitive issue and although member states are generally in favour of the EU's involvement in border control, they also want to retain their autonomy in this area. FRONTEX, like all other decentralised agencies, operates on the basis of differentiated responsibility; this prevents any clash between responsibilities, 'since Community responsibility extends only to operational coordination between member states' (Assembly of the WEU, 2005b: 8).

FRONTEX has been involved in the management of illegal immigration at sea, notably in the Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the waters around the Canary Islands and off the coasts of Senegal. In May 2007, following the December 2006 EU Presidency conclusions (Council, 2006b: 10), FRONTEX launched the European Patrols Network (EPN) to strengthen the control of EU's southern borders against illegal immigration. The aim consists in fostering 'cooperation and exchanges of information between Member States with the aim of improving joint management of the EU's maritime borders. It is designed as a flexible new structure, built around burden-sharing, which can be adjusted swiftly to respond to the evolving needs of Member States' (EU press release, 2007). As the name suggests, the EPN is nothing like a 'European Coast-Guard'. Indeed, it is not a new structure or a new service; it is a network, that is to say, a mechanism that intends to synchronise and coordinate national maritime patrol activities in order to make them more efficient. It is worth noting that coordinating multinational maritime border control operations (notably in the 'wider Mediterranean' area) has constituted the main bulk of FRONTEX's operational activities, which shows that more than for land borders, member states are consumers of the EU's added value in terms of coordination, expertise, and pooling of resources and capabilities in the maritime domain. FRONTEX is clearly interested in further developing the integration of maritime surveillance means and mechanisms at the EU level, which requires a service level agreement with EMSA and the EU Satellite Centre, towards which the agency has worked since 2011 (FRONTEX, 2013: 21).

In practice, since 2006, FRONTEX has coordinated various long-lasting counter-immigration joint maritime operations, planned on the basis of risk analyses. There has been a rapid increase in the number of operations (each lasting several weeks or even months) and the number of participating member states, including landlocked countries such as Luxembourg and Slovakia. In 2012, the biggest share (42.3%) of the operational budget (excluding risk analyses and R&T) went to sea borders joint operations (FRONTEX, 2013: 32). The areas of operation have included all the Union's maritime margins (cf. chapter 10): the Eastern, Central, and Western Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Canary Islands, and West African coasts. It is not easy to assess the 'success' of FRONTEX's operations, not least because the definition of success is debatable in the context of illegal immigration. Indeed, depending on the perspective stakeholders adopt, success may mean an increased number of migrants rescued at sea (NGOs' perspective), a reduction in the number of migrants reaching mainland Europe (member states' perspective), or a large number of operations conducted and of migrants arrested (bureaucratic perspective). FRONTEX and its operations have negatively been portrayed by various academic and civil society commentators (e.g. Van Houtum, 2008). One of the main criticisms is that the maritime operations coordinated by FRONTEX are more focused on repealing illegal migrants rather that saving the life of endangered people (especially at sea); some scholars even contest the legality of such operations from the perspective of humanitarian and refugee law (e.g. Klepp, 2010; Papastavridis, 2010). FRONTEX announced that the number of migrants apprehended during joint sea operations fell by 73% in 2010 (6,890 cases in 2010 versus 25,536 in 2009) and associated the decrease in illegal immigration flow with the success of its own operations (FRONTEX, 2010, 41–42). However, this is difficult to verify, for other factors, such as regional contexts or national incentives, may well contribute to explain changes in migratory flows.

The European Defence Agency

Since the inception of the CSDP (first at the political level in 1999 and then at the operational level in 2003), it became clear that if the EU wanted to become a global Power, member states needed to elaborate an armament strategy, so as to strengthen the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (DTIB) and R&D, to set up priorities in terms of needs (ideally based on a clear strategic vision), and to favour a concerted (if not integrated) defence procurement strategy, so as to avoid inefficient duplications. Therefore, the EDA (established by the

Council in July 2004) was assigned the following three tasks: developing the EU's defence capabilities in the field of crises management, promoting European cooperation in the field of armaments (notably by fostering the joint acquisition of equipment and the restructuration of the European defence industry), and contributing to the reinforcement of the EU's DTIB as well as increasing the efficiency of European R&T (Council, 2003a: 13–14).

The naval/maritime field has never been at the top of the EDA's agenda (to say the least) but is, nonetheless, part of the Agency's responsibilities in two respects. First, the Agency undertakes reviews 'of anticipated future demand and capacity, and current national strategies' concerning the naval DTIB in Europe (EDA, 2004: §A3). The process of industrial cooperation in the naval sector has been more complex compared to cooperation in other sectors, such as air or electronic defence. States have indeed been reluctant to liberalise their naval markets and to promote capital consolidation or common acquisition programmes (Germond, 2008a: 187–210). Persistent protectionism in the naval sector requires firm attention from the EDA, as states like France, the UK, Germany, or Italy, which have an important naval industry (in terms of size and/or traditional value), have usually been unwilling to engage in cooperative naval procurement programmes. Some joint naval procurement projects have, nevertheless, been successful in the recent past, such as the joint LPD project between Spain and the Netherlands (one ship each), the Horizon and FREMM frigate projects between France and Italy (eight ships in total), and the Type 212 submarine project between Germany and Italy (eight submarines). When states are reluctant to cooperate (i.e. to liberalise their market and to launch common acquisition programmes), the role of the EU is to provide guidance by pointing out cooperation opportunities, explaining cooperation advantages/gains and offering certain guarantees to member states regarding clarity and visibility. EDA has thus the potential to play an active role in procurement. The Council has defined broad capability priorities (such as strategic sealift and force projection capabilities) and other bodies, such as the EUMC and the FRONTEX Agency, have also specified their needs in terms of naval assets. The EDA can help realising the stipulated objectives and acquiring the required capabilities by launching targeted acquisition programmes, although it has not lived up to expectations so far. The 2014 EU MSS has reiterated the need to use the EDA to further develop capabilities through 'pooling and sharing initiatives and projects, as well as training and education [and] research and innovation' (Council, 2014c: 13, 15) in the field of maritime security.

Second, the EDA has been involved in the ongoing process of integrating the various European maritime surveillance mechanisms and tools supposed to result in global maritime domain awareness. In 2006, it launched a maritime surveillance project (MARSUR), which aims at creating 'a network using existing naval and maritime information exchange systems. Overall goals are to avoid duplication of effort and the use of available technologies, data and information; to enhance cooperation in a simple, efficient and low-cost solution for civil-military cooperation', which will eventually support both maritime safety and security (EDA, 2012: 1). This network is centred on member states' navies and the principal user community is Defence, which benefits from improved global maritime awareness. However, it 'is not specific for the military context, allowing the network to be leveraged to other user communities' (1); and it is envisaged to link it to the Commission-led CISE in the near future (see above). MARSUR was actually considered as one of the six main EDA's achievements in the 2004–2009 period (EDA, 2009b). It is worth noting that EDA mandated the so-called 'Wise Pen Team' (comprising of retired admirals) to write a report on maritime surveillance, which informed the MARSUR project (Wise Pen Team, 2010). This shows that naval stakeholders' point of view was taken into account, something that the Agency strongly emphasises on its website (EDA website, 2012). As to procurement in the field of maritime surveillance, the Agency has also worked 'on the definition of military requirements, with a focus on linking the wide range of entities involved in managing maritime surveillance across the EU' (EDA, 2009a: 5). The role and impact of the EDA in maritime surveillance still remains limited, notably due to member states' reluctance to engage in cooperative acquisition programmes.

NATO as a partner of choice

Since its inception in 1949, NATO has had a strong naval dimension; indeed, in the Cold War context, the transatlantic organisation was given the mission to secure the control of the Euro-Atlantic SLOCs. Thus, although NATO's first ever operation (operation Southern Guard – to carry out surveillance and maintain freedom of navigation in the eastern part of the Mediterranean during the 1990–1991 Iraqi crisis) took place after the end of the Cold War, NATO's expertise in the maritime domain is important, in terms of capabilities, structures, and know-how, especially regarding multinational naval cooperation.

The EU and NATO share many of their maritime operational theatres, especially the 'wider Mediterranean' area (cf. chapter 10). Since the EU also shares many of its member states with NATO, it is thus crucial to avoid any costly and inefficient duplication. Until 2008 when the EU launched counter-piracy operation Atalanta, experts and officials had thought that the EU would never 'go naval' for it would certainly imply some forms of duplication (e.g. Davis Cross, 2010: 21). However, the question is not whether the EU should or could become a maritime (and naval) actor given the existence of NATO, but which organisation does what better (or more cost-efficiently). It is now clear that the two actors are complementary in the field of naval and maritime affairs in general and maritime security and surveillance in particular. The EU possesses expertise in counter-immigration at sea, maritime safety, fisheries protection, marine environment protection, and in more general terms civilian power projection, that is to say, exercising the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea. The EU is also a crucial legislative actor in the field of port security, shipping security and safety, marine environment protection, and so on. For its part, NATO has also been involved in maritime security activities at sea. Indeed, it has been noted that 'NATO activities in the Mediterranean provide valuable support to Frontex's work' (Assembly of the WEU, 2007b: 8). NATO's counter-terrorist operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean also contributes to maritime security in the region (cf. chapter 10).

As demonstrated by operation Atalanta, in the case of CSDP operations, the EU benefits from the advantage of its comprehensive approach to security. In other words, the EU is not limited to military options but can participate in political discussions at the highest level, and can provide development aid, legal training, and so on. In the case of Atalanta, the EU could, as an entity, engage politically and diplomatically in the region, carry out an SSR mission in Somalia as well as a regional maritime capacity-building mission (EUCAP Nestor). The EU has also managed to conclude prosecution agreements with countries in the region, which was an important factor, as Europeans did not have the legal instruments or the political incentive to prosecute pirates and thus it was crucial to reach agreements that ensured that pirates would be treated fairly (according to European human rights standards). The EU was in a better position to reach those agreements. In more general terms, the EU is also less negatively perceived by non-European countries, for unlike NATO the Union is not a symbol of the Western military dominance and is still distinct from the US, although perceptions are changing

since the EU is more proactive on the world stage, including in projecting its normative power. In sum, NATO will continue to be the EU's partner of choice in the maritime domain where its 'hard power' capabilities complement the EU's own means rather well.

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The adoption of the EU MSS marks the end of a long process that started 15 years ago with the Helsinki Headline Goal stating that by 2003 the EU should be in a position to deploy self-sustaining militarily forces, which could include naval elements. In other words, from its inception the CSDP had a naval component, at least on paper. Whereas the 2003 ESS only briefly mentioned piracy as a potential threat to the EU, the launch of operation Atalanta in 2008 shed light on the importance of the sea for the EU, and the CSDP eventually 'went naval'. In parallel to these developments at the Council level, the creation of decentralised agencies with competences related to certain aspects of maritime security also played an important role in developing maritime security interests within the broader EU institutional apparatus – in particular the EFCA launched in 2004, the EMSA launched in 2005, and FRONTEX launched in 2006. Maritime security also got the attention of the Commission within the framework of the IMP launched in 2007. The IMP aims at creating an institutional and policy environment enabling the growth of the EU's maritime economy, the so-called 'Blue Growth'. But even if the main driver of the IMP has been economic growth, the Commission understood that the success of the Blue Growth strategy was dependent on a safe and secure maritime domain, so as to grant economic agents with the stability and certainties they expect to see before any investment is made. This awareness culminated with the release by the Commission in March 2014 of a communication to the Parliament and the Council on a Maritime Security Strategy for the EU, which served as a basis for the negotiation of the EU MSS by the member states. In the meantime, the Council had extended counter-piracy operation Atalanta to December 2016, which makes it one of the lengthiest CSDP operations so far (i.e. eight years) and launched two maritime capacity-building operations (EUCAP Nestor at the Horn of Africa and EUBAM Libya) to help developing maritime security competences in those regions.

The institutional framework of the EU's maritime dimension of security is rather complex. Whereas purely naval aspects, such as operation Atalanta, are limited to the CSDP (although the Commission is involved

due to the comprehensive approach adopted), maritime security and surveillance are dealt with by adopting a non-functional and cross-sectoral approach where policies, mechanisms, and even tools transcend the boundaries of the Council, the Commission, the EEAS, the decentralised agencies, and even the member states (cf. chapter 6).

Despite recent efforts, including the IMP, the CISE, and the definition of an MSS, much remains to be accomplished if the EU wants to be in a position to tackle maritime-related risk and threats in a coherent, comprehensive, and integrated manner. Even with the endorsement of the MSS by the Council in 2014, the means to implement the strategy remain vague, and success will ultimately depend on member states' practice, interests, and goodwill, which depend on various material and ideational factors including domestic politics. That said, in practice, maritime domain awareness and maritime security have gained an unprecedented importance at the EU level, which somehow tackles one of the most important threats stressed by various maritime/naval stakeholders, 'sea blindness' (e.g. Wise Pen Team, 2010). As discussed in the following two chapters, the institutionalisation of the maritime dimension of the EU's security has geopolitical implications, since it contributes to the practice of projecting security and norms beyond the EU's external boundaries.

8
The EU's Geopolitical Discourse

Chapter 3 discussed the geographical and geopolitical dimension of seapower; states' maritime geopower politics have been normalised through a series of geopolitical representations justifying the projection of power, forces, and security beyond one's territorial waters. To contextualise the EU's maritime geopolitics, this chapter examines the emerging geopolitical discourse of the EU, the way threats are geographically constructed, and the practical implications of this construction in terms of (maritime) power projection. Beyond the affirmation of security objectives calling for the projection of norms, regulations, and values beyond its external boundaries (including within its maritime margins), the EU has developed a geopolitical discourse that transcends the somewhat benign image projected by the Union as a civilian or normative power. As a global actor, the EU has developed a geopolitical discourse where the representation of the 'threats' is rooted in space; the EU's identity is constructed along geographical lines, and its security policies and activities beyond the external boundary are normalised through geographical representations.

Critical geopolitics and the European Union[1]

Since 2003, the EU has become more proactive and visible on the world stage. Indeed, in addition to its traditional economic leverage, the EU has enhanced its practice of projecting normative, political, civilian, and even military power beyond its external boundary at both the intergovernmental level (e.g. common diplomacy, CSDP military and civilian operations) and the supranational level (e.g. European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP], development aid). In so doing, the EU has had to define

zones where it is in the interest of the EU (for a variety of reasons ranging from economic to security interests) to project its power in all its forms. EU leaders and civil servants have traditionally been reluctant to acknowledge the existence of an EU geopolitical discourse, although this has slightly changed in the recent past (Bialasiewicza et al., 2009: 79; Kuus, 2011). Explicit references to geopolitical interests and geopower are still very rare in official documents, although a critical reading of many documents released by the Council and the Commission allows pointing out a growing geopolitical narrative, which is linked to the EU's practice of power projection beyond its external boundary.

As pointed out by Müller (2008: 323), 'the concept of discourse has been at the heart of a critical geopolitics right from the beginning'. In fact, geopolitics can be conceptualised 'as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft "spatialize" international politics in such a way as to represent it as a "world" characterized by particular types of places, people and dramas' (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 192). In other words, political leaders (and EU officials) develop, use, and manipulate (on purpose or subconsciously) geopolitical discourses to represent the world and to characterise international relations. Political leaders are not the only actors contributing to the diffusion of geopolitical discourses, which are handed over, transformed, and adapted by intellectuals, the media, artists, and other popular opinion leaders.

Discourse analysis allows identifying cognitive processes and their practical (policy) implications (e.g. Fairclough, 1992). In the field of critical geopolitics, it highlights the link between the production of geographical knowledge (i.e. the spatialisation of world politics) and the power to define (i.e. the construction of 'one' world and its naturalisation). Accordingly, the space is represented and the threats are constructed along an inside/outside line, the former being the 'realm of peace and stability' and the latter being the 'realm of war and insecurity'. From a post-structuralist point of view, identities, which 'are constructed through practices of othering' (Diez, 2004: 320), are also structured along this inside/outside line and mutually constructed around the dichotomy between 'here' and 'there', 'home' and 'abroad', 'domestic' and 'foreign', 'us' and 'them'. In other words, an external 'other' is constructed along geopolitical lines, which is 'integral to the constitution of a political identity' (Devetak, 2009: 200). This spatialisation of identities along binary geopolitical representations is instrumental in creating categories and hierarchies. Indeed, the reality is constructed in such a way that the 'inside' is represented as 'stable' and the 'outside' as 'unstable'. This naturalises the idea that 'danger' is 'out there' and that something

'must' be done to cope with this 'danger' or, in other words, to protect the 'inside' from the 'outside' (Germond, 2013: 80).

Since the EU project became political and especially since the end of the Cold War, 'the question of delineating "Europe" from its "other" has become a central concern in political and media discourse' (Busch and Krzyżanowski, 2007: 107). According to Larsen (2004), who studied the discursive practice related to European foreign policy, the EU's identity has been constructed 'with reference to internal as well as external dangers to European security' (74) and 'an important focus in relation to EU foreign policy is therefore who is constructed as Europe's other' (79). Most scholars agree that the construction of threats has evolved from internal/temporal threats (i.e. the EU's past characterised by political extremism and wars should not happen again/'the past as other') to external/geographically defined threats (i.e. civil wars in the periphery of Europe including the instability this could bring to Europe, non-military and transnational threats such as organised crime and terrorism, and various phenomena such as mass migration, environmental degradations, and unemployment). The EU's past has been 'fought', and seemingly 'defeated', through the deepening of European integration (e.g. Buzan et al., 1998: 90; Diez, 2004: 325–326). However, Klinke draws attention to the shortcomings of this distinction, which prevents fully grasping the intertwined nature of the temporal and the spatial discursive practices (2012: 932). And the 2014 Ukrainian crisis shows that preventing an outbreak of war on the European continent has a strong geographical dimension, since 'instability' is 'originating' in the East.

Apart from the resurgence of a 'Russia threat' narrative (already noted by Ciută and Klinke in 2010), illegal migrants have especially been targeted in the European 'othering' spatial narrative. Through military and water metaphors ('invasion', 'army of migrants', 'flood', 'tide', 'wave' of migrants), they are represented as numerous, dangerous, and overwhelming (Van Dijk cited by Busch and Krzyżanowski, 2007: 113). The securitisation of immigration by the EU has been a response to member states' growing concerns about migration, especially with the EU's enlarging to new Eastern members. However, scholars have shown that the EU continues to frame migration issues as humanitarian issues (Leonard, 2010: 236), which illustrates the somewhat 'schizophrenic' nature of the EU's 'othering' rhetoric.

The construction of the EU's 'other' is related not only to the question of 'who' or 'what' is threatening the EU but also to the question of 'which spaces' constitute a problem (in other words, where do threats

originate?). This geographical dimension of the construction of the EU's 'other' and own identity is indeed extremely important, as it normalises the EU's practice of projecting power, norms, and security beyond its external boundaries in order to tackle the threats at their origin, as far away as possible, and as soon as possible. The construction of the EU's identity along an inside/outside line and in opposition to an 'hostile other' cannot be separated from geography, all the more since in the narrative 'the main characteristic of the "other" [is] that it is always located somewhere further to the east or south' (Busch and Krzyżanowski, 2007: 121). In sum, as an emerging geopolitical actor, the EU has engaged in a geopolitical discourse where the representation of the 'threats' is rooted in space; EU's identity is constructed along geographical lines and its security policies are normalised through geographical representations.

The EU's geopolitical discourse: Constructing space and threats

Beyond the spatialisation of international relations ('who is in and who is out', Scott, 2009: 235), the very notion of geopolitics proposes that political (or strategic) objectives and foreign policies (or security policies) are constrained and shaped by geographical elements (or determinants). In this sense, the post-Cold War EU enlargement towards the northeast, east, and southeast of Europe, was a geopolitical process. Indeed, it was 'an impressive exercise in empire building. [. . .] This enlargement was about filling in an unprecedented power vacuum' (Zielonka, 2006: 44). However, the EU has not linked its enlargement process with any geopolitical stance, and the narrative (in the 1990s and early 2000s) has stuck to the official view on the enlargement's objectives, that is, securing peace and prosperity (in the spirit of the liberal democratic peace thesis) and mutual benefits (Hill, 2002: 96). In fact, the 'denial of geopolitical or geographical or territorial frameworks and imaginaries in European political discourse' is a constant since the creation of the European Communities (Heffernan, 1998, cited in Kuus, 2011: 1147). Referring to the enlargement process, Jan Zielonka noted that 'the very term "power" is totally absent in the European discourse and we have to rely on suppositions and abstract analyses of interests' (2006: 49). Nevertheless, the discourse stressing the need to enlarge the EU towards Eastern Europe to secure peace on the continent reinforces 'the power of the EU to prescribe a particular future for [Central and Eastern Europe]' (Diez, 2004: 326), or else the 'transformative power' of the Union (Grabbe, 2005; Leonard, 2005a; 2005b). For example, the narrative

consisting in presenting the EU as a global promoter of peace and security is based on the representation of the EU's values (the 'self') as superior to those of other states and communities. It implies not only the categorisation of 'others' as inferior (Niţoiu, 2013: 244) but also justifies the projection of norms and values beyond the EU's boundary. In sum, any narrative that contributes to justify the EU's exercise of its normative, transformative (or even military) power beyond its external boundary is a form of geopolitical discourse, for it includes a definition of the 'inside'/'us', the 'outside'/'them', and prescribes the intervention of the 'us' to transform the 'them'. The EU's position regarding Ukraine illustrates the link between discourse and practice; Russia's reaction confirms that the ENP can practically result in a form of 'empire building' (Zielonka, 2006: 44), which then clashes with other big Powers' own zones of influence, in this case Russia.

Even if EU policy makers and civil servants still do not favour the use of the term 'power', it has become more common since 2003, notably within the European Parliament and in former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana's statements (e.g. Solana, 2006). In fact, a certain geopolitical narrative has developed since 2003 onwards, which in part results from the institutional and policy developments that have taken place within the EU as well as from external operations and activities that have been carried out in practice. The EU has been an operational security actor only since about 2003 (when the Council launched the first ESDP operations in the Balkans and the DRC). Since then, it has rapidly developed its means of intervention abroad, including outside the framework of the CSDP, such as with FRONTEX (border management), the ENP (management of the neighbourhood), and foreign aid.

In key strategic documents, the EU has acknowledged the need to project its economic, normative, police, and military power beyond its external boundary. The representation of the EU's role and of the threats to its security has subsequently acquired a growing geographical dimension. The EU's post-2003 narrative in the field of defence, security, neighbourhood, immigration, and energy (at the level of the Council, the Commission, the EEAS, the Parliament, and the decentralised agencies) shows that the EU's comprehensive approach to security and the projection of power beyond its external boundary is supported by a 'tacit' (Kuus, 2011), albeit growingly open and acknowledged, geopolitical discourse.

The ESS, prepared by the High Representative Javier Solana and adopted by the Council in December 2003, although often regarded as

'a pre-strategic concept' (Lindley-French and Algieri, 2004: 9), has, nevertheless, 'articulated a general vision of the EU's role in the world and provided a strategic framework for the formulation of all subsequent European foreign and security policies' (Biscop and Andersson, 2008: 168). The ESS makes a clear reference to the growing strategic importance for the EU of regions such as the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and even the Middle East. It implicitly considers that the EU's margins (namely states and areas located beyond the external boundary) constitute a natural theatre for projecting the EU's security:

> With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad [. . .]. Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. (Council, 2003b: 7)

Five years later, the Implementation Report on the European Security Strategy went beyond the recognition of the importance of projecting security 'outside'. Indeed, it states that it is in the EU's interest to be more visible and effective on the world stage by developing its strategic thinking:

> To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. (Council, 2008b: 2)

In addition, the report is not afraid to name countries, such as Iran, and not only regions, such as the Middle East. This is an important difference when one knows that 'to designate a place is not simply to define a location or setting. It is to open up a field of possible taxonomies and trigger a series of narratives, subjects and appropriate foreign-policy responses' (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 194). The categorisation of regions and countries by the EU according to their degree of instability thus implicitly justifies a particular foreign and security policy towards them. In other words, when a country is represented as 'unstable' by the EU, this contributes to the normalisation of a certain projection practice, which will be discussed in the next section.

Regarding the maritime domain, the 2014 MSS is intrinsically geopolitical. Indeed, beyond the stewardship of the oceans, the geopolitical dimension of the 2014 MSS is clear: there are maritime areas close to

Europe (its maritime margins) as well as further away from it that have a 'strategic value' to the EU:

> This Strategy takes particular regard of each of the European sea and subsea basins, namely the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the North Sea, as well as of the Arctic waters, the Atlantic Ocean and the outermost regions. (Council, 2014c: 4)
>
> Member States' Armed Forces should play a strategic role at sea and from the sea and provide global reach, flexibility and access that enable the EU and its Member States to contribute to the full spectrum of maritime responsibilities. (Council, 2014c: 10)

This strategy actually constitutes a strong geopolitical statement: the EU has interests all over the world and the oceans, and those interests need to be defended; securing freedom of the seas and promoting good governance at sea is in the interest of the Union and its member states; it is not bounded by geographical considerations. In sum, the EU MSS gives the Union both a geopolitical vision and a guide for integrating the EU's maritime security interests beyond its territorial waters with the Union's global geostrategy, that is to say, 'assuming increased responsibilities as a global security provider, at the international level and in particular in its neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing its own security and its role as a strategic global actor' (Council, 2014c: 8).

At the Commission level, the idea that the EU's security is linked to stability outside the EU, particularly in its frontier zones (Germond, 2010), has also been present since at least 2003. It is especially reflected by the establishment of the ENP:

> The EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a 'ring of friends' – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations. (Commission, 2003: 4)

At first sight, the official narrative on the roots and objectives of the ENP tends to concentrate on 'politically correct' statements emphasising the duty to help neighbours:

> The premise of the European Neighbourhood Policy is that the EU has a vital interest in seeing greater economic development and stability and better governance in its neighbourhood. The responsibility for this lies primarily with the countries themselves, but the

> EU can substantially encourage and support their reform efforts. (Commission, 2006b: 2)

However, although directed towards economic and civilian efforts, the ENP also contributes to the comprehensive approach to security. Thus, the ENP can be seen as a geostrategic vision, as it has both a strong geographical dimension (the 'ring of friends') and related security objectives:

> We have acquired new neighbours and have come closer to old ones. These circumstances have created both opportunities and challenges. The European Neighbourhood Policy is a response to this new situation. It will also support efforts to realise the objectives of the European Security Strategy. (Commission, 2004: 2)

The function of these so-called 'neighbours' is thus to 'form a cordon sanitaire around the EU against an unstable and allegedly threatening world' (Armstrong, 2007a: 3), in particular against illegal migrants, smugglers, and terrorists, which necessitates the adoption of EU standards and norms as well as 'good' security practices. In other words, the ENP is a 'mechanism by which the EU projects its interests and identity in its immediate neighbourhood' (Kuus, 2011: 1140), through the projection of EU norms, regulation, and values (transformative power). The same discourse is found in relations to the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean neighbourhood where 'good practices' brought by the EU to the region are supposed to help improving security:

> The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has provided a means to address many strategic regional questions relating to security, environmental protection, the management of maritime resources, economic relations through trade in goods, services and investment, energy supplies (producing and transit countries), transport, migratory flows (origin and transit), regulatory convergence, cultural and religious diversity and mutual understanding. (Commission, 2008a: 2)

Security has thus been the 'inroad into neighbourhood issues' (Joenniemi, 2007: 143). In other words, 'the "soft geopolitics" of the EU has, nevertheless, its hard edge as well' (Scott, 2009: 233). And the division between the Council and the Commission does not correspond to the division between 'hard geopolitics' (*realpolitik* agenda) and 'soft geopolitics', since the Commission is also involved in security projection

activities beyond the external boundaries (such as counter-immigration and the promotion of norms and values). In fact, the supranational component of the EU has even taken the lead in such fields as counter-immigration. Here again, the Commission's narrative about the neighbouring areas has an implicit geopolitical posture. Thus, the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Arctic region appears clearly:

> The prosperity, stability and security of our neighbours around the Black Sea are of immediate concern to the EU. [. . .] These include key sectors such as energy, transport, environment, movement and security. (Commission, 2007b: 2)
>
> The Mediterranean region is an area of vital strategic importance to the European Union. (Commission, 2008a: 2)
>
> The European Union is inextricably linked to the Arctic region [. . .] by a unique combination of history, geography, economy and scientific achievements. [. . .] Environmental changes are altering the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests calling for the development of an EU Arctic policy. (Commission, 2008c: 2)

One can also find traces of functional geopolitics in the Commission's narrative, for example, in the field of energy security. Indeed, securing energy imports, which is vital for the EU's security, has a 'geographic scope [that] often extends beyond the EU' (Commission, 2007d: 4):

> The geographic situation of Europe is a critical factor for the EU Energy Policy. [. . .] The seas around Europe are not only important as a source of oil and gas. They are also an enabler of energy transportation and they allow us to diversify energy transport routes, thereby reducing Europe's dependence on individual external energy suppliers. (Commission, 2007d: 2)
>
> It will be necessary to develop the further use of oceans and seas to promote the EU's energy goals, given their potential to support the generation of energy and to diversify energy transport routes and methods. (Commission, 2007a: 6)
>
> Arctic resources could contribute to enhancing the EU's security of supply concerning energy and raw materials in general. (Commission, 2008c: 6)

The link between energy security and geopolitics was even made clearer by the then Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs in 2007:

> Energy security and geopolitical security are two sides of the same coin. Let us ensure that our energy actions are a motor for stability, prosperity and peace. (Piebalgs, 2007)

At the European Parliament, where speeches are less codified and individual points of view more exacerbated, many debates end up with geopolitical statements by a variety of Members of the European Parliament (MEP). The promotion of European norms and values is often linked with the operational involvement of the EU beyond its external boundaries. An example consists in the debates about the launch of counter-piracy operation Atalanta at the Horn of Africa in 2008.

> Dominique Bussereau, the French President-in-Office of the Council, stated that the EU is 'not only showing its determination to act, but also affirming its position as a prime mover on the international scene in the fight against piracy'. Rosa Miguélez Ramos, a Spanish MEP, echoed this view, stating that an EU option would be 'an important sign of visibility for Europe'. Similarly, for Philippe Morillon, French MEP (and former commander of the UN forces in Bosnia), it would be 'a chance for the European Union to use the means to defend its values and interests'. Antonio Tajani, Vice-President of the Commission, argued that 'it is a matter of defending not just the interests but also the values of the European Union'. (European Parliament, 2008)

In this case, the defence (or promotion) of the EU's values and the EU's rank in the world is clearly linked to the promotion of the EU's interests and the projection of its security 'outside'.

The EU's geopolitical discourse has been an interpillar process, and, since December 2009 (when the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the pillar structure), a cross-institutional process; it not only concerns the activities under the rubric of the CSDP and the intergovernmental processes, but has contributions and reflections from 'intellectuals of statecraft' (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 193) from the Commission, the decentralised agencies, and the Parliament too. Accordingly, the EU's embryonic geopolitical discourse does not differentiate the various threats. It is thus an indiscriminate and mainly non-functional discourse, based on a comprehensive approach to security. It puts the emphasis on a variety of risks and threats that are geographically located at the periphery of

the EU's polity and necessitate the projection of the EU's power (normative and material) beyond its external boundary. The comprehensive approach to security implies that non-military threats also contribute to the geopolitical discourse. For instance, the EU's discourse constructs climate change as a 'threat multiplier' (High Representative and Commission, 2008: 2), which integrates well into the geopolitical discourse. For example, the Arctic region is represented as crucial for the EU in terms of economic, energy, and environmental security.

To sum up, the emerging EU cross-institutional geopolitical discourse articulates as follows: Regions, countries, and maritime spaces bordering the EU and beyond are represented and constructed as unstable, as direct and indirect sources of threats to the EU's security; their control is thus vital for ensuring the EU's security. Control does not necessarily mean exercising political and military control over those spaces; the promotion of EU regulations, norms, and values can be sufficient to exercise a certain degree of control (via its power to transform and to attract). Thus, the geopolitical discourse fits well with the comprehensive approach to security, which favours an all-inclusive approach to the projection of security that includes economic, normative, police, and military power projection beyond the external boundary so as to tackle the threats at the source. In other words, the outcome of the EU's geopolitical discourse is a normalisation of the idea that the EU must 'do something' to tackle the alleged threats and that it has a responsibility as well as a duty to act beyond its external boundary.

With 'security' conceived as a core value, the power of the discourse acts through the fear of a broad range of geographically defined risks and threats across the full spectrum, that is, from military conflicts to illegal immigration to energy security. Indeed, the '[European Union's grand strategy] is [currently] constructed against a number of geopolitical competitors', which are foreign powers, as well as transnational actors and non-military threats (Rogers, 2009b: 846–847). This geopolitical discourse is thus framed within the 'process of securitisation' that has occurred in the post-Cold War era (as defined by the Copenhagen School of security studies; e.g. Buzan et al., 1998). In other words, the spatialisation of the EU's security along an inside/outside line is framed within the dominant discourse of danger.

The normalisation of power projection

The geography-informed representation of risks and threats implies a classification and a categorisation of actors (states, regions, transnational

actors, communities) along an inside/outside line. There is an 'us' to protect against a threatening 'them' located beyond one's external boundaries. This hierarchisation of space induces (or justifies) certain foreign and security policies that would not have been accepted by the audience, or public opinion, otherwise (Stritzel, 2007: 361). The EU's geopolitical discourse normalises the idea that security will (and shall) be achieved by projecting normative and material power beyond the EU's external boundary, within the Union's frontier zones, and afar. In other words, the discourse stresses that to obtain security within the EU's boundary, strengthening the external borders and living in 'splendid isolation' within a 'gated Europe' is not sufficient. It is necessary to project security beyond the external boundary in order to cope with the risks and threats at their origin, that is to say, as far away as possible (geographical factor) and timely, that is, as soon as the first signs of crisis or issues are revealed (sequential factor). Accordingly, the EU's geopolitical discourse has practical implications in terms of power projection. But the projected power we are talking about is not only 'normative' as stressed by Diez (2005: 634) but also military, constabulary, and economic, that is, material and not only ideational.

The overarching goal is the promotion of the EU's values such as good governance, the rule of law, market economy, democracy, and human rights, which will eventually 'transform' others into EU-like polities or to align them with the norms adopted by the EU. This should result in both a 'better world' and, as a positive side-effect, a 'secure Europe' (Council, 2003b). This transformation is supposed to be accepted, or even demanded, by the 'others', since the EU also exercises a power of attraction (Nye, 2004), especially in its periphery. In sum, the EU presumes an operating link between its power of attraction (through the EU's positive norms and what the Union can offer), its power to transform (i.e. the assimilation of the EU's norms by other states and communities), and a subsequent increased security for the EU (security being understood comprehensively as economic, energy, human, societal, and military security); the link between attraction, transformation, and security being crystallised in the EU's core values as shown in Figure 8.1.

In practice, this projection strategy has engendered two complementary (geo)strategies: the 'fortress Europe' strategy and the 'projection Europe' or 'imperial Europe' strategy (Germond, 2010). The former aims at making the Union impregnable by hermetically sealing its external boundary, so as to limit illegal immigration, trafficking, and terrorist activities. However, despite all the efforts undertaken by the EU and its member states, 'the Mediterranean "wet border" and the EU's



Figure 8.1 The EU's projection strategy

eastern cordon sanitaire will continue to be unquestionably penetrable' (Armstrong, 2007b: 234). The 'projection Europe' strategy aims at projecting security beyond the external borders, which is supposed to offer an effective complement to the 'fortress' strategy. Balance between 'fortress Europe' and 'projection Europe' has induced a multifaceted strategy, which consists in strengthening the external borders (e.g. to consolidate the external boundary of the Schengen space), in cooperating with neighbours for security matters (to create transnational or deterritorialised networks of control), in imposing/inculcating the EU's norms and values ('EUropeanisation', transformative/soft power), as well as in intervening and exercising 'harder' power abroad (Germond, 2010: 46).

The EU's geo-informed discourse of danger and the resulting (geo) strategies translate into a variety of policies and operations that have been normalised: the projection of good governance, the rule of law and other EU norms, regulations and values (normative power); the promotion of economic development (liberal democratic peace/security thesis); peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction; the fight against transnational criminal forces (pirates, terrorists, drug, arms and human smugglers, etc.); the repression of illegal migrants; the protection of the environment; the protection of the EU's core interests and those of the member states (e.g. energy security or maritime trade); external relations and common diplomacy (security through cooperation); and, since 2014 with the MSS, the security of the global maritime commons. All those activities contribute to transforming the periphery, if not into an EU-like entity, at least into a more secure neighbourhood. The EU's geopolitical narrative supports the strategic and security objectives of the EU. The promotion of the so-called 'EU values' (such as democracy and human rights) also tends to be strengthened by this discourse, although its central value remains security.

While the 'fortress Europe' strategy is a direct outcome of the construction of an inside/outside dichotomy, one can wonder whether the 'projection Europe' strategy actually blurs this dichotomy since the EU's space is seemingly merged into a broader area that includes the neighbourhood. In fact, the geopolitical discourse normalising power projection still constructs the space along an inside/outside line, with the core EU territory being symbolically and practically separated from the frontier zones by the external boundary. Brigitta Busch and Michal Krzyżanowski have developed a model of concentric circles to depict the construction of the 'fortress Europe' and the EU's relations with its periphery (2007: 107–124). They notably differentiate between the EU inner (Schengen) core, the outer core (the rest of the EU members with a distinction between pre-2004 and post-2004 members), the prospective candidates and future member states, and the non-candidate neighbouring states (111). One can adapt this model, so as to incorporate the notion of 'projection Europe'. In Figure 8.2, the first circle represents the core EU territory (the 'inside'); it is separated from the 'outside' by the external boundary (i.e. the outline or walls of the 'fortress'), which 'must' be strengthened ('fortress Europe'); the second circle represents the EU's frontier zones, which 'constitutes a buffer zone extending the "EU-friendly" space up to the *limes* of the empire' (Germond, 2010: 46; see also Walters, 2004).

The strengthening of the inside/outside dichotomy at the external boundary of the Union has replaced 'the sharp "inside/outside"



Figure 8.2 The EU's concentric geopolitics

dichotomy at the internal EU borders' (Anderson, 2007: 15). The concomitant construction of an unstable EU 'other' (opposed to a self-legitimate EU 'inside') and of an external border that is under threat and must be defended normalises the idea that the EU's power must be projected towards its frontier zones. The closer regions are to the EU the more important they are to secure (and thus to transform) but also easier to attract (or convert) to the EU's model (and thus to transform).

Acting through 'fear', the power of this discourse has grown and is now widely accepted in the European political arena (Bialasiewicza et al., 2009: 79; Kuus, 2011). Some scholars have gone as far as developing policy-oriented analyses that tend to legitimise the need to project security beyond the external boundary, which illustrates the fact that the EU's geopolitical discourse has managed to spread widely. For example, Rogers (2011: 6) explicitly favours 'the constitution of an extended "Grand Area", a zone where European power would be progressively institutionalised by the dislocation of existing divisions and their reintegration into a new liberal order'.

***

Discourses have practical policy implications, since the construction of a certain reality engenders (and normalises) certain practices. The construction of the EU's frontier zones as an unstable space that needs to be controlled and secured goes along with the definition of strategies and action plans as well as the creation of institutions, instruments, and mechanisms that eventually serve the EU's geopolitical ambitions including in the maritime domain.

The development of a geopolitical discourse shows that the EU conceives its action beyond its external boundary as a way to export its values (based on the respect of human rights, the rule of law, and good governance) but also as a means to satisfy its security interests and those of the member states. Through the demonstration of the link between the production of geographical knowledge, the construction of threats along an inside/outside line, and the practice of power projection, critical geopolitics allows demonstrating that the EU's geopolitical discourse contributes to the normalisation of power projection.

In the EU's foreign and security policy arena, the geopolitical discourse is not dominant but coexists with other discourses, all promoting the projection of security beyond the external boundaries but from different perspectives. For example, Diez (2005) has discerned a 'geographical othering' discourse framed within the concept of 'normative power

Europe' (634). Larsen (2004) has shown that since the end of the 1990s the 'civilian power' discourse has been challenged by a 'full instrumental power' discourse according to which 'the Union's access to military means might be beneficial in responding to international crises and in contributing to international peace and stability' (72). Building on that, Rogers (2009b) has identified an 'EU Grand Strategy' discourse, which constructs the EU as a global power: 'the grand strategy of the Union was once organized around [. . .] its "civilian culture", but [. . .] this has been restructured [. . .] to assume a "global role", which requires the exercise of "full instrumental power", mixing ideological, civilian and military components' (839).

Since about 2003, the 'civilian power' discourse has lost its hegemony and different discourses about the EU's power and role as a global actor tend to coexist if not integrate. Indeed, due to the comprehensive approach to security the EU has endorsed, the projection of security beyond the external boundary encompasses economic, civilian, military, humanitarian, and normative elements. In this sense, the EU's geopolitical discourse is not in direct competition with other discourses; it contributes to the construction of the EU as a global actor under threats, which must project its security beyond its external boundary. This metadiscourse is rooted in space and constrained by the EU's geography and ideational specificities, such as the comprehensive approach to security.

Characterised as an economic power, a civilian power (Duchêne, 1973), a normative power (Manners, 2002), a transformative power (Grabbe, 2005; Leonard, 2005a; 2005b), an imperial power (Anderson, 2007; Zielonka, 2006), or a military power in the making (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003), the EU is an actor that definitely exerts influence on the world stage. The EU's geopolitical actorness materialises in discourses (through the power to define) and (in practice) through the comprehensive exercise of power beyond its external boundary. The EU has developed an inclusive approach to security and foreign policy and has a wide array of tools at its disposal, including economic (conditional) aid, 'common' diplomacy, the CSDP, the ENP, the decentralised agencies. Consequently, the EU's geopolitical actorness is not (only) about 'hard geopolitics' but also about 'soft geopolitics' or 'normative geopolitics'. Whatever power the EU is (or exercises), its discourse and its practical implications towards the external world make the Union a geopolitical actor. The next chapters will show how the EU's geopolitical discourse translates in the maritime domain.

9
The EU's Maritime Frontier: The Concept

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has gradually replaced the concept of defence in shaping European policies.[1] The concept of security is much broader and thus less accurate, since it encompasses various kinds of loosely defined risks and threats, that is, intrastate conflicts, international terrorism, WMD proliferation, as well as various *infra*-military issues, such as transnational criminality, illegal immigration, energy security, environmental degradations, and climate change.

Thereafter, to cope with these actual, perceived, or constructed risks and threats, the EU projects security beyond its external boundary. To grasp the geographical and geopolitical nature of this phenomenon, one has to go beyond the notion of 'EU borders' (understood as a legal line of demarcation between the EU and the rest of the world) and discuss the notion of 'EU frontier' (i.e. a wide zone around Europe enjoying a high-security value for the EU, cf. Figure 8.2). In other words, the EU's practice of projecting power beyond its external boundary, notably in its maritime margins, is an example of the evolution of the concept of frontier in the post-Cold War world. The EU's maritime frontier represents a medium that is used to project security beyond its external boundary, but also a space that the EU has to secure against incoming transnational risks and threats.

The evolution of the concept of frontier in the post-Cold War era

Historically, the limit between states, nations, or political entities was not a precise line of demarcation but a wide buffer zone. One thus talked about frontiers, or margins, rather than borders or boundaries. This state of affairs was reflected in the feudal organisation of Europe during the

medieval period. But the development and the consolidation of nation-states (17th and 18th centuries), the globalisation of the Westphalian system (19th and 20th centuries), and more generally the prevalence of public international law have converted these limits into linear segments, or in other words boundaries whose function has mainly become a legal one, materialising the division between two or more polities. However, whereas in the contemporary era the frontier is legally speaking a line, 'geographically and politically speaking, it is a portion of bordering territory' (Gottmann, 1952: 122).[2] In fact, whatever its nature is, that is, a zone or a line, the primary importance of the frontier comes from its dividing function. It creates a 'on this side' and a 'beyond'; it divides territories and sovereignties that evolve differently (Pinchemel and Pinchemel, 1995: 418).

With the end of the Cold War rivalry, the acceleration of the globalisation process, and the entering into the information society, individuals have further developed strategies 'to avoid state and boundaries' (Badie, 1995: 133). On the one hand globalisation generates benefits for individuals or groups of individuals, corporations, societies, and states (such as facilitating travel, communication, trade). On the other hand, it generates or strengthens threats against the state, whose authority and power to control space tend to weaken, since the exercise of the legitimate violence has become more complex and challenging. Actually, according to Bertrand Badie, the strategies to skirt the states 'contribute to create a clash between the world of networks and the world of territories' (135). To respond to the challenges posed by globalisation states also need to free themselves from territorial constraints and imperceptibly project their competences into others' territory and frontier zones (146, 153). In 1942, Spykman wrote that the 'survival [of states] means preserving political independence and retaining control over a specific territory whose limits are defined by an imaginary line called a "boundary" [that is] not only a line of demarcation between legal systems but also a point of contact of territorial power structures' (Spykman, 1942: 436–437). Although this is still true today, the boundary, in its legal and linear acceptation, tends to lose its rigidity and its imperviousness, for it suffers the assaults not only from transnational networked forces, but also from states for which it has become crucial to operate outside their polity, that is, beyond their external boundaries, in order to obtain security inside.

Entering the information age and leaving the Cold War has strengthened the globalisation of the international system, the networking of threats, and the expansion of the security agenda. The deterritorialisation

and the destatisation of security have imposed a certain transnationalisation and denationalisation of the responses, and thus 'networks of control come to substitute for the functions that were previously physically concentrated at the border' (Walters, 2004: 680). This post-modern networked system without (or with less) borders comes along with a certain return to the frontier era in its traditional acceptation. In other words, the border is less and less considered as a line of demarcation, and more and more as a zone, or a frontier zone, where it is possible and desirable to exercise one's power. Thomas Christiansen, Fabio Petito, and Ben Tonra talked of 'fuzzy borders' to describe these 'interfaces or intermediate spaces between the inside and the outside of the polity' (2000: 393). For state actors and the EU this frontier zone must not only be secured, 'upstream', against transnational threats, but is also used to project security 'outside'.

The security dimension of the maritime frontier

More than the littoral which is only its furthermost limit, the sea itself is above all a frontier as such. Historically, it has provided protection against invaders (think of the English Channel, for example), and even if the defensive function of the sea has tended to decline since the 19th century in parallel with the technological developments of navies (and then air forces, ballistic missiles, and satellites), it still keeps most of its frontier characteristics.

The maritime frontier is not at all a 'linear line' of demarcation. On the contrary, it is a space whose political and geographical definition fluctuates according to the objectives and the means of the states. The maritime domain actually enables states to extend the frontier. The most classical example is the US imperialistic policy at the end of the 19th century. Indeed, while Frederick Jackson Turner explained that the cattle ringing of the Western frontier had closed the first period of American history (1996: 38), a new era of conquest commenced with overseas imperialism, making it possible, once again, to roll away the American frontier. The best known advocate of this new policy was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, although Theodore Roosevelt also played an important role by arguing in favour of a powerful navy able to sustain US world politics well before he met Mahan (Karsten, 1971).

In 1911, Friedrich Ratzel stressed that the littoral does not have a great value as a frontier. Indeed, for the German geographer, the shores only separate the land from the sea. But the littoral is an entryway to the high seas, which are the real source of power (notably, at that time, through

the colonial system). But while clearly claiming that on the seas there are neither limits nor borders (64), Ratzel also specified that this may backfire by generating threats, for contrary to the land borders where only the direct neighbour may threaten us, the coasts offer to all a gateway to our territory (37).

The sea, which is a source of power and liberty, offers the possibility to extend one's border far beyond one's own coasts. But in return, the sea may also be the vector of threatening actors up to one's own territory. Thus, states need to secure their maritime approaches. For example, China acknowledged the importance of anti-access strategies by developing ballistic missiles theoretically capable of targeting aircraft carrier battle groups in motion. In 1952, Jean Gottmann described the maritime border in the following way: 'if there exists a linear border set by nature, [. . .] it is the shore of the sea [. . .], however, even there, although the coastal state has not to fear any contact with its direct neighbour that is the marine vacuum, it has wanted to distance, to provide this natural limit with depth, by creating the territorial waters' (122–123). Today, the need to project security beyond one's own boundary and the need to secure one's own approaches (including against transnational threats) engenders a renewed interest for the 'strategic depth' maritime frontiers can offer. These latter have replaced in terms of expanse and elasticity what they have lost in terms of rigidity. From a littoral they have evolved into a maritime space; from lines of demarcation they have become dividing zones. In the post-Cold War era, a double dynamics has developed regarding the maritime frontiers: on the one hand, the sea contributes to the projection of power, forces, and security 'outside', but, on the other hand, dangers also come from the seas, which consequently requires securing the maritime margins. However, contrary to the land, the maritime margins cannot be occupied, as, by nature, the sea 'is not susceptible of ownership' (Corbett, 1911: 93). In the absence of possession, it can, nevertheless, be controlled and one thus talks about command or control of the sea (91–93). After having been secured, command of the sea can be exercised, that is to say that one can use the sea at one's own convenience and prevent others from doing so.

In the 1930s, Admiral Raoul Castex stated in his *Strategic Theories* that 'in peacetime, the sea is free for everyone. In war, it belongs to the strongest' (1994: 40). In the 21st century, in the framework of the evolution of the concept of security and following the new security policies adopted by a majority of states, even in peacetime the sea belongs only to the strongest (or at least to those who have the political will and the means to claim its control), as the maritime domain must be controlled

and monitored on a permanent basis in order to face the various transnational and non-military threats. However, one does not obtain command of the sea in peacetime in the same way as in war, that is, by developing the most powerful fleet and by using it efficiently. Indeed, 'fishes cross the borders' and transnational criminal actors benefit from the porosity of the maritime frontiers, by exploiting the legal disparities and the lack of coordination between the different states, as well as between the different services and agencies within states (Germond, 2007: 354). Thus, the coordinating role of institutions, such as the EU, is increasingly important, for, in the 21st century, command of the maritime frontiers is certainly not something that can be achieved on a purely national basis. In other words, in the 21st century, the notion of maritime frontier makes sense for Europeans only in the political and strategic context of the EU, since, by definition, a maritime frontier does not stop at the edge of one state's territorial waters or even EEZs. The EU provides a political, institutional, and operational framework for member states to project security into the European maritime margins and beyond.

The EU's maritime frontier

It is generally accepted that a political entity which has reached a certain level of maturity evolves from the 'frontier era', characterised by an absence of regulation and a kind of anarchy, to the 'boundary era', characterised by order and stability. Thus, according to Ladis Kristof, 'the international society in a frontier era is like the American West during open-range ranching: limits, if any, are ill defined and resented [. . .] Under a boundary regime the international society resembles rather fenced ranching: each rancher holds a legal title to his land, knows and guards its limits' (1959: 281).

However, due to the nature of the current (actual, perceived, or constructed) risks and threats, the EU has been initiating a certain return to the frontier era in its security relation to the external world. As discussed in chapter 8, two geopolitical visions coexist: the 'fortress Europe' seeking to make the EU impregnable by hermetically sealing its external borders, and the 'projection Europe' seeking to obtain security 'inside' by projecting security 'outside'. The combination of these two visions has produced four levels of borders/frontiers (see Table 9.1). Firstly, at the internal level, the borders between member states are hardly more than administrative divisions, whose interest in terms of security tends to fade, notably within the Schengen space. Secondly, the external outline

Table 9.1 The role and security value of the EU's borders and frontiers

Types of borders/frontier	*Role*	*Security value*
Internal EU borders	Administrative divisions	Very limited
External EU boundary	Legal external outline of the EU	Limited
Frontier zone (*march*)	(Maritime) zones between the EU and the outer world	High
Ultimate limit (*limes*)	Furthest edge of the EU's zone of influence	Limited

Source: Adapted from Germond (2010: 46)

of the EU is a legal and political boundary, that is to say, the external limit of the sum of the member states. Its defence is currently guaranteed, and although it represents the ultimate wall against incoming transnational threats (such as illegal immigration), its value in the framework of the new security policies is limited by the fact that security should now be searched 'upstream', beyond this boundary. Therefore, thirdly, there exists a frontier zone between the EU and the very 'outer world', that is, a wide space (mainly maritime, but also encompassing the Union's neighbouring states) separating the EU from the rest of the world. Its strategic depth is supposed to contribute to the security of the Union, but as the first 'frontline', this zone should also be secured. Fourthly, the external limit of this buffer zone becomes the very far end of the EU's 'neo-imperial' zone of security, a *limes* in the Roman acceptation, that is, the furthest edge of the empire (Walters, 2004).

The EU's land frontier demands different strategies than the maritime frontier, for there is a direct contact with some EU neighbours. Following the latest EU enlargements, these countries know they will certainly never become EU members (except for the Balkan states – the cases of Turkey and Ukraine are debatable but their adhesion in the foreseeable future seems very unlikely for various reasons, whose discussion goes beyond the scope of this book). Balance between 'fortress Europe' and the projection of security has induced a multifaceted strategy, which consists in strengthening the external boundary (consolidating the Schengen space), cooperating with neighbours for security matters (creating transnational networks of control), and imposing the EU's norms and values as well as intervening and exercising power abroad. Consequently, the EU's external boundary is reinforced, the EU's 'near-abroad' constitutes a buffer zone extending the 'EU-friendly' space up to the *limes* of the EU, or, in other words, 'pushing the threat of the outside

away from EU's own borders' (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008: 531–532). That said, it is worth keeping in mind that the land *marches* of the EU are in fact sovereign states' territories. This requires tact and diplomacy; to project security there, hegemonic tools (such as the CSDP) should indeed be complemented with partnership tools (such as the ENP and the Union for the Mediterranean), which sometimes becomes challenging for the EU. The assimilation of the EU's regulations by neighbours contributes to the EU's security by securing the direct neighbourhood and also by empowering neighbours in controlling their own external borders.

The EU's maritime frontier responds to a different dynamics. Beyond the EU's coasts, the sea prevents direct contacts with other sovereign states but, as previously discussed, the sea allows projecting security far away from one's own coast. Thus, the EU can use the maritime space (a *mare 'quasi' nullius*, thanks to the international law of the sea) to push back its frontier, and thus to cope with current maritime-related risks and threats as far away from its own territory as possible. In other words, via its maritime margins, the EU is in a position to exercise its power and defend member states' interests beyond the Union's boundary (see Figure 9.1). The diverse maritime margins (the wider Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic Ocean) constitute spaces situated outside the very territory of the EU but de facto inside its zone of security interests and of competences (in cooperation or competition with non-EU powers, such as Russia). Paraphrasing Admiral Philip Colomb, who, at the end of the 19th century, wrote that 'British frontier is the enemy's coast' (1895), one could say that the farthest limit of the EU's security frontier locates on the coasts of the states where current threats originate. In this sense, Mackinder's assertion that 'the southern boundary of Europe was and is the Sahara rather than the Mediterranean' (1904: 428–429) is perfectly relevant today, as the security frontier of the EU seems to have been pushed back to the southern coasts of the wider Mediterranean as will be discussed in the next chapter.

As discussed and shown in chapter 8, this projection practice is now backed by a growing geopolitical discourse that emphasises the need for the EU to control its maritime margins and project power towards and via them. Concretely, this translates into policies and activities in two different ways. Firstly, the EU can use the maritime margins as a vector for power and forces projection, notably in the framework of the CSDP (cf. chapter 7). Indeed, the maritime spaces bordering the EU represent an access road to other territories, where it could be in the interest of the EU to intervene, following the logic of the projection



Figure 9.1 The EU's exercise of power via its maritime margins

of European values and norms at large, and of security regulations and good governance in particular. Actually, command of the sea, notably in the periphery of Europe, is secured by the Europeans as a sum of states and as NATO, but the EU as such also benefits from it. The Union, as well as the different member states, can then exploit their command of the maritime margins in order to project security. Examples of maritime security activities include counter-piracy operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta at the Horn of Africa and maritime capacity-building operation EUCAP Nestor at the Horn of Africa and EUBAM in Libya. NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 is an example of 'hard' naval power projection in Europe's maritime margins, making the most of the Western command of the Mediterranean Sea (the fact that the EU was not selected as the framework for this intervention illustrates the current limitation of the CSDP). Secondly, the EU has developed policies and means to manage and combat transnational and environmental threats beyond its external boundaries, within the EU's maritime margins (cf. chapter 7). The EU's maritime security activities 'out of area', within the maritime margins, have thus increased in the field of maritime safety, energy

security, counter-immigration, and more generally speaking to combat transnational threats at sea. Counter-piracy operation Atalanta illustrates the thin boundary between maritime security operations and power projection.

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The adoption of an expanded security agenda by the EU and its member states in the post-Cold War era has induced the broadening and the strengthening of the EU's geopolitical vision. It is now accepted that the EU's own security strongly depends on others' security (or securing), as well as on the securing of areas where threats originate, and where the EU's interests are threatened. As quoted in chapter 8, for the Union, 'even in an era of globalization, geography is still important' (Council, 2003b: 7). Indeed, to fight transnational threats and to obtain security 'inside', the EU exercises its power and projects security 'outside', beyond its external boundary and even beyond its direct neighbours. This vision is also endorsed by the majority of the member states, including the UK, which considers that 'the EU has a vital role in securing a safer world both within and beyond the borders of Europe' (Cabinet Office, 2008: 8), although member states' financial and material contributions to security operations (such as CSDP or FRONTEX ones) greatly varies, not least due to considerations of domestic politics. Thus, the periphery of the EU, its frontier, is conceived as a space with a high security value, a space that lies within the EU's zone of interest and competences, even if legally situated outside the Union.

Within this space, the maritime margins are of particular importance. They represent an informal though pragmatic way to extend the EU's zones of competences and to project the EU's power, since operating within the maritime domain usually does not clash with other sovereign states' territorial competences and is less perceived as an attempt to influence others' politics and policies. However, the maritime margins are also a space difficult to police, and thus, where many transnational criminal actors are operating. Both dynamics (using the maritime frontier to extend the EU's zone of competences, and fighting transnational criminal actors) and the defence of the EU's security interests outside the EU's territory (energy security, security of maritime trade, etc.) have called for greater geopolitical ambitions, which concretely translate into discourses, policies, and operations that tend to reinforce the EU's exercise of power beyond its external boundary.

Consequently, the EU is now part of the 'great game' in its different maritime margins, even far away from the EU's coasts. Depending on the type of activities (projecting power and forces through the sea, securing the sea against incoming transnational threats, protecting the marine environment, etc.) or on the threats (immigration, trafficking, pollution, piracy, etc.), such margins prove more significant, which will be the focus of the next chapter.

10
The EU's Maritime Frontier: The Practice

In its periphery, or neighbourhood, the EU applies a concentric geostrategy (cf. Figure 8.2): the closest to the EU, the most important in terms of security. Surrounded by the sea, except on parts of its eastern flank, the EU also projects security in its maritime margins, whose importance varies depending on the actual threats or issues under consideration. As a union of states, the EU shares its maritime geostrategy with member states as well as NATO. Therefore, a discussion of the various EU's maritime margins cannot be conducted without widening the focus to member states' and NATO's actorness and agency as well.

The wider Mediterranean

The concept of a 'wider Mediterranean' was initially coined by the Italian military to reflect their own geopolitical vision, but it is relevant to Europe in general since 'the security challenges of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean stretch well beyond their geographic boundaries; their geopolitical dimensions encompass the Atlantic approaches to Gibraltar, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, and even Central Asia. From a Western point of view, it results in a "wider Mediterranean" arena' (Di Paola, 2004). This enlarged Mediterranean basin goes from Gibraltar or even the coasts of Senegal (on the Atlantic front) to the Horn of Africa and the western part of the Indian Ocean (Ruzittu, 2007: 2). The eminent historian of the Mediterranean Fernand Braudel elaborated the concept of 'Bigger Mediterranean' to reflect the fact that the Mediterranean 'is like Men make it': it can grow or shrink depending on the context, objectives, and opportunities (Braudel, 1966: 155). To understand Mediterranean politics in general and its security dimension in particular peri-Mediterranean and adjacent areas

need to be taken into consideration. From a geopolitical perspective, the Mediterranean, which is a lane of communication providing access to theatres of operation but also prone to various illegal activities, does not stop at the Suez Canal in the east and the Strait of Gibraltar in the west, since the commercial and criminal flows are indeed coming from (and going) beyond those two chokepoints. For example, shipping lanes transit through the Mediterranean but eventually extend towards the Persian Gulf and Asia Pacific; illegal immigration and drug trafficking via the Gibraltar Strait often originate on the Western African coasts.

In its enlarged acceptation, the Mediterranean corresponds to the definition of a European maritime margin discussed in chapter 9, that is to say, a geographical zone which lies beyond the Union's external boundary but which is crucial for the security of the EU. Indeed, most of the maritime security challenges identified by the EU are located in this area, which was not the case during the Cold War. Actually, a maritime geopolitical reorientation from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean has taken place following the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the security agenda endorsed by NATO, the EU, and their member states. Whereas during the Cold War Western Europe's security rested on the command of the Euro-Atlantic SLOCs, the majority of the conflicts in which the Europeans have recently taken part are located in countries bordering the wider Mediterranean (the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya). Moreover, the Mediterranean constitutes the main route towards Europe for incoming transnational threats, such as illegal immigration, people smuggling, drug and arms trafficking, and terrorism. In addition, in its far eastern part, the Horn of Africa is now prone to piracy and robbery at sea. Environmental security issues, including oil discharges, marine pollution and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF), also call for the protection of the Mediterranean margin.

European navies have been involved in several peace support operations in the wider Mediterranean, none of them under the auspices of the EU though. To begin with, the Mediterranean margin has often been 'used' during humanitarian or peace support operations to evacuate citizens, to bring humanitarian aid, or to secure a theatre of operation. For example, in summer 2006, several European navies (notably the French, the Greek, and the British) were deployed in the context of Israel's war operations in Lebanon. This illustrated the versatility of naval forces. Indeed, the ships contributed to the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as to the evacuation of foreign citizens. Besides, the deployment of escort frigates showed that, even though the Europeans were not ready to impose a ceasefire, they at least wanted to maintain

the freedom of the seas in this part of the Mediterranean, which succeeded with Israel eventually lifting its embargo. The subsequent UN maritime task force (authorised by UN Security Council resolution 1701 in 2006) is still deployed off Lebanon's coasts. Although under Brazilian command since February 2011, it was initially under German, then EUROMARFOR/Italian/French, Belgian, Italian, and again German command. Future Western-led peace support operations with a naval component may take place in North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, Somalia, and so on. Thanks to the experience the EU has gained at the Horn of Africa with operation Atalanta, although in a counter-piracy role, the EU would be a natural candidate for the launch of low-intensity humanitarian missions in the future if member states decide so.

The European naval forces actively cooperated in conducting blockades or embargos within the wider Mediterranean. During the 1990/1991 Gulf War, in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, more than 9,000 ships were subject to control between August 1990 and February 1991, leading to more than 1,100 inspections, and revealing about 60 cases of fraud; some cases required the firing of warning shots (Department of the Navy, 1991: Part III). During the 1992–1996 Bosnian Crises, NATO and the WEU conducted an embargo in the Adriatic (NATO operations Maritime Monitor and Maritime Guard, WEU operation Sharp Fence, then operation Sharp Guard in common to both organisations). Between June 1993 and June 1996, 74,000 ships were monitored and 6,000 inspected, and official NATO sources state that no ship broke the embargo (NATO, 1996). However, the effects of this type of naval operation in terms of conflict management are very difficult to identify. For example, in the Gulf, despite the apparent success of the blockade, the Allies preferred to launch an offensive action (operation Desert Storm), since the (successful) blockade was deemed too lengthy a process to weaken the Baathist regime enough (or quickly enough). In Bosnia, the spokesman of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) noted that the NATO/WEU embargo in the Adriatic had very few, if any, concrete positive effects on the implementation of the UN forces' mandate in Bosnia (AFP, 1992), all the more since this embargo's effects could only be limited, for the Serbs could be supplied by land, notably in the provision of petroleum. In practice, the embargo may well have had more impacts on the supplies to Bosnian Muslims and Croats than on the Serbs who benefited from a bigger stock of arms and ammunition (Vego, 1999: 198). Like for peace support operations, the EU is in a position to launch an embargo mission of its own in the wider Mediterranean. However, the EU's non-participation in the 2011 Libyan campaign, where the EU could have conducted the

embargo, illustrates the difficulty to find a consensus when it comes to military operations; and NATO seems to remain the preferred European tool, certainly since it is actually not a purely European institution but a transatlantic one, which guarantees the US (political and military) safety net.

The same dynamics applies regarding power and forces projection in the wider Mediterranean. In fact, as discussed in chapter 4, only the British and French naval forces have been involved in high-intensity projection operations, and only to a limited extent (Gulf War, Kosovo air campaign, Afghanistan campaign, Iraq War). The 2011 Libya campaign is an exception since the majority of the operations were conducted by Europeans with limited (but crucial) US support within NATO. As for EU members, the British, the French, but also the Belgian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, and Romanian navies participated in operation Unified Protector, conducting an arms embargo with 3,100 vessels hailed, 300 boarded, and 11 denied transit to or from Libya (NATO, 2011), contributing to securing the regional airspace, and conducting land-attack missions, including precision strikes using cruise-missiles as well as naval artillery bombardments to destroy coastal defence facilities and weapons. The EU is not likely to be the institution of choice for such 'medium to high intensity warfare' campaigns in the foreseeable future, due to either the reluctance of some member states (e.g. Germany during the Libyan crisis) or the need to secure the US involvement. NATO will thus remain the instrument of choice for such operations, which does not contradict the EU's strategic orientations, which mainly consider the CSDP as an instrument for peace support operations rather than peace enforcement. This informal division of task between NATO and the EU also applies to the maritime domain.

That said, the wider Mediterranean is relevant for the EU's security beyond power and forces projection considerations. As discussed in chapter 5, the command or control of the sea is also a notion of peacetime. Indeed, operating the strongest fleet in peacetime while waiting to gain command/control in case of war (as during the Cold War when the US Sixth Fleet was in competition with the Soviet *Eskadra* in the Mediterranean) is not a strategy adapted to the challenges of the 21st century when it comes to maritime security. To combat terrorists and transnational criminals operating at or from the sea, states need to permanently monitor the wider Mediterranean and to exercise the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, which requires cooperation between civilian and military agencies operating in the area, both at a national and at a multilateral level.

The most significant example of the struggle against international terrorism at sea is given by two long-term operations taking place in the wider Mediterranean, both initiated in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Since October 2001, as an 'offspring' of the military operations in Afghanistan but still in the framework of operation Enduring Freedom, a large international coalition (led by the US) has been operating in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and at the Horn of Africa to prevent terrorists from using the sea as a means of transportation or making attacks such as the ones against USS *Cole* or the French tanker *Limburg* (cf. chapter 5). CTF-150 is still active to date, alongside CTF-152 (in the Persian Gulf) and CTF-151 (responsible for counter-piracy). In another example, from October 2001 until March 2003, operation Active Endeavour (under the aegis of NATO) had a mandate to monitor the ships in the eastern part of the Mediterranean (deterrence) and from March 2003 its mandate was extended to onboard inspections (and from February 2003 until May 2004 to escorting civilian ships through the Strait of Gibraltar). After March 2004 the operation was extended to the whole Mediterranean. This ensures not only deterrence, but direct involvement to maintain and exert command of the sea. So far, about 115,000 vessels have been hailed and 162 boarded (NATO website – operation Active Endeavour). These two operations constitute an ideal type of complex naval cooperation within a multilateral composite network gathering national units, and on-call and standing naval forces (Germond, 2008b). In practice, the tangible results of these operations are very difficult to estimate. Officials declare that the deterrent effect is clear, basing their statements on the fact that there were very few cases of terrorism at sea, and attributing to themselves the merit of this positive situation, stressing that the Allied controls are successful in deterring terrorists. For example, Vice-Admiral Xavier Rolin, Commander of the French forces in the Indian Ocean, was rather ambiguous when talking about the maritime dimension of operation Enduring Freedom:

> We check suspect ships. Sometimes we find drugs and armaments, but not very often. We have never discovered a clear link with terrorism. Terrorists use the sea very little. These checks have a good deterrent effect. (AFP, 2004)

One has to remain cautious regarding this potential deterrent effect since the correlation is not straightforward and difficult to prove. Nevertheless, one can notice other positive side effects, notably a reduction in transnational criminality, especially smuggling activities in the

area (NATO website – operation Active Endeavour). These antiterrorist operations illustrate that the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea is a comprehensive task, which requires to deal with various threats at once and to operate far away from the territorial waters. As such, while the EU is not conducting any counter-terrorist operation of its own in the Mediterranean, existing maritime surveillance cooperation initiatives (such as CISE) contribute to maritime domain awareness and downstream to counter-terrorism at sea. On another level, the EU's contribution to the maritime dimension of counter-terrorism also includes the harmonisation and strengthening of port security regulations and measures in the EU's ports.

The wider Mediterranean is a popular route for illegal migrants, especially towards Italy, Spain, Malta, and Greece, mainly due to obvious geographical reasons. Italy was confronted with massive immigration flows from the Balkans, especially since the fall of communism in Tirana in 1991. In 1997, following the new influx of migrants consecutive to the Albanian financial crisis, Italy decided to tackle the issue beyond its territorial waters by signing with Albania an agreement authorising Italian naval forces to operate in Albanian territorial waters in order to intercept and roll back migrants coming from the Balkans. Since then, Italian naval forces (*Marina*, *Guardia di Finanza*, and *Guardia Costiera*) have played an important role. In 2002, a quarter of Italian navy's sailing hours were devoted to the struggle against illegal immigration (Lutterbeck, 2006: 67). Thus, since 2004, the route from Albania to Italy via the Strait of Otranto has been less frequented, thanks to the intense monitoring activities carried out by the Italian services and the aid given upstream by Italy to the Albanian services. Since the middle of the 1990s, Italy has also faced a serious clandestine immigration flow from North Africa (notably from Libya), via Sicily and notably the island of Lampedusa, where migrants keep landing on an almost daily basis. Moreover, due to the policing efforts in the Adriatic, a part of the migrants has certainly redirected towards the Sicily route. Thus, since 2002/2004, the situation in Lampedusa has worsened, probably due in part to the controls in the Adriatic (Lutterbeck, 2006: 75). Italy intercepts tens of thousands of illegal migrants annually; some of the boats are 30 meters long, carrying more than 600 immigrants. Once again the role of geography is crucial. Due to its position, Italy is a natural entry-point to the EU, and Italy's efforts in counter-immigration are certainly burdensome. In November 2014, at Italy's request, FRONTEX launched operation Triton in the Central Mediterranean to support Italy's efforts to monitor the southern border of the Union.

In Spain, since the mid-1990s, illegal immigration from North Africa (via Ceuta and Melilla) has also become important. In this case, the role of naval forces is relatively limited, as the majority of the interceptions are done ashore. The navy's role is often limited to SAR, as migrants' skiffs often capsize (Pugh, 2000: 38). Since 2004, the number of migrants using the Gibraltar route has decreased, thanks to the intensity of controls carried out ashore, notably in Ceuta and Melilla. As in the case of Italy, this diminution coincides with an increase of arrivals via the Canary Islands route (from Morocco, Mauritania, and Senegal), which is more difficult to police due to geographical constrains. Since a couple of years, the Maltese route is also well valued because of the geographical location of the island (relatively close to the African coasts, halfway to Italy) and as Malta is a member of the EU since 2004. Since its accession to the EU, Malta has constantly requested that the European navies contribute to the surveillance of the island's maritime approaches, as its own naval capabilities are very limited whereas this problem concerns all the EU members. Greece has also faced a flow of illegal immigration since the end of the 1990s and notably the beginning of the 2000s, via Turkey. Hence, each year, Greek naval forces intercept thousands of illegal immigrants in the Aegean Sea. France is less affected by the phenomenon of 'boat people'. Officials say that it is due to the deterrent effect of controls at sea (Etat-major des Armées, 2005: 9–10), but it seems that the geographical factor is a better explanation, since travelling to France by sea is much longer and hazardous than to EU countries located closer to non-EU coasts such as Italy and Spain. Beyond the Mediterranean, France is affected by illegal immigration in its overseas possessions, notably Mayotte in Africa and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean (Marine Nationale, 2006: 19).

To deter, intercept, or rescue illegal migrants in the Mediterranean, states engage their navy, coastguard, and police forces. However, since 2005, the EU is also involved in counter-immigration at sea with its decentralised agency FRONTEX. As discussed in chapter 6, FRONTEX has coordinated several counter-immigration operations conducted multilaterally in the wider Mediterranean by European navies and coastguards, notably in the Aegean Sea, off Malta, in the Western Mediterranean, as well as off Senegalese coasts and Canary Islands, now in Central Mediterranean, with operation Triton. These operations resulted in the interception of thousands of migrants as well as many facilitators. Numerous naval forces have participated, including British, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Latvian, Spanish, and Portuguese forces. Some operations have taken place in the territorial

waters of non-EU member states following the signature of memorandums of understanding between a member state (such as Spain) and third countries (such as Senegal and Mauritania), which illustrates the extensible character of the concept of maritime margins, as well as their variable geometry. In other words, when the EU and its member states envision the need to operate beyond their territorial waters to fulfil security objectives, they will not hesitate to project the EU's power (albeit via member states' contributions) far away from the EU's coasts (Germond, 2010).

Relatively less-policed coasts and the presence of weaker states on its southern shore facilitate drug smuggling via the Mediterranean. Within the Mediterranean margin, drug smuggling is dealt with in two different ways. Firstly, member states' navies and multinational naval forces are monitoring the sea on a daily basis, and, depending on the information transmitted by the various national and multilateral intelligence and maritime surveillance agencies and mechanisms, can intercept smugglers. These actions are restricted by the fact that according to the international law of the sea one is theoretically not authorised, on the high seas, to intercept ships flying foreign flags without the flag state's consent. The Europeans thus rely upon multilateral agreements, bilateral agreements, or ad hoc compromises with flag states (Byers, 2004; Gilmore, 1996). Multinational forces (such as NATO standing naval forces or EUROMARFOR) and multilateral operations (such as Active Endeavour and Enduring Freedom) also play a role in narcotics interdiction. Moreover, European navies are often acting on the basis of intelligence from another European partner. Recent initiatives in terms of 'intelligence-led anti-narcotics law enforcement supported military platform' includes the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics (MAOC-N), which groups France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK, as well as the French-based Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Mediterranée (CeCLAD-M). Both are cofinanced by the European Commission (Commission, 2008d: 6). FRONTEX also coordinates counter-narcotics operations in member states' sea ports. Secondly, states are exercising the legitimate use of violence in their territorial waters. In the Mediterranean, the Strait of Gibraltar is of particular concern. Indeed, as Morocco is seemingly the world's main cannabis provider (Boekhout Van Solinge, 1998: 101), the Strait of Gibraltar is a convenient route for smugglers wanting to reach the EU's territory. Moreover, the smuggling of cocaine from South America has a tendency to merge with the cannabis route on the Moroccan coast; indeed, 'by transferring the drugs onto smaller

boats, the traffickers can skirt the patrols along the lengthy coastlines of Northwest Africa and the Iberian Peninsula' (Socolovsky, 2007).

Piracy and robbery at sea at the Horn of Africa have become a serious problem in the 2000s, since the collapse of the Somali state and the chaotic situation ashore provide pirate leaders with rear bases to support their raids and freedom of manoeuvre to recruit operatives, sell the bounty, and launder the money. Since 2001, the Europeans are involved in the securing of Somali waters within the US-led CTF-151. Following an increase in the number of pirate raids in 2007 and 2008, the UN Security Council passed three resolutions between May and October 2008. Resolution 1816 (2 June 2008) authorises states to use 'within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery' (UN Security Council, 2008: 3). In the meantime, various states, including Europeans, had sent naval units in the region to deter pirates as well as to signify their support to the ships flying their flag, and NATO had sent units to protect ships bringing humanitarian aid to Somalia (operation Allied Provider).

The Council of the EU (as well as the French presidency – the attack of the French yacht *Le Ponant* in April 2008 was highly mediatised and served as a trigger in the fight against piracy in the Somali waters) showed strong concerns about piracy in this region, notably since May 2008. In September 2008, it established a naval coordination cell (EUNAVCO) tasked to support and coordinate member states' surveillance and protection activities at the Horn of Africa. In November 2008, the Council launched the first ever CSDP naval operation, operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR), which was operational by December 2008. The operation is still ongoing in 2014, which makes it one of the lengthiest CSDP operations (six years to date – eight years at the end of its mandate in 2016). It has the mandate to protect World Food Programme (WFP) and AMISOM vessels, to deter, prevent, and respond to acts of piracy and robbery at sea (including within Somali territorial waters since 2012), and to protect vulnerable shipping as well as to monitor fishing in the region (EUNAVFOR website). This illustrates the EU's (and EU member states') practice regarding the European maritime margins; although they are legally situated out of the Union, the EU includes them into its security perimeter and is ready to defend its interests and those of the member states there, namely, the freedom of the sea. Although the transitional government of Somalia officially authorised foreign powers to fight piracy in its territorial waters, this also illustrates the fact

that Europeans are ready to compromise on others' sovereignty when it comes to the security and the securing of Europe's maritime frontiers (Germond, 2010). That said, operation Atalanta takes place in the context of the Union's comprehensive approach to security at the Horn of Africa, which also includes diplomatic efforts, financial and technical aid, as well as security sector reforms (including maritime capacity-building operation EUCAP Nestor).

Due to the size of the wider Mediterranean, the presence of international waters, the economic divide between riparian states (notably EU versus non-EU ones), and the growing economic activities taking place in the basin (fisheries, shipping, tourism) that harm the fragile marine environment, the EU has recognised the need to improve maritime governance in the Mediterranean (Commission, 2009: 1–3). Engaging in Mediterranean governance with non-EU partners is encouraged, since it is the only efficient way to protect a marine environment shared or used by many. The Commission supports the Mediterranean Coast Guard Functions Forum, which promotes informal or semi-formal cooperation between riparian coastguard services. Maritime spatial planning is also encouraged as 'an effective governance tool for applying ecosystem-based management, addressing inter-related impacts of maritime activities, conflicts between uses of space and the preservation of marine habitats' (7). However, unresolved territorial disputes, divergent economic interests and strategic priorities among riparian states, as well as the limitations imposed by the legal status of the high seas on controls and repression all limit the effectiveness of the EU's marine environment protection initiatives in the Mediterranean basin.

Since the end of the Cold War, the wider Mediterranean area has been the most turbulent European maritime margin. Consequently, it has been the theatre of various NATO, national, and EU operations/activities in the field of power and forces projection, maritime security, and marine environment and resources protection. That said, other European maritime margins, such as the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic Ocean, have become more and more of concern to the EU, especially with respect to maritime security.

The Black Sea margin

The Black Sea is a nearly landlocked sea, only linked to the Mediterranean by the Turkish Straits, namely, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. It is bordered on its eastern shore by Bulgaria and Romania (both EU members since 2007), on its southern shore by Turkey, and on its northern

shore by Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine. Due to its geopolitics and its history (notably Russia's recurrent efforts to secure its command), the Black Sea has developed a particular dynamics distinct from the wider Mediterranean one. The end of the Cold War has had less impact on the balance of power in the Black Sea where Russia is still the dominant power. In addition, transnational criminal activities have proliferated in parallel with the increase of corruption and bad governance in the post-Soviet space.

Following the adhesion of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU now possesses a true maritime front on the Black Sea, which may increase the geostrategic importance of this region in the eyes of Brussels. The EU is de facto a significant Black Sea power, which ineluctably engenders new perspectives and challenges for the Union, notably in terms of security and neighbourhood policy. Russia, for the first time since the beginning of the 19th century, has not been for an extended period of time the *only* dominant power in the region (Aydin, 2004: 6–13). The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 illustrates its determination to reestablish itself as the main Black Sea Power while securing access to warm waters. In addition to dealing with Russia's new ambitions, the EU's main challenges in the Black Sea consist of illegal immigration, transnational criminality, and IUUF (namely maritime security issues).

In the framework of the CSDP, the EU seeks to project security beyond its external boundary, that is to say, undertaking various military and civilian operations in its periphery (and beyond), in order to get positive outcomes in terms of economic prosperity, and above all to limit the transnational threats that ineluctably spread from regions where crises occur. The ESS and the ENP are clear about the challenges of the Black Sea and the need to address them:

> The integration of acceding states [Bulgaria and Romania] increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European [. . .] with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. [. . .] We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which [is also] a neighbouring region. (Council, 2003b: 8)

> The European Union has a strong interest in the stability and development of the Southern Caucasus [. . .] Cooperation should also be developed in the area of energy, as the Southern Caucasus is an important region both for the production (the Caspian basin) and the transit of energy. (Commission, 2004: 10–11)

However, the 2008 Georgia war showed that Russia can still pose problems for European security in its broadened geographical definition. After the Russian invasion of Georgian territories, the EU was obliged to react, at least diplomatically (and partly thanks to a proactive French presidency that clearly considered that a stronger role of the EU on the world stage served the interests of France). The actual role and means of the EU civilian Monitoring Mission (EUMM), established in September 2008, however, remains very limited. In naval terms, this conflict gave a hint that the Russian Navy remains a potential competitor within the Black Sea. Its involvement during the August 2008 war (blockade, sinking of Georgian ships, an amphibious operation, monitoring of the US food delivery operation) illustrated that gaining access to theatres of operations in the Russian 'near abroad' could imply disputing command of the sea very close to the EU. The 2014 Ukraine crisis only reaffirmed Russia's determination to control the Black Sea and the importance given to the Black Sea Fleet. In this context, Moscow just tolerates the current EU presence in the Black Sea region (such as EUMM Georgia) and is likely to oppose any EU (or NATO) military operation in the region.

Turkey might be a valuable partner though, able to provide strategic access to the Black Sea theatre, not only geographically, but also legally speaking, as the legal regime of the Turkish Straits restricts the tonnage and the duration on theatre of any non-Black Sea country naval forces deployment in the Black Sea. The increasing presence of Western ships during the 2008 crisis was thus denounced by the Russians, and in 2014, the Russian air force carried out intimidation gesticulations against NATO warships cruising in the Black Sea. Turkey could be a valuable partner for any potential EU operation in the Black Sea region, all the more since Ankara would feel concerned by any EU operation taking place in its priority zone of national interests, despite not being, and because it is not, a member of the Union. And as mentioned, a Turkish involvement could even be necessary in order to obtain a legal right of access to the theatre of operation. Thus, Turkey represents a valuable asset for the EU's security policies in the Black Sea margin. However, as long as Turkey does not join the EU, it will only remain the military arm of NATO in the Black Sea.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea security environment has changed a lot. The disappearing of the communist regimes around its shore has been followed by endemic economic, political, and governance crises, notably in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Economic breakdown, weak democratic traditions, weak states, bad governance, corruption, and regional secessionism have merged, contributing to

the proliferation of criminal non-state actors. Consequently, transnational criminal activities have increased in the Black Sea region, such as the smuggling of weapons coming from the post-Soviet space and of heroin coming from Asia. Of the heroin supply to Europe, 90% comes from Asia. Most of it transits throughout Afghanistan and then either through the Silk Road or through the Balkan Road via Turkey. From Turkey, some of the smugglers use the maritime route, notably to Romania, Bulgaria, or Italy (EUROPOL, 2004). Likewise, clandestine immigration has increased, notably via Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine, which constitute the three main transit countries in the region before entering the EU's territory (EUROPOL, 2005). Finally, international terrorism could potentially become a threat in the Black Sea, due to its proximity to the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia, and to the fact that the region is already hosting terrorist groups with regional or national objectives (in Chechnya and Kurdistan notably).

For those criminal actors, who target (illegal immigration, trafficking) or could target (terrorism) Europe, the sea represents a valuable means of transportation towards southern Europe through the Straits or directly towards Bulgaria and Romania. Besides, these latter countries being member of the EU since 2007, this route has consequently become more attractive for smugglers, as it is currently an entryway to the EU that does not require crossing a Schengen border. FRONTEX and Europol pay attention to the transnational threats in the Black Sea, and the EU is aware of the need to monitor, secure, and perhaps seal its maritime frontier, approaches, and shores in the Black Sea region. Without an integrated European coastguard service, the Union relies upon the means (and, beyond, upon the will) of the member states for any police operations at sea. Bulgaria and Romania have limited naval means at disposal to ensure the complete security of the EU external borders in the Black Sea. The problem is merely financial. Indeed, these two countries have adapted the missions assigned to their naval forces, which correspond to those of the other European states. But fighting transnational criminality and illegal immigration requires important resources and infrastructures; even Italy still has difficulties in monitoring illegal immigration and trafficking despite its rather more important means and experience. Thus the supporting role of the European agencies, such as FRONTEX and EMSA, is very important. Since 2008, FRONTEX has coordinated some joint operations in the Black Sea and the Delta of Danube, which was welcomed by Romania in general and its police forces in particular (Moldoveanu, 2008). Cooperation with the Turkish forces is also important, as Turkey is currently the only actor that has

the necessary means to play a stabilising role in the Black Sea margin. The question is whether Turkey is ready to act as a kind of EU sheriff in the Black Sea with the shrinking prospect of joining the Union. Turkey's involvement for stability and security within the Black Sea, notably maritime safety and the struggle against illegal activities, is something well established. If the EU wants to be more efficient in the struggle against transnational threats in the Black Sea, Turkey may be the main valuable partner. It already acts in a way which is coherent with the EU's objectives in a region where the EU's power is underrepresented.

The same is true concerning marine environment and resources protection in the Black Sea. Indeed, since the 2007 enlargement, the EU's norms related to fisheries, marine environment protection, and safety of maritime transport have been extended to the Black Sea. As discussed in chapter 6, the EU legal corpus for the protection of the marine environment (including the stocks of fish) and maritime safety has been strongly reinforced following the CFP reform and the successive *Erika* and *Prestige* disasters. However, in order to be really efficient, these norms should be applied to the whole Black Sea, which is a nearly landlocked sea. Difficulties in engaging with Russia and the current instability in Ukraine do not provide a suitable context for efficient cooperation in the field of environment protection. Cooperation with Turkey is again crucial so as to cover a larger part of the Black Sea. Contrary to the rest of the Black Sea, where safety norms are below the EU standards, Turkey is already particularly meticulous in terms of maritime safety norms for the transport of petroleum through the Straits, for instance, night crossing restriction since October 2002 for tankers of more than 200 meters (Aydin, 2004: 14). Turkey is also concerned by IUUF in its waters (Öztürk, 2013), which may foster incentive to further cooperate with the EU. However, without a more formal link (such as a preadhesion treaty), the cooperation between the EU and Turkey for police and maritime surveillance operations and for the enforcement of the EU's environment protection regime may not further develop, all the more since Turkey has its own economic interests and priorities at sea.

Despite the fragmented geopolitics of the Black Sea, a form of naval cooperation has developed in the form of the Black Sea Naval Force (BlackSeaFor). This on-call naval force was initiated in 1998 by Turkey (which still seems to assume its informal leadership). At first, it consisted of Bulgarian, Georgian, Romanian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian units. The force can theoretically be activated at any time if the participating states decide so. Besides, it has been activated each year since September 2001 in the framework of a multilateral naval exercise.

Its potential missions include SAR, environmental protection, mine countermeasures (MCM), goodwill visits, humanitarian assistance, and potentially (if the governments decide it) peace support operations under the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) auspices. Moreover, in 2005 participants decided to include surveillance and counter-terrorism in the missions (Kyiv Communiqué, 2005). The BlackSeaFor in general, and its prerogative in terms of counter-terrorism in particular, have been relatively strongly supported by Russia, since Moscow saw it as a means to retain a kind of condominium with Turkey over the Black Sea, or in other words to prevent any further US or NATO involvement in the Black Sea (Socor, 2005). The official Turkish position does not stress that the objective is to maintain a condominium in the Black Sea but states that the very existence of the BlackSeaFor indicates that there is no need for strengthening NATO's presence in the Black Sea. The Russian position is even clearer, as stressed by the official gazette of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation:

> Russia's position coincides with the point of view of Turkey, which is a member nation of NATO. Moscow and Ankara proceed from the fact that the Black Sea must remain a region of cooperation. Only the Black Sea nations must find an adequate solution to security problems, including problems linked with terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In other words, NATO must not play the key role in this region. (Chernov, 2005)

Accordingly, Russia opposed the extension of antiterrorist operation Active Endeavour's mandate to the Black Sea, with Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov stressing that BlackSeaFor already intercepted illegal migrants and arms and that it was sufficient to manage Black Sea problems (BBC, 2005). BlackSeaFor not being a standing naval force, operates only during a very limited number of weeks a year. Thus, Russia's statement was seemingly misleading. However, it is striking to note that Turkey, a member of NATO, has been relatively reluctant to persuade its Russian partner to accept the idea of an Allied involvement in the Black Sea (BBC, 2005; Socor, 2005). Turkey preferred to initiate its own operation (Black Sea Harmony), in cooperation with operation Active Endeavour (and joined by Russia in 2006), rather than simply extending the latter to the Black Sea, which shows that Turkey and Russia might then have shared some geostrategic objectives in the Black Sea, with BlackSeaFor as a common (mainly symbolic) tool, at least before the Georgia and Ukraine crises broke out.

Indeed, Russia's foreign policy turn during Vladimir Putin's second presidential mandate brought this dynamics closer to a standstill. Following the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, and the sinking of a Georgian ship by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the future of the BlackSeaFor as a naval initiative grouping all the Black Sea navies has been highly uncertain, since it clearly appeared that the force was not able to foster confidence-building in the region. Participants decided, nevertheless, to continue to activate the force once a year (albeit Georgia has not participated after 2008). US, Western, and NATO warships' presence also increased, with Turkey's approval. The 2014 Ukrainian crisis further demonstrated the irrelevance of the BlackSeaFor, which is supposed to favour confidence-building among participating states. Ukraine has demanded the exclusion of Russia, due to its 'systematic violations of provisions of the 2001 agreement on the setting up of BlackSeaFor', notably the violation of the territorial integrity of other participating countries, namely, Georgia and Ukraine (ITAR-TASS, 2014). Activities are currently frozen and the future of the BlackSeaFor is still uncertain at the time of writing. Despite the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, Kiev and Washington organised the annual naval exercise Sea Breeze in September 2014, with participating countries including Romania, Georgia, Turkey, as well as Canada and Spain representing NATO, which shows that Western Powers and NATO are not ready to relinquish command of the Black Sea to the Russian Navy.

In sum, since 2007, the Black Sea is de facto an EU maritime margin. Like the Mediterranean, it is surrounded by EU as well as non-EU countries. But, as it is a nearly landlocked sea (all the more since the legal status of the Turkish Straits restricts its access for 'out-of-area' navies) and as two powerful actors (namely Turkey and Russia) are coastal states, the EU is likely to continue to experience difficulties when it comes to projecting security and security norms into the Black Sea. Russia's policies towards Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transnistria), and Ukraine engender a climate of mistrust in the region, where the EU's neighbourhood policy, *rapprochement* with Ukraine (and more generally its practice of projecting security and norms), is in direct opposition to Russia's own ambitions in its 'near abroad' along traditional geopolitical dividing lines and balance of power considerations. On the contrary, the EU has a card to play with Turkey, which is keener to cooperate with the EU (notably in the field of illegal immigration, counter-terrorism, marine environment protection, and maritime safety), as long as the EU has something to propose in exchange. Thus, the long-term EU policy

regarding the accession of Turkey will certainly decide on the success or failure of the EU's strategy towards its Black Sea margin.

The Baltic Sea: An EU Lake?

The Baltic Sea is a shallow, nearly landlocked sea, which forms a rather coherent geographical unit.[1] This has induced regional incentives to cooperate in geoeconomic terms, as illustrated by the Hanseatic League between the 13th and 17th centuries, which fostered intercity trade and cooperation. But the emergence of modern states induced permanent struggles to gain control over the Baltic Sea, which was, depending on the period, dominated by the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, and Germany. Nevertheless, none of these Powers managed to unify the region or even to gain complete control over it, since geopolitical, economic, and even cultural sources of division have exceeded the factors of unity. Whereas the Cold War era perfectly illustrated these divisions, its end brought many geopolitical upheavals into the Baltic Sea region. The traditional Soviet threat was replaced by a variety of transnational and non-military threats, notably criminal activities and environmental degradations. Coping with these challenges requires cooperation among littoral states, as well as within the broader European and transatlantic frameworks. In the 21st century, the Baltic Sea region is more unified than ever in the past, thanks in part to the EU's successful enlargement process. Before and just after the 2004 Baltic enlargement, the Baltic Sea was often presented in the literature as an almost 'EU lake' (e.g. Emerson et al., 2001: 40; Hagman, 2002: 93; Hyde-Price, 2002: 43; Kasekamp, 2005: 161; Leigh, 1998: 63). This expression tended to disappear thereafter though. In fact, due to the presence of two Russian coasts (the Kaliningrad *oblast'*[2] and the St. Petersburg region), the Baltic Sea remains an EU margin, which plays the role of a frontier zone between the EU and Russia. However, it is also the cement between all the EU coastal states and it thus develops a different dynamics compared to the other EU margins, a dynamics of intra-EU cooperation.

Despite the presence of Russia, the Baltic Sea region has a very different dynamics compared to the Black Sea. In the Cold War era, the region was divided into three zones: a Soviet one, including the USSR, Poland, and East Germany; a NATO one, including West Germany, Denmark, and Norway; and a 'neutral' one, including Sweden and Finland (Vitkus, 2002: 4). Therefore, geopolitically speaking, the region was heterogeneous. Yet, one has to acknowledge that a certain Nordic feeling existed,

which made, at least, 'war unthinkable between the Nordic states' (Mouritzen, 2001: 298), even if the security community among them was actually relatively weak, due to the very differences between neutrals and NATO members, and among neutrals themselves (Finland and Sweden). One also has to qualify the overused concept of 'Nordic Balance', for Denmark and Norway primarily belonged to, and acted in the interests of, the NATO camp. The Baltic Sea region is thus a perfect example of the genuine geopolitical partition of the Cold War period, with not two camps but three geopolitical groups, comprising two 'hard' camps (the Warsaw Pact and NATO) and a 'balanced' camp (the neutral countries).

Following the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea region security architecture underwent three modifications, each of them allowing the region to become more unified. This process was linked to the developments that were taking place in the broader Euro-Atlantic area, with both NATO and the EU playing as referent entities, especially for the post-communist states (Rotfeld, 2005: 29) but also for the region as a whole. Firstly, the events of 1989 (namely the non-intervention of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe) and of 1991 (namely the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union) definitely reduced the potentiality of an interstate war in Europe, and drastically redrew the Baltic Sea region's geopolitics by creating new international actors: Russia, the unified Germany, the non-communist Poland, and the three Baltic republics, which regained their independence. Furthermore, these new actors, as well as the 'old' ones, faced a completely new security environment. Indeed, before the 2014 Ukraine crisis the spectre of a major conventional (or even nuclear) war vanished, leading to the complete redefinition of threats, security concepts, and even military doctrines. The new post-Soviet states were attracted by the Western institutions, except Russia, which has undergone a major redefinition of its identity, but has not yet resolved its 'century-old European question' (Hubel, 2004: 291). The 2014 Ukraine crisis showed that Russia is rather likely to resolve this question at the expense of cooperation. Secondly, in 1994, the Russian troops were totally removed from the Baltic States, which represents the real 'independence moment' for these new republics. Indeed, like Finland after the abolition of the Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty (FCMA) with the USSR, the Baltic States were now free to develop their relations with the Western organisations, notably NATO. And while the Baltic States were officially given the title of EU candidates in 1994, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. This did not only induce EUropeanisation of the region, but it also contributed to unify the northern (Nordic states), the eastern (Baltic States), and

the southern shores of the Baltic Sea. Thirdly, 2004 represents the last, and to some extent the most, 'ground-breaking' change in the Baltic Sea region, with the accession of Poland to the EU (after having already joined NATO in 1999) and of the three Baltic States to the EU and NATO. The 2004 NATO enlargement to the Baltic States constituted some sort of a 'revolution' for many academics who, before 2001, were far from imagining this possibility, still arguing about a strong Russian opposition (e.g. Bengtsson, 2000: 374; Hyde-Price, 2000: 9).

One can thus argue that, since 2004, the unity of the Baltic Sea region in terms of security is almost complete. Indeed, 2004 does not only signify the inclusion of the three Baltic States into the same institutions as their Baltic Sea neighbours and then the reinforcement of the region's unity, but it also shows that Russia was not in a position to perturb the unifying process of the Baltic Sea region taking place under the auspices of Western organisations and values. Thus, in 2004, the Baltic Sea more or less became a kind of de facto 'EU lake', despite the presence of Russian territories on its shores. The 2008 Georgia war and especially the 2014 Ukraine crisis, as well as recent developments in Russian foreign policy, raised questions about the degree to which Russia still poses a traditional 'hard security' threat to the Baltic Sea region. For countries having suffered from a 'difficult' past with Russia, the Russian variable is still seriously taken into account. Recent events have sharpened the rhetoric, evolving from 'not mentioning' the potential Russian threat to clearly denouncing it, as exemplified by Lithuania in the following three statements separated by a gap of ten years:

> Although Lithuania does not consider any foreign state its enemy and the probability of a military threat for Lithuania is insignificant, [. . .] the mid-term and long-term probability of danger of provocation, demonstration of force and threat to use force against Lithuania remains valid. (Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, 2004: 2.3)

> We cannot start guessing how an irritated, angry and unhappy neighbour will react but it's absolutely clear that the problems have not been resolved so far as there are only responses from both sides. In fact we are practically on the verge of a Cold War. (Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, quoted in the Lithuanian Tribune, 2014)

> It is the fact that Russia is in a war state against Ukraine. That means it is in a state of war against a country which would like to be closely integrated with the EU. Practically Russia is in a state of war against Europe. (Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, quoted in ITV, 2014)

Russia's 'neo-Soviet imperialism' in its 'near abroad' will remain a source of concern for the Baltic Sea region's stability, while from a Russian perspective, the geopolitical upheavals which occurred in the region for the past 20 years are seen as impacting on its core security interests, such as NATO air surveillance patrols above the three Baltic States, the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence assets in the region, or else the fate of Kaliningrad, which is now a Russian 'exclave' within the EU and NATO. On the other hand, Russia has an interest in cooperating with the other Baltic Sea region states, ranging from precise problems to be resolved by cooperation (such as the movement of people from and to Kaliningrad) to more global challenges such as transnational criminality. That said, many threats affecting the Baltic Sea region originate in, or are related to, Russia, such as transnational criminality, environmental degradations, nuclear wastes, and the status of Russian minorities abroad.

While the Baltic Sea remained a kind of 'no-man's land on the periphery of the main axis of confrontation' during the Cold War (Hyde-Price, 2000: 2), it constituted and continues to be one of the main strategic approaches to Russia, and even to one of the most important parts of the Russian territory in demographic, economic, and military terms. Moreover, the only Russian Navy all-year ice-free naval facilities (apart from Sebastopol) are located there (in the so-called 'exclave' of Kaliningrad). Thus, the Baltic Sea region remains an important theatre in Russian geostrategic thought and it is commonly argued that this strategic importance will certainly not vary in the foreseeable future (Rotfeld, 2005: 35; Vitkus, 2002: 10). Who controls the Baltic Sea and for what purposes matters for the defence of the Russian territory. In addition, due to the Kaliningrad *oblast'* geographical location (separated from Russia by NATO countries), the Baltic Sea is the only route to reach the *oblast'* for the Russian military forces without entering NATO territory or airspace. Consequently, the Baltic Sea Fleet constitutes an important asset for Russia, which tries to stay a major Baltic naval power. But in reality, today's Baltic Sea Fleet is only a shadow of its glorious Soviet ancestor. It mainly consists of two *Kilo*-class and one *Lada*-class diesel-electric attack submarines, two destroyers, five frigates, eleven patrol and coastal combatants, four medium amphibious ships, and various small crafts and support ships (IISS, 2014: 187). It is outclassed by NATO members' navies, and this balance will certainly not change in the foreseeable future, as even if Russia manages to increase the number of modern ships in the Baltic Sea Fleet (e.g. further new-generation *Lada*-class diesel submarines), it will remain difficult to reach the degree of operability,

the quality of platforms and systems, and sailors' aptitude achieved by competing regional navies.

Other littoral states are NATO members except for Finland and Sweden. They all consider that cooperation is the best way to cope with potential naval threats (not only within the Baltic Sea region but also 'out-of-area'). The traditional NATO countries have helped strengthen the new Baltic Sea members' navies, acting as supporting states during bilateral or multilateral manoeuvres, transferring and even donating decommissioned ships to the Baltic States. Moreover, NATO carries out large-scale multilateral naval exercises in the Baltic Sea every year. The Russian Navy used to take part in most of those exercises until recent events put a stop to NATO–Russia cooperation. Following the Ukraine crisis, NATO sent more ships to the Baltic Sea as a form of reassurance to its Baltic members and in a bid to increase Western naval presence in the region. It is also worth noting that littoral countries with small navies (such as Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Sweden) have participated in NATO and/or EU naval operations far away from the Baltic Sea. It is a way for them to practice naval multilateralism with more powerful and/or experienced NATO partners as well as to acquire operational and procedural experience. The three Baltic States' navies have specialised in MCM operations so they can serve within NATO or EU-led operations in that specific field. It is a very valuable initiative, as the majority of Western European navies lack capabilities in that field, which have traditionally been considered as 'less noble' by many naval authorities and practitioners. The Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) was created in 1998 in order to improve naval cooperation between the Baltic States, notably in the domain of MCM. Along with the cost sharing benefits that it induces, this multilateral structure has the advantage of enhancing the framework for cooperation with NATO and of facilitating the integration to the Alliance's exercises. Baltic States, however, lack territorial water defence capabilities and thus will have to rely on NATO in case of an attack. Early warning and political reassurance is thus crucial.

Moving on to non-military threats, as for the Black Sea, transnational criminality and environmental issues have increased within the Baltic Sea in the post-Cold War era, or at least have been more extensively taken into consideration by states and the civil society. The proximity of Russia, as well as other 'still in transition' states, such as Belarus and Ukraine, makes the Baltic Sea region particularly exposed. Actually, problems such as transnational criminality or illegal immigrations (partly) originate in Russia. The Baltic Sea region countries represent an entryway to the EU as well as to the Schengen space, especially for smugglers

and illegal migrants. As such, the Baltic Sea itself needs to be monitored and policed. The first step involves the elaboration of common rules, norms, and procedures. Thus, the states can either act multilaterally or on their own, but always with a regional objective, as it is impossible to cope with transnational issues at sea following purely national strategies. At the political and normative levels, regional organisations play a crucial role, notably the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the EU, and NATO. Then, it is the role of the police or armed forces, and notably the naval forces, to monitor the sea and repel or deal with illegal activities.

As in the other EU maritime margins, policing the Baltic Sea requires a great amount of coordination and cooperation. Firstly, at the national level, many different services and agencies (navy, coastguard, police, and custom department) must act in coordination. Germany and Sweden operate efficient coastguard units that are specialised in these tasks, while in post-communist countries such as the Baltic States, navies perform the majority of the constabulary tasks, since the financial resources are limited and the creation of two paired institutions would be too costly. Secondly, cooperation takes place at the international level, within NATO (exercises, naval presence) and the EU frameworks (FRONTEX joint operations). Since all Baltic Sea countries are EU members (except Russia), cooperative and integrated responses are somewhat facilitated.

Regarding the marine environment, the main challenge in the Baltic Sea is not directly related to maritime activities, but concerns the excess of chemical pollutants, such as nutrients (which engender the phenomenon of eutrophication, responsible for the spreading of green and red algae, some being toxic to humans). Indeed, these problems originate in human activities, such as agriculture and heavy industries. The problem of chemical pollution is particularly acute for the Baltic Sea, as it is an almost closed sea, with relatively shallow water, with low water exchange, and slow biodegradation of pollutants due to the low water temperatures (WWF, 2005: 9). Environmental concerns were taken into consideration back in the 20th century; Environmental security was then a leading factor in the regionalisation of the Baltic Sea area, even before the end of the Cold War (Rotfeld, 2005: 39–40). Indeed, already in 1974, the littoral states signed the Baltic Marine Environmental Protection Convention and created the Helsinki Commission (Helcom) to deal with marine environment protection in the region. Whereas during the Cold War the difficulty to achieve tangible results was due to the Soviet reluctance and policy of secrecy, in the post-Cold War era the main problem is now financial. Due to its economic situation and

its large territory, Russia has experienced difficulties in making the necessary infrastructure improvements. European financial assistance has thus been of great importance up until now.

When it comes to maritime safety, the number of accidents has increased in the past decade: Helcom reported an average of more than a hundred maritime accidents per year since 2003 and almost ten cases of pollution a year (Helcom, 2013: 7), mainly due to the intensification of traffic. Serious environmental problems could occur if these accidents involved oil tankers. Then, in 2004, the IMO gave the Baltic Sea the status of 'particularly sensitive area', but this is not extended to the Russian territorial waters, because Russia refuses this special status. This rejection is certainly due to the Russian fear that under this status it will be easier to implement restrictive rules to oil transportation, while Russia does not implement the same environmental safety standards for shipping and drilling oil in the Baltic Sea than the EU. On their side, Baltic and Nordic countries have a strong interest in cooperating, especially within the EU legal framework. That said, the EU members' practice also needs to improve as, for example, a joint commission of Russian and Lithuanian experts has established violations at two oil terminals in Lithuania where wastes from tankers were not accepted, or only at a special fee; according to the commission, 'such practice violates the Baltic Sea Environmental Protection Convention and may cause tanker crews to spill ballast water into the sea' (BBC, 2006). Illegal oil discharges represent another related problem. But according to Helcom, the number of illegal oil discharges in the Baltic Sea has gradually decreased due to the intensification of air surveillance flights that represent very dissuasive measures (Helcom, 2005). This illustrates the necessity to cooperate, as some isolated countries are unable to provide complete air coverage and maritime surveillance of the entire Baltic Sea. The building of the Nord Stream gas pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany also raised concerns; environmentalists considered that the pipeline could interact with Second World War-era sea-dumped chemical weapons and subsequently create very hazardous environmental degradations.

The Baltic Sea (which constitutes the geographical link between all its littoral states) represents a security nexus, gathering almost all the previous antagonists together against traditional and new threats affecting the maritime space they share. With the exception of Russia, they are all cooperating to secure the Baltic Sea (against transnational threats), to protect the Baltic Sea (against environmental degradations), or using the sea as a means to project security outside the region (naval forces projection).

Recent events in Ukraine have impacted military/naval cooperation and the Baltic Sea seems farther away from being an 'EU lake', but cooperation in the other fields is likely to continue, since maritime security and safety represents a common interest for all the littoral states.

The Arctic margin

The Arctic Ocean, as defined by the International Hydrographic Organization, only consists in the circular portion of waters around the geographical North Pole and does not encompass the surrounding seas, such as the Barents, the Kara, and the Beaufort seas (International Hydrographic Organization, 1953: 11–21). However, the term 'Arctic Ocean' has been accepted to describe all the waters of the North Polar Region, that is, above the North Polar Circle. Thus, the EU Arctic margin does not only relate to the Arctic Ocean per se but also to the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Greenland Sea, that is to say, the portion of waters surrounding Northern Europe's coasts. Actually, the only European states which have direct access to the Arctic waters are Iceland, Denmark (through Greenland), and especially Norway, which is a member of NATO, a member of the EEA and part of the Schengen space but not a proper member of the EU.

The importance of the Arctic maritime margin in terms of security comes from many different factors, ranging from military to environmental issues. Actually, in the Arctic region perhaps more than elsewhere all the various security issues are deeply interdependent and interrelated, as one issue impacts another, and the solving of one problem depends on the solving (or non-solving) of another. It is, nevertheless, possible to broadly divide the Arctic margin's security issues between an 'old-style' Cold War inherited hard security dimension and a more recent economic, energy, and environmental dimension of security, which results from the significant presence of natural resources (petroleum and fish) in the region, requiring sustainable management and engendering tensions concerning sovereignty rights. The nuclear submarines, facilities, and wastes from the Soviet-era also create environmental concerns. Moreover, energy security and fisheries protection are linked to both the environmental dimension (avoiding pollution engendered by petroleum activities, regulating fishing activities) and the hard security dimension (delimiting zones of sovereignty over natural resources, securing maritime communications). In this very sense, the environmental dimension is strongly linked to the traditional dimension of security in the Arctic.

During the Cold War era, the Arctic region was highly militarised or, in other words, was essentially seen within the prism of the East–West confrontation. During the 1950s, when nuclear deterrence was mainly assured by strategic bombers, the Arctic vacuum was the direct route from one superpower's territory to the other. Then, since the 1960s, with the growing importance of strategic submarines, the Arctic abyss became both a sanctuary and an outpost for the SSBNs. Moreover, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea were an entryway to Soviet waters (and a gateway to the open seas for the Soviet Northern fleet, including its important submarine forces), and thus were sometimes regarded as the place where, in case of war, Mahan's decisive battle should take place, a strategy which especially developed during the Reagan era (Grove, 1990: 210–212; Hattendorf and King, 2004: 56–57).

After the end of the Cold War, the tensions logically decreased and the risk of a total global and nuclear war with Russia is now far less conceivable, although the recent events in Ukraine have raised old, almost forgotten, ghosts of the past (e.g. NATO, 2014). As both the Russian and the US defence strategies continue to rely upon a strong submarine-based nuclear deterrence, they still deal with the Arctic from a military perspective, and thus the hard security dimension of the region is still important today and the nuclear factor is still significant. The post-1991 breakdown of the Russian nuclear forces has been widely acknowledged and discussed, especially its environmental effects. However, Russia never renounced its ultimate attribute of power, that is, seaborne nuclear deterrence, although intelligence reports that its submarines hardly ever leave their bases, at least not on a regular, and thus operational, basis (Kristensen and Norris, 2013: 76). That said, the strategic importance of the Arctic is not neglected by Russia; in 2013 the brand new and long-awaited *Borey*-class SSBN (carrying new SS-N-30 *Bulava* missiles, a naval version of the *Topol*-M/SS-27) was delivered to the Northern Fleet.

Besides, since the mid-2000s there has been a major increase of Russian air and submarine activities in the region, including flights nearer to the Norwegian airspace. Actually, since the second mandate of President Putin, thanks to an improving financial situation, a more self-confident Russia has sought to act as an independent great power (Trenin, 2006). It means that Russia wants to maintain and use all the attributes and leverages of power, including maritime or at least naval power. Consequently, this grants the Arctic region (which is an important approach to Russia) with a certain strategic importance. Indeed, due to the enlargement of NATO, the Russian Navy's access to the global maritime domain is restricted in a way that has not been the case

since the 18th century (Palosaari and Moller, 2004: 265; Sawhill and Jorgensen, 2001: 87). Thus, compared to the enclosed Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Sea of Japan, the northern waters provide the Russian Navy with more liberty, which will only increase with the current and foreseeable melting of the polar ice cap.

On the 'other shore' of the Arctic Ocean, the US continues to regard the region as a key strategic zone. Apart from the already mentioned strategic submarines factor, the US considers the region as strategically valuable in the context of their missile defence programme. For example, following diplomatic negotiations, the Thule radar located in Greenland (Denmark) is being upgraded to contribute to the US early warning missile defence network (Department of Defense, 2011: 15). Besides, despite Norway's ambiguous official position, the contribution of the Vardø radar to the US ABM system remains a possibility (Nilsen, 2013). NATO post-Cold War involvement and activities in the Arctic region logically decreased. Indeed, as Russia was not perceived to be as great a direct threat as before, and due to the post-Cold War strategic orientations of the Atlantic Organization towards its Southern flank, NATO officials admit that, although the Organization 'takes the High North seriously [. . .], there is not enough happening in the North for NATO to send [too many] resources to the region' (BarentsObserver.com, 2007a). This position raises concerns in Norway, which fears that NATO's strategic focus on regions other than the north of Europe may end up with Norway having to be in charge in case of growing tensions with Russia in the High North, although this may change following the 2014 Wales Summit. The security dimension of the Arctic region is far more crucial for Norway than for NATO. Indeed, purely geopolitical considerations show that the proximity of the High North makes it appear as more important for Norway from a security perspective than for the great majority of NATO members. The High North may actually well be the most important security challenge faced by Norway:

> We note that the Russian defence budget is growing. We know that North-West Russia still is an area of strategic importance and that Russia maintains a considerable military presence in this region. We have observed that Russian strategic bombers are back outside our coastline and other places. [Thus] the Norwegian Armed Forces' presence in the North, the Coast Guard included, will be maintained at a high level. The purpose is to secure sovereignty and exercise authority, as well as effective crisis management [. . .] A coastal state that takes its responsibilities seriously must vigilantly carry out inspection and

> other control activities appropriately in [its] jurisdiction zones. This requires a 24/7 presence in the maritime areas. (Strøm-Erichsen, 2007)

Norway's rhetoric about the importance of the High North in terms of security translates into concrete policies, especially naval deployments, namely, patrolling Norwegian waters and neighbouring areas in order to monitor (Russian) military activities (for intelligence and deterrence purposes), fishing activities, and maritime traffic. In fact, it seems that for Norway, operational naval activities should not concentrate too much on external peace operations, but also be directed against the potential threats at the immediate Northern frontier area. Five new state-of-the-art *Nansen*-class frigates (5,100 tons) have been commissioned between 2006 and 2011. Although they have participated in multilateral operations (such as Atalanta in 2009, and an escort mission during the shipping of Syrian chemical weapons to Cyprus in 2014), the Arctic region seems to remain their principal operating area. Furthermore, they have important antisubmarine capabilities, which illustrates that the Russian submarine threat is still highly taken into consideration by the Norwegian navy. Besides, in response to non-military threats in the Arctic margin, Norway has also commissioned a 6,500 tons coastguards patrol boats *Svalbard*, which is ocean-going and has icebreaking capabilities.

Apart from the mostly military (and Cold War inherited) issues discussed above, security in the High North will more and more be related to energy, which is likely to be the main factor explaining the growing strategic importance of the region. Even if Russian and Norwegian offshore exploitations are relatively recent, the simple discovery that the Arctic seabed conceals about 25% of the world's remaining petroleum resources transformed the region into a top-of-the-agenda strategic area. Arctic Powers, as well as many non-Arctic states (and the EU), realised the core importance of the region's energy dimension.

The Arctic margin is still considered through the prism of 'high security' and the energy issues will certainly not reduce this trend. Indeed, the delimitation of sovereignty over the Arctic waters is not totally settled today (Du Castel, 2005: 7–10), which highlights that the High North can be described as a traditional frontier (in Frederick Jackson Turner's meaning). The growing importance of the energy question, coupled with fishing and maritime transport issues (boosted by the melting of the ice cap), is currently transforming the 'frozen' issue of legal delimitations into a central one. One of the most important sovereignty issues concerns the delimitation of the very Arctic Ocean zone (around the North Pole) between all the surrounding states, namely,

Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US. To delimitate the EEZs in the Arctic, two methods are proposed: the delimitation by the median line method advocated by Canada, Denmark, and the UN (the sea would be divided into areas proportional to the amount of coastline a country has) and the sector method proposed by Norway and Russia (the sea would be divided along lines of longitude with the North Pole as the centre). As to the central portion of the Arctic Ocean, Russia claims rights alleging a continental shelf, which, according to the UNCLOS, gives economic rights over the resources, while other countries see it as part of the high seas (Krauss et al., 2005). Since 2007, Russia is much more active in claiming its rights in this zone. Moscow notably sent an expedition in August 2007 in order to collect evidence of its continental shelf theory and took this opportunity to plant the Russian flag on the seabed under the North Pole (Yenikeyeff and Krysiek, 2007). The EEZs around Spitsbergen are claimed by Norway (under the UNCLOS principles), but according to many other states it is contradictory to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty between Norway, the United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas dominions, and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen, which allows all nations to access Spitsbergen territory, waters, and resources. 'The situation remains calm but unresolved [. . .] Other nations comply with Norwegian fishing rules without, however, recognising Norwegian claims [. . .] Norway has not licensed any gas or oil exploration, and no country has shown any intention of [doing so]' (Assembly of the WEU, 2007a: 15). Apart from these two main issues, there are various other small disputes, even between NATO members, such as between Norway and Iceland (concerning fishing in the Norwegian Sea) or between Norway and Denmark (concerning the EEZ around the remote Jan Mayen islets near Greenland). All these disputes are currently kept at a reasonable minimum, although this may well change in the foreseeable future, all the more since the sovereignty questions are often linked to the environmental and energy dimension of Arctic security. In 2010 the longlasting dispute between Norway and Russia regarding sovereignty and economic rights in a large area of the Barents Sea was eventually solved. Indeed, the two countries made a compromise in the form of a roughly median line of demarcation negotiated bilaterally. This opened up prospects for oil and gas exploitation, which will be profitable for the two parties. This shows how economic incentives (including from the perspective of Norwegian and Russian petroleum companies foreseeing benefits in cooperation) may eventually contribute to a peaceful resolution of sovereignty disputes even between a Western country and Russia.

Due to its particularities (i.e. less salty and very cold waters) the Arctic Ocean ecosystem is highly vulnerable. There are two main challenges to the Arctic marine environment: firstly, water pollution, resulting from oil and gas exploration, drilling, and transportation, from shipping or from nuclear wastes; and, secondly, overfishing activities, which call for a sustainable conservation scheme and are linked to the problem of jurisdictional delimitations. Furthermore, climate change strongly impacts the High North, as shown by European and UN experts (EEA and UNEP, 2004). All these aspects are security related, not only since environment protection is now considered as a security issue, but also since they create new sources of tensions between states. Firstly, in the Arctic, 'environmental issues [. . .] often have a particularly strong link to military security. Many of the environmental threats in the Arctic were caused by military infrastructure and activities' (Palosaari and Moller, 2004: 256). Indeed, decommissioned Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, unsecured stockpiles, and diverse radioactive wastes all represent existent and potential sources of marine pollution. Until 1993, the Soviet/Russian nuclear wastes were often simply dumped into the sea, officially in designated places, but concretely everywhere and without records (Huchthausen, 2003: 1). However, as Arild Moe and Peter J. Schei point out, 'the nuclear issues pose a potential threat, not a large, current environmental problem. Radioactive contamination of the ocean is very low' (2005: 9). Even if this issue is currently not crucial in terms of environmental security, it has seriously been taken into consideration by the Western governments. Now, as it is linked to Russian core military interests, it has a high value in terms of traditional security, not least from a symbolic perspective. Beyond the threat Russian nuclear wastes may represent for the marine environment, 'there is also a danger that nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists' (Rieker, 2005: 3). In the current international context, this potentiality is non-surprisingly well taken into account, at least in rhetoric (e.g. Petersen, 2005: 4).

Secondly, as the ecosystem is already extremely vulnerable, 'the consequences of climate change [especially the melting of the polar cap . . .] are probably more dramatic and more visible in the Arctic than anywhere else on the planet' (Assembly of the WEU, 2007a: 4). The melting of the ice cap is occurring much more rapidly than expected. Thus, the consequences of climate change in the Arctic are considered as an important problem by governments, although any serious measures to deal with climate change cannot be restricted to the Arctic countries but shall obviously concern the overall green gas emissions. However,

despite this consideration and if we look further than the general political statements, the top priorities of the governments are still military, energy, and economic issues. For example, in a 2007 speech, the Norwegian Defence Minister, after having described the critical situation of the Arctic climate and its consequences on the fauna and peoples, rapidly turned to more 'substantial' consequences:

> Here in the High North global warming may open up potential natural resources that until now have been inaccessible. New sea lines will shorten long distance routes considerably. [. . .] Exciting opportunities will present themselves. Yet, competition and potential conflicts may be lurking in a future that suddenly is not so distant any longer. (Strøm-Erichsen, 2007)

This seems rather logical; the melting of the polar ice cap will make the Northern Sea Route (along Russia's northern coast) and the Northwest Passage (across Canada's northern islands) valuable for trade between the Atlantic and the Pacific in the coming decades (engendering a significant reduction of the length of the route compared to the Suez–Malacca or the Panama routes). Moreover, the freeing of large portions of sea will allow exploitation of resources (petroleum and fish) far away into the Arctic Ocean. Thus, the melting of the polar ice cap will open up new transportation routes as well as create new opportunities to exploit natural resources; this may in turn engender a militarisation of the Arctic.

Indeed, the development of new shipping lanes and the exploitation of resources in new areas can potentially engender tensions, concerning the delimitation of zones, the transit of ships, or the protection of the environment. Regarding the jurisdictional aspect, as mentioned above, the sharing out of the majority of the Arctic Ocean is currently not legally settled. By far, this could create conflicts over resources. Actually, it is already the case concerning fishing activities. For example, Russian and Norwegian coastguards often divert and detain each other's trawlers suspected of illegal fishing. This is especially true for the Russians fishermen, who, according to Norway, exceeded their quota of 207,700 tons of cod by 77,300 tons in 2006; even this was less than what Norway expected (BarentsObserver.com, 2007b). Now, the tensions between Russian trawlers and Norwegian coastguards are particularly important near Spitsbergen, due to the unsettled legal status of the waters around it. On a similar note, current and future oil and gas exploration, drilling, and transportation also create (or could create) pollution in the Arctic.

In the Arctic region, the end of the Cold War opened the door to new processes of international, regional, or transregional cooperation. Thus, numerous initiatives fostering soft security and non-security-related cooperation have developed in the region: the Arctic Environmental protection Strategy (1991), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (1993), the Arctic Council (1996), the CBSS (1992; which is also related to the Arctic region), the EU Northern Dimension (1997), the pre-1991 Nordic Council, and the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (1996). As these forums were created in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union (except the Nordic Council), their aim was to provide forums outside the security arena, in order to foster cooperation in non-military fields (such as environment protection, indigenous peoples). Thus, except for the nuclear wastes issue, these institutions have not been mandated to deal with military and defence issues, although they constitute valuable platforms for soft security talks and cooperation (Assembly of the WEU, 2007a: 16).

Among these regional initiatives, the EU Northern Dimension, launched in 1997, had very ambitious objectives (boosting cooperation in the region and especially with Russia on pollution, nuclear risks, and international criminality). But due to the lack of political interest within the EU (even if Norway is part of the EEA and the Schengen space, it is not a full member), the lack of a real budget, and the little interest shown by Russia, the Northern Dimension did not achieve very significant goals, especially in the Arctic (Rieker, 2005: 4–7). This led some experts to envisage that the Arctic region will not become significant on the EU's agenda (Palosaari and Moller, 2004: 274). It is true that the Northern Dimension is not the most proactive EU initiative, that the recent enlargements of the EU gave importance to its southern frontiers, and that the specific Arctic hard security dimension concerns individual states and NATO rather than the EU. However, the developments discussed above (mainly the access to new sea routes and resources due to the melting of the polar ice cap) have changed the stakes, generating incentives to take the Arctic margin into account, and notably the growing energy security concerns.

Energy security, or in other words, securing sources and supply (including the delivery) of petroleum resources (oil and gas), is considered as more and more important by the EU and this trend will only grow in the future:

> Energy is essential for Europe to function. But the days of cheap energy for Europe seem to be over. The challenges of climate change,

> increasing import dependence and higher energy prices are faced by all EU members. [. . .] Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on imported hydrocarbons. With 'business as usual' the EU's energy import dependence will jump from 50% of total EU energy consumption today to 65% in 2030. Reliance on imports of gas is expected to increase from 57% to 84% by 2030, of oil from 82% to 93%. (Commission, 2007a: 13–14)

Securing energy has not only an economic and an environmental dimension, but also a strong political, diplomatic, and, as it sounds, security, dimension. Indeed, competition for petroleum will increase, and the majority of the reserves are located in unstable (or at least non-democratic) countries and regions. It means that securing energy could require proactive policies, or even the use of force. In all cases it will become increasingly challenging. This highlights the core importance of the seas that not only conceal energy resources but also serve to transport them to Europe (Commission, 2007d: 2). Thus, the Arctic could become a valuable solution to the EU's energy problem. Indeed, its oil and gas fields are located closer to the EU than any other, and not (currently) in a particularly turbulent region, although the situation may change due to the current developments, including potential conflicts over sovereignty and economic rights. Security and stability in the Arctic margin is thus crucial for the EU and has been recognised as such by the Council (Council, 2014b). Concerning the protection of the sea, the IMP puts an important emphasis on the protection of environment in general and on sustainable fishing activities in particular (Commission, 2007c: 10). Thus the Arctic region is also important for the EU as a significant place for the European fishing industry and as a region where climate change could be very dramatic and directly impact the EU's territory.

The Arctic Ocean and neighbouring seas do not constitute an EU margin in the same sense as the Mediterranean. Firstly, concerning hard security, the Arctic margin is still a traditional theatre. Although today's situation cannot be compared with the Cold War level of tensions, the action/reaction principle still guides US/NATO–Russia relationships in the High North. For example, the Russian Navy's large exercises in the Barents Sea are usually immediately followed by an increase in NATO surveillance activities or presence in the region. Consequently, the EU's activities and leverage in the Arctic frontier are limited, but the region is, nevertheless, still important in terms of traditional military security. The hard security importance of the Arctic margin will depend on Russia's behaviour in the future. Besides, energy security issues also

articulate around more classical security dynamics. Moreover, the problems of sovereignty also illustrate the basic character of frontier of the Arctic region. Secondly, transnational threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration, or international criminality do not impact the Arctic maritime margin directly, although the poor management of post-Soviet nuclear wastes and illegal fishing activities might be linked to the Russian criminal networks or bad governance practices. There also exist extremely limited cases of illegal immigration (human smuggling) via Russia to the Nordic countries. But the fact that struggling against terrorism or criminals at sea is not crucial in the Arctic does not mean that the Arctic frontier is not conceived as an object to secure, as, for example, with energy security. Thirdly, the purely environmental dimension of security, the sea as an object to protect, is more important in the Arctic margin than in any other EU maritime frontier, at least relatively to the importance of other security aspects.

The 'global frontier'

In the 21st century, maritime security threats are mostly transnational; criminal actors such as arms, drug, and people smugglers, terrorists, pirates, illegal fishermen, as well as illegal migrants cross boundaries and operate (to their advantage) under various jurisdictions. On the other hand, states also bypass traditional boundaries to intervene 'out-of-area' or, in other words, to project security where they deem necessary. This has resulted in the rebirth of the old notion of frontier, and especially the one of maritime frontier, since interventions, stabilisation operations, and other (often day-to-day) maritime security activities regularly take place beyond national and/or European waters. Indeed, the maritime domain is vast and unbound, and states' maritime security interests extend much beyond their territorial waters. Consequently, the EU's maritime margins, namely, the wider Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic Ocean, are crucial in maritime security terms. The analysis of these four case studies revealed differences among the European maritime margins. The wider Mediterranean is the most turbulent area and is thus subject to various maritime security and naval activities, not all under the EU auspices. The Baltic Sea has almost become an 'EU lake', but the Russian factor should not be underestimated. The Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean are growingly important, with the latter reaching the top of the agenda. Depending on the margin, projecting security, securing the sea, or protecting the sea does not have the same importance.

However, beyond the EU's maritime margins, the sea constitutes a 'global frontier'. Indeed, the world is globalised, the threats are transnational, and the maritime domain is by nature an undivided and undividable space frequently referred to as the 'global commons'. States' and the EU's global and maritime security interests tend to merge. That is to say that policing the 'global commons' and securing the 'freedom of the seas' are both global in reach and in scope; securing one's interests requires projecting security all over the oceans as well as securing and protecting the seas, which illustrates the link between power politics, liberal principles, and (according to critical scholars) hegemonic aspirations (cf. chapter 1).

Beyond its maritime margins, the EU's geopolitics tends to follow global sea lines of communications. The main ones include the Euro-Atlantic SLOCs, which are currently under no major threats (although the growing tensions with Russia might eventually end up in a resurgence of the old Soviet strategy consisting in denying the command of the Atlantic SLOCs by maintaining a substantial submarine presence there), and the Europe–Suez–Malacca–Pacific Asia one, which has recently received much attention, not least due to the increasing Chinese naval and geopolitical ambitions. As of today, the EU has been active east of Suez with counter-piracy operation Atalanta and maritime capacity-building operation Nestor at the Horn of Africa (which one can consider as being part of the wider Mediterranean). Developing a geostrategy from Suez to Malacca and beyond has been advocated by some commentators for the past five years (e.g. Rogers, 2009a). The 2014 EU MSS provides the EU with a clear vision as well as a framework for elaborating naval policies that take into account the necessity to secure the global SLOCs. This may not end up in CSDP military operations east of Malacca. However, the Commission has stressed the need to enhance the EU's visual presence, or visibility, in the global maritime domain. This could take the form of confidence-building operations and exercises with third countries, perhaps 'EU-flagged' (Commission and High Representative, 2014: 7).

One region which has attracted the EU's attention is the Gulf of Guinea, for which the Council adopted a strategy in March 2014. This strategy highlights the various regional threats, including IUUF, illicit dumping of waste, piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking of human beings, narcotics, arms, and counterfeit goods, smuggling of migrants, as well as oil theft (Council, 2014a: 2). In other words, the EU has acknowledged the need to be more active in the Gulf of Guinea due to maritime security threats. This is a remarkable example of how maritime security

issues, even very distant from home, can engender and justify the need to take into consideration distant regions. In practice, the EU is committed to 'identify geographic and thematic priority zones to focus the EU response, including in cooperation with other international actors' (9) and to help 'states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the rule of law and effective governance across the region, including improvements in maritime administration and law enforcement through multiagency cooperation by police, navy, military, coastguard, customs and immigration services' (3). In 2013, the Union launched the Critical Maritime Routes programme (CRIMGO) 'to reinforce regional and international initiatives against piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea' (7). As in the case of the Gulf of Guinea strategy, the *Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa* (Council, 2011) and the Council conclusions on developing a *European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region* (Council, 2014b) recognise the importance of the maritime domain when elaborating strategic objectives. This perfectly illustrates the globalisation of the EU's maritime geopolitics.

As discussed in previous chapters, illegal activities also take place in European waters. As to IUUF, the majority of the violations occur in member states' remote EEZs located overseas, due to their remoteness from the centres of power and the (relative) weakness of police forces there. For example, EEZs off the French TAAF (Terres Australes et Antarctiques Françaises) and the Clipperton Atoll are a frequent target for illegal fishers. More than fisheries protection that rather concerns member states, counter-narcotics operations illustrates the importance of a global understanding of the maritime frontier. Indeed, whereas the goal of these operations is to limit drug supply to Europe, they can take place far away from Europe. For example, one entryway for cocaine is the Caribbean, which is located near to the South American 'producers'. The smugglers have understood that the Caribbean were a valuable means to enter European territory, much easier than using the US route. Thus, the British, the Dutch, and the French have to police these remote waters in order to reduce drug supply to the very European continent. Since 2001, controls are more frequent, more systematic, the means are more important, and the cooperation between Europeans and with the US has increased. Since then, the seizures have sometime been high (several tons a year).

Naval diplomacy is also, by nature, global. For example, sanctions imposed on some countries (such as arms embargo) need to be applied at the planet level. For example, in order to sanction the 2006 North Korean nuclear test, the UN Security Council subsequently adopted in

October 2006 a resolution imposing an embargo on weapons and connected material (which can contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles). This resolution invites states to inspect ships coming from or going to North Korea. Thus, European navies are encouraged to control the cargo of potentially contravening ships, and eventually stop them. This happens far away from Europe, such as, for example, when the French navy inspected a suspected ship off Mayotte (DefenceTalk, 2006). This illustrates that on the sea legal borders (such as North Korea's territorial waters) do not matter the same as on land; there are no such things as border posts, fences, walls, and so on. Maritime surveillance takes place at the planet level, naval forces of like-minded (and less like-minded) states share (some) data and responsibilities when it comes to policing the 'global commons', of which no single country (even the US) can successfully be in charge. Cooperation, although crucial, is not easily achieved due to political obstacles, or simply because states' security interests and priorities greatly vary. For example, it may not be in the interest of every coastal state to devote resources to fisheries protection or counter-narcotics or simply to cooperate with the Europeans. The same applies when it comes to enforcing UN sanctions. Nevertheless, for those interested in promoting good governance at sea, enforcing internationally agreed regulations and laws as well as tacking the threats as soon as they materialise, the sea is more and more understood as an unterritorialised space and hence a 'global frontier'.



Figure 10.1 The EU and the 'global maritime frontier'

Notes: Lines: SLOCs relevant to the EU; Ellipses: Maritime areas of interest to the EU; 6-Point Diamonds: CSDP operations (as of 2014); 4-Point Stars: Location of FRONTEX operations

Figure 10.1 illustrates the EU's involvement in, and the informal vision of, the 'global maritime frontier'. First of all, the 2014 MSS has stressed the importance of securing the freedom of the seas along the SLOCs relevant to the EU's economy, that is to say, those connecting Europe to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Secondly, the EU has developed targeted strategies or policies for specific regions located beyond or at the edge of its maritime margins, which have a strong maritime dimension, in particular the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa, and the Arctic region. Thirdly, the EU is active at sea, within and beyond its maritime margins, in the framework of the CSDP with naval (counter-piracy) and maritime capacity-building operations, as well as via FRONTEX agency-coordinated patrols (counter-immigration). This spatial dimension of the EU's maritime policies is likely to shape the future development of the Union's seapower.

Conclusion

The Future of the EU's Seapower: Cruising the Seven Seas?

The link between maritime trade, economic growth, and seapower (including naval power) has been well documented at least since the writings of Mahan. There are obvious economic reasons explaining the EU's move to develop seapower capabilities and to take the maritime domain into consideration when developing foreign and security policies. The Blue Growth strategy represents the cornerstone of the EU's seapower. Without security in the maritime domain, the prospect for economic growth is limited, since investors are looking for certainties, and also concretely because activities such as shipping of goods, fishing, and offshore oil and gas exploitation require a safe and secure environment, comparable to the stability encountered on land. Combating transnational criminal activities at sea also has a strong economic rationale; indeed, preventing the smuggling of counterfeits goods, avoiding the costs engendered by piracy, as well as limiting IUUF and marine environment degradations ultimately contribute to sustaining the EU's economic growth. Unsurprisingly, the Blue Growth discourse has become dominant across the EU's institutions, especially within the framework of the IMP.

In parallel to this trend, the securitisation of non-military threats that has occurred throughout Europe in the post-Cold War era and the importance given to the projection of security has influenced the EU's policies, especially from 2003 and the release of the ESS. In the maritime domain, this has translated into various dedicated policies and activities, ranging from counter-piracy and counter-immigration operations far away from the EU's coasts to strengthening and implementing port security norms in Europe. The 2014 MSS offers a framework for further integrating maritime security activities, increasing the EU's competencies, and harmonising member states' activities. Maritime surveillance

is a crucial field, since maritime security mainly rests on agencies and member states sharing information so as to benefit from global maritime domain awareness. The CISE initiative is an important opportunity that the EU and member states have the possibility to transform into concrete achievements in regard to maritime security.

In its quest to secure the maritime domain, especially in its periphery, the EU applies its normative or transformative power at or from the sea. The EU's norms and regulations in the field of maritime safety and security, fisheries protection, and marine environment protection are projected beyond the EU's territorial waters. Maritime capacity-building operations and counter-immigration cooperation with third countries also end up in the diffusion and endorsement of the EU's standards, norms, and behaviours. Policing the 'global commons' and securing the maritime domain goes along with transforming distant spaces into EU-like areas, but the relationship is supposed to be reciprocal, based on the principle that a 'secure Europe' will lead to a 'better world'.

The EU's seapower is also linked to its geopolitical interests. Whereas controlling (or at least securing) its maritime margins is obviously in the EU's and member states' interest, seapower also grants the EU with means to promote its security and broader interests across the globe. The leverage of seapower contributes to the Union's place (or rank) on the world stage and the 2014 MSS unambiguously recognises the EU's interests, rights, duties, and responsibilities in the global maritime domain. The EU now has the options to concentrate on its maritime frontier or to also take part in the quest to secure the maritime domain and its main SLOCs in general and the EU's interests on the Seven Seas in particular.

In the maritime domain, the EU's action is limited in terms of means and reach while very ambitious on paper. This dichotomy is crystallised in member states' varying objectives and political will to grant the EU with the very means to fulfil its objectives. The MSS delineates the boundaries of what the EU can or shall do according to the member states. But what the EU will ultimately do and whether the MSS will be put into practice eventually depends on the member states' own evolving interests and on the evolution of the international context.

Chinese sovereignty claims over the Spartly, Paracel, and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, naval build-up (if not race) in Asia (including Australia, China, India, Japan, and Singapore to name but the most striking examples) or else Russian interests in annexing Crimea not least to gain full control over the Sebastopol naval base and to increase the room for manoeuvre of the Black Sea Fleet shall remind us that the 21st century is still a very 'realist' world in naval terms. However, the EU continues to

see the world and to conceive its external action mainly through a 'liberal' lens or, some would say, based on the 'civilising' duty and right the Union is supposed to bear. Since other actors tend to see the world (and growingly the maritime domain too) as a zero-sum game, the EU's cooperative and comprehensive approach to security is likely to be ignored, rejected, or even confronted by those states which do not share either the EU's good governance, rule of law, human rights, and democratic values or the EU's interests in the maritime domain.

The objective of this book was not to formulate policy recommendations as such; however, in light of the above discussion some basic guiding principles can, nevertheless, be highlighted. Firstly, in the context of the EU MSS member states should delineate a clear division of labour between the EU and NATO. This book has confirmed what others have already shown outside the maritime field: functionally, the EU has a comparative advantage in civilian and police operations (including coastguard capacity-building and counter-immigration operations) whereas NATO, due to its combat means and experience, will remain the dominant naval actor which will step forward in case the Europeans need to project military power at sea (beyond counter-piracy or low-intensity humanitarian operations). However, there is a grey zone where the EU may well be more suited than NATO due to the perception issues (image projection) discussed in chapter 7. For example, the EU may carry out embargo, evacuation, and other low-intensity naval operations in case of low-scale military engagements of Western Powers without suffering from NATO's reputation as a hegemonic tool. This book has also shown that the EU may well have a geopolitical comparative advantage when it comes to defending Western maritime interests 'out-of-area'. Indeed, although NATO rather than the EU has been active in the past two decades beyond its member states' territorial waters, due to the resurgence of Russia's ambitions on the European continent and around (Caucasus, Ukraine, Black Sea, Arctic Ocean), NATO will increasingly be needed in Europe, that is to say, the transatlantic organisation will not abandon its 'out-of-area' strategy, but perhaps focus mainly or at least more specifically on European defence, including SLOCs and maritime approaches (e.g. NATO, 2014). At the same time the EU may well have to take the lead when it comes to non-military or low-intensity operations in the global maritime domain, including east of Suez, leaving NATO to concentrate on its primary defence mission.

Secondly, the 2014 MSS represents a big opportunity for the EU and for its member states to fulfil great achievements in the maritime domain, especially in regard to maritime security. In 2015, the Union

will enter the implementation phase of the MSS. Words and intensions will be translated into policies and activities. This step is crucial and will determine the future of the EU's seapower. Due to the limited resources at its disposal, it is important to focus on some elements rather than to aim at becoming an all-out maritime or sea Power. The EU as an institution (and especially DG Maritime Affairs) shall not forget that the EU's power ultimately rests on member states' willingness to act and to spend financial and material resources. It is thus important to concentrate on activities that end up in concrete, quantifiable results and outcomes that member states, parliamentarians, and the public opinion in Europe can empathise with. As such, whereas counter-immigration at sea will certainly remain a top priority in the foreseeable future, it may be in the interest of the EU to also focus resources and attention on other issues. The implementation of the Blue Growth strategy, the IMP (including the environment-focused Marine Strategy), and the MSS should aim at integrating all the components of sustainable development and the security of the maritime domain. In other words, the EU could further strengthen the links between sustainable development and maritime security as shown in Figure C.1.

This would constitute a way to follow the IMP and MSS vision, to do something which is in line with the image the EU wants to project to its citizen and abroad of a 'benevolent' actor, as well as to develop an original approach to maritime security that originates in non-security considerations and contributes to security and non-security objectives.



Figure C.1 Maritime security and sustainable development

This would also fit well with the EU's civilian and civilising power rhetoric, since maritime security would be conceived as a contribution to the protection of future generations of Europeans.

This book's main argument has been about the relevance of seapower in the 21st century and the way the EU has progressively appropriated the maritime domain into its strategies, policies, regulations, and activities. Seapower proceeds from both material elements (such as economic strength, geography) and ideational elements (such as strategic culture, political will). Depending on the perspective adopted, it contributes to states' national interests and power maximisation, the stability of the global liberal order, and the hegemony of the Western maritime nations over the maritime domain in particular and the world in general. The end of the Cold War engendered a broadening and deepening of the security agenda and blurred the lines between peace and war. Projecting security through the sea as well as exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea requires a constant involvement of the public power in a bid to secure the 'global commons' and the freedom of the sea while tackling maritime security issues. This post-modern practice of seapower is especially visible at the EU level where geopolitical ambitions, norms projection, as well as maritime security policies and activities merge when it comes to the maritime dimension of the Union's security, as perfectly illustrated by the 2014 EU MSS. A quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War, new challenges have appeared (such as cyber security, climate change) and traditional ones have evolved or reemerged (such as China's ambitions, Russia's resurgence as an anti-status quo Power). In this context, the role of seapower is likely to remain central and the EU's security will growingly be linked to the sea and to its own capacity to influence events at sea.

Notes

3 Naval Forces as Vectors of Seapower

1 This section partially draws from ideas developed in my thesis manuscript, which was subsequently adapted as a book: Germond (2008a).

4 Beyond National Security – Maritime Power and Forces Projection

1 The following three sections partially draw from ideas developed in my thesis manuscript, which was subsequently adapted as a book: Germond (2008a).

7 The Naval and Maritime Dimension of the EU

1 This chapter partially draws from an article written by the author; Germond (2011).

8 The EU's Geopolitical Discourse

1 This section in part draws from Germond (2013).

9 The EU's Maritime Frontier: The Concept

1 This chapter builds on the arguments I first presented at the 2009 ISA Annual Convention in New York City and subsequently published in the *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Germond, 2010).
2 All translations are by the author.

10 The EU's Maritime Frontier: The Practice

1 This section partially draws from a paper presented at The George Washington University, *20th Conference on Baltic Studies: Re-imagining the Baltic Region: Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future*, The Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS), Washington, DC, 15–17 June 2006, which was subsequently adapted as a book chapter: Germond (2008c).
2 In the administrative hierarchy of the Russian Federation, an *oblast* refers to a subnational territorial entity, or in other words, a subject of the Federation, which has no ethnic component.

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'This is an important and groundbreaking analysis of a neglected but significant subject. The author skilfully combines a theoretical with an empirical approach, making the volume a major contribution to the study of maritime security in general, as well as the security policy of the European Union. This really is a landmark work that puts Dr Germond in the forefront of contemporary maritime security analysts.'
— Professor Eric Grove, *Naval Historian and Maritime Strategist*

In an age of uncertainties influenced by information technologies and the networking of societies, the maritime domain remains the main global lane of communication, vital for trade and security.

The European Union has become a maritime actor, carrying out counter-piracy and maritime capacity-building operations and actively dealing with maritime safety, fisheries protection, port security, maritime surveillance, and counter-immigration at sea.

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This cutting-edge book accounts for the trends in maritime strategy and seapower politics as well as the recent developments in the field, both at the conceptual and practical level. It discusses the significance of the maritime domain for European security in general and for the EU in particular.

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Basil Germond is a lecturer at the University of Lancaster, UK. He teaches Foreign Policy and International Relations Theories. Previously he was a research fellow at the University of St Andrews and Visiting Research Fellow with the Oxford-Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War, University of Oxford, UK. He is an expert in naval affairs and maritime security and has widely published on maritime security, naval affairs and European security.

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