

Federalism in Nigeria

Between Divisions in Conflict
and Stability in Diversity

Monica Emmanuel

Over 250 Ethnic Groups | Economic Growth | 1914
Jos Plateau | Federal Republic of Nigeria
NGOs | Equity | Democracy | Constitutional
Just Development | Sharia Crisis | Ig
Perennial Diversity | Yoruba | Political Stability
Hausa-Fulani | Boko Haram

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Monica Emmanuel

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DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to the memories of the most influential women in my life; my late, sweet and amiable mother, Mrs Maryamu Emmanuel Abubakar Pakka, and my beloved sisters, Mrs. Comfort Emmanuel Bulama and Margaret Emmanuel Abubakar. I will forever remember and cherish the time we spent together on planet earth. May your souls continue to rest in perfect peace with our Lord Jesus Christ, until we meet to part no more.

ABSTRACT

Nigeria is a product of the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates by the British Colonialists. The amalgamation of these protectorates was the singular primary cause of the Nigeria's political problem as it did not factor in the consequences of bringing together peoples with disparate culture and religion. The secondary cause was the lack of political will of Nigeria's political leadership to emplace institutional framework, to wit, the political system, political leadership, political structure and relevant constitution, which had promoted peaceful co-existence and tolerance in plural societies elsewhere.

These shortcomings present Nigeria with two choices namely, retaining the structure as bequeathed to Nigeria with all its internal contradictions and endeavouring to make the 1914 amalgamation, work through political cum constitutional engineering that would tinker with structural deficiency to achieve political stability.

The study derives its objectives from the preceding, which achievement it considers as the road map for ensuring Nigeria's stability, growth and development.

The chronicled ethnic and religious conflicts suggest the absence of a truly federal constitution that includes fiscal federalism and secularism. Thus the various ethnic and religious conflicts including the 3-year civil war and the Boko Haram insurgency were exemplifications of Nigeria's faulty constitutional framework or the politicisation of religion.

The review of extant literature and conflict theories shows that ethnicity and religion are identity-based and would thus spawn conflicts while Human/Basic needs; Realist; Frustration-Aggression, Scapegoat

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and Structural theories are adequate tools for explaining ethnic and religious conflicts.

The work considers the harmony construct as adequate framework for dealing with Nigeria's internal conflicts. Findings from data analyses show generally positive dispositions of respondents to adoption and operation a truly federal constitution to achieve stability in diversity. The core of the study's recommendations is the need for convocation of a sovereign national conference that would deliberate on Nigeria's future.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nigeria is a product of the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates by the British Colonialists. The 1914 amalgamation of these protectorates with diverse nationalities could not have been intended for a lasting and conflict-free end-product, named Nigeria. This is because the amalgamation was premised on economic expediency rather than political objective of building a strong and united nation that would have factored in the consequences of bringing together peoples with disparate culture and religion. The Colonialists having failed in this regard, the study is of the views that the political leadership of the independent Nigeria has the onus responsibility to achieve the political objectives of conflict-free/stable and united country, in spite of its diversity, which apparently have been elusive.

This study therefore underlies two choices before Nigeria's political leadership. The first choice is retaining the structures bequeathed to Nigeria following the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates with all their internal contradictions or conflictive internal dynamics of multi-ethnic, cultural and religious configurations, governance system, et cetera. According to the study, Nigeria presently, is structured to self-destruct because of the presence of in-built ingredients of instability such as diverse ethnicity, culture and religion, ethnic rivalry, dominance, polarisation/regionalism, perceived tribalism, and, ironically, the availability of oil.

The second choice available to the political leadership is to endeavour to make the 1914 amalgamation, otherwise called the marriage of convenience between the Northern and Southern protectorates, work. The study believes that making the amalgamation work would involve

resolving the national questions of how to open new roads for a more balanced, just, equitable, democratic and developed country that departs from the logic of conflicts and divisions via adequate understanding of the dynamics of diversity.

Furthermore, the study believes that the second choice would involve harnessing all the positive attributes of diversity and redressing all the negative ones through political cum constitutional engineering that will tinker with extant structural deficiencies. This would be the roadmap to ensure that Nigeria is placed on a solid rock of political and economic stability that would avert the inevitable disintegration, achieve stability in diversity and the objective of national growth and development. To this end, the broad objectives of this study are:

- To find out if the resolution of Nigeria's multifarious challenges and the perennial conflicts arising from its diversity lie with the adoption and practice of a truly federal constitution that includes devolution of power, fiscal federalism and secularism
- To assess the role of federal constitution/federalism including fiscal federalism and secularism in stabilizing a nation such as Nigeria with its divisive and conflictive internal dynamics of ethno-cultural and religious diversities.
- To determine if Nigeria's developmental challenges are functionally related to its diversities
- To seek the answers to the main pre-occupations or national questions of how to open new roads for a more balanced and just development of the country that departs from the logic of conflicts and divisions.

In this regard, the study works on the basis of an assumption that sustainable political stability and development in a diverse society is a function of institutional framework to wit, the political system, political leadership and relevant constitution. Thus the study through its foray into extant literature, examines how these institutional framework had

promoted cordiality, peaceful co-existence, harmony and tolerance amongst diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups in similar plural societies.

With respect to the role of political leadership vis-à-vis promotion of national stability and peaceful co-existence, the study asserts that it is incumbent on the political leadership and political elites to:

- understand that the foundation (i.e. Nigeria's diversity) of a structure (i.e. Nigerian nation) determines its durability, strength and sustainability; if the structure is erected on a faulty foundation, unless and until the faulty foundation is corrected by political leadership through socio-political engineering ingenuity and constitutional mechanism that takes due cognizance of Nigeria's diversity (i.e. foundation), the structure (i.e. Nigerian nation) is bound to collapse eventually;
- search for ways and means of ensuring harmonious relationships amongst the over 250 ethnic groups, which would invariably translate into Nigeria's stability and continued existence;
- realise the need to acknowledge the fact that one of the serious challenges facing Nigeria today, is how to harness its diversity to achieve political stability, which is inexorably linked to its economic growth and development;
- realise that the political leadership's abandonment of restraints, for political expediency, in projecting their ethnicity or religion in the articulation and implementation of policies and programmes was counter-productive to achieving the goal of stability in the political sphere, and
- acknowledge the necessity for Nigeria to transit from the negative impression about the 1914 amalgamation to conscious efforts to make the union work.

Apart from the 1914 amalgamation as the primary cause of Nigeria's ethno-religious conflicts, the overview of the chronicled ethnic and religious conflicts suggests the lack of political will by political leadership to emplace and operationalise a truly federal constitution that would address the Nigeria's structural imbalance, address the issues of separating state and religion, the politicisation of religion by political entrepreneurs and the indigenes-settlers/ state of residence-state of origin dichotomy as other causes of the violent ethno-religious conflicts.

The study views the Boko Haram, the Shariah and other religious conflicts as exemplifying the politicisation of religion for political gain at its crudest form, which, however, grew out of control or became unmanageable by the same politicians. On the other hand, the country's structural imbalance or deficiency-a post-amalgamation legacy is acknowledged as one of the causes of the Nigeria's 3-year civil war of 1967-70.

This work presumes that once Nigeria's governance system is anchored on appropriate governance structure and constitution (six geopolitical zone structures and a truly federal constitution in practice respectively), the much sought unity in its diversity would be achieved. And this, according to the study, would trigger stability, which would then propel Nigeria's growth and development.

Meanwhile, given the culture-generalty of the harmony construct or the universality of harmony as a social value or social construct, it is not unexpected that each culture has its own framework or model for dealing with interpersonal disagreements or for improving interpersonal harmony or establishing mutually beneficial relationships. Nevertheless, the study identifies with the West and East Asia's Conflict and Harmony Frameworks respectively as relevant and applicable to Nigeria in its search for peaceful and harmonious co-existence. The harmony framework includes harmony factors/motives and various handling styles that should be factored into human interactions or serve as guides to individ-

uals on how to achieve peace or harmony on a sustainable basis as a pre- or post-conflict peace and harmony goal, or how parties could handle actual or potential conflicts such that their resolution is acceptable to all.

The study believes that the achievement of harmony amongst Nigeria's diverse ethnic groups should, in any case, be predicated on the dynamics of handling styles employed by the diverse ethnic groups, particularly the three majority ethnic groups, the Hausas, Igbos and Yorubas as a response to conflict situations, or that it should be dependent on the relationships between the variety of handling styles and the harmony motives. For instance, if building of relationships as opposed to the pursuit of self-interest are the core values or goals to achieve, the choice of model such as dualistic view or dualistic harmony model or harmony framework matched with relevant handling styles becomes an appropriate tool for achieving the goal.

The study further projects how each of the three majority ethnic groups would react or respond to conflict situations, or relate to the harmony motives of the Harmony construct, or the Western conflict framework, based on their respective psycho-cultural/attitudinal dispositions to the 1914 amalgamation, Nigeria's diversity or unity. There was a high probability that the West's conflict framework would accommodate the Yoruba attitudinal disposition in view of their preference for negotiation as a response to conflict situations. However, with respect to the Handling styles of the Dual-concern model or its other variants, the Yoruba's attitudinal dispositions would accommodate *Integrating and Compromising Handling Styles* as they equate *conflict prevention to harmony promotion*, and would consequently therefore relate positively to *Disintegration avoidance and Harmony enhancement motives* of the harmony framework.

The Igbo would prefer conflict handling styles such as *Smoothing, Obey publicly/disobey privately and Constructive Diplomacy* of the Dual -concern model variants. These handling styles relate positively to

harmony motives such as *Disintegration avoidance and Harmony enhancement*. This ethnic group's attitudinal dispositions have a probability of relating positively to the harmony motive variants of *Genuine and Surface Harmony*.

The attitudinal dispositions of Hausa-Fulani would favour *Harmony as Hindrance motive* of the Harmony framework; thus all the conflict handling styles of the Dual-concern model and its variants would relate positively to *Harmony as Hindrance motive* of the Harmony Framework. Consequently, all other conflict handling styles such as *Avoiding; Compromising; Integrating and Obliging* would relate negatively to *Disintegration avoidance and Harmony enhancement motives* and their equivalents in the variants of the Dual-concern model. Because of the ethnic group's tendency to wanting to dominate others in the political space, *dominating handling style* would relate negatively to *Harmony enhancement motive and positively to Harmony as hindrance*. But with the contemporary political reality of the GPZs which, presumably, have tempered the Hausa/Fulani overweening pursuit of hegemonic domination and replaced it with their re-evaluation of their hither-to narrow ideological perception of power, its attainment and its usage. Thus, negotiation and compromise handling styles could be included in our evaluation of the Hausa-Fulani attitudes vis-à-vis conflict/harmony motive. Consequently, with respect to Hausa-Fulani attitudinal dispositions, handling styles such as avoiding, obliging, integrating and dominating are positively related to *Harmony as Hindrance motive* while compromise and negotiation relate positively to *disintegration avoidance and harmony enhancement*.

The significant deductions by the study from the literature reviewed and from the chronicled ethnic and religious conflicts are that ethnicity/culture and religion are human/people or identity-based, involving intense emotions (emotion of animosity such as fear, hate, resentment and rage towards other ethnic groups) that could be manipulated by

humans to achieve specific ends; that identity-based conflicts are often protracted and difficult to resolve, and that the incidence of these conflicts could be adequately explained by Human/Basic needs, Realist, Frustration-Aggression and Structural theories.

In view of the study's complex nature and given its inter-disciplinary outlook, Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 17.0, the Microsoft Excel and the NVivo software package, which is a Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) computer software package, were used to analyse data collected from the field.

Some of the findings with respect to questions posed to respondents in the study areas showed that responses were generally positive and the conclusions drawn from them were in tandem with the need for Nigeria to adopt and operate a truly federal constitution to achieve stability in diversity as opposed to the current pseudo federal constitution/unitary constitution in operation with its inherent conflicts and divisions.

For instance, (i) findings from the survey across the geo-political zones show an overwhelming approval for a six (6) geo-political zone structure for the country. For example, an average of 73.4% of respondents across the six zones agreed that the 6-geo-political zone structure should be adopted (meaning that its current informal arrangement should be formalised or made constitutional); (ii) The result of survey shows that majority of respondents (average of 89.6%) nationally agreed that ethnic or religious diversity was Nigeria's main problem as it represented one of the causative factors of conflicts and posed a threat to Nigeria's stability; (iii) Respondents agree that unless and until a truly federal constitution, as opposed to the pseudo federal constitution currently in practice in Nigeria, is at the centre of efforts to overcome our diversity-induced crises or conflicts, the desire for national stability despite our diversity will be a mere rhetoric, and (iv) Respondents are positive in their beliefs that operation of over-centralised governance system or unitary constitution is neither feasible nor practicable in a heterogeneous

society as it would lead to disharmony, conflict and eventual disintegration of such a society.

The analytic procedure for testing the hypothesis was qualitative and was therefore deductive. In determining the correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution, the study draws conclusions and makes inferences from the causative factors of the chronicled ethno-religious conflicts, the analysed data, the interpretations of data and conclusions from them, and consequently rejected the hypothesis 'that there is no positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal constitution/federalism'. In other words, the study believed that there was a positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal constitution/federalism.

Based on the lessons or insights gained from the chronicled ethnic and religious conflicts and Nigeria's civil war; the interpretations, inferences and conclusions from the data analysed, the study offered its recommendations. The core of the recommendations was the need for convocation of a sovereign national conference aimed at ensuring that true federal constitution including fiscal federalism, secularism and devolution of power is adopted and practised to assure the nation a long term political stability. Other striking recommendations of the study are; political restructuring that favours a constitutional adoption of six (6) geo-political zone structure in place of the current unviable 36-state structure; political power sharing arrangement that would be equitable and promote a sense of belonging of all Nigerians; constitutional adoption of "State of Residence" in lieu of the current controversial "State of Origin" and the abolition of indigeneship requirement, and the inculcation of culture of peace and harmony in the Nigerian psyche.

In adopting federal constitution for the country, the study believes that its practice should conduce to Wherea's (1959) basic tenets of federalism, some of which include; (a) national and state governments "are not subordinate to one another, but are coordinate with each other; (b) there must be at least two levels of governments and there must be constitutional division of powers among the levels of governments; (c) each level of government must be co-ordinate and independent, and (d) each level of government must be financially independent to afford each level of government the opportunity of performing their functions without depending or appealing to the others for financial assistance.

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I take responsibility however, for all errors that this work may contain.

Monica Emmanuel

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CRD	Centre for Research and Documentation
CSAT	Centre for Strategy and Technology
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FRN	Federal Republic of Nigeria
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GPZ	Geo-Political Zone
HND	Higher National Diploma
IDI	In-Depth Interview
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MNOCs	Multi-National Oil Companies
NC	North Central
NE	North East
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NIC	National Intelligence council
NR	No Response
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps

NW	North West
OND	Ordinary National Diploma
PACREP	Pan African Centre for Research
PEFS	Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies
PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
QDA	Qualitative Data Analysis
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SE	South East
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SS	South South
SW	South West
US	United States

RESEARCH BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

Nigeria is a product of the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by British Sir Fredrick Lugard who became its first Governor General with Lagos as its capital. According to Crowder (1978), the name “Nigeria” adopted for the country, was first suggested sixteen years ahead of the amalgamation by Flora Shaw, in an article in “The Times” in which she proposed that the several British Protectorates on the Niger should be known collectively as Nigeria. There has been no unanimity on the desirability or otherwise of the contentious 1914 Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates by the British Colonialists to form the contraption called Nigeria.

To those who did not believe in or have misgivings about the amalgamation, the unequal competition, rivalry and the conflictive relationships between the diverse ethnic and religious groups started with the amalgamation of 1914. To others, however, the union was a “marriage of convenience” because the whole process was conceived and executed without due consideration and respect for the socio-cultural and political differences embedded in the political, economic and social structures of the wedded couple. For instance, Obafemi Awolowo, (1947: 47-48), one of Nigeria’s foremost nationalists, wrote in his “Path to Nigerian Freedom” “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English’, ‘Welsh’, or ‘French’. The word Nigerian is a mere distinctive appella-

tion to distinguish those who live within the boundaries Nigeria from those who do not". He seemed to have expatiated this 1947 view when, in a lecture entitled "Constitution Making in Developing Countries", he said as follows: "from its (nation) definition, we will see that the distinctive and inseparable characteristics of a nation are common language, common culture, and sometimes common ancestry. Within the nation there are usually many tribes, each of which speak a common dialect, but all of whom speak the same language which is their mother-tongue, share the same culture, and sometimes claim a common ancestry. These tribes, to borrow the words of KEETON, 'will tend to cohere even if separated under different governments'; witness the irresistible tendency to cohere on the part of the Greeks in Cyprus and Greece, on the part of the German-speaking people in the two Germanies, and on the part of the Ewe-speaking people in Togo and Ghana" (Awolowo, 1981:88).

The recent developments in Ukraine where Russian-speaking people of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea were clamouring for union with Russia based on linguistic affinity were affirmations of the fact that cultural similarity was a strong force that pulls them towards Russia.

In his autobiography "My Life," Sir Ahmadu Bello (1962) described the Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Provinces (Protectorates) as "The mistake of 1914." And the first Prime Minister of the independent Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa also said that "the southern tribes who are now pouring into the North in ever increasing numbers are not welcome.... We . . . look upon them as invaders. Since 1914 the British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs, and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite. So what it comes to is that Nigerian unity is only a British intention in the country."

All of these positions or outpouring of emotions are results of misgivings about the amalgamation due to the multiplicity of ethnicity,

culture and religion existing in each of the protectorates, which since the amalgamation and subsequent political independence on 1st October, 1960 had, arguably, been the crucial factors in the divisive and conflictive relationships amongst the various ethnic and religious groups in the country. These conflict situations had translated into incessant crises that the young nation had to contend with and which eventually culminated in its Civil war of 1967 to 1970.

1.1.1 Making a Viable Nation of the 1914 Mistake

The misgivings or condemnations of the amalgamation will naturally elicit the questions such as: Are plural societies crisis-prone and unworkable? Does the currently seeming unmanageability of Nigeria's heterogeneity mean that, globally, plural societies cannot be conflict-free and stable? To answer these questions, the study will look far and wide for nations where heterogeneity does not constitute a clog in the wheels of political stability and development. This is to afford the researcher the rare insights into the mechanisms put in place by these countries that make them work in spite of their plurality.

Meanwhile, the study will work on the basis of an assumption that sustainable political stability and development in a diverse society is a function of institutional frameworks, to wit, the political system, political leadership and relevant constitution. This means that the study will be looking at how these institutional frameworks promote cordiality, peaceful co-existence, harmony, tolerance, stability and unity amongst diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups in those plural societies.

To achieve the objectives of peaceful co-existence, harmony, tolerance, stability and unity in diversity we are faced with two questions thus: First, should we retain Nigeria "as it is" with all its internal contradictions or conflictive internal dynamics of multi-ethnic, cultural and religious configurations, governance system, et cetera without efforts

directed to redressing the negativity of the dynamics of heterogeneity? Second, should Nigeria's political leadership adopt all those positive factors while redressing the negative ones to ensure that Nigeria is placed on a solid rock of political stability?


This study will discuss extensively the implications of the two questions, particularly the question with respect to stability in diversity. This means in a nutshell that political leadership should be pre-occupied with:

- the understanding that the foundation (i.e. Nigeria's diversity) of a structure (i.e. Nigerian nation) determines its durability, strength and sustainability; if the structure is erected on a faulty foundation, unless and until the faulty foundation is corrected by political leadership through socio-political engineering ingenuity and constitutional mechanism, the structure is bound to collapse eventually.
- the search for ways and means of ensuring harmonious relationships amongst the over 250 ethnic groups and Nigeria's continued existence.
- the need to acknowledge the fact that one of the serious challenges facing Nigeria today, is how to harness its diversities to achieve political stability, which is inexorably linked to its economic growth and development, and
- the necessity for Nigeria to transit from the negative impression about the 1914 amalgamation to conscious efforts to make the union work.

1.1.2 Diverse Ethnicity, Culture and Religion as Sources of Instability


The origin of the conflictive situation in Nigeria today had been located in the 1914 Amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates into a single country by the British Colonialist (see figure 1.1). This is, as noted earlier, in spite of the glaring ethno-cultural and religious differences of the various peoples that constitute the protectorates. Adogame (2004) noted that Nigeria, with a population of over 120 million people and approximately 374 ethno-linguistic groups, is among the African countries with the challenge of diverse ethnicity. This diversity was also noted by Sir Hugh Clifford, (1920:31), the then Nigeria's Governor General when he described Nigeria as a: "collection of independent Native States, separated from one another by great distances, by differences of history and traditions, and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social, and religious barriers" (Nigeria Council Debate, Lagos, 1920).

Figure 1.1 Nigeria's Amalgamated Protectorates



Source: www.nairaland.com/1019602/dont-blame-1914-amalgamation-rather/1

Figure 1.2 Some of Nigeria's Ethno-Linguistic Groups



Source: culture.chiamaka.com

We are not in doubts that ethnicity, culture and religion give man his identity, and that factor of identity is central to conflict because these components of identity have the tendency to ignite instability in political and socio-economic spheres. This is when conflict tends to be dysfunctional as it threatens order and stability, which is the very foundation of any human society (Nnoli, 1986; Lave, 1990). It should be further underscored that no meaningful development can take place in an atmosphere of chaos. Thus for any meaningful development to take place in the society, peaceful co-existence is a major requirement (Okafor, 1982), hence the need for order and stability in the society (Okafor, 2007). It should also be recognized by the political leadership that conflict could as well be functional especially if it leads to innovations and other positive changes in the society (Burton, 1972). The search for

these innovations, in terms of relevant political system and constitution that will address Nigeria's challenges emanating from its plurality, will therefore be the focus of the study.

That Nigeria has to contend with her multi-ethnic, cultural and religious configurations complemented by tribalism, nepotism and religious intolerance or bigotry is an open secret. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) point out that there was an entrenched system of discriminatory practices in which non-indigenes, migrants, settlers are shunted out or denied access to the resources, rights and privileges of a locality. This sad system according to them produces and sustains a hierarchical, unequal and ranked system of citizenship that has provoked violent conflicts, which go to the very heart of the 'National Question'. This system also has deep historical roots in pre-colonial patterns of inter-group relations, the discriminatory practices and ethnic inequalities entrenched by both the colonial regime and continued by post-independence administrations. It is thus not far-fetched to conclude that these discriminatory practices and inequalities have cumulatively provoked various forms of self-determination agitation by the different groups who are canvassing for the review of the 1999 constitution or the making of a new constitution, which provisions will make the composite parts of the whole called Nigeria can be seen as equals and partners in the process of Nation building and continued existence.

As noted by (IDEA, 2000), Nigerians are constantly challenging the legitimacy of the 1999 Constitution because, as they point out, the final draft was crafted and imposed by the military. However, IDEA (2000), opined "that constitutional review has to go beyond the tradition of constitution crafting and re-crafting by the elite, it must produce a constitution that becomes the "citizens' handbook", reflecting the 'soul' of the Nigerian nation and its people. Consequently, today throughout Nigeria, from North to South and from East to West there are calls for a

new constitution or the amendment of the extant 1999 constitution to address pragmatically Nigeria’s structural problem”.

1.1.3 Political System, Leadership and Constitution


Other salient issues that the study will address will include the political system, the leadership and the constitution. There would be discussion on whether or not Nigeria should revert to the hitherto four- regional system of the first republic; the twelve-state structure of the civil war period; the present 36-state structure or should adopt the informal six-geo-political zones arrangement and strive to entrench a true federal constitution. (See Figures 1.3, 1.4 & 1.7) Meanwhile, the adoption of relevant political structure should be guided by the comparative advantages of each of these political structures.

Figure 1.3: 4 Regions in existence between 1963 and 1967



Source: commons.wikimedia.org

Figure 1.4: 12 States of Nigeria from 1967-1976




Source: commons.wikimedia.org

It is assumed that the 36-state political structure in operation in Nigeria now is unviable and cost ineffective, and has diluted the homogeneity concept and made the centre, in contradistinction to the dictates of federalism, to wield too much power at the expense of the federating states. Consequently, it has encouraged unbridled struggles for control of power at the centre, ethnic rivalry and religious intolerance or fundamentalism with its attendant crises.

That the current operation of inappropriate constitution (unitary constitution) that does not respect Nigeria's heterogeneity, has inadvertently led to pervasive insecurity and political instability is not in doubt. These unfortunate developments were observed by Osaghae and Suberu, (2005) when they opine that the country's over-centralization of political

power had explosively encouraged partisan, sectional and factional political and economic competition for the control of the country's central government, with devastating implications for national stability. Obviously, the developments tend to erode one of the outstanding legacies of the First Republic which, in spite of the non-consensus about the desirability or otherwise of the amalgamation, was the operation of a true federal constitution and its beneficial offshoot. While during the period there was no official inter-regional cooperation, there was, indeed, informal cooperation that cut across sectors among the four regions. For instance, Western region became a trailblazer by its pioneering programmes and projects such as free and compulsory primary education; establishments of the first television station in Africa; world-class stadium, produce marketing board, etc., etc., which were emulated and replicated by other regions (i.e. Northern, Eastern and later Mid-Western regions).

Figure 1.5: 19 States of Nigeria (1976 - 1987)




Source: commons.wikimedia.org

1.1.4 Political Instability and the Challenge of Development

The study will address the consequences of political instability. In doing so, it will endeavour to ascertain that Nigeria's perennial political and developmental challenges and conflictive relations are a function of the leadership's inability or its lack of courage to institute or emplace governance structure that is guided and superintended by appropriate constitutional and institutional frameworks that could sufficiently address its plural ethnic, cultural and religious configurations. Unfortunately, in its unscientific search for suitable governance structure, Nigeria had experimented with 19 and 30 state structures (Figures 1.5 & 1.6). Meanwhile the six-geo-political zone structure being canvassed will be subjected to the rigour of scientific analysis to ascertain its comparative advantages.

It is presumed that once Nigeria's governance system is anchored on appropriate governance or political structure and constitution, the much sought unity in its diversity would be achieved. Consequently, it would trigger political stability, which would then propel Nigeria's growth and development. This work believes very strongly that this should be the pathway to evolving a new Nigeria that will have to contend with minimal ethnic and religious conflicts, rise from its present potential greatness to actual greatness, thereby realizing its vision to be among the world's top 20 developed economies by the year 2020.

Figure 1.6: 30 States of Nigeria (1987-1991)



Source: commons.wikimedia.org

Figure 1.7 Present-day Nigeria with a 36-State Structure



Source: en.wikipedia.org

1.1.5 Dealing with the realities of US National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Centre for Strategy and Technology (CSAT) Reports

Although Nigeria never engaged in warfare to gain independence, nothing has so heinously threatened its process of nationhood like the violence which has characterized post-independence Nigeria. These skirmishes, unfortunately, have continued unabated, and are feared to likely constitute the potential for outright collapse of Nigeria as indicated in the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) report (2005) entitled “Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa’s Future” which discussed “other potential developments that might accelerate decline in Africa and reduce even our limited optimism”. Also Idowu Akinlotan in his Palladium Column in the ‘The Nation Newspaper’ of Sunday, 29th January, 2012 wrote inter-alia: “last year February (2011), five US military scholars at the Centre for Strategy and Technology (CSAT), a think tank based in Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, suggested in a 156 page report that given prevailing conditions and conflicts in Nigeria, the country was likely to be wracked by multipartite civil war such as the world witnessed in Lebanon in 1975 and Somalia in 1991. The war, they concluded, could lead to the breakup of Nigeria in 2030, not 2015”.

What should be done to eschew the perennial conflicts, abort the above cited doomsday reports and set Nigeria on the path of sustainable growth and development, and internal cohesion? Is it the institutionalization of appropriate constitution? To answer these questions, Awolowo (1981: 91) proposed the following constitutional framework that took cognizance of and addressed Nigeria’s heterogeneity, which will guide us:

“(1) If a country is uni-lingual and uni-national, the constitution must be unitary; (2) If a country is uni-lingual or bi-lingual or multi-lingual, and also consists of communities which, though, belonging to the same nation, had, over a period of year, devel-

oped divergent and autonomous nationalities, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organized on the dual basis of language and separate nationality; (3) If a country is bi-lingual or multi-lingual, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organized on a linguistic basis, and (4) Any experiment with a unitary constitution in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country must fail, in the long run”.

Despite the above warning by Awolowo that any experiment with a unitary constitution in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country, the governance of the Nigerian state since the first military coup d'état of 1966 has become increasingly unitary/over centralized in both form and practice, even when the need for political stability, economic growth and development, and peaceful co-existence amongst the over 250 ethno-linguistic groups with diverse culture and religious orientations dictate otherwise. Sadly, the consequences of the failure of political leadership to embrace constitutional federalism cum fiscal federalism have been the unrelenting internal conflicts, ethnic loyalty and weak national identity, fear of domination by one ethnic or religious group over the other, all of which have led to lack of internal cohesion and have stifled the country's development.

It is therefore, pertinent that the study determines that while the 1914 amalgamation of Southern and Northern protectorates could be implicated in the incessant ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, the real culprit in the Nigeria's elusive search for political stability, economic growth and development is the failure to fashion out, adopt and operate a constitution that not only suits and recognizes Nigeria's diversity but has peaceful co-existence and national integration as its main objective, while also giving the constituent parts the freedom to develop according to their inherent abilities and pace without being tied to apron-strings of each other. This means that the study must perforce determine whether

or not a decentralized or a centralized governance system/ a unitary governance system in a plural society is an invitation for heightened ethno-religious crises, inevitable arrested socio-economic development and the eventual disintegration of Nigerian nation.

1.1.6 Statement of the Problem

As a result of the 1914 amalgamation of Southern and Northern protectorates, the evolved nation had been plagued by ethnic suspicions, religious intolerance or bigotry and incessant conflicts that pushed the country into a 3-year civil war of 1967-1970 because of the inherent heterogeneity. Granted that conflict is an inevitable and integral part of human interactions, then how can Nigeria's political leadership respond creatively to make conflicts positively functional?

This poses the problem that the study is poised to find solution for, and it also elicits the following fundamental *research questions*:

1. What is the extent of the relationship between adoption and application of appropriate constitution (federal constitution that emphasizes fiscal federalism and secularism) and the mitigation of the negative consequences of ethnic, cultural and religious diversities such as political instability and socio-economic underdevelopment?
2. Can it be assumed that sustainable political stability and development in a diverse society is a function of institutional frameworks, to wit the political system, political leadership and relevant constitution in operation in that country?
3. Can the adoption and operation of Federal Constitution that includes fiscal federalism and secularism resolve Nigeria's multifarious challenges and perennial conflicts?
4. What institutional mechanisms or frameworks should serve as the veritable tools for ensuring cordiality and harmony among the di-

verse ethnic, cultural and religious groups as well as Nigeria's political stability?

5. Is the operation of a unitary constitution feasible or pragmatic in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country?
6. What is the Road Map for a new Nigeria where there will be sustainable stability in spite of the diversity?

1.1.7 Hypothesis

This study postulates that there is no positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution. The hypothesis is intended to establish the fact that the Nigeria's divisive and conflictive situations as well as its stifled growth and development have a lot to do with the incorrect operation of federal constitution/federalism including fiscal federalism and secularism.

1.1.8 Objective of the Study

The objectives of this study are as follows:

- To find out if the resolution of Nigeria's multifarious challenges and the perennial conflicts arising from its diversity hinges on the adoption and practice of federal constitution including fiscal federalism and secularism.
- To assess the role of federal constitution/federalism that includes fiscal federalism and secularism in stabilizing a nation such as Nigeria with its divisive and conflictive internal dynamics of ethno-cultural and religious plurality.
- To determine if Nigeria's developmental challenges are functionally related to its diversity.
- To seek answers to Nigerians' main pre-occupations or national questions on how to open new roads for a more balanced and just

development of the country that departs from logic of conflicts and divisions.

1.1.9 Significance of the Study

Nigeria's heterogeneity has its implications for incessant conflicts, insecurity and political instability that have stifled its political development as well as economic growth and development. The study of this nature is of invaluable significance because it concerns phenomena that are globally known and experienced (conflicts and instability), and which are mainly chaotic, destructive and regressive in nature. Several scholars and researchers have conducted countless researches on conflict and political instability in a bid to proffer solutions to them. This study is another contribution to the ongoing research. Beyond this, the study is significant:

- as a revelation to the political leadership that, for peaceful, harmonious co-existence, national progress and unity in diversity, Nigeria must acknowledge that adoption of and implementation of federal constitution, fiscal federalism and secularism is *sine qua non*.
- as it will show that the unitary constitution currently in operation in Nigeria is dysfunctional, but that the adoption and operation of federal constitution could be a functional tool for cordiality, peaceful co-existence and enhanced national economic growth and development.

1.2 Methodology

The nature of this study is notably complex as it is shaped by historical, economic, political, sociological and anthropological factors, thus giving it an interdisciplinary outlook. For this reason, therefore, the

study employs a variety of methods, both qualitative and quantitative, for its analytical task. This is in order to ensure full coverage of the entire States/6-Geo-Political Zones (GPZs) in Nigeria, thereby giving equal opportunity and representation to all participants from the different GPZs, which is by default since independence, already divided based on ethnic, cultural and religious differences.

There will be further expatiation on the six-geo-political zone structure in the section where we will analyse respondents' views on whether Nigeria should retain its present political structure, revert to old political structures or adopt this novel 6 GPZs.

Primary Data will be obtained through face-to-face communication with all participants from all the selected States from the six GPZs of Nigeria through semi structured Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and In-Depth Interviews (IDIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Structured questionnaire will be used to elicit information from the respondents based on National and GPZs for in-depth analysis and to enhance the reliability of the study.

At least four FGDs and eight interviews will be conducted in each of the six (6) GPZs, making a total of twenty-four FGDs and forty-eight interviews. Meanwhile a total of 720 questionnaires will be administered in the six (6) GPZs (120 questionnaires per zone).

The study will also rely on extant literature as well as information and data from *secondary sources*- published and unpublished books, journals, government papers, pamphlets, newspaper reports, internet, periodicals, dissertations and theses et cetera, as a first line of enquiry.

Both Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15.0, Microsoft Excel and the NVivo software package will be used to analyse data collected from the field. NVivo software package is a Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) computer software package.

1.2.1 Definition of Concepts

Conflict: There are many definitions of conflict available. However, the study will adopt Coser's (1996) definition as well as his and Tidwell (1998) observations on conflicts. According to Coser, social conflict is a struggle over status, power and scarce resources in which the sole aim of the parties involved are not only to gain the desired value but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals. He further observed that conflicts could have a positive political and social function while Tidwell (1998) opined that: "A person or society without conflict is dead"; and how it is managed will determine whether it will be functional or dysfunctional.

Political Stability could be defined as political behaviours or the interactions of political actors that, because of collective *legitimacy* and the systemic support it affords for political or government institutions, reproduce or ensure the status-quo of the political system, thus it is averse to violent changes that challenge the status-quo or destabilize the political system. It could also be defined as the outcome of interactions of political actors or political behaviors that reproduce, preserve or guarantee the status-quo of political system because of its collective legitimacy and the systemic support it afforded (Adaptation from Parsons, 1963; Easton, 1917).

In this context, the meaning of legitimacy is the citizen's perceptions of government institutions as fair, responsive, and valuable. (Easton, 1917)

Political stability also means a predictable political environment, which in turn attracts investment, both internally, and from externally. The resulting virtuous cycle of poverty reduction, job creation, increased state revenues and investment in welfare and education bring benefits to all in the society such that a return to violence or chaos is in no-one's interest. It means the rule of law, strong institutions rather than powerful

individuals, a responsive and efficient bureaucracy, low corruption and a business climate that is conducive to investment (Shepherd, 2010)

Diversity refers to human differences in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, ideology or social class. Isaac Olawale Albert and Kan (2011)

Federalism: The Study adopts the definitions, views and explanations of Messrs David Nice and K. C. Wheare on federalism.

David Nice defines it as "a system of government that includes a national government and at least one level of sub-national governments, and that enables each level to make some significant decisions independent of the others." Sub-national governments may include different levels from states to provinces to local governments. But independent decision making is not absolute. .regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent of one another." A workable federalism for the British academic is one wherein no level of government is able "to override the terms of agreement about the power and status which each is to enjoy." In this regard, Mr. Wheare considered the United States as embodying the modern concept of federalism, wherein the constitution provides that the national and state governments "are not subordinate to one another, but coordinate with each other. According to him, "basic tenets of federalism are:

- a. There must be at least two levels of governments and there must be constitutional division of powers among the levels of governments.
- b. Each level of government must be co-ordinate and independent.
- c. Each level of government must be financially independent to afford each level of government the opportunity of performing its functions without depending or appealing to the others for financial assistance.
- d. There must be Supreme Court of the independent judiciary to resolve the inevitable conflicts.

- e. In terms of the amendment of the constitution, no levels of government should have undue power over the amendment process.

1.2.2 Structure of Research

The thesis is structured into six chapters as follows:

Chapter 1 begins with the general introduction and background to the study. It covers the statement of problem, objectives, scope and significance of the study and key concepts used in the work.

Chapter 2 surveys existing literature to provide insights and enable the researcher to know the grounds already covered in her particular field of interest. The chapter also includes the theoretical or conceptual framework for the study.

Chapter 3 chronicles Nigeria's ethno-religious conflicts, their causes and consequences/impacts.

Chapter 4 is Research Questions and Methodology. It presents the five research questions and their variants. It also discusses the issues of methodology and methods of collecting and analysing data. It discusses basic assumptions and rationale for the mixed methodology, the research design and explanation of the methodology for collection of data from the field.

Chapter 5 is data presentation and analysis. It contains the interpretations and conclusions on the outcomes of the analysis.

Chapter 6 contains the summary of findings, conclusions as well as recommendations of the work.

1.2.3 Summary of Chapter 1

This is essentially the background to the study and contains the methodology for the study as well. The background was the 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and northern protectorates that were made up

of diverse nationalities with diverse religious persuasions. There was no unanimity about the desirability or otherwise of the contentious 1914 Amalgamation that metamorphosed to the contraption called Nigeria. The various positions of the nationalists were contained in the background.

These diversities became the precursors of ethnic suspicions, rivalry, antagonisms, and religious intolerance which were crucial factors in the divisive and conflictive relationships amongst the various ethnic and religious groups in the country that had led to many violent conflicts and consequent instability which might have informed the unfortunate reports by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the US Centre for Military Strategy and Technology (CSAT) that indicated the potential of Nigeria's eventual collapse in 2015 or 2030.

In view of the diversity-problems arising from the amalgamation, two options are left open to Nigeria's political leadership to resolving these amalgamation-inspired problems: Firstly, retaining Nigeria "as it is" with all its internal contradictions or conflictive internal dynamics of multi-ethnic, cultural and religious configurations, governance system, et cetera without serious efforts directed to redressing them and secondly, adopting all those positive factors and redressing the negative ones to ensure Nigeria's political stability, which will translate to economic stability and national development.

The choice of the second option was predicated on the understanding that the political leadership will realise the need to adopt appropriate constitution, which is sine-qua-non to the nation's political stability. Thus, the study works on the basis of assumption that sustainable political stability and development in a diverse society is a function of institutional frameworks, to wit, the political system, political leadership and relevant constitution. This constitutes the mechanism to make the amalgamation work, or make a viable nation out of that "1914 mistake" or "the mere geographical expression". This must, however, be contingent

on the imperative of understanding the dynamics of diversity with a view to harnessing it to ultimately achieve political and economic stability as the pathways to national growth and development.

In addition to the adoption of appropriate constitution, it was suggested that political leadership must be courageous to institute or emplace correct governance structure that could sufficiently and effectively address Nigeria's plural structural configurations. The governance structures from which to choose are the hitherto four- regional system, the twelve-state structure or the informal six-geo-political zones arrangement.

The advantages derivable from the adoption of any of these political structures are given as: (i) it is the nature's way of solving Nigeria's heterogeneity in the sense that each of these structures is ethnically and culturally homogenous and (ii) its operation is driven by a true federal constitution and it is cost effective. (See Figures 1.3, 1.4 & 1.5)

Political leadership inability to respond creatively to make conflicts arising from Nigeria's diversity positively functional constitutes the study's problem, which elicits fundamental research questions.

The study's hypothesis postulates *that there is no positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution*. The hypothesis is intended to establish the fact that the Nigeria's divisive and conflictive situations as well as its stifled growth and development have a lot to do with the incorrect operation of federal constitution/federalism including fiscal federalism and secularism.

Meanwhile, the study intends to achieve four objectives as follows:

- To find out if the resolution of Nigeria's multifarious challenges and the perennial conflicts arising from its diversity lie with the adoption and practice of federal constitution including fiscal federalism and secularism;

- To assess the role of federal constitution/federalism that includes fiscal federalism and secularism in stabilizing a nation such as Nigeria with its divisive and conflictive internal dynamics of ethno-cultural and religious plurality;
- To determine if Nigeria's developmental challenges are functionally related to its diversity, and
- To seek the answers to Nigerians' main pre-occupations or national questions on how to open new roads for a more balanced and just development of the country that departs from logic of conflicts and divisions.

The study is structured into six chapters.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter surveys existing literature on the assumed correlation between the multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion, the perennial conflicts, the political instability and the arrested socio-economic development arising there-from. It also presents the theoretical explanations for the conflicting pulls of multi-ethnicity, culture and religion, the impact they have on stability (both political and economic) and the mechanisms available for harnessing these diversities for positive contributions to national stability and socio-economic development. In addition, the chapter contains conflict-specific analyses that give us detailed understanding of what happens in a given conflict, that is its nature, causative factors/drivers of specific conflict, issues involved and the array of conflict theories and conflict resolution mechanisms available to researchers to enable a detailed understanding of conflicts vis-à-vis the dynamics of multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion in a society as well as the modus operandi for nipping potential conflicts in the bud, or resolving them to the mutual satisfaction and acceptance of parties to the conflicts.

2.2 Literature Review

The focus of this section is the review of existing literature on the conflictive nature of ethnicity, culture and religion and how they impact political stability, growth and socio-economic development. Literature is replete with array of works on the intricate dynamics of ethnicity, culture and religion and their impacts on social relations, politics and economic growth and development from which this study will benefit.

This section also provides us the determinants of peaceful and harmonious co-existence in a multi-ethnic, cultural and religious society, just as it affords us deep insights into why the forces of ethnicity, culture and religion are tamed in some plural society for positive functional impacts, while they are dysfunctional and destabilizing in some others. In other words, this section surveys global perspectives on the dynamics of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity as veritable vehicles for national instability and consequent underdevelopment, and the various mechanisms deployed in heterogeneous societies world-wide to harness the dynamics to become tools for political stability and consequent socio-economic development.

These mechanisms, invariably, include political system/regime type, politics, political structure, institutions as well as relevant constitutional framework that harness the forces of ethnicity, culture and religion for purposive development, peaceful coexistence amongst the various ethnic groups and religious tolerance amongst people of different religious persuasions. As Okafor opined (1982, 2007), 'for any meaningful development to take place in the society, peaceful co-existence is a major requirement, hence the need for order and stability in the society'. This implies that no meaningful development can take place in an atmosphere of chaos.

Meanwhile, to facilitate an in-depth understanding of conflict or conflictive situation, its resolution methods and handling styles via the re-

view of several extant literature and articles, this section is structured as follows:

2.3. Conflict Resolution Methods

2.3.1 Conflict Analysis

Conflict Analysis as a tool avails researchers a detailed understanding of what happens in a given conflict that is the nature of conflict, its causative factors or what drives a given conflict, and the issues involved in the conflict. Gaya-Best (2006: 62), corroborated this when he opined that conflict analysis helps to identify the various components of the conflict, which may include the background of the conflict, or the historical context, time lines, perspectives of the parties to the conflict, the positions, interests and needs of the parties as well as the causes of the conflict. According to him the methods employed by conflict interveners include case studies, fact finding and analysis meetings (such as workshops)


Conflict analyses, according to Fisher et al (2000) are those activities that are undertaken by any person doing anything either directly or indirectly to know as much as possible about what is going on in a given conflict. It is therefore an indispensable tool for researchers in the field of conflict as it provides them in-depth knowledge about a given conflict without which it might be difficult to resolve, transform or manage the conflictive situation effectively. Conflict analysis tool will help in dissecting the series of conflicts Nigeria had experienced, make the causative factors apparent, thus making conflict recurrence avoidable, and where for whatever reasons conflicts recur, they could be easily resolved to the mutual satisfaction and acceptance of parties to the conflicts through the analytic tool

2.3.2 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution according to Miller (2003: 8), is a variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems; it is distinct from management or transformation of conflict. The institutional approaches to resolving conflicts can be described as the methods or means of settling conflicts using peaceful and non-violent methods along the lines prescribed by institutions and values of community. These methods vary, and are available at individual, family, group, community and international levels (Gaya-Best, 2006: 93).

Meanwhile, it is important we touch on the aspect of reconciliation that shows graphically the process for resolving conflicts and reconciling parties to the conflict and restoring strained relationships. Figure 2.1 below is Tearfund's (2003) Vicious Cycle of Conflict. It contends that conflict is premised on hidden hurts (which may arise from Expected - Actual Needs Satisfaction Gap, or Unrealized Expectations). The hidden hurts trigger events that lead to conflict. To bring the conflict to an end and achieve sustainable peace thereafter, the parties to the conflict through third-party-organized conference must communicate and discuss the hidden hurts with a view to resolving them and building lasting relationships.

Figure 2.1 Reconciliation and Conflict



Source: Tearfund, (2003)

It should be underscored that to sustain the peace achieved through the dialogue, peace building process must be on a continuous basis. There are two categories of peaceful methods of conflict resolution available to conflict managers namely, proactive and reactive methods. The proactive method prevents conflict from taking place while the reactive deals with managing potential as well as actual or already existing conflicts. The other available methods of preventing, terminating and managing conflicts are; conflict management, conflict transformation and conflict suppression. Gaya-Best, Miall, Lederach, Swarstrom & Weissman and many other conflict and peace researchers have endeavoured to define or offer profound explanations for or expressed

diverse perspectives on conflict management, conflict transformation and conflict suppression as well as other available methods of preventing, terminating and managing conflicts as follows:

2.3.3 Conflict Management

According to Miall (2001), conflict management is the art of appropriate interventions to achieve political settlements, particularly by those powerful actors having power and resources to bring pressure on the conflicting parties in order to induce them to settle. Conflict management could also be seen as the positive and constructive handling of differences and divergence (Bloomfield & Reilly, 1998 in Miall 2001). The aim of this conflict resolution method is to reduce the negative and destructive capacity of existing conflict through a number of measures that include conflict limitation, containment and litigation ((2006: 95).

2.3.4 Conflict Transformation

Jeong (2000) sees conflict transformation as the coming into being new situations involving conflict issues, perceptions, relationships and communication patterns.

Lederach (1995) sees conflict transformation as change or can be seen descriptively in the changes created by social conflict, and prescriptively in the deliberate intervention by third parties to create change.

Gaya-Best (ibid) opines that conflict transformation method goes beyond conflict resolution; its focus or aim is to build longer lasting relationships among the erstwhile conflicting parties through a process of change in perceptions and attitudes of parties involved in conflicts, while conflict suppression method applies the instrument of power or force to resolve conflict through the imposition of solution that is unsustainable as well as unsatisfactory to parties to the conflict by powerful parties or stronger interveners.

Meanwhile, Gaya-Best (2006: 93-101) has identified non-conventional peaceful methods in the conflict resolution and transformation spectrum as the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) method. He defined it as the non-conventional peaceful method of settling disputes and resolving conflict situations using the least expensive method and in ways that satisfy the parties, as well as ways that preserve relationships after settlement might have been reached. There are two strands of this method namely, African Traditional Alternative Dispute Resolution and Western Alternative Dispute Resolution. Both of these conflict management methods are similar in the sense that they embrace non-violent approaches to conflict management, except that the diversity of cultural and religious influences may have differential impact. Both African and Western Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms employ conflict management approach as a process of containing, preventing or limiting conflict.

2.3.5 Other Processes and Structures of Conflict Resolution

The other processes and structures of conflict resolution which are nonetheless elements of the collaborative process for conflict management and the various contributions or the salient perspectives of conflict and peace researchers on them are summarized below as follows:

- *Grassroots community-based activities:* Gaya-Best (2006:ibid) considered community-based activities such as village festivals, initiation rites, puberty festivities for young people, marriage ceremonies, the sharing of village and community markets, et cetera as a veritable means to create social bonding in ways that ensure solidarity and prevent dysfunctional conflict. Once this solidarity is lost, violent conflicts ensue as exemplified by the conflict be-

tween the Ife and Modakeke communities of Osun State of Nigeria, between the Chamba/Jukun and Kuteb of Taraba State etc.

- *Good governance*: Onu (2009) opined that good governance which embraces equity, justice and rule of law, is a major way of preventing conflict or reducing the incidence of conflict arising from state activities. He noted that most conflicts in the world, particularly in Africa, originate from state activities and policies.

This approach, according to Gaya-Best (2006: *ibid*) is anchored on the assumption that as a concept, good governance ensures that government is run in transparent, accountable, responsive, positive and progressive manners that are beneficial to the governed; the governance system is democratic and anchored on maintenance of law and order. All of these tend to diffuse tensions and remove problems as they evolve. Once good governance is compromised or dictatorship replaces democracy, as it is the case in many African countries, conflicts are generated.

- *Communication*: This is an invaluable but controversial process for conflict prevention and for conflict resolution. As an important process for conflict de-escalation, it relies on information sharing and exchange between individuals, groups and potential parties in conflict situation. This approach is based on the principle that it is better or more rewarding to jaw-jaw than to war-war, because it enables parties to conflicts to share and exchange critical information, thereby remove doubts and suspicion, and contribute to the confidence-building process. Burton, 1965) recognizes the importance of this process as a key conflict prevention strategy in the sense that most non-violent methods of conflict management, such as collaboration, negotiation and dialogue; as well as third party interventions like mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication, are largely dependent on effective communication. The critical role of communication in conflict prevention and crisis management has also to do with the fact that it

is well suited to removing negative perceptions, assumptions, stereotypes, and attitudes on which conflict is dependent.

- *Collaboration*: This is individual-based process of conflict management in which parties work together on their own to remove problems through constructive dialogue or engagement in joint community-based projects and sharing of social facilities, infrastructures as well as other utilities. Collaboration works on the assumption that those who collaborate, and those who do things together, are likely to build more friendship and mutual respect among themselves than those who do not. Like communication, collaboration does not involve a third party, and so is within the reach and control of the participating parties (Gaya-Best, 2006: *ibid*).
- *Negotiation*: This is a key approach to peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts that may arise among parties. It has a universal application as a principle of conflict management that is based on dialogue. Negotiation is defined variously as follows: a structured process of dialogue between conflicting parties about issues in which their opinions differ (Fisher et al, 2000; 115). Miall, Rambotham and Woodhouse (1999: 21) define it as the process whereby the parties within conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflicts. Miller's (2003: 25) sees negotiation as communication, usually governed by pre-established procedures between representatives of parties involved in a conflict or dispute. Thus, negotiation is a direct process of dialogue and discussion taking place between at least two parties who are faced with a conflict situation or a dispute. The goal of negotiation, according to Jeong (2000: 168) is.....to reach agreement through joint decision making between parties.

Negotiation takes place during the early stages of conflict when communication between parties is existent and good. There are two

types of negotiation- the positional and the collaborative/constructive negotiation. The positional negotiation is based on the aggressive pursuit of interest by parties, and is typically adversarial and competitive. But the collaborative/constructive negotiation is a process where parties try to educate each other about their needs and concerns, and both search for the best ways to solve their problems in ways that the interests and fears of both or all parties are met. It is believed that the benefits of compromised solution outweigh the losses arising from refusal to negotiate. Communication is critical to collaborative or constructive process.

- *Conciliation or Facilitation*: it refers to intermediary efforts to encourage the parties to move towards negotiations, as does the more minimalist role of providing good offices. (Ramsbotham, O. et al. 2011:32). It is also a third party activity, which covers intermediary efforts aimed at persuading parties to conflicts to work towards a peaceful solution. A key aim of conciliation is to reduce tensions between parties in a conflict situation. (Gaya-Best; 2006: *ibid*) To Miller, (2003: 6-7) conciliation is a voluntary referral of a conflict to a neutral third party which either suggests a non-binding settlement or conducts explorations to facilitate more structures or techniques of conflict resolution. The latter can include confidential discussions with the disputants or assistance during a pre-negotiation phase
- *Mediation*: This is the voluntary, informal, non-binding conflict management process undertaken by an external party that fosters the settlement of differences or demands between directly invested parties (Miller, 2002: 23)
- *Arbitration*: by definition, arbitration is the use and assistance of a neutral third party in conflict, who hears the evidence from both parties, and thereafter renders a decision, called an *award*, which is expected to be binding on the parties. Arbitration, like adjudication, is different from mediation because its decision is binding

on the parties. Like others, arbitration depends on communication, dialogue and negotiation. Much of the third party intervention in traditional African societies is done through arbitration. (Gaya-Best; 2006: *ibid*)

- *Adjudication*: Adjudication is a non-violent method of conflict management that involves the use of the courts and litigation processes. Because it involves litigation, it tends to destroy trust, love, respect, and other forms of confidence between parties. Consequently, it increases suspicions and bitterness which linger for a long time after judgment. Litigation ends in win-lose outcomes. Unlike the preceding processes, it is out of the control of the parties, takes a long time to dispose off cases and very expensive. (Gaya-Best; 2006: *ibid*)

2.3.6 Conflict Handling Styles

From the preceding paragraphs we have understood the criticality of conflict analysis to conflict resolution. This is in the sense that, as a detailed study, conflict analysis provides us deep insights and understanding of the root causes and nature of conflict. Once the causes are known, it becomes easy or less difficult to terminate or resolve the conflict in manners that are satisfactory and mutually acceptable to parties to the conflict. This implies that the underlying contentious issues in the conflict, which the analysis has made apparent, have been satisfactorily dealt with.

The outcome of conflict analysis is also relevant to Conflict Handling styles. This will become apparent from the point of view that conflict handling style refers to the responses that people make to address the situation or how individuals or groups respond to situation that is considered detrimental to the attainment of a desired goal (Ochinya Ojji, 2006:120). The situation or event here represents the deep - seated

causes of conflict that conflict analysis tool avails and which are responded to. The response is a function of perception of the situation or event. Meanwhile, according to Devine et al (1995) in social perception, people's actions are perceived in terms of some underlying motives, purpose, desires and reasons. This perception, however, involves the interplay of the physiological, cognitive and cultural processes (Ochinya Ojiji; *ibid*), which operates in people and groups. However, perception of events or situation could only trigger appropriate response when it is sent as stimulus through neural mechanism to the brain and interpreted by the brain. This is in accord with the opinion of Massaro (1989) that the occurrence of stimulus itself does not trigger a response until it has been interpreted and appropriate response selected. This means that the occurrence of conflict depends on perception of situation or event and the response to the event. Culture, which is the way of life of people, influences perception of people of an event and, indirectly, the response it triggers.

There are two categories of response namely, cooperation and assertiveness. Cooperation, in the context of conflict, means that our response to a situation satisfies our desires or needs but not at the expense of others' needs or desires. Cooperation, according to Ojiji (*ibid*) manifests in a number of other methods of dealing with conflicts such as accommodation, avoidance, collaboration and compromise. On the other hand, assertiveness is concerned mainly with the satisfaction of ones needs and desires at the expense of other person we relate with.

Conflict resolution methods that employ assertiveness are arbitration, domination, confrontation/fighting and threats to other party. It is important to note that misperception of events or situation in conflict situation can further escalate or sustain the conflict. Conversely, the correct perception of other individuals' or groups' intention can aid in the application of right methods of handling conflict, and thus douse or resolve conflict or potential conflict in ways that are mutually acceptable to the

parties involved in conflict. The following spectra of conflict handling styles have been identified by Ojiji (ibid: 121-124):

- **Domination:** It deals with conflict derived from the disposition of people to assert themselves in conflict situations. It is self-interest driven with no interest in the plight of other party.
- **Avoidance:** In this style, one party to the conflict ignores or denies the significance of the issues involved. In the style, there is the tendency to tactically postpone deliberations on the issues involved.
- **Accommodation:** this is a non-assertive or cooperative method of conflict situations. Here, there is a conscious effort on the part of the parties to the conflict not to engage in competitive dialogue but in readiness to forgo one's needs in the attempt to find acceptable solution to issues involved in conflict.
- **Collaborating:** this style involves cooperation of the parties in the efforts to find satisfactory solution to the conflict. In this style, both parties win.
- **Compromising:** This style involves finding an expedient mutually acceptable solution that partly satisfies both parties. With this style, parties split their differences and make concessions in order to resolve the conflict.
- **Confrontation/Fighting:** With this style, there is a considerable lack of understanding of each other's position or point of view. (There is an unwillingness of the parties to concede, collaborate, compromise or cooperate) It is lose-lose situation.
- **Problem-Solving:** This approach involves parties constructively listening to each other with the intention to understand the underlying elements in the conflict and to deal with the issues. With this style, parties respect individual differences; there is little or no concern for who is right or wrong

2.4 Conflictive Ethnic, Cultural and Religious Diversities

2.4.1 Introduction

There are many definitions or explanations of conflict as there are authors. Despite the variety of definitions, what is central to or the common denominators of these definitions are that conflict is human driven, contains emotional intensity, it is always a struggle or competition between ethnic/cultural or religious group over scarce resources and it is about incompatibility of goals and desires.

To Coser (1956:121), conflict occurs when two or more people engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. He expatiated further that conflict emerges whenever one party perceives that its goals or purposes or the means of achieving a goal or preference are being threatened or hindered by the activities of one or more parties. The parties may be seeking to expand into the same field or physical sphere, or, more abstractly, into the same field of influence or behaviours.


Coser, 1956; 8) and Isard (1992: 1) see conflict as a phenomenon that is an important part of human existence. This study however, believes that human interactions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for conflict to occur; such human interactions must permit or allow encumbrances such as rivalry, competition over resources, incompatibility of interests, threatened interests, denial of inalienable rights, struggle for control of power, desire to dominate others, et cetera for conflict to transform from potential to actual. The conflict-potential of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity could, among others, be properly understood as distilled from the perspectives of various conflict researchers as follows:

- Ethnicity/culture and religion are human/people or identity-based, involving intense emotions (emotion of animosity such as fear, hate, resentment and rage toward the “other” ethnic groups) that could be manipulated by humans to achieve specific ends;
- Diversity implies a mosaic or medley of people with divergent cultures, world-views and religious orientations and beliefs that are hardly compromised;
- Every conflict is about competition between humans for position or resources that are limited or scarce;
- Conflict is about incompatibility of man’s interests, threatened interests, unmet needs, fears of domination, and of losing privileges;
- Conflict is about mankind’s resistance to change, yet change is part and parcel of human existence,
- Conflict is about mankind’s desire for freedom and his insistence on his inalienable rights, and
- Conflict becomes inevitable when the preceding factors converge.

From the foregoing bullets, we could conclude that since conflicts are embedded in human actions, reactions, emotions and/or identity, then diversity of ethnicity, culture and religion must, necessarily, have potential for conflict.

The fore-goings could, therefore, explain the high propensities of conflicts (figure 2.2) amongst African states and peoples with plurality of ethnicity, culture and religion as well as divergent worldviews brought together in countries by the colonialists without due regard or consideration for their inherent dissimilarities.

Figure 2.2: *Conflicts in Africa by State Borders*



Source: Peter S. Larson, 2011 (From Murdock's Ethnic Map of 1959)

However, it must be underscored that the preceding determinants (bullets) of ethno/cultural or religious conflict must be aided by institutional failure, exploited by political entrepreneurs (politicians) and complemented by those encumbrances afore-mentioned for conflict stakes to be higher and consequently move conflict from the potential to the actual. As Blagojevic (2009) argued, ethnic conflict occurs when a particular set of factors and conditions converge: a major structural crisis; presence of historical memories of inter-ethnic grievances; institutional factors that promote ethnic intolerance; manipulation of historical memories by

political entrepreneurs to evoke emotions such as fear, resentment, and hate towards the “other”; and an inter-ethnic competition over resources and rights.

We shall now break and deal with each of the components of the diversity (i.e. ethnicity, culture and religion) in order to get detailed perspectives on their conflictive nature or conflict potentials. We now start in the following sequence:

2.4.2 The Conflictive Nature or Conflict Potential of Ethnicity

For a better understanding of the conflictive nature of ethnicity, it is necessary that we understand what ethnicity is, its characteristics, its embodiments or its applications that make it conflictive or make it a strong causal factor of conflict. Osaghae (1995:11) defines ethnicity as the employment or mobilization of ethnic identity and differences to gain advantage in situation of competition, conflict or cooperation. In other words, he suggested that ethnicity could be perceived as a fallback on such factors as ethnic identity, differences, common origins or interests, shared experiences and common history that could provide assurances of solidarity or commonality in times of need such as competition, conflict or cooperation. Rupesinghe (2003) maintained for instance that ethnicity is the mixture of perception and external contextual reality which provides it with meaning. In political theory, "ethnicity" describes a group possessing some degree of coherence and solidarity, composed of people who are aware, perhaps only latently, of having common origins and interests. Thus, according to him, an ethnic group is not a mere aggregate of people but a self-conscious collection of people, united or closely related by shared experiences and a common history. Agiri (1997) defined ethnicity as group dynamism. He argued that ethnic group consists of people characterized by cultural criteria of symbols including language, value systems and normative behaviour and whose

members are anchored in a particular part of the state or territory. In essence, ethnicity is all about social classification emerging from within relationships.

Yinger (1994), identified three ingredients that should be reflected in any definition of an ethnic group, namely: that a group is perceived by others in the society to be different in some combination of the following traits—language, religion, race, and ancestral homeland with its related culture; that members perceive themselves as being different in a number of ways from other groups; and that they participate in shared activities built around their real or mythical common origin and culture.

2.4.3 Political, Economic and Social Applications of Ethnicity

Though ethnicity is emotion- and identity-driven, it remains latent until it is manipulated by those Blagojevic (ibid) described as political entrepreneurs, otherwise called politicians to achieve their own particular ends. Politicians have the tendency or propensity to manipulate and exploit ethnicity for maximum political advantage without minding the negative implications of such action for national stability. This manipulation of ethnicity is feasible because; as Horowitz (1985: 59) argued, “ethnicity embodies an element of emotional intensity that can be readily aroused when the group’s interests are thought to be at stake”. There is no gainsaying the fact of political application of ethnicity being rampant in Africa. For example, Suberu (1994) contended that ethnic and regional polarization went a long way to bring to inglorious end Nigeria’s First Republic, while Amoo (1997) also observed that events in Africa since independence indicates that during periods of political crises, ethnic ties are by far more important to individuals than civil ties. He further drew our attention to the fact that the two forces that operate at the core of politics in Africa are ethnic groups and political parties.


Meanwhile, it should also be underscored that, for instance, during a major structural change (i.e. forceful or democratic change of government), it is quite easy for political entrepreneurs to exploit ethnic/emotion or ethnic polarization in their quest for power by mobilizing their ethnic constituencies and by promoting inter-ethnic animosities using the rhetorical weapons of blame, fear, and hate. Speaking on emotions, such as fear, resentment, mutual suspicions, intolerance, primordial animosities or ancient hatreds, rivalry, selfishness/self-interest, Lakes and Rothchild (1996: 41) believed that they create a context of instability and uncertainty about the political, social, and economic future of the communities, or of collective fears of the future. Crighton (1991:127) noted that social conflicts that take long to resolve are identity-driven and grow out of the feelings of powerlessness and memories of past persecution.

The primordialist approach helps to explain the role of emotions in conflicts and the conflict potential of ethnicity; it states that while ethnic emotions appear to be *primordial*, they are a socially and politically constructed reality – drawn from the historical memories of past injustices and grievances (Blagojevic, *ibid*). Because ethnic emotions are socially and politically constructed reality, the possibilities for cooperation and peaceful cohabitation, according to Suny (2001: 896) are greater. Prazauskas (1991: 581-2), defines a historical memory of an ethnic group as a “set of ideas about the past history of the group, its historical relations with other groups, ethnic images and self-images.”

Unfortunately, the exploitation or manipulation of ethnicity by politicians for political ends is done without regard for its implications for creating political instability and uncertainty about political, social and economic future of the communities. Thus lays the danger of relegating politics of ideas and the lifting of ethnic or religious politics, which

thrives on emotion, to lofty heights in the developing countries which often leads to violent conflicts.

Figure 2.3: 2011 Presidential Election Results show regional divide in Nigeria



Source: Nigerianmuse.com, April 18, 2011

Ethnicity also has economic and social applications. It is not inconceivable that those with state power could use it to deny or deprive other ethnic groups of their privileges, rights and access to socio-economic opportunities, specifically employment, housing, healthy environment and other facilities that make life and living worthwhile. The frustration arising there-from could lead to aggression and ultimately to a fallback on ethnicity or group identity by the deprived to resist, thereby putting ethnicity in the role of influencing the deprived ethnic group to react to the injustice by resorting to fighting those they assumed to be responsible for their plight. It is not unlikely that this recourse may lead to conflict; thus contradicting the main thrust of functionalism that society naturally leans towards homeostasis, therefore, there is little need for social reform because when one part of society malfunctions, the other

parts will adapt and work twice as hard to compensate to maintain stability. However, the resort to self-help by the deprived is in line with Lake and Rothschild's argument, (1996) that ethnic conflict is a sign of state weakness or a state embroiled in ancient loyalties is germane. In this case, states act with bias to favour a particular ethnic group or region, and behaviours such as preferential treatment fuel ethnic conflicts.

2.4.4 The Conflictive Nature of Culture or Conflict Potential of Culture

Culture, which is one of the characteristics of ethnicity or the particular practices and values common to a population living in a given setting or a shared, collective product that provides a repertoire of actions and a standard against which to evaluate the actions of others (Ross, 1993:21), has the potential to cause conflicts within a nation or between nations. For instance, Samuel Huntington (1996) hypothesized that, the fundamental sources of conflicts in the new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economics. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating sources of conflict will be cultural. He then predicted that the conflicts of the future would occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilizations. The conflict-potential of culture among civilizations could become clear from the standpoint that civilization is a cultural entity defined by objective elements such as language (ethnicity), religion, history, institution and the subjective self-identification. Both Enloe, C. (1981: 123-36) and Nagel, J.(1986: 93-112) have argued that countries whose political institutions politicize cultural [ethnic] identity are more vulnerable to cultural [ethnic] conflict than countries whose political institutions promote social integration of diverse cultural groups.

2.4.5 The Conflictive Nature of Religion or Conflict Potential of Religion

There is no unanimity among individuals on the meaning of religion. Individual's perspectives vary. Religion means different things to different people. According to Adeniyi (1993), religion is a body of truths, laws and rites by which man is subordinated to the transcendent being. This implies that religion deals with norms and rules that emanated from God and which must be followed by the believers. To Ejizu (1993), religion is man's intuition of the sacred and ultimate reality and his expression of that awareness in concrete life. Ayinla,(2003) understood religion as a particular system or set of systems in which doctrines, myths, rituals, sentiments and other similar elements are interrelated. Peter (1998) sees it as a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

It has been observed that unlike economic researchers, researchers in political science have emphasized the importance of religious differences as causes of ethnic conflicts. However, questions about why the way to the sublime has become the pathway to religious fanaticism or fundamentalism and subsequent bloodshed still agitate the mind thus: If, indeed, the advent of religions in the world is the culmination of mankind's search for God; if the search for this Transcendent or Supernatural being is out of curiosity or out of genuine desire to acknowledge the centrality of this Superior being in his life and in those things He created to sustain man on the earth, and, finally, if it is to pay Him the well-deserved homage for being the Creator of all things, then why have these religions turned into weapons of destruction? Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005: *ibid*) offered these plausible explanations, "The faith and the family, the blood and the beliefs are the things with which peo-

ple identify themselves, for which they fight and die; also differences in adherents' visions of the relations between God and humans, the uncompromising nature of religious matters, and the fact that religion discriminates and differentiates humans in a sharp and exclusive way, as some of the reasons why religions cause wars".

2.5 Reasons for Conflict: Nigeria's Perennial Diversity Conflicts

The reason for Nigeria's post-amalgamation perennial conflict, which intensified in post-military inter-regnum, could find explanations in mankind's desire for freedom to exercise his unalienable rights without let or hindrance. The colonial period with its philosophy of divide and rule and the military era in Nigerian history represent periods when rights of Nigerians were severely curtailed. It was during the military rule that the concept of internal colonialism when economic and political differences along ethnic lines became much pronounced in Nigeria. Then democratic governance, with its inherent freedom, was ushered in and Nigerians were expressing themselves, asserting and claiming their hitherto curtailed rights freely. Without doubt, freedom, sudden or unexpected, or anticipated, is sweet, but it also carries its dangers, as it could lead to recollection of old wrongs with consequential desires to avenge those wrongs or memories of past injuries incurred as a result of ethnic or religious identity and the whimsical urge to have one's pound of flesh. All of these, invariably, may lead to altercations or at worst, to conflicts. We could liken the concept of freedom to two scenarios: (1) when a bottle of wine that was firmly corked under pressure, was vigorously shaken and then uncorked. Expectedly, the wine will forcibly expel itself with some telling effects; and (2) a dam that is holding large volume of water well above its capacity; if the water was disgorged systematically damage along its catchments will be minimal. But if, by

carelessness on the part of the management, the dam collapses under the deluge of water, the damage will be maximal. Under the two scenarios, there was, literally a desire for freedom, which could be got systematically or by force. What it means is that repression or curtailment of freedom under whatever governance systems is often met by a strong desire to be free, using whatever means available that may include violence. But this event is not without consequences, particularly for those responsible for the repression or the curtailment of freedom and rights, *ab initio*.

In support of this position, Prazauskas (1991: 581-2) opined that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in multinational states means first of all the disintegration of the coercive system of checks and controls. This inevitably leads to ethnic flare-ups as ethnic communities begin to organize, to mobilize their members, and to voice their grievances and demand upon the state and each other. Dixon (1994:14), however, argued that “democratic states...are better equipped than others with the means for diffusing conflict situations at an early stage before they have an opportunity to escalate to military violence.

2.6 Ethno-Religious Diversity and Conflict

2.6.1 Introduction

This sub-section addresses the relationships between ethno/cultural or religious conflict, political instability and national development. Conversely, the sub-section will address the relationships between conflicts, be it ethnic, cultural or religion, and peace, political/economic stability and national development. Though Coser (1956) and Tidwell (1998) had opined that conflicts could have a positive political and social function, this study adopts the dysfunctional use of conflicts. This is because, as a process and in most cases, conflicts leave in its wake destruction of human beings and infrastructures, destabilization of political system and

disintegration of national economy. The possible linkage between instability, arising from the destructive capability of conflict, and economic growth and development will also be the focal attention of this subsection.

Alesina et al (1996), in a sample of 113 countries from 1950 to 1982, analyzed the joint determination of political instability and per-capita GDP growth and find that instability has a negative and significant effect on growth rates. Collier (1999:168-183) showed that under extreme cases of political instability, such as civil war, a country's existing capital stock will suffer from both physical destruction, general neglect, decline or delays in new capital investments during wartime as well as the resort by investors to purely speculative activities or move their money abroad. Thus, it could be concluded that political instability hinders economic development through its effect on the accumulation of physical and human capital. Furthermore, because during period of extreme strife investments are often difficult to reverse, investors will most likely postpone new capital projects until the policy environment clarifies. While many papers in the literature have found political instability to be harmful, Pindyck & Solimano (1993) argued contrarily that economic instability, in the form of high inflation, is more damaging to new investment than political instability. Just as it impacted negatively on physical capital, political instability can also depress the accumulation of human capital. Thus, Maloney (2002) argued that endemic political instability in Latin American countries may, among other factors, be responsible for low levels of human capital for countries in the region.

Likewise, Kaufmann & Kraay (2002) argued that good governance or political stability has a positive effect on per-capita income growth, and that one of the components of good governance is low political instability. Meanwhile, Tulchin & Brown (2002) found inequality to be a significant explanatory variable of political instability because, at least in part, inequality in education, skill, income, and wealth creates an

uncertainty in environment whereby it becomes difficult to promote democracy, and low democracy has been associated with high political instability. To Collier & Hoeffler (2004), poor economic performance could be considered a major cause of political instability.

A host of other researchers including Alesina & Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), and Odedokun & Round (2001) had shown empirically that countries with high income inequality are more likely to be politically unstable.

From the preceding research outcomes, it will not be far-fetched to conclude that both political and economic instabilities are harmful to economic growth and development. Furthermore, there is a fundamental mutual dependence of economic growth and development because for economic growth to take place, there must be tangible improvements in levels of incomes, savings and investment, and for development, there must be a consistent and sustainable or sustained rate of economic growth.

The effect of low growth as a result of decline in or low investment could be seen clearly from the vicious cycle of development concept, which argues that low level of investment leads to low level of productivity, which in turn leads to low level of national income that also leads to low level of savings. All of these are critical factors of economic development. Thus for development to take place, there is need for concerted efforts of government to break this vicious cycle, particularly of poverty; by increasing the levels of income, savings and investment. The essence of breaking the vicious cycle of poverty is to be able to meet the basic needs of the citizenry while also improving their welfare and standard of living, which are indices of development.

Omorgbe & Omohan (2005) had implicated high level of poverty in the frequency of occurrence of ethno-religious crises in Nigeria. Ibrahim's (2008) research on causes of ethno-religious crises in Kano State discovered that poor economic base of the populace carried the highest

percentage of 34.9%, while religious fundamentalism followed with 31.8%.

It must be underscored however, that to stem the tide instability, potential conflict situations must be diffused institutionally. The state has the monopoly of the institutional wherewithal to stop or promote conflicts. Reasoning along this line, Crawford (1998:556) therefore argued that countries whose political institutions politicize cultural [ethnic] identity are more vulnerable to cultural [ethnic] conflict than countries whose political institutions promote social integration of diverse cultural groups.

2.6.2 Impact of Ethnic and Religious Diversity Conflicts on Development

Meanwhile, in order to avoid sweeping generalization on the effect or impact of ethnic and religious diversity on conflict, growth and development, and to assist government in its choice of policy instruments in dealing with conflict and its consequence, it will be helpful or useful to examine various existing work on diversity/heterogeneity of ethnicity and religion and their impact on conflict, growth and development.. In this regard, Montalvo, et al (2005: 293-323) in their study on 'Ethnic Diversity and Development' have differentiated between categories of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity while they have at the same time assessed their effects on conflict, growth and development. In many instances, studies on ethno-linguistic and religious diversities and the divisions and tensions they generated could potentially have a strong conflict dimension, which constitutes a social cost that, expectedly, impinges on growth. Several authors including Mauro (1995), show that a high level of ethno-linguistic diversity implies a lower level of investment. Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic diversity has a direct negative effect on economic growth. Montalvo, et al (2005: *ibid*) employ the indices of ethno-linguistic polarization and ethno-linguistic

fractionalization as well as religious polarization and fractionalization to ascertain the effects these variables have on direct or indirect channels of growth and development. Index of polarization/fractionalization is used to measure or capture ethnic/religious diversity as well analyse the relationship between potential ethnic/religious conflict (arising from heterogeneity) and growth and development

The results of the research efforts on the effects of ethno- linguistic/religious fractionalization or polarization on growth and development are treated as follows:

- a) *Comparison of difference between ethno-linguistic polarization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization and their effects on growth and development.*

With respect to (a) above, Montalvo et al (2005; *ibid*) had observed that ethno-linguistic fractionalization has a negative and significant effect on growth, while ethno-linguistic polarization has no statistically significant direct effect. On the other hand, the level of ethno-linguistic polarization has the expected impact on investment, government consumption and the incidence of a civil war, while ethno-linguistic fractionalization has no effect on those indirect channels (i.e. investment, government consumption), and thus no empirical justification to argue that the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth is due to its impact on the indirect channels above mentioned. Meanwhile, they asserted that many authors had argued that the reason for that negative effect was that a high degree of ethnic fractionalization increases potential conflict, which has negative effects on investment and increases rent seeking activities.

- (b) *Religious and ethnic diversity and their effects on growth and economic development*

In (b) above, Montalvo et al agreed with Easterly and Levine's (1997) conclusion that ethnic diversity has a direct negative effect on

economic growth; and with La Porta et al's (1999) suggestion that ethnic diversity is one of the factors explaining the quality of government.

(c) Differences between the effects of religious polarization and religious fractionalization on conflict, growth and development

With respect to (c), Montalvo et al (2005: *ibid*) found that religious fractionalization has no direct effect on economic growth. Also they concluded, based on Collier and Hoeffler (2002), that religious fractionalization had no effect on the risk of conflict. However, by contrast, they found an important effect of religious polarization in the explanation of economic development, through its impact on civil wars, the rate of investment, and the proportion of government consumption over GDP. In fact, the indirect effect of polarization on economic growth is as large as the direct effect of fractionalization. Also religious polarization has the expected effect of decreasing investment and increasing the proportion of public consumption over GDP and the likelihood of a civil war while the effect of religious fractionalization is the opposite to the expected. A high level of religious polarization increases the likelihood of a civil conflict and the share of government consumption on GDP while religious fractionalization has the opposite effect.

(d) Comparison of different effects of ethno-linguistic fractionalization versus ethno-linguistic polarization on investment, government consumption and development.

With respect to (d) above, it was observed by these researchers that ethno-linguistic fractionalization had a negative and significant effect on growth, while ethno-linguistic polarization has no statistically significant direct effect. On the other hand, the level of ethno-linguistic polarization has the expected impact on investment, government consumption and the incidence of a civil war, while ethno-linguistic fractionalization has no effect on those indirect channels. Therefore, there seems to be no empirical justification to argue that the negative effect of ethnic frac-

tionalization on growth is due to its impact on the indirect channels above mentioned.

(e) *Effects of ethnic or religious polarization on economic development*

Study (e) above reveals that ethnic or religious polarization has a large and negative effect on economic development through the reduction of investment and the increase of government consumption and the probability of a civil war. Furthermore religious polarization has the expected effect of decreasing investment and increasing the proportion of public consumption over GDP and the likelihood of a civil war while the effect of religious fractionalization is the opposite to the expected. A high level of religious polarization increases the likelihood of a civil conflict and the share of government consumption on GDP while religious fractionalization has the opposite effect. Finally, ethnic polarization has a negative effect on investment.

2.7 Impact of Political System on Stability and Development

2.7.1 Introduction

The premise of this subsection is that ethnic/cultural or religious diversity per se does not lead to conflict. It is the functional failure or encouragement of the type of government in operation in a country, the relevant constitution in operation plus other institutional mechanisms that are partly responsible for why the potentials of conflict, arising from multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion are not nipped in the bud. We have in mind the functional relationship between relevant political system/regime type (democratic, autocratic, unitary, theocratic or monarchical political system), the constitution relevant to countries with diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups and the incidence of conflict. We shall review extant literature on this relationship starting with:

2.7.2 The Implications of Political System/Regime and Diversity for Stability

Many studies have highlighted the importance of regime type to political stability. Both Ellingsen (2000) and Parsa (2003) had argued that democratic regimes tend to experience less political instability than undemocratic regimes because they allow citizens to participate in the political process. According to Rummel (1995), by allowing political participation, violence will be less likely to arise in democratic regimes because conflict can be solved through voting and consensus. It is very likely that in a democracy, a regime that fails to meet the basic needs of the citizenry will be voted out in the next fair and free election. Thus, a sensitive and responsible government in power will always strive to meet socio-economic needs of the populace. The provision of the basic needs of the citizens is likely to placate them and thus have a stabilizing effect on the political environment. In this regard, Auvinen (1997) opined that democracies divert resources from investment to consumption, which allows democratic regimes to provide more economic and political goods, thus alleviating deprivation and discontent. Feng (1997), in a sample of 96 countries from 1960 to 1980, presents evidence of a positive relationship between democracy and stability.

Researches have also found that democratic governance system is adequate in ensuring peace, cordiality and stability in diverse societies. According to Prazauskas (1991:581-2), in a democratic multinational state, stability is generally maintained by means of political bargaining and compromise between ethnic subgroups. In the same vein, Dixon (1994:14.) was of the opinion that “democratic states are better equipped than others with the means for diffusing conflict situations at an early stage before they have an opportunity to escalate to military violence. However, Brunner disclosed that in the communist systems, “nationality [ethnicity] conflicts were suppressed, compulsorily canalized or even consciously instrumentalized.”

In support of our premise that diversity per se does not lead to conflict, some scholars see beauty in diversity. For instance, Adesuyi, Albert and Kan (2011) likened diversity to a budding flower with many beautiful petals that complement each other in adding beauty to the environment, thus making it an asset to any nation. To them, diversity makes it possible for Nigeria to be one of the most culturally significant nations in the world, as reflected in the variety of languages, food, dresses, songs, festivals and cultural sites in the country.

Osaghae and Suberu (2005) in support of the fact that diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict, posited that, contrary to suggestion that diversity is a necessity but not a sufficient condition for conflict, the fact that a country has different ethnic, communal, religious, and racial groups does not make divisions and conflicts inevitable. They further argued that empirical evidences had shown that divisions and conflicts are not dependent on the degree of diversity as some of the most diverse countries like Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia and Tanzania enjoy relative peace and stability while some least diverse are the most unstable or violent for example, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and perhaps Sri Lanka. James Fearon and David Laitin (2003) contended that a greater degree of ethnic and religious diversity by itself is not a major and direct cause of violent civil conflict but the associated condition like poverty that favours insurgencies.

2.7.3 Relevant Constitutional Framework and its Implications for Diversity, Conflict and Stability

To eschew the perennial conflicts, abort the doomsday predictions about Nigeria's eventual disintegration and set Nigeria on the path of sustainable growth and development, internal cohesion engendered by institutionalization of appropriate constitution is sine-qua-non. In other words, beside policy instruments and relevant regime-type/political system, constitution is another important institutional tool available to

political leadership in managing or regulating diversity effectively. While other constitutions employ tool of suppression or over-centralised power to control or regulate inter-ethnic/cultural and religious relations, federal constitution or federalism has been found to be a very efficacious and effective tool that could ensure inter-ethnic, cultural and religious cooperation, sustained harmony and peaceful cohabitation in diverse society without unnecessary coercion. Its employment by courageous political leadership can therefore be the panacea for diversity conundrum.

So, what is this federalism or what are the characteristics of a federal constitution or what makes it a useful tool to ensure unity and harmony in diversity? In his book *Federalism: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations*, David Nice defined it as "a system of government that includes a national government and at least one level of sub-national governments that enables each level to make some significant decisions independent of the others. This independent decision-making is not absolute as one level of government influences another in many ways. These sub-national governments may include different levels from states to provinces to local governments. Tenorio, (2000) opined that federal states could best be viewed as being at the midpoint of a continuum with unitary systems at one end and confederations at the other.

Obafemi Awolowo (1981) proposed constitutional framework from which Nigeria's political leadership could choose while taking cognizance of Nigeria's heterogeneity/diversity as follows:

- If a country is unilingual and uni-national, the constitution must be unitary.
- If a country is unilingual or bilingual or multilingual, and also consists of communities which, over a period of years, have developed divergent nationalities, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organized on the dual basis of language and nationality.

- If a country is bilingual or multilingual, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organized on linguistic basis.

He concluded his proposal with an assertion that any experiment with a unitary constitution in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country must fail, in the long run.

In the opinion of Muhammad (2007: 2), federalism represents a unique form of governmental arrangement that involves organization of the state in such a manner that it promotes unity while at the same time preserving existing diversities within an over arching national entity. Implicit in this opinion that federalism is a system which mediates the potential and actual conflict that often arises from the heterogeneity of a political entity.

Abdullahi and Saka (2007) were of the opinion that the search for an enduring system of government for heterogeneous country like Nigeria necessitates the adoption of a federal system of government. Alkali, (2004) believed that, world-over, federal system is conceived as political arrangements that afford an opportunity for the myriad diversities within a political system to find legitimate expression. Still on federalism/federal system, Oyeneye et al, (1998).declared that in a federal system of government, constitutional powers are shared among the component units that are constitutionally recognized and largely autonomous. According to Jega (1998), in adopting federalism for Nigeria, the British conceived it as an administrative convenience that was meant to provide for unity in diversity by safeguarding, protecting and preserving the cultural differences while at the same time lessening mutual fears and suspicions among the ethnic groups with a view to laying the foundation for national development, progress and advancement.

Wheare (1959) did not only define federalism, he gave a vivid description of federal principles. He refers to federalism as a "method of

dividing powers so that general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent of one another." A workable federalism for the British academic is one wherein no level of government is able "to override the terms of agreement about the power and status which each is to enjoy." Distribution of powers between and among the different levels is the domain of the constitution. In this regard, Wheare considered the United States as embodying the modern concept of federalism, wherein the constitution provides that the national and state governments "are not subordinate to one another, but coordinate with each other."

Wherea's (1959) proposition posits that the federal principle essentially entails a legal division of powers and functions among levels of government with a written constitution guaranteeing and reflecting the division. He gave the basic tenets of federalism as follows:

- a. There must be at least two levels of governments and there must be constitutional division of powers among the levels of governments.
- b. Each level of government must be co-ordinate and independent.
- c. Each level of government must be financially independent in order to afford each level of government the opportunity of performing their functions without depending or appealing to the others for financial assistance.
- d. There must be Supreme Court of an independent judiciary that will resolve conflict that may arise from power sharing.
- e. In terms of the amendment of the constitution, no levels of government should have undue power over the amendment process.

He maintained that, once a country is able to satisfy these conditions, such country is said to be practicing true federalism.

Since, according to Justice Albie Sachs of South Africa (IDEA, 2000), 'a constitution is an autobiography of the nation' and constitution

making is a process by which a nation births and writes itself, its past, present and future', it is therefore the onerous responsibility of Nigerians to write the constitution that will stand the test of time, be timeless and be accommodating of the "mosaic of diversities" (Osaghae, 1989) and "the sociological mixed grill"(Soroma, 1983) that Nigeria is. This means, going by Awolowo's rational and unassailable opinion, "only a federal constitution is well suited to uniting Nigeria, and generate harmony amongst its diverse racial and linguistic groups" (Awolowo, 1981:4). However, this study strongly believes that the federal constitution must embrace fiscal federalism so that the federating units are constitutionally financially independent to discourage the current practice of over-dependence of constituent states on federal revenue allocations to meet their developmental needs.

In view of Awolowo's conclusion and contrary to Adebayo's (2010) misgivings or discomfiture with federalism and his ascription of anarchy to this system of government, it is the way federalism is practiced in Nigeria, that is over-centralization or over-concentration of power in the central government without regard for the principles of federalism and fiscal federalism that is responsible for Olusegun Obasanjo's (1984) following lamentations: "Fear, suspicion, intolerance, and greed have been constant in every crisis and confrontation in Nigeria... It is the psychological fear of discrimination and domination. It is fear of deprivation or not getting one's fair share... It is variously described, at the political level as constitutional imbalance; at economic level as uneven distribution of national cake; and at the educational development level as inequality of opportunity". As a matter of fact, it is federal constitution that will adequately address the issues contained in Olusegun Obasanjo's speech as it guarantees equity and fairness.

Figure 2.4: Feature of Federalism



Source:<http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/guest-articles/the-uae-example-of-federalism-a-lesson-for-nigeria.html>

2.7.4 Impact of Constitutional Secularism on Religious Diversity, Conflict and Stability

Religious crisis or conflict in a multi-religious society presupposes the absence of relevant constitutional framework that will forestall the intrusion of religion into state or public affairs and vice versa, or where the constitutional provisions for the separation of state from religion exist, the political leadership lacks the political will to enforce relevant provisions of the constitution that ensure the separation of religion from public or state affairs. It is presumed that the constitution and its relevant provisions can protect religion from deliberate or inadvertent politicization or forestall the intrusion of the secular into the divine by ensuring their separation from each other. The mechanism that is presumed will ensure that desired separation of religion from the public or state affairs or maintain some form of neutrality and independence with regard to religious matters, but also allow religious freedom, particularly in a multi-ethnic, cultural and religious societies is constitution secularism. Omotola (2007) views secularism as being commonly regarded as ‘an ideology that holds that religious issues should not be the basis of Poli-

tics, or (in the extreme) that religion has no place in public life', and that it essentially seeks to preserve the religious neutrality of government and cultures. And quoting Andrew Coates in (Birchall, I. 2007: 1), Omotola held that Secularism connotes 'the freedom of the public sphere from religious dogma.

It is necessary to underscore the fact that there is no consensus amongst authors on the concept of secularism, its meaning and what it stands for. To some critics, the conception of secularism as a separation of religion and state was a contradiction of the facts of history, because, according to Antje Jackelen (2005: 863), 'the secular,' 'is a companion of religion rather than its enemy.' John Hendryx (2006) believed that the pretended neutrality, often associated with secularism, had placed secularists in dominant position, thereby handling them exclusive power in public policy processes. This, according to him, has not allowed for the use of secularism against the 'intrusive religious tyranny' of the secularists into public policy. Despite the lack of consensus, considering the diverse ethnic, cultural and religious configurations and in view of the desire of the Nigeria state to seek not only to maintain some form of neutrality and independence on religious matters but also allow Nigerians religious freedom, Nigeria has adopted secularism in its constitution, essentially to demarcate between the two realms – state and religion – and by so doing reduce the influence of religion (a powerful force of identity) on nation-building, or put an end to the politicization of religion, which had caused Nigeria its peace, tranquillity and stability.

The 1999 Nigerian constitution provides in section 10(1) that 'the government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion' (FRN, 1999). This provision is further strengthened by section 38 (1-3) of the constitution, which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Section 38(1) stipulates:

Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief,

and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance (FRN, 1999).

In spite of the adoption of constitutional secularism by the Nigerian state, religious intolerance, fundamentalism and accompanying conflicts are on the increase. It will, however, be counter-productive for Nigeria to jettison secularism as a veritable tool for religious balancing, harmony and tolerance, and for ensuring religious conflict-free Nigeria. Instead, Nigerian government must embrace it whole-heartedly, because in a multi-religious society like Nigeria, the state must not be seen playing a religious role. Meanwhile, it behoves the government to search for reasons why secularism is not working in the country.

2.7.5 Relevance of Institutions to Resolving Conflicts

It should be emphasized that the availability of the array of theories and analytical tools are by themselves not enough to prevent, terminate or suppress conflict. To resolve conflicts in ways acceptable and satisfactory to parties to the conflicts State with its institutions must be involved. This is because the State has effective institutions with power of both coercion and persuasion. This is in addition to its expertise to initiate the process of conflict resolution and transformation which leads to settlement of the conflict in manners that are satisfactory and acceptable to the parties such that the recurrence of the conflict in future is foreclosed. Bojana Blagojevic (2009) saw institutions as playing an important role in regulating the level of the conflict potential of ethnicity just as they (institutions) define inter-ethnic relationships by either facilitating or obstructing inter-group cooperation. With regard to employment of institutional tool in conflict management, Crawford (1998: 17, 597-8) noted that institutions “both constrain behaviour and provide incentives for cooperation and compliance in norms, rules, and proce-

dures for allocation, participation, representation, and accountability. She was enthusiastic about institutional approach to the extent that she was certain that its proponents could claim that the approach played an important role in resolving the nineteenth century tensions among the three ethnic groups in Switzerland through the adoption of the current political system (consociational democracy) which institutionalizes ethnic pluralism and gives the three groups equivalent power-sharing. Her position was supported by Lijphart (1968) when he opined that “consociational politics” or political arrangements that promote bargaining and representation of conflicting interests could reduce the potential for violence.

From the Swiss example, it could be concluded that the management of conflicts is within the purview of political leadership who must, necessarily, be courageous, visionary and proactive and who will look beyond the immediate in the attempts to manage the anticipated as well as the unanticipated outcomes of ethnic/cultural and religious conflicts, using institutional means available to it.

2.7.6 Role of Civil Society Organizations in Conflict and Development

The institutional approach to preventing, managing and resolving conflict of whatever hues does not and should not preclude the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs), which composition includes but not limited to both local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), gender organizations, et cetera in conflict and peace fields. The London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society defines civil society as the set of institutions, organizations and behaviour situated between the state, the business world, and the family. Konteh (2006: 272) quoting (German *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* or bourgeois society) refers to Civil Society as the system of social relations

based on association of people independently of the state and the family. He warned the fact the Civil Society organizations (CSOs) are independent of government, they should not be viewed as playing opposition role to the State, but should be viewed mainly as counterpoise to bad governance that is at the roots of conflicts and instability. Thus they should be perceived as agents for sustaining democratic governance and stability.

Their complementary and supportive roles to the state in pre-conflict mediation, prevention and management as well as the post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation/recovery efforts have been acknowledged globally. For instance, Konteh (ibid) again acknowledged that during conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire CSOs were active in mediation, reconciliation, and post-recovery efforts and had emerged as indispensable partner in peace building. By virtues of the indispensability of peace and stability in national growth and development, and because of the active roles of CSOs in them, they should, along with other institutions, form the nucleus of the institutional approach for anticipating, preventing and resolving conflicts.

2.8 Theoretical Framework

2.8.1 Introduction

In view of the complexities of the Nigerian situations that more often than not result to incessant conflicts, the conceptual or theoretical framework of this study will adopt from the array of conflict theories available relevant ones that will suitably explain the dynamics of multi-ethnicity, culture, religion in Nigeria's troubled march to nationhood and its search for stability growth and development. In this regard, the study will review, among others, some of the conflict theories that range from

structural, realist, frustration-aggression, human needs, psycho-cultural to systemic conflict theories. This is because these conflict theories are well suited to the specific challenges and context of Nigeria, and thus could be used to explain the nature, the causes and the impacts of conflicts on the Nigerian economy. In addition to the theories, the section will also provide searchlight on the different methods of conflict resolution and transformation as well as conflict analytical tool available to researchers.

In addition however, economic growth theory will be utilized in view of the fact that conflict impacts negatively on political and economic stability. Yet, the essence of political and economic stability is to ensure favourable environment for investment without which economic growth will be difficult to achieve. It is recognized that increased investment will generate more national income which will in turn lead to increased national savings, et cetera. These progressive economic trends will reverse the familiar vicious cycle of development theoretical concept, stabilize the polity and the economy, and thus impact positively on the economic welfare and well-being of the nation, which is otherwise called development.

The theoretical framework will provide reasons for Nigeria's state of anomie, deepen our understanding of conflicts in all their ramifications and serve as veritable and realistic tools for the realistic resolution of conflict inherent in Nigeria's internal dynamics of multi-ethnic, cultural and religious configurations.

2.9 Relevant Conflict Theories and Growth Models

2.9.1 Introduction

Conflict has been described as a phenomenon that is an important part of human existence (Isard, 1992:1), as a natural part of our daily lives (Weeks, 1992: ix) that is identity-based and which causes cannot

be explained by a single factor. According to Faleti (2006: 35), the emergence, escalation, or protraction of conflict cannot be explained by a single factor. Additionally, conflict can also be variously defined as;

- perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously” (Rubin & Pruitt, 1994: 5);
- a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources” (Rubin & Pruitt, 1994).
- a struggle over status, power and scarce resources in which the sole aim of the parties involved are not only to gain the desired value but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals (Coser 1996), and
- a struggle and rivalry for objects of importance to the group or individual (Osaghae, 2001).

From the above definitions, it can be surmised that conflict is human/people/identity-based, and as such must involve intense emotions that could be manipulated by humans to achieve specific ends that may be resisted by others; it is about competition between humans for position or resources that are limited or scarce, and it is also about incompatibility of man’s interests, threatened interests, unmet needs, fears of domination, or of losing privileges. From the preceding, it is obvious that the underlying issues of conflict theories are humans, their inter-relationships, their needs, their struggles for acquisition, control and retention of power, and their value differences, all of which explain conflict, its nature, causes, impacts, resolution and management, and they are the essence of conflict theory. This will become apparent as we discuss some of conflict theories relevant to this study as follow:

2.9.2 Structural Conflict Theory

The main argument of structural theory is that conflict arises from how polity or society is structured or organized. (Gaya-Best; 2006: 41) If the structure encourages political domination, economic exclusion, deprivation, inequity, inequality, injustice and discrimination, conflict will be inevitable. In an ethnic, cultural and religious diverse society, conflict becomes inevitable if power structure is skewed in favor of a particular group, because in such a scenario there is bound to be reactions against such an arrangement. Scarborough (1998) supported this argument when he asserted thus, “in a situation where existing structures are tilted in favor of one group while putting the other(s) at a disadvantage; where holders of certain power or privileges are unwilling the rights of others to be different.....the chances are that conflict will emerge and escalate if nothing is done to correct such anomalies”.

Collier, (2000, 2) opined that Structural conflict theory considers incompatibility of interests that often spurs competition for scarce resources, as being responsible for conflict. This theory is suitable for an exposition on Nigeria’s political structure and the deadly struggles among its majority ethnic groups and then the resistance and antagonistic cooperation from minority ethnic groups, leading to incessant conflicts and consequent instability and national retrogression. This is to be expected as the acquisition of political power confers on the holder-group unlimited access to the control and use of natural resources. This view is in accord with position of Khotari (1979: 6), which states” that the control and use of (natural resources lies at the heart of the deepening crises in the world today”.

2.9.3 Conflict Transformation Theory

According to Fisher (2000: 8), problems of inequality and injustice, which are caused by competing social, cultural and economic frame-

works, are at the root of conflict transformation theory. The theory also sometimes addresses the reactions of individuals, groups, cultures, institutions and societies to change. Change, it is agreed, is ever inevitable and is the only thing that is permanent in the affairs of man. Yet man often resists change. The June 12, 1993 Presidential election won by a Nigerian from the South but annulled by Nigerian military junta headed by a Northerner, and the current terror unleashed by Boko Haram have their roots in the resistance of a section of the country to change of political power.

In a way, change and resistance to it is the focus or central theme of the transformation theory. The way out of this type of mindset is for a focused and courageous political leadership to, in spite of resistance, change structures and frameworks that cause inequality, injustice and political domination for the attainment of the long-term objective of political stability of plural or homogeneous society.

2.9.4 Realist Theory of Conflict

This theory ascribes the root cause of conflict to the flaws inherent in human nature which are seen as selfish, brutish, individualistic, and naturally conflictive. Man is always in pursuit of power and competing over scarce resources with a view to acquiring them without minding if others' interests are injured. His driving forces are self-interest and pursuit of power. Morgenthau (1973: 4) and other Structural realists like Walt (1959: 232) argue that states (like humans) will always pursue their national interests defined as power, and that such interest will come into conflict with those of others leading to the inevitability of conflict.

2.9.5 Frustration-Aggression Theory of Conflict

The main explanation of this theory is that conflict is caused by unmet or unfulfilled needs of individuals or groups. According to Feiera-

bends (1969:256-7), when there is a difference between what people feel they want or deserve and what they actually get conflict becomes inevitable. Davies, (1962: 6) argued that the divergence between expected need satisfaction and actual need satisfaction leads people into conflict with those they consider responsible for the non-attainment or non-actualization of their needs.

In contrast to realist theory of conflict, this theory does not ascribe conflict to flaws inherent in human nature rather the theory believes that conflict is the outcome of frustration arising from denial of legitimate desires of individuals or groups due to the way society is structured. Expectedly, the feeling of disappointment over the denial of their legitimate desires may lead to overreaction through anger, which is invariably directed at those assumed to be responsible directly or indirectly for their plight. For instance, the frustration of the people of the Niger-Delta area of Nigeria, where major oil exploration and exploitation that earns Nigeria almost 90% of its revenue takes place, over what they considered as a deliberate neglect of the area by the federal government of Nigeria and the multi-national oil companies, and the people's paradoxical poverty led to the just ended destructive militancy or conflict in the area. It is hoped that the interventions that ended that conflict will be sustained and sustainable.

2.9.6 Psycho-Cultural Conflict Theory

This theory is otherwise known as Identity Theory of Conflict because of its ethnic, cultural and religious biases. The theory, according to Crighton (1991: 127 in Gaya-Best, 2006) underscores the role of ethnicity/culture in inducing conflict because of feelings of threatened identity, powerlessness and memories of past persecution, history of humiliation, oppression, and victimization..... and other forms of experiences that wear away a person's dignity and self-esteem and make them as victims to respond vindictively and defensively violently to

protect their individuality or group's self-worth/self-esteem or dignity. The resort to vengeance constitutes part of what is referred to as the 'pathological dimensions of ethnicity' (Rothschild and Groth, 1995). The theory, according to Ross (1993:18), shows how conflicts are induced when enemy images are created from deep-seated attitudes about human action that are learned from early stages of growth. In other words, psycho-cultural theory could be seen to deal with the totality of man, his way of life, his attitudes and perspectives on wide-ranging issues, all of which have become embedded in man's subconscious and could lend themselves to constraining inter-ethnic, cultural or religious relationships to stir-up conflicts. Bassey (2003: 117,118) explains it as dispositions which determine the overall level of conflict in a society in terms of shared assumption, perceptions and images about what people in a society value, their definitions of friends and foes, and the means groups and individuals use to pursue their goals. Avruch et al (1991) argued that psycho-cultural explanations look to the actors themselves and how they interpret the world.

Furthermore, this theory deals with discrimination against individuals or deprivation of individuals' rights and needs on the basis of their identities. For instance, while leadership ineptitude and unfavourable economic factor prevailing in the periods leading to the military intervention in 1966 could be implicated, it was, arguably, the resentment of dominance of the Nigerian public sector by the Igbo ethnic group and the corresponding backlash it attracted that caused the 1967-70 Nigeria's civil war. In support of this position, Chinua Achebe (2012: 74-77) recalled from his small book entitled *The Trouble with Nigeria* that Nigerians will probably achieve consensus on no other matter than common resentment of the Igbo. He also referred to a publication from Northern Nigeria called "The Nigerian situation: facts and background" in which, according to him, the Igbo were cast as assertive group that unfairly dominated almost every sector of Nigerian society.

2.9.7 Violence and the Sacred: Theory of Violence and Scapegoat

This theory was propounded by Rene Girard (1977). From the perspectives of Gregory, P (1972) and Townsley (2003), Girard ascribes violence to rivalry arising from what he called mimetic desire, which he linked to ritual sacrifice, considered to be a source of religion. All religious rituals evolve from the surrogate or ritual victim. According to him, humans are mimetic creatures that imitate what they see in others, and desire what they copy from others. As it is characteristic of mimetism, desire for an object by one often arouses in another man the desire for same object which he would, otherwise, have not desired. This leads to rivalry, and rivalry in turn transforms desire into hatred, conflict and violence. The reason being that there are two people vying for one object, with each determined to prevent the other from appropriating the object. Meanwhile, in the opinion of Girard the person who prevents us from satisfying a desire which he himself has inspired in us is truly an object of hatred. However, the two individuals may not engage themselves violently with destructive intent. Instead, they rediscover the object of their original desire and "deflect their destructive energy from one another onto a substitute" (Wallace 1994, 10). Thus was born the theory of scapegoat. Scapegoat is an individual that was sacrificed for the problems that he has no direct connection with. He is otherwise a substitute victim, a ritual victim or a surrogate victim- the source of all rituals and religion. The substitute victim is the single victim for all the members of the community while the surrogate victim is the victim drawn from outside the community- the process involves violence that could be generative. Yet, in spite of this sacrificial substitution or sacrificial killing of the surrogate victim or the scapegoat with its ritual connotation, the problems of mimetic desire, (or of the community) remain unresolved.

In summary, we can say that theory of scapegoat, violence and the sacred involves mimetic desire, rivalry, conflict/violence and the sacrifi-

cial/ritual/surrogate victim from which religion evolved, which protects man from his own violence through rituals or sacrifices.

2.9.8 Human Needs Theory

This theory posits that the denial or frustration of basic needs of man, which could be distilled from the works of Rosati et al (1990), Burton (1979) and Azar (1994) to include food, shelter, sex, reproduction, freedom safety, survival, security, protection, affection/love, participation, recognition of identity, et cetera, all of which are hard to give up, could lead to violent conflict. Burton further identified a link between this theory and the frustration-aggression theory, Gurr (1970) believed that the inability to sufficiently meet and satisfy the economic needs of man coupled with political imbalance will lead to growth in economic and political problems, which will eventually lead to conflicts. This, according to him was the central issues addressed by Human needs theory of conflict.

2.10 Growth Theories

2.10.1 Introduction

Why should this study incorporate growth theory as a means of articulating policy response to both political and economic instability brought about by conflict? As a starting point, we propose that it is quite illogical to divorce politics from economics and vice versa. Thus logically, political instability cannot be divorced from economic instability and vice versa. Just as conflict could be a source of political instability with consequences for destruction of social and economic infrastructures, which ultimately impact negatively on the national productive capacity, so also economic instability could result in the emasculation of an economy's productive capacity, in the under-utilization of its scarce

resources and the inability to meet national objectives of self-sufficiency and self-reliance, which often manifest in deterioration in all development indices- decline in the living standards of the citizenry, increase in poverty level, decrease in foreign exchange earnings, huge external debts and other socio-economic malaise- that can lead to violent conflict.

In this connection, particularly in Africa, globalization and the globalization-led Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had been implicated in the causes of conflict. Globalization is the process of integrating the world culturally, economically, politically and technologically. But to Ake (1995: 23), “globalization is about growing structural differentiation and functional integration in the world economy; it is growing interdependence across the globe... it is about the emergence of global mass culture driven by mass advertising and technical advances in mass communication”.

Despite the ascribed elevated role of market mechanisms in globalization as an instrument of nurturing and encouraging innovation among social actors and as an instrument for rationalization in the distribution of planet’s resources (Hamoudu, 2000:31), there is the obvious snag that the benefits and cost (losses) are not evenly distributed amongst the countries of the North and South of the world. The obvious fact is that the losses are largely skewed against the less developed countries (LDCs) of the South. This is to be expected given the historical technological and developmental gaps between the North and the South. Thus, given the imbalance in the allocation of benefits and losses by globalization, any countries in Africa or any countries of the South are expected to be marginalized. The implication of the allocation imbalance of globalization according to Khor (2001: 16) is that it will lead to polarization between the few countries and groups that gain and the many countries and groups in a society that lose out or are marginalized. What this translates to are antagonisms, animosities, anguish, or at worse conflicts

amongst groups in societies that lose out (i.e. countries of the South including Nigeria).

On the other hand, with respect to the Structural Adjustment Programme the process may differ, but the end result is the same. Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is the re-adjustment of the structure of production with emphasis on market mechanism for the allocation of resources, or it is the restructuring of production process and dependence on the market forces in the allocation of resources. SAP relies on tools such as deregulation of the market, liberalization of the economy, commercialization or privatization of the public enterprises, devaluation of national currency and withdrawal of subsidy. Meanwhile, the removal of subsidy, the devaluation of currency and the liberalization policy have the combined effects of triggering-off unprecedented human misery and economic hardships such that in most countries that adopted SAP there was large scale social unrest and political instability. The reason for this aftermath is that the adoption and implementation of SAP, with its outright reliance on market forces by most countries, is without consideration for human welfare. This tends to provoke turbulence, serious instability and possible disintegration (Aina, 1997: 42).

So, in a way, globalization and SAP became major sources of conflicts in countries of Africa and the South as a whole. And flowing from this, it could be asserted that the political cum economic instability and conflict-nexus has brought about a triad of marginalization, deepening of poverty and conflict. The impact of deepening poverty, on socio-economic and political space, is captured copiously by Savigny (1990) when she noted that: "Deepening poverty is already leading to mounting instability. The widespread unrest, turmoil or violence which is now afflicting an unprecedented number of countries is linked by one common thread of growing economic malaise, regardless of ethnic and political guises it adopts. In Liberia, Rwanda, the Horn of Africa, poverty is

the tinder which ignites the resentments and fears that all people and communities harbour”.

Thus, there is logic in asserting the indivisibility of political instability and economic instability, and the poverty and misery they spawned, as a causative factor of identity-based conflict. This assertion is corroborated by our earlier observation that just as political instability has the tendency to impact negatively on the social and economic infrastructures so also is economic instability capable of negating and regressing developmental progress.

From the globalization and structural adjustment programme-interface, we will not just conclude that; politics could not be divorced from economics, but that the conceptualization of development should go beyond the efficiency in the management of scarce resources and increased productivity consideration to include what Adetula (2006: 388) called the broad social and political questions that are central to conflicts. The aim, according to Adetula (*ibid*) is to justify the hypothesis that the crisis of African development, is at the root of the incessant conflicts on the continent. From the fore-going, we could also say that conflicts, resolution of conflicts and the success of post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts are inextricably linked to the developments in the political and economic spheres.

As an additional response to the legitimate and relevant question posed at the beginning of the sub-section, it could be said that because conflict leads to both political and economic instability, it is necessary that a focused political leadership put in operation processes that will restore stability to the two important sectors (i.e. political and economic). Once political stability is restored, investors' confidence is also restored. The next crucial step is to put in operation the modality for growing the economy. Only growth model will provide the required guidelines or ideas for achieving the objective of growing the economy and the consequent economic stability.

2.10.2 Harrod-Domar and Two-Gap Growth Models

According to Olopoenia (1989: 9), some of the conclusions and consensus of most growth models including the Harrod-Domar and the 'the Two-Gap' models are:

- Output growth depends on the growth of labour force, capital, natural resources and technical-know-how;
- The growth of the above-named variables and their effects on output depend on their productivities;
- The rate of investment and savings are important determinants of the growth of the output;
- Most growth theories are concerned with the analysis of the rates of savings and capital or investment in growth process.

Like the Vicious cycle of Development Theoretical Concept we discussed earlier in the literature review, Harrod-Domar Growth model (Olopoenia, 1989: 9) was explicit on the importance of the increased levels of savings, investment, incomes and productivity in the growth and development process. It is concerned with the analysis of the roles of savings and investment in the growth process, as it provides a simple framework for projecting the required levels of savings and investment considered to be important variables in growth and development processes. We are not unaware that Nigeria, even under normal circumstance, is faced with a dilemma of a low level of savings, which creates investment-savings gap. This is expected to worsen under conflict or politically unstable situation, thus making the levels of savings and investment to decline drastically and creating a dire need for supplementation or augmentation from the external sector.

Amieyeofori (1991: 27) was of the view that the 'The Two-Gap model' is about savings and trade gaps, and is particularly well suited to developing countries like Nigeria that plans for injections of foreign capital/foreign exchange to supplement its low level of savings or foreign exchange earnings from their foreign trade (export) sector.

Meanwhile, the success of the augmentation from the external sector is a function of the country's political stability and the investors' confidence in that economy. However, achieving post- ethnic, cultural or religious conflict political and economic stability through growth process is not an end by itself, but a means to achieving development which three objectives, according to Todaro, et al (2003:57) are as follows:

- *To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods such as food, shelter,, health and protection.*
- *To raise the levels of living, including, in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and human values, all of which will serve not only to enhance material well-being but also to generate greater individual and national self-esteem.*
- *To expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and nation-states but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery.*

But, why is development central to prevention or reduction of ethnic, cultural or religious conflict? Or why is conflict anathematic to economic development and the achievement of development objectives itemized above? To answer this question we define economic development as a process of economic transition involving the structural transformation of an economy through industrialization and the raising of Gross National Product (GNP) and income per head (Collins internet-linked dictionary of Economics). In other words, economic development is a process of economic transition through growth process. It involves the process of revenue mobilization and expenditures on social and economic infrastructures destroyed during conflicts without which the process of economic transition by state will be hampered and, consequently, the state will not be able to meet the basic needs, improve the quality of lives of

the citizenry through improved welfare as well as meet other development objectives. This informed the study's choice of stability (political and economic) in diversity and its exploration of mechanisms that will prevent, manage, resolve and/or transform conflict such that its capacity to severely constrain development endeavours by destroying infrastructure, interrupting the production process and diverting resources away from productive uses is stemmed, and in its place we have peace and harmony, and the satisfaction of the basic needs of the citizenry through growth and development of the economy. And as a consequence, increase the ability of the citizens to lead productive lives that would douse identity-based conflicts. As we shall discover in chapter 3, poverty and discontents arising there-from are some of the causes of identity-based conflicts that are chronicled.

2.11 Summary of Chapter 2

Generally, the chapter surveyed existing literature on the assumed correlation between the multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion, the perennial conflicts, the political instability, the arrested socio-economic development arising there-from and adoption and operation of relevant constitution as a veritable mechanism for addressing the heterogeneity-induced cum nation building problems. In addition, it explored the causes, the characteristics and consequences of ethnic and religious conflicts as well as the theoretical explanations for the dynamics of multi-ethnicity, culture, religion in Nigeria's troubled march to nationhood and its search for stability growth and development.

The chapter reviewed the arrays of conflict theories ranging from structural, realist, frustration-aggression, human needs, psycho-cultural to systemic conflict theories. This is because these conflict theories are well suited to the specific challenges and context of Nigeria, and thus

could be used to explain the nature, the causes and the impacts of conflicts on the Nigerian economy.

In the chapter, there was also searchlight beamed on the different methods of conflict resolution and transformation as well as conflict analytical tools available to researchers.

The probable explanation given in this chapter for the inclusion of Growth Theory was that conflict impacts negatively on political and economic stability, thus creating or ensuring unfavourable environment for investment without which national development will be difficult to achieve.

In specific terms, the chapter provides deep insights into conflict analysis as a critical tool for understanding of the root causes and nature of conflict and its resolution. With regard to conflict resolution, detailed explanatory tools available include conflict management and transformation. Other processes and structures of Conflict Resolution, which are nonetheless elements of the collaborative process for conflict management, were also dealt with in the chapter. Some of these processes and structures include grassroots community-based activities, good governance, communication, collaboration, and negotiations. Others are conciliation/facilitation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication.

Conflict resolution, according to the chapter, is often complemented by conflict handling styles, which refer to the responses that people make to address the situation or how individuals or groups respond to situation that is considered detrimental to the attainment of a desired goal (Ochinya Ojiji, 2006:120).

For a better understanding of the conflictive nature of ethnicity and religion, the chapter provided variety of reasons why ethnic, cultural or religious diversity is conflictive or has conflict potential. Accordingly, the chapter contained the perspectives of various conflict researchers on conflict potential of ethnicity, culture and religion. Some of them include as follows:

- Ethnicity/culture and religion are human/people or identity-based, involving intense emotions (emotion of animosity such as fear, hate, resentment and rage toward the “other” ethnic groups) that could be manipulated by humans to achieve specific ends;
- Horowitz (1985: 59) argued, “ethnicity embodies an element of emotional intensity that can be readily aroused when the group’s interests are thought to be at stake”
- Diversity implies a mosaic or medley of people with divergent cultures, world-views and religious orientations and beliefs that are hardly compromised;
- Every conflict is about competition between humans for position or resources that are limited or scarce;
- Conflict is about incompatibility of man’s interests, threatened interests, unmet needs, fears of domination, and of losing privileges;
- Conflict is about mankind’s resistance to change, yet change is part and parcel of human existence,
- Conflict is about mankind’s desire for freedom and his insistence on his inalienable rights, and
- Conflict becomes inevitable when the preceding factors converge.

The chapter revealed that ethnicity also has economic and social applications in the sense that it is not inconceivable that those with state power could use it to deny or deprive other ethnic groups of their privileges, rights and access to socio-economic opportunities, specifically employment, housing, healthy environment and other facilities that make life and living worthwhile.

The chapter explained that Nigeria’s post-amalgamation perennial diversity conflicts, which intensified in post-military inter-regnum has to do with mankind’s desire for freedom to exercise his unalienable rights without let or hindrance.

This position was supported by Prazauskas (1991: 581-2) who opined that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in multi-national states means first of all the disintegration of the coercive system of checks and controls.

The chapter drew on various studies on the relationships between ethno/cultural or religious conflict, political instability and national development and concluded that the instability arising from arising from the destructive capability of conflict had strong negative impact on economic growth and development. As a result of the instability, the level of investment declines, leading to declines in economic growth because of the mutual dependency of investment and economic growth. The effect of low growth as a result of decline in or low investment was demonstrated clearly by the vicious cycle of development concept. Important observations were made and conclusions drawn from the differences between:

- a. *the effects of ethno-linguistic polarization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization on growth and development.* It was found that ethno-linguistic fractionalization has a negative and significant effect on growth, while ethno-linguistic polarization has no statistically significant direct effect. On the other hand, however, the level of ethno-linguistic polarization has the expected impact on investment, government consumption and the incidence of a civil war, while ethno-linguistic fractionalization has no effect on those indirect channels (i.e. investment, government consumption)
- b. *the effects of religious and ethnic diversity on growth and development.* (Ethnic diversity was found to have a direct negative effect on economic growth)
- c. *the effect of religious polarization and religious fractionalization on growth and development.* The result with regard to this was that religious fractionalization has no direct effect on economic

growth while religious polarization has an important effect in the explanation of economic development through its impact on civil wars, the rate of investment, and the proportion of government consumption over GDP.

- d. *the effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization versus ethno-linguistic polarization on investment, government consumption and development.* The chapter showed that ethno-linguistic fractionalization had a negative and significant effect on growth, while ethno-linguistic polarization has no statistically significant direct effect on growth. On the other hand, ethno-linguistic polarization has the expected negative impact on investment, government consumption and the incidence of a civil war, while ethno-linguistic fractionalization has no effect on those indirect channels.
- e. *the effect of ethnic or religious polarization on growth and development.* It was disclosed in the chapter that ethnic or religious polarization has a large and negative effect on economic development through the reduction of investment and the increase of government consumption.

The conflict potential of political system/regime type, relevant constitutional framework, and diversity was explained by the functional relationship between them and the incidence of conflict. Researches have also found that democratic governance system is adequate in ensuring peace, cordiality and stability in diverse societies.

Beside policy instruments and relevant regime-type/political system, relevant and appropriate constitution is another important institutional tool available to political leadership in managing or regulating diversity effectively. There were viewpoints that ethnic/religious crisis or conflict in a multi-ethnic/religious society presupposes the absence of relevant constitutional framework and provisions or the lack of political will to adopt appropriate constitution and enforce its provisions.

In this regard federal constitution or federalism has been found to be a very efficacious and effective tool that could ensure inter-ethnic, cultural and religious cooperation, sustained harmony and peaceful cohabitation in diverse society without unnecessary coercion.

Wheare (1959) did not only define federalism, he gave a vivid description of federal principles. He refers to federalism as a "method of dividing powers so that general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent of one another."

The relevance and involvement of institutions such as the state in resolving conflicts in ways acceptable and satisfactory to parties to the conflicts was emphasized. The reason advanced for involvement was that state has effective institutions with power of both coercion and persuasion. In addition, the state has expertise to initiate the process of conflict resolution and transformation which leads to settlement of the conflict in manners that are satisfactory and acceptable to the parties such that the recurrence of the conflict in future is foreclosed.

The chapter presented and discussed the array of conflict theories and growth model adopted for the study which it considered were well suited to the specific challenges and context of Nigeria, and thus could be used to explain the nature, the causes and the impacts of conflicts on the Nigerian economy.

Reason for the incorporation of Growth theory in the study was that it is a veritable tool for articulating policy response to both political and economic instability brought about by conflict. Its premise was that it is illogical to divorce political instability from economic instability. Both political and economic instability have consequences for destruction of social and economic infrastructures, which ultimately impact negatively on the national productive capacity. Also economic instability could result in the emasculation of an economy's productive capacity, in the under-utilization of its scarce resources and the inability to meet national objectives of self-sufficiency and self-reliance.

It was indicated in the chapter that only growth model such as Harrod-Domar or the Two-Gap model will provide the required guidelines or ideas for achieving the goal of growing the economy that would result in economic stability and the achievement of national development objectives, which are central to the prevention or reduction of ethnic, cultural or religious conflict that is anathematic to economic development and the achievement of development objectives.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY

3.1 Introduction

As long as human beings live together or interact with each other, conflicts are inevitable. This is as a result of the fact that in a community of humans there are bound to be incompatibility of interests, incompatibility of access to political and economic opportunities, personality and political differences as well as contradictions in the perceptions, goals, hopes and aspirations of men and women that populate that community. In this regard, it will be palpably abnormal to have a conflict-free society. It is for this reason that Coser (1955) postulates as follows: “Conflict is a form of socialisation. This means essentially that [...] no group can be entirely harmonious, for it would then be devoid of process and structure. Groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as association, and conflict within them is by no means altogether disruptive factors”.

In the same vein, Lee (1964: 3-10) asserted that “the society without conflict is a dead society [...] like it or not, conflict is a reality of human existence and therefore a means of understanding social behaviours”. On his part and reasoning along same line, William (1972: 11-26) opined that a conflict-free society “seems so remote from the world as we know

it that the inevitability of continual and repetitive conflict seems a more sensible starting point”.

However, despite conflict’s inevitability or its inescapability as a societal feature, conflict becomes undesirable when it turns violent and destructive. Thus conflict prevention, in view of its cost-effectiveness in ensuring that conflict does not snowball into violence, should be embraced by the state and community leadership. The views of Oliver Ramsbotham, et al (2011:124) that violent conflicts often result in lose-lose outcomes for the parties and population involved and that attempts to prevent violence must also involve conflict prevention, the satisfaction of needs, the accommodation of legitimate aspirations and the remedy of manifest injustices are very germane and must be re-echoed and re-emphasized because of their criticality as socio-economic factors for engendering social harmony. There is no question about it that state whose responsibilities include maintenance of internal security has a duty to continually ensure social harmony by preventing violent conflicts.

3.2 The Nature of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts

Ethnic, religious and political conflicts as well as land or boundary disputes belong to communal group and share the unenviable characteristics of being violent and destructive in nature. However, by virtue of their being identity-based and being affiliated to communal group, ethnicity and religion naturally exhibit characteristics of collective fears, hopes, aspirations or destiny that often find expressions in collective actions, reactions or responses that may be uncompromisingly violent, depending on what the triggers are. Conflict trigger, according to Akpuru-Aja (2009: 16), spotlights events or incidents; either by provocative utterances or decisions or actions that automatically give vent to an outburst of frustration or aggression by a party through manifest violence. Since members of the communal group perceive themselves as a

pseudo-family (Goor, et al; 1994:25), it stands to reason that to members of a communal group defending the group interest, becomes a passion and a bounding duty that transcends objectivity. Thus, objective analysis of conflict situations, or the assessment of conflict situations is non-existent or seriously subjective. Consequently, actions such as those that are perceived to threaten or undermine group identity or diminish its status, worth and legitimacy attract or evoke hostile response (Horowitz, 1985).

In such a situation, members of a communal group are willing and ready to fight and die for the communal interests or rights that are perceived as being encroached or trampled upon, or for perceived injustices visited upon the communal group by the common enemies of the group. This solidarity, this seeming extremism of ethnicity or religion was viewed by Nnoli (1998) “as resulting from the power of communal identity to totalise and transcend other loyalties and obligations, which regard the total commitment to the cause of the group as a collective sense of belonging to a group, of willingness to contribute to the success of the collective mission and of self-realisation and self-affirmation within the collectivity. He further opined that there is a feeling (within or among the communal group) that the individual and the communal group can seize their collective destiny in a manner akin to the dynamics of mob action”. Thus, according to Chipman (1993; Posen; 1993 cited in Nnoli, 2003) one of the striking features of communal violence is the turning of every individual into a soldier by the sole virtue of his or her group identity.

3.2.1 Why Identity-Based or Communal Conflict is Intractable

Without doubt, in communal conflict objectivity is more often than not overshadowed by passion, and because emotion predominates in this type of identity-based conflict, it lends itself to easy mobilisation and

manipulation for political advantage by political entrepreneurs who seized it to appeal to their fears, religion, ethnicity, et cetera such that, according to Gurr (1993, cited in Nnoli, 2003), it becomes possible to draw an easy distinction between “us” and “them”. Little wonders that identity-based conflict becomes intractable, violent and protracted. It is protracted because it represented the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal group for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation (Edward Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict, cited in Ramsbotham, et al, 2011: 99).

There has been consensus in the literature on the violent nature of identity-based/ communal conflicts. For instance, it had been opined that the characteristic violent nature of communal (identity-based) conflicts make them more difficult to handle, less amenable to diplomatic intervention or standard methods of crisis management and peaceful settlement (Carmet, 1993). On his part, Stavenhagen (1990:76 cited in Nnoli 2003) opined that communal conflicts tend to be violent, messy, no-hold-barred affairs in which human lives are generally devalued and in which since 1945 these conflicts had caused greater loss of life worldwide than all other forms of deadly conflicts combined.

3.2.2 Role of Government in the Menace of Ethno-Religious Conflicts

With the benefit of the insights we had on the characteristics of communal/identity-based conflicts, then what roles can or should the state or government play in addressing the menace of ethno-religious conflicts? In countries with a multiplicity of ethnicity, culture or religion, particularly in developing countries including Nigeria, state/government policy and political leadership could be factors of either explosive or harmonious inter-ethnic, cultural or religious relationships, depending on the management/mismanagement, or use/misuse

of state power. In Nigeria, state policy had been found to be deliberately formulated and implemented to give advantage to or favour or advance the interest of one ethnic or religious group over the other. This is in spite of the fact that state power and responsibilities, which include the guarantee of security of lives and property, the meeting of the development needs, the provision of unfettered access to political and economic opportunities, and the protection of the inalienable rights of its citizens are derived from and protected by the constitution.

It should be underscored that the discharge of these statutory or constitutional responsibilities by the state should, however, be anchored on good governance and sound political leadership. Good governance being a system of administration that is democratic, efficient and development oriented. (Jeffries, 1993:21) This means that the state in formulating and implementing/executing policies and programmes should be guided by the provisions of the constitution, which political leadership has moral obligation to respect and defend; it also means that in a heterogeneous society, state's neutrality in the discharge of its constitutional responsibility should not be suspect; that in case of conflict, the state should be above blame, it must be seen to be fair and just, and lastly it means that the state should focus serious attention on the dynamics of conflict with a view to preventing, containing or managing its incidence.

Sadly, in developing countries the alternative (bad governance) is the rule rather than the exception, and the result is perennial ethno-religious conflicts or social upheaval which blames the Human Rights Watch (1995) put at the doorstep of government when it argues that "communal tensions per se are not the immediate cause of many violent and persistent communal conflicts; while communal tensions are obviously a necessary ingredient of an explosive mix, they alone are not sufficient to unleash widespread violence. Rather, time after time the proximate cause of communal violence is governmental exploitation of communal differences". The reason being that dynamics of state policy

with regard to heterogeneous countries was often played out in the tactics of divide and rule, which had its origin in colonial period and had persisted even till today, with consequent ethnic suspicion, religious intolerance and political instability that Nigeria has had to contend with today. In this regard, the following summarized views of Nnoli (1978: 120-122) are apposite as they succinctly conveyed the prejudices and presumptions inherent in the colonial political or administrative policy of divide and rule pre- and post--1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigerian protectorates: "the policy was intended to manipulate ethnic consciousness and mobilize it to ethnic and regional sectionalism to curb Nigerian nationalism; it was used as a vehicle for spreading propaganda that Nigeria did not have a common destiny with respect to political independence because they were separated by differences of history and tradition. Its policy was to secure the right of each ethnic group to maintain its identity, individuality, nationality and chosen form of government, as well as the peculiar political and social institutions that were presumed to have evolved from the wisdom and accumulated experiences of its previous generations" Unfortunately, these colonial prejudices had continued to gain legitimacy in Nigeria's political leadership who projects power by its personalization such that it becomes difficult for it to act in its official capacity without projecting its ethnicity, culture or religion.

Idowu Akinlotan (2014) in his column entitled palladium, corroborated this view when he wrote of the incumbent president of Nigeria inter-alia: 'President Jonathan may not have taken anyone's vineyard in the direct sense of the word, but he has done much worse by undermining democratic rule in Rivers State, involving himself in oil wells controversy, usurping state powers in favour of the police, and giving the general and depressing impression his sole idea of the presidency is to act and fight in favour of his party, supporters and people. It is difficult to explain why he is not unsettled and deeply nauseated by the brazen-

ness of his methods in Rivers and the openness of the state police commissioner's partisanship'. Again, Nnoli (2003: 80) observed that what is uniquely negative about politics in Africa today such as ethnic violence arises from the character of this state particularly its lack of neutrality, the immensity of its power, its proneness to abuse and lack of immunity against it.

3.2.3 Pro Neo-Imperialist Stance of Nigerian State and Conflict

Beside the bad and divisive governance exhibited by the state, which often plays one ethnic group against the other, there is what could be described as the pro neo-imperialist stance of the state that places much premium on its economic cooperation with the multi-national corporations, otherwise called agents of external imperialists to the disadvantage of its nationals. For instance, in the Niger-delta region of Nigeria where multi-national oil companies (MNOCs) exploit crude oil without regard for the air, water and soil pollution which their activities engender, any protest by the indigenes against this social irresponsibility of MNOCs usually pitches the state against its nationals. State's response often takes the form of either vicious military offensive or instigation of one ethnic group against another. The Ijaw-Itsekiri-Urhobo violent clashes could be best explained as the outcome of the internal and external imperialists' collaborations in continually causing disaffections, disharmony, distrust and suspicions amongst these three contending minority ethnic groups for economic gains and political advantage. It seems that what matters to the state in its unalloyed support for or alliance with those Nwosu (2009: 544) called *the external imperialist oligopolies* represented by the multinational oil companies (MNOCs), is unfettered flow of oil revenue and not the clean and healthy environment of its citizens; not the oil spillage that destroys the farmland and the marine life and pollute the drinking water; not dialogue, negotiations;

not consensus building, and certainly not preventing violent conflicts among diverse ethnic and religious groups. This contradiction is corroborated by Nwosu (2009: *ibid*) when he observes in the following words that, “the basic contradiction lies in the fact that while resources from oil enhance national capabilities in practically all spheres- economic, military, industrial, infrastructural and technological- of human endeavours, the same resources from oil become the focal point of the virulent and unrelenting conflict among companies, social classes, as well as local communities and individuals”. Underscoring the Nigerian state’s attitude towards its citizens Alli et al (2003: 133) say *inter-alia*: “when the state is not employing direct violence, it engages in discourses that present such communities/communal groups as unpatriotic; and the behaviour of their leaders as acts of hooliganism by hoodlums”.

We could conclude that the preceding is a sad reflection on the state’s inability not to subordinate its sovereignty to the MNOCs. It also shows that, in most developing countries including Nigeria, the state and the political leadership cannot be described as committed preventers of violent conflicts. The Nigerian state had aided and abetted through policy omission or commission, violent ethno-religious conflicts that had caused wanton destruction of lives and property.

3.2.4 Overview of Causative Factors of Conflict

Beside the state collusion and political leadership’s manipulation of ethnic and religious differences, which resulted in cases of violent conflicts treated in this chapter, other causative factors of conflicts identified and dealt with comprehensively in this chapter include:

- Colonial administration policy of divide and rule which was intended to ensure the achievement of the Colonialists’ objectives that informed the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates.

- Failure to abide with the provisions of federal constitution that is well suited to countries with diverse ethnicity, culture and religion. The cornerstones of federal constitution are the emphasis on a decentralized political structure in order to eschew unhealthy competition for control of central government amongst the disparate people, and fiscal federalism.
- Post- independence politics and political development
- Ethnic/cultural and religious identity issues that include ethnic diversity & suspicions, and religious pluralism & intolerance
- Ethnic nationalism
- Domination and oppression of one ethnic group by another
- Tussle over access to and control of political power at local level
- Struggle for control over resources including farm land and oil
- Denial of access to economic resources and opportunities
- Agitation for clean and healthy environment, et cetera, et cetera.

3.2.5 Consequences of Violent Conflicts

In addition to the identified causative factors, this chapter also addresses the consequences or the socio-economic and political costs of the violent conflicts involving the various ethnic and religious groups the study investigated. The socio-economic cost includes deaths of millions of Nigerians, deprivation, population displacement and the attendant refugee problems, destruction of private property as well as physical, social and economic infrastructures, and the huge cost for reconstruction and rehabilitation. There were also ecological damage, disruption of economic activities or production, famine and starvation. Social malaise such as rape, child abuse in the form of child soldier, and forced prostitution was not left out.

We begin the chronicles of Nigeria's ethnic and religious conflicts with:

3.3 Ethnic and Religious Conflicts, and the Nigerian Civil War

3.3.1 Introduction

Before we embark on the treatment of some of the identified ethnic conflicts, it is necessary that we have some perspectives on the cultural or attitudinal dispositions of Nigeria's ethnic tripod. The conclusions that would be drawn from these perspectives would also, hopefully, by extension enrich our understanding of the attitudinal dispositions of other minority ethnic groups in Nigeria.

This ethnic tripod is made up of Nigeria's three majority ethnic groups that are comprised of the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba. The insights into the cultural dynamics of Nigeria's three majority ethnic groups will illustrate how cultural differences could be an important factor in stirring up conflicts amongst them and even the minority ethnic groups, which could be sources of political and economic instability. The same cultural dynamics could also feature in how and by what conflict handling styles conflicts could be resolved. We will examine and compare how the three ethnic groups will fare in Leung's five handling styles as well as in negotiation and in their relationships with the harmony motives. The psycho-cultural construct dealt with in the preceding chapters provides the theoretical underpinnings that will aid our investigation. Meanwhile, Conflict/Harmony framework, and the variants of harmony model could also help in analysing the responses of these ethnic groups to conflict situations, or explain the antagonistic relationships between these three ethnic groups or how these ethnic groups and by extension the over 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria can live or interact harmoniously.

3.3.2 Conflict Framework

Conflict Framework embraced by the West is not at all motivated by promotion of relationships, but by competition with a winner or loser. Its focus is on outcomes or self-interest and relies on negotiation as its conflict handling style. It must be underscored however, that cooperative exchange may also emerge from the tool of negotiation embraced by the West leading to mutually satisfactory outcomes (McGinn & Keros, 2002)). Moreover, as implied by McGinn & Keros, the Chinese, whose preference for conflict avoidance handling style was informed by the need for harmony, should be less worried about the disruptive potential of negotiation and be more attracted to its integrative benefits that lead to a satisfactory settlement as well as the establishment of a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship; they should in fact promote the active handling of a conflict afforded by negotiation conflict handling style. In this regard therefore both conflict and harmony frameworks could be regarded as providing the tools for serving the cause of peace. However, we shall learn more about harmony framework in the paragraph that follows.

3.3.3 Harmony Framework

On the other hand, the Harmony framework and its many variants embraced by East Asia are guided by the need to promote, maintain or preserve relationships. In other words, the Chinese or the East Asians' attitudes are guided by principles and actions that will deepen or cement inter-personal relationships. But despite the harmony motive-driven tendency of Chinese to avoid conflict, it has been observed that the relationship between harmony and conflict avoidance has rarely been subjected to a systematic analysis. Leung (1997) noted that conflict avoidance typically offers no solution to a dispute and fails to optimize the outcomes of the disputants. If, however, harmony is conceptualized

as a desire to establish a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship, it should in fact (like negotiation) promote the active handling of a conflict for arriving at a mutually acceptable settlement. This observation leads Leung (1997: 644) to propose a dualistic view of harmony that distinguishes two harmony motives, namely, Disintegration avoidance and Harmony enhancement. According to him, Disintegration avoidance refers to “avoiding actions that will strain a relationship and lead to its weakening and dissolving” while Harmony enhancement refers to “engaging in behaviours presumed to strengthen the relationships among the interactants” He further stated that disintegration avoidance is concerned with the maintenance of a relationship by minimizing actions and events that may disrupt it. In contrast, harmony enhancement is concerned with actions and events that will promote the quality of a relationship.

Given the culture-generality of the harmony construct or the universality of harmony as a social value or as a social construct, it should be expected that each culture would have its own framework or model for dealing with interpersonal disagreements or for improving interpersonal harmony or establishing a mutually beneficial relationship. Thus, we have the Dual-Concern Model (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Rahim 1983; Thomas & Kenneth, 1976,) where-in conflict behaviour is jointly determined by the concern for one’s own outcome and for the other party’s outcome. By crossing the two outcome concerns (self and other), five conflict styles, namely, avoiding, obliging, compromising, dominating and integrating are derived.

These previous studies have evaluated and validated the relationships between harmony motives and various handling styles. The results from these studies provide a more precise and systematic assessment of the validity of the harmony motives as they relate to five conflict handling styles. Leung et al (2002: *ibid*) concluded their two studies with analyses

and hypotheses that succinctly summarized the relationships of the three harmony factors with five conflict handling styles. The hypotheses are:

- H1: Avoiding relates positively to Disintegration Avoidance in the handling of a dispute.
- H2: Obliging relates positively to Disintegration avoidance and Harmony enhancement, but the relationship is stronger for disintegration avoidance than for harmony enhancement.
- H3: Compromising also relates positively to both Disintegration avoidance and Harmony enhancement, but the relationship is stronger for harmony enhancement than for disintegration avoidance.
- H4: Integrating relates negatively to Disintegration avoidance while it relates positively to Harmony enhancement.
- H5: Dominating relates negatively to both disintegration avoidance and Harmony enhancement.

Relationships between Harmony Motives and Conflict Handling Styles

Table 3.1 Dual- Concern Model/ Harmony Factors

Conflict Handling Style	Disintegration Avoidance	Harmony Enhancement
Avoiding	Related positively	Related positively
Obliging	Related positively	Related positively
Compromising	Strongly and positively related	Strongly and positively related
Integrating	Related negatively	Related positively
Dominating	Related negatively	Related negatively

Table 3.1 is derived from the Hypotheses above.

There are also Dualistic Model of Harmony (Leung, 2002); the Harmony Framework/Perspective (Gabrenya & Hwang, 1996; Huang, 1997) and the Yin-Yang model of Harmony (Brew, 2007). A detailed study of these models will show that their central focus was the achievement of harmony as a post-conflict goal and that the difference between them is merely semantic. Put in another way, the difference between them is like the difference between six and half-a-dozen, particularly with regard to the various conflict handling styles. Conflict handling Styles we should recall refer to the responses that people make to address the situation that is considered detrimental to the attainment of a desired goal (Ojiji, 2006). The achievement of harmony is, in any case, predicated on the dynamics of handling styles employed as responses to conflict situations. It is dependent on the relationships between the variety of handling styles and the harmony motives/factors. For instance, if building of relationships as opposed to self-interest is the core value or goal, the choice of model such as dualistic view or dualistic harmony model or harmony framework matched by relevant handling styles becomes an appropriate tool. Leung et al. (2002) have crossed the two harmony motives and come up with four harmony styles. The four harmony styles are indicated and described as follow:

Balancing which refers to a high emphasis on both disintegration avoidance and harmony enhancement. This is somewhat analogous to the compromising conflict style, but with the addition of relational as well as outcome concerns. Thus, people with this orientation should be able to achieve goals without damaging interpersonal relationships.

Smoothing refers to a high emphasis on disintegration avoidance and low emphasis on harmony enhancement. This harmony style is likely to characterize much Chinese conflict behaviour, which focuses on long-term benefits by hosing down conflict in the short term, and our results

indicate this is likely to be found in Western cultures as well, although not as widespread.

Aligning refers to a high emphasis on harmony enhancing, but a low emphasis on disintegration avoidance. Leung et al. (2002) argued that this harmony style is more consistent with the notion of harmony espoused in classical Confucianism, in which debate and argument for attaining goodness and righteousness are encouraged. This style is also analogous to the integrating conflict style.

Finally, *Disintegrating* refers to a low emphasis on both disintegration avoidance and harmony enhancement. According to these researchers, people with this orientation are likely to be socially isolated. In view of the assertion that we should worry less about the disruptive potential of negotiation and be more attracted to its integrative benefits that lead to a satisfactory settlement as well as the establishment of a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship, we have included negotiation in the Harmony Styles to see how it relates with Leung, et al (2002) harmony motives.

Table 3.2 Dualistic Model of Harmony

Harmony Handling Style	Disintegration Avoidance	Harmony Enhancement
Balancing	Strongly and positively Related	Strongly and positively Related
Smoothing	Related Positively	Related Negatively
Aligning	Related negatively	Related positively
Disintegrating	Related negatively	Related Negatively
Negotiating	Related positively	Strongly and positively Related

Table 3.2 is derived from Leung, et al (2002) Crossing of Harmony motives

3.3.4 Culture-Generality of the Harmony Construct

In order to demonstrate the culture-generality of the Harmony Construct, Anedo (2012) came with his *harmony framework based on Chinese & Igbo cultures*. This framework is applicable also to West African cultures. The following strands of Harmony Framework are identified as; *Ignoring harmony or Maintaining harmony, and Pursuing goal or discarding goal*. Furthermore, harmony was disaggregated into; *Genuine harmony and Surface harmony*. Following the example of Leung et al (1997: ibid), Anedo also related his harmony factors with different handling styles. In order to make the outcomes of both the dual-concern model and the harmony frameworks easier to understand when they were related with different handling styles, we shall present them graphically in the table below.

Table 3.3 Harmony Framework based on Chinese and Igbo Cultures

Conflict Handling style	Ignoring Harmony/ Pursuing Goal	Maintaining Harmony/ Discarding Goal
Confrontation	Related positively	Related negatively
Obey publicly/disobey privately	Related positively	Related positively
Compromise	Related positively (but moderately)	Related positively (but moderately)
Endurance	Related negatively	Related positively
Severance	Related negatively	Related positively

Adapted from Anedo’s (2012) Adaptation of Brew (2007)

There is no doubt that Nigeria with its diversity-problems, has a lot to learn and benefit from the incorporation of conflict/harmony frame-

work, its other variants as well as disintegration avoidance and harmony enhancement factors in its governance policy. In as much as it is near impossible to have a conflict-free society, it becomes the responsibility of the government, once conflicts arise, to adopt conflict handling styles that are necessarily influenced by desires to avoid national disintegration and should consciously encourage and enhance societal harmony on a sustainable basis.

3.3.5 Utility of Conflict and Harmony Framework in Response to Conflict

The Conflict/harmony framework and the harmony motives complemented by variety of conflict handling styles will be useful in analysing and assessing the responses of Nigeria's majority ethnic groups to conflict situations.

In our analysis of the attitudinal dispositions of these three ethnic groups to conflict situations, we shall rely on West's Conflict framework and its Negotiation conflict handling style, the Dual –concern model and its five (5) conflict- handling styles, namely Avoiding, Obliging, Compromising, Integrating and Dominating (Leung, 1997: 644) as well as the Dualistic harmony model with its four (4) harmony styles.

In addition, we shall also utilise *Smoothing and Superficial Compliance Styles* of the integrated harmony framework.

3.3.6 Hausa-Fulani Attitudinal/Cultural Dispositions and Conflict/Harmony Framework

The Hausa ethnic group is sometimes referred to as Hausa-Fulani. The hither-to two distinct ethnic groups (Hausa and Fulani) had assimilated each other's cultures, particularly the language, to the extent that the Hausa language had become the accepted medium of communication

of the two. Thus for this study, when we talk about Hausa ethnic group we are actually implying Hausa-Fulani.

The Hausa are the majority ethnic group holding political sway in the Northern part of Nigeria as well as Nigeria in its entirety. They are conservative, reserved, calculating, and feudalistic and are largely farmers and traders. According to Ifeyinwa (2002: 123) citing 1995 demographic information, the Hausa constitute 21.3% while the Fulani constitute 11.2% of the Nigeria's population (Table 3.4). Despite the relatively lower population ratio, the Fulani are, ironically, the senior partner.

They are predominantly Muslim with uncritical loyalty to the emirs who believe that their authority was divine. The emirs and emirate system were strengthened and empowered by the British colonialists through the indirect rule to the extent they became the sole Islamic leader and political authority in Northern Nigeria. As a result of the conservatism of the emirate system and due to the influence of colonialism, Northern Nigeria according to Zalanga decided that the safest thing to do was to resist change or allow as much social change as would not disrupt the traditional social structure which is built on the legacies of the caliphate. Also, it was observed that, "Islam under colonial rule became a force of conservatism rather than change, as it had been in the 19th century..." (Crowder, Michael; 1968). Consequently, the North of the Hausa/Fulani was antagonistic to the embrace of modernity, modernization, scientific revolution and Western ideas including education. The result is the relative under-development of Northern Nigeria and by the same token, the relatively lower position of the Hausa/Fulani in socio-economic indicators. As indicated below.

Using the six geo-political zone structures, the Hausa/Fulani are found predominantly in the Northwest geo-political zone. However, along with the Northeast zone, they comprise what is referred to as the core north. Then we have the North central zone. The three zones constitute the three geo-political zones of North. According to Sowunmi et al

(2012), the northwest geopolitical zone has the highest average poverty rate (77.6%). This is followed by northeast (74.5%) and north central (68.1%). The probable reason adduced for these high average poverty rates in the northern geopolitical zones was the long – standing lags in provision of health, education and other social services resulting in proportionately more poor in the north. Meanwhile, a survey of literacy level by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2006 found the North-Central has 53.5% literacy level while the Northwest has the lowest with 23.2% literacy level among its adult population.

Table 3.4 Demographic Information (1995)

Demographic Information (1995)			
	%		%
Urban Popula- tion:	39.3	Rural Popula- tion:	60.7
Population by Ethnic Composition			
Ethnic group	%	Ethnic Group	%
Hausa	21.3	Edo	3.4
Yoruba	21.3	Tiv	2.2
Igbo	18.0	Ijaw	1.8
Fulani	11.2	Bara	1.7
Ibiobio	5.6	Nupe	1.2
Kanuri	4.2	Others	8.1

Source: The Robinson Rojas Archive (1998)

The Hausas have a characteristic single-minded pursuit of political power and leadership of post-independence Nigeria. In this regard, the Hausas are imbued with certain uncanny political engineering wizardry, which exercise though not altogether altruistic but ultimately self-serving, is directed solely at achieving hegemonic domination and polit-

ical leadership of Nigeria. It manifested first in the insistence by the ruling emirs that the British colonialists concede to them the right to maintain their ways of life without interference, which the colonialists granted through the institution of indirect rule in the North. (Ikejiani-Clark, 2009: 451) Its second manifestation was in the way they played (and are still playing) politics with religion and vice-versa, and ensuring that the mass of the northerners, particularly the Muslim faithful remain largely illiterate to achieve the feudal goal of what Benjamin Higgins (1968 225-226) describes as opposition to industrialization, mass education, and technological change. These armies of illiterates are not only susceptible to been brain-washed, they actually become malleable tools in the hands of the northern oligarch who often mobilized them for sinister political goal. Its third manifestation is the making of Hausa language the lingua-franca of the North to achieve the “one north one people objective of the northern ruling elites- a proxy for a make-believe philosophy of united and culturally monolithic north to provide a strong bargaining power for it in its negotiations with the South during the colonial, pre-independence and even post-independence periods. The fourth manifestation was the series of alliances the North entered with other ethnic groups that were willing to concede political leadership to it; and the fifth manifestation was the emplacement of major military installations in the North.

All of these strategies were intended to provide the North a sort of political leverage it often utilizes to extract or force concession from the South for political leadership, dating from the immediate amalgamation period through the First Republic, the military inter-regnum and to the current Fourth Republic. For instance, Odumosu (1963: 77) quoting from the proceedings of the General Conference credited the Emirs of Katsina and Zaria as representatives of the north with the statement that “unless northern region was allocated fifty percent of the seats in the central legislature it would ask for the separation from the rest of Nige-

ria on the arrangement existing before 1914". This North's demand or blackmail received the support of the Eastern region, and thus the North had its way with 50% of representation at the Federal House of Representatives conceded to it.

Thus, it could be argued that North's political strategy, which was tacitly supported by the British colonialists by virtue of the indirect rule policy instituted in the north that allowed the various emirates to operate with a large measure of autonomy, was geared towards not just leadership of the country but the domination of other two major ethnic groups. This position was corroborated by Ikejiani-Clark (2009: 451) when she opined as follows: "These emirates, as a result, (of indirect rule) constantly regarded themselves almost as a people apart from the rest of the country. It became difficult in the years ahead and after independence to inculcate in them a Nigerian outlook unless they or their representatives were in a position to dominate the rest of the country". The overriding deduction therefore, is that the religious cum political views of the Northern elites or more appropriately the Hausa/Fulani elites need to be moderated to accommodate change and differing tendencies of the various ethnic or religious groups that make up Nigeria. It is this accommodation of change and differing tendencies that will shape the future of Nigeria.

3.3.7 Placing Hausa-Fulani in the Conflict Framework and Harmony Construct

From the foregoing, how then do we place the attitudinal dispositions of Hausa-Fulani within the contexts of Nigeria's diversity dynamics, the political configuration, the conflict framework and harmony construct imperatives? It could be argued that by virtue of the fact that conflict framework depends solely on negotiation as a conflict handling tool, this framework can neither accommodate Hausa-Fulani's religious intolerance, love for power nor embrace their insistence on having it

their own way without regard for the sensibility of other ethnic groups. Again, these kinds of attitudes which could only breed bitterness and animosity negate those things that promote peaceful co-existence and generate intense inter-ethnic disagreements and disharmony cannot be accommodated by Harmony framework. This is because, so long these attitudes that despise good relationship persist amongst the Hausa-Fulani so long will all the five handling styles relate negatively to harmony factors/motives (i.e. Disintegration Avoidance and Harmony Enhancement).

However, it is expected that the contemporary political reality of the GPZs should temper the Hausa/Fulani overweening pursuit of hegemonic domination. This is because the GPZ innovation dictates that electoral success of any zones and, by extension, of any ethnic groups requires cooperation or negotiation with other zones/ethnic groups, which involves compromise. This is predicated on the fact that geo-political zone structure has given every zone or ethnic group including the minority ethnic groups the freedom of political association or cooperation without being tied to the apron-strings of the majority ethnic groups, or without fear of backlash from the majority ethnic groups. This realisation has informed the Hausa/Fulani's re-evaluation of their hither-to narrow ideological perception of power, its attainment and its usage. In essence our argument, therefore, is that we could include negotiation and compromise handling styles in our evaluation of the Hausa-Fulani attitudes vis-à-vis conflict/harmony motive. Thus, though the Hausa/Fulani relate negatively to Leung's avoiding, obliging and integrating vis-à-vis the harmony motives of disintegration avoidance and harmony enhancement, they are found amenable to compromise and negotiation handling styles, which are found to relate positively to the harmony motives. In other words, with respect to Hausa-Fulani attitudinal dispositions, handling styles such as avoiding, obliging, integrating and dominating are positively related to Harmony as Hindrance motive while compromise

and negotiation relate positively to disintegration avoidance and harmony enhancement.

Table 3.5 Placing the Hausa/Fulani in the conflict/harmony construct

Harmony Motives			
Conflict Handling Style	Disintegration Avoidance	Harmony Enhancement	Harmony as Hindrance
Avoiding	Related Negatively	Related Negatively	Related positively
Obliging	Related Negatively	Related Negatively	Related positively
Compromising	Related positively	Related positively	Related negatively
Integrating	Related negatively	Related positively	Related positively
Dominating	Related negatively	Related negatively	Related positively
Negotiation	Related negatively	Related positively	Related negatively

Adapted from the Dual-concern model/Harmony Factor

All of these conclusions will become clearer from the definitions of the three harmony factors/motives here-under:

Disintegration Avoidance: It refers to avoiding actions that will strain relationship and lead to its weakening and dissolving (Leung, 1997: 644).

Harmony Enhancement: refers to engaging in behaviours presumed to strengthen relationships among interact ants. (Leung, ibid: 644)

Harmony As hindrance: conveys negative view of harmony and the perception of harmony as a cause of a variety of problems. (Leung; ibid: 644)

3.4 Igbo Attitudinal/Cultural Dispositions and Conflict/Harmony Framework

The Igbo on the other hand, are the majority tribe in the five South Eastern states of Nigeria. They are Christians and constitute 18% of national population (Table 3.4). Unlike the monarchical and hierarchical attributes of the Yoruba or the Hausa/Fulani, the Igbo are republican and individualistic in their attitudes. Accounts in the literature describe pre-colonial Igbo society as ‘stateless’, ‘acephalous’, ‘segmentary’ and ‘individualistic, comprising autonomous villages and village groups ruled by dispersed authority void of formalized, permanent or hereditary leadership positions (Meek 1937; Green 1947; Uchendu 1965). Meanwhile, Lord Hailey (1951: 155) observes that ‘the large Igbo community presents perhaps the most outstanding structure in which it is difficult to find any definite seat of executive authority, a characteristic which it has retained up to this day In contrast to the Hausa-Fulani in the North and Yoruba in the West, the formal establishment of colonial rule in the East spawned an enterprising tendency among the Igbos as they became more mobile, receptive and nationally oriented than other ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. (Onuoha, G; 2008) Anber (1967: 168) identified the unrivalled pace with which the Igbos advanced faster than all other ethnic groups in Nigeria within a relatively short period to the pace and nature of ‘Igbo modernisation’ in a plural society. On his part, Chinua Achebe (2012: 75) attributed the forced migratory tendencies of the Igbo to the population density in Igbo land which created a “land hunger”- a pressure on their low fertility, laterite-laden soil for cultivation, housing and other purposes, factors that led ultimately to migration to other parts of

the nation. The forced migration gave them the appellation of ‘the Jews of West Africa’ (Henry Kissinger, 1969)

Though the Igbo are aggressive, presumptuous, gifted and adventurous but they are without doubt lacking in circumspection. It is, perhaps, this lack of circumspection that, arguably, informed their domination of the Nigeria’s public sector’s employment and the series of unsuccessful Hausa-Igbo political alliances that saw the Igbo usually conceding political leadership to the Hausas, and the eventual coup d’état of 15th January, 1966. No Igbo individual other than Chinua Achebe was better placed to provide a comprehensive glimpse into the character of the Igbo. Chinua Achebe (2012: 76) had this to say about his Igbo kin: “I will be the first to concede that the Igbo as a group is not without its flaws. Its success can and did carry deadly penalties: the dangers of hubris, overweening pride, and thoughtlessness, which invite envy and hatred or, even worse, that can obsess the mind with material success and dispose it to all kinds of showiness. There is no doubt at all that there is a strand in contemporary Igbo behaviour that can offend by its noisy exhibitionism and disregard for humility and quietness”

Assessing Igbos’ commitment to the Nigeria project could be somewhat difficult because of its ambiguity in terms of political ideology. There is, however, no doubt about their commitment to one Nigeria; but under what philosophical or ideological framework could not be easily fathomed. Unlike the Hausa’s hegemonic power ideology that is manifested in the conditional commitment, lukewarm or unenthusiastic commitment to national integration unless their leadership was guaranteed; or the Yoruba’s commitment that was dependent on concession to them of regional autonomy, constitutional cum fiscal federalism in view of Nigeria’s diversities, and their right to secede, the Igbo’s support for the amalgamation and their unalloyed faith in one Nigeria appeared to be propelled by the peculiarity of the topography of the Eastern region where the Igbos have their root, which makes migration a necessity. In

this regard, Ikejiani-Clark's (2009: 447) statement to the effect that, "Nigeria as a whole became an Eastern Nigeria Diaspora. Population pressure on the land, particularly in the heart of Igbo territory, along with a general desire for upward mobility, led hundreds of thousands of people of Eastern Nigeria to migrate to other parts of the country, primarily to the North, which constituted over two-thirds of the territory" is apposite. This view was corroborated by Chinua Achebe as indicated earlier when he made reference to the topography of Igbo land as a factor in their one Nigeria philosophy.

Thus, it could be concluded that the Igbo's support for and faith in the Nigeria project was never predicated on any conditions tabled for negotiations with the North and West, rather it was the topography-factor, which engendered their migratory habits, that was responsible for their belief in national integration or in the Nigeria-project.

This factor could also have influenced their many unsuccessful political alliances with Hausas, in spite of the contention of Ikejiani-Clark (ibid), to wit, "there is no escaping the fact that there was the inescapable existence of a most profound and fundamental cultural antipathy and conflict between the Eastern and Northern establishment".

3.5 Igbo and the Embrace of Machiavellian Strategy

There could also be a subtext to the earlier observed series of unsuccessful Hausa-Igbo political alliances that saw the Igbo usually conceding political leadership to the Hausas, and the eventual coup d'état of 15th January 1966. This subtext could be better explained by the Machiavellian strategy for attaining and retaining power. According to Machiavelli (2001:27-28), *there are two ways to conduct a conflict: by lawful means, or by the use of force. The first is considered appropriate to women and men, and the second to beasts. But often the first method is ineffective, and it becomes necessary to adopt the second. And so it is necessary that a Prince must know how to employ both the man and the*

beast within. He further suggests as follows: *As it is essential for a Prince to learn the use of beast, he should imitate, both the fox and the lion as models [...]. To model yourself on the lion alone is not enough.* Conversely, neither should you model yourself on the fox alone; the fox and lion models are not mutually exclusive. One could reasonably argue or assume that, going by the Igbo's presumption of superior intelligence in relation to other ethnic groups, the Igbo's concession of political leadership to the Hausa-Fulani during their many failed political alliances could be or was actually predicated on a fox model, which entails pretended subservience to the Hausa political leadership to achieve two objectives, namely assume control of the public service to prepare them for the attainment and the success of the second objective of political leadership of the country.

3.5.1 Placing Igbo in Harmony Framework

Smoothing handling style of the Harmony Framework accommodates this Igbo Machiavellian behaviour or tactic. According to Leung (1997) *Smoothing* relates highly but positively to disintegration avoidance. Though this conflict avoidance phenomenon is common among the Chinese, Anedo (2012) opined that the Igbo also embraced this harmony motive. *Smoothing* is otherwise known as *obey publicly and disobey privately* (Hwang, 1997-8), meaning that you avoid conflict publicly in order to protect one's interest while seeking or pursuing one's goal privately or secretly. This handling style is also called *Superficial Compliance*, which according to Hwang (ibid) equates Machiavellian behaviour that involves the use of unscrupulous manipulative tactics to obtain self-motivated political goals.

Available indices pointed inexorably to the fact that they (the Igbo) had achieved or were achieving the first objective before the military coup d'état of 15th January 1966. That the Igbo had, indeed, achieved

their first objective was supported by the data from *The Nigerian Situation: Facts and Background* that showed manpower distribution within the public services, where 45 percent of the managers were Igbo “and it is threatening to reach 60 percent by 1968; where in the Nigerian Railway Corporation the Igbos occupied; the Nigerian Ports Authority and the Nigerian Foreign service, in which over 70 percent of the posts were held by the Igbos (Chinua Achebe, 2012: 77).

There was a sense in the argument that the Igbo having failed to achieve the assumed political objective through *Fox Model* alone, which though enabled them to occupy relatively disproportionate positions in the public sector of Nigeria, considered the application of the *Lion Model* through the military option that would turn the tide against the Hausas. Thus on the 15th of January, 1966 the federal government headed by Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Hausa-Fulani was over thrown in a military coup d'état, led by mainly Igbo military officers. The military putsch was tagged Igbo coup because, apart from its execution by mainly Igbo officers of the rank of Major (there was a Yoruba Major among the group), only political leaders from the North and West, namely the Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sadauna of Sokoto, his counterpart from the West, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola and the Prime Minister afore-mentioned were killed by coup makers. Meanwhile, the ceremonial President of the Republic Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and the Premier of the Eastern Region, Dr. Michael Okpara and the Chief of the Army, Major General Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi, all belonging to Igbo ethnic group were spared.

From the preceding in respect of Igbo attitudinal dispositions, we can conclude by asserting that Igbo attitudes could adequately be accommodated by Harmony Framework; that the attitudes are favourably disposed to Leung's five (5) conflict- handling styles, namely Avoiding, Obliging, Dominating, Compromising and Integrating, and that these handling styles (except dominating) are positively related to Disintegra-

tion Avoidance and Harmony Enhancement of Harmony motives/factors and their variant such as Smoothing or Obey Publicly Disobey Privately. Meanwhile, negotiation handling styles relates negatively to disintegration avoidance and positively to harmony enhancement.

Table 3.6 Placing the Igbo in the conflict/harmony construct

Harmony Motives			
Conflict Handling Style	Disintegration Avoidance	Harmony Enhancement	Harmony as Hindrance
Avoiding	Related positively	Related positively	Related negatively
Obliging	Related positively	Related Positively	Related negatively
Compromising	Strongly related positively	Strongly positively related	Related negatively
Integrating	Related negatively	Related positively	Related negatively
Dominating	Related negatively	Related negatively	Related negatively
Negotiation	Related negatively	Related positively	Related negatively

Adapted from the Dual-concern model/Harmony Factors

3.5.2 Yoruba Attitudinal/Cultural Dispositions and Conflict/Harmony Framework

According to Ifeyinwa (2002: 123) citing 1995 demographic information, the Yoruba constitute 21.3% of the Nigeria’s population (Table 3.1). It is widely recognized that Yoruba are a model of religious toler-

ance in the sense that in spite of the equal representation of the two received religions among them there has not been reported cases of religious crises. We can now examine and analyse the Yoruba attitudinal dispositions towards other ethnic groups and the peaceful existence of Nigeria.

Several factors have been identified to have influenced the Yoruba attitudinal dispositions. These factors include their constitutional monarchical system and the hierarchical culture as well as their early head-start in education. (Onuoh, G: 2008) Added to the preceding factors is their close proximity to the coast. All of these factors combine to reflect on the Yoruba's polished political outlook, as well as on their improved socio-economic indicators, such as high literacy level and relatively low poverty level. According to Sowunmi et al (2012) the poverty rate in the Yoruba Southwest geo-political zone was 37.9% relative to the core North which includes Hausa/Fulani Northwest and the Northeast geopolitical zones with poverty rates ranging from 78.4% to 97.7%. The National Bureau of Statistics (2006) gave the literacy level in the Yoruba Southwest as 70.4%. The relatively low poverty incidence and the high literacy level could be as a result of the impacts of the identified factors, which enabled this ethnic group to identify and exploit opportunities in commerce and industry.

The Yoruba, the third leg of Nigeria's ethnic tripod are cosmopolitan, never subservient to others, do not believe in nor respect the arrogation of power by any ethnic group to itself. Yoruba do not seek to dominate others and strongly resist domination or any semblance of domination by other ethnic groups. By virtue of their early head start in education, Yoruba seem to have cultivated dialectics or the art of argumentation as a tool for subjecting governance issues to serious analyses and discourse. Because of these attitudinal dispositions, Yoruba are viewed by her other compatriots as a hard-to-please ethnic group with a penchant for criticizing every administration. This could explain the ethnic

group's preference for playing formidable oppositional role right from the First Republic to dissociate themselves from the band of opportunistic politicians who were only interested in retaining the status-quo. The Yoruba believe that charity begins at home in the sense that it is imperative that you are a good Yoruba first and foremost before you can become a better Nigerian. In other words, the quality of your ethnicity is functionally related to the quality of your nation. For this, the Yoruba are viewed as people with tribal or regional orientation.

Yoruba's views on Nigeria as a nation and what they consider as the ideal constitutional framework and government structure are well documented by one of their illustrious sons, Chief Obafemi Awolowo who said that a federal constitution where the constituent regions, or states are organized on linguistic basis was the most appropriate for countries with multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion (vide chapters 1 & 2 of this work).

3.5.3 Placing the Yoruba in the Conflict/Harmony Construct

But in view of their personality dispositions of tolerance and preference for debates on national issues, what is our prognosis of Yoruba's response to conflict situations or their placement in the conflict/harmony construct? Yoruba have realized early enough that the survival or success of Nigeria as an amalgamation of multiplicity of ethnic, cultural and religious entities depends on its adoption of constitutional federalism. They are also in the forefront of those clamouring for the convocation of sovereign national conference that will deliberate on how Nigeria should be structured so that one ethnic group will not have the latitude to dominate others, or a conference that will deliberate on all issues, including the right of the federating units to secede.

The Yoruba believe very strongly in ethics of democracy which according to Sabine, regards mutual concession and compromise as ways

of reaching agreements, which over all were more satisfactory than any that could be reached by the dominance of one interest of one party over all the others (Sabine 1973: 844), and which Salami (2006), regards as upholding the ethos of resolving human antagonistic interests through negotiation. This is in consonance with democratic ethos, which important features Salami (2006: *ibid*) said could be located in the traditional Yoruba social, cultural and political arrangement.

According to Ezeru (1960: 6,7) cited in Ikejiani-Clark (2009: 445-446), the Yoruba people of Nigeria have three characteristic features, in comparison with other Nigerians. The society of Yoruba is hierarchical in structure, with large-scale political institutions, and they are more urbanized. In comparison to other groups, they received a greater amount of impingement by Western institutions during the colonial period, probably due to their location near the coast, and the first area of considerable Western contact.

Yoruba traditional society was a reconciliation of the “autocratic dictatorship and popular democracy” as traditional Yoruba Kingdoms exhibited a balance of authority and democracy (Tangwa 1998: 2).

The preference of the Yoruba for discussion or *negotiation* that should encompass, to borrow from Osi (1998:30), accommodation, persuasion, compromise and consensus, and premised on the understanding that in social interactions, inter-personal disagreements are a constant; and that it is only through negotiations that those disagreements could be resolved through give-and-take philosophy. Therefore, Yoruba believe very strongly that negotiations provide a strong plank for building a virile nation.

To the Yoruba, avoiding conflictive issues as opposed to discussing them to arrive at a negotiated resolution, amount to escapism. Therefore, the preference of the Yoruba for negotiation could be assumed to fit adequately into the Western Conflict Framework, which as indicated earlier, is dependent on self-interest and focuses on outcomes. This

framework, which employs negotiation as its operational tool is viewed to favour competition from which emerges a winner or loser outcome (Wall & Stark, 1998). However, it is worth reiterating and underscoring McGinn & Keros' (2002) position that cooperative exchange that leads to mutually satisfactory outcomes may also emerge from negotiation. Moreover, the long-run integrative and mutually beneficial relationship arising from negotiation should commend it to universal application.

For instance, the Yoruba insistence on the re-validation of the 1993 Presidential elections won by a Yoruba candidate but annulled by the Military Head of state of Northern extraction, led to a negotiated settlement that eventually saw another Yoruba becoming the President (the winner of the 1993 presidential election having died in military custody for insisting on his mandate). The negotiations averted what would have been another civil war, featuring the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani as combatants. The consequences of the averted war might have led to the disintegration of Nigeria.

In view of Yoruba's preference for discussion or negotiation, we could also examine its relationship with the harmony factors. We could also argue that because of relationship of negotiation with compromise, it would relate positively to harmony enhancement. Thus, in addition to negotiation, the Yoruba attitudinal dispositions would favour Leung's five (5) conflict- handling styles of Avoiding, Compromising, Accommodating and Integrating, which also relate positively to harmony motives of Disintegration Avoidance and Harmony Enhancement.

Table 3.7 Placing the Yoruba in the conflict/harmony construct

Harmony Motives			
Conflict Handling Style	Disintegration Avoidance	Harmony Enhancement	Harmony As Hindrance
Avoiding	Related positively	Related positively	Related negatively
Obliging	Related Positively	Related positively	Related negatively
Compromising	Strongly positively related	Strongly positively related	Related negatively
Integrating	Related negatively	Related positively	Related negatively
Dominating	Related negatively	Related negatively	Related negatively
Negotiation	Related negatively	Related positively	Related negatively

Adapted from the Dual-Concern Model/Harmony Factors

3.5.4 Consequences of Attitudinal Dispositions of Nigeria’s Three Majority Ethnic Groups and the Goal of Harmony

The accommodation of compromise and negotiation handling styles by the Hausa/Fulani as a result of the change in their hither-to attitudinal dispositions, which is consequent upon the reality of the politics of the geo-political zone, means the acceptance of give-and-take philosophy and the rejection of pre-conditions as basis for discussing national questions. This new disposition should be seen as an improvement in the former attitude of regarding other ethnic groups as vassals who should be lorded over. This new disposition should therefore be encouraged as it is the pathway to establishing harmonious inter-ethnic/religious rela-

tionships in a diverse country like Nigeria. Meanwhile, the largely positive relationships of the Leung's five handling styles to harmony motives (except dominating, integrating and negotiation which relate negatively to disintegration avoidance) with regard to both Igbo and Yoruba attitudinal dispositions means that any of these handling tools could be adopted to achieve existential goal of peace and harmony.

However, the embrace of negotiation that is positively related to harmony enhancement by the three ethnic groups should be acknowledged for its relevance, particularly in a society with cultural diversity. In addition, its democratic value should make it a more attractive and flexible tool for solution to the inevitable conflicts of diversity on a sustainable and long-term basis without which Nigeria's development may become stalled.

3.5.5 Hausa-Igbo Conflicts

Hausa – Igbo conflicts like any other ethnic conflicts in Nigeria had their roots in the 1914 amalgamation of peoples of diverse cultures and religions. This is in consonance with the contentions of researchers including Obioha (1999) that ethnic conflicts are bound to occur when people with diverse cultures, economic conditions, and political systems are brought together regardless of their dissimilarities. Thus the series of conflicts between the Hausas and Igbos could best be explained as the result of clash of high intensity political ambition and of culture arising from cultural and religious value differentials, and the dynamics of social, economic and political relationships of two ethnic groups with different world-views.

Nigeria being not a federation of homogeneous ethnicity, culture and religion, it is incumbent on the various ethnic compositions to learn to respect each other's culture, if they are to avoid conflicts. Furthermore, interacting ethnic groups should reflect on Jerman's views (1998)

that “the way one relates to somebody has to do with culture. What is important is to make an attempt to understand the dynamics of social relationships in the environment...” Dunmoye (2003: 11) contended that “there is nothing unusual about belonging to an ethnic group or tribe, it is the aggressiveness associated with a group’s dealing with another one that creates conflicts- this is ethnicism or tribalism”. The need for the interacting ethnic groups to reflect on Jerman’s and Dunmoye’s is to derive benefits that will come from improved inter-ethnic relationship.

3.5.6 Hausa-Igbo Attitudinal Dispositions as a Fault Line

We had discussed earlier the forced migratory habits of the Igbos and their seeming lack of appreciation of humility and respect for other cultures as a liability, particularly in a heterogeneous society when perforce you are dealing with other people. It is trite saying ‘that when you are in Rome you do as the Romans.’ The failure on the part of the Igbo to learn this elementary lesson or not to treat it with levity has brought them always in collision with not only the Hausas but other ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Perhaps, for emphasis, we could recall the statements credited to Sir Adeyemo Alakija, President of Egbe Omo Oduduwa-the Yoruba socio-cultural group as well as the reactions of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe through his West African Pilot Newspaper for better appreciation of Jerman’s views and to drive home the argument of Dunmoye.

The scene was Lagos, a coastal town belonging to Yoruba ethnic group that was (is) home to all Nigerians regardless of their ethnic group identities. Sir Adeyemo Alakija who in 1948 “was reiterating the need to articulate a Yoruba agenda and safeguard the Yoruba nation against the perceived threat from other ethnic groups in Nigeria” (Onuoha, 2008) and was quoted as follows:

'This Big Tomorrow [...] (For the Yoruba) is the future of our children [...] How they will hold their own among other tribes of Nigeria. How the Yoruba will not be relegated to the background in the future' (cited in Coleman 1958: 346).

Then the West African Pilot riposte on behalf of Azikiwe its Publishers:

'Henceforth, the cry must be one battle against Egbe Omo Oduduwa: its leaders at home and abroad, up hill and down dale, in the streets of Nigeria and in the residences of its advocates [...] It is the enemy of Nigeria; it must be crushed to the earth [...] There is no going back, until the fascist organisation of Sir Adeyemo Alakija has been dismembered' (Coleman, 1958: 346).

Meanwhile, the Hausa's tendency to always want to dominate their environment, to want to be in control wherever they may be, is one serious attitudinal shortcoming that has always brought the Hausa into collisions with their compatriots.

Domination results in grievances, bottled-up anger and inevitable animosity or hostility, and the eventual explosion of conflicts between the dominated and the dominating. The resultant conflict accords with Collier and Hoeffler's (ibid) grievance model. Konye Ori (2009) in corroborating the conclusions of Collier and Hoeffler Grievance Model opined that "grievances such as ethnic rivalry and ethnic dominance, polarization/ regionalism, perceived tribalism and religionism, and perceived income inequality were very significant in the outbreak of the war (the demand for Biafra's independence)". It also aligns with Ifeyinwa's (2002) views that ethnic conflicts may remain unmanageable when certain issues such as incessant disregard for the needs and interests of diverse ethnic groups in the country or when one ethnic group is consistently in authority and another ethnic group is consistently in a minor-

ity position without due attention to its needs and interests remain unresolved. These views are consistent with our earlier expositions on the behavioural or attitudinal dispositions or culture differentials of the three majority ethnic groups, which explained why the relationships between them were bound to be frosty and antagonistic.

3.5.7 Modernization, Religion and Potential for Conflict

Meanwhile, modernity and the demands of modernisation could have the potential for increasing ethnic rivalry in Nigeria. This is as a result of the pressure they exert on individuals and the society at large. Those with an edge in education are bound to access opportunities available in commerce to the envy of others. We are aware that in terms of education, the Igbo, relatively, have an edge over the Hausa and thus were able to harness opportunities in trade and commerce, and in the public sector. Certainly, this had attracted the envy, the animosity and hostility of other ethnic groups, which more often than not usually degenerated into antagonistic relationships between the ethnic groups, particularly between the Hausa and Igbo. Barongo (1987) sees modernisation as the major reason for the desire to grab and accumulate resources which generates antagonistic relationships and tends to create an environment conducive to inter-ethnic competition and rivalry. Without doubt, these issues among others constitute some of the causes of the conflicts between the Hausas and the Igbos, and even other ethnic groups in the country.

Religion was another causative factor of the series of conflicts between the Hausa and the Igbo. But as we indicated earlier, the line between religion, politics and ethnicity is blurred. More often than not what starts as a religious or political crisis often assumes ethnic colouration, particularly in the North, pitching the Northerners (Hausas) against the Southerners (mainly Igbos and Christians) who are always at the receiving end of the Hausa onslaught and orgy of violence.

It could, therefore, be asserted that, except for the immediate post-July 29th counter coup, there was no direct confrontation between Hausa and Igbo in the guise of ethnic conflicts. The Hausa – Igbo conflicts had always been a fall-out from religious and/or political crises where the Igbo became a veritable scapegoat in the sense that this ethnic group had no direct bearing on the religious and political crises other than the fact the Igbo relatively stood out in terms of entrepreneurial excellence and other natural endowments.

3.5.8 Nigeria-Biafra Civil War 1967-1970

The British Colonialists sowed the seed of the 3-year Nigeria-Biafra civil war of 1967-70 in the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates. It was, however, watered first by the colonial policies that were inconsistent with the heterogeneous nature of the colonial contraption, called Nigeria, which lopsided structure was skewed in favour of the North and its ethnic groups, and secondly by bad governance by the immediate post-independence political leadership. The fruits that the seed (amalgamation) bore were regionalism, ethnic rivalry, fear of imagined or real ethnic domination, animosity and hostility, political discord, struggles for control of the central government and the resources, marginalization, corruption, greed, grievances, socio-economic and political crises, which culminated in the whirlwind of conflicts that eventually led to 1966 coup d'état and the civil war we are focussing on.

Yet, the unfortunate scenarios could have been avoided had the leaders of the three majority ethnic groups, the political class and political leadership taken time to learn that in a heterogeneous society like Nigeria, it is important to: (a) understand, inculcate and internalise the dynamics of harmonious social relationship; (b) appreciate the quality of humility and respect for other cultures; (c) shun the attitudinal tendency

or disposition to wanting to dominate others in economic or public sphere. Collier and Hoeffler (2004: *ibid*) had showed that except ethnic dominance, most proxies for grievance such as inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization were insignificant. They then underscored the need for avoidance of the tendency to wanting to dominate by pointing out that societies characterized by ethnic and religious diversity are safer than homogenous societies as long as they avoid dominance. This is because the consequences of ethnic domination in a diverse society are grievances, bottled-up anger and inevitable animosity or hostility, and the eventual explosion of conflicts between the dominated and the dominating, and (d) remember Konye Ori's (2009:*ibid*) views that "contrary to the findings of Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin, in my assessment of the Nigerian civil war, grievances such as ethnic rivalry and ethnic dominance, polarization/ regionalism, perceived tribalism and religionism, and perceived income inequality were very significant in the outbreak of the war (the demand for Biafra's independence)".

Figure 3.1 Map of Biafran Republic



Source: www.oyibosonline.com

3.5.9 British-Aided North's Hegemonic Dominance of Nigeria

Despite the fact that ethnic dominance is prone to causing grievances and avoidable political instability, the British Colonialists seemed to have deliberately encouraged it by ensuring the pre-eminence of a part of the amalgamated country in political and military spheres at the expense of the rest of the country. For instance, in the immediate post-amalgamation period, the British Colonialists created three regions, namely the Northern Region dominated by the Hausa-Fulani; the Western Region by the Yoruba, and the Eastern Region by the Igbo ethnic group, all of these dominant ethnic groups within these three regions, according to McCaskie (1997) were competing and seeking economic, political, and social dominance in the new Nigeria. In what could be described as a dangerous political misstep but which was in furtherance of their divide and rule policy, the colonialists, McCaskie (1997: *ibid*) noted that the north was made to have slightly more population than the other two regions combined, and on which basis the northern region was allocated a majority of the seats in the Federal Legislature established by the colonial authorities. This was the beginning of the British-aided North's hegemony in Nigeria's political and military sectors, and certainly the core factor in Nigeria's political instability. For instance, with regard to political domination, it is obvious from Table 3.2 below that the north had dominated the country's political leadership for 39 years of the country's independence in 1960 to date.

Table 3.8 Nigeria's Ruler From 1960-2011

S/N	Date	Identities	State	Region
1	Oct 1, 1960- Jan 15 1966	Tafawa Balewa	Bauchi	North
2	Jan 15 1966-July 29 1966	J.T.U. Ironsi	Abia	East
3	July 29, 1966-july 29, 1975	Yakubu Gowon	Plateau	North
4	July 29,1975-Feb 13, 1976	Murtala Mohammed	Kano	North
5	Feb13, 1976-Oct 1,1979	Olusegun Obasanjo	Ogun	West

6	Oct 1,1979-Dec 31,1983	Alh. Shehu Shagari	Sokoto	North
7	Dec 31, 1983-Aug 27, 1985	Muhammadu Buhari	Katsina	North
8	Aug 27, 1985-Aug26,1993	Ibrahim Babangida	Niger	North
9	Aug 26,1993-Nov.17,1993	Ernest Shonekan	Ogun	West
10	Nov.17,1993-June.8,1998	Sani Abacha	Kano	North
11	June.8,1998-May 29,1999	Abdul salam Abubakar	Niger	North
12	May 29,1999-May 29,2007	Olusegun Obasanjo	Ogun	West
13	May 29, 2007-May 5,2010	Umaru Musa Yar'Adua.	Katsina	North
14	May 5, 2010 to 29 May 2015	Goodluck Jonathan	Bayelsa	South

Source: Sunday Tribune, 7th August 1994, Ibadan, pp-7-9. Updated by Ahmed Babatunde Adeosun, 2011

Even in the military sector, North's pursuit of hegemonic domination was palpable as major military installations were located in the North. (Table 3.3) In this regard, Atofarati (1992) observed as follows: At independence, it was also obvious that only the group that controlled the Army could call the tunes in Nigeria's political leadership. It was, therefore, not by coincidence but actually by design that, as indicated in the Table 3.3, almost all major military installations were concentrated in one area of the country - The North. This was in keeping with the North's conquest philosophy as espoused by Nigeria's first Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in April 1947. According to Ikejiani – Clark (bid: 452) during the Legislative Council (Lagos) debates, April 1947, Mallam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said:

I think 1947 will always stand as a very important year in the history of Nigeria. Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern provinces in 1914 Nigeria has existed as one country only in paper. It is still far from being united...we do not want, sir, our southern neighbours to interfere in our development...but I should like to make it clear to you that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea (See Memorandum by Northern Delegates, 1966)

As weighty and incredible as the remarks that the northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea were, they nonetheless reflect North's or Hausa-Fulani's mind-set even as of today, and could well serve as the reason for their single-minded pursuit of political leadership and the control of the military sector. And that was why it had been asserted in some quarters that the loss of control of the military rather than the murder of their political heavy weights was more important factor in the counter-coup of 29th May, 1966 and the large scale savagery it encompassed.

Table 3.9 Major Military Installations in Nigeria and their Locations before the January 1966 coup

Northern Nigeria		
1	3rd Bn	Kaduna
2	5th Bn	Kano
3	1 Field Battery (Arty)	Kaduna
4	1 Field Squadron (Engrs.)	Kaduna
5	88 Transport Regt	Kaduna
6	Nigerian Defense Academy	Kaduna
7	Ordinance Depot	Kaduna
8	44 Military Hospital	Kaduna
9	Nigeria Military Training College	Kaduna
10	Recon Squadron & Regt	Kaduna
11	Nigerian Air Force	Kaduna
12	Ammunition Factory	Kaduna
13	Recruit Training Depot	Zaria
14	Nigerian Military School	Zaria

Western Nigeria		
1	4th Bn	Ibadan
2	2 Field Battery (Arty)	Abeokuta
3	2 Recon Squadron	Abeokuta
Eastern Nigeria		
1	1st Bn	Enugu

Source: Major Abubakar A. Atofarati in the Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies and Lessons Learnt, 1992

3.6 The Lopsided Political Structure

Sadly, in the attempt to entrench its domination of the rest of the country, the military dominated by the North imposed a unitary system of governance on the country, in spite of the country’s ethnic, cultural and religious heterogeneity. As a consequence, Nigeria is now beset by series of ethnic and religious conflicts, and the consequent enduring political instability. This was even corroborated by Obasanjo (1980) when he opined that Nigeria was beset by strings of political problems which stemmed from the lop-sided nature of the political divisions of the country and the type of the existing federal constitution and the spirit in which it operated. The political problems were the harbingers of the 15th January 1966 military coup and the counter coup of July 1966. Yet, the country did seem not to have learned any lesson from the inappropriateness of unitary constitution in a country with multiplicity of ethnicity and religion like Nigeria, as the governance system continued to be over-centralized.

This lopsided execution of the coup created suspicion that the coup was intended by the January coup makers to end North’s (Hausa-Fulani’s) dominance of the political leadership of the country and to install Igbo at the helm of national leadership, which would be in fulfillment of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe’s “Manifest Destiny” of the Igbos in

the struggle against colonialism that Onuoha (2008:19) argued was expressed in terms that were strikingly hegemonic as follows:

'It would appear that the God of Africa has created the Igbo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages [...] The martial prowess of the Igbo nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not only to conquer others but also adapt themselves to the role of preserver [...] The Igbo nation cannot shirk its responsibility' (Crowder 1962: 228)

This suspicion was further fuelled by the promulgation of Decree 34 by General Aguiyi-Ironsi on May 24, 1966. The widely unpopular decree, according to Achebe, (2012: 80) eliminated Nigeria's federal structure and put in place a unitary republic, which seemed to threaten more local patronage networks.

When this decree is juxtaposed with the manpower distribution statistics discussed earlier, the suspicion of an Igbo coup might not after all be unfounded, as the statistics would have supported the assumption or conclusion that the decree was intended to aid the complete clean sweep of the public service positions and assumption of the national political leadership by the Igbo.

3.6.1 The Absurdity of Unitary System in Heterogeneous Society

The success of the counter coup that terminated the Ironsi Administration revealed the Igbo as a not too careful political cum military strategist whose presumption of superior intelligence was hardly put to better use in political matters. This appraisal of the Igbo in matters political was by the assumption that the Ironsi Administration ought to have known the absurdity of transforming federal democratic governance into a unitary state in heterogeneous society like Nigeria. After all, three of the essential ingredients of political stability, unity, harmonious and peaceful co-existence in ethnically, culturally and religiously heteroge-

neous society are; (i) no one ethnic group dominates other ethnic groups in whatever sector of the national economy, (ii) democracy or democratic practice and federal constitution have proved to be an unassailable stabilizing and unifying tool in countries with ethnic, cultural or religious diversity, and (iii) the recognition of the un-workability of unitary constitution or unitary system of governance in ethnically and religiously diverse society. Added to this was the failure of General Ironsi to disabuse the minds of the two aggrieved majority ethnic groups (i.e. Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba) of the Igbo-conspiracy theory by not dealing with the 15th of January coup makers speedily and decisively in accordance with the military tradition, at least to assuage the feelings of the Northern oligarch. With regard to this failure, Oyediran opined thus:

“Even if the coup was planned with the best of intentions, its outcome looked patently to the other ethnic groups, particularly in the North and West, like an Ibo conspiracy. Firstly [...] of the seven ringleaders, six were Ibo. Secondly, but more importantly, the victims were virtually all non-Ibo, even though the Ibo political leaders ... were as solidly steeped in the vices of the First Republic as any other ethnic group. However, matters grew even worse when the dust of the January coup settled and General Ironsi eventually took over ... Even in the North where there was scepticism, the attitude was that of wait-and-see rather than of outright hostility. Unfortunately, Ironsi wasted this goodwill and in this he was not helped by the post-coup actions and words of his fellow Ibos who in public places in Northern towns jeered at and taunted the people of the Northern Region for their losses. (Oyediran 1979, pp. 27-8)

We had observed in the preceding paragraphs that dominance by one ethnic group over others was an anathema in ethnically, culturally and religiously heterogeneous society. Yet, the Igbo seemed to have violated this golden rule, in spite of Collier and Hoeffler’s grievance

model (2001), which states that increased ethnic dominance increases the chances of civil conflict significantly. The consequences of the violation of this golden rule were the hatred, the resentment against the Igbo, the counter coup by Northern military officers, the pogrom and the genesis of the incessant or vicious cycle of violent conflicts between the Hausas and the Igbos and, ultimately, the unfortunate 3-year civil war.

But then, it is absolutely not inconceivable that if the Hausa-Fulani had reflected deeply on and objectively assessed their attitudinal disposition towards power, their inordinate pursuit of hegemony as a policy objective that was reflected in the location of the major military installations virtually in the north, they would have realized such a disposition was untenable in a country with a multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion.


Figure 3.2: Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Biafran Leader at Nigeria-Biafra Peace Talk in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



Source: <http://mwyeliff.blogspot.ch/2012/03/mocking-of-nation-where-nigeria-leads.html>

It was their failure in this regard that propelled the 15th January, 1966 and their further intransigence or adamant inclination towards the retention of status quo ante that encouraged the staging of the counter coup of 29th July, 1966 by Northern military officers, the pogrom of the Igbo in the North and other parts of Nigeria by soldiers of northern extractions, the return of the Igbo to their Eastern region home, the declaration of the State of Biafra on 30th May, 1967 and the conflagrations of war that followed.

Figure 3.3: *Timeline of the Civil War*



Source: <https://humanrightsinnigeria.wordpress.com/genocide-and-civil-war/>

As justifiable as the declaration of the State of Biafra was (pogrom that claimed up to thirty thousand of Igbo lives that were killed in fighting with Hausas, and around 1million refugees that fled to their Ibo homeland in the east) (BBC, 2007), the federal government's failure to ensure the safety of Easterners in the presence of organized genocide, and the direct incrimination of the government in the murders of its own citizens (Achebe; 2012, *ibid*), the one million military and civilian casualties during the war (Konye Ori: 2009) would have been saved if and only if the leadership of both Nigeria and Biafra had accepted their cul-

pability, recognised and accepted the futility of war and had subsequently persuaded themselves to the indispensability of the conflict framework of the West and the Harmony framework of the East (Asia) to the resolution of the incipient conflict. The West's Conflict framework as noted earlier emphasises *negotiation* while the hallmarks of the Harmony framework including its many variants are promotion, maintenance or preservation of relationships, and harmony motives that include disintegration avoidance and harmony enhancement

3.6.2 Causes of Civil War

The following are the identified causative factors of the Nigeria-Biafra war:

- A. Clash of culture arising from ethnic/cultural and religious value differentials, which stemmed from the 1914 amalgamation of the disparate peoples of Northern and Southern protectorates;
- B. Nigeria's structural imbalance or deficiency as a post-amalgamation legacy;
- C. Better- than –thou attitude and the disdain for humility: Ojukwu was not ready to take orders from Gowon whom he saw as a military mate and therefore did not recognize his leadership (Ejike: 2010);
- D. Clash of ambition: The inordinate ambitions of the two combatant ethnic groups to monopolise or control power at the centre, thereby dominating both political and economic spheres and other Nigerians;
- E. The discovery, exploitation and exportation of petroleum that earned the nation huge revenue;
- F. The pursuit of hegemonic interest by one of the three majority ethnic groups as well as ethnic domination;
- G. Corruption;

- H. The coup and counter coup of 1966,
- I. The creation of 12 states from the existing four regions by the Gowon Military Administration;
- J. The pogrom or the massacre of Igbo residing in the North and other parts of Nigeria by soldiers of northern origin, and
- K. The declaration of secession or the state of Biafra by Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, which Obasanjo (1980) declared made war not inevitable but imminent.

3.6.3 Consequences of Civil war

The 3-year war cost the nation lives and infrastructural facilities. Konye Ori (2009: *ibid*) indicated that well over one million human lives were lost to the unfortunate war. The infrastructures that were damaged or destroyed spread across physical, social and economic infrastructures.


With regard to social infrastructures destroyed or damaged, we had educational facilities such as schools including primary and secondary schools and technical colleges; the health facilities included hospitals, primary health care centres. Other levels of social infrastructures that bore the brunt of the war were prisons, police stations and military installations and barracks.

The economic infrastructures were not spared in the spate of destructions which included various financial institutions and oil and gas. In the petroleum subsector, we have the refineries, the oil pipelines and flow stations while in the transportation subsector, railway lines, coaches and wagons, airports and seaports with airplanes and ships were not spared. The facilities destroyed or damaged in the energy subsector, included power generating stations and substations, and transmission lines. We can now present these consequences in at-a-glance format below:

- Halt in economic growth and development progression for the next few years as there was decline in the economic activity in the modern sector (manufacturing/industrial sector);

- Shortages of both domestic and imported consumer goods because of the declines in both private and public industrial activities;
- Huge public expenditure outlay consequent upon the need to finance the war and to execute the Nigeria's equivalent of the US Marshall Plan- the Nigeria's 3Rs (i.e. reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction);
- Destruction of both physical and economic infrastructures in the public sector;
- Destruction of lives and property;
- Increased incidence of internally displaced persons or refugees which number was put at 1 million;
- Starvation of civilian population, particularly women, children and the disabled in the rebel enclave, and
- Increased incidence of armed robberies at the end of the war as a result of the demobilisation of soldiers from both sides of the war

Figure 3.4: Countries with the largest displacement related to conflict and violence



Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Overview 2014: people internally displaced by conflicts and violence, infographic.

3.7 Jukun-Tiv Conflicts

3.7.1 Overview of the Conflicts

Both the Jukun and Tiv belligerents are found predominantly in the North Central state of Benue and Nassarawa, and North Eastern state of Taraba. The Tiv are found mainly in Benue State, but they are also found in large numbers in Taraba, Nassarawa and Cross River states. On the other hand the Jukun are found predominantly in parts of Southern Taraba state, particularly in Wukari Local Government Area. In his historical overview of how the two belligerents came and settled in the disputed areas of Wukari Local Government, Gaya Best (2003:174) noted that the earliest known group to have settled in the Benue valley was the Jukun nation. The Jukun, according to him, believe they originated/migrated from Yemen. The contested Wukari was established in the 1840s when the Tiv had already arrived and settled in different parts of the Benue valley. Before then, however, the Jukun had built a powerful Kwararafa Kingdom, which held sway in the political landscape of the North of the present day Nigeria until its demise by the middle of 18th century (Meek, 1931; Johnson, 1967). The Tiv were said to have migrated from Cameroon to Benue valley from the late 17th century into the early part of the 18th century. The Tiv being predominantly farmers are always aggressively in search of farmland, which led them to migrate to Benue, Taraba, Nassarawa and Cross River states. Thus, it could be said that the hunger for farm land was the singularly most important factor in the resentment of the Tiv by the Jukun who feared the Tiv who “were not only aggressive expansionists, given their hunger for farmlands, but also aggressive procreators” (Gaya Best, *ibid*) would soon dominate them.

These different ethnic groups for territorial space and the exercise of sovereignty could situate the Wukari conflict between the Jukun and Tiv within the context of quest over the space (Best et al, 1999:84-84).

Meanwhile, the protracted nature of this conflict aligns with Azar's explanation of a protracted social conflict, which represents the prolonged violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation (Azar, 1991:93). In the context of the Jukun-Tiv conflicts we may add access to chieftaincy stool and farm land as explanations for the protracted Jukun-Tiv conflicts under consideration.

3.7.2 Causes Jukun-Tiv Conflicts

There has not been historical consensus about the reasons for the recurrent violent confrontations between the Jukun and the Tiv. Some believe that that antagonism was a product of the 1926 annexation of eleven Tiv clans to Jukun territory by the colonial administration while others ascribe it to chieftaincy tussle of 1954 when the Tiv under the leadership of Mr. Uva Va'ase demanded for a right to ascend the throne of Aku Uka- the traditional ruler of the Jukuns (Dauda Abubakar, 2003:60). Apart from the colonial intervention and chieftaincy affairs being implicated as causative factors, the protracted conflicts are also rooted in ethnicity and in the fear of domination. They were also politically motivated as well as resource based

3.7.3 Consequences Jukun-Tiv Conflicts

The series of violent communal clashes between the Tiv and the Jukun claimed so many lives and destroyed both public and private property on a large scale in that region. For instance, houses and homes were burnt, schools were destroyed and hospitals were attacked leaving the wounded and sick to suffer and bleed to death. Children were made orphans and wives were made widows. Alubo (cited in Maier, 2006), stated that the *"1990/93 crises recorded widespread devastation; burnt out villages, littered corpses in various stages of decomposition and*

household items thrown all over". Avav (2002) also documented in details the degree of destruction.

Apart from the unfortunate loss of many precious lives of both the combatants and non-combatants including women and children, villages/settlements and farm lands were destroyed. Furthermore, there was a high incidence of internally displaced people, which created a refugee problem for the state. The de-mobilised combatants became a security-concern, as many of them took to criminality through engagement in social vices.

The political instability engendered by the conflict brought the economic activities in that region of the country to a stand-still, at least for the duration of the conflict.

3.8 Hausa-Kataf Conflicts

3.8.1 Overview of the Conflicts

We are aware that the Hausa ethnic group is one of the three majority ethnic groups in Nigeria; the other two being the Igbo and the Yoruba ethnic groups. The Hausa form the majority ethnic group in the North West zone of Nigeria. This zone is made up of the following states: Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto and Zamfara. However, because of the emirate system in operation in the North, a system that was supported and retained by the colonialists, but which also embraced indirect rule, the Emirs appoint their representatives (district Heads) who are mainly of the Hausa/Fulani stock and Moslem in semi-urban Northern towns whose suzerainty covers matters ranging from local taxes, land, dispute settlement, et cetera. One of the shortcomings of this system, which constitutes a source of frictions and grievances, is that it confers undue advantage on the Hausa/Fulani vis-à-vis the indigenes of the place, in terms of access to resources or appropriation of political and economic opportunities. This view is corroborated by Abubakar

(2003:47) when he opined that “the foisting of Hausa-Fulani hegemony through the Islamisation policy of the caliphate over minority ethnic groups not only sharpened communal divide along ethnic-religious lines but more dangerously along the religious lines” It is pertinent to recall that Zango-Kataf was an Hausa settlement, established in around 1750, in the homeland of the Atyab people as a mid-way base for Hausa traders from northern emirates on their way to the forest zone of Southern Nigeria (Dunmoye, 2003: 23). The Kataf who are also known and called Atyab are one of the indigenous tribes in the Southern part of the present Kaduna state

3.8.2 Causes Hausa-Kataf Conflicts

Egwu, et al (2003:79) opined that the Zango-Kataf problem could be located within the wider context of ethnic and cultural identities, especially in the context of globalisation, state failure and the crisis of nation-state project. There is the innate tendency of individual ethnic group within diversity to wanting to affirm, recognize, promote and protect its ethnic and cultural identities without let or hindrance. It is the responsibility of the state to recognize, protect and enforce individual ethnic groups right within the confines of the constitution. It is the failure of the state in this regard that usually causes inter-ethnic conflict, like the Zango-Kataf violent conflict under discussion. Another cause of the conflict under review was ethnic nationalism, which Ignatieff, (1993:2) called the language of our time. Every ethnic group wants to assert its individuality, the uniqueness of its culture vis-à-vis other ethnicity and culture.

The determination of the Katakats to resist the Hausa-Fulani’s efforts to dominate and oppress them and the Kataf’s insistence on their ownership of Zango often lead to violent confrontations between them. For example, the February 1992 riot emanated from a Kataf’s decision to

affirm their suzerainty through their local government by relocating a market from a Hausa dominated area to another dominated by the Katafs. The British colonialists' indirect rule tactics apparently facilitated the oppression or the domination. Land ownership and land use are also factors that caused the conflict. Then, there was the denial to the Katafs of access to economic resources and opportunities.

Other factors responsible for the communal conflict, according to Kazah-Toure (1995) include:


The manipulation of ethnic and religious differences by the various circles of the ruling class, domination and marginalisation of the predominantly Christian Atyab (Kataf) and other groups by the predominantly Muslim Hausa communities, jealousy and hatred towards the more wealthy Hausa community by others, sudden springing of animosity and intolerance between two ethnic groups that hitherto lived in peace and harmony

Then there were issues of inequality/unequal access to both economic opportunities as well as political office

3.8.3 Consequences of Hausa-Kataf Conflicts

The violent conflicts resulted in loss of lives and property. Places of worship- churches and mosques were burnt. As a result of the conflict, there were ethnic suspicions and divisions along religious line. Mutual trust was broken. There was displacement of the people in the area, as over 60,000 people were made homeless. There were huge losses of farms and farm products. Because farmers were unable to farm and traders could not trade their wares, the result was unemployment of able-bodied and the resultant increase in poverty level amongst the people of the area.

Figure 3.5: 12 countries with the largest displacement in 2013



Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Overview 2014: people internally displaced by conflicts and violence, infographic.

3.9 Hausa-Fulani versus Beroms (Settlers versus Indigenes Conundrum) Conflict

3.9.1 Overview of the Conflict

To borrow from Nnoli's characterization while he was discussing the inter-ethnic conflict between the Bachama and the Hausa immigrants, the Hausa-Berom conflict was part of ethnic minority politics, the struggle between the Northern ethnic minorities and the majority Hausa-Fulani ethnic group (Nnoli, 2003:33). The conflict between the Hausa and Berom/other Northern minority ethnic group in Jos, Plateau state also follows the Indigene-Settler paradigm and revolves around the determination of who are the indigenes/the original owners of Jos or who are settlers-the Beroms or the Hausa/Fulani. According to Dunmo-

ye (2003:26), the Beroms and other ethnics like the Ngas, Ankwei, Sura and Tal belong to Chadic linguistic group who settled in Jos. The Beroms expanded and displaced other ethnic group in the area. Meanwhile, the Hausas came to Jos in the early period of British colonialism and their number increased during the period of tin mining. This Indigene-Settler conundrum had, since 1940 pitched the Beroms against the Hausa. Meanwhile, the state could not be absolved from blame for this conflict. For instance, the creation of Jos North Local Government from the Jos Local Government with a Hausa as chairman was seen by the Beroms as calculated attempts to dispossess them of the ownership and authority over Jos and by implication establish the Hausa suzerainty in Jos.

3.9.2 Causes of Hausa-Fulani – Berom Conflict

The following factors could be identified as the causes of the Jos conflict:

- The 1914 amalgamation and the institution of indirect rule in the north which retained the emirate system and vested much power in the Hausa-Fulani emirs at the expense of the northern minority ethnic groups.
- The struggle against or the opposition to Hausa-Fulani pursuit of hegemonic power and control over the indigenes of Plateau state.
- Federal Government's intrusion in the internal affairs of Plateau state by creating Jos North local government from the existing Jos local Government, which amounts to siding with the Hausa-Fulani.
- The unresolved constitutional issue of 'Indigene-Settler' dichotomy.

Meanwhile, General Babangida, Nigeria's former military President while speaking on sectarian crises in Jos North in 2002 ascribed the causes of the Jos crises to what he observed as: *"The most fundamental underlying forces which propel ethnic nationalism in Nigeria are those*

of pervasive poverty, mass unemployment and underdevelopment of productive force and non-absorbance of the economy. The absence of developed productive forces constrains the transformation of the structures of the economy and society. Mass poverty and unemployment create alienation and insecurity, which in turn encourage Nigerians to experience and prefer accommodation within the social insurance systems of ethnic nationalities. In this regard, people are easily excited about injustice of other groups against their own groups. Poverty also creates frustration and divisiveness”.

3.9.3 Consequences of Hausa-Fulani – Berom Conflict

Several lives were lost and properties worth billions of Naira, which included both public and private properties, were destroyed. Businesses were crippled; the Ultra-modern main market was vandalized while schools were burnt down, teachers were killed while girls and female teachers were raped. The magnitude of destruction prompted the then president Olusegun Obasanjo to declare in Plateau state a state of emergency in September 18th 2004. In declaring the state of emergency, he said inter-alia that *“Violence has reached unprecedented levels and hundreds have been killed with much more wounded or displaced from their homes on account of their ethnic or religious identification. Schooling for children has been disrupted and interrupted; businesses have lost billions of naira and property worth much more destroyed”.*

Figure 3.6: Mass burial for villagers attacked by herdsmen in Jos Plateau



Source: BBC News Africa, Lagos, October 2010

3.10 Ife- Modakeke Conflict

3.10.1 Overview of the Crises

This is an intra-ethnic conflict that could also be called a sub-ethnic conflict in the sense that the two antagonists belong to Yoruba ethnic group. Sub-ethnicity shares same characteristics with ethnicity. In this regard, four perspectives were identified in defining ethnicity, namely social structure level; pattern of social interaction; subjective experience of identity, and relatively fixed patterns of behaviour and expressive emotional styles (de Vos and Romanucci-Ross, 1975:xi; cited by Albert, et al, 2003:213). The conflict according to Albert, et al (2003: 212), represents a good example of conflict resulting from internal displacement of people in pre-colonial Nigerian society. Following the internecine war in Oyo between 18th and 19th centuries, the Modakeke having

been displaced from their Oyo homeland migrated to Ile-Ife (Akinjogbin, 1965, 1966, 1992; Ajayi & Smith, 1964) and became migrant-guests of the Ife who are the original inhabitants of Ile-Ife. In other words, the Modakeke are migrants (refugees) from Oyo who had to contend with the by-product of migration, which often produces conflict termed “host-stranger” conflict, most especially where the migrants are in competition with their host-population (Albert, et al, *ibid*). The migrant-guests could avoid hostility or conflict with their host or indigenous community via three contending means of survival: assimilation, pacific co-existence, or animosity (Simir Amin, 1974:115). Levine (1966:101-116), however, posits that a migrant population could reject assimilation option on the ground of different socio-cultural systems; or the migrants could even be denied assimilation by their hosts in a situation where there is no intimate physical interaction with their hosts because of striking cultural differences, personal motives and anxieties of individuals on the two sides of the fault line. The choice of pacific co-existence is dependent on healthy interaction with the hosts, which is also facilitated by the development of some new or “compromising” sub-cultures that replace animosity with mutual friendship or cordiality.

3.10.2 The In-Group and Out-Group Theoretical Construct for Ife-Modakeke Conflicts

Thus Ife-Modakeke conflict, considered as one of the most violent conflicts, could be situated within the theoretical framework of “In-group and Out-group”. According to Brewer and Campbell (1976:77), *the primary mechanism by which the displacement of aggression from ingroup to outgroup is facilitated is ingroup members’ shared perception of outgroups that serve to blame the out-group for ingroup troubles and promote distrust and fear of the out-group. The focus of fear may be lacking for a few locally dominant ingroups whose ideology justifies aggression against the out-groups without a defensive posture, but in*

most cases perceived treachery and hostility from the outgroup are required for a sense of justified aggression. Serving this requirement, however, can lead ingroup members to emphasise the strength and power of outgroups to a point inconsistent with their own self-adulation. The potential psychological distress aroused by this inconsistency (relative to the principle of congruity...) can be avoided by a process of differentiation whereby outgroup strengths are as "bad", deriving from immoral practices, while ingroup strength lies in adherence to certain moral values. When the In-group/ host is tolerant of the Outgroup/migrant/stranger, there is in existence what Levin called 'pacific-co-existence'. The rejection of assimilation by the migrants or its denial by the hosts, or opposition to pacific co-existence often produces animosity within the context of social, economic and political interactions.

The Ife-Modakeke conflict could also be situated within what Best, et al (1999:83-84) called the quest for territorial space and the exercise of sovereignty over the space. This will become apparent from the 1847 decision of Ife Oba (King) Abaweila. Following the unabated hostility between the Ife and Modakeke, Oba Abaweila according to Albert, et al (2003:) decided to expel the Oyo refugees from his Kingdom to Ipetumodu, Gbogan and Ikire where they were settled. Those Oyo refugees who refused expulsion were settled at the outskirts of Ile-Ife city. The settlers were the Modakeke who now decided to exercise their right and suzerainty over the geographical space given them by the Ife by refusing to pay rent (Isakole). According to 1981 Oyo State Official Document, the Modakeke by virtue of their interpretation of the Land Use Act insisted that the payment of 'isakole' to Ife landlord should be discontinued. There the insistence of the Ife on the payment of rent and their determination to re-establish their authority over the land occupied or farmed by the Modakeke are the triggers of the often-violent conflicts between the two Yoruba ethnic group.

3.10.3 The Ife-Modakeke Conflict in Historical Perspectives

What follows are the condensed history of Ife-Modakeke conflict from the perspectives of Ajayi, and Smith (1964); Akinjogbin, (1965, 1966,1992) as cited in Albert, et al (2003) in their “Population Displacement in Ife-Modakeke Communal Conflict”: The Ife are the indigenuous inhabitants of Ile-Ife while the Modakeke were the Oyo speaking refugees from the internecine wars that ravaged the Yoruba land following the collapse of the Oyo Empire in the 18th century that settled in Ile-Ife. Ibadan was also a huge refugee camp led by Chief Okunade- The Maye in 19th century. Because of the autocratic disposition of Chief Okunade, the Oyo-speaking warriors rose against him, and in the process he was killed.

Following the killing of Okunade and in a fit of what was described as a transferred aggression, the Ife became hostile to the Oyo refugees (Modakeke) in their midst while taking the sequence of actions that follow: The Ife withdrew the land earlier given the Modakeke for farming. However, the Modakeke that retained their land, were made to pay rent to their Ife- landlord. In 1847, Oba Abeweila expelled some Oyo-speaking refugees to Ipetumodu, Gbogun and Ikire, and those Oyo refugees that remained were settled at the outskirts of Ife city. The settlement was known as Modakeke. Meanwhile, these Modakeke refused to recognise, accept or acknowledge that the settlement was an extension of Ile-Ife; rather the Modakeke saw themselves as an autonomous community. The face-off resulted in two wars between the Ife and the Modakeke in 1847. The Ife people were not only defeated, Ile-Ife was destroyed and its people were sold into slavery. Between 1853 and 1854, the two belligerents were reconciled. However in 1882, the Ife joined the Ekitiparapo war of 1877-1893 on the side of the Ekitiparapo against Ibadan, The Ibadan people, supported by the Modakeke, were victorious. Consequently, Ile-Ife was sacked and was not re-occupied until 1894, following the intervention of the British colonialists in 1893 when

they formally took over the Yoruba land. In 1909, Ooni Adelekan Olubuse once again expelled the Modakeke from Ile-Ife. They were not readmitted until 1922. The last war between the two antagonists was fought from 1997 to 1998. It was the most destructive that saw huge displacement of people. During the war the two sides deployed sophisticated weapons.

3.10.4 Causes of Ife-Modakeke Conflict

The main cause of this conflict had to do with the unresolved constitutional issue of 'settler-indigene' dichotomy. Other identified causes were the refusal of the Modakeke to recognise the suzerainty of the Ile-Ife paramount ruler. They should have done this while awaiting the constitutional resolution of the vexed issue of 'settler-indigene' dichotomy. Then there was the discontinuation of the payment of 'isakole' by the Modakeke to the Ife, based on their interpretation or misinterpretation of the Land-Use Act and the insistence of the Ife on receiving this payment on the land they gave the Modakeke.

3.10.5 Consequences of Ife-Modakeke Conflict

The protracted Ife-Modakeke conflict had left in its wake wanton destruction of lives and property. Houses, farms, automobiles, schools, churches and mosques were touched. The huge scale of destructions today would marvel first-time visitors to Ile-Ife and Modakeke. The intra-ethnic conflict introduced a new dimension whereby marriages between the Ife men and Modakeke women and vice-versa were broken on account of the conflict. Rancour and intra-ethnic suspicions and distrusts still pervade the atmosphere of Ile-Ife and Madakeke.

3.11 The Ijaw–Itsekiri-Urhobo Conflicts and Niger Delta Militancy

3.11.1 Introduction

The Niger-Delta area of Nigeria is home to the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) which oil production or exploitation activities have made life and living a hellish undertaking for the people of the Niger-Delta area. It is also home to diverse minority ethnic groups including the Ijaws, the Itsekiri and the Urhobos. The negative externalities from the oil production resulted to drastic decline in the economic activities of the people of the area as a result of environmental degradation and pollution of water they relied on for farming and fishing. Consequently, the people became impoverished in spite of the fact that it is their land that funds Nigeria's continued existence. The paradoxical existence of the people of the area led to militant agitations by the youth of the area against their impoverishment in the midst of oil wealth. It also led to strife among the principal minority ethnic groups there.

These principal minority ethnic groups are the Ijaws, the Itsekiri and the Urhobos and they occupy the space called the Niger-Delta where the MNOCs have their production activity. These minority ethnic groups have to compete with one another for the crumbs from the master's (MNOCs) table. Thus the incessant conflicts between the Ijaws, the Itsekiri and the Urhobos could be rationalized as the struggles for oil royalty from the MNOCs and the divide and rule tactic of the federal government. We shall expatiate on this in the relevant sub-section.

3.11.2 Niger Delta Militancy

The primary focus of this section is the oil-inspired or triggered militancy in the Niger-Delta area. As Oyefusi (2007) noted, like many oil producing countries Nigeria has not been spared the agony of recurring

violent conflicts. The militant agitations of the people of this region have their roots in what could be described as environment-natural resources-conflict linkage pathways, but which Phil-Eze's (2009:400) explained as follows:

- i. Exclusion from control or denial of access to scarce or extractive natural resources;
- ii. Use of stolen extractive resources to finance arms and militants, and
- iii. Undermining of peace prospects by beneficiaries of conflict situation who would otherwise lose access to revenues gained from resource exploitation

The link between environment and conflict is demonstrated by environmental degradation resulting from oil production or exploitation activity of the multi-national oil companies (MNOCs); government's trade-off of the welfare of the people of Niger-Delta by subordinating its primary responsibility to MNOCs activity and revenues accruing therefrom; MNOCs' socially irresponsible activities, and the impoverishment of the generality of the people of this area, all of which combined to trigger the formation of militant groups that were violently agitating for fair and equitable distribution of oil resources. Thus, were born violent groups such as the Niger Delta People's Volunteers Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The activities of these militant groups covered the destruction of oil production and transportation facilities, and the kidnap of foreign oil workers. This led to the disruption of operations, oil flows and cuts in oil revenue accruing to the government. Expectedly, this impacted negatively on government's developmental activity. The consequences were unemployment, impoverishment and further increase in militancy. This scenario is captured by Phil-Eze (2009:394) when he opined that the link between environment and conflict has been explored in terms of the impact of conflicts on the environment, the role of environmental re-

sources in conflict, and intervening variables that render environmental resources and conflict intricately inter-twined.

3.11.3 The Ijaw–Itsekiri-Urhobo Conflicts

The Ijaw, the Itsekiri, the Ogoni and the Urhobo are minority-ethnic groups in the Niger-Delta. The Ijaw are found mainly in Bayelsa state but are also scattered all over the Niger Delta region, while the Ogoni are found in the Rivers state of the same region. However, the Itsekiri and Urhobo are located in the Warri area of the Delta state. These minority ethnic groups are all located in the oil producing Niger Delta. Thus, the conflicts between them had a lot to do with oil resources and patronages or rents derived there-from. This is to be expected as studies have linked oil resource and mineral availability in a country or the concentration of that country on primary commodity exports to the risk of conflict. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2000), “the extent of primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of conflict.” Lujala (2005) concludes that onshore oil production increases the probability of civil conflict, but that offshore production does not, and Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) suggest that secondary diamonds increase the likelihood of conflict.

In addition to the foregoing theoretical explanations, the conflicts or militancy in the Niger Delta could also be explained as a by-product of the contradictions inherent in the activity of the Nigerian state in the oil sector, its alliance or partnership with the external imperialist oligopolies represented by the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) as a subordinate and the implications of the partnership and the subordination of the Nigerian state to the MNOCs for inter-ethnic and state relationships. Nwosu (2009), however, hinges the basic contradiction on the resources from oil, which according to him enhance national capabilities in practically all spheres-economic, military, industrial, infrastructural and tech-

nological-of human endeavours, the same resources from oil become the focal point of the most virulent and unrelenting conflict among the oil companies, social classes as well as local communities and individuals. What is missing in Nwosu's well-articulated submissions are the role of government as an instigator of the violent inter-ethnic conflict or the militancy in the Niger Delta. This will become apparent when viewed against the backdrop of the significant dependence of the government on oil revenue for its developmental activities. The following statistics will show the significant importance of oil in the Nigerian economy. According to Watts, (2006) oil accounted in 2004 for 80 percent of government revenues, 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, 96 percent of export revenues according to the IMF, and almost half of GDP. In the same September 2006 issue of Watt's *Empire of Oil*, crude oil production runs currently at more than 2.1 million barrels per day valued at more than \$20 billion at 2004 prices. These figures had remained constant even in 2014. What this implies is that oil production and revenue there-from are indispensable to Nigerian economy and general development, thus the Nigerian state will do everything possible to ensure the sustenance of uninterrupted flow of oil as its stoppage will be very devastating.

But then oil production and exportation should not just be about inflow of petro-dollars into the national coffers, but about balancing externalities against environment and socio-economic wellbeing of the Niger-Delta people favoured by the principle of Pareto optimality, which requires that a harmonization of the wellbeing of the people with the interests of the oil industry (Emmanuel, M 2014:235,236).

This much was implied in the report of the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987 (UN WECD, 1987) entitled, "Our Common Future", which notes inter-alia: "environment and development are not separate challenges; they are inexorably linked. Development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental resource base; the environment cannot be protected when growth

leaves out of account the cost of environmental destruction, they are linked in a complex system of cause and effect.” The seriousness of the environmental deterioration and its devastating impact on Niger-Delta people as a result of oil exploitation could be imagined from the World Bank Report (1995), which stated that Nigerian oil fields contribute more to global warming than the rest of the world put together.

3.11.4 The Roles of Nigerian State and MNOCs in Niger Delta Conflicts

Though by deliberate efforts, it is feasible to strike a balance between national development, community welfare and the enforcement of environmental quality standards without impairing industrialization. But, unfortunately, the Nigerian government could not be bothered by such niceties, in view of the subordination of its responsibilities to the profit maximization objective of the MNOCs. In effect, any agitation or protest by the people of Niger Delta against the degradation of their land or pollution of their environment through the activity of the MNOCs was usually met with military action by the state. When this strong-arm tactic fails, government then often resorts to the use of divide & rule tactic that pitches one ethnic group against another. The result was the violent conflicts between these ethnic groups on the one hand and between the ethnic groups, the MNOCs and the state on the other hand.

Nwosu’s (2009: *ibid*) account of the Ijaw-Itsekiri-Urhobo crises is summarised as follows: “The late 1960s and 1970s ushered in accelerated oil exploration, exploitation and production through out the Niger Delta. Warri is one of the major cities in the Niger Delta that host MNOCs’ activity. As a result, the Olu of Itsekiri was re-christened Olu of Warri in order to control and establish his authority over the city with a view to receiving oil royalties from the MNOCs to the exclusion of other ethnic groups-the Ijaws and the Urhobos. The action of the Itsekiri provoked violent confrontations between the three ethnic groups. An-

other incident that led to violent conflicts between the Itsekiri and the Ijaw ethnic groups was the creation of South Warri Local Government from the existing Warri North Local Government. The new local government was headquartered in Ogbe Ijaw. In line with government policy of creating enmity amongst the ethnic groups, the headquarters of the new local government was suddenly moved to Ogidigben- an Itsekiri settlement. The Ijaws protested this government action and the protest led to the closure of oil flow stations in the areas where the new local government was situated. As result of the protest and the closure of oil flow stations, the headquarters of Warri South Local Government was moved back to its former place of Ogbe Ijaw”.

3.11.5 Causes of the Ijaw – Itsekiri- Urhobo Conflicts

One of the remote causes of the Ijaw-Itsekiri-Urhobo inter-ethnic conflicts or the face-off between the Niger Delta minority ethnic groups and the state was the military government inspired dysfunctional federalism. Before the Nigeria’s first military coup d’état of 15th January, 1966, Nigeria operated a fairly functional federal system cum fiscal federalism. Then the military came with a unitary form of government with a strong centre, thereby eroding the hither-to operative fiscal federalism principle that accommodated derivation principle of revenue allocation. This had led to violent agitations for revert back to the old system that gave the federating units some measures of control over their resources. Another cause of the conflicts was the exploration, exploitation and production of oil by the MNOCs and the agitations of the host communities against negative externalities such as environmental degradation and the pollution of farm land and water arising there-from. The extent of the environmental pollution made farming or fishing near impossible. There was the inter-ethnic competition for patronage and oil royalties. Then we have the uninspiring role of government in instigating one ethnic group against another.

3.11.6 Consequences of the Ijaw – Itsekiri- Urhobo Conflicts

The resultant effect of pollution and land degradation was the creation of army of unemployed, which transmuted to violent agitations for the rights of the people of Niger-Delta area. Other consequences are destruction of oil production facilities; cut in oil revenues available to the government for its developmental activities. And above all, human lives were lost, and flora and fauna were destroyed.

3.12 Chronicle of Causes and Consequences of Religious Conflicts

3.12.1 Introduction

Like ethnicity/culture, religion is an identity-based phenomenon, thus it is usually inflamed by passion or emotion. Yet identity, according to Faleti (2006) is an unshakeable sense of self-worth, which makes life meaningful and includes the feeling that one is physically, socially, psychologically and spiritually safe. Northrup (1989) shows that events which threaten to remove the feeling of ‘safety’ that are tied to different forms of identity usually lead to defensive reactions aimed at avoiding such spiritual and/or physical exposures. Obasi (2009) has argued that the protection of identity or its recognition plays a significant part in conflict. Groups in conflict feel that their identity is profoundly threatened by the position or desired outcome of other side, creating what to both sides is an existential threat.

Religion, as an identity, is easily susceptible to manipulation and mobilization by politicians to achieve personal ends regardless of the negative outcomes of such mobilization. Mobilization becomes easy in a situation where there is a prevalence of horizontal inequality, which may engender structural violence. The ensuing conflict will on the surface appear to be religion-induced, but in reality it is political cum socio-

economic. It is for this reason that it has been argued that strictly or objectively speaking, there is no religious conflict. For example, Hoffman (2006) suggests that some conflicts are not really religious because of the pre-eminence of political rather than religious motivation. On his part Seul (1999: 564) opines that religion is not the cause of 'religious conflict; rather for many... it frequently supplies the fault line along which intergroup identity and resource competition occurs'. Stewart (2009) corroborates the view of Seul when he argues that 'religious conflicts' need not be about religion or religious conversion, and indeed usually have non-religious causes. They are so called because this is the unifying and mobilizing identity. Gurr (1993) takes a similar view by arguing that religion is rarely the root cause of conflict.

This study approaches the issue differently as follows: while all conflicts have several motives with political and/or economic ones being central; mobilization frequently occurs on the basis of particular identities: 'ethnic' or 'religious', or class or ideological, rather than with respect to the political or economic motives for such mobilization. In this connection, religion as an identity-based phenomenon is a veritable source of mobilization.

Whether it has political or economic characterization or not, or whether it is a mere label,

religion's conflictive nature is indisputable. Religion being primarily concerned with our relationship with God or its being man's search for God does not constitute a problem, neither is the centrality in religion of the Ultimate Being to whom we daily supplicate for mercy, to whom we take refuge in time of trouble and from whom all blessings flow and who assures us of safety and protection, is the problem. The problem has to do with the many paths to this Ultimate Being.

3.12.2 The Problem of Divergent Views

The paths are strewn with myths, beliefs, precepts, doctrines, and with what Awoniyi (2013) calls the conflicting truth claims and religious particularism, and which he describes as a unique feature that cuts across nearly all matters relating to every religious belief system. It is the belief that one's own religion is special and, in fact, the best and the only one that gives assurance of ultimate salvation to man that constitutes a problem. This path soon became divergent. It is these divergent pathways with their inherent doctrines and contradictions that give rise to the many religions in the world with distinctive features. Meanwhile, one distinctive feature that is ubiquitous with all religions, according to Takaya is the categorization of the world such that every religion is characterized by sharp subdivisions of the world, specifically with clear-cut dichotomies as follows: the 'good' and the 'bad', the 'we' versus 'they', the 'saved' and the 'lost'; 'sacred' and 'profane', or 'brethren' versus 'the rest of the world', who are expected to share in the life-after (Takaya 1992:110). It is these paths that are the problems in Nigeria, particularly with the two received religions—Christianity and Islam.

3.12.3 Religious Conflicts as Permanent Feature of Nigeria's Existence

Tables 3.6-3.9 show the percentages of regional distributions of the adherents of Islam, Christianity and the adherents of the traditional religions in Nigeria based on 1952 and 1963 population census. In 1952 and 1963 the populations of Muslims were 14,397,498 (47.9%) and 25,938,218 (47.2%) respectively, while during same periods the populations of Christians were 6,412,168 (21.1%) and 15,842,434 (34.8%). The residual figures belong to the adherents of traditional religions. The tables further show that Christians constitute the majority in the South while in the North the Muslims were in majority.

The region by region analyses for the same 1952 and 1963 periods show that in Western Region Muslims and Christians have percentage distributions of 32.8%, 35.7% and 36.9%, 49.9% respectively; the Eastern Region was mono-religion with 0.3%, 0.2% and 0.5%, 77.2% respectively, which indicated that there were more Christians than Muslims in the East. The reverse is the pattern of distribution in the North, for Muslims and Christians as shown by the following ratios 73.0%, 71.7% and 2.7%. 9.7% respectively for Muslims and Christians; meaning there were more Muslims than Christians.

The adherents of these religions are indoctrinated to the point of manipulability and malleability via the strategy that is designed to keep the flock ignorant or barely literate such that they become a robotised mass of foot soldiers at the beck and call of their leaders who deploy them for whatever purposes, including crusade and jihad or killing in the name of God. Thus was born religious conflicts, which Reynal-Querol (2002:29) claims are likely to be fiercer and on a larger scale than ethnic ones. In the same vein, Grew also argues that 'religious beliefs have always been those that people were most willing to sacrifice, fight, and die and live for' (Grew 1997:20, cited in Nordäs 2007). An instance of the willingness of the adherents to die for their beliefs was the religious demonstrations in Katsina, which led to loss of lives and property. The demonstrations continued despite the warnings and threat of the Military Administrator, Colonel Yohanna Madaki to publicly execute the leader of the demonstration (Bande; 2003:99). And in rationalizing the destructive disposition of religion, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol argue that, "The faith and the family, the blood and the beliefs are the things with which people identify themselves, for which they fight and die; also differences in adherents' visions of the relations between God and humans, the uncompromising nature of religious matters, and the fact that religion discriminates and differentiates humans in a sharp and exclusive way, as some of the reasons why religions cause wars". The recurrent religious

conflicts arising from misinterpretation of the truth represented by each religion or the diverse doctrines espoused by the contending religions have eroded the sublimity of religion. The contrasting doctrinal viewpoints were acknowledged by Igbo and Anugwom (2002:125) when they declare;

Muslims, for instance, believe that they have the right to “islam-ise” the world. This is not necessarily through persuasive arguments or evangelism but through ‘holy wars’ or ‘Jihad’. Christians on their own part believe in evangelism or spreading the gospel of Jesus Christ. They argue that one cannot attain salvation or go to Heaven except through strict adherence to the teachings of Christ. Each of the two groups want to maintain separate identity and at the same time try to win converts from each other.

The conflictive nature of religion and the antagonistic rivalry of the adherents have prompted ‘AWAKE’ (2011) to ask if religion is a force for peace.

Proceeding from the premises that Nigeria is not a mono-religious country; that the adherents of the two received religions- Christianity and Islam are in competition along doctrinal divide; given that statistics from a public opinion survey in Nigeria demonstrate that Nigerians believe religion to be more central to their identity than nationality and thus Nigerians are more likely to identify themselves first and foremost as Christians or Muslims rather than as Nigerians (The Economist, 2007) and in view of the fact that identity-based phenomena including religion overwhelm reason and inflame conflict behaviour, it is obvious why religious crises have become a permanent feature of Nigeria’s existence .

3.12.4 Factors in Nigeria's Religious Crises

But then there are other factors that can be implicated in Nigeria's religious crises. There is the factor of religious intolerance that is pervasive among the adherents of Nigeria's two predominant religions. Balogun (1988:166) defines religious intolerance as the hostility towards other religions as well as the inability of religious adherents to harmonise between the theories and the practical aspects of religion in areas like the diversity of interpretations of doctrine, acculturation process and indoctrination.

It is imperative that the spirit of religious tolerance is inculcated in the adherents of the two religions. This is against the backdrops of the proliferation, polarisation and fractionalization of religion and the accompanying incendiary tenets and evangelistic bellicosity in Nigeria, which are somehow facilitated by external financial support and promptings. It is necessary therefore that the evangelistic fervours and the proselytising engagements of the clerics who, doubtlessly, have firm grips on their adherents, be tempered with tolerance, which should be recognised by the clerics as an essential factor for religious peace and harmony, national stability and security in a multi-religious society. Downs (1999) defines tolerance as the posture and cordial effort to understand another's beliefs, practices, and habits without necessarily sharing or accepting them. Expatriating further, he said that the principle is simply to show empathy or indulgence for beliefs and practices differing from or conflicting with one's own. The ultimate reality is the same divine personality who is at the centre of all religions. Thus, there are many paths that lead to the Truth, the only One, who knows no distinction. Therefore, no single tradition can legitimately claim superiority or definitive truth.

One of the awful outcomes of religious intolerance in Nigeria is the rise of religious extremism/zealotry/fundamentalism. Religious extremism is possible by virtue of its dual attributes of being easy to mobilise

as well as its capability to foster stronger loyalty and commitment than other identities (Juergensmeyer 1993). Added to these qualities, according to Stewart, (2009) are the extensive influence and control of religious organisations over their adherents' behaviour, which inevitably leads to politicisation, with religious organizations either collaborating with the state or coming into conflict with it, and the deeply political role of religion is perhaps clearest where a particular religion is recognised as the state religion (in about a quarter of countries today) – in these cases it is impossible to differentiate between state and religion.

In the cases of Maitatsine sect led by Mohammed Marwa in the 1980s, Darul Islam, Kalakato, and currently the Boko Haram sect first led by late Mohammed Yusuf and now by Shekau, these respective leaders have firm grips over their followers to the extent of (to borrow from Grew) their being most willing to sacrifice, fight, and die- and live- for their faith. This could only happen in an atmosphere of horizontal inequality.

Another factor in Nigeria's cycle of religious crises is the abandonment of restraints and ethical value by Nigeria's political leadership in the projection of their religion or ethnicity in the articulation and execution of official policies and programmes. Thus for political expediency, Nigeria's political leaders have consistently breached the secularism provisions in our constitution by consciously or covertly mixing religion with politics or politicizing religion. Secularism, we should recall is viewed as being commonly regarded as 'an ideology that holds that religious issues should not be the basis of Politics, or (in the extreme) that religion has no place in public life', and that it essentially seeks to preserve the religious neutrality of government and cultures (Omotola, 2007).

This indiscretion of politicizing religion had led to the encroachment of the provision of constitutional secularism was demonstrated by the rush to register Nigeria as a member of the Organisation of Islamic

Countries (OIC) and the introduction or application of Shariah law in 2000 (Ugwu, 2009) in some Northern states. These actions were taken in spite of Nigeria's embrace of secularism in her constitution. As we noted in Chapter 2 of this work, the 1999 Nigerian constitution provides in section 10(1) that 'the government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion' (FRN, 1999). This provision is further strengthened by section 38 (1-3) of the constitution, which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Section 38(1) stipulates:

"Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance" (FRN, 1999).

The next section following the preceding above will deal in-extenso with some of the religious conflicts in Nigeria as follows:

3.13 Maitatsine Religious Uprising

3.13.1 Overview of Maitatsine Religious Uprising

The Maitatsine religious conflict could be seen from the perspective of the availability of a large pool of the marginalised, the poor, the discontented, the dispossessed or the displaced Nigerians-products of government-induced horizontal inequality- from where Mohammed Marwa like any other Nigerian sect leaders drew his followers. Mohammed Marwa alias Maitatsine preyed on their despicable condition by mobilising, indoctrinating and feeding them with ideas that Tijjani Bande (2003:97) described as completely unorthodox to Islam and which held in great contempt modern traits of society. Mohammed Marwa later, in the Yan Awaki area of Kano city in December 1980, unleashed his

armed followers on the populace. This led to the murder of 4,177 people including the fanatics and 1,673 fanatics were arrested (Bande, *ibid*)

3.13.2 Causes and Consequences of Maitatsine Religious Uprising

The Federal Government set up a tribunal of inquiry to look into the causes of the Maitatsine conflict. Justice Aniagolu headed the Tribunal. Its report, titled Aniagolu report, 1981, cited in Bande, (2003:98) identified the following as the causes of the disturbance:

- i. The objectionable preaching of Maitatsine and his disciples;
- ii. Maitatsine's deep-rooted hatred for the authority, particularly the police;
- iii. Maitatsine's hostile attitude to his neighbours and incessant public harassment of the people;
- iv. The build-up of a contingent of armed student followers known as the "Almajarai";
- v. Leakage of official secrets to Maitatsine;
- vi. The death of Maitatsine's first son, and
- vii. Governor Muhammad Abubakar Rimi's ultimatum issued in a letter dated 26th November, 1980, requiring Maitatsine and his followers to quit 'Yan-Awaki area within two weeks'

But in addition to the causes identified above, we could add marginalization, poverty and alienation, and frustration arising there-from. This is in accord with the thrust of Frustration-Aggression Theory or the Relative Deprivation thesis which was alluded to in chapter 2 of this work. The main proposition of the two theories is that the divergence between the expected needs/satisfaction and the attained needs/satisfaction leads to frustration, anger and aggression, which inevitably explode into violence.

The consequences were wanton destruction of lives and property. The property includes residential buildings, automobiles, churches and government facilities.

3.14 The Shariah Crisis

3.14.1 Overview of the Shariah Crisis

The Shariah crisis exemplifies the politicisation of religion or the contemptuous disregard by opportunistic politicians for the constitutional secularism provided for in the country's constitution to accommodate its religious diversity, thereby ensuring its political stability. It is, therefore, unbelievable that the then Governor of Zamfara State, who had sworn to protect the constitution of Nigeria, could breach that same constitution by legalising shariah in his state on 27th October, 1999 with full complement of security apparatus. Thereafter 11 other northern states of Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe, and Borno (Figure 3.7) launched their own shariah, also with the accompaniment of official enforcement outfit. The principal aim of the re-introduction of shariah was, arguably, to make the country ungovernable for President Olusegun Obasanjo who hailed from the southern part of the country. The northern oligarch represented by Hausa-Fulani, had thought that Obasanjo would do their bidding, hence his endorsement by them. This view was corroborated by Akande (2005) and Askira (2012) when they opined that "with time, media reports were rife with the bad blood and dissatisfaction had enveloped the camps of northern 'kingmakers' who had worked assiduously to install Olusegun Obasanjo in office" The re-introduction of Shariah to embrace criminal matters was therefore a payback to Obasanjo for daring to be independent. This is because, according to (Ostein (2007), in 1960 Islamic criminal law was abrogated and from then the application of Islamic civil law in the North, as in most of the rest of the Muslim world at the time, was

increasingly limited to the law of personal status and family relations. In other words, the re-introduced shariah now encompassed Islamic criminal law. The re-introduction of shariah in Kaduna soon became shariah's Achilles' heel as the state witnessed unprecedented explosion of violent confrontations between the Muslims and Christians in the state. These violent confrontations should be expected because of the huge population of Muslims and Christians in Kaduna state. For instance, the estimated percentage of Moslems in Kaduna state is 56% or 3,397,275 out of the state's 6,066,562 people in the 2006 census. This means that non-Muslims in Kaduna state constitute 44% or 2,669,287 of the population (Ostein, 2007)

Figure 3.7: States under Sharia Law in Nigeria (coloured orange)



Source:<http://www.meanmesa.com/2014/06/modern-nigeria-african-paradox.html>; <http://geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/electoral-politics-and-religious-strife-in-nigeria#ixzz34OQePb79>

3.14.2 Causes of the Shariah Crisis

The remote cause remains the 1914 amalgamation, which brought together peoples of diverse ethnicity and religious persuasion. As a result of this shoddy political engineering, people are unable to practise their religion as they wish. Had the political leadership being propelled by patriotic intent, it should have adopted true constitutional federalism instead of the pseudo-federalism currently in operation to take care of our value differentials. Thus, those who are more interested in Shariah would have instituted it without any opposition and the consequent violence.

Other causes are high rates of illiteracy, unemployment and poverty which created a large pool of idle people who were mobilised and brainwashed to embark on destruction-spree.

3.14.3 Consequences of the Shariah Crisis

The consequences in terms of destruction cut across human fatalities and economic and social infrastructures. Though an accurate, total death toll has never been ascertained, but according to International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2007), the Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up by the Kaduna state government reported that at least 1,295 people had been killed, while an unspecified additional number were buried unidentified, and others were declared missing as the result of the February riots alone. In all, it is believed that the two Kaduna riots left at least 3000 persons dead and led to the displacement of over 63,000 people within Kaduna and its surroundings. The scale of the killing and human displacement and destruction was so huge that President

Obasanjo described it the worst he had seen since the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war.

Table 3.10 Religious Conflict in Nigeria (1980 –2010)

Date	Location	Principal Actors
May 1980	Zaria (Kaduna State)	Disturbance in Zaria during which property belonging to mainly to Christians were destroyed.
December 1980	Yan-Awaki Ward in Kano (Kano State)	Riots by Maitatsine sect, 4, 177 people died, extensive destruction of property.
October 1982	Bullumkutu, Maiduguri (Bornu State)	Kala-Kala and Maitatsine sect. 118 people died, extensive damage to property.
October 1982	Kano (Kano State)	Muslim demonstrators burnt down churches.
February/ March 1984	Dobeli Ward, Jimeta-Yola (Gongola State)	Maitatsine sect, 586 died, wanton destruction of property.
April 1985	Pantami Ward, Gombe (Bauchi State)	Maitatsine sect, 105 died, extensive destruction of property.
March 1986	Ilorin (Kwara State)	Muslims and Christians clashed during a Christian procession at Easter.
May 1986	Ibadan, Univer- sity of Ibadan (Oyo State)	Demonstrations by Muslims in which they burnt the figure of the Risen Christ in the Chapel of Resurrection University of Ibadan.
March 1987	Kafanchan (Kaduna State) Tafawa Balewa (Bauchi State)	Clashes between Muslims and Christians at the College of Education, Kafanchan... loss of some lives and the burning of some Mosques by Christians and native Kajes. Wave of religious riots in which Muslims burnt down numerous Church buildings, and damaged property belonging to Christians. Many lives were lost.

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February 1988	Kaduna, Kaduna Polytechnic (Kaduna State)	Religious riots, ostensibly among students, destroyed the foundation walls of the Christian Chapel.
April 1991	Katsina (Katsina State)	Religious violence spearheaded by Mallam Yahaya Yakubu, leader of the fundamentalist Shiite sect in Katsina. It was a protest over a blasphemous publication in Fun-Times. Several lives were lost and property destroyed.
	Bauchi	Started as a quarrel between a Fulani man and a Sayawa meat seller in Tafawa Balewa. Escalated into a full blown violence and later took the colouring of a religious war in Bauchi Several lives were lost and property valued over hundreds of millions of Naira was destroyed.
October 1991	Kano (Kano State)	A peaceful procession initiated by the Izala sect to halt Rev. Reinherd Bonnke from having a crusade in Kano, later degenerated into very bloody religious violence. Thousands of lives were lost and property-
May 1992	Zangon Kataf, Zaria, Kaduna, Ikara (Kaduna State)	A communal feud between the Katafs and the Hausas later took the dimension of inter-religious war between Muslims and Christians in other major cities of Kaduna State. Several lives and property were destroyed.
January 1993	Funtua (Katsina State)	The Kalakato religious sect assaulted the village Head and burnt down a Police vehicle. Lives and property were also lost.
February 2000	Kaduna	Conflict engulfed the city between Christians and Moslems over the implementation of Sharia law. Thousands of lives and property worth millions were destroyed.
February/ May 2000	Abia State	Religious riots in Aba and minor disturbances in Umuahia. Over 450 persons killed in Aba, Abia State, as a reprisal killing for the Kaduna crisis.
September 2000	Gombe	The Kaltungo religious crisis. The crisis erupted over the implementation of <i>Sharia</i> in the State.
Oct 2001	Kano	Religious riot in Kano. In protest of US invasion of Afghanistan in search of Osama bin Laden: over 150 persons were killed.

Nov. 2002	Kaduna	The Miss World crisis in which Muslims attacked Christians and churches. The crisis was triggered by an article by Isioma Daniel, published in the newspaper; over 250 people killed and several churches destroyed.
June 2008	Adamawa	Religious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Numan town. Caused by the location of the town's Central Mosque close to Bachama paramount ruler's palace; over 17 persons killed.
February 2006	Borno	Religious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Maiduguri. The riot was caused by the Danish cartoon on prophet Mohammed, in Jyllands-Posten newspaper; over 50 persons killed and 30 churches destroyed; over 200 shops, 50 houses and 100 vehicles vandalized.
March 2007	Gombe	Muslim pupils killed their Christian teacher, Mrs. Oluwatoyin Olusesan. The pupils claimed that their teacher had "desecrated" the Quran in the process of stopping a student from cheating in an examination hall.
November 2008	Plateau	Religious violence between Muslims and Christians in the city of Jos. The crisis ensure from the controversial results of a local election; over 700 people killed and thousands internally displaced.
February 2009	Bauchi	Ethno-religious conflict at the Makama New Extension. Over 11 people were killed, more than 400 houses burnt, and over 1,600 families displaced
June 11 2009	Bauchi	Clash between members o the Boko Haram and the police. 17 members of the sect were killed.
July 2009	Bauchi, Bornu, Kano, Yobe	Religious violence unleashed by the radical Boko Haram sect. Over 700 persons killed; 3,500 persons internally displaced; 1,264 children orphaned; over 392 women widowed; and several properties destroyed.
December 2009	Bauchi	Religious violence unleashed by the Kala-kato sect. Over 38 persons killed; about 20 suspected members of the sect arrested; and over 1000 people internally displaced.

January 2009	Plateau	Resurgence of religious crisis in Jos. Police announced at least 320 killed, but aid workers and local leaders place death toll at over 550; some 300 persons arrested; and over 40,000 displaced.
March 2010	Plateau	Attacks by Fulani Moslems on Christian –dominated villages of Dogo Nahawa, Shen and Fan in Jos. Over 500 people were killed mainly women and children.
March 2010	Plateau	Suspected Fulani militias attacked residents of Biye and Batem village in Jos. 13 persons killed, including 6 women 4 children and 3 men. One of the women a pregnant woman, was burnt with a baby on her back.
April 2010	Plateau	Attack on a Berom village some 30 kilometers south of Jos by suspected Fulani herdsmen. The attackers targeted the homes of some officials in Kura Jenta. No life was lost but 3 houses and 6 vehicles were torched. Kuru Jenta was the scene of a deadly massacre where about 150 Fulani were allegedly killed and dumped in wells on January 19, 2010.
May 2010	Plateau	Murder of three (Muslim) Fulani herdsmen at Tusung village in Barkin Ladi Local Government. The attacker was alleged to be Berom youths.
May 2010	Plateau	Attack on some Christians, who were returning from their place of worship along Bauchi road in Jos. Alleged reprisal attack by Muslims over the kill of 3 Fulani herdsmen. Many sustained injuries and one was feared dead.
July 2010	Plateau	Muslim Fulani herdsmen launched an overnight attack on a Christian village, Mazah, a village North of the city of Jos. About eight people were reportedly killed. The wife, two children and a grandson of a Christian priest, Rev. Nuhu Dawat, was among those killed. Seven houses and a church were razed.
July 2010	Plateau	Attack on Tagir village a nearby community to Mazzah village which was attacked on 17 July 2010. Although no life was lost in Tagir, wanton destruction of property, including loss of livestock was reported.

Source: J.I. Eliagwu, [cited by Gofwen, 2004: 65-67]

3.15 Boko Haram Religious Crisis

3.15.1 Overview of Boko Haram Crisis

In dealing with Boko Haram religious crisis, it is worth reiterating that religion, arguably, provides an easy platform for the mobilisation of the disgruntled, including the poor and the marginalised sector of the society who were frustrated by the perceived (real or imagined) discrepancy or divergence between the desired and the obtained basic needs. Theories such as Gurr's relative deprivation thesis (Gurr, *ibid*), Festinger's (1951) Cognitive Dissonance theory, which Cunningham, Jr. (2003) explains as follows:

Men prefer a situation of stability in respect of values, behaviour and their environmental conditions. When people experience a difference between what they perceive and what they desire (cognitive dissonance), they seek to reduce this dissonance by reducing this gap through actions, filtering information or altering perceptions.

Alao, et al (2012) further expatiated on this cognitive dissonance by saying that it is experienced when there is a discrepancy between preferred value and actual value states. The difference between Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Gurr's Relative Deprivation Thesis is like the difference between six and half-a-dozen; the difference is only in semantics as both pointed to divergence between the desired and the obtained basic needs.

Mohammed Yusuff took advantage of the presence of the mass of disgruntled elements, the poor and the marginalised in the North Eastern states of Borno and Yobe, mobilised them to form the vanguard of his movement-the Boko Haram. The Boko Haram insurgency had since then spread its tentacles to Adamawa and Bauchi states with occasional strikes in Kano state.

The members of Boko Haram were indoctrinated with what could be considered as unorthodox Islamic tenets, which main thrusts were the adoption of unorthodox Islamic tenets and the unabashed hatred for Western values. Indeed Boko Haram, according to Obinna (2011) and Sani, (2011), was derived from Hausa and Arabic words. “Boko” in Hausa means “western education” and “Haram” an Arabic word means, “sin”. The Economist (2011) among others noted that the term means “western education is forbidden” and is due to the strong opposition to anything Western, as it is believed by the sect to have corrupting influence on Muslims.

3.15.2 Predisposing Factors of Boko-Haram Insurgency

The predisposing factors of Boko-Haram insurgency could therefore be located largely in the real or perceived discrepancy between the preferred way of life (to maintain the sanctity of orthodox Islam) and the actual state of their existence (secular state) that influence the dissonance (Alao et al, 2012).

The fiery preaching of the unorthodox Islamic principle, though not well received by the cross-section of the Islamic clerics in the core North, Yusuff nonetheless became the toast of the youth and soon began to command a large followership willing and ready to do his bidding. This is in sync with Volkan’s opinion (1990:31) that the shared views by the sect and other recruited members of the larger society provide a cheap platform for mobilization of groups for political action that can lead to popular uprisings, riots and revolutions.

In this specific instance, it develops to terrorism as the movement enjoys widespread overt or covert support among the disgruntled elements within the society, which include the poor, the unemployed/unemployable and the politicians from the core North who could not come to terms with being out of power since 1999 and with the pro-

spects of the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan winning another 4-year term in 2015.

The politicians with eyes ever focused on the next elections and how to outwit their opponents soon started to latch on to the platform provided by Yusuff and his followers in political cooperation which sole objective was winning elections. Though elections were indeed won (or rigged), but politicians reneged on whatever understanding they had with Yusuff and his group. The renege led the group to embark on retaliatory violent actions.

The sequence of events that culminated in the transformation of the sect into armed insurgency was provided by Dibia (2012) cited in Alao et al (2012) where it was revealed as follows: “the police killed Yusuf, the leader of the Boko-Haram sect and went ahead to arrest many of its members, assembled them somewhere in the northern part of Nigeria, shot and killed them one by one. He further noted that this was shown to the whole world by Aljazeera on its television channel and website. Sadly, the governments (both federal and state) did nothing to condemn or ensure that those responsible for extra-judicial killings were punished. In addition, in order to ensure electoral victory at all cost, desperate northern politicians recruited members of the sect to rig the 2011 elections in their favour but they were dumped after winning the election. The study observed that the aggrieved members of the sect in order to avenge the death of Yusuf decided to use the guns and bombs procured by the politician to fight same politicians and the government”.

The Boko Haram sect that set out as a fundamentalist religious group that was canvassing for the maintenance of the sanctity of orthodox Islam, soon became politicized, subsequently infiltrated by global Islamic terrorist organizations (such as Al-Shabab of Somalia, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region) and now transformed into Nigeria’s formidable terrorist sect that is taking on Nigeria’s security with ferocity, boldness and leaving on its trails bloodshed and de-

struction of private and public property including places of worship, government infrastructures, Police Headquarters, Army barracks and the protected United Nations building.

3.15.3 Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency

Nigeria is a study in contradictions or in governance by hypocrisy. Without any inhibitions, Nigerian leaders are constantly engaged in the hollow ritual of admonishing the citizenry on the essence of patriotism or patriotic engagements without setting examples. Yet, it is obvious to the discerning that it is my region, my ethnicity or my religion first and my country next. Thus, every government action or inaction is interpreted along regional, ethnic or religious line, while these same identity parameters are factored into the enforcement of government policy. Any wonder then that Boko Haram like its fore-runner, the Maitatsine sect, which originally set out on the fanatical note of the embrace of pure, undiluted Islamic orthodoxy (shariah) and the objective of converting Nigeria into an Islamic republic soon became a political tool of the North of the country to serve as an informal opposition to the government of the day that were headed first by a Yoruba from the South west, and later by an Ijaw-a minority ethnic group from the South-South zone of the country. This view was corroborated by Okpanachi (2012) when he opines that Muslims could not possibly be motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs. Under that hypocritical cover they were actually aiming to “destabilize the country”, to “create chaos”, to “topple the newly elected president” (Olusegun Obasanjo, a Southern Christian), to “derail Nigeria’s new democratic system”, to “bring back the rule of a military dominated by northern Muslims”.

The hypocrisy, the contradictions inherent in the Nigerian system could also explain why Boko Haram has become a festering sore, and why the ‘Lugardian contraption’ called Nigeria, is forever in a state of flux, or enduring political instability.

That Boko Haram blossoms into its present formidability is not just because intelligence on the group to warn federal government of its capability and affiliations with other Islamic terrorist groups, is being compromised but because there are closet Boko Haram sympathisers in government, or because there are Boko Haram members amongst the northern political elites who are assigned the task of countering every government move against the group with anti-Islamic accusations to elicit support from Muslims in the country and the sub-region. From the foregoing, we can deduce the causes of Boko Haram insurgency as under-listed:

- Failure of intelligence, or intelligence compromise
- Politicisation of religion
- Lack of patriotism in the articulation and implementation of government policies
- The extra-judicial murder of Mohammed Yusuff, the founder of Boko Haram sect along with some of his followers by the police and the failure of federal government to bring those responsible to justice.
- The presence of factors that are conducive to nurturing structural violence (i.e. unemployment, poverty, inequality, discriminatory practices in the political cum economic spheres, et cetera)
- Unregulated religious preaching
- Lack of political will to enforce constitutional provisions on secularism
- Covert financial, material and moral support that Boko Haram is receiving from disgruntled political opponents of the Jonathan Administration who had vowed to make the country ungovernable for the administration

3.15.4 Consequences of Boko Haram Insurgency

The Boko Haram insurgency had led to general insecurity in the country. This was as a result of killings through its introduction into Nigeria of the novel art of suicide bombing of places of worship, motor parks, Nigeria Police headquarters, and media house and protected buildings such as the United Nations building in Abuja. In addition, there were also targeted assassinations of those the sect considered as antagonistic or opposed to their religious ideology or fundamentalism. The insurgency had also led to internal displacement of people in the Northeast.

Moreover, as a result of the sect's rejection of Western values, particularly education, schools were being bombed in order to intimidate northerners, especially girls so that they would eventually abandon education.

As part of the intimidation strategy, over 200 school girls in one of the secondary schools in Chibok town in Borno State of Nigeria were recently abducted and their whereabouts (until recently) were unknown. Statistics below shows fatalities in schools and colleges from 2010 to 2014 which run into thousand of people killed in places like Abuja, Maiduguri, Kano, Chibok and other towns and villages scattered over Borno and Yobe States. As a matter of fact, the federal government had disclosed that over 16,000 lives had been lost to Boko Haram insurgency. The insurgency had also led to the displacement of people, thus creating refugee problems. UN reported a total number of 8,000 displaced people are camped in Cameroon alone while local organizations are giving a figure of around 20,000 people displaced (Yvonne and Azad, 2013).

3.15.5 The Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria's continued Existence

Boko Haram insurgency in the core North of Nigeria may signal the beginning of the end of Nigeria as a united nation. There had been arguments that the insurgency was a religious cum political tool in the hands of Hausa-Fulani of the core North to make the country ungovernable for the incumbent President who, incidentally, is from a minority ethnic group for daring to complete the tenure of late President Umaru Yar'ardua, for having the tenacity to contest the 2011 Presidential elections and for now preparing for re-election in 2015. The arguments are predicated on and supported by many hostile pronouncements credited to eminent Hausa-Fulani/Northern leaders whose voices are respected. Transformation Watch, (2012) an online news site, citing Pointblank-news (2010), another online news, published a statement credited, allegedly, to Northern leaders that stated inter-alia: "In a recent letter jointly signed by Ciroma, Ayu, Kaita, Kirfi, Kwande and Bashir Ibrahim, they said "...we are extremely worried that our Party's failure to deliver justice in this matter, may ignite a series of events, the scope and magnitude of which we can neither proximate nor contain [...]" According to Nairaland, northern leaders led by Mallam Adamu Ciroma had fired a memo to the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) which it accused of double-speak on the issue of zoning, warning that its failure to stop Jonathan from contesting the presidential election would plunge Nigeria into an unimaginable chaos. Yet, on September 2010, another prominent northern leader, Alhaji Lawan Kaita was credited with the statement to the effect that; "Anything short of a northern president is tantamount to stealing our presidency. Jonathan has to go and he will go. Even if he uses incumbency power to get his nomination on the platform of the PDP, he will be frustrated out. The North should not be blamed for the calamity that would befall Nigeria if Jonathan emerged as the president".

The preceding Northern political leaders' statements and recent but unfortunate developments in the North Eastern states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Bauchi, considered as bastions of Boko Haram insurgency, seem to support the arguments in some circle that Northern political elites are indeed the sponsors of Boko Haram insurgency as a counter to Jonathan Administration. However, there are also insinuations that Boko Haram are now beyond the control of the sponsors, as Boko Haram are now bent on carving a caliphate in the North east and North West geo-political zones of Nigeria. Should Boko Haram succeed in this task, it might signal the pursuit of the ultimate goal of Islamizing Nigeria. What are the implications of this Islamisation agenda? In the first place, the South will regard the agenda as a determined effort by Northern oligarch to fulfill their forebears' ambitions of regarding Southern Nigeria as its fiefdom. Secondly, it will pitch the South against the North in a military confrontation. The scenarios may hasten the coming to pass of the NIC and CSAT Reports that Nigeria may disintegrate in 2015 or 2030

The prognosis of the imminent end of Nigeria could also be predicted on the outcome of 2015 presidential elections. If President Jonathan wins in 2015, Boko Haram would become more daring in their Islamisation of Nigeria agenda. If the North (Hausa-Fulani) wins the 2015 presidential elections, the Niger Delta militants would pay the North (Hausa-Fulani) back in their own coins. The militants would become more than a match for the Boko Haram in making the country ungovernable as they would aim to destroy the Nigerian economy by striking decisively at her economic jugular- Oil and Gas facilities. Thereafter, they would target key economic, social and physical infrastructures and military installations, majority of which are concentrated in the North for destruction. The core north would fight back, and the whole country would be engulfed in a full-blown war. This may be the end of the contraption called Nigeria. This may sound alarmist, but to the discerning it is a grim possibility.

Table 3.11 Record of Boko Haram Menace of Sweat and Tears across Nigeria (26 July, 2011 – 18 January 2012)

26 July 2009	Bauchi	First clash with security agencies in Bauchi state
27 July 2009	Yobe	First attack in Yobe State during an invasion of Potiskum Divisional Headquarters, leading to the death of three policemen, one fire service officer.
29 July 2009	Yobe	Confrontation with security men at Mamudo Village, along Potiskum/Damaturu Road, Yobe 33 Boko Haram members killed.
29 July 2009	Maiduguri Borno	An all-night battle with combined security operatives at Railway terminus, Maiduguri Borno State. Scores Killed and operational based destroyed.
8 September 2010	Bauchi	Set ablaze Bauchi Central prison and fired members of the sect who were jailed there.
28 January 2011	Borno	Killed governorship candidate of the Borno State chapter of the All Nigerian peoples party (ANPP), Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio and six others at Lawan Bukar ward, Maiduguri.
2 March 2011	Kaduna	Killed two policemen attached to the residence of a Divisional Police officer (DPO). Mustapha Sandamu at Rigasa area of Kaduna State.
30 March 2011		Bomb Explosion in Damaturu Injuring a policeman
2 April 2011		Bombed Dutsen-Tanishi police station, injured two policemen.
4 May 2011	Maiduguri	Shot dead a prison warder at Maiduguri prison on Kashim Ibrahim way
5 May 2011	Maiduguri	Shot duty officer at Maiduguri Government House Umaru Shehu at his Abuja Talakawa residence of Maisandami ward killing a 13 year old boy and injured another.
9 May 2011	Maiduguri	Killed two Islamic clerics, Sheikh Goni Tijani and Mallam Alhaji Aburat their residence in Mairi and Bulabulum wards of Maiduguri.
9 May 2011	Bauchi	Killed Bauchi State Chairman of the National Union of Road Transport workers (NURTW), Ibrahim Dudu Gobe

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		and injured his son, Mohammed.
13 May 2011		Planted bomb at Lagos Street, Maiduguri which injured two soldiers, three policemen. A policeman was also shot dead same day in the city.
29 May 2011	Bauchi	Bombed Bauchi military barrack, killing 14.
29 May 2011	Kubwa in Abuja	Eight victims lose their legs after an explosion occurred at Zuba, a suburb of Kubwa in Abuja
31 May 2011		Shot dead Shehu of Borno's Brother, Alhaji Abba Anas Garba El-Kanem.
1 June 2011	Maiduguri	Five people killed during attack on police stations in Maiduguri.
12 June 2011	Maiduguri	Four persons killed at a drinking joint in Bulumkutu, Maiduguri,
16 June 2011	Maiduguri	Four children killed in a bomb explosion at Dambo a town Maiduguri.
16 June 2011	Abuja	A Massive explosion at the National Police Headquarters building in Abuja.
20 June 2011	Katsina	Seven people including five policemen killed in gun and bomb attacks on a police station and a bank if in Kankara, Katsina State.
27 June 2011	Maiduguri	Boko Haram's gun and bomb attack on a beer garoten in Maiduguri at least 25 dead and dozens injured
July 2011		Government say it will open a negotiation panel to initiate negotiations with Boko Haram sect
3 August 2011		The government rejects negotiations with Boko Haram.
25 August 2011	Adamawa	Gun and bomb attacks by Boko Haram on two police stations and two banks in Gombi, Adamawa State, kill at least 16 people including seven policemen.
26 August 2011	Abuja	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bomb blast on the UN compound in Abuja, killing 23 people.
1 September 2011	Adamawa	A Shootout between BH gunmen and soldiers in Adamawa state, kills one sect member while another is injured and

		captured.
4 September 2011	Maiduguri	Muslim Cleric Malam Dala shot dead by two BH members outside his home in the Zinnari area of Maiduguri
12 September 2011	Bauchi	Seven men, including four policemen, are killed by BH gunmen in bomb and shooting attacks on a police station and a bank in Misau, Bauchi State. The attackers rob the bank.
13 September 2011	Maiduguri	Four soldiers shot and wounded in an ambush by Boko Haram members in Maiduguri shortly after the arrest of 15 sect members in military raids on Boko Haram hideouts in the city.
17 September 2011	Maiduguri	Babakura Fugu, brother –in-law to slain Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf, is shot dead outside his house in Maiduguri two days after attending a peace meeting with Nigeria’s ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo in the city. BH denies any involvement in the incident.
1 October 2011	Maiduguri	A butcher and his assistant are killed by the Boko Haram gunmen at Baga market in Maiduguri in a targeted killing. In a separate incident, three people are killed in a shoot-out following BH bomb and shooting attacks on a military patrol vehicle delivering food to soldiers at a checkpoint in Maiduguri three victims are civilians
3 October 2011	Maiduguri	Three killed in BH attacks on Baga market in Maiduguri Borne State. The victims included a tea-seller, a drug store owner and a passer-by.
23 October, 2011	Kaduna	Boko Haram members kill a policeman and a bank security guard in bombing and shooting attacks on a police station and two banks in Saminaka, Kaduna State.
23 October 2011	Kaduna	Boko Haram sat members open fire can market in the town of Katar in Kaduna state, killing two.
25 October 2011		A policemen is shot dead in his house in a targeted attack by Boko Haram gunmen in Damaturu.
29 October 2011	Maiduguri	Boko Haram gunmen shoot dead Muslim cleric Sheikh Ali Jana’a outside his home in the Bulabullin Nagarnam neighborhood of Maiduguri. Jana’a is known to have provided

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		information to security forces regarding the sect.
November 2011		Boko Haram sect says it will not dialogue with the government until all of its members who have been arrested are released.
2 November 2011		A soldier on duty is shot dead by sect members outside Maiduguri's main market.
4 November 2011	Maiduguri	The motorcade of Borno State Governor Kashim Shettima comes under Boko Haram bomb attack in Maiduguri on its way from the airport to the Governor's residence as he returns from a trip to Abuja. Around 1.50 are killed in coordinated BH bombing and shooting attacks on police facilities in Yobe State. Two Boko Haram suicide-bombers blow themselves up outside the military Joint Task Force Headquarters in Maiduguri in a botched suicide attack.
9 November 2011	Bornu	Boko Haram members bomb a police station and the office of Nigeria's Road Safety Agency in Maina village, Bornu State. No one is hurt.
26 November 2011	Yobe	Three policemen and a civilian are wounded in Boko Haram bomb and shooting attacks in Geidam, Yobe State. Six churches, a police station, a beer parlor, a shopping complex, a high court, a local council building and 11 cars are burnt in the attacks.
27 November 2011	Bornu	A Bornu State protocol officer in the office of the Governor is shot dead by motorcycle-riding sect members while driving home.
4 December 2011	Maiduguri	A soldier, a policeman and a civilian are killed in bomb and gun attacks on police buildings and two banks in Azare, Bauchi State. Boko Haram open fired at a wedding in Maiduguri killing the groom and a guest.
7 December 2011	Kuduna	An explosion linked to Boko Haram kills 8 in the Oriyapata district of Kuduna city.
13 December 2011	Maiduguri	A bomb attack on a military check point by Boko Haram and resulting shooting by soldiers in Maiduguri leaves 10 dead and 30 injured.


17 December 2011	Kano	A shootout between sect members and policemen following a raid on the hideout of a Boko Haram sect leaders in the Darmanawa area of Kano State kills seven, including three police officers. Police arrested 14 BH suspects and seize large amount of arms and bombs. Three BH members die in an accidental explosion while assembling home-made bombs in a hideout on the outskirts of Maiduguri.
19 December 2011	Damaturu	One suspected BH member dies and two others wounded in an accidental while assembling a home-made bomb in a hideout in Damaturu.
22 December 2011	Yobe	BH bombs in parts of Maiduguri kill 20. Four policemen and a civilian are killed in gun and bomb attacks on a police building in Potiskum, Yobe State. Around 100 are killed following multiple bomb and shooting attacks by BH gunmen and ensuring gun battles with troops in the Pompomari outskirts of Damaturu.
25 December 2011	Plateau	A Christmas Day Boko Haram attack on Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla town, near Abuja Kills 42 Worshipper, Three Secret Police Operatives [SSS]and a BH bomber are killed in a suicide attack when the bomber rams his bomb-laden car into a military convoy at the gates of SSS Headquarters in Damaturu. A policeman is killed in a botched BH bomb attack on a church in the ray field areas of Jos, capital of Plateau State.
30 December 2011	Maiduguri	For Muslim worshipper are killed in a BH bomb and shooting attack targeting a military checkpoint in Maiduguri as worshippers leave a Mosque after attending Friday prayers.
1 January 2012	Yobe	President Goodluck Jonathan imposes a state of emergency on 15 local government areas hardest-hit by Boko Haram. Attacks, in Bornu , Yobe and Plateau States. He orders the closure of Nigerian borders in the North.
3 January 2012	Jigawa	Boko Haram gunman attack a police station in the town of Birniwa in Jigawa state killed a teenage girl and wounded a police officer.

5 January 2012	Gombe	Six worshippers are killed and 10 others wounded when Boko Haram gunman attack a church in Gombe city.
6 January 2012	Adamawa	Eight worshippers are killed in a shooting attack on a church in Yola. Boko Haram gunman shoot dead 17 Christian mourners in the town of Mubi in the Northeastern State of Adamawa. The victims are friends and relations of one of five people killed in a Boko Haram attack on a hotel the previous day.
7 January 2012	Biu	Three Christian poker players are killed and seven others wounded by Boko Haram gunman in the town of Biu.
9 January 2012	Maiduguri	Boko Haram gunman shoot dead a secret police operative along with his civilian friend as they leave a mosque in Biu, Borno State, 200km South of the State capital, Maiduguri. The President says Boko Haram has infiltrated the executive parliamentary and judicial wings of government.
10 January 2012	Yobe	A Boko Haram attack on a beer garden kills 8, including five policemen and a teenage girl, in Damaturu, capital of Yobe State.
11 January 2012	Yobe	Four Christians killed by Boko Haram gunman in Potiskum, Yobe state, when gunman open fire on their car as they stop for fuel.
13 January 2012	Adamawa	Boko Haram kills four and injures two others, including a policeman in two separate attack in Yola, Adamawa State and Gombe city in neighbouring Gombe State.
17 January 2012	Borno	Two soldiers and four Boko Haram gunmen are killed in an attack on a military deck point in Maiduguri, Borno State.
18 January 2012	Abuja	A key suspect in the 2011 Charismas Day bombing in Abuja, which killed more than 40 people, escapes police custody.

Source: Shehu Sani 2011: 39-41; and Local and Agency Reports adapted from *The Nation* on Sunday 27, May 2012: 20 and 22.

Figure 3.8: Boko Haram Fatal Attacks

Reported civilian deaths in Boko Haram attacks Sep 2010 - Apr 2014




Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex

Figure 3.9: Reported Civilian Deaths by Boko Haram

Boko Haram fatal attacks

Civilians reported killed in Boko Haram attacks Sep 2010 - Apr 2014



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex

Table 3.12: Northern Region Religious Distributions

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Present State (North)	1952			1963		
	% Muslim	% Christian	% Animist and Other	% Muslim	% Christian	% Other
Sokoto	96.3	0.5	3.2	98.9	0.4	0.7
Zamfara	96.3	0.5	3.2	98.9	0.4	0.7
Jigawa	98.4	0.4	1.3	98.0	0.8	1.2
Kano	97.8	0.5	1.7	97.0	1.1	1.8
Yobe	87.3	0.5	12.2	94.8	1.0	4.2
Katsina	95.2	0.3	4.5	94.6	0.4	5.1
Borno	80.9	0.6	18.5	88.3	2.7	8.9
Kebbi	79.0	0.3	20.7	85.5	0.5	14.0
Bauchi	76.3	1.1	22.6	83.4	1.6	14.9
Kwara	63.4	6.5	30.1	75.6	13.6	10.8
Gombe	70.1	2.5	27.4	75.0	6.2	18.8
Niger	46.8	3.5	49.7	62.4	4.0	33.6
Kaduna	57.3	10.2	32.5	55.7	25.1	19.2
Kogi	22.5	18.5	59.1	37.5	28.2	34.2
Adamawa	32.9	3.8	63.3	34.6	16.0	49.4
Nasarawa	23.4	7.8	68.8	30.2	13.8	56.0
Taraba	19.0	2.0	78.0	26.2	13.7	60.0
Plateau	25.5	11.4	63.1	26.1	23.2	50.7
Benue	2.8	7.1	90.1	2.8	53.4	43.8
Total North	73.0	2.7	24.3	71.7	9.7	18.6

Source: (Philip, 2012)

Table 3.13 Western Region Religious Distributions

Present State (West)	1952			1963		
	% Muslim	% Christian	% Other	% Muslim	% Christian	% Other
Oyo	50.4	26.7	22.9	58.3	30.5	11.2
Lagos	48.3	44.3	7.4	56.0	40.7	3.3
Ogun	47.5	35.2	17.4	53.0	37.9	9.1
Osun	48.3	38.2	13.5	52.7	42.2	5.1
Ondo	12.7	66.7	20.6	14.2	78.2	7.6
Ekiti	8.2	69.3	22.5	10.6	79.0	10.4
Edo	7.1	24.5	68.3	7.4	58.2	34.4
Delta	1.1	21.1	77.8	0.6	51.2	48.3
Total West	32.8	36.9	30.3	35.7	49.9	14.4

Source: (Philip, 2012)

Table 3.14 Eastern Region Religious Distributions

Present State (East)	1952			1963		
	% Muslim	% Christian	% Other	% Muslim	% Christian	% Other
Anambra	1.2	36.9	62.0	0.7	72.6	26.8
Enugu	0.5	18.7	80.8	0.5	47.9	51.6
Cross River	0.3	47.9	51.8	0.3	75.1	24.6
Ebonyi	0.1	8.2	91.7	0.3	30.3	69.4
Rivers	0.4	65.6	34.0	0.3	90.4	9.3
Abia	0.2	70.9	28.9	0.1	91.3	8.6
Akwa Ibom	0.1	77.7	22.2	0.0	95.8	4.2
Bayelsa	0.1	45.3	54.5	0.0	79.2	20.8
Imo	0.1	56.7	43.2	0.0	85.0	15.0
Total East	0.3	50.0	49.6	0.2	77.2	22.5

Source: (Philip, 2012)

Table 3.15 Nigeria's Population and Religious Distributions 1952 and 1963

	1952				1963			
	Population	Population by religion			Population	Population by religion		
		Muslim	Christian	Other		Muslim	Christian	Other
North	16835582	12289975	454561	4091046	29763276	21342866	2880112	5540302
West	6352472	2083491	2346826	1922155	12801687	4565388	6388700	1847599
East	7215251	24032	3610781	3580438	12394463	29964	9573622	2790878
Total Nigeria	30403305	14397498	6412168	9593639	54959426	25938218	18842434	10178779
Percentages		47.4%	21.1%	31.6%		47.2%	34.3%	18.5%

Source: (Philip, 2012)

3.16 Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflicts on Nigeria's Development

3.16.1 Introduction

Ethnicity and religion often play a major role in the success or failure of developmental efforts. Clearly, the greater the ethnic and religious diversity of a country, the more likely it is that there will be internal strife and political instability (Todaro, et al, 2003:76). In view of this observation, we should be interested in how political instability, consequent upon her many diversity-imbued conflicts, has impacted on Nige-

ria's development. In other words, we shall be interested in ascertaining the relationships between political instability and development. To do this, we shall proceed from the following premises:

- i. Define or explain political instability, economic growth and development
- ii. Determine the relationships between political instability, economic growth and development
- iii. Determine the roles of social trust, civil society organizations and institutional factors in stemming ethno-religious conflicts to achieve development

In their paper on political instability and economic growth, Alesina, et al (1996) "political instability" is defined as the propensity of a change in the executive, either by "constitutional" or "unconstitutional" means. Thus, we study whether a high propensity of an executive collapse leads to a reduction of growth. On their part, Ari Aisen et al (2011) regard political instability "as a serious malaise harmful to economic performance. Political instability is likely to shorten policymakers' horizons leading to suboptimal short term macroeconomic policies. It may also lead to a more frequent switch of policies, creating volatility and thus, negatively affecting macroeconomic performance. With regard to the fore-going, it is certain that such sub-optimal macro-economic performances will most certainly lead to negative economic growth".

Economic growth is the sustained increase in the real gross domestic products, the national income/output through sustained production of good and services in a year. Todaro, et al (ibid: 827) define economic growth as the steady process by which the productive capacity of the economy is increased over time to bring about rising level of national output and income.

Development can be regarded as the improvement in the standards of living, in the welfare and wellbeing of the people in an economy through the availability of and access to basic needs. Satisfaction of basic needs

depends on their availability made possible through production of goods and services- a euphemism for economic growth. It is worthy of reiteration our assertion in chapter two that there is a fundamental mutual dependency of economic growth and development because for economic growth to take place, there must be tangible improvements in levels of incomes, savings and investment, and for development, there must be a consistent and sustainable or sustained rate of economic growth. But political instability which connotes a state of flux or an economic collapse or wanton destruction of the economy (i.e. destruction of physical, social & economic infrastructure and the environment) does not afford an environment that is conducive to economic growth because of the accompanying unstable policies or constant policy-switches and distortions in investment fundamentals such as the levels of national income and national savings, and interest rate. The result was that investments on which economic growth depends decline, leading also to decline in the production of national output and national income. What this amounts to is that there is a decline in the availability of goods and services that ought to improve the welfare, wellbeing and standard of living of the generality of the citizens on a sustainable basis. In other words, there is a decline in the level of national development.

There is absolutely no question about it that ethno-religious conflicts breed divisions, mistrust and disharmony- all of which impact development or social progress negatively. For social progress or development to obtain on sustainable basis, it is imperative that, first and foremost, unity, mutual trust and harmony must be restored amongst the diverse ethnicity and religion. The restoration of trust among the diverse ethnic and religious groups is bound to leverage on the achievement of national development objectives and elicits cooperation that will translate to tangible achievements in both political and economic spheres. The outcome of this process is ultimately the reversal of the sad consequences of political instability arising from ethno-religious conflicts.

Trust or social trust is defined as the commitment of resources to an activity where the outcome depends upon the cooperative behaviour of others; it is a social mechanism that is embodied in structures of social relations which cannot be separated from social capital because they reinforce each other mutually. This is in the sense that social capital generates trusting relationships that in turn produce social capital, defined as a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it which level, according to Fukuyama (1995), strongly influences economic success of that society. Grootaert & Bastelaer (2002), opine that social capital construct is not only about people's relationships and their values but also a constructive element in the creation and maintenance of economic prosperity and regional development. All of these go to reinforce the conviction that mutual trust or social capital and its deliberate cultivation is indispensable to harnessing resources embedded in a social structure which are assessed and mobilized in purposive actions (Lin; 2001) that should reverse the ugly consequences of conflict and put back the country on the paths of economic growth and development. But then, trust must be augmented or supported by institutions, which North (2003) describes as the incentive systems that structure human interaction as well as economic, political and social activity.

What roles do institutions play in growth and development? In answering this question, it will be helpful to acquaint us with further insights into the meaning and characteristics of institution as follows:

- The main determinants of differences in prosperity across countries are differences in economic institutions; to solve the problem of development will entail reforming these institutions. (Acemoglu, P. & Robinson, J. 2003)
- Institutions are made up of formal rules, informal constraints and their enforcement characteristics; these formal rules are laws, constitutions, regulations, whatever, that have the character of be-

ing specific and being defined precisely; institutions would not exist in a frictionless world where there is no uncertainty; institutions exist to reduce uncertainty in the world, and in a world without institutions we would not know how to deal with each other (North, D. 2003)

The formal rules (institutions) are directed to structuring economic, political and social activity. Consequently, we have political, economic and social institutions. These institutions are the backbones of growth and development and the determinants of economic prosperity dictated by differences in economic institutions, which cannot be divorced from the efficiency, and effectiveness of the applied rules and regulations (institutions). For instance, the efficiency or effectiveness of political institutions will shape the activity of economic institutions. We can also approach this from the angle that political institutions are creation of government that drive governance to achieve government's political or economic or social objectives. However, the achievement of the economic or social or political objectives is a function of the performance of the political institutions. If they perform sub-optimally, or in case of institutional failure, the impacts will be reflected on the economy. After all according to North, a political structure in turn puts in place an economic structure that shapes how that society works.

Apparently, the essence of political institutions is to ensure good governance, which ultimately encompasses justice, equity, transparency, trust and hope. These variables of good governance are intended to prevent institutional failure and consequent anarchy that instils hopelessness in the citizenry, stalls the wheels of political and economic progress, and constrains the pace of economic growth and development.

To checkmate this process, there is the need for intervention by active, neutral and non-governmental third-party organizations that will serve as watchdogs for good governance and compliance with its attributes. These organizations are the civil society organizations (CSOs).

CSOs can be described as the aggregate of non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary organizations formed by people with common interests that manifest the interests and will of citizens of a state. By virtue of the fact that the areas of concentration of CSOs include good governance & Justice; education; culture; peace & stability, and growth & development, their intervention is very critical in ensuring respect for the rule of law, or compliance with the fundamentals of institution to achieve peace and stability without which economic growth and development would be hard to achieve, if not elusive to that society.

We can, therefore, conclude that political instability derives from institutional failure and impacts economic growth negatively; that political instability connotes economic instability; that political stability correlates positively with economic growth, and that there is positive relationship between institutions, economic growth and development. What all this amounts to is that Nigerian government should always aspire or endeavour to harness Nigeria's diversity for growth and development of its economy by adhering strictly with institutional fundamentals and by recognizing and respecting the invaluable role of CSOs as the watchdogs for good governance. Because institutional failure exacerbates the dysfunctional features of ethnic, cultural and religious diversities, it will therefore require good governance to restore mutual trust and hope in the system and achieve the much desired unity in diversity, restore peace and stability that will enable us realize the objectives of growth and development.

This is because, as evident from our fore-gone analyses, failure of our institutions or bad governance is responsible for the various ethnic or religious conflicts, the devastations, destructions and deprivations arising from them. The cost of these conflicts is staggering and negatively impactful on national growth and development.

The cost of these conflicts will be obvious when we assess their impacts in the section that follows.

3.17 Assessment of Impact of Conflicts on Humans and Infrastructure

3.17.1 Introduction

Unarguably, the sad consequences of violent conflicts or war are the wanton destruction of lives, private property and public infrastructures, which have been acknowledged as the core or indispensable inputs for national growth and development, and international competitiveness. The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 of the 2010 World Economic Forum underscored the relevance of infrastructure. The report emphasized that, "Extensive and efficient infrastructure is critical for ensuring the effective functioning of the economy, as it is an important factor determining the location of economic activity and the kinds of activities or sectors that can develop in a particular economy".

While no monetary values could, morally, be put on human lives that are, unfortunately, destroyed during violent conflicts or war, the cost of property or infrastructural destructions could be staggering. The destructions that the WWII left in its wake in Europe would have plunged that continent back several notches on the developmental scale, if not for the US Marshal Plan of action for its reconstruction. The cost of this US effort in monetary terms ran into several millions of dollar. The post-Nigeria civil war's reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation (3Rs) policy of the Gowon Administration, which cost Nigeria millions of Naira had been credited with the rapid re-integration of the Igbos into the Nigerian society and the hastening of Nigeria's recovery.

3.17.2 Assessment of Impact of Conflicts on Humans

Humans are an indispensable factor of growth and development. This is because humans bring together both tangible units (raw materials and resources) and intangible units (ideas, innovations, technology) into

the production process which end-results are goods and services required to meet our basic needs. When the human factor is in jeopardy or impaired through mindless killings and maiming occasioned by ethnic or religious conflicts then the whole value chain of production is disrupted, and consequently growth and development are slowed down considerably. Put in another way, the loss of precious human lives occasioned by violent conflicts or the internal displacement of people, not just children but able-bodied and skilled and unskilled men and women constitutes a monumental tragedy that traverses the entire political and economic space. This is because humans are the force that keeps the wheels of industrialization rolling. As a matter of fact, human ingenuity and his exertions-both physical and intellectual are responsible for the largely human contributions to, the recorded world progress; this is without losing sight of his negative contributions to world turbulence and environmental degradation. The tragic but avoidable loss of human lives or the infliction of bodily harm on him has negative implications for a nation's overall progress. In other words, large scale human tragedies such as those that occur during wars (such as world wars, international wars, national/civil wars or internal insurgencies or insurrections), translate to global political and economic problems. We can recall that Ori (2009: *ibid*) disclosed that over one million lives were lost during Nigeria's 3-year civil war. According to President Goodluck Jonathan the Boko Haram insurgency alone has so far cost Nigeria 16,000 precious lives.

Figure 3.10: Infrastructure worth millions of dollars is destroyed yearly due to ethno religious conflict



Source: <http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/02/06/boko-haram-carnage-in-rural-nigeria/>

3.17.3 Assessment of Impact of Conflicts on Infrastructures

Infrastructure has been defined as the basic physical and organizational structures needed for the operation of a society or enterprise, or the services and facilities necessary for an economy to function (2013). New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) acknowledges an infrastructure- growth and development nexus when it declares inter-alia that “the relationship between the economy and infrastructure is evidently critical to promoting inclusive growth and sustainable development. In fact, high cost of transport, energy and internet access is a major economic growth deflator and is partly associated the Africa’s continued economic marginalization” (NEPAD; 2011).

This is to say that infrastructure destruction, deficit or inadequacy will ultimately have deleterious effects on national growth and development. The same ‘The Global Competitiveness Report’ cited earlier further said that “well-developed infrastructure reduces the effect of

distance between regions, integrating the national market and connecting it at low cost to markets in other countries and regions. In addition, the quality and extensiveness of infrastructure networks significantly impact economic growth and affect income inequalities and poverty in a variety of ways. A well-developed transport and communications infrastructure network is a prerequisite for the access of less-developed communities to core economic activities and services.”

It becomes incontrovertible why destruction of infrastructures during the Nigeria’s civil war and the many ethnic and religious conflicts, will impact negatively the pace of national economic growth and development. From Tables 3.5 & 3.6, we could see that infrastructures that were destroyed cut across social, economic and security sectors.

The social infrastructures destroyed during the civil war and the many ethno-religious conflicts can be compartmentalized into health, education, housing, churches, mosques and transport. Under educational infrastructures, schools including primary and secondary schools as well as technical schools were destroyed or damaged. Health facilities destroyed or damaged included hospitals both publicly and privately owned. Security infrastructures such as police headquarters and police stations, military barracks and installations as well as Prisons were attacked and destroyed. In the Housing sector, building housing the United Nations Offices in Nigeria was bombed.

The economic sector witnessed the destruction of financial institutions, oil & gas installations including refineries, oil pipelines and flow stations. In the energy subsector, power generating stations and substations, and transmission lines were destroyed. Meanwhile, the Transport infrastructures destroyed were highways, rail lines along with assortment of coaches and wagons.

In concluding this section, it is necessary that we state that the singular lesson to be learned from the negative impact of violent conflicts or war that is, the refugee problems and the wanton destruction of human

lives and social and economic infrastructures, is that, like plagues, violent conflicts or war should be avoided at all cost.

3.18 Achieving Post-conflict Harmony and National Stability

As a starting point we equate harmony with peace. We also assert that the core aim of conflict resolution along with conflict management, conflict transformation and conflict handling styles is to ensure a post-conflict harmonious co-existence in which peace is eventually internalised among the hither-to conflicting or belligerent parties or groups. Peace, according to Francis (2006:17), is generally defined as the absence of war, fear, conflict, anxiety, suffering and violence, and about peaceful co-existence. Rummel (1981) regards peace as the absence of dissension, violence or war, a state of concord, harmony and tranquillity. To Galtung (1996), peace is a state of absence of hostility, disturbance or agitation.

It is believed that once peace or harmony is achieved, instability of whatever hues becomes non-existent. Achieving harmony is concomitant to achieving national stability, while national stability translates to national economic growth that, depending on the policy choices or decisions of government, can translate to improvement in the quality of lives of the citizenry, which connotes development. The decision of the government on what to do with increase in economic growth is critical because growth does not translate to development automatically.

We believe that once peace or harmony is achieved, incidences of political instability and, transitively, economic instability are stemmed. It is worth further reiteration that achieving harmony is concomitant to achieving national stability.

In view of the importance of harmony or peace, how then do we achieve harmony as a post-conflict goal or how do we achieve societal

harmony/peace on a sustainable basis? It is worth bearing in mind that even if peace or harmony is achieved as an aftermath of a violent conflict, there is the danger of a relapse unless certain conditions are observed or certain variables are factored into our individual dealings or social interactions.

From *Dialogue in Nigeria* (2010) emerges two principles on establishing sustainable peace namely, (1) peace is dependent on relationships, and (2) dialogue is the indispensable promoter of peace. The principles underscore the need for interactions amongst individuals for mutual understanding. As the conference revealed, “an enemy is one whose story you have not heard”. Once relationship is established, it becomes apparent to everyone that we are after all “one humanity and one spirit” This being so, we would aim to replace culture of violence with culture of peace, and also discard mutual distrust and suspicion, all of which lead to conflictive relationships.

There is no doubt that Nigeria, with its diversity-problems, has a lot to learn and benefit from the incorporation of disintegration avoidance and harmony enhancement factors in its governance policy. In as much as it is near impossible to have a conflict-free society, it becomes the responsibility of the government, once conflicts arise, to adopt conflict-handling styles that are necessarily influenced by desires to avoid national disintegration and should consciously encourage and enhance societal harmony on a sustainable basis.

3.18.1 Deductions from Chronicled Ethno-Religious Conflicts

What could we deduce from the series of conflicts reviewed and Conflict/Harmony frameworks or models analysed in this chapter? In the first place, most if not all the conflicts were avoidable, had the political leadership taken the pains to manage with patriotic intents and without primordial sentiment the 1914 amalgamation of peoples of diverse ethnicity, culture and religion. Government or political leadership ought

to have learned from other countries how they were able to successfully cope or deal with their diversity. For instance Switzerland is not having problems with its diversity because of its adoption of *consociational approach*. This approach, according to Abubakar (2003:65), “ensures stability by getting the parties who would otherwise be locked in conflict to understand each other, discuss issues of common interest and arrive at decisions by bargaining and consensus, rather than a zero-sum approach”. Sadly, since independence in 1960, Nigerian leaders have embraced a zero-sum approach that engenders mutual scheming and rivalry by each of the three majority ethnic groups to dominate and control Nigeria’s political space, while there was a seeming unanimity among them to subjugate the minority ethnic groups in their individual regions of influence, thereby creating mutual distrust and suspicion, aggression, grievances, hatred and polarisation along ethnic, religious or regional line. In that regard and contrary to Azikiwe’s view (1964:6-19) that “tribal instincts could be transformed into pragmatic tools for national co-existence of all the groups, for the varieties in the tribal groups make for enriching communion”, Nigeria’s diversity has become a veritable tool for disharmonious co-existence. Despite the hypocritical mouthing of commitment to Nigeria’s unity, its political leadership continues to engage in divisive primordial sentiments, hence the prevalence of ethnic and religious intolerance.

Other issues that resonate throughout the ethno-religious conflicts were resource ownership, resource control, resource allocation and settler-indigene dichotomy and secularism vis-à-vis constitutional provisions. These issues brought into focus the lack of political will to put in place and enforce the constitutional provisions that will address the afore-mentioned issues in accordance with the dictates of federalism as enunciated by Wherea and others in chapter two of this study. For instance, the lack of political will to address issues such as fiscal federalism, devolution of more power to the federating units and the enforce-

ment of extant constitutional provisions on secularism contribute immensely to triggering violent agitations or conflicts. Sadly, the analyses of these conflicts showed that governments (both at federal and state levels) were the instigators of some of the religious or ethnic conflicts in the country to achieve political ends or ensure continual flows of petrodollars.

We could also deduce that conflicts engender both political and economic instability, which invariably leads to decline in national output and in development indices, including welfare, wellbeing and living standards of the citizens; that poverty, unemployment and horizontal inequality were precursors of structural violence or conflicts of whatever colouration; that the line of demarcation between ethnic and religious conflict is indistinct, as what begins as ethnic or religious conflict soon assumes religious or ethnic colouration, and that the high incidence of conflicts in the north of Nigeria had much to do with the British colonialists' indirect rule in that part of Nigeria and the divide and rule tactics of the ruling elite.

We could further deduce that the conflicts in the north were in line with the pursuit of hegemonic power agenda by the Hausa-Fulani oligarch; that the hegemonic agenda was at the root of oligarch's rejection of decentralisation in line with the dictates of federal system of governance; of oligarch's insistence on 'one north one people principle', in spite of north's obvious heterogeneity, in order to enhance and ensure Hausa-Fulani oligarch's control of the destiny of the northern minorities in perpetuity, and that the 'one north one people principle' is a euphemism for the continued enslavement, subjugation and control of the north's minority ethnic groups by the Hausa-Fulani.

By and large, it is the desire to be free-an unalienable right of man-that often propels the minority ethnic groups to violently confront the Hausa-Fulani hegemony. The pursuit of hegemonic power by the Hausa-Fulani without due consideration for Nigeria's diversity somehow also

explains why Hausa-Fulani are the issue in the north's ethnic or religious violence and, indeed, in Nigeria's divisive politics and conflictive inter-ethnic and religious relationships.

Finally, with regard to the civil war and the series of ethno-religious conflicts, we could assert that these are phenomena that leave in their wake high rate of destruction of lives and property, and infrastructures which without doubts had impacted negatively on the pace of our national progress. All of these go to show that there is no alternative to harmonious co-existence. Fortunately, we have in existence conflict/harmony frameworks or models of universal applicability that can be utilised to achieve a sustained harmony in our ethnic or religious relationships.

3.19 Summary of Chapter 3

Chapter 3 acknowledged the inevitability of conflict and the abnormality of having a conflict-free society. This is in the sense that conflict being a form of socialisation; no group can be entirely harmonious, for it would then be devoid of process and structure. While a society is accommodative of functional conflict, it is its dysfunctional feature that is undesirable because it is violent and destructive. The chapter, therefore, essentially dealt with the dysfunctional conflicts by chronicling the various violent and destructive ethnic and religious conflicts that Nigeria had had the misfortune of engaging in in its nation-building endeavours. It was observed that because ethnicity and religion are community or identity-based, objectivity is more often than not overshadowed by passion and emotion, thus lending themselves to easy mobilisation and manipulation for political advantage by political entrepreneurs who seize it to appeal to their fears, religion, ethnicity, et cetera to stir up conflicts. These conflicts, it was observed, often result in lose-lose outcomes for the parties and population involved.

3.19.1 Reasons for Violent Nature of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts

Reasons for the violent nature of ethnic and religious conflicts were proffered as follows: Ethnic, religious and political conflicts as well as land or boundary disputes belong to communal group, or are identity-based. They are for this reason characteristically uncompromisingly violent. This is because members of the communal group perceive themselves as a pseudo-family; thus defending the group interest, becomes a passion and a bounding duty that transcends objectivity. As a result, members of a communal group are willing and ready to fight and die for the communal interests or rights that are perceived as being encroached or trampled upon, or for perceived injustices visited upon the communal group by the common enemies of the group. In this regard, objective analysis of conflict situations, or the assessment of conflict situations is non-existent or is seriously subjective.

While detailing the causes and consequences of various conflicts chronicled, the chapter included the prospects for post-conflict harmonious co-existence and national stability. It also re-echoed and re-emphasized the fact that attempts to prevent violent conflicts must involve conflict prevention, the satisfaction of basic needs, the accommodation of legitimate aspirations and the remedy of manifest injustices because of their criticality as socio-economic factors for engendering social harmony.

3.19.2 Addressing the Menace of the Communal/Identity-Based Conflicts

In addressing the menace of the communal/identity-based conflicts such as ethnic and religious conflicts, emphasis is placed on the indispensable roles of the state/government policy and political leadership as determining factors of either explosive or harmonious inter-ethnic, cultural or religious relationships in countries with a multiplicity of ethnici-

ty, culture or religion, particularly in developing countries including Nigeria. These roles are however depended on the management/mismanagement, or the use/misuse of state power. It was revealed that the misuse or mismanagement of state power in Nigeria was reflected by the fact of state policy being found to be deliberately formulated and implemented to give advantage to or favour or advance the interest of one ethnic or religious group over the other. This was a key factor of ethnic or religious conflicts. Sadly, this is in spite of the fact that state power and responsibilities, which include the guarantee of security of lives and property, the meeting of the development needs, the provision of unfettered access to political and economic opportunities, and the protection of the inalienable rights of its citizens are derived from and protected by the constitution.

It was thus suggested that state, in formulating and implementing/executing policies and programmes, should be guided by the provisions of the constitution, which political leadership has moral obligation to respect and defend. It was further suggested that in a heterogeneous society, state's neutrality in the discharge of its constitutional responsibility should not be suspect; that in case of conflict, the state should be above blame, it must be seen to be fair and just. This means that the state should focus serious attention on the dynamics of conflict with a view to preventing, containing or managing its incidence.

3.20 Causative Factors of Nigeria's Ethno-Religious Conflicts

It was observed that by its policy failure or the misuse of state power, the Nigerian state had aided and abetted violent ethno-religious conflicts that had caused wanton destruction of lives and property as reflected in the chronicled ethnic and religious conflicts. Other causative factors of conflicts, which include colonial administration policy of divide

and rule; failure to abide with the provisions of federal constitution that is well suited to countries with diverse ethnicity, culture and religion; post- independence politics and political development; state aiding, abetting and exploiting communal differences to instigate inter-ethnic/religious antagonism; ethnic nationalism; politicisation of religion, modernity and the demands of modernisation which could have the potential for increasing ethnic rivalry as a result of the pressure they exert on individuals and the society at large were, among others, identified.

3.20.1 Socio-Economic Cost of Conflict

This socio-economic cost includes deaths of millions of Nigerians, deprivation, population displacement and the attendant refugee problems, destruction of private property as well as physical, social and economic infrastructures, and the huge cost for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Also addressed are the ecological damage, disruption of economic activities or production, famine and starvation. Social malaise such as rape, child abuse in the form of child soldier, forced prostitution and armed robbery was not left out.

3.20.2 X-Ray of Attitudinal Dispositions of Nigeria's Ethnic Tripod

In order to have the correct perspectives on the civil war, the conflictive relationship between the majority ethnic groups and the series of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, there was in the chapter an x-ray of the psycho-cultural or attitudinal dispositions of the three majority ethnic groups that constitute Nigeria's ethnic tripod. It was intended to give insights into the cultural dynamics of Nigeria's three majority ethnic groups and to illustrate how cultural differences could be an important factor in stirring up conflicts amongst them and even the minority ethnic

groups, which are sure sources of political and economic instability. Psycho-cultural theory, and Conflict and Harmony frameworks aid this.

Meanwhile, Conflict framework, and Harmony framework and its variants help in analysing the responses of these ethnic groups to conflict situations, or in explaining the antagonistic relationships between these three ethnic groups or how these ethnic groups and by extension the over 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria could live or interact harmoniously.

Hausa-Fulani are conservative, reserved, calculating and feudalistic, possessing of uncanny political engineering wizardry, with a single-minded pursuit of hegemonic power and political leadership of post-independence Nigeria. Their religious intolerance, love for power and their insistence on having it their own way could, arguably, explain why Hausa-Fulani are the issue in the north's ethnic or religious violence and, indeed, in Nigeria's divisive politics and conflictive inter-ethnic and religious relationships.

As a result of these attitudes, Hausa-Fulani could not be accommodated by Harmony or conflict framework. The Igbo are aggressive, presumptuous, gifted, individualistic, and adventurous but no doubt lacking in circumspection. The Igbo attitudinal dispositions, was explained by the Machiavellian strategy for attaining and retaining power that could be equated to *Smoothing/Superficial compliance/ Obey publicly and Disobey privately* handling style. The Yoruba are considered a model of religious tolerance, cosmopolitan, and opposed to arrogation of power by any ethnic group to itself. They believe very strongly in negotiations; dialectics or the art of argumentation; appreciate and embrace democratic ethos which they assume provide a strong plank for building a virile nation. To the Yoruba, avoiding conflictive issues as opposed to discussing them to arrive at a negotiated resolution, amount to escapism.

The preference of the Yoruba for negotiation could be assumed to fit adequately into the Western Conflict Framework and Harmony framework of East Asia.

Consequent upon the evaluation of the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo attitudinal dispositions and how these two ethnic groups fared in the harmony framework, it was concluded that the attributes of these two ethnic groups were seen as key factors in their relationships, in Nigeria's conflictive inter-ethnic relationships and in its eventual descent into the 3-year Civil war.

3.20.3 Explanations for Religious Fundamentalism and Boko Haram Insurgency

Religion, arguably, provides an easy platform for the mobilisation of the disgruntled, including the poor and the marginalised sector of the society who were frustrated by the perceived (real or imagined) discrepancy or divergence between the desired and the obtained basic needs. Thus, it is accommodated by Gurr's relative deprivation thesis (Gurr, *ibid*), and Festinger's (1951) Cognitive Dissonance theory.

Mohammed Yusuff, the late founder of Boko Haram sect and other Islamic fundamentalists took advantage of these theories and the presence of the mass of disgruntled elements, the poor and the marginalised in the North Eastern states of Borno and Yobe, mobilised them to form the vanguard of their various sects. Boko Haram, which means Western education is a sin, originally set out on the fanatical note of the embrace of pure, undiluted Islamic orthodoxy (shariah), the objective of converting Nigeria into an Islamic republic and the rejection of Western values.

The predisposing factors of Boko-Haram insurgency could therefore be located largely in the relative deprivation/cognitive dissonance theory and the real or perceived discrepancy between the preferred way of life (to maintain the sanctity of orthodox Islam) and the actual state of their existence (secular state) that influence the dissonance (Alao et al, 2012).

The sect that set out as a fundamentalist religious group soon became a political tool of the North of the country, enjoying widespread overt or covert support among the disgruntled Northern politicians to serve as an informal opposition to the government of the day that were headed first by a Yoruba from the South West, and later by an Ijaw-a minority ethnic group from the South-South zone of the country. The politicians from the core north could not come to terms with being out of power since 1999 and with the prospects of the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan winning another 4-year term in 2015.

Subsequently, the sect was infiltrated by global Islamic terrorist organizations (such as Al-Shabab of Somalia, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region) and now transformed into Nigeria's formidable terrorist sect that is taking on Nigeria's security with ferocity, boldness and leaving on its trails bloodshed and destruction in North Eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, Yobe and Bauchi with occasional strikes in Kano state.

As a result of the sect's rejection of Western values, particularly education, schools were being bombed in order to intimidate northerners, especially girls so that they would eventually abandon education. As part of the intimidation strategy, over 200 school girls in one of the secondary schools in Chibok town in Borno State of Nigeria were abducted in April 2014.

The hypocrisy, the contradictions inherent in the Nigerian system could also explain why Boko Haram has become a festering sore, and why the 'Lugardian contraption' called Nigeria, is forever in a state of flux or enduring political instability that is bound to hasten the coming to pass of the report that Nigeria may cease to exist by 2015 or 2030.

3.20.4 The Prognosis for the Imminent End of Nigeria

The prognosis of the imminent end of Nigeria could also be predicated on the outcome of 2015 presidential elections. If President Jonathan wins in 2015, Boko Haram would become more daring in their Islamization of Nigeria agenda. If the North (Hausa-Fulani) wins the 2015 presidential elections, the Niger Delta militants would pay the North (Hausa-Fulani) back in their own coins, by unleashing devastating blows on Nigeria's economic juggler-the oil and gas facilities. The envisaged armed confrontation between the two may signal the beginning of the end of Nigeria as a united country.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The perennial conflicts that have been the lot of Nigeria and which have unfortunately stifled her growth and development presuppose foundational, structural and constitutional dysfunctions. We have observed earlier in this work that the foundation (i.e. Nigeria's diversity) of a structure (i.e. Nigerian nation) determines its durability, strength and sustainability; if the structure is erected on a faulty foundation, unless and until the faulty foundation is corrected by the political leadership through socio-political engineering ingenuity and constitutional mechanism, the structure is bound to collapse eventually. Nigeria is a product of the 1914 amalgamation of Southern and Northern protectorates with their diverse ethnicity, culture and religion, which constitutes its foundation. It is this faulty foundation and the structural deficiency that have been responsible for why Nigeria has remained a "child" at over fifty years of age. The slow developmental progress of Nigeria, however, has elicited patriotic inquiries by Nigerians into what should be done to reverse this misfortune, and has therefore informed the objectives of the study stated in chapter 1 which, for ease of reference, they are being reiterated hereunder:

- To find out if the resolution of Nigeria's multifarious challenges including the perennial conflicts arising from its diversity lie with the adoption and practice of federal constitution including fiscal federalism and secularism;
- To assess the role of federal constitution/federalism including fiscal federalism and secularism in stabilizing a nation such as Nigeria with its divisive and conflictive internal dynamics of ethno-cultural and religious diversities;
- To determine if Nigeria's developmental challenges are functionally related to its diversities, and
- To seek the answers to the main pre-occupations or national questions of how to open new roads for a more balanced and just development of the country that departs from logic of conflicts and divisions.

4.1.1 Methodology for Achieving the Study's Objectives

This chapter deals with the methodology for achieving the above objectives. The methodology involves collecting and analysing data that are generated from five (5) research questions and their variants produced here-under:

- 1 What is the extent of the relationship between adoption and application of appropriate constitution (federal constitution that emphasizes fiscal federalism and secularism) and the mitigation of the negative consequences of ethnic, cultural and religious diversities such as political instability and socio-economic underdevelopment?
- 2 Can it be assumed that sustainable political stability and development in a diverse society is a function of institutional frameworks, to wit the political system, political leaderships and relevant constitution in operation in that country?

- 3 Can the adoption and operation of Federal Constitution/Fiscal Federalism and Secularism resolve Nigeria's multifarious challenges and perennial conflicts?
- 4 What institutional mechanisms or frameworks should serve as the veritable tools for ensuring cordiality and harmony among the diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups as well as Nigeria's political stability?
- 5 Is the operation of a unitary constitution feasible or pragmatic in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country?

The variants of the above research questions are also itemised as follows:

- A. Do the adoption and the current practice of federal constitution have any linkages with the conflicts in Nigeria?
- B. What do you assume or perceive as causative factors of conflicts experienced in Nigeria?
- C. How has the current practice of federal constitution or federalism in Nigeria helped in stabilizing the country in spite of its ethno-cultural and religious diversities?
- D. Is the way that federal constitution is currently practised in Nigeria having implication for the crisis rocking the country?
- E. Is the operation of a unitary constitution feasible or pragmatic in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country?
- F. How will devolution of powers to the states affect different sectors of the nation?
- G. As a Nigerian citizen, do you feel that diversities in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion have (a) anything to do with Nigeria's developmental challenges or (b) are the root causes of Nigeria's developmental challenges?

The analyses and interpretations of the data (responses from stakeholders) are intended to achieve the above-enumerated objectives set for the study.

This chapter in a nutshell discusses the research methodology including data collection and analysis methods, concepts and process et cetera as indicated in the sections that follow.

4.1.2 Overview of Research Methodology

The data collection component above deals with the methods and types of data to be collected. The study employs a variety of methods, both qualitative and quantitative, for its analytical task. By this triangulation of methods, which is the research design, there was a correlation of empirical and normative insights into the phenomenon under study.

The researcher employed the use of structured questionnaires, structured interviews and focused group discussions to collect data from stakeholders across the six Geo-Political Zones (GPZs) in Nigeria. The study obtains its primary data from the stakeholders through the use of structured questionnaires to elicit information from the respondents to enhance the reliability of the study. In addition, the study employs Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) along gender and literacy lines, and between 4-8 participants per focus group and in each of the GPZs, as well as Interviews of relevant stakeholders from all the six GPZs in Nigeria. The Interview tools consist of semi structured Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and In-Depth Interviews (IDIs), which involve mainly the use of face-to-face communication with participants in a safe and secure environment of their choice.

4.1.3 Why these Data Collection Tools are Used

The main advantage of focus group discussions according to Morgan (1996) is the opportunity to observe a large amount of interactions on a

topic in a limited period of time based on the researcher's ability to assemble and direct the focus group sessions. In view of the fact that the researcher determines the topic of the study, this, in essence, means that it is the researcher's interest that provides the focus, whereas the data themselves come from the group interaction.

The researcher's decision to use questionnaire as one of the researcher's data collection tools is influenced by *StatPAC (2014)* identified advantages of questionnaires. According to *StatPAC, the advantages of the use of Questionnaires* as a data collection tool lie in the fact that:


1. Questionnaires are very cost effective when compared to face-to-face interviews. This is especially true for studies involving large sample sizes and large geographic areas. Written questionnaires become even more cost effective as the number of research questions increases.
2. Questionnaires are easy to analyze. Data entry and tabulation for nearly all surveys can be easily done with many computer software packages.
3. Questionnaires are familiar to most people. Nearly everyone has had some experience completing questionnaires and they generally do not make people apprehensive.
4. Questionnaires reduce bias. There is uniform question presentation and no middle-man bias. The researcher's own opinions will not influence the respondent to answer questions in a certain manner. There are no verbal or visual clues to influence the respondent.
5. Questionnaires are less intrusive than telephone or face-to-face surveys. When a respondent receives a questionnaire in the mail, he is free to complete the questionnaire on his own time-table. Unlike other research methods, the research instrument does not interrupt the respondent.

On the other hand, the advantage of using qualitative interview derives from the fact that it encourages interactions between the interviewer and the interviewees through a flexible agenda. Its aim is to go beneath the surface of the topic under discussion, exploring what people are saying in details and unravelling new ideas not anticipated at the outset of the study.

4.1.4 Study Area

Data for this study were obtained from the six geo-political zones (GPZs) of Nigeria, which are also designated as the research/study area for this work (see figure 4.1). A state was selected from each of the six geo-political zones (Adamawa, Rivers, Abuja-FCT, Lagos, Enugu and Kaduna) using a purposive method. From the six selected states, four research sites were also selected using a sampling method that combines both purposive and diversity sampling to obtain perspectives of respondents on why Nigeria remains a “child” at more than 50 years after gaining independence from Great Britain in 1960. Stakeholders/Respondents were randomly selected to give answers to or assess the state of the nation under the current arrangement. Their responses were assessed vis-à-vis how the extant constitution is currently practised.

Figure 4.1: Nigeria's 6 Geopolitical Zones



Source: <http://www.wjgnet.com/1949-8462/full/v4/i12/327.htm>

Specific sites were selected to represent a variety of scenarios, including:

- A clearly demarcated area of the capital city where government service provisions are assumed to be high.
- A peri- urban area with some government service provisions
- Two more remote sites where government services availability is minimal or absent

4.1.5 Study Population

The study population used for this work was selected from the six geo-political zones of Nigeria (See figure 4.1). Ideally, because of the nature of issues to be addressed in this work, the ideal age of the population was 18 years and above who are resident in Nigeria. This was because the concepts of “federalism”; “institutions” may be very difficult to explain to those less than 18 years in view of their levels of education and exposure. The ideal respondent would be one that is politically aware of his country and society.

For interviews, the ideal interviewees are people who play some form of leadership role in the military, civil service, civil societies, ethnic groups, religious groups, educational institutions, professional institutions.

The nature of the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) requires a mix of literate and illiterate persons who are resident in the different zones. There was also an emphasis on gender balance in the selection of participants. It must, however, be noted that in the Northern Nigeria, custom does not permit women to talk in the company of men. Therefore efforts were made to get the northern women interviewed in private spaces, respecting culture and tradition of the respondents.

Table 4.1 Overview of Discussants, Interviewees, Issues/Questions by Geo-Political Zones

Focus Group Discussions with Focus Group Discussants	
Issue discussed	Perspectives on Nigeria’s ethno-religious conflicts, its lack of progress or under-development and the solutions
Participating Stake-Holders per Geo-political Zones	
NC	Religious leader; Government worker; Trader; Teacher; Housewife
NE	Pastor; Ustaf-Islamic Scholar; Housewife; Social Activist
NW	Religious leader; Government worker; Lecturer; Trader; Social

	Activist;
SE	Pastor; Trader; Lecturer; Teacher; Government worker; Unionist;
SS	Social Activist; Women leader; Politician; Unionist; Teacher
SW	Social Activist; Unionist; Businessman; Politician; Trader; Teacher
Interviews with Interviewees	
Questions for the interviews	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the root causes of the ethno-religious crises in Nigeria? 2. Could the practice of true federalism mitigate or eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria? 3. What are the solutions for mitigating ethno-religious crisis in plural society like Nigeria
Participating Stake-Holders per Geo-Political Zones	
NC	Religious leader; Government worker; Politician
NE	Traditional ruler; religious leader/Preacher; Businessman; Politician
NW	Ustaf-Islamic Scholar; Lecturer/Teacher; Politician
SE	Pastor; Government worker; Trader; Lecturer
SS	Government worker; Staff of MNOC; Politician
SW	Lecturer; Teacher; Politician; Businessman

The following table and figures summarize the demographic distribution of the respondents:

Table 4.2: National Distributions of Respondents by Gender, Age, Occupation and Academic Qualifications


Gender	%	Age Distribution	%	Occupation Type	%	Academic Qualifications	%
Male	50.3	18-24	14.4	Skilled	48.1	Doctorate	0.6
Female	36.5	25-34	36.5	Semi-skilled	9.4	Masters	8.4
		35-44	21.9	Unskilled	8.7	Bachelor	36.7
		45-54	12.7	Others	29.8	HND	14.4
		55-64	4.0	NR	4.0	High school	13.5
		65 and above	0.8			Others	12.9

4.1.6 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Distribution of Gender of Respondents

Table 4.2 above shows the national distribution of respondents by gender, age, occupation and academic qualifications while Figure 4.2 that follows immediately, shows the distribution of respondents on the basis of their gender. The result shows that 36.5% indicated their gender as female whilst 50.3% indicated their gender as male. However, 13.2% did not indicate their gender.

Figure 4.2: Distribution of Gender of respondents




Distribution of Age of Respondents

Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of respondents on the basis of their age. The result shows that those aged between 25 and 34 years account for the highest proportion of respondents surveyed; specifically, the respondents in this category account for 36.5%. This is closely followed by those aged between 35 and 44 years, which account for 21.9%.

As figure 4.3 below shows, older respondents (i.e. those aged 55 years and above), were sparsely represented as they account for less than 5.0%

of those surveyed, while those within 65 years and above age brackets constitute only a mere 0.8%. About 9.7% did not indicate their age.


Figure 4.3: Distribution of Age of respondents



Distribution of Occupation-Type of Respondents

Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of respondents on the basis of occupation-type. The result shows that respondents classified as engaging in skilled labour account for 48.1%, whilst those classified as semi-skilled and unskilled account for 9.4% and 8.7% respectively. However, 29.4% of respondents were classified as “Others”. “Others” are those who indicated their occupation as Students, National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), Unemployed, etc.


Figure 4.4: Distribution of Occupation-type of respondents



Distribution by Academic Qualifications of Respondents

Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of respondents on the basis of their highest academic qualification; these academic qualifications range from High School certificate holders to doctorates. The result shows that 36.7% of respondents have a Bachelors Degree qualification, and also account for the highest proportion while 8.4% of respondents hold Masters Degree. Those with HND/OND and High School certificate (School cert) qualifications account for 14.4% and 13.5% respectively.

Figure 4.5: Distribution by academic qualifications of respondents



4.1.7 Proposed Sample size

It is not possible in this case to investigate the over 140 million Nigerians for the study, and since it is the practice in research to choose samples from the larger population based on various strategies, a small representative group was selected to give relevant information for the study.

Consequently, the study proposes a total of 720 questionnaires to be administered in the six (6) GPZs (120 questionnaires per zone). Thus it is anticipated that a total of 720 participants distributed across the required six geo-political zones of Nigeria would participate in the quantitative survey. At least four (4) FGDs and eight (8) interviews would be conducted in each of the six (6) GPZs, making a total of proposed twenty four (24) FGDs and forty eight (48) interviews across the 6 GPZs.

4.1.8 Actual Sample Size

It was originally proposed that at least four (4) FGDs, eight (8) interviews would be conducted and 120 questionnaires would be administered in each of the six (6) GPZs, making a total of twenty four FGDs and forty eight interviews and seven hundred and twenty (720) questionnaires. The reality on ground in Nigeria however caused a change of plan. Thus there were only one FGD, 4 interviews and still 120 questionnaires per the six geo-political zones. However, 630 questionnaires were retrieved and analysed, while 90 questionnaires were either declared invalid or were not received from participants.

4.2 Sampling Technique

The ‘purposive sampling’ approach was adopted. This is a non-probability sampling method that could, otherwise, be termed strategic sampling. The probability sampling method or any other method was not possible for this study since there are no demographic data to determine the entire population from which the sampling is drawn.

The researcher using a purposive sampling approach has at the back of her that ‘Given what I already know about the research topic and about the range of people and events under study, who and what are likely to provide the best information?’

There were advance arrangements and good relationships established with leaders and influential people in all communities in order particularly to assist in securing female responses in a bid to ensure gender balance in the selection process. As it has been noticed from experience, there were often uneven representations of women as a result of their unwillingness to participate in such studies, due to the claim that they have nothing to say or that men are better placed to supply the needed information.

Meanwhile, the study concentrated on persons who displayed a wide variety of illuminating perspectives on the issues at hand. Even though this sampling style may not be merely economical, but it is far more informative than the conventional probability sampling as it can be termed “strategic sampling”.

4.2.1 The Focused Group Discussions (FGDs)

The FGDs were grouped along gender and literacy lines, (i.e. in each GPZ there were: Literate Female, Literate Male, Illiterate Female and Illiterate Male groups). The FGDs give room for respondents to present matters in accordance with their lived experiences and in the way they see things. The people that were selected for the FGDs were not entirely elites or religious people but included the grassroots ‘common’ people, brought together under one roof, with the exception of women from the northern part of Nigeria who will not according to their custom and tradition, sit with their male counterparts in the same place. The views or perspectives garnered from the group discussions were then compared with the views or perspectives of the individual interviewees in order to see how agreeable or disagreeable they were with the ‘official’ positions on governance issues or issues of common interest.

The survey and interviews also cut across societal strata or classes as they included traditional rulers, religious leaders, Christian and Muslim adherents, civil servants, artisans, women and other relevant voices in the society. All interviews were conducted in a safe and secure environment mainly based on the participant’s choice of venue and timing. Cultural values and traditions which are key considerations to participants were respected for maximum value of the study.

4.2.2 Qualitative Interview

Qualitative interview encourages interactions between the interviewer and the interviewees through a flexible agenda. As we indicated earlier, data for this study also rely on interviews of stakeholders from the six geo-political zones (GPZ) to obtain their perspectives on why Nigeria remains a “child” at more than 50 years after gaining independence from Great Britain in 1960. These interviewees were randomly selected to answer questions on the state of the nation under the current constitutional arrangement or practice. The responses were assessed vis-à-vis how the extant constitution was currently practised.

The interview aims to go beneath the surface of the topic under discussion, exploring what people are saying in details and unravelling new ideas not anticipated at the outset of the study. Britten (1996) opined that as one does not know all what one would meet on the field, one cannot underestimate the importance of theorizing with the participants’ “points of view” from their particular setting. Scholars refer to this as “adopting the social actors”. The data generated from their indigenous settings with very little imposition from the researcher are easier to manage and is very possible to locate specific ideas coming from these specific individuals.

4.2.3 Questionnaire Administration

Structured questionnaires were used to elicit information from the respondents to enhance the reliability of the study. The questionnaires for the study consist of both *open and close-ended* questions. Whereas the *close-ended* question provides options for the prospective respondents to choose from and keep their attention on the subject-matter, the *open-ended* question enables the respondents to express their views and opinions freely on the subject matter of the study. The questionnaire for this study was divided into six sections as follows:

- a. Section one deals with prospective respondents' socio-economic and demographic characteristics.
- b. Sections two to six (2 to 6) deal with some other issues relating to the objectives which the study intends to achieve.

The study also relies on extant literature as well as information and data from secondary sources- published and unpublished books, journals, government papers, pamphlets, newspaper reports, internet sources, periodicals, dissertations and theses et cetera, as a first line of enquiry.

4.2.4 Data Collection Phases

The first phase of data collection for this study contains six sections.

Section A: consists of a semi-structured interviewer's self-administered questionnaire aimed at obtaining information on socio-demographic characteristics of participants that will be used in this section.

Section B: This section covers General Questions- Questions about knowledge of Nigeria, its peoples and its diversity

Section C: This section covers Fiscal Federalism Principle. In this section, questions that address perceptions on the national revenue generation and its subsequent distribution are asked. It covers a total of 5 questions

Section D: This section covers Political Restructuring and deals with perspectives on reverting to the previous political structures of Nigeria, retaining retaining the current political structure or adopting the new six geo-political zone structures. There are a total of 21 questions in this section.

Section E: This is the section on Federal constitution or Federalism including fiscal federalism and secularism.

Section F: This section covers Federal Character Principle.

There were also General Questions.

For the second phase of data collection for this study, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were chosen as appropriate methods to elicit responses from participants. The interview guide contains core questions on:

- The immediate and remote causes of the ethno-religious crisis
- The perception of the impact the practice of true federalism would have on eradicating ethno-religious crisis
- The possible solution to the ethno-religious crisis

In addition to these preceding core issues, such issues as diversity, the economy and political factors were also discussed.

4.2.5 Validation of the Study Instrument

To achieve the reliability and validity of this instrument, there was a pre-test. This was intended to avail us of a prior knowledge of the outcome of the instruments to be used. In this regard, the study instruments were pre-tested at Ilorin, a city in Kwara State of North Central Zone of the country.

4.2.6 Data Analysis Tools

As indicated earlier, the data collected from the field were analysed using a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods. In analysing the quantitative data, the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 17.0 and Microsoft Excel were used. The analysis involved the use of descriptive statistical tools such as frequency counts, percentages and chi-square test. In other words, the analysis involved univariate and bivariate analyses. While the former (univariate), was mainly descriptive, the latter (bivariate), involved cross tabulation to establish association between variables.

4.2.7 Analysis Procedure

Analysis was carried out in stages to minimize errors. The analysis started by ensuring proper data management; notes were taken in abridged form to complement tape recordings so as to capture significant portions of reports, and observations were jotted down as well. Each recording was properly labelled, transcribed into word formats for onward analysis. The transcripts were effectively coded, and the codes were used to retrieve, link and sort the data, which were transferred into the NVivo 'source' to create nodes, which help to bring out various emerging themes and sub-themes of the narratives.

The NVivo software package, which is a Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) computer software package, was used to analyse both the FGDs and in-depth interviews (IDI) so that they could be constructed into meaningful accounts of social life.

The analysis was narrative and focused on both content and the form (structure) of the narrative in its coherence and complexities. The emphasis was on what was said and how the informants interpreted the issues at hand (how they made sense of the problem on ground).

4.2.8 Researcher's Undertaking

The researcher is quite mindful of the sensitive nature of this study. Hence, the consideration of some ethical issues with regard to the people involved would not be overlooked. The researcher further undertakes to protect the rights; dignity, integrity and safety of the subjects of the research. Subjects will be duly informed that the study will be strictly for academic purpose and not intended to pry into private issues, beliefs or political convictions of any individuals. Consequently, subjects will have the freedom to participate or not to participate. The researcher will exclude any variable that may identify the individuals involved. All the

data generated and audio-tapes will be kept where no member of the public will have easy access to them.

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

The data for this study, as indicated in chapter 4, were generated from the five (5) research questions or their variants and are presented and analysed in this chapter. Furthermore the interpretations of the data (responses from stakeholders), deductions and conclusions drawn from them, which are intended to achieve the objectives set for the study are also contained in this chapter. The analyses of responses to the research questions are both on national and geo-political bases. The analyses of national responses come first. They are thereafter followed by the geo-political analyses of responses to the same research questions. Data Presentation and analysis are done together for each of the research questions.

5.2 Research Question 1:

What is the extent of the relationship between adoption and application of appropriate constitution (federal constitution that emphasizes fiscal federalism and secularism) and the mitigation of the negative consequences of ethnic, cultural and religious diversities such as political instability and socio-economic under-development?

With respect to evaluating the extent of the relationships between adoption and application of appropriate constitution, and the mitigation of political instability and socio-economic under-development (research question 1), other specific questions were derived from the research question 1 and were analysed on National level (i.e. responses to derived-questions were aggregated and analysed on national basis) and Geopolitical level (i.e. responses to derived-questions were disaggregated and analysed based on respondents' geopolitical zones). The derived questions with respect to research question 1 are as follows:

- a) Does the adoption and current practice of federal constitution have any linkages with the conflicts? , and
- b) Could any of the under-listed variables including national constitution have fuelled or /have been fuelling conflicts experienced in Nigeria?

5.2.1 National Overview: Analysis of Responses to the Under-Listed Research Questions:

(a) Do the adoption and the current practice of federal constitution has any linkages with the conflicts?




Figure 5.1 Do the adoption and current practice of federal constitution have any linkages with the conflicts?

Response	Frequency	Percent
Strongly agree	75	11.9
Agree	164	26.0
Neutral	114	18.1
Disagree	135	21.4
Strongly disagree	63	10.0
No response	79	12.5
Total	630	100.0

Table 5.1 Do the adoption and the current practice of federal constitution in Nigeria have any linkages with the conflicts in the nation?

According to Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1; of the 630 respondents surveyed nationally, a total of 239 (37.9%) were positively disposed to the opinion that the adoption and practice of federal constitution have linkages with the conflicts, whereas a total of 198 (31.4%) were negatively disposed to this opinion. However, 114 (18.1%) of the respondents held a neutral position while 79 (12.5%) of them did not indicate any response.

Despite the slight difference in the proportions of respondents who seem to hold positive views and those with negative dispositions, the evaluation suggests that there is urgent need for an ethnically/culturally and religiously diverse country like Nigeria to institutionalize and practise a truly federal constitution/federalism, which main tenet is the recognition of multi-lingualism and the fact that neither the central (federal government) nor regional (state) government is subordinate to each other, but rather, the two are co-ordinate and independent (Wherea; 1959: *ibid*). It is the fact of our substituting unitary constitution for fed-

eralism that constitutes the genesis of our problem. As Awolowo's (1966) review of constitutional evolution of all countries of the world revealed inter-alia: "First, in any country where there are divergences of language and of nationality - particularly of language - a unitary constitution is always a source of bitterness and hostility on the part of linguistic or national minority groups. On the other hand, as soon as a federal constitution is introduced in which each linguistic or national group is recognised and accorded regional autonomy, any bitterness and hostility against the constitutional arrangements as such disappear. If the linguistic or national groups concerned are backward or too weak vis-à-vis the majority group or groups, their bitterness or hostility may be dormant or suppressed. But as soon as they become enlightened and politically conscious, and/or courageous leadership emerges amongst them, the bitterness and hostility come into the open, and remain sustained with all possible venom and rancour, until home rule is achieved".

To the discerning Itse Sagay (2001), Awolowo's statement was absolutely correct; it is even more accurate about today's Nigeria than the Nigeria of the '40s as inter-ethnic intolerance (I add religious intolerance and associated conflicts) which has become chronic, confirms that we are a country of many mutually distrustful nations, as is evident from the clashes we have experienced since the return of civil democratic rule in 1999. What is more to add than to underscore that the conflicts ravaging the nation are not isolated from the structure of the country and the way we currently practice or implement the federal constitution. In view of this, it could be stated emphatically that adoption and application of appropriate constitution (federal constitution that emphasizes fiscal federalism and secularism) is capable of mitigating the negative consequences of ethnic, cultural and religious diversities such as political instability and socio-economic under-development that Nigeria is faced with.

(b) What are the policies that are fuelling conflicts in Nigeria?

Figure 5.2: Existing policies that have fuelled or are fuelling conflicts experienced in Nigeria




Table 5.2: Policies that have fuelled/and are fuelling conflicts experienced in Nigeria

Policy	Yes	No
Federal character Principle	152 (24.1%)	478 (75.9%)
Indigenization policy	149 (23.7%)	481 (76.3%)
Land use act	61 (9.7%)	569 (90.3%)
Political zoning	296 (47.0%)	334 (53.0%)
National constitution	528 (83.8%)	102 (16.2%)
Others	10 (1.6%)	620 (98.4%)

In the above figure 5.2 and table 5.2, which are in furtherance of research question 1, respondents were asked to indicate if any of the listed parameters had fuelled or were fuelling the Nigeria’s perennial conflicts. A total of five parameters that included Federal character, Indigenisation policy, Land Use Act, Political zoning, and National consti-

tution were listed. The question was intended to show that these policies do not by themselves achieve set objectives but have to be complemented by the commitment of the implementers to achieving the set objectives. This is to say that no matter how good a policy, a system or a national constitution is, its effectiveness is fundamentally related to how it is implemented, operated or managed. It thus explains why same policy or system could achieve a better result in one place and a worse result in another place, or that the effectiveness or efficacy of a policy under one administration could vary substantially relative to another administration.

The result shows that a high proportion of the 630 respondents nationally believe that all the listed policies except national constitution 528 [(83.8%)] had not fuelled or contributed to fuelling conflicts in the country. For example, with respect to Federal Character principle [478 (75.9%)]; Indigenisation policy, [481 (76.3%)]; Land Use Act, [569 (90.3%)]; Political zoning, 334[(53.0%)]; and others, 620 [(98.4%)] respondents of the 630 surveyed said 'No' to any connection between the policies/parameters and the fuelling of conflicts in the country. The rejection of connection of these policies (with the exception of National Constitution) to fuelling conflicts was expected, because the policies were intended to strengthen the unity and ensure the security of the Nigerian federation as would be seen from the discussions that follow:

5.2.2 Interpretations of Responses to Questions on Policies that Fuel Conflicts

The interpretations of the seven policies indicated in figure 5.2 and Table 5.2 are contained in sections below, starting with federal character principle.

5.2.3 Federal Character Principle:

The federal character principle, which is also known as quota system or zoning policy, is intended to give every Nigerian equal access to opportunities in economic and political spheres. The principle is also designed as a vehicle for ensuring that no Nigerian is discriminated against in terms of employment as it serves as a safety-valve for equity & justice. By giving every region/zone equal representation in federal or regional/zonal/state appointments, the principle ensures that no region/zone/state or even ethnic group dominates others. To Orji (2008: 125), it is the quest for elite's consensus on how Nigeria should be governed to ensure political stability and fairness in the distribution of resources among the various ethnic groups that make up the country.

Agbodike, (1989:182) identified two applications of the principle-informal and formal. The informal application was concerned with legislative representation and equalization of inter-regional opportunities in education and appointments at the Federal level while the present formalised and institutionalised form, as enshrined in the 1979, 1989 and 1999 constitutions, virtually every sphere of federal, state and local governments' operations is involved and consequently politicised.

According to Nnoli (1996: 234), section 14(3) of the 1979 Constitution explains the responsibility of federal character in the following words:

“The composition of the Government of the federation or any of its agencies, shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies”.

The application of the principle was not without its snags or lapses. In what may amount to reverse discrimination, merit was often sacri-

ficed on the altar of the principle in the sense that more qualified Nigerians for government appointments are often by-passed in favour of less qualified ones, or the principle was being manipulated against the minority. In this regard Adeosun (2011) argued that the federal character principle has proved inadequate for effective national integration, because it discriminates against one group and favours another. However, on the whole, the principle had achieved its main objective of ensuring that there was no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in a government or any of its agencies. It is thus for this reason that 478 out of the 630 or 75.9% of respondents surveyed did not see any connection between the principle and the fuelling of conflicts in the country.

5.2.4 The Indigenisation Policy/Enterprises Promotion Act

The cardinal objective of the policy is to ensure national ownership, or that the management of Nigerian economy is vested in Nigerians. This view is corroborated by Akpotaire (2005) when he stated that the net effect of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, 1972; the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, 1977 and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (issue of Non-voting Equity Shares) Act, 1978 embodied in the Statutes was to encourage and enable Nigerians to have prioritized access to ownership, management, and control of the economy as against foreign investors who are permitted to play second fiddle in the same.

The Act is not without its strident critics and virulent criticisms. One important critic of the Act was Chinua Achebe who saw the Act as a post-civil war effort to punish his Igbo kinsmen. To Achebe (2012:234-235), “the chicanery of the entire scheme of course was quite evident. Having stripped a third of the Nigerian population of the means to acquire capital, the leaders of the government of Nigeria knew that the former Biafrans, by and large, would not have the financial muscle to participate in this plot. The end result, they hoped, would be a perma-

ment shifting of the balance of economic power from the East to other constituencies”. This assertion was, however, dismissed by General Gowon who was the Nigeria’s Head of State during the period when he opined “the Decree was really to ensure the participation of every part of the country, unlike the Privatisation Policy now in place” (Achebe: 2012; *ibid*).

In spite of Achebe’s misgivings about the Act, the Indigenisation Policy/Enterprises Promotion Act, as indicated by respondents, had not fuelled, neither is it fuelling conflicts in the country.

5.2.5 Land Use Act

The Land Use Act, 1978 vested all land in each state of the federation in the Governor of each state (except *land vested in the Federal Government or its agencies*). What Nigerians enjoy with respect to land are rights of occupancy. For instance, section 1 of the Act provides as follows: “Subject to the provisions of this Act, all land comprised in the territory of each state in the Federation are hereby vested in the Governor of that state and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of the Act” (Rasak: 2011). The purpose of the Act is to allow government easy and unhindered access to land whenever and wherever it is needed for developmental purposes. The Act was not intended to dispossess Nigerians of their land. This clarification was made by Nnaemeka Agu JSC (as he then was) in *Ogunleye v Oni* when he opined *inter-alia* that: “... The Land Use Act never set out to abolish all existing titles and rights to possession of land. Rather, when such rights or titles relate to developed lands in urban areas, the possessor or owner of that rights or titles is deemed to be a statutory grantee of a right of occupancy under section 34(2) of the Act. (Rasak; 2011) Similarly, Smith argued that “while section 1 vests the radical title on the land in every

State in the Governor of that State subject to the provision of the Act. The radical title as expressed above can be said to be the legal title to land which inheres in the Governor while the other less titles can be described as the equitable title which every Nigerian owns. Thus, while the previous legal title can be said to have been taken away, sections 34(2) and 36(2) of the Act preserve the equitable rights of possession, occupation and enjoyment of all previous owners of land be it in urban or rural areas”.

Where it is in non-urban land, the holder or owner customary law or otherwise is deemed to be a deemed grantee of a right of occupancy under the appropriate Local Government” (Rasak; *ibid*). Had this been otherwise, it is certain that respondents would have affirmed that the Act had fuelled or was fuelling conflicts in the country because it was not in the interest of owners of land. This explains the reason why 90.3% of respondents said the Act had not fuelled nor was it fuelling conflicts.

5.2.6 National Constitution

With respect to the views of the respondents on national constitution, it is apposite to state that, naturally, constitution being in the first instance the foundation for building a united, peaceful, strong and virile nation, should therefore not be a tool or factor of fuelling internal crises or conflicts. For instance, International IDEA (2004) opined *inter-alia*; “In the framework of political and institutional reforms, the design of constitutions can play a critical role in ensuring the advancement and the sustainability of democratic systems, by providing adequate mechanisms to manage conflicts within limits of peaceful coexistence and by promoting consensus around a set of core values. It opined further that constitutions are the core of the institutional structure/legal system of a country and define the relationship among citizens, between citizens and the State, and between the State and the international legal system”.

Expectedly, this was the thinking and expectations of 83.8% of the respondents who accepted the *national constitution- fuelling of conflicts nexus*. In practice, there is, indeed, a nexus that is based on the relevance, the appropriateness of and how the constitution is being operated. In other words, the nexus is constitution-specific. For instance, if a unitary constitution is being operated in a country with multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and/or religion, there is no way violent conflict or even civil war could be eschewed. It is for this reason that there was a consensus amongst respondents from both north and south or in the six geo-political zones that there was a correlation between current practice of federalism and perennial conflicts in the country. In essence, what we are saying is that a policy or system is as good as its relevance, its appropriateness, its mode of implementation and its implementers.

5.2.7 Political Zoning

This is an informal arrangement by political parties designed purposely to ensure that every part of the country has equal access to political power or position. This is intended to eschew monopolization of political power by a section of the country; thus engendering a sense of belonging. The National Constitutional Conference of 1994/95 came up with the six (6) geo-political zone-initiative as a solution to the problems arising from the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election by the by the Armed Forces Ruling Council, which created very serious political and inter-regional problems and, as a consequence, the fault-lines of differing identities across the country became suddenly sharpened and solidified. (Final Draft Report; 2014: 40) Because the recommended new 1995 constitution was not promulgated, the six geo-political zone-initiatives remained an informal arrangement.

5.2.8 A Policy or System is as Good as the Implementer: The Case of Political Zoning

We shall now attempt to use political zoning policy to illustrate our contention that a policy or system is as good as its relevance, appropriateness, the mode of implementation and the implementers. We recall that 53% of respondents rejected the notion that political zoning policy had fuelled conflicts while 47% of the respondents believed that the policy had fuelled conflict. It is the contention of this study that, without prejudice to 53% of the respondents that rejected the notion and those 47% respondents that believed in the correlation between political zoning and fuelling of conflicts, both protagonists and antagonists of the political zoning policy, had good reasons for their stand. This shall become clear later when we deal with the genesis and the *raison d'être* of political zoning arrangement; why it has become contentious or even become one of the causative factors of the current insurgency in the north.

The Political zoning policy or the six geo-political zone structure as earlier stated was a recommendation of the 1994/1995 National Conference. It could be regarded as a political engineering ingenuity that was designed to save the country from certain and sure disintegration following the annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential election by a military junta, headed by a Northerner. A Southerner won the election. The consensus amongst Nigerians, particularly Nigerians from the South, was that the Hausa-Fulani of the North did not want political power to shift to the South. In other words, the Hausa-Fulani wanted to monopolise political power and thus dominate other ethnic groups.

The intensification of the Southern demand for de-annulment and the possibility of armed struggles if the demand was not met, led to this ingenious political arrangement called political zoning. The North eventually agreed to let power shift to South. And in 1999, Olusegun

Obasanjo from the South-West became the president and the first beneficiary of political zoning.

At the conclusion of his (Olusegun Obasanjo) two terms in 2007, power returned to the north with Mr. Umaru Yar'adua becoming the president in 2007. But he became very sick and left the country for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on "medical vacation". The indisposition of the president created a national problem, as the North would not accept that the vice president become the Acting President. The National Assembly eventually resolved the political logjam by its application of *Doctrine of Necessity* and the Vice president became the Acting President. The *Doctrine of Necessity* requires that the National Assembly do what is necessary when faced with a situation that was not contemplated by the constitution (Adeniyi; 2011:221).

Upon the death of Umaru Yar'adua, the completion of the first term, the Acting President should have been allowed to complete the Second Term without opposition from the north, and by the demand of political zoning, presidency would then return to north in 2015. Unfortunately, right from the period of President Yar'adua's incapacitation early in his first term, political leadership from the North, using religion and un-mindful of the fact that the north had held the rein of political power more than the South, had strongly opposed and tended to make the country ungovernable for the Jonathan Administration.

The next question that should agitate the mind is: Why should President Jonathan seek re-election in 2015 in view of the subsisting political zoning arrangement or why should he not simply allow the presidency to shift back to the North by virtue of extant informal political zoning arrangement?

Now that President Jonathan has been nominated by his party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) to contest the 2015 Presidential election one may ask: on what moral ground would he be doing this? Will President Jonathan's decision to present himself for re-election in 2015

not amount to deliberate refusal to keep simple faith with a policy that could benefit the nation? The preceding scenario shows how a good policy or system could be made impotent for reasons that are, nonetheless, not altogether altruistic.

With respect to the preceding, it could be inferred that apart from adoption and application of the appropriate constitution, which is seen to directly influence political instability and socio-economic underdevelopment, the obvious bad faith in abiding with the provision of political zoning arrangement could somehow influence the stability of the polity.

5.2.9 Geographical Overview: Analyses of Responses to the Under-Listed Research Questions:

(a) Do the adoption and the current practice of federal constitution has any linkages with the conflicts in Nigeria?

Table 5.3 Views of respondents on whether the adoption and the current practice of federal constitution have any linkages with the conflicts in the nation (Geo-Political Zones)

Response	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
Strongly agree	13 (14.1%)	17 (21.0%)	15 (13.3%)	7 (9.0%)	14 (16.9%)	9 (8.7%)
Agree	23 (25%)	27 (33.3%)	31 (27.4%)	18 (23.1%)	26 (31.3%)	39 (37.5%)
Neutral	18 (19.6%)	10 (12.3%)	24 (21.2%)	16 (20.5%)	19 (22.9%)	27 (26%)
Disagree	30 (32.6%)	18 (22.2%)	29 (25.7%)	23 (29.5%)	16 (19.3%)	19 (18.3%)
Strongly disagree	8 (8.7%)	9 (11.1%)	14 (12.4%)	14 (17.9%)	8 (9.6%)	10 (9.6%)

According to Table 5.3, an average 43.3% of respondents across the six geo-political zones were positively disposed to the opinion that the adoption and the current practice of federal constitution have linkages

with conflicts ravaging the country. This was against the average of 36.1% of respondents across the six geo-political zones that were opposed to the insinuation that the adoption and current practice of federal constitution in the country have linkages with the series of conflicts that Nigeria is contending with. Meanwhile, 20.4% of the respondents held neutral positions vis-à-vis the question. Comparatively, on the average 44.7% of respondents from the North as against 42.2% from the South were favourably disposed to positive linkage between the adoption and current practice of federalism and perennial conflicts in Nigeria.

Invariably, the above evaluations suggest that there was a consensus amongst respondents from both north and south or in the six geo-political zones that there was a correlation between current practice of federalism and perennial conflicts in the country. Even, when the average of the geo-political zone percentile response of 43.3% was juxtaposed with the aggregate positive national percentile responses of 37.9%, we could in the final analysis conclude that there is positive correlation between conflicts, political instability, the adoption and current practice of federal constitution and the structure of the federating units.

(b) What are the policies that have fuelled/are fuelling the conflicts experienced?

Table 5.4 Policies that have fuelled/are fuelling the conflicts experienced (Geo-Political Zones)

Policy	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
Federal character	22 (18.8%)	25 (28.1%)	27 (22.7%)	16 (15.8%)	29 (29.9%)	33 (30.8%)
Indigenisation policy	21 (17.9%)	30 (33.7%)	37 (31.1%)	23 (22.8%)	24 (24.7%)	14 (13.1%)
Land use act	7 (6%)	12 (13.5%)	14 (11.8%)	11 (10.9%)	11 (11.3%)	6 (5.6%)
Political	11	26	22	10	13	20

zoning	(9.4%)	(29.2%)	(18.5%)	(9.9%)	(13.4%)	(18.7%)
National constitution	43 (36.8%)	68 (76.4%)	45 (37.8%)	44 (43.6%)	45 (46.4%)	51 (47.7%)

In furtherance of our evaluation of responses to research questions, respondents from each of the six geo-political zones were asked to indicate specific existing policies that were fuelling or that had fuelled conflicts experienced in the nation (research question 1). A total of five existing policies were listed (Federal character principle, Indigenisation policy, Land Use Act, Political zoning, and National constitution). The result (Table 5.4) shows that majority of respondents in all the geopolitical zones identified National Constitution as the most significant variable spurring the conflicts in the nation as indicated thus; [NC (36.8%), NE (76.4%), NW (37.8%), SE (43.6%), SS (46.4%), and SW (47.7%)]. This was followed by Federal Character with the following percentage of responses: [NC (18.8%), NE (28.1%), NW (22.7%), SE (15.8%), SS (29.9%), and SW (30.8%)]; indigenization policy with the percentages of response: [NC (17.9%), NE (33.7%), NW (31.1%), SE (22.8%), SS (24.7%), SW (13.1%)]. Relative to National Constitution, it could be seen from responses across the six geo-political zones that other policies such as Federal Character & Indigenization Policies, Land Use Act and Political Zoning were insignificant as conflict fuelling factors.

Again, as in the case of the ‘National overview’, there seems to be a strong popular opinion in support of the notion that the conflicts experienced in the nation are primarily influenced by the adoption and operation or practice of inappropriate national constitution. This opinion is most popular in the North-east geopolitical zone – a stance which could not be totally isolated from the high level of violence and insecurity presently being experienced by residents of the area. Also, policies such as Indigenisation policy and Federal character policy were also rated on a higher level (after national constitution), whereas the other policies

highlighted were not seen as significantly contributing to fuelling conflicts.

However, with respect to political zoning policy, it must be underscored that it was not political zoning policy per se that was fuelling conflicts but political leadership's insincerity and lack of faith in upholding or respecting that policy that was to blame. As we had explained earlier, political zoning policy was intended to give every part of Nigeria a sense of belonging by the assurance that no matter how long it takes, important political offices would be conceded to every zone in the country.

5.2.10 Qualitative Analysis

From qualitative data, the following central themes emerged:

- Impunity
- Corruption

Majority of respondents acknowledged that there were laws in Nigeria and those laws were adequate to improve the performance of the economy in order to ensure that basic needs of the average Nigerian were met, but there was little or no political will to implement or enforce these laws. As a consequence, there were huge masses of unemployed; of the impoverished and of the disgruntled that could be mobilised for sinister motive. From the analysis, there seemed to be vicious cycle of corruption and impunity. Impunity seems to breed corruption and corruption leads to more impunity. According to them, this cycle had ensured that Nigeria remains politically unstable and economically underdeveloped.

A typical case cited was the Boko Haram issue. Key respondents argued that just because the early excesses and extremism of few of Boko Haram members were not sanctioned or punished to serve as deterrence, Boko Haram insurgents had gained strength and had continued to inflict

more harm on the populace of the North east cities with reckless abandon.

There was also an argument to the effect that because corruption had been institutionalized, illicit arms continued to pass through our borders to arm these terrorist groups, and because military personnel and intelligence were being compromised, Boko Haram armed members were able to ambush or stage surprise attacks on troops easily and constantly. The resultant effect of the sad development was that people were gradually losing confidence in the ability of military to crush the insurgency or protect them. This had led, several times, to the breakdown of law and order. The fight against the insurgency had become difficult because the average citizen was reluctant to give intelligence information because of fear for his personal safety.

From their conversations it was clear that there was a significant relationship between adoption and application of our existing laws and the negative consequences of ethnic, cultural and religious diversities.

5.2.11 Conclusions for Research Question 1

From the analysed responses in respect of research question 1, it could be concluded that there was a correlation between current practice of federalism and perennial conflicts in the country. Furthermore, with respect to acceptance/rejection of national policies- fuelling of conflicts nexus, the conclusion that could be drawn from it was that a policy or system is as good as its relevance, its appropriateness, its mode of implementation and its implementers.

5.3 Research Question 2

Could it be assumed that sustainable political stability and development in a diverse society is a function of institutional frameworks, to wit the

political system/regime-type, political leadership and relevant constitution in operation in that country?

The intention of the above question is to explore the validity of the assumption that it is the functional failures of variables such as the political system/regime type (i.e. democratic, autocratic, unitary, theocratic or monarchical political system) and the constitution in operation but not ethnic/cultural or religious diversity per se that have led to conflict in countries with such diversity problem.


In evaluating whether sustainable political stability and development in a country with ethnic/cultural and religious diversity is a function of institutional framework, respondents were requested to respond to questions on political system/regime-type, constitution, political leadership, political stability and development. The responses were analysed on National and Geopolitical level bases.

5.3.1 National Overview: Analysis of responses to the Under-Listed Research Questions

(a) Do you know of countries that have diverse ethno-cultural and religious configurations but are relatively peaceful and the type of constitution adopted in those countries?

With regard to the question on acquaintance with countries that have diverse ethno-cultural and religious configurations but are relatively peaceful and the type of constitution and political system/regime type, adopted in those countries, figure 5.3 shows that of the 67.3% of positive or 'yes' responses, 38.3% of these 'yes' respondents (constituting the majority) identified federal constitution/federal system as the constitution in operation in those countries, while 7.1% of respondents were also aware of such countries but they did not know the type of constitution or political system/regime-type in those countries.

Figure 5.3: Political system/Regime-Type and Constitution



Meanwhile, 4.4% of respondents indicated that such countries adopted unitary constitution/system. With respect to political system/regime-type in practice in those countries, the following political system/regime-type stood out:

1. Presidential system (8.4%)
2. Parliamentary system (4.3%)
3. Military system (3.3%)
4. Monarchical system (1.4%)

It is generally acknowledged world-wide that, historically, both presidential and parliamentary systems are recognised to align with democracy or to have democratic outlook and are more suited to federal constitution/system, which thrives on devolution and separation of powers. These attributes are, however, in contrast with military and monarchical systems, which are usually autocratic, despotic and over-concentrated political power in individuals, and are thus amenable to unitary constitution/system.


It should be noted that 15.2% of respondents stated that they were unaware of countries with ethno-religious diversity that were relatively peaceful, while 16.8% of respondents did not respond to the question.

Of immense interest to this study, are the proportions/ratios of respondents that identified federal constitution/system (38.3%) as the constitution in operation in countries with ethnic, cultural and religious diversity that are peaceful and the 4.4% of respondents that identified unitary constitution/system. The wide margins between the two categories of respondents and constitutions they identified which implies that more Nigerians acknowledge the place of federal constitution/system in dealing adequately with our diversity problems, which obviously are not unconnected or unrelated to Nigeria's political instability, underdevelopment and non-realisation of its potential. In other words, the unitary constitution or unitary system of governance/over-centralised governance system as currently obtained in Nigeria predisposes it to political instability.

The above analyses suggest that, from the list of specific constitutions indicated by respondents, federal constitution should have the ability to mitigate the crisis springing up as a result of on ethno-cultural and religious diversities.

- (b) How has the current practice of federal constitution in Nigeria helped in stabilizing the country in spite of its ethno-cultural and religious diversities?

Figure 5.4: Degree of stability experienced in Nigeria due to the current practice of federalism



With regard to question on the degree of Nigeria’s stability due to the current practice of federal constitution, or how the current practice of federal constitution or federalism in Nigeria had helped in stabilizing the country in spite of its heterogeneity, Figure 5.4 shows how respondents relate to the question. The result showed that 17.8% of respondents nation-wide were of the views that federalism as currently practiced in Nigeria had given rise to very stable situation in the country. This was against 53.2% of respondents who believed that the current practice of federal constitution/federalism in the country had helped to destabilize the country. In other words, the current practice of federalism or the federal constitution as currently practised in Nigeria had ensured a high degree of instability in the country. The outcome was in keeping with the global consensus that the over-concentration of power at the centre as currently obtained in Nigeria does not accommodate nor align with heterogeneity of the country, and is not in tune with the dictates of true federal constitution which does not consider the federating units as subordinates of central authority but as coordinates. In other words, the unitary system of governance/over-centralised governance system as currently obtained in Nigeria predisposes it to political instability

- (c) As a Nigerian citizen, do you feel that diversity in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion has anything to do with Nigeria’s developmental challenges?

Figure 5.5: Response on whether ethno-cultural and religious diversities are a part of Nigeria’s developmental challenges




Figure 5.5 depicts respondents’ dispositions to questions on if Nigeria’s diversities in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion have (a) anything to do with Nigeria’s developmental challenges. The response showed that majority of respondents (64.6%) indicated in the affirmative that the developmental challenges of the country were somewhat remotely linked to the existing ethnic, cultural and religious differences amongst the citizens. This was in contrast to 20.5% of the respondents who expressed contrary opinion. Remotely linked in the sense that it is the lack of political will on the part of the country’s political leadership to adopt and practise that relevant constitution (as it ought to be practised) to take care of negative features of the diversity that is responsible for the developmental challenges faced by the country. That relevant constitution has been acknowledged by respondents as federal constitution in name and practice. For instance as shown in figure 5.3, highest

38.3% of respondents indicated that they were aware that countries with diverse ethno-religious configurations that are relatively peaceful operate federal constitution.

- (d) As a Nigerian citizen, do you feel that diversities in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion are the root causes of Nigeria’s developmental challenges?

Figure 5.6: Response on whether ethno-cultural and religious diversities are the root causes of Nigeria’s developmental challenges




Figure 5.6 shows the response to question on whether ethno-cultural and religious diversities are the root causes of the nation’s developmental challenges. The result indicated that 50% of respondents were of the views that Nigeria’s ethno-cultural and religious diversities were the root causes of its developmental challenges, whilst 31.8% rejected the suggestions of linkage between ethno-cultural and religious diversities and the nation’s developmental challenges.

However, the study believes that the respondents’ indications of a positive correlation between ethnic/cultural and religious diversity and developmental challenges should have been qualified with the fact that it was the absence of adequate institutional frameworks such as relevant constitution and governance system, which play a vital role in harness-

ing these diversities to positively contribute to national stability, thus negating their potentialities to constitute the root of the nation's developmental challenges. This means that once the diversities are harnessed positively through the adoption and operation of relevant constitution (federal constitution), these developmental challenges are also frontally addressed.

A juxtaposition of the differentials in opinions on the issues of (a) diversities having anything to do with developmental challenges with (b) its being the root cause show a significant conviction that the existing diversities were regarded more to be a part of the nation's developmental challenges rather than its being the root cause. Thus, it could be implied from the opinions of respondents that ethno-cultural and religious diversities are a part of the reasons for our development challenges; howbeit they don't constitute the very core of the causes of these challenges.

5.3.5 Geographical Overview: Analyses of Responses to the Under-Listed Research Questions

(a) Do you know of countries that have diverse ethno-cultural and religious configurations but are relatively peaceful and the type of constitution adopted in those countries?

Table 5.5: Type of constitution and governance system adopted in other countries having ethno-cultural and religious diversities (Evaluation on Geo-Political Zone basis)

Responses	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
I don't know any	50 (54.3%)	45 (57.7%)	48 (44.9%)	25 (31.6%)	43 (53.8%)	30 (34.1%)
Yes, federal constitution	12 (13.0%)	11 (14.1%)	16 (15%)	26 (32.9%)	6 (7.5%)	25 (28.4%)
Yes, unitary consti-	4	3	5	6	6	4

tution	(4.3%)	(3.8%)	(4.7%)	(7.6%)	(7.5%)	(4.5%)
Yes, military system	0 (0%)	1 (1.3%)	5 (4.7%)	1 (1.3%)	8 (10%)	6 (6.8%)
Yes, monarchical system	3 (3.3%)	2 (2.6%)	2 (1.9%)	1 (1.3%)	1 (1.3%)	0 (0%)
Yes, presidential system	6 (6.5%)	5 (6.4%)	13 (12.1%)	11 (13.9%)	5 (6.3%)	13 (14.8%)
Yes, parliamentary system	3 (3.3%)	4 (5.1%)	4 (3.7%)	6 (7.6%)	7 (8.8%)	3 (3.4%)
Yes I know, but no idea	13 (14.1%)	6 (7.7%)	13 (12.1%)	3 (3.8%)	4 (5%)	7 (7.9%)
Others	1 (1.1%)	1 (1.3%)	1 (0.9%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.1%)

From the following data [NC (54.3%); NE (57.7%); NW (44.9%); SE (31.6%); SS (53.8%); and SW (34.1%)] in Table 5.5 above, it is apparent that an average of 46.1% of respondents across the six geopolitical zones indicated that they did not know of any country that has remained relatively peaceful irrespective of diversity in the ethno-cultural and religious landscape of the country. Meanwhile, an average of 18.5% of respondents across the six geo-political zones who claim to know of countries in which such a situation exists readily identified the practice a federal constitution with such countries. This was against an average of 5.4% of respondents who identified unitary constitution with such countries. An extrapolation from these analyses is that the adoption and implementation of a truly federal constitution along with presidential or parliamentary system of government could likely be a practical solution to crisis-ridden multi-cultural, ethnic, and religious countries such as Nigeria.

- (b) What is the degree of instability experienced in Nigeria due to its current practice of federalism?

Table 5.6: Degree of instability experienced in Nigeria due to its current practice of federalism (Evaluation on geopolitical zone basis)

Response	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
Very unstable	10 (9.5%)	5 (4.3%)	5 (5.8%)	8 (10%)	9 (9.5%)	6 (6.9%)
Unstable	52 (49.6%)	55 (47.8%)	28 (32.6%)	43 (44.7%)	68 (71.6%)	59 (67.8%)
Neutral	21 (20%)	27 (23.5%)	1 (1.1%)	14 (17.5%)	12 (12.6%)	11 (12.6%)
Stable	19 (18.1%)	22 (19.1%)	36 (41.9%)	8 (10%)	13 (13.7%)	7 (8%)
Very stable	3 (2.9%)	6 (5.2%)	16 (18.6%)	7 (8.8%)	6 (6.3%)	4 (4.6%)

Findings, according to Table 5.6 above, showed that an average of 60% of respondents across the six geopolitical zones were of the opinion that the currently practised of practised federal constitution (unitary constitution) in Nigeria had aided in destabilizing the country. This is to be expected in a country that is ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse but which governance system (unitary system), in contradistinction to the dictates of federal constitution/federalism, concentrates more power on the central government to the disadvantage of the federating units and also promotes one ethnic group or religion over the others. In such a context, instability is a natural consequence of ethnic domination of political power in a country with diversity attribute, or of a state that by act of commission disregards the secularism provision of the federal Constitution by not only intruding into religious matters but by also promoting one religion over the other. On the other hand, the result showed that relatively smaller proportion of respondents (at an average of 26.2%) across the six zones believed that federalism as currently practised in Nigeria had helped to stabilise the country.

The result further showed that 74.7% of respondents from the South-West zone affirmed the historical stand of the zone on the positive correlation between the practice true federal constitution including fiscal

federalism and national stability. The region/zone's political leaders had been in the forefront of those clamouring for true federalism as opposed to the pseudo federalism currently in practice in the country.

Interestingly but not unexpectedly, 60.5% of respondents of the North-west zone, a zone considered as the bastion of opposition to true federalism including fiscal federalism and secularism, believed that the current practice of federalism in Nigeria had stabilised the country.

- (c) As a Nigerian citizen, do you feel that diversity in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion has anything to do with Nigeria's developmental challenges?

Table 5.7: Showing (a) Diversity as part of the causes of Developmental Challenges, and (b) Diversity as the root cause of Developmental Challenges of Nigeria

	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
(a) Diversities as a part of the causes						
Strongly agree	23 (21.7%)	22 (23.4%)	27 (24.3%)	25 (29.1%)	25 (28.1%)	38 (32.5%)
Agree	37 (34.9%)	42 (44.7%)	38 (34.2%)	41 (47.7%)	44 (49.4%)	45 (38.5%)
Neutral	13 (12.3%)	8 (8.5%)	16 (14.4%)	11 (12.8%)	7 (7.9%)	12 (10.3%)
Disagree	24 (22.6%)	18 (19.1%)	28 (25.2%)	5 (5.6%)	8 (8.5%)	19 (16.2%)
Strongly disagree	9 (8.5%)	4 (4.3%)	2 (1.8%)	4 (4.7%)	5 (5.6%)	3 (2.6%)
(b) Diversities as root cause						
Strongly agree	8 (8.3%)	8 (8.3%)	22 (20.4%)	17 (19.8%)	17 (19.3%)	27 (22.9%)
Agree	34 (32.7%)	38 (39.6%)	25 (23.1%)	31 (36.0%)	46 (40.0%)	42 (44.7%)
Neutral	13 (12.5%)	9 (9.4%)	20 (18.5%)	19 (22.1%)	11 (12.3%)	17 (14.4%)
Disagree	40 (38.5%)	31 (32.3%)	36 (33.3%)	14 (16.3%)	14 (15.9%)	26 (22%)
Strongly disagree	9 (8.7%)	10 (10.4%)	5 (4.6%)	5 (5.8%)	4 (4.5%)	6 (5.1%)

Results of data analysis in Table 5.7(a) showed that there was a general consensus amongst majority of respondents across the six geopolitical zones that ethno-cultural and religious diversities played a role in the developmental challenges Nigeria is faced with. This position is attested to by more than 50% of respondents in each geopolitical zone with a slightly higher proportions from the North-West (58.5%) and significantly higher proportions from North-East (68.1%), South-West (71.0%), South-South (77.5%) and South-East (76.8%). These findings are in accord with the requirement that in a multi-ethnic/culture or multi-religious society the practice of unitary constitution, which the current pseudo-federal constitution currently in practice in Nigeria symbolizes, is a recipe for acrimony, disorder, disharmonious inter-ethnic relationships and political instability in the country. In other words, in a country with diversities, a truly federal constitution is the panacea for the negative attributes of diversities.

However, from the perspective of whether these diversities could be considered as the root cause of these conflicts cum developmental challenges, response patterns seem to vary across the geopolitical zones (see Table 5.7(b)). While there were relatively significant popular opinions in the South-West (67.6%), South-South (57.3%), and South-East (55.8%) that diversities were the root causes of the challenges faced by the country, the reverse obtains in North-Central (41.0%), North-East (47.9%) and North-West (43.5%), with respondents in these northern geopolitical zones believing that these diversities were not the root causes of the challenges faced by the country.

5.3.8 Qualitative Analysis

From qualitative data, the following central themes emerged:

- Rule of law
- Foreign Countries

- Equality
- Religion and Morality
- Pre-colonial or African Way of Governance

Majority of the respondents made mention of countries like Ghana and United States where law was supreme. Although many seemed not to understand the characteristics of constitution in details, they nonetheless knew that if a society had relevant and fair laws in place and rule of law obtains in such society there would be relative peace and progress. One respondent from the North Central zone referred to the pre-colonial times to illustrate this point. According to him, in the pre-colonial time there were various clans that were under the headship of a chief. These communities had laws and the enforcement of these laws was key factors of peace and prosperity during the period.

Some older respondents even suggested going back to what they termed the "African way of governance". For them the "African way of governance" seemed to be more peaceful and progressive than the present situation in Nigeria. Most believe Africans are capable of governing themselves without having to totally adopt the governance style of the countries of the West.

There was also emphasis on equality before law. Most respondents had a firm belief that if no one were above the law, we would have peaceful and progressive societies. One respondent in the South West referred to Lagos as a 'mini-Nigeria' because it is home to diverse ethnic group and religion. According to him the Lagos State Government had built strong institutions. The governor though a Muslim, enjoys support of many Christians. He argued that there is a sustainable development-taking place in Lagos because of the existence of these strong institutional frameworks, and the emphasis on equality before the law, accountability and patriotism.

What we can deduce from the preceding is that sustainable political stability is achievable provided the necessary institutional frameworks are not only in place, they are implemented and protected.

5.3.9 Conclusions for Research Question 2

The conclusions we could draw from research question 2 are: in view of the correlation between developmental challenges and ethno-religious diversities, institutional frameworks are necessary veritable and potent tools for addressing the challenges and for positively harnessing these diversities for political stability. The fact that ethno-cultural and religious diversities constitute a part of the reasons for our developmental challenges is enough reason for the political leadership to summon enough courage to operate and practise a truly federal constitution, which had been acknowledged to have the ability to mitigate ethno-cultural and religious diversity crises or conflicts. This means that unitary constitution or over-concentration of power at the centre or in the central government should be acknowledged as the factor causing conflicts and instability in heterogeneous countries.

It is apposite to note respondents' unarguable characterisation of Lagos state as a mini- Nigeria and a melting pot of cultures. It should be noted also that Lagos state is one of the six states in the Yoruba South-west geo-political zone of Nigeria. It would be helpful if we could advance reasons for how other states of Nigeria's federation could be modelled after Lagos state. We know that Lagos state is predominantly Yoruba- one of the three majority ethnic groups. We are also aware that one of the great cultural attributes of the Yoruba vis-à-vis other ethnic groups is their culture of tolerance that is founded on democratic ethos and is reflected on their socio-politico and economic outlook, which can be correctly described as integrationist. The integrationist policy outlook recognizes and acknowledges the intrinsic values of other cultures and

facilitates the voluntary inflow of people, trade and commerce, investment/ industrial activity from other states of the federation to Lagos state or the entire southwest geo-political zone. In other words, as a result of this policy or culture, the best in human and material resources is made available to Lagos state or the southwest zone for developmental purposes. Thus it could not be gain-said the fact that when you tolerate other cultures or other ethnic groups they will voluntarily channel their energies toward you, your cause or in this context contribute their quota in the developmental task of the state. This is in contradistinction to the exclusionist policy that obtains in the core-northern states and cities of the Hausa/Fulani (Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi etc.) where there is an established “separate but unequal policy”, exemplified by institutionalized “Sabon Gari and walled city” that is aimed at preventing inter-ethnic intercourse. By this measure, Nigerians are treated as strangers in the core north (Northwest, Northeast of the Hausa/Fulani). Under such policy, mutual trust is replaced by mutual suspicion and antagonism and poor neighbourliness. So, unlike Lagos State, it would be a herculean task to tap into the expertise of the so-called strangers or draw the best from them for your developmental needs.

However, it is important that we emphasize the need for not only tolerating but for respecting the cultures of others. Furthermore, it is essential that Nigerians including its leadership realises the importance of understanding the dynamics of social relationships. There is no place for condescension; or assumption that one culture is superior to others.

In conclusion, it must be underscored that beyond the institutional framework, what gives Lagos state its enviable status is the Yoruba culture of tolerance and the humility to recognize the goodness in other cultures and tap them for its development. Other states outside of the Yoruba states should strive to emulate these qualities if they are aspiring to become a melting pot like Lagos or any of the Yoruba states.

5.4 Research Question 3:

Could the adoption and operation of a truly federal constitution that includes provisions on fiscal federalism and secularism resolve Nigeria's multifarious challenges and perennial conflicts?

In order to evaluate and get a better understanding of question 3 by respondents, other related questions were derived from this basic question. The derived questions or the variants of research question 3 are:


1. Do you agree that the federal constitution as currently practiced in Nigeria has implications for the crisis rocking the country?
2. Could a well-implemented and truly federal constitution solve country's problems?
3. How will devolution of powers to the states affect different sectors of the nation?

The responses to these derived questions were analysed on National level basis (analysis of responses to the questions were aggregated) and Geopolitical level basis (analysis of responses were disaggregated along respondents' geopolitical zones).

5.4.1 National Overview: Analysis of Responses to Under-Listed Research Questions:


- (a) Do you agree that the federal constitution as currently practiced in Nigeria has implications for the crisis rocking the country?

Figure 5.7: Respondents' views on the implication of the federal constitution as currently practiced for the crisis rocking the country



(b) Could a well-implemented and truly federal constitution solve country's problems?

Figure 5.8: Respondents' views on whether a well-implemented truly federal constitution can solve country's problems



In figure 5.7 preceding the above, respondents were asked if they agreed that the federal constitution as currently practiced in Nigeria has implications for the crisis rocking the country, while in figure 5.8 also above, respondents' views on whether a well-implemented constitution

could solve the country's problems were sought. With respect to the first question, which results were shown in figure 5.7, 44.8% of the respondents agreed that federal constitution as currently practiced in Nigeria had had implications for the crisis rocking the country, as against 30.5% who disagreed with the suggestion of correlation between how we currently operate the federal constitution and our problems of nation-building. Of the remaining respondents, 19.2% were neutral while there were no responses from 5.6%. On the other hand and with respect to the results in figure 5.8, 60.0%, of respondents were in support of the views that there are positive relationships between a well-implemented federal constitution and resolution of our national problems.

The implications of the positive responses to the above two questions are: (1) Nigeria is currently operating or practicing unitary constitution in view of its over-centralised governance system or over-concentration of power at the centre, which is in contravention of one of the dictates of federal constitution with respect to countries with multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion; (2) that the do-or-die politics prevalent in the country stems from the over-concentration of power at the centre and the desire to acquire it by all means on the behalf of ethnic, sectional, religious or regional interest; (3) that Nigeria's retarded growth and development could be attributed to the pseudo-federal constitution in operation in the country, and (4).that the operation of a truly federal constitution could be the magic wand for solving Nigeria's multifarious problems only if the provisions of that federal constitution are obeyed to the letter-this is the meaning of a well-implemented federal constitution.

Table 5.8: Respondents' views on the implications of current practice or implementation of the federal constitution on the crises experienced in the nation

Response	(a) Constitution as currently practiced has implication for national crises	(b) A truly federal constitution, if well-implemented can solve problems
Strongly agree	83 (13.2%)	171 (27.1%)
Agree	199 (31.6%)	207 (32.9%)
Neutral	121 (19.2%)	100 (15.9%)
Disagree	157 (24.9%)	95 (15.1%)
Strongly disagree	35 (5.6%)	23 (3.7%)
NR	35 (5.6%)	34 (5.4%)

Result in Table 5.8(a) showed that, of the 630 respondents surveyed, a total of 282 (44.8%) were in agreement with the notion that the way the Nigerian constitution is currently practiced has implications for the crisis rocking the country. This was against 192 (30.5%) of the respondents who disagreed with the insinuation that the way we currently practised federal constitution in the country had implications for the series of ethno-religious conflicts and other challenges the country is facing. However, 35 (5.6%) of respondents did not respond while 121 (19.2%) maintained a neutral stance.

Given that majority of respondents (44.8%) believed that the way we currently practised federal constitution in Nigeria had implications for the crises in the country, as against 30.5% of respondents who thought otherwise, then we could conclude that the majority positive response represents a clarion call on the political leadership to take urgent steps to adopt and practise a truly federal constitution that will encompass fiscal federalism and devolve more power to the federating units

Similarly, result in Table 5.8(b) showed that of the 630 respondents surveyed, a total of 378 (60.0%) were of the views that a truly federal constitution if well implemented could solve the problem experienced in the nation. This view was however opposed by 118 (18.8%) respondents who thought that the nation’s problems and their solutions had no link with how well the constitution was implemented. Meanwhile, 100 respondents (15.9%) were neutral while 34 respondents (5.4%) did not indicate any specific response.

We could deduce from the responses that majority of respondents were positively disposed to the suggestion that a well implemented federal constitution could well be the much sought-after panacea for the nation’s multifarious problems. Expectedly, there were still respondents who objected to the idea that a federal constitution (even if well implemented) would solve our problems of nation building.

(d) How will devolution of powers to the states affect different sectors of the nation?

Figure 5.9: Effect of true federalism including fiscal federalism and devolution of power on different sectors of the nation




Figure 5.9 above shows questions 29 to 37 that deal with devolution of power. Respondents were requested to indicate YES/NO in response to the questions which key is indicated in Table 5.9 here-under:

Table 5.9 Key to Questions on Devolution of Power

Key	Questions
<i>Do you think devolution of powers to states will:</i>	
Q29	Lead to unnecessary duplication and waste of resources?
Q30	Lead to mutually destructive policies?
Q31	Discourage accountability in government?
Q32	Lead to promotion of trade and economic development?
Q33	Lead to decline in growth and economic development?
Q34	Lead to promotion of acceptance of diversity?
Q35	Lead to increase in tolerance?
Q36	Make allowance for greater local level or grassroots participation in governance?
Q37	Lead to unity and stability in diversity?

Figure 5.9 and Table 5.9 reflect questions on devolution of power to the states, and are also adjuncts to research question 3. Their objective is to further elucidate on the research question, particularly in respect of the devolution of power. To that end, respondents were asked to respond to 9 questions by indicating “Yes” or “No” The questions were intended to measure the effect of the practice of true federalism including fiscal federalism and devolution of power on resource management and political stability. The questions are as follows: Do you think devolution of power will; lead to unnecessary duplication and waste of resources (Q29); lead to mutually destructive policies (Q30); discourage accountability in government (Q31); lead to promotion of trade and economic development (Q32); lead to decline in economic growth and development (Q33); lead to promotion of unity and acceptance of diversity

(Q34); lead to increase in tolerance (Q35); make allowance for greater local level or grassroots participation roots participation in government (Q36) and lead to unity and stability in diversity (Q37).

An overview of the findings from Figure 5.9 and Table 5.9 shows that majority of respondents believed that the practice of true federalism including, particularly the devolution of power would have positive effect on the political landscape, national stability and resource management by cutting down or eliminating unnecessary duplication and waste of resources [Q29 (54.4%)]; by evolving mutually beneficial policies [Q30 (57.5%)]; by promoting accountability in government [Q31 (54.6%)]; by promoting trade and economic development [Q32 (64.3%)]; by enhancing growth and development [Q33 (64.2%)].

Respondents further indicated their support for the notion that devolution of power would have positive effects on the polity: by promoting and accepting Nigeria's diversity [Q34 (61.0%)]; by embracing religious tolerance as one of the necessary conditions for promoting peace amongst adherents of the nation's two received religions [Q35 (59.2%)]; by ensuring or even encouraging grassroots participation in governance in order to promote development at local level [Q36 (70.2%)], and by acknowledging that the essence of devolution of power is the insurance of unity and stability in diversity [Q37 (62.9%)]. The general deduction that could be made from the above positive responses to the various questions on devolution of power is that a truly federal constitution that devolves more power to the federating units is efficacious in addressing most of diversity-induced problems of Nigeria because it takes due cognizance of Nigeria's heterogeneity as well as mediates the potential and actual conflicts that often arise from the heterogeneity of a political entity. By this, a truly federal constitution promotes national growth and development. In addition, federalism gives the federating units a sense of belonging and autonomy including financial independence which affords each level of government the opportunity of performing their

functions without let or hindrance, or without depending on or appealing to the others for financial assistance. It also permits the federating units to develop according to their pace, while allowing for healthy competition and innovativeness amongst the federating units.

The implications of all these are that it will reduce, if not wipe out the current high incidence of ethno-religious conflicts, it will ensure political stability and will elicit investors' confidence in the economy. With investors streaming into the country, Nigeria will be set on the path of sustainable growth and development which, without doubts, will impact positively on all sectors of Nigeria's economy. The important outcome of this scenario is that the army of unemployed, the disgruntled and the marginalised would be wiped out or reduced drastically, thereby blocking the very source(s) of foot soldiers for insurgency.

5.4.2 Geopolitical Overview: Analyses of Responses to Under-Listed Research Questions

- (a) Do you agree that the Nigerian constitution as currently practiced has implications for the crises rocking the country?

Table 5.10 Respondents' views on the effect of practice/proper implementation of federal constitution on the crises experienced in the nation (Geo-Political Zones)

Response	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
(a) Does the federal constitution as currently practised in Nigeria have implication for crises in the country?						
Strongly agree	17 (15.3%)	20 (23%)	17 (14.5%)	12 (14.5%)	9 (9.4%)	8 (7.9%)
Agree	35 (31.5%)	36 (41.4%)	40 (34.2%)	22 (26.5%)	30 (31.3%)	36 (35.6%)
Neutral	23 (20.7%)	9 (10.3%)	20 (17.1%)	17 (20.5%)	29 (30.2%)	23 (22.8%)

Disagree	31 (27.9%)	18 (20.7%)	30 (25.6%)	24 (28.9%)	23 (24%)	31 (30.7%)
Strongly disagree	5 (4.5%)	4 (4.6%)	10 (8.5%)	8 (9.6%)	5 (5.2%)	3 (3%)
(b) Could a true federal constitution, if well implemented solve Nigeria's Developmental problems?						
Strongly agree	35 (32.4%)	30 (33.7%)	35 (29.9%)	24 (28.9%)	29 (30.5%)	18 (17.3%)
Agree	36 (33.3%)	32 (36%)	35 (29.9%)	20 (24.1%)	39 (41.1%)	45 (43.3%)
Neutral	19 (17.6%)	13 (14.6%)	18 (15.4%)	20 (24.1%)	11 (11.6%)	19 (18.3%)
Disagree	15 (13.9%)	11 (12.4%)	25 (21.4%)	10 (12%)	16 (16.8%)	18 (17.3%)
Strongly disagree	3 (2.8%)	3 (3.4%)	4 (3.4%)	9 (10.8%)	0 (0%)	4 (3.8%)

From the Table 5.10(a) above, it was found that a higher proportion of respondents in all the zones [i.e. NC (46.8%), NE (64.4%), NW (48.7%), SE (41.0%), SS (40.6%) and SW (43.6%)] were in support of the notion that the way the constitution was currently practiced had implications for the crises rocking Nigerian nation. This was in contrast with respondents across [i.e. NC (32.4%), NE (25.3%), NW (34.1%), SE (38.5%), SS (29.2%) and SW (33.7%)] who disagreed. On the average, however, 47.5% of respondents across the six (6) geo-political zones affirmed a positive correlation between the current practice of federal constitution and the crises ravaging the country. This was against the average of 32.2% of respondents across same geo-political zones who disagreed with the notion. Therefore, comparatively, we could conclude that more people were in support of the suggestion that the way we currently practised federal constitution had implications for the crises in the country (Table 5.10a). Meanwhile, the fact that more respondents (64.4%) in the North-east geo-political zone were in agreement with the notion, was suggestive that the insurgency going on in that part of Nigeria had a lot to do with the pseudo federalism or unitary constitution Nigeria is practicing.

With regard to question in Table 5.10 (b), which asked respondents to indicate if a well-implemented federal constitution could solve the nation's problems, a vast majority of respondents in all geopolitical zones [i.e. NC (65.7%), NE (69.7%), NW (59.8%), SE (53.0%), SS (71.6%) and SW (60.6%)] were in support of the notion that a well-implemented constitution could solve the nation's problems. In a way, the respondents were saying that if the federal constitution were well implemented, the nation would be rid of crises associated with diversity. Thus, we could deduce from the high proportion of respondents in favour of the question that there was a general consensus that a well-implemented federal constitution could serve as a panacea for the diverse crises being experienced in the nation and could be the magic wand for solving our socio-economic and political problems.

- (b) How will devolution of powers to the states affect different sectors of the nation?

Table 5.11: Effect of true federalism that embraces devolution of power on the nation

Response	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
Q29	62 (53.0%)	36 (40.4%)	64 (53.8%)	36 (35.6%)	39 (40.2%)	50 (46.7%)
Q30	54 (46.2%)	34 (38.2%)	44 (37.0%)	41 (40.6%)	40 (41.2%)	55 (51.4%)
Q31	46 (39.3%)	40 (44.9%)	64 (53.8%)	44 (43.6%)	37 (38.1%)	55 (51.4%)
Q32	77 (65.8%)	64 (71.9%)	87 (73.1%)	52 (51.5%)	71 (73.2%)	54 (50.5%)
Q33	48 (41.0%)	45 (50.6%)	33 (27.7%)	43 (42.6%)	27 (27.8%)	30 (28.0%)
Q34	75 (64.1%)	65 (73.0%)	78 (65.5%)	52 (51.5%)	65 (67.0%)	49 (45.8%)
Q35	69 (59.0%)	64 (71.9%)	73 (61.3%)	46 (45.5%)	64 (66.0%)	57 (53.3%)

Q36	76 (65.0%)	66 (74.2%)	86 (72.3%)	51 (50.5%)	80 (82.5%)	83 (77.6%)
Q37	77 (65.8%)	65 (73.0%)	73 (61.3%)	48 (47.5%)	70 (72.2%)	63 (58.9%)

In furtherance of our evaluation of research question 3 and responses to the nine (9) questions on devolution of power, respondents from the six (6) geo-political zones were asked to respond to the same nine (9) questions on the effect of devolution of power on different sectors of the nation. As stated earlier, the key to these nine questions on devolution of power is in Table 5.9.

Result in Table 5.11 above shows respondents’ dispositions to the identified nine questions vis-à-vis true federalism including the devolution of power. A general assessment showed that a significant proportion of respondents in each of the six geopolitical zones were positively disposed to those questions. In other words, the respondents answered in the affirmative the nine questions. The average of the percentile responses to the nine (9) questions for the six (6) geo-political zones are: on efficient resource management by cutting down or pruning unnecessary duplication and waste of resources [Q29 (54.4%)], on institutionalizing mutually beneficial government policies [Q30 (57.5%)], on accountability in government [Q31 (54.6%)]; on trade and development [Q32 (64.3%)]; on growth and development [Q33 (64.1%)]; on the promotion and acceptance of diversity as a permanent national feature [Q34 (61.1%)]; on tolerance, particularly religious tolerance [Q35 (53.5%)]; on grassroots participation in governance as a way of ensuring sense of belonging [Q36 (70.3%)] and on promoting unity and stability in diversity [Q37 (63.1%)]. These positive responses are in consonance with the tenets of devolution of power, which is the cornerstone of true federal constitution.

5.4.3 Understanding Devolution of Power and Sad Features of Over-Centralization

The preceding recognised and accepted devolution of power as the cornerstone of federal constitution, which unfortunately had been progressively replaced by the current over-centralisation of Nigeria's governance system, which started with the military incursion into Nigeria's government from the 1966 military counter coup which sad features are anti-development or anti-progress. As a result of the over-centralised governance/unitary system, devolution of power had become non-existent.

What then are the sad features of this unitary or over-centralised governance system now in operation in Nigeria? They are: (1) the federal government and the federating units are no longer co-ordinates as the federating units are now subordinates of the federal government; (2) the federal government now controls relatively larger proportions of the nation's resources. For example, currently federal government receives 52% of revenues from the federation account, while the balance is shared between 36 states, 774 local governments and Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; (3) the erosion/dilution of federal constitutions of 1960 and 1963 which hither-to devolved more power to the states and permitted the operation of fiscal federalism; (4) States and local governments are completely dependent on the federal government and on the federation account; (5) the competitive spirit and economic drives of the regional governments of the 1960s had been completely wiped out; (6) do-or-die struggle for control of the central government and national resources engendering political instability had, inadvertently, been instituted, and (7) a strand of the do-or-die struggle among the political entrepreneurs, which informed the politicisation of religion-the harbinger of the current Boko Haram insurgency- has become our lot.

These sad features of unitary system call for what Kincaid, in Tanenwald (1998), called optimal inter-governmental arrangements that

would reject extreme centralisation and accept decentralisation of governmental responsibilities, which is alternatively called “devolution,” the devolving” of federal responsibilities to lower levels of government.

The above enumerated sad features, which are a reflection of the burgeoning, growing and intrusive power of the central government into matters better handled by state and local governments, had led to the current agitation for the reduction in the power of the central government which is otherwise called devolution of power to the states.

Why is Devolution of Power important in the context of the current Nigeria’s political instability and sub-optimal development? To Kincaid, in Tannenwald (1998), devolution could be more accurately called “restoration” or “rebalancing” of powers between the federal government and the states, and could connote a surrender of a function by a superior government to a subordinate government that is generally complete, permanent, and of constitutional magnitude. He then specifies six objectives of devolution as: (1) more efficient provision and production of public services; (2) better alignment of the costs and benefits of government for a diverse citizenry; (3) better fits between public goods and their spatial characteristics; (4) increased competition, experimentation, and innovation in the public sector, (5) greater responsiveness to citizen preferences; and (6) more transparent accountability in policymaking.

A careful look at these objectives will show their alignment or harmony with the nine (9) questions on how devolution of powers to the states would affect different sectors of the nation (See figure 5.8 and Table 5.11). We could also recall that a significant proportion of respondents in each of the six geopolitical zones were positively disposed to those questions depicted in Table 5.11. This means that a truly federal constitution that devolves more power to the federating units will, in the long term, be efficacious in promoting growth and development of the federating units as they become more transparent and accountable; more efficient in the production and provision of public services, and more

competitive and innovative. In addition, the federating units enjoy some measure of financial independence, which allows them to prioritize their development projects and programmes in response to the needs of their people.

5.4.4 Military Incursion into Governance and Erosion of Devolution of Powers

We can assert with a measure certainty or certitude that prior to the incursion of the military into governance in Nigeria, there was a great measure of devolution of power on display between two tiers of government (i.e. between federal/central government and the federating units/regions). In other words, from post-1914 amalgamation to September 1960 period and from October 1960 Independence to 14th of January, 1966 period power was actually devolved from federal government to the four regions of the First Republic. It was during this immediate post-1960 Independence period, but before the 15th of January, 1966 military coup and counter coup, that Nigeria's development was at its zenith because all the six objectives of devolution of power by Kincaid guided the operations of the governments.

By and large, from the military inter-regnum to the current democratic dispensation, governance has become over-centralised with relatively little responsibilities devolved, surrendered, or delegated to the current 36 states of the federation. For instance, the 1999 Constitution currently operative in the country has sixty-eight (68) items on its Exclusive Legislative List and thirty, (30) items on the Concurrent Legislative list.

5.4.5 Qualitative Analysis

In the preceding figure 5.8, though respondents were requested to indicate "Yes" or "No" or "I don't know" in response to the nine (9) ques-

tions on devolution of power as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, findings from the qualitative data revealed that not only did respondents answer “Yes” or “No”, they also provided additional arguments for their responses. By and large, the additional arguments however revealed a palpably little understanding of devolution of power as well as fiscal federalism principles. From their additional arguments, the following themes emerged:

(a) Indispensability of education

Respondents argued that there had been an inter-mingling of various tribes and religions even within the regions. We have had intertribal and interreligious unions. So within the various geopolitical regions, some non-indigenes have settled down and have called the place home. If fiscal federalism is practiced without prior dialogue mechanism, tensions would likely arise among indigenes and non-indigenes. Some of those who belong to this school of thought also argued that there was fiscal federalism just before the Nigerian Civil War in 1963.

(b) Size of federating unit vis-à-vis fiscal federalism

Some of the respondents argue that when true (fiscal) federalism was practiced in Nigeria, the federating units were larger in size but fewer in number and therefore were easy to manage. Because of the further splits over 50 years ago, they claimed it would be more difficult to manage because some federating units barely have resources to stand on their own. If fiscal federalism is practiced with the present state structure, there was fear that there might be migration from the less endowed areas to the more endowed ones. This migration might trigger interregional violence. One respondent suggested that states could fuse to make them regions of the present geopolitical zones.

(c) Holistic practice of federalism

Some believe that federalism would only work if it is practiced thoroughly and holistically. They argued that each of the federating units

must be truly autonomous - financially and politically. It was believed this would create an environment for healthy competition. This would divert their attention from unhealthy ethno-religious rivalry and conflict.

5.4.6 Conclusions on Research Question 3

The generally positive responses to research question 3 point inexorably to the centrality of a well implemented federal constitution, a euphemism for federal constitution with provisions for devolution of power, fiscal federalism and secularism, to the resolution of Nigeria's multifarious problems of nation-building. It could also be concluded that the lack of devolution of power to the states in Nigeria has implications for the current inefficiency and inefficacy in the provision and production of public services, which also have implication for the under-performance of the nation's private sector, leading to stifled national growth and development. The important outcome of this scenario is the creation of the army of unemployed, the disgruntled and the marginalised, which are the very sources of foot soldiers for insurgency. The current developmental challenges of the country are therefore sad reflections or features of the unitary governance system currently in operation the country. What this means is that Nigeria's political and socio-economic problems are surmountable and easy to resolve once the missing links (i.e. true federal constitution & committed implementers of the constitution) are acknowledged.

5.5 Research Question 4

What factors or framework should serve as the veritable tools for ensuring cordiality and harmony among the diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups as well as Nigeria's political stability?

In order to identify the factors that should serve as veritable tools for ensuring cordiality and harmony among the diverse ethnic, cultural and

religious groups as well as ensuring Nigeria’s political stability, respondents were asked questions on selected variables that were assumed would ensure peace and harmony among the diverse ethnic/religious groups in the country. The responses were analysed at national level (i.e. nation-wide responses were aggregated) and at Geopolitical zone level (i.e. responses were disaggregated on geopolitical zone basis).

5.5.1 National Overview: Analysis of Responses to Under-Listed Research Questions:

(a) What are the Perceived Causative Factors of Conflict?

Table 5.12: Identification of Perceived Causative Factors of Conflicts

Factors	Yes	No
Ethnic	592 (94.0%)	38 (6.0%)
Cultural	607 (96.3%)	23 (3.7%)
Religious	537 (85.2%)	93 (14.8%)
Social and economic	548 (87.0%)	82 (13.0%)
Political	399 (63.3%)	231 (36.7%)
All of the above	457 (72.5%)	173 (27.5%)
None of the above	598 (94.9%)	32 (5.1%)

With respect to research question 4, respondents were asked to identify which factors could be regarded or assumed as the root causes of the conflicts experienced in the country. A total of five factors were listed, namely Political, Ethnic, Religious, Social and economic, and Cultural. (See Table 5.12 above)

Table 5.12 shows that, of the 630 respondents surveyed nationally, high proportions of the respondents [457 (72.5%)] indicated that all the factors listed were or could be perceived or assumed as causes of conflicts in the country, though there were divergences in the ratios they

apportioned to each of the factors. In line with most of the conclusions in extant literature and theoretical expositions vis-à-vis causative factors of conflicts in a nation with multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion, respondents scored ethnicity/culture and religion very highly as causes of conflicts. For example, a total of 592 (94.0%) respondents out of the 630 respondents surveyed nationally identified ethnic; [607 (96.3%)] identified cultural; and 537 (85.2%) identified religious factors as causes of conflicts in the country. However, other respondents [548 (87.0)], however, attributed social and economic factors as the causes of conflicts while [399 (63.3%)] of the respondents viewed political factor as responsible for most conflicts in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, it is necessary to underscore that both ethnicity and religion can hardly be divorced from politics in stirring conflicts, particularly in ethnically and religiously diverse country, which had not been able to adopt and operate appropriate and relevant constitution and whose political leadership, for political gains, had chosen to politicize religion or project their ethnicity/religion in the administration of the country.

The important conclusions that could be drawn from the responses are: all the factors work together to cause conflicts. For instance, ethnic or religious conflicts could have socio-economic and political underpinnings; to avert ethnic or religious conflicts, it is imperative that political and economic atmosphere that is not conducive should be avoided, and with regard to political environment that is conducive to national stability, it should be underscored that only the adoption and operation of a true federal constitution which provisions are obeyed would douse the ability of these five identified critical factors to cause or instigate conflicts, which are capable of destabilizing the country.

In summary, the general consensus on the effect of the afore-listed factors serving as veritable tools for ensuring cordiality and harmony among the different ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the nation is that political factor is the most vital factor that could foster harmony in

the nation. This fact of the pre-eminence of political factor, however, does not imply that other listed factors are less important. The pre-eminence of political factor stems from the fact that it embraces political class, political leadership, political system, constitution and politics, which represent the building blocks of the nation and whose contributions are indispensable to the resolution of other national problems. Consequently, once the political factor is on the right tract, the process for solving the national problems has commenced. Since enlightened political leadership produces good policies that in turn produce good politics and vice-versa, the immediate beneficiaries of this development are the populace and the national economy.

The study had observed earlier that it is impracticable to divorce politics from economics. And that political stability leads to economic stability, which also leads to investment-friendly environment, and increased economic activity. The end-results are declines in the levels of unemployment and poverty. The decline in the levels of these variables invariably leads us to conclude that once there is economic buoyancy and sustainable improvements in the welfare and wellbeing of the citizenry, then the army of unemployed from which politicians and religionists draw members or foot soldiers for sinister motives becomes non-existent.

- (b) Do Nigeria's ethno-cultural and religious diversities pose a threat to Nigeria's stability?

Figure 5.10: Respondents' perceptions on whether ethno-cultural and religious diversities pose a threat to Nigeria's stability




Table 5.13: Respondents' views on whether ethno-cultural and religious diversities pose a threat to Nigeria's stability

Response	Frequency	Percent
Strongly agree	158	25.1
Agree	227	36.0
Neutral	73	11.6
Disagree	93	14.8
Strongly disagree	49	7.8
NR	30	4.8

To gain further insights into the specified causative factors of conflict as they relate to research question 4, a deep probe into the place of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's problems was undertaken. To start, respondents were asked first to indicate whether ethnic, cultural and religious diversities pose a threat to Nigeria's stability. The national overview results as reflected in Figure 5.10 and Table 5.13 show that majority of respondents [385 (61.1%)] identified strongly with the notion that ethnic and religious diversities posed a real threat to the stability of the nation, and that they constituted Nigeria's fault lines.

(c) Do you agree with the suggestion that Nigeria’s main problem is ethnic and religious diversity?

Figure 5.11: Perception on whether ethnic and religious diversities are Nigeria’s main problem




Table 5.14 Respondents’ views on whether ethnic and religious diversities are Nigeria’s main problem

Response	Ethnic diversity	Religious diversity
Strongly agree	113 (17.9%)	191(30.3%)
Agree	174 (27.6%)	143 (22.7%)
Neutral	86 (13.7%)	94 (14.9%)
Disagree	163 (25.9%)	100 (15.9%)
Strongly disagree	74 (11.7%)	75 (11.9%)
NR	20 (3.2%)	27 (4.3%)

Figure 5.11 and Table 5.14 contain the outcomes of the national survey on the perception of ethnicity and religion as Nigeria’s main problem. The results in Figure 5.11 indicated that [287 (45.5%)] of respond-

ents nationally believed ethnicity is Nigeria’s main problem, while [237 (37.6%)] did not subscribe to this notion. Also in Table 5.14 [287 (45.5%)] of respondents indicated that ethnic diversity constituted Nigeria’s main problem while [237 (37.6%)] disagreed. On the other hand, [334 (53.0%)] of respondents, a comparatively significant proportion of the respondents attributed Nigeria’s main problem to its religious diversity with [175 (27.8%)] holding a contrary view.

5.5.2 Geopolitical Overview: Analyses of Responses to Under-Listed Research Questions:

(a) What do you assume or perceive as causative factors of conflicts experienced in Nigeria?

Table 5.15 Assumed or Perceived causative factors of conflict (Geo-Political Zones)

Factors	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
Ethnic	5 (4.3%)	12 (10.4%)	2 (1.6%)	1 (1.1%)	12 (10.7%)	6 (5.4%)
Cultural	7 (6.1%)	8 (7.0%)	3 (2.4%)	3 (3.3%)	2 (1.8%)	2 (1.8%)
Religious	15 (13.0%)	24 (20.9%)	31 (24.4%)	9 (9.8%)	8 (7.1%)	6 (5.4%)
Social and economic	9 (7.8%)	20 (17.4%)	6 (4.7%)	9 (9.8%)	21 (18.7%)	15 (13.5%)
Political	44 (38.3%)	22 (19.1%)	44 (34.6%)	35 (38.0%)	50 (44.6%)	36 (32.4%)
All of the above	30 (26.1%)	25 (21.7%)	30 (23.6%)	34 (36.9%)	13 (11.6%)	41 (36.9%)
None of the above	5 (4.3%)	4 (3.5%)	11 (8.7%)	1 (1.1%)	6 (5.4%)	5 (4.5%)

Table 5.15 is a further evaluation on the basis of six geo-political zones of the responses to question on the perceived or assumed causative factors of conflicts. As with the national overview, five assumed factors as indicated in the table were listed. The table shows that respondents across the six geo-political zones believed that all of the factors could be perceived as being significant contributors to the conflicts

in Nigeria. The ratios of their responses to the question are indicated as follows; [NC 30 (26.1%); NE 25 (21.7%); NW 30 (23.6%); SE 34 (36.9%); SS 13 (11.6%), and SW 41 (36.9%)]. Meanwhile relative to other causative factors, respondents across the six geo-political zones identified political factor as the major root cause of conflicts experienced in the nation and, by extension, a key tool for fostering cordiality and harmony in the nation if it is well managed. The responses are as reflected in the following proportions: [NC 44 (38.3%); NE 22 (19.1%); NW 44 (34.6%); SE 35 (38.0%); SS 50 (44.6%), and SW 36 (32.4%)]; meaning that on the average, 34.5% of respondents across the geo-political zones assumed political factor as the cause of conflicts in the country. This is followed by Religious, social & economic and ethnic factors, which from the table form average ratios of 16.7%, 12% and 5.6% of respondents respectively across the six zones perceived as causing conflicts.

As indicated earlier, if political factor is on the right tract, it could turn out to be the necessary and indispensable condition for resolving national problems including ethnic and religious conflicts, economic et cetera et cetera. Ironically, only 19.1% of respondents from the NE identified political factor as an important cause of conflicts. It is ironic in the sense that the raging Boko Haram insurgency in that zone of the country is both political and religious. As a matter of fact, the insurgency can, accurately, be described as the result of politicisation of religion.

Meanwhile, respondents from only two of the six geo-political zones identified all of the factors as responsible for the conflicts in the proportions of minimum of 30%. For example respondents from SE and SW scored “all of the above factors” 36.9% a-piece.

Comparatively, the result shows that the three northern geo-political zones of NC, NE and NW rated religious factor in the following ratios; [NC 15 (13.0%); NE 24 (20.9%), and NW 31 (24.4%)] than their three counterparts from the southern zones of [SE 9 (8.9%); SS 8 (8.2%), and

SW 6 (5.6%)]. This is not unexpected since the northern zones had experienced significantly more religion-inspired conflicts over the years than the southern parts. It is affirmative of religious tolerance of the south than the north. As a matter of fact, within a household in the south, particularly in the SW, you could have adherents of the two religions co-habiting without problems. On the other hand, it could also be indicative of north's intolerance of other received religion (Christianity). It could also be supportive of the allegation of north's long-term objective of Islamizing Nigeria. Thus, it has formed one of the objectives of Boko Haram, and other Islamist groups before it. And it explains why more respondents from the northern part of the nation identified religion as the causative factor of conflicts, and thus a veritable tool in fostering disharmony amongst Nigerians in that part of the country.

The above evaluations indicate that there is a general consensus across two-thirds of the geopolitical zones (i.e. 4 out of 6) on the notion that political factor is the major single-tool for fostering a cordial and harmonious co-existence in the nation.

(c) Do Nigeria's ethno-cultural and religious diversities pose a threat to Nigeria's stability?

Table 5.16 Respondents' views on whether ethno-cultural and religious diversities pose a threat to Nigeria's stability (Geo-Political Zones)

Response	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
Strongly agree	24 (21.8%)	18 (20.5%)	37 (32.5%)	24 (26.1%)	39 (41.1%)	16 (15.8%)
Agree	34 (30.9%)	39 (44.3%)	49 (43%)	39 (42.4%)	26 (27.4%)	40 (39.6%)
Neutral	24 (21.8%)	8 (9.1%)	9 (7.9%)	14 (15.2%)	2 (2.1%)	16 (15.8%)
Disagree	22 (21.8%)	16 (18.2%)	15 (13.2%)	9 (9.8%)	13 (13.7%)	18 (16.4%)
Strongly disagree	10 (9.1%)	7 (8%)	4 (3.5%)	6 (6.5%)	15 (15.8%)	7 (6.9%)

Further to research question 4, respondents in each of the six geopolitical zones were asked to indicate whether ethnic and/or religious

diversities constitute a threat to Nigeria’s stability. Result in Table 5.16 shows that majority of respondents in all the six geopolitical zones were in agreement with the notion that ethno-cultural and religious diversities were a threat to the nation’s stability. The number of respondents and ratios of their responses are shown as follows: [NC 58 (52.7%), NE 57 (64.8%), NW 86 (75.5%), SE 63 (68.5%), SS 65 (68.5%), and SW 56 (55.4%)]. The percentile response invariably suggests that these factors are regarded by majority of respondents in the each of the six geopolitical zones as threats to Nigeria’s stability if the government does not handle them properly. But if handled properly, they could constitute the veritable tools for ensuring Nigeria’s political and economic stability and consequent growth and development that would translate to peaceful and harmonious co-existence in spite of the diversity.

(d) Do you agree with the suggestion that Nigeria’s main problem is ethnic and religious diversity?

Table 5.17 Respondents’ views on whether ethnic or religious diversity is Nigeria’s main problem (Geo-Political Zones)

Response	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
(a) Ethnic diversity						
Strongly agree	24 (21.2%)	21 (23.6%)	7 (6.7%)	11 (12.4%)	21 (21.9%)	29 (24.6%)
Agree	35 (31%)	27 (30.3%)	25 (23.8%)	24 (27%)	31 (32.3%)	32 (27.1%)
Neutral	18 (15.9%)	5 (5.6%)	19 (18.1%)	21 (23.6%)	8 (8.3%)	15 (12.7%)
Disagree	23 (20.4%)	28 (31.5%)	35 (33.3%)	25 (28.1%)	24 (25%)	28 (23.7%)
Strongly disagree	13 (11.5%)	8 (9%)	19 (18.1%)	8 (9.0%)	12 (12.5%)	14 (11.9%)

(b) Religious diversity						
Strongly agree	19 (17.1%)	21 (23.9%)	35 (29.7%)	15 (16.7%)	7 (7.2%)	3 (3%)
Agree	24 (21.6%)	25 (28.4%)	27 (22.9%)	28 (31.1%)	17 (17.5%)	22 (22.2%)
Neutral	20 (18%)	13 (14.8%)	13 (11%)	14 (15.6%)	18 (18.6%)	16 (16.2%)
Disagree	35 (31.5%)	24 (27.3%)	31 (26.3%)	25 (27.8%)	34 (35.1%)	42 (42.4%)
Strongly disagree	13 (11.7%)	5 (5.7%)	12 (10.2%)	8 (8.9%)	21 (21.6%)	16 (16.2%)

Table 5.17 (a & b) contains the geo-political overview of the findings in respect of question on whether ethnic or religious diversity constitutes Nigeria's main problem. The results showed that, on the average, 47% of respondents in the six (6) geo-political zones agreed that ethnic diversity was Nigeria's main problem with 44% of respondents disagreeing. The North South geo-political zone comparative analysis indicated that, on the average, 45.6% of respondents from the three (3) North geo-political zones (North GPZs) and 48.4% of respondents in the three (3) South geo-political zones (South GPZs) agreed that Nigeria's main problem was its ethnic diversity while 41.3% and 36.7% of respondents in the three North GPZs and South GPZs respectively disagreed with ethnic diversity being the main problem of Nigeria. Meanwhile, comparative analysis of the ratios of responses per geo-political zones of [i.e. SW & NW; SE & NE, and SS & NC] in respect of ethnic diversity being the main problem of Nigeria, revealed that 51.7% of respondents in the SW versus 38.5% of respondents in the NW agreed that ethnic diversity constituted Nigeria's main problem with 35.6% and 51.4% of respondents from SW and NW respectively disagreeing. It also showed that 39.4% and 53.9% of respondents in the SE & NE respectively considered ethnic diversity the main problem of Nigeria, while

37.1% and 40.5% of respondents in SE & NE respectively disagreed. In the SS and NC, findings revealed that 54.2% and 52.2% respectively of respondents agreed that ethnic diversity was Nigeria's main problem. This is against 31.9% and 37.5% of the respective zone's respondents who disagreed that ethnic diversity was the main problem of Nigeria.

With respect to religious diversity constituting Nigeria's main problem, findings showed that the proportions of distributions of responses along the six (6) GPZs and in the 3 GPZs in the North were almost the same. For example, on the average, 44% of respondents in the 6 GPZs agreed that religious diversity was the nation's main problem. This is against 44.5% of respondents in the same GPZs that disagreed.

However, comparative analysis of the ratios of responses per geopolitical zones of [SW & NW; SE & NE, and SS & NC] in respect of religious diversity being the main problem of Nigeria, showed that 25.2% of respondents in the SW versus 52.6% of respondents in the NW agreed that religious diversity was the main national problem with 58.6% and 36.5% of respondents from SW and NW respectively not in agreement. The analysis also showed that 47.8% and 52.3% of respondents in the SE & NE respectively considered religious diversity the main problem of Nigeria, while 36.7% and 33.0% of respondents in SE & NE respectively disagreed. In the SS and NC, findings revealed that 24.7% and 38.7% respectively of respondents agreed that religious diversity remained Nigeria's core problem. This is against 56.7% and 31.9% of the respective zone's respondents who disagreed that religious diversity was the main problem of Nigeria.

5.5.3 Deductions from Preceding Analyses

What then can we make of the preceding analyses or what can we make of the percentage response differentials in respect of either ethnic or religious diversity constituting Nigeria's main problem, particularly

with respect to the ratios of responses of the respondents in the NW and SW geo-political zones? That 51.7% of respondents from the SW agreed that ethnic diversity was Nigeria's main problem was in accord with SW's long standing position that until the political leadership adopt a constitutional framework that recognises the imperative that *If a country is bi-lingual or multi-lingual, (like Nigeria) the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organized on a linguistic basis, and that any experiment with a unitary constitution in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country must fail, in the long run*" (Awolowo, O; 1981: *ibid*).

Because Nigeria's political leadership had failed to organize Nigerian federation on linguistic basis, the vicious cycle of ethnic conflicts has become part and parcel of our national life. As a result, our national growth and development has been stifled. And with regard to religious diversity, the Yoruba ethnic group or the SW geo-political zone where they constitute the main ethnic group have generally been regarded as the oasis of or reference point in religious tolerance in Nigeria. It stems from the fact that within a Yoruba household, you have adherents of the two received religions and even traditional religion co-habiting without problems.

That 51.4% of the respondents in the NW disagreed that ethnic diversity was Nigeria's main problem was hard to believe considering the fact that the Hausa-Fulani, as the majority ethnic group in that zone are considered as the main issue in the North's and Nigeria's ethnic or religious conflicts. One would have expected a higher proportion of respondents in that zone agreeing that ethnic diversity constituted the main national problem. And the fact that 52.6% of the respondents from that zone correctly agreed that religious diversity was Nigeria's main problem conformed to the characterisation of NW and NE geo-political zones as the bastions of religious fundamentalism or fanaticism and homes to on-going insurgency in the country.

The concurrence of majority of respondents with the fact of both ethnic and religious diversities constituting Nigeria's main problem is a clarion call on the necessity for Nigeria's political leadership to accept this general consensus on the place of ethnicity and religion in conflicts and *ipso facto* put in place constitutional framework that will enable the nation to harness these diversities for the overall benefit of the nation. This study through its findings had identified that constitutional framework as a truly federal constitution as opposed to the unitary constitution Nigeria is currently operating.

5.5.4 Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative data show two central themes in response to the research question:

- Religious Institutions
- Social Institutions

Some respondents argued that religious institutions could play a significant role in preventing ethno-religious crises and could come handy in dousing these crises when they occur. They argued that this is due to the nature and belief system of the average Nigerian who views religion and culture passionately and respect the heads of these institutions. Though during the conversation, veiled references were made to the leadership of these institutions and to the sad fact that some of them had compromised their values and have even connived with politicians to take advantage of the people. In spite of these shortcomings, they believed that leadership of religious institutions are better placed to inculcate in their followership the importance of tolerance in ensuring peaceful and harmonious co-existence amongst the adherents of the various religions.

Another area where emphasis was placed was on social institutions. Sports and Entertainment in particular kept recurring during the conver-

sations. The role which sports, especially football, had played in uniting the nation was greatly emphasized. Most young respondents believed that the entertainment industry particularly comedy and music could be utilised to re-brand or re-orientate the country towards harnessing our diversity to achieve peace and national stability.

5.5.5 Deductions from Research Question 4

That majority of respondents identified ethnic, religious, social and economic as factors as having important political leverage which the political leadership should factor into its search for constitutional solution to Nigeria's problems; or should serve as a compass for navigating the tortuous journey of nation-building. Meanwhile, the consensus among the respondents that our diversity was both a threat to national stability and the main problem of Nigeria, should not surprise keen, objective or unbiased observers of Nigeria's stifled growth and development. Rather, these observers should regard it as an acclamation of the obvious national dilemma and the failure or unwillingness of political leadership to do the right things that could guarantee peaceful and harmonious co-existence of Nigeria's diverse ethnic and religious groups. Those right things, according to this study are:

- Emplacement/adoption and operation of an appropriate constitution, which this study had identified as a truly federal constitution that embodies fiscal federalism, devolution of power and secularism. That constitution should be reminiscent of the Independence constitution of 1960 or the Republican constitution of 1963;
- Avoidance of inordinate ambition by one ethnic group to dominate others or the political power;
- Avoidance of politicisation of religion or disallowing political entrepreneurs from using religion for political advantage;

- Transformation of ethnic instincts into pragmatic tools for political, economic and national stability, growth and development;
- Eschewing mutual scheming, rivalry, suspicions, distrust, aggression and grievances that often arise from domination of political power by one ethnic group, and
- The determined efforts of political leadership to expunge from our national life the dysfunctional features of ethnic and religious diversity.

5.5.6 Conclusions on Research Question 4

The general conclusions from the analyses of research question 4 and its variant or various strands are: that unless and until the emplacement of a truly federal constitution, as opposed to the pseudo federal constitution currently in practice in Nigeria, is at the centre of efforts to overcome our diversity-induced crises or conflicts, the desire for national stability despite our diversity will be a mere rhetoric. This is because the operation of a truly federal constitution has ramifying implications for the successful resolution of our multifarious challenges, and that from the survey, the political factor was generally perceived as a significant contributor to conflicts, implying that once political issues, consisting mainly of politics, political leadership and political engineering initiatives such as relevant constitution and electoral process are right, other challenges of nation building including divisions arising from ethnic and religious diversity are resolved, and Nigeria would largely become stable.

5.6 Research Question 5

Is the operation of a unitary constitution feasible or pragmatic in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country?

In addition to research question 5 above, we also derive other questions on which stakeholders' views are then presented and analysed at national level (i.e. responses aggregated nationally) and at geopolitical level (i.e. responses disaggregated on geo-political zone basis). The derived questions are:

4. Would you agree that a unitary system of governance in an ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse society is a recipe for disharmony, conflict and disintegration of that society?
5. Would you agree that as long as the over-centralised governance system continues, the cycle of ethnic conflict would continue?
6. What is the relationship between unitary system of government and the ethno-cultural and religious conflicts in Nigeria?
7. Would you agree that Nigeria retain the present political structure or revert to old structures or adopt new six (6) -geo-political zone structure?

The essence of these questions is to enable stakeholders to reflect on the impact and implications of operating a unitary constitution in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country for peaceful co-existence of the populace and for national stability.

5.6.1 National Overview: Analysis of Responses to Under-Listed Research Questions

Table 5.18: Respondents' views on the relationship between unitary system of government and the ethno-cultural and religious conflicts in Nigeria

Key questions		
Q50: Would you agree that a unitary system of governance in an ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse society is a recipe for disharmony, conflict and disintegration of that society?		
Q48: Would you agree that as long as the over-centralised governance system continues, the cycle of violent ethnic conflicts would continue?		
Response	Q50	Q48
Strongly agree	141 (22.4%)	129 (20.5%)
Agree	200 (31.7%)	217 (34.4%)
Neutral	87 (13.8%)	90 (14.3%)
Disagree	78 (12.4%)	87 (13.8%)
Strongly disagree	46 (7.3%)	33 (5.2%)
NR	78 (12.4%)	74 (11.7%)

Results from national survey as reflected on Table 5.18 show that, of the 630 respondents surveyed, 341 (53.4%) were in agreement with (Q50) which states that implementing a unitary system of government or unitary constitution in an ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse society is a recipe for conflict, disharmony and eventual disintegration of such society, while 124 (19.7%) of respondents were in disagreement. The results further show that 87 (13.8%) of the respondents took a neutral stance, whilst 78 (12.4%) did not respond to the question.

The implication of the result is that the practice of unitary constitution or unitary system of governance in a diverse society will not augur well for that society. In other words, unitary constitution is only suitable for a uni-lingual and uni-national country. This is in concurrence with Awolowo's (1981: *ibid*) submissions as follows:

- (1) *If a country is uni-lingual and uni-national, the constitution must be unitary;*
- (2) *Any experiment with a unitary constitution in a bilingual or multi-lingual or multinational country must fail, in the long run”.*

Meanwhile, with regard to Q48 that asks if respondents would agree that as long as the over-centralised governance system continues, the cycle of violent ethnic conflicts will continue, a vast majority of respondents [346 (54.9%)] agreed that the cycle of violent ethnic conflicts would continue if the system of government remains over-centralised. This is against [120 (19.0%)] respondents who held opposite opinion on the issue.

It could be concluded from the findings that the popular opinions amongst the surveyed respondents were not in favour of a unitary system of government (whether in principle or in practice). In view of these findings, current Nigerian government should see it as a wake-up call to decentralize governance by reverting to a truly federal constitution which provisions must be strictly adhered to. This should serve as one of the solutions to the perennial ethno-religious conflicts and the consequent instability and stalled pace of development. Opposition to unitary governance or centralization of power should not be far-fetched, going by the examples of countries like the Republics of Cameroon and Indonesia which share same diversity characteristics with Nigeria. According to Law No 84-1 of February 4, 1984, the Republic of Cameroon shall be a decentralized unitary state. It shall be one and indivisible, secular, democratic and dedicated to social service. However, since its independence, it has gone from a decentralised/federal state to a highly centralized unitary or authoritarian presidential republic in which absolute power resides in the president. As Pitt (1770: 566) posits, ‘unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it. As a consequence, the centralization and personalization of political power became an impediment to peace and stability in Cameroon. (Valery Ferim)

But in contrast to Cameroon, the Republic of Indonesia started with centralized system of governance (unitary system) and monarchical/sultanate system based on its 1945 constitution with the aim to unify its diverse ethnic, religious and cultural groups. It has now moved to embrace regional autonomy as a way of decentralizing power after decades of authoritarian rule. The central government is now charged with responsibilities for defence, foreign policy, fiscal-monetary and macroeconomic policy, justice and religion. The expected impact of this new political orientation could be gleaned from Forje’s, (2006:2) views that decentralisation or devolution of power creates opportunities to improve efficiency in governance and in the delivery of services. It also narrows the gap between expected performance and actual performance of government.

(a) Would you agree that Nigeria retains the present political structure or revert to old structures?

Table 5.19 Respondents’ views on retaining the present structure or reverting to old structures or adopting new six (6)-geo-political zone structure.

Response	(a) Revert to old 4 regions	(b) Revert to 12 states	(c) Retain 36 states	Adopt 6-geo- political zone structure
Strongly agree	160 (25.4%)	170 (27%)	47 (7.5%)	244 (38.7%)
Agree	266 (42.2%)	236 (37.5%)	73 (11.6%)	266 (42.2%)
Neutral	94 (14.9%)	73 (11.6%)	97 (15.4%)	30 (4.8%)
Disagree	46 (7.3%)	53 (8.4%)	233 (37%)	46 (7.3%)
Strongly disagree	14 (2.2%)	44 (7%)	130 (20.6%)	14 (2.2%)
NR	50 (7.9%)	54 (8.6%)	50 (7.9%)	30 (4.8%)

In a bid to further highlight respondents’ dispositions towards the current practice of a unitary system of government or the adoption and

practice of the federal constitution of the immediate post-independence period, respondents were asked to indicate whether Nigeria should: (a) revert back to the 5-region structure of the first republic, (b) revert back to the 12 state structure of the post-civil-war period, (c) retain its current 36 state structure or adopt a new 6-geo-political zone structure for the country.

As reflected on Table 5.19, findings from the study showed that out of the 630 respondents surveyed, 426 (67.6%) respondents agreed with the idea of reverting back to the old five regions while 406 (64.5%) respondents suggested a return to the old 12- state structure and 510 (80.9%) of respondents favoured the adoption of the new six (6) geo-political zone structure for the country. The least favoured governance structure was the present 36-state structure which 120 (19.1%) of respondents wanted its retention. This was against 363 (57.6%) respondents who disagreed that the structure should be retained.

The relatively higher proportions of the respondents that approved that the country should adopt the new six (6) geo-political zone structure or revert to 4-region governance structure of the 1960 Independence and 1963 Republican constitutions of the First Republic was in line with the respondents' earlier repudiation of the unitary constitution or unitary or over-centralised system of governance- another name for pseudo federal constitution- that Nigeria currently practices.

5.6.2 Reflections on First Republic Constitutions

As we are aware, the First Republic constitutions represented a truly federal constitution with devolution of powers embodied there-in. According to Sagay (2001), "under the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, a true federal system made up of strong States or Regions and a Central or Federal 'state' with limited powers, was instituted. Both the 1960 (Independence) Constitution and the 1963 (Republican) Constitution were the same. The noticeable differences were the provisions for ceremonial

President (1963) in place of the Queen of England (1960) and the judicial appeals system which terminated with the Supreme Court (1963) rather than the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council (1960)”.

The following features, which emphasised the existence of a true federal system composed of powerful and autonomous Regions and a Centre with limited powers, were also noted by Sagay (2001):

- Each Region had its own separate Constitution, in addition to the Federal Government Constitution.
- Each region had its own separate Coat of Arms and Motto, from the Federal State or Government.
- Each Region established its own separate semi-independent Mission in the U.K. headed by 'Agents-General'.
- The Regional Governments had Residual Power, i.e., where any matter was not allocated to the Regions or the Federal Government, it automatically became a matter for Regional jurisdiction”.

It could be assumed that the rejection nationally of the current 36-state structure and its operative 1999 constitution could be attributed to the over-centralised nature of 1999 constitution which concentrates more power in the federal government, and the consequent cost ineffectiveness of operating a 36-state structure. Whereas more powers should have been vested in the federating units (i.e. devolve more power to the states) for efficiency and effectiveness and if the do-or-die politics of ‘capturing power’ at the centre were to be avoided.

5.6.3 Geopolitical Overview: Analyses of Responses to Under-Listed Research Questions:

Table 5.20: Assessment of Respondents' views on (a) Q50 and (b) Q48 as spelt out in the key below (Geo-Political Zone)

Key questions						
(Q50) Would you agree that a unitary system of governance in an ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse society is a recipe for disharmony, conflict and disintegration of that society?						
(Q48) Would you agree that as long as the over-centralised governance system continues, the cycle of ethnic conflict will continue?						
Response	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
(a) Q50						
Strongly agree	24 (22.9%)	13 (14.8%)	4 (3.6%)	16 (22.2%)	22 (24.2%)	14 (16.5%)
Agree	29 (27.6%)	18 (20.5%)	32 (28.8%)	26 (36.1%)	24 (26.4%)	32 (37.6%)
Neutral	20 (19%)	16 (18.2%)	15 (13.5%)	10 (13.9%)	19 (20.9%)	17 (20%)
Disagree	21 (20%)	27 (30.7%)	24 (21.6%)	15 (20.8%)	15 (16.5%)	21 (24.7%)
Strongly disagree	11 (10.5%)	14 (15.9%)	36 (32.4%)	5 (6.9%)	11 (12.1%)	1 (1.2%)
(b) Q48						
Strongly agree	24 (22.2%)	6 (6.7%)	6 (5.4%)	24 (30.8%)	35 (36.1%)	16 (16.5%)
Agree	29 (26.8%)	15 (16.9%)	20 (18%)	21 (26.9%)	30 (30.9%)	47 (48.5%)
Neutral	30 (27.8%)	37 (41.6%)	26 (23.4%)	20 (25.6%)	17 (17.5%)	14 (14.4%)
Disagree	15 (13.9%)	15 (16.9%)	45 (40.5%)	9 (11.5%)	10 (10.3%)	18 (18.6%)
Strongly disagree	10 (9.3%)	16 (18%)	14 (12.6%)	4 (5.1%)	5 (5.2%)	2 (2.1%)

Table 5.20 (a & b) above contains the geo-political analyses of respondents' views on two questions (50a & 48b) above.

With respect to Q50, the results of the analyses show that at an average of 46.8%, respondents across the geopolitical zones agreed that a

unitary system of government in an ethnically/culturally and religiously diverse society will breed/encourage conflicts and disharmony which would eventually disintegrate that society, while average of 35.5% of the respondents in the six (6) geo-political zones of the country that did not share the view. Meanwhile, when the average ratios of responses from the three southern geo-political zones were compared with those of three northern geo-political zones, the result showed that larger proportions of respondents (54.3%) from the south against 39.4% from the north agreed that there was a correlation between unitary system of governance in a diverse society and the incidence of violent conflicts. When we compared NW & SW; NE & SE, and NC & SS, the following results emerged; 32.4% (NW) & 54.1% (SW); 35.3% (NE) & 58.3% (SE), and 50.5% (NC) & 50.6% (SS) of respondents agreed that operation of unitary constitution would lead to conflicts. What these statistics implied is that the responses of the majority ethnic group of core north (i.e. NW & NE) were in tune with their traditional preference for over-concentration/ centralisation of power at the centre, or their traditional opposition to a truly federal system of government. The SE and SW are traditionally the bastions of advocates of adoption and operation of true federal constitution in the country.

Next we compared the responses of the minority ethnic groups of the north with those of the south. The results revealed a striking semblance of views as indicated thus; NC (50.5% and, SS (50.6%). From these results, one could say with certainty that these minority zones, particularly the NC have same ideological orientations with the majority ethnic groups of the south geo-political zones, particularly SW.

Because Q48 took its cue from Q50, and because they were only semantically different from each other, respondents' views ought to be the same. And that was what exactly happened. For instance, at an average of 47.6%, respondents across the six geopolitical zones agreed that as long as the over-centralised governance system continues, the cycle of

violent ethnic conflicts will continue. This was against 27.3% of respondents who disagreed.

Meanwhile, an average of 63.2% of respondents from the three south geo-political zones against the average of 32.0% of respondents from the three north geo-political zones also agreed with the positive relationship between over-centralised governance system and the continuation of the cycle of violent conflicts in the country.

5.6.4 Comparative Analysis of Responses of Majority and Minority Ethnic Groups of North and South

The comparison of the ratios of responses from the zones of the majority and minority ethnic groups of north and south with one another reveal the following statistical results: 23.4% (NW) vs. 65.0% (SW); 23.6% (NE) vs. 57.7% (SE), and 49.0% (NC) vs. 67.0% (SS) of respondents agreed that over-centralised governance system is tantamount to continued cycle of violent conflicts in the country. What these statistics imply is that the responses of the majority ethnic group of core north (i.e. NW & NE), which rejected the associations of over-centralisation of governance system with continuation of cycle of violent conflicts accorded with their traditional preference for over-centralisation of power at the centre, or their traditional opposition to a truly federal system of government.

As the statistics show, SE and SW maintained their age-long opposition to over-centralisation of powers at the centre or unitary system of government. With respect to the percentage of responses from the two minority geo-political zones of NC (49.0%) and SS (67.0%) vis-à-vis the sharp percentage differentials with the majority four geo-political zones of NW (23.4%) & NE (23.6%); and SW (65.0%) & SE (57.7%) we could infer sharp ideological differences between the two minority ethnic group geo-political zones and the majority ethnic groups of the core north geo-political zones. While the minority ethnic groups of NC

and SS geo-political zones tend towards liberal and progressive political ideology like the majority ethnic groups of SW and SE, the majority ethnic groups of NW and NE are conservative. The implication of the liberal or progressive political ideological leaning of the two minority geo-political zones of north and south is that, generally, Nigeria’s political ideology is largely progressive.

(b) Would you agree that Nigeria retains the present political structure or reverts back to old structures or adopt new six (6) geo-political zone structures?

Table 5.21: Respondents’ views on retaining the present political structure, reverting back to old ones or adopting new six (6) geo-political zone structures

Response	NC	NE	NW	SE	SS	SW
(a) Revert back to 4 region structure						
Strongly agree	11 (10.2%)	4 (4.5%)	7 (6.3%)	17 (22.1%)	31 (33.3%)	50 (49.0%)
Agree	19 (17.6%)	6 (6.8%)	17 (15.2%)	21 (27.3%)	41 (44.1%)	17 (16.7%)
Neutral	23 (21.3%)	7 (8%)	20 (17.9%)	20 (26%)	13 (14%)	14 (13.7%)
Disagree	35 (32.4%)	36 (40.9%)	50 (44.6%)	10 (13%)	1 (1.1%)	8 (7.8%)
Strongly disagree	20 (18.5%)	35 (39.8%)	18 (16.1%)	9 (11.7%)	7 (7.5%)	13 (12.7%)
(b) Revert back to 12 state structure						
Strongly agree	3 (2.9%)	0 (0%)	7 (6.3%)	3 (3.9%)	1 (1%)	0 (0%)

Agree	13 (12.4%)	5 (5.6%)	14 (12.5%)	4 (5.2%)	0 (0%)	10 (9.9%)
Neutral	13 (12.4%)	6 (6.7%)	21 (18.8%)	20 (26%)	14 (14.6%)	20 (19.8%)
Disagree	56 (53.3%)	41 (46.1%)	47 (42%)	34 (44.2%)	39 (40.6%)	49 (48.5%)
Strongly disagree	20 (19%)	37 (41.6%)	23 (20.5%)	16 (20.8%)	42 (43.8%)	22 (21.8%)
(c) Retention of current 36-state structure						
Strongly agree	24 (23.3%)	25 (28.7%)	31 (27.9%)	8 (10.5%)	13 (13.5%)	3 (2.9%)
Agree	41 (39.8%)	45 (51.7%)	44 (39.6%)	4 (5.3%)	6 (6.3%)	10 (9.7%)
Neutral	21 (20.4%)	6 (6.9%)	10 (9%)	21 (27.6%)	5 (5.2%)	9 (8.7%)
Disagree	12 (11.7%)	5 (5.7%)	17 (15.3%)	27 (35.5%)	37 (38.5%)	44 (42.7%)
Strongly disagree	5 (4.9%)	6 (6.9%)	9 (8.1%)	16 (21.1%)	35 (36.5%)	37 (35.9%)
(d) Adoption of new 6-geo-political zone structure						
Strongly agree	35 (32.4%)	35 (39.8%)	30 (26.8%)	37 (38.1%)	36 (38.7%)	55 (53.9%)
Agree	30 (27.8%)	36 (40.9%)	50 (44.6%)	31 (32.0%)	41 (44.1%)	22 (21.6%)
Neutral	13 (12.0%)	7 (8%)	8 (7.1%)	10 (10.3%)	8 (8.6%)	4 (3.9%)
Disagree	11 (10.2%)	6 (6.8%)	17 (15.2%)	10 (10.3%)	1 (1.1%)	8 (7.8%)
Strongly disagree	19 (17.6%)	4 (4.5%)	7 (6.3%)	9 (9.3%)	7 (7.5%)	13 (12.7%)

Table 5.21 further shows respondents' views on what type of political structure they would prefer for the country: (a) would they prefer that the country reverts back to 4-region structure; (b) would they prefer that the country reverts back to 12-state structure; (c) would they prefer that the country retains the current 36-state structure, or would they like to adopt a 6-geo-political zone structure for the country? Respondents' views are as reflected here-under:

(a) Revert back to 4-Region Structure

With regard to 5.21(a), analyses of the respondents' views showed that an average ratios of 64.2% of respondents in the three (3) south geo-political zones preferred that the country revert back to the 1960 Independence-4- region political structure, while only 20.2% of their counterparts in the three (3) north geo-political zones preferred to revert back to that political structure. Conversely, an equally larger proportion (64.1%) of respondents in the three (3) north geo-political zones vis-à-vis small proportion (18%) of their counterparts in the three (3) south geo-political zones disagreed with the notion of reverting back to the 4-region political structure. From these findings, it is obvious that respondents' views on the subject matter are divided along north-south geo-political zone and thus adequately reflect the political and ideological differences or problems between north and south, with the south tending towards a truly decentralised governance system.

(b) Revert back to 12- State Structure

Findings in respect of 5.21 (b) show that on the average, 73.7% of respondents across the six (6) geo-political zones rejected the idea of reverting back to the 12-state structure instituted by the Gowon Administration of 1966-75. Even the comparison of the views of respondents from the three northern geo-political zones with those of its southern counterpart showed almost equal proportionate views with 74.2% of

respondents from the north geo-political zone and 73.2% from the south rejecting the idea of reverting back to 12-State Political Structure.

(c) Retention of the current 36-State Political Structure

Findings in respect of retention of the current 36-state structure revealed a sharp divergence in the views of respondents from the north and south geo-political zones. For instance, on the average, 70.3% of respondents from the north agreed that the current 36-state structure should be retained. This was against a disproportionate average of 16.1% of respondents from the south who agreed with the idea of retaining the current 36-state structure. Meanwhile, an average of 43.2% of respondents across the six (6) geo-political zones favoured the retention of the 36-state structure.

(d) Adoption of new 6-Geo-political Zone Structure

It needs re-iterating the 1994/95 National Conference origin of the six (6) geo-political zone, which was intended purposely to ensure that every part of the country has equal access to political power or position. It is a sort of antidote for future recurrence of annulment of 1993 presidential election. We should also recall that our evaluation of policy variables that had fuelled or were fuelling conflicts in Nigeria did show that 53% of respondents did not consider political zoning policy to have fuelled conflicts in the country.

These antecedents could be rationalized to have influenced 510 (80.9%) out of 630 respondents surveyed nationally who opted for the adoption of the 6-geo-political zone structure for the country. This is against 9.5% who disagreed with the adoption of the 6-geo-political zone structure. In addition, the antecedents could also have impacted positively the findings from the survey across the geo-political zones which showed an overwhelming approval for a six (6) geo-political zone structure. For instance, an average of 73.4% of respondents across the six zones agreed that the 6-geo-political zone structure should be adopt-

ed (meaning that the informal arrangement should be formalised or made constitutional). This is against 18.2% who rejected the adoption or formalization of the arrangement.

Even the comparison of the views of respondents from north and south revealed that on the average 70.8% of respondents from the North's 3-geo-political zones and 76.1% from the 3-geo-political zones of the South agreed that the 6-geo-political zone structure should be adopted. It should, however, be clarified that the new 6-geo-political zone structure that this study is proposing is in tune with the 4-region political structure of the First Republic of the 1960's. Thus, there will be six zones (regions) with local government councils as the third tier of government. The number of local government council will be the prerogative of each zone and be determined by factors of finance and development. But the number of local government councils per GPZ should not be less than 200. Like the old 4-region political structure of the immediate post-independence period, this new 6-geo-political zone structure will be vested with full autonomy as dictated by the imperatives of federal system. It is therefore proposed that the constitution that will govern the operation of the new 6 geo-political zones will borrow heavily from the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions of federal republic of Nigeria, which were adjudged to be true federal constitutions and which will vest the zones with strong powers while leaving limited powers to the federal government. The governments of the six geo-political zones will have Residual Power, i.e., where any matter is not allocated to the Zones or the Federal Government, it automatically becomes a matter for jurisdiction of the geo-political zones. (Adapted from Sagay, 2001) With regard to representation of the each of the geo-political zones in the Senate, federalism principle which guarantees equal representation to the member-states of a federation, that is, an equal vote for every state will guide us in the number of seats allocated to each geo-political zone

in the Senate. The same equality-of- representation principle would apply to representations in the Lower House.

There will be no need for boundary adjustments. The present boundaries instituted by the National Boundary Commission will continue to be in operation.

5.6.5. Devolution of Power

In line with the principle of appropriate decentralization, that is, principle of subsidiarity envisaged by federalism in order to ensure good governance, legislative powers must devolve appropriately between central /federal government and the constituent units (i.e. States or GPZs relevant to this study). Currently, the 1999 Constitution as amended provided for both Exclusive and Concurrent legislative lists. The Exclusive legislative list consists of 68 items in which the central/federal government has exclusive legislative jurisdiction, while there are 30 items in the Concurrent list over which both the central/federal and constituent units have shared responsibilities. With respect to the unwieldy exclusive list, it is apparent that it violates one of the fundamental and distinguishing characteristics of federalism espoused by Wheare, which states that “neither the central nor the regional governments are subordinate to each other, but rather the two are coordinate and independent’’. Another principle of federalism that this unwieldiness of the current exclusive legislative list connotes is the violation of the principle that powers should devolve from the constituent units to the central /federal government. In future, Nigerian political leadership should note this when new constitution is to be drafted. For the present, the study believes strongly that the federal government should have exclusive legislative jurisdiction only on the following Exclusive list item Numbers; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50, 52, 53, 56, 60, 63, 65, 67 and 68. With regard to the concurrent legislative list, federal government should be exempted

from having legislative jurisdiction over the following item numbers: 7, 8, 11(except the procedure regulating elections to a local government council), 16, 17, and 28. (See Appendices E & F: Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative List, as contained in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended)

Meanwhile, with respect to the devolution of powers from the GPZs to the local government councils (LGCs), the guiding principle would be; decisions should be taken at level closest to where the impact would be greatly felt.

5.6.6 Conclusions on a, b, c & d

The conclusions that could be drawn from the respondents' views on a, b, c & d are as follows: Respondents' views on (a) are a reconfirmation of the historical political stand of the South and its preference for a constitutional arrangement that gives the federating units a high degree of autonomy and freedom to conduct its affairs as it deemed constitutionally fit and proper, and to develop according to its pace. Whereas the North's rejection of reversion back to the old 4-region political structure and its preference for the current 36-state political structure was arguably influenced by the economics of petroleum revenue: rejection of derivation principle of the 4-region structure period; over-dependence of states on oil revenue and the federation account; the higher number of states which are currently skewed in favour of the north, meaning more revenue for north from the federation account; the current over concentration of power in the central government which by virtue of population advantage, the north is favoured to control, and thereby approximate to its advantage disproportionate higher share of oil revenue of the central government which currently stands at 52%. All of these factors are in favour of the north and are, arguably, in line with north's desire for and pursuit of hegemonic power.

We need to underscore that the 12- and 36-state structure periods represented the beginning of the erosion or dilution of Nigeria's federal constitution/federal system of government and the beginning of the current unitary system of government, represented by the current 36-state structure.

The 12-state structure was created by the Gowon Administration (1966-75) at the start of the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967-70 and was intended principally to excise the minority enclave in the Eastern region of Nigeria (Biafra) where the Nigeria's oil reserves then resided from Eastern region, thereby denying Biafra the support of the minority ethnic groups and the control of oil resources and revenues there-from. In short, the 12-state structure was a strategy designed to achieve a 3-fold objectives, namely:

- To get the support of the Eastern Nigeria's minority for Nigeria military government;
- Deny Biafra the control of oil resources, and
- Cripple the Biafran economy financially

As a military administration, its characteristic unified command structure was instituted, meaning the abrogation of the federal constitutions of 1960 and 1963 and the accompanying federal political structure (i.e. 4-region structure), and the emplacement of the unitary system with power concentrated in the centre. This was the genesis of the extant political structure and the pseudo federal constitution that Nigeria is currently operating.

The preferences of respondents nationally and across the six geo-political zones for the adoption of the 6-geo-political zone-structure for the country were a vote to formalise or make constitutional this novel political arrangement. Meanwhile, though half-heartedly the just concluded National Conference 2014, in its Final Draft Report, had only given its imprimatur for the use of political zoning arrangement instead of making it a section of the constitution. For instance, the Draft Report

(2014:506-510) recommended that additional States should be created in each of the six (6) geo-political zones to bring the number of States in each zone to nine (9) and that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) should be amended to provide for: (a) The Principle of Zoning and Rotation of elective offices at the Federal and State levels on the basis of excellence, equity, gender, justice and fairness, and (b) The Office of President to rotate between the North and the South and amongst the six (6) geo-political zones.

It must be stressed here that this study's 6 GPZs is not quite the same with the extant 6 GPZs. This study's GPZs will be autonomous, and will not provide for states. Instead of states, the GPZs will now have local governments, which because of their being closer to the people will have much developmental impact. The number of local government council will be determined by the autonomous GPZs. However, the number of local government council should not be less than two hundred.

5.6.7 Qualitative Analysis

Research question 5 generated a lot of reactions. Few of respondents who believed in the unitary system reminded us that it was fallout from the civil war of 1967-1970. They were of the views that it was the seeming financial autonomy of the immediate post-independence regions that encouraged the unsuccessful secession-bid of the then Eastern Region. They further argued that issue of how to successfully implement this unitary constitution to the letter should rather be the focus of government.

In the meantime, other respondents were of the views that reverting to old constitution would bring back the glory of that era when there was rapid development of the economy by shunning the reliance of government on such a mono-product as petroleum, which market vagaries

Nigeria could not control. A significant number of respondents especially the elderly from South and North Central geo-political zones belonged to this school of thought.

However, other respondents who had the privilege of experiencing the implementation of both constitutions agreed that the core problem was not the constitution; it was the lack of or inadequate dialogue and communication that were the problems. They believe that if communication channels were left open and early warning mechanisms were put in place, the unfortunate civil war as well as the various ethno-religious tensions would have been avoided.

5.6.8 Conclusions on Question 5

In view of the overwhelming rejection of unitary constitution/unitary system of governance by respondents because of its consequences for political instability and because it was adjudged by respondents to constitute Nigeria's main problem, we can conclude that the operation of a unitary constitution in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country like Nigeria cannot be feasible or pragmatic. It would also be illogical to revert to 12-state structure or retain the current 36-state structure since both structures are unitary in nature and practice, as they allowed more powers to be concentrated in the federal government, while the characteristic autonomy of the federating units were eroded or are being eroded, thus negating the fundamental feature of the federal constitution that makes both the federal government and the states co-ordinates. Advocating for a return to the old 4-region political structure becomes tenable. However, this study would prefer that the 4-region structure be replaced with 6-geo-political zone structure which operating constitution should take its cue from the 1960 and 1963 federal constitutions. As we noted in the preceding paragraphs, the fascinating features of these constitutions were there provisions for devolution of power to the federating units, the embrace of fiscal federalism and secularism- all of which

make them truly federal constitutions. Consequently, federal constitution can serve as an antidote to political instability and as a vehicle for national integration, harmony and development. But they are dependent on the operators of this constitution who must be imbued with patriotic zeal to respect and protect the provisions of this constitution.

5.6.9 Testing the Hypothesis:

The hypothesis postulates that that there is no positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution.

The analytical procedure for testing this hypothesis is qualitative and thus deductive. In determining the positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution, the study reflects on how the current pseudo federal constitution or unitary system in operation in the country had impacted negatively on the inter-ethnic or inter-religious relationship in the country by stirring up conflicts among the diverse ethnic or religious groups. The study then draws conclusions from the hitherto analysed responses to some research questions that are germane to our accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. These questions are as follows:

- A. Do the adoption and the current practice of federal constitution have any linkages with the conflicts in Nigeria?
- B. What do you assume or perceive as causative factors of conflicts experienced in Nigeria?
- C. How has the current practice of federal constitution or federalism in Nigeria helped in stabilizing the country in spite of its ethno-cultural and religious diversities?
- D. Is the way that federal constitution is currently practised in Nigeria having implication for the crisis rocking the country?

- E. Is the operation of a unitary constitution feasible or pragmatic in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country?
- F. How will devolution of powers to the states affect different sectors of the nation?
- G. As a Nigerian citizen, do you feel that diversities in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion have (a) anything to do with Nigeria's developmental challenges or (b) are the root causes of Nigeria's developmental challenges?

A careful look at the preceding questions would show that adoption and operation of relevant federal constitution is central to them and to the resolution of Nigeria's developmental challenges, including the perennial conflicts and instability that are also the by-products of its diversity challenges. Thus, the task of the researcher is to draw realistic conclusions from the afore-analysed and evaluated responses to these questions in order to establish that Nigeria's divisive and conflictive situations as well as its stifled growth and development have a lot to do with the pseudo federal constitution/ unitary constitution currently in operation in the country.

5.6.10 Conclusions on Responses to Questions A-G

Question A: With respect to question A, it should be recalled that national survey of respondents showed that out of the 630 respondents surveyed nationally, a total of 239 (37.9%) believed that the current practice of federal constitution had linkages with the conflicts in the country. This was against 198 (31.4%) of respondents that were negatively disposed to this opinion and, 114 (18.1%) of the respondents held a neutral. The implication of the comparatively higher ratio of respondents favourably disposed to the question was suggestive of the need for the political leadership to institutionalise the operation or practice of a truly federal constitution in the country. And that true federal constitu-

tion should embrace fiscal federalism, devolution of power (responsibilities) to the federating units (i.e. the current 36 states) and separation of state and religion (secularism)

Question B: The analysed data with regard to question B showed an average proportion of 56.9% of respondents across the six geopolitical zones indicated that the current practice of pseudo federalism (unitary constitution) in Nigeria had aided in the destabilisation of the country, as it is insensitive to Nigeria's heterogeneity or diversity. In addition, 341 (53.4%) of 630 respondents surveyed nationally agreed that implementing a unitary system of government or unitary constitution in an ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse society is a recipe for conflict, disharmony and eventual disintegration of such society. This means that the chronicled ethnic and religious conflicts that had bedevilled Nigeria, which had stalled its growth and development, were the result of Nigeria's adoption and practice of unitary system of governance or the over-centralisation of power in the central government.

Question C: Out of the 630 respondents surveyed, a total of 282 (44.8%) agreed that the federal constitution as currently practised in Nigeria had implication for the crisis rocking the country while 192 (30.5%) of the respondents disagreed that the way the Nigerian constitution was currently practiced had implications for the crisis or the series of ethno-religious conflicts and other challenges the country rocking the country. What this implied was that once the constitution is right, Nigeria's developmental challenges which 64.6% of respondents linked to its diversity would fizzle out. The onus is therefore on the executive and the legislature to ensure that a true federal constitution is entrenched. This could be made possible or measured by (i) devolution of power to the federating units; (ii) by recognizing that the central government and the states are coordinates; (iii) by instituting or embracing fiscal federalism as well as secularism.

Question D: Comparatively higher average proportion of 72.5%) or 457 of 630 respondents indicated that all the factors (i.e. ethnic, cultural, religious, socio-economic and political) listed were or could be perceived or assumed as the causes of conflicts in the country, though there were divergences in the ratios they apportioned to each of the factors.

Question E: The responses to the question show that majority of respondents believed that the practice of true federalism including, particularly the devolution of power would have positive effects on the economic sphere by ensuring efficient resource management and on political landscape by ensuring its stability. For instance, with regard to [Q29], 54.4% of respondents believed that efficient resource management by cutting down or eliminating unnecessary duplication and waste of resources would be achieved through devolution of power; 57.5% of respondents were of the views that mutually beneficial policies [Q30] would evolve; 54.6% believed that devolution of power would promote accountability in government [Q31]; 64.3% thought devolution of power would promote trade and economic development [Q32], and finally with respect to [Q33], 64.2% of respondents agreed that devolution of power would enhance growth and development.

Question G: The evaluation of responses to this question showed that a total of 378 of respondents surveyed nationally (i.e. 60.0%) agreed that a truly federal constitution if well-implemented could solve the myriad of problems experienced in the nation. In this connection, the resolution of Nigeria's myriad problems and developmental challenges is functionally related to the adoption and operation of a truly federal constitution.

5.6.11 Why the Hypothesis is Rejected

From the various conclusions drawn from our analyses and evaluations of questions A to G, we therefore reject the hypothesis that postulates that there is no positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-

economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution.

It is obvious from the conclusions that there is indeed a positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution. Alternatively, we can say that the current unitary system of government, which is in defiance of the constitutional requirement that a country with multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion must, of necessity, embrace, adopt and operate a federal constitution, constitutes Nigeria's developmental Achilles' heel. This is because the political instability that unitary system of governance in a country with ethnic/cultural and religious diversity engenders will lead to economic instability, since we cannot, logically, divorce politics from economics. Thus political disturbance will translate to economic disturbance and creates unfavourable environment for investors. Therefore, to create both politically and economically stable environment that is conducive for investment, the correct constitution (truly federal constitution) must be in place. Once the constitution is right, political and economic stability would result and consequently investors' confidence would be restored, leading to increased propensity to invest. As we indicated earlier, increased investments will generate more national income which will in turn lead to increased national savings, et cetera. These progressive economic trends will reverse the familiar vicious cycle of development concept, stabilize the polity and the economy and thus impact positively on the economic welfare and well-being of the nation, which is otherwise called development.

In a nutshell, the kernel of the analysed data and their interpretations are intended to show convincingly that the road map to new Nigeria where there is enduring peace and stability in spite of its diversity is inexorably tied to the adoption and operation of a truly federal constitution. It is this relevant constitution that will address pragmatically Nige-

ria's structural and foundational problems and lead to the achievement of study's set objectives. By and large, the respondents, by their express viewpoints on the five (5) research questions and their derivatives or variants, had been able to demonstrate that adoption and operation of a truly federal constitution was central to resolving our diversity problems, achieving the set objectives of the study and ensuring Nigeria's harmonious co-existence and stability in both the political and economic spheres on a sustainable basis.

5.6.12 Implications of Research Findings

In general terms the implications of this study's findings point inexorably, to the indispensable roles of political leadership and institutional frameworks, particularly the national constitution in resolving Nigeria's structural problems. This is in the sense that Nigeria's post-1914 amalgamation's multifarious problems, including divisions arising from ethnic and religious conflicts as well as the 3-year civil war, are the results of the political leadership's lack of courage to adopt and operate a truly federal constitution that has been acknowledged globally to be central to resolving our multifarious diversity problems, to serving as a road map for achieving the set objectives of the study and for ensuring Nigeria's harmonious co-existence and stability in both the political and economic spheres on a sustainable basis. The fact of this constitution's provisions for fiscal federalism, secularism and devolution of powers to the federating states gives these states the leverage to operate according to their peculiarities, to rely on their resources for developmental purposes and to develop at their own pace, thus eschewing the current struggles for hegemonic dominance. It is in this context that there was recognition of positive correlation between Nigeria's socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution.

The specific implications are: The positive disposition of majority of respondents or stakeholders to reverting to the former 4-region political structure or to adopting the informal 6-geo-political zone structure implies the rejection of unitary constitution that Nigeria is currently operating, and the desire for the formalisation of the 6-geo-political zone structure.

The general perception of political factor as a significant contributor to conflicts implies that once political issues, consisting mainly of politics, political leadership and political engineering initiatives such as relevant constitution and electoral process are right, challenges of nation building including divisions arising from ethnic and religious diversity would be resolved, and Nigeria would largely become stable. In the same vein, that majority of respondents identified ethnic, religious, social, and economic factors as factors having important political leverage, implies the imperatives for political leadership to factor them into the search for constitutional solution for Nigeria's problems. By constitutional solution we are talking about the adoption and operation of a true federal constitution which provisions should be obeyed in order to douse the abilities of these five identified critical factors to cause or instigate conflicts, which are capable of destabilizing the country.

The concurrence of majority of respondents with the fact of both ethnic and religious diversities constituting Nigeria's main problem, the cause of crises rocking the country or constituting a threat to her stability implies a general consensus on the conflictive nature of ethnicity and religion, which *ipso facto* demands the emplacement of a relevant constitution along with Presidential or parliamentary system of government that will enable the nation to harness these diversities for the overall benefit of the nation; thus serving as a practicable solution to crisis-ridden multi-cultural, ethnic, and religious Nigeria.

The fact that, at both national and geo-political levels, respondents believed that relative to National Constitution other policies such as

Federal Character & Indigenization Policies, Land Use Act and Political Zoning were insignificant as conflict fuelling factors implies that that a policy or system is as good as its relevance, its appropriateness, its mode of implementation and its implementers. An extrapolation from this is that there is a unitary constitution-conflict fuelling nexus. And it explains the incidence of perennial ethno-religious conflicts in the country.

In view of the preceding, the study firmly believes that the adoption and operation of federal constitution is the principal Road Map for the envisaged new Nigeria. It is indeed the compass for navigating the tortuous journey to Nigeria of our dreams. Meanwhile, we should be inclined to learn from the South Sudanese and Ethiopian experiences which should open a new vista in constitutional engineering to Nigeria that should become handy in addressing its diversity through a paradigm shift from the current practice of creating states to a six-geo-political zone model that is linguistic or ethnic based, and from the current unitary constitution to a truly federal constitution. This will accord with Akol's (2013) entreaty that, "instead of glossing over or brushing aside our diversity as tribal trivialities, South Sudan and Ethiopia have come to terms with the realities of our diversity, of the realities of the variety of small "nations" which make up an African state within the colonial borders by recognizing that "all cultural values are equal" and by giving it form as well as making ethnic diversity the foundation of their respective constitutions. Thus South Sudan has a 'House of Nationalities' while Ethiopian constitution provides for nine states that are based on ethnicity".

5.7 Summary of Chapter 5

Chapter 5 contains Data Presentation, Analysis and interpretations. It also contains deductions and conclusions from the analyses and interpretations as well as why the hypothesis is rejected. The data collected for the study took cues from study's five (5) research questions and those

other questions derived from them. The research questions focused mainly on national questions such as (a) the implication of diversity for the nation's developmental challenges; (b) how feasible and pragmatic is unitary constitution in a heterogeneous country; (c) what are the effects of devolution of power to the states on different sectors of our economy; (d) the consequences of current practice of federal constitution on Nigeria's political and economic stability, et cetera, et cetera.

A careful look at data interpretations shows that adoption and operation of a truly federal constitution is central to the resolution of Nigeria's developmental challenges, including the perennial conflicts and instability, which are also the by-products of its diversity challenges. Also, it could be observed that responses to the five research questions or their variants were largely positive. Generally, there were consensuses amongst respondents from the north and south of the country in respect of the research questions. However in a few instances, respondents exhibited biases along north-south divide in their views. For instance, with regard to questions on devolution of power to the federating units, retention of the current 36-state political structure and reversal to the old 4-region political structure, the responses were influenced by respondents' geo-political affiliations. However, there was unanimity in the point of views of respondents in rejecting reverting back to the 12-state political structure and a resounding approval of respondents across the six geo-political zones in respect of the adoption of the currently informal 6-zone political structure for the country.

The respondents' positive dispositions to the five (5) research questions or their variants, demonstrated beyond reasonable doubts that adoption and operation of a truly federal constitution was central to resolving our multifarious diversity problems, to achieving the set objectives of the study and to ensuring Nigeria's harmonious co-existence and stability in both the political and economic spheres on a sustainable basis.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This final chapter summarizes the content of the preceding chapters of this study, draws conclusions from them and provides recommendations, which take cognizance of the research findings with respect to respondents' views regarding the 5 research questions or their variants contained in this work. In a nutshell, the study is primarily concerned with how Nigeria could eschew divisions arising from ethno-religious conflicts and ensure its stability in spite of its diversity. In other words the study is about how to make Nigeria work despite the misgivings of the political leaders of the three majority ethnic groups about the 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates, which fused the various nationalities of these protectorates without regard to their diverse cultures and religions. In eschewing diversity-induced conflicts, the study recognizes the imperative to borrow from Switzerland's consociational democracy, a political system that promotes bargaining and representation of conflicting interests to reduce the potential for violence by institutionalizing ethnic pluralism and giving the three groups equivalent power-sharing. We shall now undertake a chapter-by-chapter summary of this work.

6.2 Chapter-by-Chapter Summary

6.2.1 Summary of Chapter 1

Chapter 1 contains the background of the study. That background was the 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates that were made up of diverse nationalities with diverse cultural and religious persuasions by Lord Fredrick Lugard. The chapter reveals that there was no unanimity or consensus among the then political leadership about the desirability or otherwise of the contentious 1914 Amalgamation that metamorphosed to the contraption called Nigeria. As a matter of fact, there were misgivings by some political leaders from the majority ethnic groups about the amalgamation. One of them had described the amalgamation as the mistake of 1914 while another called the product of the amalgamation (Nigeria) a mere geographical expression.

According to the chapter, Nigeria is a diverse or plural society – a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society consisting of over 250 ethnic groups and 3 principal religions – Christianity, Islam and Traditional Worship.

The amalgamation of these diverse nationalities is the singular primary cause of the Nigeria's political problem as it did not factor-in the consequences of bringing together peoples with disparate culture and religion. It was Nigeria's Achilles' heel. However, the chapter discloses that to make amalgamation work or to make Nigeria work in spite of its diversity, Nigeria's political leadership has two options, namely;

- a. To retain Nigeria's post-1914 amalgamation structure "as is" with its structure-induced internal contradictions and conflictive dynamics of multi-ethnic, cultural and religious configurations and irrelevant governance system without efforts by the political leadership, directed at redressing the negativity of the dynamics of Nigeria's heterogeneity;

- b. To tinker with this contentious structure through the emplacement of a constitutional framework that will harness the dynamics of diversity to achieve a strong, virile and stable nation, which without doubt will translate to economic stability and national development.

The choice of any of the two options also presents the political leadership of the three majority ethnic groups in particular the need for them to either allow or disallow their misgivings about the 1914 amalgamation to override their patriotic duty of positively harnessing the diversity such that it did not become conflictive, divisive and destabilising. The overriding desire of political leadership should be the achievement of the objectives of political and economic stability, growth and development of Nigeria.

Finally, this chapter contains the objectives of the study, the statement of the problem the study intends to solve, the methodology the study adopts as well as the hypothesis to be tested.

6.2.2 Summary of Chapter 2

To assist them in the onerous task of providing global perspectives on conflict resolution and management, and in making available the mechanisms for achieving national growth and development, chapter 2 of this work contains the survey of existing literature on the assumed correlation between the multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion and the perennial conflicts arising there-from as well as the consequent political instability and the arrested socio-economic development. There was suggestion that the conflict-potential of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity could be properly understood from the following condensed perspectives of various authors covered in the body of this study:

- Ethnicity/culture and religion are human/people or identity-based, involving intense emotions (emotion of animosity such as

fear, hate, resentment and rage toward the “other” ethnic groups) that could be manipulated by humans to achieve specific ends;

- Diversity implies a mosaic or medley of people with divergent cultures, world-views and religious orientations and beliefs that are hardly compromised;
- Every conflict is about competition between humans for position or resources that are limited or scarce;
- Conflict is about incompatibility of man’s interests, threatened interests, unmet needs, fears of domination, and of losing privileges;
- Conflict is about mankind’s resistance to change, yet change is part and parcel of human existence,
- Conflict is about mankind’s desire for freedom and his insistence on his inalienable rights, and
- Conflict becomes inevitable when the preceding factors converge.

The chapter also presented the theoretical explanations for the conflictive pulls of multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion; the impact they have on stability (both political and economic) and the mechanisms available for harnessing these diversities for positive contributions to national stability and socio-economic development.

The various conflict-specific analyses surveyed in this chapter gave us detailed understanding of the dynamics of a given conflict that is, its nature and causative factors. They were supported by an array of conflict theories and conflict resolution mechanisms available to researchers to afford stakeholders detailed understanding of conflicts vis-à-vis the dynamics of multiplicity of ethnicity, culture and religion in a society as well as the modus operandi for nipping potential conflicts in the bud, or resolving them to the mutual satisfaction and acceptance of parties to the conflicts.

It was, however, emphasized that the availability of the array of theories and analytical tools are by themselves not enough to prevent, terminate or suppress conflict. To resolve conflicts in ways acceptable and satisfactory to parties to the conflicts, it was suggested that state with its institutions must be involved.

Meanwhile, the chapter believed that the reason for Nigeria's post-amalgamation perennial conflicts, which intensified in post-military inter-regnum, could find explanations in mankind's desire for freedom to exercise his unalienable rights without let or hindrance. With the advent of democratic governance and its inherent freedom, Nigerians were expressing themselves, asserting and claiming their rights, which were once curtailed during the military rule. This was in accord with Prazauskas' observation (1991: 581-582) that "the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in multinational states results in the disintegration of the coercive system of checks and controls. This inevitably leads to ethnic flare-ups as ethnic communities begin to organize, to mobilize their members, and to voice their grievances and demands upon the state and each other".

The chapter also provided plausible explanations for the impact of ethnic and religious diversity conflict on stability. It reasoned that violent conflicts leave in their wake destruction of human beings and infrastructures, destabilization of political system and disintegration of national economy. Thus, the chapter drew the following conclusions:

that political instability hinders economic development through its effect on the accumulation of physical and human capital;

that because during period of extreme strife investments are often difficult to reverse, investors will most likely postpone new capital projects until the policy environment clarifies, and that instability (political and economic) is harmful to economic growth and development. Meanwhile, the chapter further revealed the fundamental mutual dependency of economic growth and development. This was in the sense

that economic growth is functionally related to tangible improvement in levels of incomes, savings and investment, and for development there must be a consistent and sustainable or sustained rate of economic growth. The effect of low growth as a result of decline in or low investment was linked to the vicious cycle of development theoretical concept, which argues that low level of investment leads to low level of productivity, which in turn leads to low level of national income that also leads to low level of savings and to low level of investment. The levels of income, savings and investments are critical factors of economic development. Thus for development to take place, there is need for concerted efforts of government to break the vicious cycle of poverty by increasing the levels of income, savings and investment.

The importance of relevant constitutional framework to address perennial conflicts associated with diversity was also underscored in the chapter. It insisted that institutionalization of appropriate constitution is sine-qua-non to averting conflicts and to setting Nigeria on the paths of sustainable growth, development and internal cohesion. In this regard, the chapter supported the institutionalization of federal constitution or federalism, because unlike other constitutions which employ tool of suppression or over-centralised power to control or regulate inter-ethnic/cultural and religious relations, federal constitution or federalism has been found to be a very efficacious and effective tool for inter-ethnic, cultural and religious cooperation, sustained harmony and peaceful cohabitation in diverse society. This preferred constitution must however, embrace fiscal federalism so that the federating units are constitutionally financially independent to discourage the current practice of over-dependence on federal revenue allocations to meet their needs. The political system or the regime type embraced by the country was equally considered relevant to managing ethnically, culturally or religiously heterogeneous society.

With respect to religious conflict arising from multiplicity of religion and the inevitable competition among adherents, the chapter proposed constitutional secularism which provides for separation of state from religion as a panacea. But, there was the need for political will to enforce this constitutional provision.

There were also contained in this chapter insight into why this study incorporated growth theory as a means of articulating policy response to both political and economic instability brought about by ethnic and religious conflicts. It evinced the illogicality of divorcing politics from economics and vice versa. Thus logically political instability could not be divorced from economic instability and vice versa. Just as conflict could be a source of political instability with consequences for destruction of social and economic infrastructures, which would ultimately impact negatively on the national productive capacity, so also economic instability could result in the emasculation of an economy's productive capacity, consequent under-utilization of scarce resources and the inability to meet national objectives of self-sufficiency and self-reliance, which often manifest in deterioration in all development indices- decline in the living standards of the citizenry, increase in poverty level, decrease in foreign exchange earnings, huge external debts and other socio-economic malaise.

6.2.3 Summary of Chapter 3

In chapter 3, the study chronicled the Nigeria's 3-year civil war of 1967-70 and some of the ethnic and religious conflicts across the country. In addition, this chapter x-rayed the impact of these conflicts on Nigeria's development while also giving insights into how to achieve post-conflict harmony and national stability.

The chronicling of the civil war and the various ethno-religious conflicts was aimed at identifying the causes and consequences. The first

fact that emerged was that the conflicts as well as the civil war were avoidable, had the political leadership taken the pains to manage with patriotic intent and without primordial sentiments the 1914 amalgamation of peoples of diverse ethnicity, culture and religion. Instead, Nigeria's diversity had, unfortunately, become a veritable tool for disharmonious co-existence. This was because since independence in 1960, Nigerian leaders had embraced a zero-sum approach that engenders mutual scheming and rivalry by each of the three majority ethnic groups to dominate and control Nigeria's political space, while there was a seeming unanimity among them to subjugate the minority ethnic groups in their individual region of influence. The result was the polarisation along ethnic, religious or regional line, ethnic suspicion, distrust and mutual antagonism and aggression.

Other issues that resonate through out the ethno-religious conflicts covered in chapter 3 were resource ownership/resource control, resource allocation, settler-indigene dichotomy, secularism vis-à-vis constitutional provisions, the roles of the government/state and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) in conflicts. These contentious issues brought into focus the lack of political will to enforce the constitutional provisions with respect to the issues and in accordance with the dictates of federalism as enunciated by Wherea and others, which included fiscal federalism, devolution of more power to the federating units and the enforcement of extant constitutional provisions on secularism – all of which are antidotes to incidences of violent agitations or conflicts.

The chapter emphasised that both federal and state governments could not be absolved of culpability in the chronicled conflicts as they were the instigators of some of the religious or ethnic conflicts in the country to achieve political ends or ensure continual flows of petrodollars.

There were deductions that poverty, unemployment and horizontal inequality were precursors of structural violence or conflicts of whatever

colouration; that the line of demarcation between ethnic and religious conflict was indistinct, as what began as ethnic or religious conflict soon assumed religious or ethnic colouration, and that the high incidence of conflicts in the northern part of Nigeria had much to do with the British colonialists' indirect rule in that part of Nigeria, the divide and rule tactics of the ruling elite and the politicisation of religion by northern politicians.

It had been speculated that the Shariah crisis, the Maitatsine riot and the present Boko Haram insurgency in the north were North's religious cum political tools to make the country ungovernable for the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan (from a minority ethnic group) for daring to complete the tenure of late President Umaru Yar'ardua, for having the tenacity to contest the 2011 Presidential elections and the audacity to now prepare for re-election in 2015 against North's vociferous opposition to this ambition. Consequently, the chapter then declared that the ethno-religious conflicts and political crises in the North were in line with the pursuit of hegemonic power agenda by the Hausa-Fulani oligarch; that the agenda was at the root of oligarch's often times rejection of decentralisation, which federal system of governance dictates; and of oligarch's insistence on 'one north one people principle', in spite of north's obvious heterogeneity.

To achieve post-conflict harmony, the chapter noted its dependence on conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation mechanisms as well as conflict handling styles-all of which were intended to ensure a harmonious co-existence in which peace was eventually internalised among the hither-to conflicting parties or groups. Once peace or harmony is achieved, incidences of political and economic instability, ethnic suspicions and rivalry, grievances, animosity and religious intolerance that usually translate to conflicts would be stemmed. In other words, achieving harmony was concomitant to achieving national stability. In pursuing and achieving societal harmo-

ny/peace on a sustainable basis and as a post-conflict goal, and to prevent a relapse once peace or harmony is achieved, the chapter suggested the embrace of harmony factors that must be factored into individual dealings or social interactions. These factors, which must be pursued for a sustainable post-conflict peaceful co-existence, were identified as *Disintegration Avoidance, Harmony Enhancement and Harmony as Hindrance*.

The chapter identified the causative factors of Nigeria's ethno-religious conflicts and the 1967-70 Civil War. The causes of the ethno-religious conflicts as exemplified by the chronicled conflicts and the 3-year Civil War identified in the chapter are summarized as follows:

6.2.4 Summary of Causes of Nigeria's Civil War and Chronicled Ethnic Conflicts

The causes of Nigeria's civil war of 1967-70 could be located in the lopsided political structure bequeathed by the 1914 amalgamation, which encouraged North's (Hausa-Fulani ethnic group) pursuit of hegemony as well as the East's (Igbo ethnic group) determined efforts or ambition to control and dominate the national public service as a first step towards the realisation of the objective of political leadership of the country. The clash of ambitions of the two ethnic protagonists of the war led to the 15th of January, 1966 military coup d'état and the 29th July, 1966 counter coup, which eventually culminated in the 3-year civil war. Another cause of the civil war was the discovery, exploitation and exportation of crude oil, which potential revenues encouraged and hastened the declaration of the state of Biafra by Lt. Col Ojukwu that took Nigerian state three years to crush.

Meanwhile, the primary cause of ethnic conflicts chronicled in the study was also the 1914 amalgamation, which sowed the seeds of ethnic rivalry, suspicion and animosity, and the fear of imagined or real ethnic

domination and intense struggles against it. This resulted to what is described as indigene-settler dichotomy.

Then there were in the Niger Delta region violent protests against environmental degradation arising from crude oil exploitation and the covert instigation of inter-ethnic conflicts by federal government to protect its interest and those of the multinational oil companies.

6.2.5 Summary of Causes of Chronicled Religious Conflicts

The failure of the political leadership or their lack of political will to enforce constitutional provision on secularism was the principal cause of religious conflicts in the study. The consequence of this lapse was politicisation of religion. Other identified causes were religious intolerance and unregulated religious preaching.

With respect to how conflicts or civil war could impact national development, the chapter rested it on the fact that conflicts engendered both political and economic instability, which leads to decline in national output and in development indices, including welfare, wellbeing and living standards of the citizens. The chapter also showed that ethnicity and religion often played a major role in the success or failure of development efforts in the sense that the greater the ethnic and religious diversity of a country, the more likely there would be internal strife and political instability, and thus the retardation of national growth and development.

6.2.5 Summary of Chapter 4

The chapter deals with the methodology of the study. The researcher employed the use of structured questionnaires, structured interviews and focused group discussions to collect data from stakeholders. For its sample size, it was originally proposed that at least four (4) FGDs, eight (8) interviews would be conducted and 120 questionnaires would be

administered in each of the six (6) GPZs, making a total of twenty four FGDs and forty eight interviews and seven hundred and twenty (720) questionnaires respectively. However, reality on the field caused a change in the original plan. Consequently, there was instead one FGD, 4 interviews and still 120 questionnaires per each of the 6 geo-political zones.

In view of the complex nature of the study, the study, in chapter four employed a variety of methods, both qualitative and quantitative, for its analytical task. Both Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 17.0, Microsoft Excel software and the NVivo software package, which is a Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) computer software package, were used to analyse and evaluate data collected from the field.

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6.2.6 Summary of Chapter 5

The main thrust of chapter five is the exploration of those factors that constitute Nigeria's challenges of nation building and their resolution through relevant constitutional means in order for Nigeria to achieve political and economic stability. These challenges are captured by the study's five (5) research questions or their variants. This chapter also contained data analyses, interpretations, deductions and conclusions, which invariably validated the study's premise that only a true federal

constitution/federalism could salvage Nigeria from its multifarious problems, or that Nigeria's stability is irrevocably linked with the political leadership's will and courage to restructure the country in line with the demand and tenets of federal constitution or federalism.

The respondents' viewpoints on the research questions and the various interpretations they engendered provided the parameters for the achievement of the study's objectives that were assumed to constitute the road map for a new Nigeria.

6.2.7 Roadmap for New Nigeria

The road map for the new Nigeria the study envisages will implement the outcomes of this work which, in the main, aim to resolve those identified factors the study considers constitute the national questions. It will also borrow from the Sudanese and Ethiopian experiences. The pragmatic resolution of the national questions through the adoption and practice of a truly federal constitution as the study will recommend is indispensable. This is considered the first essential step to resolving our diversity problems and other socio-economic issues that constrain our development aspirations.

The chapter underscores the fact of federalism being a veritable constitutional tool for effectively managing diversity problems that include ethno-religious conflicts- the banes of our unity, stability and development. Mauro (1995) has shown that a high level of ethno-linguistic diversity implies a lower level of investment. Also Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic diversity has a direct negative effect on economic growth. What these researchers failed to recognize is the countervailing power of federal constitution with its ability to serve as an antidote to the inevitable conflicts that may arise from ethnic or religious diversity. The chapter believes that in spite of the conflict dimension of ethnic or religious diversity, the nation will be able to harness the best in diver-

sity and launch itself on the path of growth and balanced development under the atmosphere of peace engendered by the institutionalization of federalism. This constitutional option will constitute the compass or roadmap to creating employment and alleviating poverty through optimal utilisation of our resource endowments, or addressing and resolving the contentious national questions, which include indigene-non-indigene dichotomy, minority-majority ethnic group conflict, the Shariah issue, devolution of power, revenue allocation formula, et cetera. The federal constitution, the chapter discloses, will also ensure peaceful co-existence of the diverse ethnic and religious groups as it will guarantee equal access to both political and economic opportunities.

The chapter further discloses that the high incidence of conflicts in societies with large majority-minority ethnic group dichotomy (Horowitz 1985) was attributable to Horowitz's failure to recognise the efficacy of federal system as well as equity in resolving or checkmating the occurrence of such minority-majority ethnic conflicts. It is believed that when there is equity in the allocation and distribution of resources and when there is mutual trust amongst the citizenry, social relationships are enriched, and efforts to douse majority-minority ethnic conflicts succeed and diversity becomes a blessing. This, according to the chapter is without prejudice to the imperative of accommodation of change and differing tendencies of Nigeria's diverse ethnic and religious groups which should shape the Nigeria of the future.

With regard to equal access to political and economic opportunities, the chapter underscored that the six geo-political zone structure recommended by this study would provide the platform for access and the realization of these opportunities. This is on the basis that GPZ would provide for equal representations in the Senate or in the lower House in contrast to the unequal representation engendered by the present 36 state political structure. In other words, the number of seats per geo-political

zone that will be based on equality will be resolved by new federal constitution.

The positions of interviewees and the focus group discussants on how to build our future Nigeria, contained in this chapter in could be summarized as follows:

- Absolute or imperative need to not only adopt and operate a true federal constitution but respect its provisions of fiscal federalism and secularism in order to stop or mitigate the perennial incidence of ethno-religious conflicts. This is because, according to general views of the focus group discussants, there was a positive correlation between the practice of truly federal constitution and the country's stability and development;
- It was opined that there was a negative correlation between how Nigeria currently practised its federal constitution and Nigeria's political stability. Put in another way, the way and manner Nigeria currently practised its federalism including fiscal federalism is positively correlated with the spate of ethno-religious conflicts and other crises the country had been engulfed in and the retardation of Nigeria's growth and development;
- There was need for cultural-value re-orientation with political leadership's emphases on power of love and not on love of power; on religious tolerance; on practice and not precept;
- To correct the misgivings about the 1914 Amalgamation, the stakeholders were of the views that Nigerian political leadership should restructure the country in favour of decentralization, which they believe would lead to the even development of the country through competition, devolution of power/responsibility with resources that federalism engenders;
- There was a consensus that various relevant institutions should be strengthened to engender, accountability, transparency and respect for the rule of law, and

- That politicization of religion to achieve political end, which was pin-pointed as one of the causative factors of religious conflict should be discouraged through education.
- The considered position of this study on Nigeria’s future that is devoid of the current perennial ethno-religious conflicts and consequent instability is that the adoption and operation of a federal constitution is fundamental to the roadmap for the new Nigeria the study anticipates.

Table 6.1 Summary of Focus Group Discussions, and the Interviews

Issues Discussed and Questions Asked	Summary of various perspectives or responses
<p>Perspectives of focus group discussants on reasons for Nigeria’s ethno-religious conflicts, its lack of progress or under-development and the solutions.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Discussants were unanimous on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • inappropriate constitution, • absence of patriotic political leadership, • inappropriate political structure and • mismanagement of Nigeria’s endowments; • as the reasons for Nigeria’s ethno-religious crises and developmental challenges. <p style="text-align: center;">The solutions proffered by discussants could be summarized as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need for divine intervention and guidance; • Need for dialogue; • Need for power of love to transcend love of power • Need for value re-orientation • Need for political restructuring; • Need to adopt and operate true federal constitution

Interview Questions	Responses of Interviewees
1. What are root causes of the ethno-religious crises in Nigeria?	The causes of ethno-religious crises according to interviewees are politicization of religion by virtue of lack of political will to adopt and operate true federal constitution, which provision for secularism is respected.
2. Could the practice of true federalism mitigate or eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?	The interviewees were unanimous in affirming that true federalism would mitigate Nigeria's ethno-religious crises.
3. What are the solutions for mitigating ethno-religious crisis in plural society like Nigeria?	There were also unanimity in proffering as solutions the restructuring of the country, the adoption and operation of true federal constitution including fiscal federalism and secularism and the strengthening of Nigeria's institutions to engender, accountability, transparency and respect for the rule of law.

6.2.8 Rejection of Hypothesis

The analysed data and their interpretations formed the basis for the rejection of the hypothesis postulated that “that there is no positive correlation between Nigeria’s socio-economic development, political stability and the adoption and operation of true federal system/constitution” .The hypothesis was intended to establish the fact that the Nigeria’s divisive and conflictive situations as well as its stifled growth and development have a lot to do with the incorrect operation of federal constitution/federalism including fiscal federalism and secularism.

6.3 Conclusions

In the light of the facts that emerged from the study which were corroborated by the results of the data analyses, evaluation and interpretations carried out, it can be emphatically concluded that the associative roles of appropriate and relevant constitution, political system, courageous political leadership and good governance are indispensable tools

in the search for stability amidst our conflict-prone ethnic/cultural and religious diversity.

Furthermore, the all-encompassing strategic role of constitution which, according to Virelli, (2012:111) provides the framework for rule-making and the final word on how government functions or according to Wikipedia- the free encyclopaedia, is a set of fundamental principles or established precedents according to which a state or other organisation is governed, becomes a veritable tool in the hands of the representatives of the people for correcting every noted foundational and structural anomalies. Put another way, constitution can be used to harness the dynamics of diversity within a given country to achieve unity and stability and sustainable development.

Added to the preceding should be the recognition that the undertaken patriotic inquiry-endeavours must also engender an understanding that it is not enough to declare that there is the need to harness our diversity to achieve political stability and, by extension, economic stability, the declaration must be backed by concerted efforts of Nigerians to strive to transit from the negative impression about the 1914 amalgamation to conscious efforts to make the union work through institution and practice of relevant or appropriate constitution. This, in a way, acknowledges and underscores the pre-eminence of correct constitution or constitutional framework for addressing the foundational error and structural deficiency which Nigeria's diversity or the 1914 amalgamation of disparate peoples and cultures had foisted on the country. This conclusion is anchored on the fact of a constitution being the foundation for a strong and virile nation. It is therefore the onerous responsibility of political leadership to evolve or fashion out relevant and appropriate constitution as well as a cost-effective political system (recognised as presidential/parliamentary democracy) that is complemented by good governance that would inevitably address and successfully resolve pragmatically Nigeria's structural problem, the divisive and conflictive

ethno-religious and cultural configurations and the growth and developmental challenges.

Without a doubt, the interpretations of the analysed data confirm the foundational role of the federal constitution, without which diversity becomes a trigger of conflicts and even civil war. Countries like Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia and Tanzania with diversity conundrum enjoy relative peace and stability because they adopt and operate true federalism. However, it would be helpful if this constitution is complemented by dialogue and mutual trust among the various ethnic or religious groups.

From the overview of the interpretations of the analysed data, it could further be concluded that conflicts and divisions in the country are products of political leadership's lack of political will and courage to resolve to practise or operate a truly federal constitution that embodies the fiscal federalism and secularism provisions. This means that the operation of this constitution should conform to its acknowledged attributes or characteristics of timelessness and accommodating of the "mosaic of diversities" (Osaghae, 1989) and "the sociological mixed grill" (Soroma, 1983) that Nigeria is.

The study has not only been able to identify causative factors of Nigeria's developmental challenges, it has also been able to establish that divisions, acrimonies, and destructions- by-products of conflicts, could be avoided if the political leadership realised the imperative of the choice and pursuit of stability as an indispensable weapon for harnessing the dynamics of diversity for realizing national developmental objectives, which are critical antidotes to consequences of conflicts.

6.3.1 Nigeria's Political Leadership's Skewed Perspectives on Federalism

Generally, the literature reviewed and the analysed data copiously revealed Nigeria's political leadership's skewed visions or perspectives

on the federal constitution/federalism imperatives vis-à-vis Nigeria's diversity and what the end-game should be- divisions in conflict or stability in diversity.

What are the attributes of federalism? A federal constitution sets up a federal system/federalism and provides the modality or mechanism for the operation of the system. Without prejudice to Wheare's universally accepted definition of federalism referred to in the introduction to this work, this study further embraces or recognizes other insights on the term. For instance, the 2008 Bern Conference defines federalism/federal system and differentiates it from federal government thus: "Federalism refers to a system of somewhat autonomous units (the "constituent units") brought together under one unified system (the "federal government"). Typically, the federal government has limited functions that are thought to be important to all the constituent units and which the separate constituents would not be able to easily perform on their own – this means that a vertical allocation of responsibilities must occur between the federal level and the constituent level.

Irabor (2011) views federalism as an arrangement whereby powers within a multi-national country are shared between a central authority and a number of regionalized governments in such a way that each unit, including this central authority, exists as a government separately and independently from the others. Klaus-Dieter Schnapauf identifies the following as core attributes of federal system as:

- Promoting the division of powers, strengthening the rule of law
- Strengthening democratic legitimacy
- Promoting political competition
- Promoting social development

Federalism thrives on decentralisation or devolution of power, which according to Forje (2006:2) creates opportunities to improve efficiency in governance and in the delivery of services just as it narrows the gap between expected performance and actual performance of government.

What we can deduce from these various insights is that federal system is concerned with sharing of powers between central/federal government and the federating units. Its fundamental characteristic is that neither the central nor the federating units (State governments with respect to Nigeria) is subordinate to each other, but rather the two are coordinate and independent. But in spite of this non-subordination principle, it should be recognized that there is however a common subordination of the two levels to the Nigerian constitution; and a limited subordination in domains where each of these two levels has jurisdiction.

Above all, it should be emphasised that federalism is a suitable system for managing diversity as it promotes balance and cooperation amongst the constituent units. It discountenances or counteracts tendencies towards extremes and inflexibility of central and regional governments because it is guided by rule of law.

Meanwhile, the current federal constitution in operation in the country is more or less unitary in conception and practice, because it shuns the characteristics and attributes of federal system, which include decentralisation, devolution of power and responsibility to the federating units, fiscal federalism, the recognition of the federating units as co-equal partners of the central government and others cited in the preceding paragraph.

As a result of the over-concentration of power in the central government, there is unhealthy competition or scheming for control of central government or the domination of key institutions of government by one ethnic group, thus violating Coller and Hoeffler's (ibid) Grievance model that stipulates that increase in ethnic dominance will increase the chances of civil conflict. And importantly, the over-concentration of power in the federal government has constituted impediments to peace and national stability.

6.3.2 Nigeria's Unity and Stability Call for Patriotic Engagements

From the review of the series of ethnic and religious conflicts for this study, we could conclude that politicians and governments (federal and state), particularly federal government could not be exonerated from being willing collaborators or instigators of conflicts as they openly or covertly aided and abetted conflicts in all parts of Nigeria.

By and large, the study could conclude that the ethnification and regionisation of politics and the politicisation of religion, which had spawned the various conflicts and consequent instability, call for patriotic engagement of the political class. We dare to say that unless and until the political class allows patriotism to overshadow ethno-religious sentiments and sectional or regional interest, whatever conflict resolutions arrive at would not be permanent. As the saying goes; 'what goes around comes around'. The political class and leadership must be courageous enough to acknowledge that Nigeria's unity and stability is inexorably tied to three factors, namely:

- a) Adoption and practice of true federal constitution
- b) Respect for and enforcement of the provisions of federal constitution, particularly in respect of separation of state and religion (secularism), and
- c) The restructuring of the country that is guided by the dictates of federal constitution with regard to diversity.

Meanwhile, judging by the fact that majority of respondents asserted that a well implemented federal constitution or the practice of true federalism would impact positively on our diversity, then we could also conclude that the pseudo federalism or the unitary constitution was a big factor in the ethno-religious conflicts, structural imbalance, and declining growth and development that constitute the challenges Nigeria is facing.

Finally, another conclusion that could be drawn from the reviewed literature and the analysed data is that since we could not logically divorce politics from economics, then political instability resulting from ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria will translate to economic instability, which will then impact negatively on the growth and development of the country.

6.4 Recommendations

The recommendations that follow here-under are derived mainly from interpretations of the analysed data including the various deductions and conclusions from them. Lessons learned from the review of extant literature, from the chronicled Nigeria's ethno-religious conflicts and the Nigeria's civil war of 1967-1970 also form significant proportions of these recommendations. Meanwhile, the outcomes of the focus group discussions (FGDs) as well as interviewees' informed contributions constitute invaluable inputs for the recommendations.

The recommendations address the many thorny issues that constitute the Nigeria's national questions, which Nigeria's political leadership have failed to address for reasons that are not altruistic.

6.4.1 Convocation of a Sovereign National Conference

A stanza of the old Nigerian national anthem said; "though tribe and tongue may differ, in brotherhood we stand". The anthem was implying that despite our diversity, we can still live in love, harmony and unity. However, this is not automatic, the political class, the political leadership and all Nigerians have responsibility to evolve a tool or mechanism to achieve this goal. That indispensable mechanism is the constitution. The constitution is the foundation on which a united, strong and virile nation is built. Having accepted from the data analysed that there was a correlation between a conflict-free and stable nation, and federal consti-

tution; that having also shown from the research findings that Nigeria is currently operating a pseudo-federal constitution or unitary constitution, which is an anathema to developmental and political stability objectives of Nigeria, and constitution being an autobiography of a country, it is hereby recommended that Nigeria's political leadership should resolve to bequeath to Nigerians a federal constitution which dictates and provisions would be respected and enforced to the letter. This would come about through the convocation of a sovereign national conference.

We recall that majority of respondents had emphasised the need for dialogue or conference of ethnic nationalities as a pre-requisite for sustainable peace among the diverse ethnic and religious groups that make-up Nigeria, which by extension make for the unity of the country. The conference would be mandated to come up with a federal constitution that would address thorny issues such as (1) political restructuring, (2) state-religion relationship/secularism, (3) devolution of powers, (4) fiscal federalism, (5) settler-indigene dichotomy/indigeneship-residency issue, (6) poverty, unemployment and other related socio-economic issues.

It is necessary that we emphasise that all issues that would ensure the survival of the country must be discussed. In other words, there should not be 'no-go-areas' for deliberations at the conference. This was because throughout the research findings, one thing that clearly stood out was the need to deliberate on all issues that would ensure the survival of Nigeria and that would make a great nation out of the Nigeria that, currently, has not been able to realise its full potential for greatness. In this connection, emplacing 'no-go-areas' or the non-negotiability of Nigeria's unity or union official stance would not only be absurd, it would amount to postponing Nigeria's evil days.

6.4.2 Lessons from the 2014 Referendum on Scotland's Continued Membership of the United Kingdom

Instead of the political leadership dismissing the call for a Sovereign national Conference with the absurd stance that Nigeria's unity or union is non-negotiable, government should condescend to learn a few lessons from 18th September, 2014 referendum on Scotland's continued membership of the United Kingdom. Had the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom been obdurate and adamant on foreclosing Scottish referendum issue, it would not have been possible to know that majority of the people of Scotland still wanted to remain members of the United Kingdom. The implication of Scotland's successful referendum for Nigeria is that it is high time that the federal government of Nigeria stopped stirring a hornet's nest by its stubborn embrace of farcical conference like the just concluded national conference as alternative to sovereign national conference or national referendum on Nigerian union. The study believes that the ability of Nigeria's political leadership to borrow from United Kingdom's approach to the Scotland referendum would be a boon to Nigeria's leadership in the West African sub-region and its claim to membership of civilized global community and its ethos in the resolution of serious governance issues. The official position should be the facilitation of conference proceedings for productive outcomes.

Unfortunately, the just concluded national confab where various ethnic and religious groups and other bodies had met to fashion out modality for Nigeria's future had somehow not lived to expectations. The 'no-go-areas' for deliberations, that is the exclusion of Nigeria's divisibility in the ongoing talks, became a contentious issue. Some have argued that making certain themes no-go- areas restrict the "openness" of the conversation. They contended that all issues should be open for discussion without let or hindrance, while the ultimate goal of the conference should be the production of acceptable and relevant constitution that would, for instance, address the all-important devolution of power issue.

Figure 6.1: President Jonathan taking pictures with select National Confab Delegates



Source: The Sun News, May 29, 2014. www.sunnewsonline.com

6.4.3 Political Will to Create Environment Conducive to Productive Economic Engagements

The research outcome has shown the interplay of unemployment, poverty and inequity in the ethno-religious conflicts, militancy and the current insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria and the country as a whole. It should be noted that unemployment, poverty, unequal access to opportunities, and inequity create disaffections. As some respondents opined, it is difficult to separate poverty and unemployment from violence. The disaffected or the disgruntled elements soon become easy targets for manipulation and mobilisation for sinister purposes as evidenced in the religious conflicts in the north or the militancy in the south-south. In view of this, government at all levels should endeavour to create job opportunities, and should be equal opportunity employers. With regard to equal opportunity employment, the extant federal character principle must be strengthened, but should not be a tool for punishing or sacrificing merit. In that connection and in order that the principle might achieve its objectives of equity and merit in the public sector, the

Federal character Commission should be removed from the pervasive influence of the political class by ensuring that the agency is headed by a career civil servant who would be under the superintendence of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation.

6.4.4 Political Restructuring-Argument in Favour of Six (6) Geo-Political Zonal Structure for Nigeria

Research findings on the type of political structure that should be recommended for Nigeria revealed from “National Overview”, an overwhelming support for a reversion to a 4-region structure, while on geo-political basis there was a division between North and South with regard to retention of the current 36-state structure for the country. The North preferred the retention of the existing 36-state political structure while the South rejected it. The North’s acceptance of the 36-state political structure was obviously borne out of misunderstanding of the “devolution of power concept” and the preference for current unitary system of governance. The respondents unfortunately seemed to equate the devolution of power concept with number of states or creation of more states. But devolution of power simply means ceding more responsibilities to the federating units from the Exclusive Legislative List, while reducing the central government’s responsibilities to its traditional statutory responsibilities for defence, external affairs, currency/monetary policy, et cetera. Currently in Nigeria, the central government has dominance in the Exclusive Legislative list while the states derive their responsibilities mainly from the Concurrent Legislative list.

In view of the respondents’ inadequate understanding of devolution of power concept, this study recommends a constitutional approval for a 6-Geo-political zone structure for the country. It is cost-effective. It could be a catalyst for national development as more funds are freed from mostly unviable 36-state structure and made available to the 6 geo-political zones for capital development. Currently, the largely unviable

36 states in operation are dependent on revenue from the federation account, which they utilised almost entirely on recurrent expenditures with little or nothing left for capital expenditure.

The rejection of a reversion to 4-region political structure, and by inference the 6-geo-political zone arrangement for the country by respondents from the north could not have been altruistic. As we indicated earlier, the 4-region or 6-geopolitical zone structure was more cost effective, equity-inspired and captured the essence of federalism. This is against the backdrop that political zoning is a political engineering ingenuity designed to give every zone of the country a sense of belonging by ensuring that no zone is excluded from access to the presidency. However, north was not in any way ready to accept this for motives that could not have been altruistic. The rejection, however, sadly revealed the north's hegemonic power interest and the domination of Nigeria's political space, which the current 36-state structure and unitary system of governance represent.

Will the rejection of the 6-geo-political zone political structure be in the longer-term political interest of the north? It is doubtful! This is because if the north wins the 2015 presidential election and ipso facto, Jonathan is denied second term, the South-South zone where the current president belongs will pay back the north in its coin by making the country ungovernable (as the north is allegedly presently doing to Jonathan Administration). The South-South (also called the Niger-Delta region) will definitely aim at economic jugular of the country by destroying oil and gas installations and reducing Nigeria's oil export and oil revenue, which accounts for almost 90% of national revenue sources, to almost zero. This will signal the beginning of the end of Nigeria as a nation. This is, unfortunately, the end-game the sponsors of Boko Haram, those who are opposed to the 6 geo-political zone structure and those pursuing hegemonic power, are myopic enough not to see.

6.4.5 Political Power Sharing Arrangement

The bane of Nigeria's political stability is the inequitable access to political power by its three majority-ethnic groups namely, Hausa-Fulani, Igbos and Yoruba and the minority ethnic groups, and the tendency of each of the majority ethnic groups to wanting to dominate political power. Thus political succession has, consequently, become a do-or-die affair-the equivalent of war. This do-or-die politics or the politics of domination had been fingered as one the causative factors of the three-year civil war and the series of ethno-religious conflicts chronicled in this study. In consideration of the need for political stability and equity, this study recommends a political sharing formula that would involve:

- a. A. Office of the President of the federal Republic of Nigeria; the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Finance;
- b. B. Office of the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
- c. C. Speaker of House of Representatives, and
- d. D. President of the Senate.

Category A: With respect to this category, it is recommended that the offices there-in should rotate amongst the three majority ethnic groups. The offices in this category should be for two (2) terms of four (4) years per term. The process shall be as follows: If the holder of the office of the President is Hausa-Fulani, an Igbo would be at the helms in the Ministry of Defence while a Yoruba would head the Ministry of Finance; when an Igbo is the President, the Ministry of Defence would be held by a Yoruba while a Hausa-Fulani would hold sway at the Ministry of Finance. Under no circumstance shall persons belonging to the same ethnic group be the political heads of the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources.

Category B: This office would be ceded to the minority ethnic groups of the North and South. This is because, currently, the office is often rotated amongst the three majority ethnic groups and also because it would be easier for the proverbial camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a minority candidate to win a presidential election in Nigeria or even be considered for the office of the Vice President no matter his superlative qualifications. But, by default a minority Vice President could become the President as exemplified by the current President of the Federal republic of Nigeria. Meanwhile, we should underscore the need to, constitutionally, recognise their legitimate right to contest for the highest political office in the federation.

On the surface, this recommendation with respect to the office of Vice president and its cession to the minority ethnic group would attract virulent condemnation for its negation of democratic principles, or its breach of the fundamental human rights of the minority ethnic group or for falling short of acceptable democratic standards, particularly when it is viewed through the prism of developed democracies of the West. But further deep reflections on it and the crudity of Nigeria's democratic practices would show that it is, nonetheless, altruistic and a reflection of the underdeveloped state of our electoral system.

There is no doubting the fact that in this 21st century Nigeria, a qualified minority candidate could be a hard-sell for the office of the president and thus has to be consigned to the office of vice president is a sad commentary on our political development. May be as we advance in our political development, one day a candidate for the highest political office of the land would not be judged by his minority status but by his qualifications and the content of his character.

It must, however, be underscored that this recommendation would not have been necessary had the 2014 national conference's recommendation to the effect that offices, including the presidency should rotate

between North and South of the country, and amongst the six geopolitical zones had been made a constitutional provision.

Category C: Under this category, it is recommended that the Speakership of the House of Representatives should be ceded to the ethnic minority of the North Central and North East Geo-political Zones. The duration for speakership would be for a 2 term of four (4) years per term.

Category D: With respect to this category, it is recommended that the office of the President of the Senate should be ceded to the ethnic minorities of the South-South Geo-political Zone.

With regard to categories A, B, C and D, it is also recommended that there should be a constitutional backing for the principle of rotation for those offices among majority and minority ethnic groups in Nigeria.

6.4.6 Devolution of Powers and Fiscal Federalism

To whom much is given much is expected. By virtue of our preceding recommendation that the federating units (call them the 6 geopolitical zones), should have predominance of the Exclusive Legislative list, it means the federating units would have more responsibilities. It is also suggestive of the rationale for this study's recommendation for the empowerment of these federating units to identify various sources of revenue within their areas of jurisdiction from which to generate and retain the revenue while paying the central government the stipulated tax ratio for the maintenance of its statutory responsibilities. The study believes that the recommendation will constitute a paradigm shift from the current revenue sharing mentality to innovative and optimal revenue generation mentality, which will lead to prioritized expenditure programme.

This state or zonal autonomy was in accord with the findings of this research, which had shown, that a significant number of respondents

were in support of an autonomous form of government. The Gowon administration in 1967 kicked against this form of government because of the fallout of the Civil War. It was the thinking of his administration that the Civil War was possible because of Eastern region's autonomy. Nevertheless, there must be constitutional provisions to check excesses of federating units or that will make it difficult, if not impossible, for any of the federating units to hold the whole of the country to ransom.

6.4.7 Strengthening of our Institutions

From this research, the need for the government of the day to strengthen its institutions and make them independent and strong enough to discharge their functions without fear, favour or interference was obvious. Chief among the institutions that need strengthening and independence are the Judiciary, Electoral Commission, Police and other security agencies. This is because of the belief of the study in what Crawford (1998; *ibid*) considered as the ability of institutions to both constrain behaviour and provide incentives for cooperation and compliance in norms, rules, and procedures for allocation, participation, representation, and accountability; and in the belief in the important role institutions play, which, according to Bojana Blagojevic (2009), lay in regulating the level of the conflict potential of ethnicity as well as in defining inter-ethnic relationships.

6.4.8 Settler-Indigene Dichotomy and State of Residence versus State of Origin

One of the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts, according to revelation from the chronicled ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, was the distinction between an indigene and a settler in every state of the federation. Indigenehip confers on the indigenes undue advantage and disproportionate opportunities both in economic and social spheres. This generates an-

tagonistic relationships and tends to create an environment that was conducive to inter-ethnic competition and rivalry and ethnic dominance. The new federal constitution being planned should abolish indigeneship, and “State of Residence” should replace “State of Origin”. This would help to achieve the homogeneity that the country requires. Soon Nigerians would begin to live in all the zones not as Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba or other minorities but as Nigerian. Lagos state government was taking that step when it appointed an Igbo man as a Commissioner for Economic Planning.

When the country becomes really homogenous, a Hausa man or woman from the north may vie for governorship or any elective post in the South East and vice versa win. This will instil in Nigerians a sense of belonging and patriotism.

6.4.9 The State and Religion (Secularism)

Secularism, we should recall, is ‘an ideology that holds that religious issues should not be the basis of Politics, or (in the extreme) that religion has no place in public life’, and that it essentially seeks to preserve the religious neutrality of government and cultures (Omotola, 2007).

The 1999 Nigerian constitution provides in section 10(1) that ‘the government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion’ (FRN, 1999). This provision is further strengthened by section 38 (1-3) of the constitution, which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Section 38(1) stipulates:

Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance (FRN, 1999). But despite the constitutional provisions, the indiscretion of politicizing religion or the involvement of the

state in religious matters, which had led to the encroachment on, or the breach of the provision of constitutional secularism, and religious intolerance still persists in Nigeria. It is therefore the responsibility of the political class to adhere strictly to these constitutional provisions for the sake of peaceful co-existence amongst the various religious adherents in the country.

The various umbrella organisations for the two received religions have responsibility for inculcating a culture of tolerance and restraint in their adherents. The organisations should ensure that their adherents exercise extreme caution in their proselytising engagements and sermonizing. They should be made to understand that there is no compulsion in religion and that peace is a central theme in the tenets of all religions.

6.4.10 Stemming the Boko Haram Insurgency and its Resurgence elsewhere in Nigeria

The primary cause of Boko Haram insurgency had been located largely in Gurr's relative deprivation and cognitive dissonance theory that lent credence to the fact that the deprived, the impoverished, the disgruntled and discontented elements of the society are easily mobilised for sinister religious purpose by politicians. In that regard, it becomes imperative that the socio-economic environment that breeds deprivation, disgruntlement, impoverishment and discontent must be addressed by the state through the creation of employment opportunities and equal access to economic opportunities. This is because the interplay of unemployment, poverty and inequity had been implicated in most of the ethno-religious conflicts, particularly the current Boko Haram insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria.

The politicisation of religion by the political entrepreneurs must also be addressed through strict adherence to constitutional provision on

secularism as well as regulation of religious preaching in order to stem inciting and offensive preaching.

Government must rely on combination of stick and carrot strategy in dealing with the insurgency. This means that government must realise that military strategy alone cannot defeat the insurgents but must combine it with carrot strategy that would address their grievances.

The civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should play the role of inculcating in the youths and other members of the society the necessity to place civic responsibility above religious obligations and the essence of peace and harmony as a prerequisite for societal progress.

6.4.11 Inculcation of Culture of Peace and Harmony

Peace is the most-sought-after universal social concept because of its intrinsic value as a national stabiliser. Without peace or harmony societal progress is hindered, as no society or nation can thrive under atmosphere of uncertainty created by violence or violent conflict. It is for this reason that peace or harmony should not only be cultivated by society, it should be inculcated in the citizenry. The study recommends the Western Conflict Framework and the Asian Harmony Model for adoption and practice by Nigeria's political leadership, the political class, ethnic and religious groups. This is because of the emphasis of Western conflict framework on *Negotiation* or *Give and Take Principle*, and because of the Harmony model's motives of *Disintegration avoidance and Harmony enhancement* with such conflict handling styles as *compromise, avoiding and integrating*.

6.4.12 Equal Representation per the 6-Geo-Political Zone to Promote Ethnic and Regional Harmony

One of the pre-conditions for harmony in an ethnically diverse society is social justice, which in the context of this work embraces equality of representation and other inalienable rights such as civil right. A situation where, consequent upon its numerical strength in the National Assembly, a part of the country can determine the fate of the whole country is dangerous. This is because that part (region) can misuse the numerical advantage for sinister, unpatriotic or less than altruistic purposes. It is absolutely inconceivable that under such condition democracy, democratic practices and harmonious co-existence would be deepened. Unless and until this abnormality is corrected, conflict will be inevitable. It is for this reason that the 6-geo-political zone governance structure with equal representation per zone in the National Assembly should be institutionalized or made constitutional. This would result to ethnic or regional harmony.

6.4.13 Suggested Areas for Further Research

It is hereby suggested that in future, interested researchers should direct further research efforts towards the under listed areas:

- a. Determine that if Nigeria is restructured on linguistic basis with appropriate constitution, it could serve as panacea for its perennial conflicts and consequent instability.

Awolowo (1981: 91) has hypothesized that “If a country is bi-lingual or multi-lingual, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organized on a linguistic basis”. Could it be assumed then that once Nigeria or any country with diversity conundrum is restructured along linguistic line, but with appropriate constitution, such country would enjoy some measure of stability and progress? There is the need to find out the truth about that through a detailed study.

- a. Determine if oil resource endowment is the trigger of conflicts and the bane of Nigeria's development or ethnic and religious diversity is the culprit.

The quest for determining (b) above is informed by the need to subject the conclusions of Auty and Gelb (2001) that 'point resources' such as minerals, have a particularly strong association with destabilizing social tension, Murshed (2004) that 'point resources' retard democratic and institutional development, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) that "the extent of primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of conflict" as well as the assertion of Fearon and Laitin (2003) that measures of a country's ethnic or religious diversity should be associated with a higher risk of civil war to rigorous research in order to ascertain the truth. Point resources or primary commodity by definition include minerals and oil resource.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Focus Group Discussions

Enugu Focus Group 5

Tunde: Why is Nigeria still the way she is today, and yoked in recurrent conflict?

Uzor: I think it still boils down to one word “LOVE” there is a saying that until the power of love overcome the love of power there won’t be unity, when you love your neighbour like Jesus said as yourself you wouldn’t hurt them, and the reason for these is that we don’t accept others the way we accept ourselves.

(Ebere): I think the problem is intra (i.e. it’s more of personal) because this is how it has been so let’s continue that way, I was born into an Igbo family and I grew up in Yoruba land so I speak the language fluently but that doesn’t matter to my parent because they fill you are an Igbo man you are better than a Yoruba man any day anytime that is what they feel and that is what we believe, Igbo people they believe that in terms of strength and intellect we are better, so when we get to the society and we are faced with sitting down between people of different tribes we tend to stand out because we believe that we are the best, same also a Yoruba man, a Yoruba man comes up and say we are better, so the problem is not what is happening now, I think it has to do with the root (it is lack of

love), we just want to discriminate, we love ourselves more than we love others, Everybody should change their mind-set to love their neighbour regardless of the tribe.

Nneka Osuji: I think is lack of understanding, when every tribe understands the values of each other we will stable.

Chinedu Fabian: From my own point of view, it is political and religious problem, we don't understand that we are serving the same God, people should be allowed to serve the God they wish to serve, and we should join our hands together and work like brothers and sisters.

Francis: The problem we have in this country is based on religious issue, if we believe that we serve the same God all this misunderstanding won't be going on in our country.

Tunde: Do you think that the Biafra war is affecting our unity today, and what can we do to avert another one from happening?

Chinedu Fabian: The stories we were told are not the issue we're having, the issue is what an individual stands to gain, the rich are extracting from the poor, the poor are getting poorer and the rich getting richer every day, that is why we are having money laundering in our country.

Ebere: religion is the opium of people according to Karl Max, the fact that we're not going to fight again is not debatable, if the Yoruba's decides to go on their own are we sure that there won't be problem. Religion is not serving God alone it is more of who you are, how have you been able to show love to your neighbour.

Nneka Osuji: All we need is one Nigeria, because I don't want to experience any War.

Uzor: I think the issue is not splitting, because splitting is not only an issue in Nigeria it is an issue in Spain too, I don't have a problem with Nigeria splitting, if we can manage ourselves then we should split.

Tunde: Do you think that fiscal federalism would help to move Nigeria forward and why?

Uzor: I think we should go back to the practice of true federalism

Tunde: What is the way forward?

Chinedu Fabian: We need to reconcile our differences so that God will answer our prayers, we should forget whatsoever that happened in the past and move forward. And we should try and support whosoever that has been elected.

Ebere: We should try and enforce our laws

Nneka Osuji: We should forget about our tribal differences and come together as one.

Francis: We should not take laws into our own hands; if laws are been enforced things will be going forward.

Rivers Focus Group 2

Monica: why do you think Nigeria is where she is today?

Alfred: I think the problem of Nigeria is corruption and wickedness, the reason is we are in a country were nothing works, not because things cannot work and not because the people are unmanageable, but everybody believes that there is something about me that is better than the person next door and I just have to keep everything for myself, if we can solve the problem with corruption all our problems will be over.

Philips: From my own point of view the root cause is corruption, if corruption is tackled it will go a long way.

Esther Chinenye: our problem is corruption, bad leadership and lack of accountability.

Jesse: No nation can grow without vision, if you study about Nigeria very well we don't talk about vision, dreams, aspiration. The only thing we talk about are the external roads, bridges and jobs, America for example has national dreams and vision that is why they are together. How can we come together;

- We must embrace one another
- We must walk in love
- We must drop our differences and embrace vision

Warri Girl: one of the things that affect Nigeria today is our individual perspective about life, our youth believe in government alone they don't believe in their self, they want the government to take responsibility for everything around the world which is not possible, as individual we have our own roles to play.

Monica: Do you think true federalism will be able to move Nigeria forward?

Esther Chinenye: From my own point of view, the states generating their own fund and using it in their own state would be paramount; the oil producing states are not filling the positive impact of what they are giving out, most of the money comes from the south-south but there is no good road, no electricity, and no water, even the little ones have been taken from them i.e. oil spillage. Each state should generate their own fund and spend it in their own state

Jesse: At first everything will be fine, but in future it will result to anarchy.

Alfred: the regional system of government is still the best option we have if at all we have to remain one Nigeria, I still don't believe in Nigeria, but If Nigeria will remain let us agree on the basis of our existence.

Kaduna Focus Group 6

Monica: Why we are where we are today?

Hausa: The traditional rulers must pray a lot in the education of their people, the Christians and the Muslims are the same people, and corruption has eaten deep into Nigeria politics.

Wale: We need leaders that will try and bring us together and make us see that we are one and help us to develop not to bring about division or diversity. We need to be positive about Nigeria to bring about development.

Mariam Badmus: My own perspective is due to external influence, the problem of ethnicity started during the colonial period.

Monica: What is the way forward, should we be united or should we separate, or even if we are going to unite what will be the basis for our unity?

Hausa: it is better we come together and become one; we should join heads together and work together to achieve a common goal. But when everybody decides to go their own separate ways there won't be peace.

Interpreter: This country is blessed with natural and human resources, we have good documents there is poor implementation, the citizen are not the problem but the government, because the citizen are ready to do whatsoever they are asked to do by the government. We the citizens should come out and vote a credible leader in the upcoming election, we should vote for candidate and not for party.

Mariam Badmus: The best thing is for us to come together to become one and find solution to all the problems we are having in Nigeria.

Wale: When true federalism is practiced it will bring about competition and competition brings about development i.e. if one region is develop-

ing the other region will want to do better, but on the long run the region donating more to the central will want to break up. And we need to stop depending on oil and start looking towards agriculture.

Lagos Focus Group 4

Tunde: What do you think are the problems or challenges facing Nigeria today?

Lukman Saka: Nigeria's problems and challenges were not with us when we got independence they tend to manifest as we progress in our nationhood, their manifestation over the years has tend to become more compounded such that today an average Nigeria will want to ask if there is a basis for us to continue as to exist as one nation, but the seed of the challenges we are facing today have been planted over the years. The problem that has led us to where we are is the problem of leadership; our leaders have failed to effectively utilize natural resources to advance the course of nation's development. Policies decision is taken in the past by leaders without necessarily letting it been informed by national needs and by national interest. Improper management of resources and corruption are serious challenges our nation is facing.

Remi: the first challenge we have as a nation is corruption, corruption tends to grow from one generation to another generation, and one's corruption is out we will have a better Nigeria, and I think our own selfish interest as well, Nigeria is not just a country it is you and me, if we should lookout for the needs of our neighbour whether Hausa, Igbo or Yoruba we will move forward.

Tunji: I believe that there are many issues affecting Nigeria today however, I believe it can all be traced to lack of vision from our leaders, if some certain values can be inculcated into children from within their families I believe this country will get better.

Mrs. Olayinka: it is due to the bad leaders we have in Nigeria, I do pray that one day God will give us somebody like Rawlings as a leader in Ghana he cleared all the previous bad leaders so that Ghana will move forward, so if Nigeria should elect a leader that will take decision on his own I think Nigeria will be a bit better.

Tunde: Do you think that fiscal federalism is the way forward?

Lukman Saka: Federalism has its inherent strength that has not been maximized to the fullest, federalism has its own weaknesses, I think there is a need for a greater decentralization of power back to the states as it was under the first republic where the region is somewhat stronger in terms of their ability to deliver service and to drive regional development which ultimately drives national development. It is not just about devolving resources you have to devolve responsibilities so that resources that were devolved will make meaning, because if you have money and you don't have anything to do with the money the money that you have becomes useless.

Tunji: When the regions become more powerful they will eventually secede, the federal government should devolve resources according to what each states are bringing to the central.

Mrs. Olayinka: The issue is based on bad leadership and not the way our resources are disbursed.

Tunde: Does leadership make fiscal federalism inconsequential or does it make better?

Lukman Saka: of course there is a strong leadership factor irrespective of the nature of the state, irrespective of the forms of state organization, irrespective of the nature of government. It is important we have credible, committed and focused leaders, and it's also important that the citizenship also wake up to their responsibility of holding their leaders

accountable for what they do while in power, the way they do it and why do it the way they do it.

Remi: I think when we get good leaders we will get solution to almost all our problems.

Tunji: Quality leadership is the key if we want to move forward in this country and there should be orientation right from the family which is very important.

Tunde: what will be your advice for moving forward?

Mrs Olayinka: We need a young and vibrant leader in other to move forward.

Tunji: When we instill the values that our fore fathers believed in when they decided to get independence for Nigeria, if we can get those values back it's going to be of tremendous help to this great nation.

Remi: favoritism should be avoided.

Lukman Saka: We need to tackle corruption well with commitment and dedication; we need to sanitize the process of emergence of leader.

Appendix B: Interviews

Adamawa State

Monica: What are the causes of religious crisis in Nigeria?

Emir: As a father, the root causes of ethno religious crisis in Nigeria is selfish interest as an experience man this is how I see it and secondly leaders should be fair and honest, leaders starts from the home because if you have a wife you are a leader.

Monica: Do you think the practice of true federalism can eradicate ethno religious crisis?

Emir: Let's not deceive ourselves; to me democracy is the best system of government because it's the government for the people to the people and by the people, voters should ensure that they put credible people to represent them and if we should have free and fair election whereby people will elect whosoever they want. With that on ground then there will be no problem.

Monica: What solution do you proffer for mitigating ethno-religious crisis?

Emir:

- Whoever is religious should make sure that he contains his own virtues, principles and practice of his own kind being Christian or Muslim and extends the same to those who are with him.
- Religious people should not use their religion as a base to do something different

Monica: What do you think are the root causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Juta: Ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria are a recent thing because two decades ago there was nothing like that, so the root causes are two things;

- Politics-there are people who are not prepared to serve the people and have no good message for people about development and so they hide behind religion and ethnicity, they want to get votes by deceiving people through ethnicity and religion and try to create unnecessary division so as to get votes.
- Lack of unemployment for the youths

Monica: Do you think that the practice of true federalism will help mitigate or eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Juta: it depends on how you define true federalism you have federalism where the center is weak and the states are strong based on division of labor or division of responsibilities, and true federalism will be based on the stage of development of the populace (citizenry), if the citizenry are highly educated then you can have true federalism, so the key factor in getting good federalism is to educate the citizenry when they know their right, they know what they want, they know what they can do then you get true federalism or a true democracy, but where people are not educated, they are hungry, they do not know their left from right you don't expect such citizenry to have what is call true democracy or true federalism.

Monica: In a plural society like Nigeria what solution do you proffer for mitigating these ethno-religious crises?

Juta: To get a stable and purposeful government that can bring unity among the citizenry of a country and there are different ways for instance Gowon way back at 1963 started what we call NYSC where young people are brought from different part of the country into the other part of the country to serve and it's all to create understanding and

unity amongst our people, and through these people become mobile society i.e. moving from one sector of the country to live in the other sector just like the traders do and inter-tribal marriages will occur, you have to first of all educate your citizenry because that is the most important thing that will expose them to each other. And we need to fight unemployment, educate the people and create unity programs then most of these conflicts we are having will be history.

Monica: What do you think are the root causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Professor Steve Azake: Obafemi Awolowo and many others said that the foundation of Nigeria was wrong; it was more of the economic interest of the colonial masters. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country with diverse dialects and languages and we've not been able to accept that fact and to give every ethnic group a fair hearing and understanding their problems and giving them the opportunity to play an active role within the system call Nigeria. Ethnic it means various people, various way of life, various cultures and various traditions etc. you need to allow them express themselves in their own way, language, culture and tradition. One of our problems in Nigeria is that we look at people in terms of state and in a state we have so many dialects and unless you allow each of those groups to express themselves we will have feeling of injustice, unequal opportunities which is the root cause of ethno-religious crisis, and education in terms of developing the people to make what they have important i.e. their dialects, language, way of life, culture and tradition must allow them to express these so that they can feel that they are respected.

Monica: Do you think that the practice of true federalism will help eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Professor Steve Azake: Yes of course the concept of federalism as against that of parliamentary system of government was to allow each

group express themselves, look at their resources, advice themselves on how best to use it and interact with other parts of Nigeria as brothers and sisters and allowing for a healthy competition, allowing for greater participation and opportunities, But by centralizing everything Nigeria just missed the way for greatness. People been appointed for leadership should be prepared for leadership. Hence true federalism is giving every part of the country opportunity to develop themselves and pay appropriate taxes to the center.

Monica: In a plural society like Nigeria what solution do you proffer for mitigating these ethno-religious crisis and what kind of system would lead Nigeria to stability and peace?

Professor Steve Azake: I think federalism should be the best if we are practicing true federalism, the things we should do

- We must identify and agree on a language, language is the number one identity of a people.
- The upcoming conference should have been on ethnic representation, let us give voice to every ethnic group, until we allow various ethnic groups to express themselves we could have another civil war.
- We need to document our tribes not based on assumption, and know our population.

Monica: What do you think are the root causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Dr. Onuoha: fundamentally, we need to emphasize the point that ethno-religious crisis is one of the critical defining features of the post-colonial Nigerian states as way back as the late 1970's we've started having incidence of ethno-religious conflict particularly in the north but I think the most serious outbreak of it was the 1980's period of Asiri vote led

by Mohammed Marwa, after that we've had several incidence of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. Fundamentally, the root causes are;

- The faulty nature of Nigerian states; the way the Nigeria states came to be as a modern nation state is a product of colonial subjugation.
- Secondly, is the faulty nature of Nigerian federal system; during the post independence period when we opted for federal structure so we had a political federalism not matched with fiscal federalism.
- Another critical factor is environmental trends especially exasperated by climate change, increasingly we are seeing livelihood conflict taking more ethno-religious orientation.
- And again, we have a constitution that in itself is propitious to conflict; the constitution expects to see every person as a Nigerian, but if you look at the federal character principle is allocating public offices based on your place of origin and so those who are not from that place are usually not entitled to juicy public offices because when it comes to those appointment people now go back to activate the principle of federal character whereas the constitution expects every Nigerian to be treated on the basis of equality.

Monica: Do you think that the practice of true federalism will help eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Dr. Onuoha: I think to a very large extent it will go a long way to articulating some of the contributing factors underpinning the outbreak and persistence of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria. The multi-ethnic nature of the Nigerian state and the way people have settled over the years is important that we should begin to think and walk around the engineering about having a fiscal federalism in Nigeria. Firstly, there are so much inert potential in Nigerian people that if we go back to fiscal federalism things will be stable.

Monica: In a plural society like Nigeria what solution do you proffer for mitigating these ethno-religious crisis?

Dr. Onuoha: The faulty nature of the Nigerian states is also at the root of the outbreak and persistence of ethno-religious crisis then we must think about what we're going to do about the states. There is need for Nigeria to sit down and discuss on how they are going to form a constituent unit and agree on that.

- The conference should interrogate the issues that agitate the basis of the Nigerian federation so that we will discuss if we should retain something like retaining indignity or settler ship those has to be addressed.
- Must we continue to retain federal character principle? If we are practicing true federalism the federal character shouldn't have been in the constitution.
- And the constitution must clearly reflect Nigerian diversity and through a political engineering process common with innovative mechanisms that will address some of these issues.
- And we need politics based on principles because that is rarely the problem.
- Management of resources; so the principle that has to entrench distributive justice in the way and manner in which political office is been used.
- Bringing strong national institutions; institutions that will promote and sustain physical responsibility.
- If we go to fiscal federalism the states will begin to deal with problems that are quite peculiar to the state and not problems that are peculiar to the country.

Monica: What do you think are the root causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Officer: the federal structure in which we practice is not a bad document; the fundamental reasons are for us as practitioners, or for the politicians, or for the leaders to be able to effectively applied with justice and fairness in mind, for instance one of the critical issues of Nigerian conflict today is rooted in ethno-religious issues which shouldn't be, there has been a lot of discuss on issue of indigene ship and settlers but I've always believed that first and foremost we are Nigerians. The issues of indigene should be taken out of our constitution to allow every Nigerian who has lived in any part of the country, paid his taxes, contributed to the economic growth to also benefit from whatever is available in that community that will give them the sense of belonging. So the root cause is more of socio-economic what I call the bread and butter issues, if everybody is gainfully employed who will have time to start fighting over resource, resource that we don't know how it got there. The issue of federalism needs to be looked at in the sense we need to allow every states to be able to harness, harvest, and exploit the resources at their disposal and there should be an umbrella agreement which every state should contribute to the coffers of the government and the extrusive list of the federal government should be looked at again for the purpose of devolving some issues to the state level so they can have very viable state and the federal government will be taking care of the critical issues of states, the military, the issue of foreign policy and those other things that will help to harmonize and integrate our people much more better. And the issue of unemployment which is a very dangerous trend that we a facing today and in a way is contributory to the insurgency that we are seeing in some part of the north east.

Monica: What do you think are the root causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Dr Ude: there are some factors that cause ethno-religious crisis

- Leadership problem; since 1960 Nigeria has been a little bit unfortunate in having leaders that should be able to drive the countries development and its more prevalent since 1999 the return of democracy that is why we have not been able to put together the ethnic configuration of this country. We need to have purposeful leadership, effective leadership and leaders that transform the society.
- Socio-economic underdevelopment in Nigeria; today we have a population of about 1.2million people living in poverty, about 24% of the Nigerian population that are unemployed all these are triggers that could fuel ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria.
- The structure of the federal system in Nigeria also increases ethno-religious conflict; political parties also align themselves along ethnic lines. The center is too heavy that is why people wants to grab the power at the center and ones people feel marginalized or displaced it results in conflict.
- The issues of people not respecting each other in terms of not understanding the ethnic compositions and even religious affiliations

The solutions will be

- To restructure the federal systems i.e. reduce the power in the center; devolve powers to the federating units, the states and the local government.
- We need to generate jobs for the youths.
- Have a moral reorientation, we need to get the people to come to terms that wealth is important but it's not everything.
- And deliberately we must do something to reduce poverty, measures to create job, measure to provide infrastructure.

Monica: What do you think are the root causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Resp: there are historical factors which are hardly mentioned but which have been carried along as baggage by communities against each other for all these time, and the best place to start is from the colonial period, what the British colonial administration did was to box people together and in the arrangement for local administration in particular lead to historical recollected grievances. The issue of good governance, the issue of inclusiveness is critical to resolving these.

Monica: Do you think that the practice of true federalism will help eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Resp: there is no such thing as true federalism; this is just some Nigerians causing confusion sometimes deliberately. There is no such thing as true federalism anywhere in the world; federalism has come to the world in two ways

- It has resulted from units deciding that it is better we form an association and be one big territory but these are the boundaries. Apart from the mid-western state that was created under a civilian government all the others were created by authoritarian regimes including the colonial ones, so people did not have the opportunity to say this is what they want. Because people are excluded and they don't count for anything that is why they are talking about what they call true federalism which is actually a way of saying give us more states which won't work because that does not equate to having the resources to satisfy the basic needs of the people, at independence we started with three regions but now we ended up with 36 states yet things have not improved. If by true federalism we're talking about devolution i.e. some of the things the federal government is doing ought to be returned to the constituent units as it used to be during the first republic, but we

had an arrangement imposed on us by the unitary character of the military. There are issues the federal government should not border about e.g. agriculture, education etc.

Monica: What type of federalism would you advice we practice?

Resp: The type of federalism we should practice is the one that allows the states more room, they should be weaned to go and fend for themselves it is then that states will discover that they have resources that they never taught they had.

Rivers State

Monica: What do you think are the root causes of ethno- religious crisis in Nigeria?

Ugga Martins: By my knowledge, what I know is that you know this country we were being fused together by our colonial master. It is not out of our making that let stay together. You know when cohesively they are being caged together, they are lot of things they are not free and they might not and the minority right are not well being protected in this country. So when I fell that we cannot stay together freely because when you force me we cannot stay together. So I think that is one of the reasons and when you feel that the other religion is more superior to other religion, simply because am not a Muslim, this discrimination is there, so that is one of the issue I consider.

Monica: Do you think the practice of true federalism could help mitigate or eradicate ethno religious crises in Nigeria?

Ugga Martins: I believe it yeah, but the problem is that we are operating in a unitary system of government. I hope you are getting me. Because when the colonial masters were here, they considered what is called true federalism. And what do you mean be true federalism, it's a situation that you are in charge of the administration, you rule yourself then your

resources (petroleum resources) and other minerals. When you mine them, you sell them and pay tax to the center like what we call now the Abuja. But now the resources of the Nigeria are being managed by the federal government at the central. That is absolutely wrong and that make us to know that we are not practicing what is known as true Federalism. This is a unitary system of government.

Monica: Ok lastly, in the plural society like Nigeria, what solution to you prefer in mitigating ethno religious crisis.

Uga Martins: Yeah we have to talk; we have all the rooms to talk. That is why when the president is saying there must be a conference this and that, we find out that the conference is not open for you willingly to talk and dialogue. By his situation of the conference, we believe what is known as surveying national conference. You must know that in Nigeria we have two sections the minority and the majorities. So if you allow the minority to fully say there mind, how do we go. That refer me to the same thing that you want to cajole everybody. Ok when you say we need a conference, why do we say we need to nominate the so-so number of people that will represent the federal government. All of us are we not members of Nigeria? We all belong to the state we are citizen. Why are saying you are nominating, you give us free hands to say how do we leave together, how do I respect a Hausa man, a Yoruba man, and Ijaw man. I hope you are getting me? We must freely discuss our co-existence and that is very important. So when the president say am going to nominate a so-so number of peoples from the presidency, it means you have a stake in the conference, you want to dictate the direction of the conference which is not good. So that is one of the problem, until you talk freely, discuss the issue affecting the country Nigeria, then we will be having this problem. There is all this sentiment of favoritism, nepotism, you are not from my side, am from my side, and that is why the same time you see corruption. Because as from this table, anything I

get I feed back to the country, this is my own share of what I make from Nigeria. Nobody is willing to sacrifice for this country, nobody has the love of this country even as you are talking, if they say much or how dear do you love this country, you cannot say but in US people stake there life for the love of their country. In Nigeria everybody wants to get from the country, you are not giving back to the country.

Monica: We don't know sir for record purpose if you can please tell us your name?

Upga Martins: yeah I am Mr Upga Martins, Accountant Eleme local government council.

Monica: What do you think are the root causes of ethno religious crisis in Nigeria?

Catherin: First and foremost, Nigeria has wrong foundation, you understand. A situation whereby people were not taken into consideration but because of convenience they just bring them together. We know even siblings of the same parents also have conflicts but those are minor issue but when it come to a federation, there are things that but be put in place before you bring people from differ background together. If siblings of the same parents are having issues, you will find out that they have a rallying point where the will compromise. But the case of Nigeria is bringing people of different places together, so it is not always easy to come to a place where you will say Ok! Let me lose and let you win because we will always have it at the back of our mind that if this man gain am losing. But if they are of the same stock they will know that whichever way if he has it, I also have if. That is the major problem why we have this ethno crisis and religious crisis. Am sure am on the right track? Because of this kind of suspicion, it doesn't mean that in countries where they have a mono religion that they don't have crisis, they still have crisis. Most of their crises are mainly socio economic problems. Those are the things that majorly cause the crises. You can have

disagreement, but when I have to come to crisis, then you have to looking at what is actually causing it.

The problem of Nigeria is not necessary that, the ethnic religious crisis of Kano helped fuel it more because when you are making appointment, you are considering your brother. Is he a Muslim? Can he speak Hausa? Can I speak to him in the board meeting and the rest will not understand. Fine I can and we can understand ourselves. You may not even like me but because of the same religion or we speak the same language you will even appoint me, so that is the major problem. Now when you bring religion and ethnicity into politics, it spoils the whole thing.

Monica: Do you think the practice of true federalism could help mitigate or eradicate ethno religious crises in Nigeria?

Catherin: Talk about true federalism, what is true federalism? Is it what we are practicing in Nigeria, Is it dividing the country into regions is that what you call true federalism? it boils down to taking a lot of things into consideration now when you talk about going back to practice true federalism there are things you have to put into place. If we are coming as a nation and you are splitting us now you want to know, you have to know, and at the end of the day can this people really evolve or develop at their own pace? You find out that in Nigeria it is only crude oil that is the rallying point. Now there are states that were created that cannot even feed for or fend for themselves. Aside the federal allocation you find out they cannot do anything. So you talking about true federalism now means that there are states that do not produce enough though it would start making them to produce enough but then this idea of suspicion would still be there it can still fuel crisis in a country so you want to take into consideration does state too that cannot stand on their own. Take for example when I was in school we talked about Ada-Ada states. If you go to Ada-Ada you find out that they are just an expanse of land without anything there is nothing they can produce to the point of ex-

porting to the next state. How are they going to survive if made a state? Likewise in practicing true federalism are those states or those region, will they be capable of generating what they would use even though at the end something would come from the federation purse but then would they be able to stand on their own. True federalism should take into consideration the weaker states can they really stand on their own? So if we are talking about true federalism and not considering the fact that there are some regions or states who would not be able to stand on their own it becomes a problem. Now when we talk about the regions like we use to have , you know they were very big very big when we talk about true representation it can be a problem you find out that in the whole of rivers state you cannot have somebody up there although there are other factors that they may input you know to make sure that there is this geographical spread but at the end of the day you check, when it was a region and we have our headquarter in Enugu, the eastern region then that was where everything was happening the whole of this place were just adjoin things were not really happening here. So when you talk about regions, you should be able to work out the modality also that will help the region survive, that is what true federalism entails. Also work out a modality to make sure that those areas that are weak in terms of they don't have enough economic power, you also find a way of reaching out to them. That is true federalism if only you know we have the willpower to go down to doing it. So true federalism is accepted like in America they practice true federalism though the presidential type of true federalism. You find out that every state on their own they are capable another thing again is our mind-set it has been glued to the oil and the oil is wasting asset its going at a point it would just go dry. Now what we wait for at the end of every month we work in the local government because we have IGR Internally generated revenue we discovered that with this money coming from the federal allocation nobody is resting on their oars, they don't bother the budget was read couple of

days back and we discovered by the internally generated revenue they said that all these are going to be expended from the general allocation that comes monthly, so you discover that in a community where people are only waiting from hand out coming from above if you say true federalism now, then you have to turn their mind-set to start generating and it would not be an easy one but if it can be sustained on the long run true federalism is the best kind of government. Like in America it is working every states is working hard to generate what they would use to survive, but it all boils down to our mind set.

Monica: in plural society like Nigeria what solution do you proffer for mitigating ethno religious crisis?

Catherin: this is a hard question I don't work on such areas but I know that ethno religious crisis has to do with suspicion. It is fuelled by mere suspicion because you are not my brother the tendency that you would harm me is there ok, or because we don't worship God the same way or because I believe my own mode of worship is better so you should also worship like me. That is what fuels ethno religious crisis. Suspicion. How can we make people understand that this things ought not to be? Now talk about the diversity we have it is also causing this problem. We don't speak the same language, I am talking Igbo you are talking Hausa so the suspicion also comes up, so can we really have a lasting solution to this or are you saying we should have a common language so that virtually everybody understand the next person so that the aspect of suspicion would go off? Are you saying we should disintegrate? But even right here in the office where I work two third of the workforce are from Eleme, I am not from Eleme, two third of the work force are from Elene. Do they unite? You understand what I am trying to say? They still have their differences. Right here in a community where I was staying before in Ebubu right among them they were fighting is it because they were from diverse areas? They are from the same origin you know,

from the same community but they were fighting among themselves they made the place not residable for months sons and daughters from that place terrorizing their own people, so you see.

Monica: that was late last year right?

Catherin: Yes it all boils down to each of the religions not projecting theirs as the best. Religious tolerance if we are able to tolerate each other irrespective of their religion or where they come from. But it would have to come from our pulpits also from our religious center to see the next person as your brother so it has to be the platform of the religious leaders for them to spread it the message of love. Today is Valentine's Day right? The message of love, that the next person is your brother. So there is no clear cut solution to mitigating it. It's not there. Even right in the family they fight right? But when you are able to see everybody as your brother you are able to let go. Sometimes what causes this ethnic crisis is land boundary, land demarcation because a state feels you are encroaching on their land they come to fight for it instead of letting it go, and at the end of the day everybody is smiling because we are able to let go. So there is no clear cut strategy apart from making people understand we are all one irrespective of our diversity.

Mr. Apataonu Andrew

Monica: what are the root causes of the ethno religious crisis in the country?

Andrew: it is growth, when a country is growing, it grows in crime and development. It is growth, nothing is really causing it.

Monica: so do you think the practice of true federalism can help mitigate or eradicate ethno religious crisis?

Andrew: the government in power should wake up and do all they can to reduce the crisis

Monica: in plural society like Nigeria what solutions do you proffer for mitigating ethno religious crisis?

Andrew: It is just like I said before the government should sit up to do more employment, extend development all over to lower area to gradually reduce the crisis.

Lakia (medical lab scientist)

Monica: what do you think are causes of the ethno religious crisis in Nigeria?

Lakia: I think it's because we don't practice true federalism in Nigeria. The northerners see the northerners as his own brother and when you move down south, the southerners sees themselves as people they can always work with. Like what is happening in this kind of a country, when a northerners steals money if he is in power and the people now feels their own people are in power and misuses his office and stills money and does any kind of a thing, those northerners will say he has done anything bad and of course if you move down south here, they will say forget about it, steal money don't steal money and therefore true federalism is not practiced. The next thing you can talk about is the resources that the people under whose land that the resources has been found that sustains the country like the Igoni people, if you go they are leaving in poverty. Can you believe that even up to this state that we are now, there is no single electric pole standing in my own village. Can you believe that? That is Kani, we share boundaries with Bori in Ogoni land. No one electric pole standing there. So when is it going to be done and you say we are in this country. So you can see in this country the level of poverty, we can see the level the people has been subjected to all forms of treatment. But consider the north, on your journey to the north, you will see that the north is like a desert, but see what is been put there. Get to Abuja, Abuja is one of those cities in the world that

anybody can always reckon with. We talk about true federalism on the part of leadership; the people that are being taken are thieves. They are not even the right people. The under whatever disguise but we know them as full time thieves. Initially the bible says if you are faithful in little you will be faithful in much. If they have been tried one time or the other and see they are embezzlers and corrupt people. They are the people you see going to the senate. You see them migrating from house of assembly to house of senate. In true federalism or democracy, people can sit down and say look. This man cannot go, he has no track record. But now they just gang up and ask do you have money. Do they even vote in this country? And does there vote count? In situation where there is true federalism, this practice will not hold.

Edward: so do you think the practice of true federalism can help mitigate or eradicate ethno religious crisis?

Lakia: Yes it's true, if actually that is done, anybody that is rules this country and doing the right thing and is there because of this true federalism am talking, then we make him our leader. We are not going to support like what am telling you when a northerner is there and steals money, the northerner will be very happy and tell to steal money and come home, after all we will defend you. And of course there no place in this country that will take a position and in office and don't still money and rake wealth out of it, you will be like a useless person in your community, they will course you.

Monica: in plural society like Nigeria what solution do you proffer for mitigating ethno religious crisis?

Lakia: That is what we are talking about. One is true federalism, lets practice this, we don't have to politicizes everything thing. Some time we come out and say something reasonable from the moral aspect. We go to churches, new are all Christians and Muslims and all these religious divides talk about moral issues. And what is moral in one can be

moral in all. No Muslims will say Boko Haram continue to kill, then you are not a true Muslims and no Christian will say so, not even the juju men worshipping in shrine will say it because they know the consequences that you don't kill. They don't create life and therefore should not kill. If all of this things to come, we will take ourselves as indivisible person. The north and south is for administrative reasons, the same blood run in us all, so if I take you as my brother and carry these people along, it's only then we have true democracy. But when you consider every three houses as local government and in north they count trees and Nama as human beings, we are as well cheating ourselves. Look at America it's not big politics all the time, they have known what you can do, otherwise Obama would not have been the president by his color position and finances. But the look at what is happening in the United States of America. Somehow they are practicing true democracy and federalism and you can see it.

Abuja - FCT

Monica: What do you think is the root cause of ethnic and religious crisis in Nigeria?

Kingsley: I will say that unfortunately, when Nigeria gained independence, this year we are celebrating 100 years as a people, or as a nation, fortunately when the whites began the discussions of modalities of living together, the north and south, even among the southern people. I will say that we are not really one in that sense. Before the white brought us together, they should have given us that chance to talk, to fashion out modalities on how to live together without problems. That is the real major cause, because there was no initial discussions on the modalities on how we are to live, how we are going to share power, how we are going to relate with each other, different ethnic groups. Because there was no deep rooted discussion and understanding initially. That is being

the real problem of Nigeria the real issue. It didn't start today that's why I don't believe, I am praying though. Until we sit down and talk this is how we are going to live. I want to have respect for a Muslim I don't bother with his religion so long he also gives me respect. The moment we sit down and talk, and have an understanding about each other, I believe this problem will be the thing of the past. Until we do that, really it's going to be difficult.

Monica: Do you think the practice of true federalism could help mitigate or eradicate ethnic religious crisis in Nigeria.

Kingsley: Yeah, what is true federalism, federalism, in fact I want to sincerely thank Dr Alex Ekwueme who brought the idea of regions Southwest, Northeast and Southeast. I mean, geopolitical zones. If we can sit down and agree and devolve powers to this region. Let the centre not be as powerful as it is, let the regions get their resources, manage and remit some, a percentage to the center. So that the center can be used to manage those areas we cannot give back to the region e.g the military, navy, air force and to a large extent the police. So that the regions will know that they have enormous powers to make some certain decisions to affect the areas in which those political zones fall in. I believe sincerely that not only in the federalism as a form of government, but fiscal, the monetary aspect of federalism. Distribute this wealth according to how it is coming. Look at the south south for instance. This is where the bulk of the money comes from. And until you effectively address this issue, we will continue to have these problems: that is the truth. That is why I am happy with what the government is doing through the confab. Let's sit down and talk about how we are going to manage ourselves so that these conflicts, is difficult to eradicate 100%. But let us reduce it to a very manageable level.

Monica: In a plural society like Nigeria, what solutions do you prefer for mitigating religious crisis?

Kingsley: For me, for me, sincerely speaking, it's the same thing I am talking about. Let us sit down and understand each other. The Christian should understand where the Muslim is coming from and the Muslim should know where the Christian is coming from. We will sit down and agree and fashion out ways. First there must be respect: you must respect me as a person and also respect my religion. You don't force your religion on me and I don't force mine on you. In spite of these differences religious differences, ethnic differences, let us take an example of the leaders. Look at Jonathans government there are all the tribes and religions in this government e.g, some Muslims are benefiting from this government they know it's a personal thing he is coming to them, they are benefiting from this government and ready to go to war against those saying that Jonathan cannot come back. What can you say to that? What you can say to that is that Christians and Muslim can leave together. We must learn to respect each other. Let's come to what I have been advocating, the truth of the matter, until we have a president that is ready to change Nigeria sincerely speaking who can sit down, a thinking president, who will sit down and say enough is enough, let us begin to rebuild, let us begin to find a new order of doing things. For instance corruption, I want to deviate, if the president, ordinary person who are working, ministers, special advisers, governor's, members of the national assembly. Sincerely speaking if the president is ready to fight corruption, everybody will sit down and begin to change. Let's begin to talk about the civilian president, Obasanjo would have done something, but he wasn't sincere about it unfortunately. If he had been sincere, he would have begun to order a new way of doing things in Nigeria. That is my take on this. Let us begin to look at the man/woman that is ready to work for Nigeria. That is ready to say enough of this corruption, ethnic problems, religious sincerely from his heart e.g former minister of sport Chief Akinyele, said during Abachas period, he was the chairman, Abacha constituted a national reconciliation commission. Unfortunately,

the man who set up the commission wasn't sincere in reconciling Nigeria. Until we get that leader, president, that is ready to change, you will see that Nigeria will change. Nigerians are good followers. All over, the president and vice president are of different religions and tribes but there are working together, national assembly senate president and deputy are working together, so we can work together in Nigeria. Until we come to sit together and agree on some conditions, the problem will continue. Respect is the key.

Ikenna, Ojenuwah-Regional Youth President (RCCG)

Monica: What do you think is the root cause of ethnic and religious crisis in Nigeria?

Ikenna: Thank you very much for this opportunity. Ethnic and religious crisis in a country like ours that is diversified is a factor that has the tendency of increasing. But I think the main of the issue is in the different ethnic groups that we have. Furthermore, even our institutions encourage us to pursue the religion that appeals to them. But the problem is the interactions between these groups. If we can just but appreciate these differences, rather than make it a criteria for us, when people of small pockets of ethnic groups start seeing themselves as better than the other groups. For instance, in my university days, one of the things I was taught is that there is no culture that supersedes another. So u cannot begin to judge other culture practices of your culture. That's the simple one, and that is what we are yet to get over it in Nigeria. In terms of politics, you can say majority and minority. I think there should be a level playing ground for everybody. There is no such thing .that makes somebody to become major or minor than the other; after all, no man was born equal the way I see it. I think if we break all these perceptions, then we will be going somewhere. So I think it is intolerance.

Monica: Do you think the practice of true federalism could help mitigate or eradicate ethnic religious crisis in Nigeria.

Ikenna; True federalism at best is an ideal state. It's a concept which if it's practiced will help. But does true federalism exist anywhere. But I think it can pave a way towards some solutions, because if we practice it, people will have less misgiving about their welfare in a big state. Because when that is done, I like to think that it will promote to some level some of finance and unity in issues like resource control, hearing of people's voice. Because the issue why this is coming up is because some people think they are not properly represented in the larger picture. So it will help because presently it is very difficult to define what is obtainable in Nigeria.

Monica: In a plural society like Nigeria, what solutions do you prefer for mitigating religious crisis?

Ikenna: When you asked the first question, I talked about the concept of tolerance; I still want to hammer on it, especially when you look at it from the point of view of majority and minority. What I would say is that we need to go beyond I am from this state, I am from this state. When a citizen of America is distressed anywhere, it looks as if the whole country is affected. So I think we should see ourselves as one nation. Then we need to take pain because men generally are afraid of what they don't understand. Because the things they don't understand, they begin to form assumptions that lead to these fracas.

Mr. Udoka, NNPC- Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation

Monica: What do you think is the root cause of ethnic and religious crises in Nigeria?

Udoka: I will answer you with some bullet points. The root cause or causes if there are causes. I think the root cause of ethno religious crisis

is greed, nothing more than that. People who want to get something and they cannot get it. And the fact the person discovers that Nigerians are very religious people. This is an aspect an average Nigeria doesn't play with. And then they discover that the character of the individual possibly also discovers that the only way to get Nigerians very sentimental is to go through religion. So the man is having his own personal agenda, but wants to achieve it through religion. So he mops up peoples sentiment and the resultant effect of that is crisis.

Monica: Do you think the practice of true federalism could help mitigate or eradicate ethnic religious crisis in Nigeria.

Udoka: Again I still go back to the same issue. Let me take you back to the reason why people want more local government to be created. The very reason for this is greed. But they are going to vent it with the belief that it will bring about development. It's greed. I will call it cheap recognition, people who want offices and positions. And the positions they are looking for is to cheat the people and amass wealth through the instrumentality of government. So if u are asking me that problem, I will say no. the crisis is that of leadership because the leadership at the center has failed and at every level. So people think the position is that the crisis in Nigeria leadership at the center has failed, so let us create our own leadership. So my own position is that the real problem is leadership and not segmentation or the practice of federalism.

Monica: In a plural society like Nigeria, what solutions do u prefer for mitigating religious crisis?

Udoka: One of the solution, I should proffer is complex and I don't know how to put it. Our consequence management is very weak in Nigeria. Nigeria is the only place where someone does something and goes scot free. It's the only country where law is activated to punish only perceived political enemies, when someone wants to make cheap political goals, as to build a very strong institution. Let the law reign supreme.

Let people know that there are certain things you must not do and that there are consequences for doing some things. People will learn to behave differently. The idea of religion is a personal thing. I can decide to be a Christian. There are those who become Muslims for the reason that they were born in the north. So you can't force people to become Muslims, Christians or traditionalist. It is a very personal thing. The day the Nigerian government build and strengthens institutions and make consequence management very strong, the earlier the better people learn how to behave. There is nothing wrong with having your church, but you won't force people to come to your church. You can't force people to be a Muslim by killing. The consequence for killing others should be severe. The consequence for stealing money through your position should be very clear. I haven't seen people go to jail because they disobeyed traffic or didn't pay NEPA bill. In other places the person would go to jail.

Rev Simeon Obisike, Pst. Christ Ang. Church

Monica: What do you think is the root cause of ethnic religious crisis in Nigeria?

Rev Simeon: A disconnect from God. 1.) There is an ideal of lifestyle and principles. But because man has deviated from the ideal of God and God himself, that is why there is ethnic and religious crisis. 2.) Religiously, Jesus said He is the light of the whole world. And he said my peace I have given to you. So when we refuse to believe in Jesus, there is crisis. 3.) Individualism: - My desires are not the same as yours, my ideologies and opinions are different. Our schools and religion couldn't unite us in one purpose.

Monica: Do you think the practice of true federalism could help mitigate or eradicate ethnic religious crisis in Nigeria.

Rev Simeon: Yes. The phrase or adjective true federalism will solve the whole issue. But when federalism is not sincere, and when it is selfish, ethnic based, power based. The crisis will continue.

Monica: In a plural society like Nigeria, what solutions do u proffer for mitigating religious crisis.

Rev Simeon: The solution is in our pledge. The pledge is a self-commitment- willingly committed to the cause of the nation and people. If our leaders, people, illiterates, educated will see Nigeria has their own country the ethnic crises will stop; but we have foreigners who rule, i.e. chancellors who don't build in their community. To be faithful means unreserved sincerity and commitment. Even an ordinary classroom teacher writes one thing on the board and go out to do other things. If the doctors will be faithful to the cause of health of an ordinary Nigeria, if the police will be faithful, political leaders will be faithful. The national resources will be used rightly, to serve with all our strength. The military will use their guns on the people they claim to protect. The lawyers will defend them and the judges will collect bribe in order to falsify contracts. Now election is at the corner, and they will maim those who voted for them. Where is the faithfulness, honesty, service with all our heart? When we say arise o compatriots, Nigeria call obey. Which Nigerian call, is it today's Nigerians call that is religiously biased, politically corrupt, economically brutal. I think we need to redefine the call our youths should obey.

Lagos State

Nike: What do you think are the root causes of Ethno-religious crises in Nigeria?

Alhaji: You see, if we think back, during the lifetime of late Pa. Jeremiah Obafemi Awolowo, when he was approached during the sudden

death of his first son- the first Nigerian international lawyer- they first of all told him about the great loss, not to him but to Nigeria. Later on, they asked him, "Papa, what kind of government is suitable for this country?" he said "democratic socialism". Those journalists of those days were bold; as they asked "why democratic socialism?" he said "Nigeria is beleaguered country". It is that beleaguer that where the ethno-religious crises come in because when we say beleaguer, under each language we have so many tribes of which each tribe has its own cultural heritage, religion. For instance, when you say beleaguer, among Yorubas, if you want to go in details, at least not at most, we have 100 different languages in not at most, we have 100 different languages in Yoruba land; now all these people have their own religious practices. For instance, Muslims are among, Christians are among, traditional worshippers are among. What is happening now is not ethno-religious crisis; they just use it to frustrate the government of the day. For instance, if I stray from the scope of your question please pardon me, in the north the people who are with Lucky (Goodluck) Jonathan, who are running the administration with (the) president are Hausa mafia- majority of them- using the Boko Haram as a camouflage. There is nothing like Boko Haram in the Quran neither does it discriminates. They are using that as an avenue to suppress or overthrow the government of Lucky (Goodluck) Jonathan; if Lucky (Goodluck) Jonathan is not supported by Almighty Allah "kata-kata" could have busted before now. So I will tell you that if we think deeply, both Muslims, Christians, traditional worshippers, we are one created by the Almighty Jehovah, Allah. During the time of Chief Olusegun Okikiola Obasanjo there wasn't anything like this. You might be young during his time but have you been told that there was anything like Boko Haram? No! This kind of action you people have taken is very good; it is just (to) know the way and manner to solve the problem. Number two, it is the same thing. For instance, in the north see how these Hausa (people) were killing people callously. If they have the fear

of God in mind they won't go to churches and be slaughtering human beings like goats or cow.

Nike: In all these, Sir, what do you think you think are the root causes of ethno religious crisis?

Alhaji: Ha! The root? I have already said it in my earlier statement. The root is that the Hausa mafia believes that they are (a) "born-to-control" ethnic group. Do you understand me? It is not (the) religious issue. When Obasanjo was there, there was nothing like this; even (when) Babangida, the military president (reigned) there was nothing like this.

Nike: Do you think the practice of true federalism will help mitigate or eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Lucky

Nike: What do you think are the root causes of Ethno-religious crises in Nigeria?

Lucky: Basically, I think it is really a question of certain group Of people or individuals thinking "we are better than the others". Every other reason will grow from that. It is selfishness.

Nike: Do you think the practice of true federalism could help mitigate or eradicate the problem of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Lucky: About that, I think it will mitigate it but it is not going to eradicate it because, even, when you look into our make-up, the make-up of society, you will find section, even hatred in class beyond the family, in villages, hamlets before you start coming to the traditional structures of local government, state government, region. So I think it will do a lot in the practice of true federalism, to mitigate ethno-religious crisis but it won't eradicate it.

Nike: In a plural society, like Nigeria, what solution would you proper for mitigating ethno-religious?

Lucky: First, education. Then in the course of giving education we should look at how to bring (out) more of the things that unite us rather (than) the things that divide us. When you talk of principles like (when) you have sections of the society being given privileges over others just because of their state of origin and all those things; those are more divisive, so practices like that should be stopped and we should reward more of competence rather than all these primordial consequences. And schemes like Unity schools should be encouraged; schemes in our military should be developed along nationalistic ideals; even occupying public office(s) should be based on meritocracy; and for me, one brilliant idea that I think as a people will help, if practiced well, goes I the line of focusing the minds of the youth in the NYSC. So, even sport, our game, when people play sport they forget that someone is from this part or that part or is from that religion; it unites. So, I think, they should be more focused on activities that unite us. There will be many more things to divide but we should not focus on them.

Ajetumobi

Nike: On behalf of Emmanuel Monica, a Ph.D. student, we are conducting interviews on ethno-religious crisis (in Nigeria). May we meet you?

Ajetumobi: My name is Wale Ajetumobi.

Nike: We may need to make a video or audio recording of this interview for the purpose.

Ajetumobi: Of course, you can do that.

Nike: What do you think are the root causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Ajetumobi: The root cause of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria is just simple intolerance. People don't tolerate themselves; people are selfish; they are only concerned about what is due to them alone. They don't want to know what (the) others feel about the same thing they feel. They are selfish. They don't want to know. So, if people can tolerate I believe such thing won't happen in the first place. And ethno-religious has two things: ethnic and religious. So we have to divide that in the sense that Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones, and in the six geopolitical zones we have the Christian and Muslim divide; then in the south it is according to what you believe in. The south is mainly Christian and the north mainly Muslim whereas we have more Muslims in the south and more of Christians in the north. So if they can tolerate themselves religiously, like where I live there is a church opposite a mosque and since I have been living on that street I have never witnessed any friction between them. So that is what we are trying to say here (that one is on a religious angle). Then coming to the ethnic angle I am a Yoruba man, (I don't know if you are an Ibo girl), so (in) my opinion of the other person, an Ibo girl, a Hausa girl, will I be able to tolerate what I tolerate from my own people? (So), we have to promote this. (So) ethno-religious strife in Nigeria has its own history but then the only solution, to me, is just to tolerate one another.

Nike: Thank you, Mr. Wale. Do you think the practice of true federalism will help mitigate or eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Ajetumobi: Yes. To an extent because the problem we are having at hand is very deep, in the sense that our leaders don't appreciate our diversity. Federalism, according to what we read in Government, is just for federating units to govern themselves; people with the same background, people with the same religion, people with (of) the same tongue to be together and govern themselves. Of course it is a good idea but then in another way you have to, even within the same family you're still going to have somebody who say that "I am very different, that is

my brother, that is my sister but me I am very different”. So that is just that. But federalism solving the ethno-religious crisis, that is (is that) your question (?). Well, to an extent, it will. I believe that substantially it can. Truly it can. Federalism, if like Yoruba state, the south-west, if people like Fashola is leader here people will respect him more, say(ing) “this is our leader. We don’t need (to be) concerned with whatever (that) is happening at the center”. What we used to have in Awolowo’s time, like people respected Awolowo because he was seen as their president. People never saw Zik as the president because we believed that whatever they wanted they asked him directly before going to the federal. So people with (of) the same tongue can promote peace if they are together.

Nike: The last question, sir. In a plural society, like Nigeria, what solution would you proffer to mitigate ethno-religious crisis?

Ajetumobi: In a plural society like Nigeria, the solution is just to tolerate one another. That is just the simple message here; to tolerate one another.

Nike: Thank you, Sir.

Wale

Wale: You see that you bring them along. So we have a problem whereby we are not properly defined as a people; we have not properly defined what brings us together, so that is the fundamental problem. And we have a problem of leadership. From the time we gained independence we’ve have had the misfortune of having bad leaders in this country; and because of that we have leaders who foster disunity- playing the ethno-religious card which easily flares up anger and mistrust within people. So, we have the problem of poor leadership, we have the problem of bad political system and we have the problem also of corruption.

Corruption breeds poverty and when you see the problem of ethno-religious crisis you'll see that the foot soldiers (who) are used by the so-called leaders or the so-called sponsors of the problem. The foot soldiers are basically people who are poor, who are ignorant, people who didn't go to school, who didn't have any education. And why are they poor? Why are they ignorant? Why didn't they get education? It is because of corruption. People, leaders, who are supposed to use the commonwealth of the people to better the lots of the people and give them knowledge, the(se) people, those leaders have stolen the money and appropriated the money for (to) themselves. So we have a problem of corruption which breeds poverty and all these kind of causes. So those are the root causes of this problem and ...

Nike: Thank you, sir. The second question; do you think the practice of true federalism could help mitigate or eradicate the problem of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Wale: No. Absolutely I cannot say it is going to eradicate it immediately, that it is not going to be like the magic wand that we have been looking for; you bring true federalism and everything goes away like that because we have a problem of mistrust. The Yoruba does not trust the Ibo; the Ibo does not trust the Ibibio; the Hausa man is a no-go for Itshekiri man; so we have that mistrust and it's going to take some time before it goes. But if we practice true federalism, at least the different states, the different region are able to get whatever, the resources they have from their region to use it to develop their people and then pay a royalty to the center, to the power at the center. You will see that development will start coming down; it will not be from up, top to bottom, it will now be bottom up. When you have a situation like that you'll see that when the leaders speak the people at the grassroots can understand and when they do they will hate the division, they will have some money to take home to their children. So there will be less time for them to start playing the ethno-religious cards. Anybody that tries to play it, you

will see that, they will be able to dispel (it) and say no, this is not going to work. So, I believe that the practice of true federalism is what we actually need to kick-start the process of ending these blood-seekers we have placed in our society; but I hope that we will be able to get there.

Nike: In a plural society like Nigeria, what solution could you proffer for ending the ethno-religious crisis?

Wale: First and foremost, (the first solution is) we need leaders. We need transformational leaders. What we have had are transactional leaders all the way. (You know), you rig election for me I give you contract; you be my godfather, get to office I steal public funds for you. That is what we have had. Those are the kind of leaders that we have. If we have transformational leaders, true transformational leaders, you will see that we will begin the process of ending these crises, (and) all these problems, this mirage of problems that we have. Now we need true leaders; that's number one and we need to tackle corruption. We need to stop corruption, at least to the barest minimum; if we cannot eradicate it overnight we will be able to reduce it to the barest minimum because that's one of the major causes of our problems; everybody is trying to get to the centre, trying to the commonwealth- what they call "national cake" and trying to take the commonwealth of the people for themselves. That must stop! And then we can (now) begin the process of building our country, infrastructural development. That is the process of industrial revolution. The president recently said..., ok, rolled out the industrial revolution plan; I mean it doesn't make any sense because the bases that you need, the pillars these things are supposed to stand on are not there. These are the pillars: we need true leadership, we need transformational leaders we need transformational government; not like they "mouth" it in government but in truth and in deeds. Unless we get all that going we cannot eradicate all these problems. And that is where we should start from.

Enugu State

Theophilous Egbala

Okennwa: Ok sir can you introduce yourself to us.

Rev Egbala: I am a right Reverend Theophilous Egbala am the dean in charge of the Presbyterian church of the Nigeria St Andrews cathedral, the one in Enugu.

Okennwa: Ok sir, sir we want to get your views on what you think is the root cause of religious crisis happening in Nigeria today.

Rev Egbala: Yes, one of the root causes is political. Many people are not happy having somebody perhaps from the minority area being the president of a great nation like Nigeria. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and among the blacks in the entire world. If you go out there to any of the countries outside the continent of Africa when you find five, six, seven, ten blacks, in fact if you took your time to really analyze, you will find out that out of the ten blacks you find out that eight or nine will be Nigerians. So Nigeria is a country made up of many ethnic people from different backgrounds and the Hausas, the Yorubas and Igbos are the main major tribes of this country.

Okennwa: could you describe sir the issues about this diversity?

Rev. Egbala: In the last 30 years of the military rule our head of states have always come from the northern part of the country and at a time it was assumed or they believed that leadership of this country is an exclusive right of the northerners. Now that things have turned around to be the other way round, many people in the north are not pleased, they are not happy and they feel the best way to really dislance the activities of this present administration is to cause a lot of religious crisis. What we find today is purely a religious war and it is also heavily politicized. If leadership is shifted to the north I believe that the tendencies of having

repeated cases of religious palaver in this country will reduce drastically. Must we then look at it from this angle? Is the leadership of this country a birthright of a certain people the opportunity to lead us? One or two people has said if the present administration is still in force that they will make the country ungovernable for the president and that account for why we have today we have Boko-haram activities they have killed so many people so many families have been rendered hopeless helpless and displaced and then we discovered that many churches have been attacked even though few mosque too have been attacked but the major thing is that many churches many Christians have been killed and have been destroyed. There is a way forward if we continue to trust God and look up to Him.

Okennwa: So sir, do you think that the practice of true federalism will bring a true solution to this problem?

Rev Egbala: Yeah putting the word true federalism which is a sign that there could be false federalism but when true federalism is implemented and practiced day in day out, I feel very strongly that it will solve the problem of this country called Nigeria.

Okennwa: Thank you very much sir, so sir in your conclusion what will you prefer as a solution to this issues in Nigeria.

Rev Egbala: Well keying into what the present administration is already asking us to do this year 2015 the president has proposed a national conference, I feel we should accept this spirit of national conference, national dialogue, where the various ethnic groups in the country will come together, sit chat a common font, come out with ways as to how to move this present country to another level. I think by adopting that, we will go a long way in solving some of the teething problems of our country Nigeria.

Okennwa: Thank very much sir for your time, thank you I appreciate.

Dekumzy

Okennwa: Thank you very much sir for your audience, we are currently speaking with Dekumzy, he is one of the most popular producer in south east, he has produced so many songs you are familiar with like Flavour so many of them. He will introduce himself let us just hear from him.

Dekumzy: OK my name is Dekumzy it all over choice am a producer, artiste and an entertainer.

Okennwa: Sir we actually want to get your views about what you think about the ethno religious crisis in Nigeria, what do you think is the root cause of this religious crisis happening everywhere?

Dekumzy: Well I think they are fighting for who rules. A friend of mine said something that Muslims and the Christians are fighting a battle that started from the time of Abraham, they believe Ishmael is supposed to be the rightful owner and Christian believe is Isaac. so that battle has been going on till now but in Nigeria here I don't think that is what they are fighting for, I think they are fighting for money and oil who takes it first so that's what they are fighting for so the religious thing is just part of their camouflage, they are just fighting for money and oil.

Okennwa: Thank you very much sir, what do u think Do u think practicing true federalism will solve this problem

Dekumzy: I don't think it is going to solve any problem, if they want to solve their problem they are meant to be dealing with getting these people together to work, to work together and work something out but telling them to do all those different things , that one is to kill each other.

Okennwa: So your solution to this problem is dialogue

Dekumzy: YES dialogue they need to dialogue, they need to understand each other and they need to understand whatever they are fighting for is still going to come and go they fight for it they will go and that thing

will still be there so whatever it is they keep fighting for it will still going on for generation until they sit down and dialogue and decide ok fine you handle this for this time lets handle this then we change at this Particular time it will never get better like in Nigeria is divided in three Igbos control the market Yorubas control the media and Hausa they control the political part of the country but still they still fight everybody wants everything.

Okennwa: Thank you very much sir.

Kaduna State

Tinu: in a plural society like Nigeria what solutions would you proffer for mitigating ethno religious crisis?

Mr. Kazeem: Just like bearny and friends, trying to exhibit the fact that living in peace is better than living as a king all your life. There is an adage in Hausa that says “Zaman lafia ya pi zaman dan sraki” that is been in peace is better than been a prince so that is one, two there should be a particular subject in all level of education in our curriculum been introduced as conflict resolution or whatever name they fit is suitable to that but it has to be a subject that is treated in all level of education from nursery. Our culture level, then that will help because we have a lot of history that we can teach and explain to the pupils as well as the students for the to know the danger attached in any crisis and or them to know the advantages of been in peace with one another for the to know and respect individual tribes and groups and they are to know you are to respect one another as Christian and to respect another as Muslim. I have to respect your opinion as a Yoruba man and your culture and appreciate your culture you have to respect and appreciate my culture too. I think under the subject or whatever name they try to give it, it is something that has to encompass crisis religion culture and education, I think it will go a long way, so that is why I said education is one of

those things and without the government not making education easy for anyone that means we cannot acquire it, we have to pass through it then if they think they can use the media house to break this things into parts just like Nollywood make their movies in parts it's a matter of taking an hour or 30 minutes make a captivating programme for the young ones, the adults, the people ruining the media house know the way they have packages they can introduce for those at home those that don't have privileges of going to school through the radio the people in the villages, we have lots of programme been introduced in the radio which entice the heart of people listening to the radio I think it will go a long way so the whole thing still goes back to the government. The government has to look into our pleading and complain and do the right thing, we have everything in paper and people with better understanding but the problem is implementation and if the government will implement every assignment been given out by same government in each and every crisis, they assign committee to look into the problem and to come up with a solution. We have it in this regime, I think the federal government inaugurate two or three committee to bring out the problem that causes religious crisis whatever crisis and solution to the problem and they submit the assignment to the federal government and it has not been adopted.

Pastor

Tinu: What do you think are the root causes of ethno religious crisis in Nigeria?

Pastor: Look at the basic cause of ethno religious crisis in this country to be tied around corruption, corruption is really causing lots of things and when we talk about corruption there are other things that contributed to that and I think one of the issue we need to look into is lack of tolerance lack of empowerment ,having lots of people around that have nothing doing and of cause it is usually said that an idle mind is the devils work-

shop and I think another reason is misunderstanding if we don't understand ourselves we can be sure there would be misunderstanding and another thing is monopoly some people try to monopolize things take cover even when they suppose not to so I see it as a good cause of conflict.

Tinu: Apart from intolerance, corruption, lack of empowerment, based on our system of government I will want you to tell us. Do you think if we practice true federalism it would help put an end to ethno religious crisis in Nigeria?

Pastor: To an extent yes but also you see when we talk about true federalism we have to x-ray our culture but not only ex-ray our culture but when you look at our setting but I think if true federalism is brought to play I want to believe that things will move well. The issue of crisis is that we cannot do away with crisis we cannot rule away crisis there is no society on earth that is free from crisis you have to know that so that when talking about ethno religious crisis we are talking cross ethnicity and religion coming in, for the fact that you have a different belief and I have a different believe and so as long as there is no tolerance you can be sure that crisis must be there if true federalism is brought to play just like in America were so ever you are you look at that place to be your home you are not a second class citizen were you are but what so ever the person that claim the place you have the same right and I think and I think it is when we begin to look at things like that then that is true federalism and things will move very well but also to an extent with the way things are you discover a particular tribe wants to stay in one area and so one religion or tribe will not want to move to another part and it is not surprising to know that there are people in the west that don't know the north and people in the south that have not been to the north and some in the north that have not been to the south. We have other tribes in the west but we look at everybody to be Yoruba, a typical Yo-

ruba man that has not been to the north will see every northern to be Hausa 'omo gambari'. If truly true federalism is brought to lay I think it will make the country what it's supposed to be.

Tinu: In a plural society like Nigeria, what solutions would you proffer for mitigating ethno religious crisis?

Pastor: We have to look at ourselves, look, we are one another ,I mean we are the same and we must not look at ourselves like ,look I am from another part of the country we must look at ourselves to be the same and e must look at ourselves that we are here to complement one another and we must also understand that the issue of religion must not divide us if you are a Muslim that's ok if I am a Christian that's ok it must not cause any crisis among us practice your religion and I practice mine but let me also say this one thing that would help this nation is that we have discovered that there are people who have this dominating spirit they get to a particular place they want to dominate the people that have been there and of cause if you dominate me in my area I won't tolerate it ,it would get to a particular time that I may not tolerate it and so there should be respect for my culture and I should also respect other peoples culture respect for my religion and I should also respect other peoples religion and I thing by the time we bring all this things to play then it is well.in so we need to respect each other's culture and respect our religion and I think this are some of the things that would really help us to live together.

Appendix C: Questionnaire

Nigeria: Between Divisions in Conflict and Stability in Diversity

This questionnaire has been designed to obtain information on the topic; ‘Nigeria: Between Divisions in Conflict and Stability in Diversity’. This research work tries to find opinions and perspectives of respondents on the impact (positive or negative) of systemic or institutional frameworks for managing Nigeria’s ethnic and religious diversity.

It is divided into five (5) sub-sections: General Questions; True Federalism; Fiscal Federalism Principle; Political Restructuring; and Federal Character. Your responses are very important for the successful outcome of this research work. All information given by you will be treated confidentially. Relate each statement in the questionnaire to the situation in Nigeria and your immediate environment/community. In completing the questionnaire, you are, please requested to rate and choose one item only that best describes your opinion.

Please feel free to contact me if you are in need of further clarifications.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Monica EMMANUEL

Personal Questions

1. Gender:

- Male
- Female

2. Age

3. Occupation *

- Skilled Labour
- Semi-Skilled Labour
- Unskilled
- Others

4. Position *

5. Town/City *

6. Country *

7. Highest Qualification *.....

- Doctorate
- Masters
- Bachelors
- Higher/Ordinary National Diploma (HND/OND)
- Higher School Certificate (HSC)
- Others

8. Organization (Select One)

- Academic Institution
- Civil Society
- Government Institution
- International Organization
- Private Organization
- Regional or Sub-Regional Organization

- Retired
- Self Employed
- Traditional Institution
- Unemployed
- Others, Specify

General Questions

9. Which is your Geographical Zone in Nigeria?

- North Central
- North East
- North West
- South East
- South South
- South West

10. Are you optimistic about Nigeria's future given series of predictions that it is likely to disintegrate in 2015 or 2030?

- Very Optimistic
- Optimistic
- Neutral
- Not Optimistic
- Other.....

11. Frankly speaking, how do you perceive people that are not of the same tribe with you?

- Fellow Nigerians
- Friends
- Enemies
- Suspicious

Strangers

12. To what extent do you know the other parts of the country?

Very well

Well

Not very well

Not at all

No interest

13. Do Nigeria's ethno-cultural and religious diversities pose a threat to Nigeria's stability?

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

14. Would you agree with the suggestion that Nigeria's main problem is ethnic diversity?

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

15. Would you say that Nigeria's religious diversity is her major problem?

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

16. What do you perceive as the root cause(s) of the conflicts experienced by Nigeria?

- Ethnic
- Cultural
- Religious
- Social and Economic
- Political
- All of the above
- None of the above
- Others:.....

Specify

17. Does the adoption and current practice of the Federal Constitution have any linkage(s) with the conflicts?

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

18. Can you highlight existing policies that have/and are fuelling the conflicts experienced in Nigeria? (You can select more than option)

- Federal Character
- Indigenization policy
- Land Use Act
- Political Zoning

- National Constitution
- Others: Specify

19. Are you aware of any homogenous country/society (*i.e. a country or society where virtually all members have the same religion or ethnic identity*) have experienced violent conflicts? If so, give examples and possible reasons.

.....
.....
.....
.....

20. Do you know of countries that have diverse ethno-cultural and religious configurations but are relatively peaceful? What type of constitution are they operating?

- No, I don't know any
- Yes, Federal Constitution
- Yes, Unitary system
- Yes, Military system
- Yes, Monarchical system
- Yes, Presidential system
- Yes, Parliamentary system
- Yes, No idea
- Other: Specify

21. How has the current practice of federalism in Nigeria helped in stabilizing the country in spite of its ethno-cultural and religious diversities?

- Very Unstable
- Unstable
- Neutral
- Stable
- Very Stable

Other

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
22. As a Nigerian citizen, do you feel that the diversities in terms of ethnicity, culture and religion have anything to do with Nigeria's developmental challenges?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. Do you perceive the ethno-cultural and religious diversities in Nigeria as the root causes of its developmental challenges?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Do you agree that the Nigerian constitution as currently practised has implications for the crises rocking the country?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25. Do you think that a Federal Constitution (if well implemented) can solve Nigeria's problem once and for all?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. Do you think that lack of political will to deliver on the part of our leaders contribute to the persistent social and economic crises in the country?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

27. Do you think that if Nigeria were to have good leaders with clout, she will be better-off than what she is now?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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True Federalism

Do you think that devolution of powers to the states will:

	Yes	No
28. Lead to unnecessary duplication and waste of resources	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29. Lead to mutually destructive policies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30. Not allow for or promote accountable government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31. Lead to promotion of trade and economic development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32. Lead to retardation of economic development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33. Lead to promotion of acceptance of diversity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34. Lead to increase in tolerance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
35. Make allowance for greater grassroots participation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
36. Lead to unity in diversity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Fiscal Federalism Principle

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
37. Revenues should be independently generated by states?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38. Each state should claim resource ownership?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

39. Should the funds from the federation account be shared in such a way that the states get more?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40. Should the funds from the federation account be shared in such a way that the federal (centre) gets more?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41. Should the Federal Government collect all royalties from mineral production and mandate the mining companies and special development authorities to give benefits to the states?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Political Restructuring

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
42. Should Nigeria revert back to 5-region structure of the First Republic?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43. Should Nigeria revert back to 12-state structure of the Civil War period?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
44. Should Nigeria retain its current 36-state structure?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<p>45. Should Nigeria adopt 6-zone structure as a solution for her instability and other multifarious problems?</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>46. Is confederation suitable for Nigeria?</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>47. As long as the over-centralized governance system continues, the cycle of violent ethnic conflicts will continue</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>48. Oil, the wasting asset, is the reason for the pseudo- federal constitution in operation in the country and is what ties the country together. Once the oil evaporates, the country will fall apart</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>49. Would you agree that a unitary system of government in an ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse society is a recipe for disharmony, conflict and disintegration of that society?</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>50. Nigeria's problems of nationhood are neither ethnic nor religious but political?</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<p>51. The strength and the progress of any nation is tied to its internal cohesion. Nigeria should therefore eschew the conflictive ethnic and religious politics</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>52. Nigeria's leadership succession problem is tied to its ethnic and religious diversity</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>53. The resolution of Nigeria's problems or the unity of Nigeria is tied to the resolution of its national questions</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>54. Religion and Ethnicity being good sources of political mobilisation and manipulation have been used by Nigerian politicians to cause disunity and disharmony in the country</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>55. The Sharia crisis of 2007 and the current Boko Haram insurgency are in line with the thinking that religion is a veritable tool of political mobilisation and manipulation</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<p>56. The Nigerian Military have been infected by both ethnic and religious virus in terms of postings and operations thereby compromising efficiency and repudiating esprit-d-corps while replacing them with ethnic suspicions and religious intolerance</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>57. Consequently, Nigerian Military has become a force of destabilisation which manifested in 1966 coup and counter coup and the several other coup d'états intended to entrench political leadership or rulership of a particular ethnic group</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>58. Despite the provisions of the Federal Character, every political appointment has a tinge of ethnic and religious colorations</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>59. The Political Head of Nigerian nation often projects his ethnicity and religion in terms of key appointments and in governance</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>60. Constitutional secularism in Nigeria should be a factor in reducing the incidence of incessant religious conflicts, or the politicisation of religion</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

61. In addition to freedom of worship enshrined in the 1999 constitution as amended, Nigeria should adopt a state religion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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1914 Amalgamation and Nigeria's Diversity Problems (on a scale of 1- 5) score the statements or questions below:

	1	2	3	4	5
62. The 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates by the British Colonialists was done without consideration for political integration	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
63. The 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates by the British Colonialists was done solely for economic advantages to be derived by the British Colonialists	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
64. The amalgamation was deft political engineering by the British Colonialists to serve their interest only	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
65. Nigeria is a collection of disparate peoples of diverse ethnicity, culture or religion that have nothing in common	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<p>66. The 1914 amalgamation was therefore a mistake and Nigeria was and is a “mere geographical expression”</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>67. Nigeria’s multi-faceted problems including its diversities are traceable to not only 1914 amalgamation, but to leadership and institutional failure</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>68. The skewed population figures and land mass are factors of instability created by British Colonialists</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>69. To plant Nigeria on a solid rock of stability, population size should not be a criterion for revenue allocation to federating states</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>70. Representation in the National Assembly should not be based on the skewed and spurious population figures</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>71. National Assembly should make a law that stipulates that before a Bill becomes an Act, it must enjoy 2/3 Aye or Nay respectively of members from North and South</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

72. The struggles amongst the majority ethnic groups for control of political power constitute constraints on Nigeria's growth and development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Federal Character

73. What is the impact of Federal Character constitutional provision on Nigeria's development in terms of Ministerial/Commissioner and civil service appointments?

- Very Positive
- Positive
- Neutral
- Negative
- Very Negative

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
74. Do you think that using merit as the basis for recruitment will revitalize the efficiency and integrity of state bureaucracies/ Civil service?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
75. Do you agree that federal character policy has compromised merit, and in its stead promoted mediocrity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

76. Do you agree that federal character policy was designed to ensure a sense of belonging of the diverse ethnic and religious groups in the country?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
77. Should residency requirements be liberalized or mandatory for states and local government? Why?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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78. What is your opinion of the “Indigene ship” condition for both elective and appointed positions and electoral contest, should it be removed or retained?

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In line with the “Federal Character” policy on citizenship, which of these is more privileged, privileged and less privileged?

	More privileged	Privileged	Less privileged?
79. One who belongs to the indigenous communities of the state in which they reside?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
80. One who is an indigene of other state?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
81. One who is unable to prove that they belong to a community indigenous to any state in Nigeria?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
82. Women married to men from states other than their own?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
83. Others: Specify:			

Appendix D: Interview Questions

[Greetings]

Good morning/afternoon/evening **Sir/Ma**,

Thank you for giving me audience. I am Monica Emmanuel, a doctoral student; I would like to conduct an interview that would assist me get information about the causes of our ethno-religious crises in Nigeria and the way forward as a nation. I have 3 questions please and I hope we would be done in about 30 minutes or less.

Please could we also make an audio/video recording of this interview for sole purpose of research?

[If the interviewee *does not oblige*, I just take note and *do not pressure* further.]

Question 1:

What do you think are root causes of the ethno-religious crises in Nigeria?

Question 2:

Do you think the practice of *true federalism* could help mitigate or eradicate ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria?

Question 3:

In a plural society like Nigeria, what solutions do you proffer for mitigating ethno-religious crisis?

Appendix E: Exclusive Legislative List of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

Item

1. Accounts of the Government of the Federation, and of offices, courts, and authorities thereof, including audit of those accounts.
2. Arms, ammunition and explosives.
3. Aviation, including airports, safety of aircraft and carriage of passengers and goods by air.
4. Awards of national titles of honour, decorations and other dignities.
5. Bankruptcy and insolvency
6. Banks, banking, bills of exchange and promissory notes.
7. Borrowing of moneys within or outside Nigeria for the purposes of the Federation or of any State.
8. Census, including the establishment and maintenance of machinery for continuous and universal registration of births and deaths throughout Nigeria.
9. Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens.
10. Commercial and industrial monopolies, combines and trusts.
11. Construction, alteration and maintenance of such roads as may be declared by the National Assembly to be Federal trunk roads.
12. Control of capital issues.
13. Copyright
14. Creation of States
15. Currency, coinage and legal tender

16. Customs and excise duties
17. Defence
18. Deportation of persons who are not citizens of Nigeria
19. Designation of securities in which trust funds may be invested.
20. Diplomatic, consular and trade representation.
21. Drugs and poisons.
22. Election to the offices of President and Vice-President or Governor and Deputy Governor and any other office to which a person may be elected under this Constitution, excluding election to a local government council or any office in such council.
23. Evidence
24. Exchange control
25. Export duties
26. External affairs
27. Extradition
28. Fingerprints identification and criminal records.
29. Fishing and fisheries other than fishing and fisheries in rivers, lakes, waterways, ponds and other inland waters within Nigeria.
30. Immigration into and emigration from Nigeria
31. Implementation of treaties relating to matters on this list
32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of bodies corporate, other than co-operative societies, local government councils and bodies corporate established directly by any Law enacted by a House of Assembly of a State.
33. Insurance.

34. Labour, including trade unions, industrial relations; conditions, safety and welfare of labour; industrial disputes; prescribing a national minimum wage for the Federation or any part thereof; and industrial arbitration.
35. Legal proceedings between Governments of States or between the Government of the Federation and Government of any State or any other authority or person.
36. Maritime shipping and navigation, including -
 - shipping and navigation on tidal waters;
 - shipping and navigation on the River Niger and its affluents and on any such other inland waterway as may be designated by the National Assembly to be an international waterway or to be an inter-State waterway;
 - lighthouses, lightships, beacons and other provisions for the safety of shipping and navigation;
 - such ports as may be declared by the National Assembly to be Federal ports (including the constitution and powers of port authorities for Federal ports).
37. Meteorology
38. Military (Army, Navy and Air Force) including any other branch of the armed forces of the Federation.
39. Mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas.
40. National parks being such areas in a State as may, with the consent of the Government of that State, be designated by the National Assembly as national parks.
41. Nuclear energy

42. Passports and visas
43. Patents, trademarks, trade or business names, industrial designs and merchandise marks.
44. Pensions, gratuities and other-like benefit payable out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public funds of the Federation.
45. Police and other government security services established by law.
46. Posts, telegraphs and telephones
47. Powers of the National Assembly, and the privileges and immunities of its members
48. Prisons
49. Professional occupations as may be designated by the National Assembly.
50. Public debt of the Federation
51. Public holidays.
52. Public relations of the Federation
53. Public service of the Federation including the settlement of disputes between the Federation and officers of such service.
54. Quarantine
55. Railways
56. Regulations of political parties
57. Service and execution in a State of the civil and criminal processes, judgments, decrees, orders and other decisions of any court of law outside Nigeria or any court of law in Nigeria other than a court of law established by the House of Assembly of that State.
58. Stamp duties

59. Taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains, except as otherwise prescribed by this Constitution.
60. The establishment and regulation of authorities for the Federation or any part thereof -
- To promote and enforce the observance of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles contained in this Constitution;
 - To identify, collect, preserve or generally look after ancient and historical monuments and records and archaeological sites and remains declared by the National Assembly to be of national significance or national importance;
 - to administer museums and libraries other than museums and libraries established by the Government of a state;
 - To regulate tourist traffic; and
 - To prescribe minimum standards of education at all levels.
61. The formation, annulment and dissolution of marriages other than marriages under Islamic law and Customary law including matrimonial causes relating thereto.
62. Trade and commerce, and in particular -
- trade and commerce between Nigeria and other countries including import of commodities into and export of commodities from Nigeria, and trade and commerce between the states;
 - establishment of a purchasing authority with power to acquire for export or sale in world markets such agricultural produce as may be designated by the National Assembly;
 - inspection of produce to be exported from Nigeria and the enforcement of grades and standards of quality in respect of produce so inspected;

- establishment of a body to prescribe and enforce standards of goods and commodities offered for sale;
- control of the prices of goods and commodities designated by the National Assembly as essential goods or commodities; and
- registration of business names.

63. Traffic on Federal trunk roads.

64. Water from such sources as may be declared by the National Assembly to be sources affecting more than one state

65. Weights and measures.

66. Wireless, broadcasting and television other than broadcasting and television provided by the Government of a state; allocation of wave-lengths for wireless, broadcasting and television transmission.

67. Any other matter with respect to which the National Assembly has power to make laws in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

68. Any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this list.

Appendix F: Concurrent Legislative List of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

EXTENT OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE POWERS

1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the National Assembly may by an Act make provisions for -
 - (A) The division of public revenue
 - (a) between the Federation and the States; (between federal and the GPZs)
 - (b) among the States of the Federation; (among GPZs of the federation)
 - (c) between the States and local government councils; (between GPZs and local government)
 - (d) among the local government councils in the States (among the local government councils in the GPZs); and
 - (B) grants or loans from and the imposition of charges upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public funds of the Federation or for the imposition of charges upon the revenue and assets of the Federation for any purpose, notwithstanding that it relates to a matter with respect to which the National Assembly is not empowered to make laws.
2. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, any House of Assembly may make provisions for grants or loans from and the imposition of charges upon any of the public funds of that State or the imposition of charges upon the revenue and assets of that State for any purpose notwithstanding that it relates to a matter with respect to which the National Assembly is empowered to make laws.

3. The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to such antiquities and monuments as may, with the consent of the State in which such antiquities and monuments are located, be designated by the National Assembly as National Antiquities or National Monuments but nothing in this paragraph shall preclude a House of Assembly from making Laws for the State or any part thereof with respect to antiquities and monuments not so designated in accordance with the foregoing provisions.
4. The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to the archives and public records of the Federation.
5. A House of Assembly may, subject to paragraph 4 hereof, make laws for that State or any part thereof with respect to archives and public records of the Government of the State.
6. Nothing in paragraphs 4 and 5 hereof shall be construed as enabling any laws to be made which do not preserve the archives and records which are in existence at the date of commencement of this Constitution, and which are kept by authorities empowered to do so in any part of the Federation.
7. In the exercise of its powers to impose any tax or duty on
 - (a) capital gains, incomes or profits or persons other than companies; and
 - (b) documents or transactions by way of stamp duties.

the National Assembly may, subject to such conditions as it may prescribe, provide that the collection of any such tax or duty or the administration of the law imposing it shall be carried out by the Government of a State or other authority of a State.

8. Where an Act of the National Assembly provides for the collection of tax or duty on capital gains, incomes or profit or the ad-

ministration of any law by an authority of a State in accordance with paragraph 7 hereof, it shall regulate the liability of persons to such tax or duty in such manner as to ensure that such tax or duty is not levied on the same person by more than one State.

9. A House of Assembly may, subject to such conditions as it may prescribe, make provisions for the collection of any tax, fee or rate or for the administration of the Law providing for such collection by a local government council.
10. Where a Law of a House of Assembly provides for the collection of tax, fee or rate or for the administration of such Law by a local government council in accordance with the provisions hereof it shall regulate the liability of persons to the tax, fee or rate in such manner as to ensure that such tax, fee or rate is not levied on the same person in respect of the same liability by more than one local government council.
11. The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation with respect to the registration of voters and the procedure regulating elections to a local government council.
12. Nothing in paragraph 11 hereof shall preclude a House of Assembly from making laws with respect to election to a local government council in addition to but not inconsistent with any law made by the National Assembly.
13. The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to-
 - (a) electricity and the establishment of electric power stations;
 - (b) the generation and transmission of electricity in or to any part of the Federation and from one State to another State;

- (c) the regulation of the right of any person or authority to dam up or otherwise interfere with the flow of water from sources in any part of the Federation;
- (d) the participation of the Federation in any arrangement with another country for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity for any area partly within and partly outside the Federation;
- (e) the regulation of the right of any person or authority to use, work or operate any plant, apparatus, equipment or work designed for the supply or use of electrical energy.

14. A House of Assembly may make laws for the State with respect to

- (a) electricity and the establishment in that State of electric power stations;
- (b) the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity to areas not covered by a national grid system within that State; and
- (c) the establishment within that State of any authority for the promotion and management of electric power stations established by the State.

15. In the foregoing provisions of this item, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings respectively assigned to them -

- (a) "distribution" means the supply of electricity from a substation to the ultimate consumer;
- (b) "management" includes maintenance, repairs or replacement;
- (c) "power station" means an assembly of plant or equipment for the creation or generation of electrical energy; and

- (d) "transmission" means the supply of electricity from a power station to a sub-station or from one sub-station to another sub-station, and
 - (e) the reference to a "sub-station" herein is a reference to an assembly of plant, machinery or equipment for distribution of electricity.
16. The National Assembly may make laws for the establishment of an authority with power to carry out censorship of cinematograph films and to prohibit or restrict the exhibition of such films; and nothing herein shall -
- (a) preclude a House of Assembly from making provision for a similar authority for that State; or
 - (b) authorise the exhibition of a cinematograph film in a State without the sanction of the authority established by the Law of that State for the censorship of such films.
17. The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to -
- (a) the health, safety and welfare of persons employed to work in factories, offices or other premises or in inter-State transportation and commerce including the training, supervision and qualification of such persons;
 - (b) the regulation of ownership and control of business enterprises throughout the Federation for the purpose of promoting, encouraging or facilitating such ownership and control by citizens of Nigeria;
 - (c) the establishment of research centres for agricultural studies; and
 - (d) the establishment of institutions and bodies for the promotion or financing of industrial, commercial or agricultural projects.

18. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of Assembly may make Laws for that State with respect to industrial, commercial or agricultural development of the State.
19. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs of this item shall be construed as precluding a House of Assembly from making Laws with respect to any of the matters referred to in the foregoing paragraphs.
20. For the purposes of the foregoing paragraphs of this item, the word "agricultural" includes fishery.
21. The National Assembly may make laws to regulate or co-ordinate scientific and technological research throughout the Federation.
22. Nothing herein shall prelude a House of Assembly from establishing or making provisions for an institution or other arrangement for the purpose of scientific and technological research.
23. The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to statistics so far as the subject matter relates to -
 - (a) any matter upon which the National Assembly has power to make laws; and
 - (b) the organisation of coordinated scheme of statistics for the Federation or any part thereof on any matter whether or not it has power to make laws with respect thereto.
24. A House of Assembly may make Laws for the State with respect to statistics and on any matter other than that referred to in paragraph 23 (a) of this item.
25. The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to trigonometrical, cadastral and topographical surveys.
26. A House of Assembly may, subject to paragraph 25 hereof, make laws for that State or any part thereof with respect to trigonometrical, cadastral and topographical surveys.

27. The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to university education, technological education or such professional education as may from time to time be designated by the National Assembly.
28. The power conferred on the National Assembly under paragraph 27 of this item shall include power to establish an institution for the purposes of university, post-primary, technological or professional education.
29. Subject as herein provided, a House of Assembly shall have power to make laws for the state with respect to the establishment of an institution for purposes of university, technological or professional education.
30. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs of this item shall be construed so as to limit the powers of a House of Assembly to make laws for the State with respect to technical, vocational, post-primary, primary or other forms of education, including the establishment of institutions for the pursuit of such education.

Appendix G: Authorisation letter

Monica Emmanuel

BSc. (hons) Political Science, M.Sc. International Relations
& Strategic Studies, Candidate, Doctorate in International Relations

Abuja, February 11, 2014

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that the person bearing this letter is working for Monica Emmanuel, a Doctoral Student at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and a Research Fellow with the National Defence College, Abuja.

This letter empowers the bearer the authority to interview, distribute questionnaires and carry out any other activities with respect to the research topic:

**Nigeria: Between Divisions in Conflict and Stability
in Diversity**

We shall be very grateful for any assistance and support that your office could offer to us towards the success of this research work.

Thank you in advance for your kind cooperation.

Yours Faithfully,

Monica Emmanuel



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Federalism in Nigeria

Between Divisions in Conflict and Stability in Diversity



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was educated in Nigeria where she obtained Bsc. (Political Science) and Msc. (International Relations and Strategic Studies) degrees of Ahmadu Bello University and Benue State University respectively. She also holds a Doctorate Degree in International Relations of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Switzerland. She worked as a Research Fellow with the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National

Defence College, Abuja (Nigeria) for over nine years, focusing on issues of conflict, peace building, peace support operations and development.

Nigeria is a product of the amalgamation of Northern and Southern British protectorates, that is the primary cause of the Nigeria's political instability, ethno-religious divisions and underdevelopment. Adopting a pragmatic constitutional approach that institutionalizes federal constitution would produce a promising political mechanism for addressing ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. Meanwhile the adoption of relevant political structure should be guided by the ethical and political comparative advantages of many different political structures.

The originality of this doctoral research is based on findings from data analyses that show positive dispositions of respondents to adoption of a federal constitution to achieve stability in diversity and the current operation of unitary constitution as inappropriate. The study underlines that adoption and implementation of a federal constitution, fiscal federalism and secularism is sine-qua-non.