Deleuze and The Fold

A Critical Reader

Edited by

Sjoerd van Tuinen and Niamh McDonnell

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# Deleuze and *The Fold*: A Critical Reader

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Sjoerd van Tuinen

and

Niamh McDonnell

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Preface

The aim of this volume is to provide, through a series of close textual engagements, critical readings of Gilles Deleuze's *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (*Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque*, 1988). As interest in the Deleuzean corpus grows, more detailed expositions of his work become necessary. *The Fold* is a notoriously intricate text that presents a unique reading both of Leibniz and of the Baroque by bringing them together under an operative concept that also happens to be integral to Deleuze's own work. Since its appearance, the book has seen its readership grow incessantly, inspiring creative work across the fields of philosophy, aesthetics and cultural theory. However, surprisingly little sustained critical work has been undertaken with regard to it. This volume is not just a book on Deleuze-on-Leibniz. It opens up a number of key areas of difficulty and complexity within the text in order to provide a readership across different fields with a number of critical perspectives on this work.

The impetus for this volume came in 2005, from a workshop on 'Gilles Deleuze and The Fold' hosted by the Research Group in Post-Kantian European Philosophy of the University of Warwick. The organisers, Darren Ambrose and Siobhan McKeown, decided that both the high quality of the work presented at this event and the creative momentum it provided could best be kept up in the form of a reader. Then, for personal reasons, they had to abandon their project. Instead of simply stopping the entire project, however, they generously passed it on. We would like to thank Darren and Siobhan, firstly, for the enthusiasm and work they put into this project before handing it over to us and, secondly, for their confidence in our capacities to further extend it. We would like to thank the contributors for the privilege of the close reading of their essays, and our editor Priyanka Gibbons at Palgrave Macmillan for making corrections and providing support.

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Sjoerd van Tuinen teaches Philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. He is the author of *Peter Sloterdijk. Ein Profil* (2006) and has received his Ph.D. in philosophy at Ghent University for a dissertation on Deleuze and Leibniz entitled *Mannerism in Philosophy*. His current research revolves around a neo-monadological approach to speculative philosophy, aesthetics and theoretical sociology.

Abbreviations List

Works by Gilles Deleuze

ABC	*L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*, DVD (Paris: Editions Montparnasse).
AO	*Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, with F. Guattari, translated by R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane (London/New York: Continuum, 2003).
ATP	*A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, with F. Guattari, translated by B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
B	*Bergsonism*, translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991).
C1	*Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
C2	*Cinema 2: The Time Image*, translated by H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
CGD	Deleuze, Gilles, 1971–87, seminars at the Université Paris VIII Vincennes and Vincennes St-Denis, http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/sommaire.html.
DI	*Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, edited by D. Lapoujade, translated by M. Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004).
D	*Dialogues II*, translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York/London: Continuum, 2002).
DR	*Difference and Repetition*, translated by P. Patton (New York/London: Continuum, 2001).
EPS	*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, translated by M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1997).
F	*Foucault*, translated by S. Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
FB	*Francis Bacon. The Logic of Sensation*, translated by D. W. Smith (London/New York: Continuum, 2004).

H	*Empiricism and Subjectivity. An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, translated by C. V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
K	*Kafka. Toward a Minor Literature*, with F. Guattari, translated by D. Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
KCP	*Kant's Critical Philosophy*, translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
LS	*The Logic of Sense*, translated by M. Lester with C. Stivale (London/New York: Continuum, 1990).
N	*Negotiations. 1972–1990*, translated by M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
NP	*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, translated by H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
PS	*Proust and Signs*, translated by R. Howard (London/New York: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1973).
SPP	*Spinoza Practical Philosophy*, translated by R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988).
TF	*The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque*, translated by T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
TRM	*Two Regimes of Madness. Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, translated by A. Hodges and M. Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006).
WP	*What is Philosophy?*, with F. Guattari, translated by H. Tomlinson and G. Burchill (London/New York: Verso, 1994).

Works by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

A	*Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Akademie-Ausgabe)* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1923-).
AG	*Philosophical Essays*, edited and translated by R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).
C	*Opuscules et fragments inédits*, edited by L. Couturat (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1903).
GM	*Mathematische Schriften*, edited by C. I. Gerhard (Hildesheim/New York: George Olms Verlag, 1962).

GP	*Die philosophische Schriften*, edited by C. J. Gerhardt (Berlin/Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1875–90).
GR	*Textes inédits d'après les manuscrits de la bibliothèque de Hanovre*, edited by G. Grua (Paris: PUF, 1948).
L	*Philosophical Papers and Letters*, edited and translated by L. E. Loemker (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989).
LLP	*Leibniz Logical Papers*, edited and translated by G. H. R. Parkinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).
NE	*New Essays on the Human Understanding*, edited and translated by P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Introduction

Niamh McDonnell and Sjoerd van Tuinen

> THEOPHILUS: *To me what you have said seems divinely inspired, and the analogy with folds is marvelous.*
> PACIDIUS: *I am glad you approve of my opinion, which I will expound more fully at another time*
> —Leibniz, 'Pacidius to Philalethes', 1676

Leibniz's portrait

In the twentieth century, each major philosophical current has possessed its own Leibniz. There has been an appropriation from the perspective of logic in the works of Bertrand Russell (1900) and Louis Couturat (1901), an epistemological appropriation in the works of neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer (1902), and a phenomenological appropriation in the works of Edmund Husserl (1931) and Dietrich Mahnke (1917). None of these philosophical appropriations, however, were interested in the variety, complexity, and richness of Leibniz's philosophy for its own sake, contenting themselves rather with reducing it to a handful of metaphysical doctrines. More recently, however, continuing the early work of mainly French scholars such as Yvon Belaval (1960) and Martial Gueroult (1967), there has been a tremendous boom in Leibniz studies with authors taking a less philosophical and more historiographical approach. Like Kantian philosophy, the entire Leibnizian system is now being taken seriously as a crucial moment in the development of modern philosophy.[1]

Deleuze's book on Leibniz, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1988), is the result of a life-long engagement with Leibniz, to which *Difference and Repetition* (1968), *The Logic of Sense* (1969), *Proust and Signs* (1964/1970) and *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968) already bear testimony.

This engagement intensified at the final stage of his professional career in two series of lectures from 1980 and 1987, the second series being Deleuze's last before his retirement. But even if Deleuze witnessed the beginnings of the turn of the tide in Leibniz scholarship, it seems that at this point he didn't have the ambition to be up to date. The presence of Michel Serres (1968), Christiane Frémont (1981), Herbert Knecht (1981), and André Robinet (1986) in *The Fold* need not be considered as part of a scheme of referencing scholarly research, recapitulating a body of knowledge that is fragmented by the fields of disciplinary specialization. Rather, the totality of the Leibnizian edificve is reflected in the manner of interdisciplinary engagement Deleuze invites from the reader. From the vantage point of *The Fold*, one of the primary texts of the constructivist period of Deleuzian philosophy, a Leibnizian position within the baroque is key to understanding its defining characteristic – that concepts are created in the movement of thought and do not belong to a philosophical mode of representation but are expressive of non-philosophical affects. In other words, if Spinoza is Deleuze's avowed 'prince of philosophy', Leibniz is his 'conceptual persona'.[2]

Long before writing *The Fold*, Deleuze had already argued that 'the theory of thought is like painting: it needs that revolution which took art from representation to abstraction' (*DR* 276). Deleuze's search for new means of philosophical expression is at the same time a questioning of philosophy's mode of historicization. He maintains that it 'is not a matter of "making lifelike", that is, of repeating what a philosopher said but rather of *producing resemblance* by separating out both the plane of immanence he instituted and the new concepts he created' (*WP* 55, emphasis added). Thus if *The Fold* is a form of portraiture, attention is drawn to *how* it renders Leibniz's persona mediating the plane of immanence and the concept, a figure which is never given in fact, but which has to gain consistency in its 'manners' or 'habits' (even in the sense of his infinitely folded attire (*das Habit*, *het habijt*)):

> How can a portrait be made of Leibniz's person without marking the extreme tension of an open façade and a hermetic inner volume, each being independent of the other and both regulated by a strange pre-established connection? It is an almost schizophrenic tension. Leibniz comes forward in baroque strokes. […] The courtly wig is a façade, an entry, like the vow to hurt no one's established feelings, and the art of presenting his system from one point of view or another, in such and such a mirror, following the apparent intelligence of a correspondent or of an opponent knocking on his door, while the System

itself is up above, turning about itself, ceding absolutely nothing to the compromises, down below, whose secret he keeps, taking, on the contrary, 'the best of all sides' in order to deepen or to make another fold in the room with closed doors and with sealed windows, the room in which Leibniz is confined when he states, 'Everything is always the same, with degrees of perfection excepted'.[3]

(*TF* 32–3)

In his *Abécédaire*, Deleuze draws an analogy between this production of resemblance and colourist painting – the plane of immanence corresponding to the canvas and the concept to colour (*ABC H*). With Cézanne or Van Gogh, chromatic differentials and the singularities that distribute them constitute the diagram or outline, which follows the modulations of form. This process of modulation does not start from a tabula rasa, but rather begins from the middle, from informal and pre-individual traits covering the canvas, extending or stretching any pre-existing clichéd figuration and subordinating it to infinite and monstrous deformation. Deleuze states that *The Fold* is his first truly colourist book in the history of philosophy, whereas his earlier works belong to a 'pre-colorist' apprenticeship in the problems and concepts of other philosophers (ibid.). For more than anywhere else, the 'almost schizophrenic tension' between the two floors of the baroque house (*TF* 28–9, 35, 102–4, 119) realizes this transmedial transfer of a stylistic procedure from painting to philosophy. As Tom Conley, the English translator, has rightly argued, nowhere does the feature of style become so integral to the text than in *The Fold*: 'it appeals to the history and theory of art less on account of its conclusions than because of its rivalry with its sources, that is, the demand that its own style be read as the content of those conclusions'.[4]

The inversion of style as supplement to content places a surplus power or excess in expression at the centre of the philosophical text and invites the reader to engage with the manner in which objects of thought are constituted in and through points of view. Firstly, the process of rendering resemblance in Deleuze's portrait of Leibniz draws on the nature of perception itself as a 'resembling' of the outside: 'unconscious perceptions comprising […] minute folds as the representatives of the world (and not representations of objects)' (*TF* 94). In baroque *chiaroscuro*, portraiture is initiated from an ante-predicative vagueness, which attests to 'the relativity of clarity (as much as of movement) [and] the inseparability of clarity from obscurity' (*TF* 32). Secondly, the symbolic value of perceptions and their objectification of content give way to 'a power of

figuration entirely different from that of the symbol' (*TF* 125). A power of resemblance in perceptions transforms the logical relation between concepts and objects into an allegorical nature. Allegory, as an approach to reading objects and determining conceptual thought, implies that it is performed in the text in the manner of writing: 'The object itself overflows its frame in order to enter into a cycle or a series, and now the concept is what is found increasingly compressed, interiorized, wrapped in an instance that can ultimately be called "personal"' (*TF* 125).

In these ways *The Fold* announces a new approach to expressionism in philosophy, which sets it apart from Deleuze's other books that are notable in respect of this concern: his work on Nietzsche, Bergson, Kant, or Spinoza. Whereas in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, the problem of expression in Spinoza's work is approached in solely philosophical terms, references in *The Fold* range from allegorical narrativity in the *Theodicy* to the fine folds of Bernini's sculptures, from Caravaggio's *chiaroscuro* to Rameau's theory of Harmony and from the projective geometry of Desargues to the laws of curvilinearity of Huygens. Moreover, 'the nonphilosophical situation implicit in Leibniz' (*N* 154) is something that is integral to *The Fold* insofar as the architectonic structure of the baroque house is the lens through which this is explicated: 'the Leibnizian monad and its system of light-mirror-point of view-inner decor cannot be understood if they are not compared to baroque architecture' (*TF* 28). The 'and the Baroque' from the subtitle asks that we read Leibniz's philosophy in between seventeenth-century art and science and in so doing the 'operative function' of the baroque is put into play: '[t]he baroque refers not to an essence but rather to an operative function, to a trait. It endlessly produces folds. It does not invent things' (*TF* 3).[5] But that is not all. As Deleuze says in his *Abécédaire*, the aim of his book on Leibniz is no longer just to continue certain problems and concepts of previous masters of philosophy, but now also includes their mixing with problems in art and science of the twentieth century. *The Fold* announces itself as an allegory, or rather enunciates its perspectival view such that the emphasis on style of writing goes hand in hand with the new status of the object. It thus becomes possible to rigorously define the essential traits or 'extreme specificity' of baroque expression while also following the material processes of historical production relative to events in the world, 'stretching' the baroque 'outside of its historical limits' (*TF* 34). Hence the baroque returns in modernist painting, architecture and design, music, literature, embryology and evolutionism, mathematics, psychiatry, and quantum mechanics.

Towards an affirmative reading

The question 'What does it mean to be Leibnizian today?' forms the leitmotiv of Deleuze's lectures on Leibniz and is again posed in *The Fold*, the last in a series of studies on the work of other philosophers to which similar questions are central: 'What is Nietzsche today?' (*DI* 252). What would be 'a renewal or an extension of Bergson's project today, in relation to the transformations of life and society, in parallel with the transformations of science' (*B* 115)? What does 'Spinoza and us' imply (*SPP* 122)?

In each case, Deleuze does not write 'on' other philosophers, but 'with' them, initiating a new temporal and schizophrenic synthesis. The Platonic ideal of the authenticity of the authorial voice as a claim of the philosopher to truth is replaced by the focus on the real conditions of an internal genesis of thought.[6] In Deleuze's early work, the re-evaluation of values drawn from *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887) (*DR* 54, *LS* 174) marked the initiation of a Nietzschean perspectivism. In *The Fold*, a containment of tension in schizophrenic expression is considered in the context of a perspectival geometry that is specific to Leibniz's philosophy. Change is mapped on the path of curvature, whereby curves are '"the trace of the same line" in a continuous movement, continually touched by the curve of their convergence' (*TF* 19, translation modified). In the abstract geometry of the drawn line composed of a movement from 'fold to fold and not from point to point', distinction of the singular is at the same time a locus of the regular *in situ*. Points of view are in things by virtue of the two dimensional form of perceptions. They are both distinct and obscure at the same time: 'perspectivism amounts to a relativism, but not the relativism we take for granted. It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to a subject' (*TF* 20). The subject is produced through the distinction of its perceptions within their obscure background, the latter being unfolded by 'rising to the surface', by *coming to* the point of view (*TF* 19).

This transition from Nietzsche to Leibniz is of course all but natural for Deleuze. Insofar as Deleuze's 'writing with' philosophers reaches its apogee in *The Fold*, Deleuze may *have always been* Leibnizian (see *TF* 137). At the same time, however, Leibniz is not the philosopher who comes to mind considering those that Deleuze 'writes with' in order to overcome the 'dogmatic image of thought'. Focusing on those 'who seemed to be part of the history of philosophy, but who escaped from it in one respect or altogether: Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson', what makes

these philosophers unique is their extra-philosophical charm or style: 'All these thinkers are of a fragile constitution, and yet shot through with an insurmountable life. They proceed only through positive and affirmative thought' (*D* 14–5; *N* 6). Compared with these 'wild' thinkers, the choice for the vain courtier, political opportunist and diplomatic pragmatist Leibniz is all but obvious. Leibniz claimed it the task of philosophy to create new concepts, but is distinguished from his colleague Spinoza in this respect by not wanting to overthrow 'established sentiments'[7] (*NP* 104; *LS* 116; *SPP* 11). Leibniz firmly denied having ever met Spinoza, and if he did, then it was only to 'keep him under surveillance' (*CGD* 15 April 1980). 'Leibniz is abominable', Deleuze says, since:

> He is the philosopher of order, even more, of order and policing, in every sense of the word 'policing'. In the first sense of the word especially, that is, [the] regulated organization of the city. He only thinks in terms of order. But very oddly in this taste for order and to establish this order, he yields to the most insane concept creation that we have ever witnessed in philosophy. Disheveled concepts, the most exuberant concepts, the most disordered, the most complex in order to justify what is. Each thing must have a reason'.

> (Ibid.)

However, Deleuze's fascination with Leibniz is evident: 'perhaps no other philosopher created so much' and 'he's probably had more creative followers than any other philosopher' (*N* 154–5). What makes Leibniz particularly interesting for Deleuze, especially when seen in the light of *What is Philosophy?*, which appeared soon after *The Fold*, is the nature of his philosophical activity. While Descartes stands for the sober production of distinct concepts that together form a relatively ordered unity, in Leibniz we find an 'exuberant' and 'sloppy' (*CGD*, 15 April 1980), sometimes even 'orgiastic' (*DR* 48) creative power. For him, a concept never stands alone, but always refers to further concepts, which are still to be invented, resulting in a complex and almost unbridled proliferation. This philosophical activity moreover takes place within correspondences maintained with the most important intellectuals of the time in addition to short memoirs, raw sketches, and dialogues articulated in transit between engagements, where Leibniz's role shifts accordingly. Plying his philosophical thought to concrete experiments in science or practical matters of jurisprudence through a universal symbolic logic to aid the economy of expression, Leibniz features in Deleuze's philosophy as a figure on the threshold of disciplinary crossings. On the one hand

he fuels Deleuze's nomadic empiricism that pursues a 'free and wild creation of concepts' (*WP* 105) in a philosophical life that 'straddles[8] many diverse materials and areas' (*TF* 38). On the other, he plays the role of the most important protagonist of dogmatic rationalism (as he is for Kant, Heidegger, or Derrida).

Leibniz's position as a liminal figure is consistent with Deleuze's philosophy from his early structuralist to his late constructivist works. What does change, however, is how Deleuze situates Leibniz in relation to the question of the movement of thought and the conditions of its genesis. Indeed, Deleuze's reflections on the concept of the fold act as a kind of prism through which this movement of thought can be articulated in philosophical terms: 'Ultimately all these periods lead into one another and get mixed up, as I now see better with this book on Leibniz or the fold' (*N* 135–7). This is to be seen in the context of the 'return of the baroque' in *The Fold*: 'I see this book as both a recapitulation and a continuation. (…) The whole thing is a crossroads, a multiple connectedness. We're still a long way from exhausting all the potential of the fold, it's a good philosophical concept' (*N* 155).

The play of the world

In the first chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, devoted to the critique of the 'quadripartite yoke of representation' made up of identity, opposition, analogy and similitude, Leibniz belongs, with Hegel, to the category of philosophers who, instead of overcoming representation, made it infinite:

> Between Leibniz and Hegel it matters little whether the supposed negative of difference is understood as a vice-dicting limitation or a contradicting limitation, any more than it matters whether infinite identity be considered analytic or synthetic. In either case, difference remains subordinated to identity, reduced to the negative, incarcerated within similitude and analogy. That is why, in infinite representation, the delirium is only a pre-formed false delirium which poses no threat to the repose or serenity of the identical.
>
> (*DR* 50)

However, Leibniz not only plays the role of Hegel's twin brother, he is also regarded as superior to the German master of negativity, insofar as he is a more 'orgiastic' thinker, going further in the exploration of 'bacchanalian delirium' (*DR* 49). Whereas Hegel made difference infinitely

big, pivoting on difference as inherently contradictory (*DR* 44–5), Leibniz made it infinitely small, which makes a significant contribution to Deleuze's theory of the virtual:

> [W]e are not sure that Leibniz does not go 'farthest' (nor that, of the two, he is not the least theological). His conception of the Idea as an ensemble of differential relations and singular points, the manner in which he begins with the inessential and constructs essences in the form of centres of envelopment around singularities, his presentiment of divergences, his procedure of vice-diction, his approximation to an inverse ratio between the distinct and the clear, all show why the ground rumbles with greater power in the case of Leibniz, why the intoxication and giddiness are less feigned in his case, why obscurity is better understood and the Dionysian shores are closer'.
>
> (*DR* 264)

Perhaps the most important reason why Deleuze prefers Leibniz to Hegel is that a 'play in the creation of the world' (*DR* 51) animates Leibniz's philosophy insofar as he challenges the logic of the limit and its ontology. In the philosophy of both Leibniz and Hegel, the limit is articulated outside of the terms of 'finite representation'. In the movement of its disappearing, it is reborn as 'the element in which power is effectuated' (*DR* 43). Under the terms of such 'infinite representation', the containment of the 'Other' is the key factor in their differentiation. Hegel conceives the containment of 'the other essentially […] *in essence*', whereas Leibniz 'begins with the inessential so far as phenomena are concerned' and regards the containment of the other 'with respect to properties, in *cases*' (*DR* 45–6). The introduction of the infinite by Hegel leads to the 'movement of exteriority or real objectivation' based on 'the identity of contraries'. In the determinateness of overcoming the limit, 'difference finds its own concept in the posited contradiction' (*DR* 45). In Leibniz's conception of the limit as threshold, by contrast, there is a 'movement of exteriority or real objectivation' by virtue of 'an original depth'. Drawing attention to Leibniz's distribution of 'the distinctive points and the differential elements of a multiplicity throughout the ground' (*DR* 51), early Deleuze thus anticipates the concept of the fold and the distinction of the singular points of perceptions as a continuity, unfolding what is already folded. The inclusion of the outside on the inside, rather than their opposition, underlies the power of repetition of elements in series 'converging towards a ground' (*DR* 43).

The significance of the limit in Leibniz's 'infinite representation' serves Deleuze's argument not only against Hegel and the conception of difference through contradiction, but also against Kant and the modality of the realization of the possible. Deleuze displaces the terms of the classical choice between the pre-Kantian (or Leibnizian) 'negative of the limit' in the 'analytic of identity' and the post-Kantian 'negative of opposition' in the 'synthetic identity' of the finite self (*DR* 58). Yet since Kant's 'complete determination' – 'distinguishing a thing from *everything that it is not*' – is based on 'real contradiction' (*DR* 45), Leibniz's limit as differential is again the vantage point from which Deleuze manoeuvres between the polarities of this problem between synthesis and analysis. Whereas 'Kant [...] defines the truth of a problem in terms of the possibility of its finding a solution [...] a question of a transcendental form of possibility' (*DR* 161), Deleuze asserts the modality of the virtual and its actualization in relation to the question of problem posing and the ideal of its objectivity. The objective outline of 'complete determination' is thus posited in reply to its Kantian formulation – the possible being a reflection of realization and conceived in opposition to impossibility. The formulation of 'complete determination' through Leibniz allows Deleuze to reconfigure the terms in which properties are identified and moreover have ontological significance, as they are understood in relation to an ontology of the world before the subject, and hence through their possession within the actualization of relations in the world rather than through their attribution to substance (*LS* 111, 170–1; *TF* 52–3, 56). Complete determination refers to 'the values of a relation – in other words the composition of a form or the distribution of singular points which characterise it' (*DR* 175). Deleuze makes the distinction between 'complete' determination and 'completed' determination, pointing out how the monads are 'completed individual notions' and each one 'expresses the totality of the world [and] precisely under a certain differential relation and around certain distinctive points which correspond to this relation'. By virtue of the objectivity of this correspondence, Deleuze concludes that there are 'centres of envelopment within the continuum brought about by individual essences [or monads]'. From this he makes the very important move to the claim that 'the continuum of affection and properties in a sense precedes the constitution of these individual essences (which amounts to saying that the distinctive points are themselves pre-individual singularities)' (*DR* 47).

These aspects of Leibniz's differential orientate the discussion around the power of difference as a repetition in relation to the actualization of a virtual world in the monad. We will see more fully towards the

end of the introduction that the inclusion of the essential through the inessential in cases in the actual world, initiated through vice-diction in Deleuze's early work, anticipates the power of affection in the possession of properties in an ontology of 'being-for the world'. In this sense, we could say that the reading of Leibniz provides Deleuze with the technical facility to zoom in on the micro-level of material sensation in perception and zoom out in terms of their immaterial affects. It is arguable that without this technical extension in philosophical thought concerning the ontological status of the limit, perhaps Deleuze could not adopt such a cosmological world view as he does through Gombrowicz. Here the movement of a perplexed and perplicatory thinking is envisaged as the dramatization of the objectivity of the problem in the divergent perspectives of a 'cosmos-system':

> The trinity complication-explication-implication accounts for the totality of the system – in other words, the chaos which contains all, the divergent series which lead out and back in, and the differenciator [the fold (*pli*) as 'mobile cusp' (*DR* 304)] which relates them one to another. Each series explicates or develops itself, but *in* its difference from the other series which it implicates and which implicate it, which it envelops and which envelop it; *in* this chaos which complicates everything. The totality of the system, the unity of the divergent series as such, corresponds to the objectivity of a "problem"'.
>
> (*DR* 123–4)

Explication designates the movement from the virtual to the actual and implication the movement from the actual to the virtual. Both movements are always mutually coimplicated 'in the middle' and refer to each other in a universal complication that guarantees the immanence of the one to the many and that subordinates them both to the perplication of the multiple. More readily associated with the investment in Nietzschean 'eternal return' and perspectivism according to the ideal of the ground as pure difference, the impetus for such a cosmological view could be Leibnizian. In *The Fold*, the 'chaotic world' of Gombrowicz is cited in relation to the Leibnizian 'play of the world' that has 'changed in a unique way, because it now becomes the play that diverges' (*TF* 81).

The problematizing unconscious

Deleuze's reinstatement of the logic of the distinct/obscure idea and the thinking of clear/confused thoughts (*DR* 253) in discussing the objective

outline of problems in relation to 'ideas and the synthesis of difference' bears witness to much reflection on Leibniz's differential unconscious and its abstraction through calculus (*DR* 177; *TF* 96). This reflection serves to bring forth the potential of the virtual as part of Leibniz's 'theory of individuation and expression' (*DR* 252–3). In *The Fold*, Deleuze thus engages with the notion of the play of the limits of material sensations as '*thresholds* of consciousness' (*TF* 88). Consciousness itself is considered as 'a matter of threshold' owing to the levels of distinction or 'filters' (*TF* 91) of perceptions in the multiple sites of the body. Leibniz is thereby employed as part of the argument against Freudian psychoanalysis as an interpretative model of the signs of the unconscious in its compulsion to repeat. The interpretation of this compulsion as demonstrative of primary repression marks the point of Deleuze's affirmation of desire unbound from its opposition to the force of repression (*DR* 17).

A 'problematising' unconscious challenges the terms of the Freudian unconscious – it 'is differential, involving little perceptions, and as such it is different in kind from consciousness. It concerns problems and questions which can never be reduced to the great oppositions or the overall effects that are felt in consciousness (we shall see that Leibnizian theory already indicated this path)' (*DR* 108). Taking the path that Leibniz's theory of the unconscious lays open, the *reduction* to opposition adhering to the terms of representation in the phenomenon according to the Kantian schematism can be evaded. The primacy is no longer given to a reflective consciousness in relation to the realization of possibility in experience. The nature of the distinction of representations by consciousness, resting on 'distinguishing a thing from *everything that it is not*' dictates that the power of the 'other' is determined through negation. Such a logic of causality through the 'negative of opposition' grounds the Freudian theory of the unconscious in primary repression and interpretation through psychoanalysis as a scientific approach. The basis of the Freudian unconscious – the compulsion to repeat presupposing primary repression – is reversed and the power of repetition is asserted: 'we do not repeat because we repress, we repress because we repeat' (*DR* 105). This reconfiguration of repetition as disguise[9] initiates the rethinking of analogy, under the terms of the copy of the model, in the Kantian schema. It also substantiates 'the theatre of problems opening questions which draws spectator, setting and characters into the real movement of an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious' (*DR* 192, translation modified).

In *Difference and Repetition* there is thus an intimation of the concept of the fold by virtue of how Deleuze begins to consider the significance of the limit in the monadic substance as an interiority. When he asserts

that the limit is a threshold of the outside on the inside, or an imitation of the outside on the inside, he moves towards the claim that 'the essence of repetition' can be seen as a novelty that is not necessarily 'reconciled […] with an approximative repetition, so called by analogy' (*DR* 27). Deleuze's revision of the concept of resemblance or imitation, as a power of repetition with its ideal in 'real repetition', draws on a reading of Leibniz via Tarde (*DR* 25–6). The implications of this reading are perhaps only really apparent from the retrospective position of *The Fold*, in terms of how the relation of resemblance between monadic perceptions and matter *produces* the model rather than 'conforming to a pre-existing model' (*TF* 96, emphasis added).

The implication of Leibniz's psychic mechanism of perception is that it allows models of reading to be generated through the examination of the processes of variation in perceptual states. This is attested by the fact that the concept of folds pertains to both the material and immaterial dimensions of perceptions, corresponding to the two orders of baroque expression, the reading of matter and its manner of expression (*TF* 35). The claim about Leibniz's unconscious as 'problematising', enabling an objective approach, is that it obviates the criteria of the conditions of the truth of solutions in the Kantian sense of the 'transcendental form of possibility'. The objectivity of Leibniz's approach becomes tangible when we look more closely at the ontology of 'being-for the world', whereby the world is made up of its continuously varying perspectives of monadic points of view that are read in the varying states of the monad's perceptions. The judgement of properties within *cases* pertains to problems, appealing to their already 'complete determination' as a continuum of properties and affections. Maïmon's post-Kantian reading of Leibniz, cited by Deleuze in *The Fold* in the Chapter 'Perception in the Folds', testifies to a recuperation of the notion of 'complete determination' that is arguably closer to its Leibnizian formulation than Kantian, insofar as both are read through Deleuze. The infinitely small *petites perceptions* constituting the background of unrest – the 'inessential' – in *Difference and Repetition* are posited as 'representatives of the world in the finite self' (*TF* 89). In this context they figure as part of the reading of the conditions in the passage from one state of perception to the next, which is relative to events in the world and the judgement of cases of points of view (See *TF* 72–3).

Judgement and 'complete determination'

In *Difference and Repetition*, the distinction of the singular points of the problem are the determinants of its solutions relative to the regular

points. Together they '*enter into* the complete determination of a species of a curve' (*DR* 177, emphasis added). Hence, the 'evaluation of what is important and what is not takes place entirely within the inessential or within the description of a multiplicity, in relation to the ideal events which constitute the conditions of a 'problem'' (*DR* 189).

In the context of the abstraction of the ontology of events in the world in relation to the infinitely small, the inessential is the 'universal matter or continuum from which essences are finally made' (*DR* 47). What is most important for Deleuze here is that this 'continuum of properties, affections or complete cases' precedes the constitution of these individual essences. In other words, the differential relations and distinctive points of the differential continuum are 'centres of possible implication or involution which are brought about by individual essences' (ibid.). Consequently a principle of continuity is seen in relation to distinctive points that are 'pre-individual singularities'. Through the staging of the problem around Leibniz's theory of vice-diction, Deleuze extracts a philosophical ideal which mobilizes the genesis of new concepts. Recapitulating the 'problem-instance', the production of an 'actual historical world' (*DR* 190) is envisaged through the case for the ideal world in conjunction with its potential continuum of 'pre-individual singularities'.[10]

In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze pushes further a Leibnizian conception of 'complete determination' in which the differential elements of the unconscious are put into play, as part of the theatre of predication as events. Through Leibniz, Deleuze procures the means to enable actualization to be considered outside of the analogy of representation, posing problems that include '"ambiguous signs" or aleatory points, that is diverse distributions of singularities to which instances of different solutions correspond' (*LS* 114). In *The Fold* the correspondence between the 'ambiguous sign' and the 'intrinsic singularity' figures within a perspectival geometry particular to the concept of the fold. In respect of an outside folded on the inside, the distinct points through which change is traced on the curve are unfoldings of the 'complete determination' (*TF* 15). The conceit of Leibnizianism bears within itself the neo-Leibnizianism that Deleuze merely enunciates under the new conditions of being-for the world. Deleuze's 'chaosmos' or 'chaotic world of divergent series' extends the Leibnizian principle of 'complete determination'. The entry of pre-individual singularities into nomadic distributions is an extension of the baroque excess underlying monadic determination as an expression of the world. Monads thus become complicated in the eternal return of their common and immanent becoming unbound by the laws

of pre-established harmony. From the vantage point of *The Fold*, the concept of the fold – an inclusion of the world in the monad – can be considered retrospectively as an inversion of the terms of 'vice-diction'. The selection among an infinity of possible worlds does not rest on a logical impossibility but on an incompossibility of worlds in relation to the best possible (*TF* 26). 'Instead of sticking to abstractions', Deleuze summarizes the Leibnizian movement of thought, 'we always have to restore the series' (*TF* 56). It can be said that 'with' Leibniz, Deleuze proposes that philosophy can embrace the compossibility in one world of all series of possible events – sinning, damnation, catastrophes, wars, diseases to infinity; the dissonance that was laid bare for the first time in the baroque is not the object of exclusion of the incompossible, instead the affirmation of divergence leads to 'the fold taken to infinity'.[11] This implies that instead of the attributive judgement 'IS', the method of vice-diction is the method of a machinic thought that says only 'AND': it is 'neither a union, nor a juxtaposition, but … the outline of a broken line which always sets off at right angles, a sort of active and creative line of flight … AND … AND … AND' (*D* 10).

In relation to the concept of the fold 'the problem is not how to finish a fold, but how to continue it' (*TF* 34) since we are always 'discovering new ways of folding, akin to new developments'[12] (*TF* 137). The ideal of continuity is bound to the task of philosophy in terms of how it poses problems. It is in the manner of posing problems that philosophy reads the conditions of their variation. This ideal of continuity is something that Deleuze borrows from Leibniz, or perhaps we could say that Deleuze makes an intervention into the tradition following the principle from Bergson to Whitehead. Leibniz's philosophy announces a 'teleological conversion of philosophy' (*TF* 79): 'For with Leibniz the question surges forth in philosophy that will continue to haunt Whitehead and Bergson: not how to attain eternity, but in what conditions does the objective world allow for a subjective production of novelty, that is of creation?' (ibid.). This ideal of continuity is implicit in the extension of series and is 'the first component or condition of both Whitehead's and Leibniz's definition of the event' (*TF* 77). Objects are taken in modulation, they become objectile (*TF* 19), while subjects are 'what comes to the point of view, or rather what remains in the point of view' (*TF* 19).

The capacity to be affected to an outside becomes the focal point of the study of the object. Its tendency to vary is considered in respect of how the outside is folded into it: 'every contour is blurred to give definition to the formal powers of the raw material, which rise to the surface and are put forward as so many detours and supplementary

folds' (*TF* 17). The second component of the event is the generation of intrinsic properties in the extension of series: 'for example height, intensity, timbre of a sound, a tint, a value, a saturation of color [and these intrinsic properties can] […] enter on their own account in new infinite series, now converging towards limits, with the relation among limits establishing a conjunction' (*TF* 77). Reading the characteristics of matter is a determination of its texture 'as a function of different materials that are part of it' (ibid.). The lower floor of the baroque house is established as a receptivity to material sensation in conjunction with which matter is conceived as a texture; revealing its texture, it becomes 'raw material' (*TF* 35). The notion of thresholds of resistances in matter revealing its texture implies that the limit is where 'texture becomes most evident, before rupture or tearing, when stretching, no longer being opposed to the fold, now expresses it in its pure state' (*TF* 37). What this stretching arrives at is not parts that would compose the texture but 'strata that determine its cohesion' (ibid.). The ideal of the composition of forms conceived through overcoming the limits of matter is supplanted by their playing out or exhaustion. In the coupling of 'material-forces' (*TF* 35), the movement goes from 'seeing to reading' (*TF* 31, 41). The dramatization or 'play of the world' Deleuze identifies in Leibniz's philosophy in his early work becomes the theatre of baroque expression of the fold in its unfolding (*TF* 31, 121–8). The extension of series is a movement from 'matter to manner' and from 'the *Texturologie* to the *Logologie*', the two orders of the baroque house corresponding to its two floors (*TF* 35).

Perspectivism and expressionism

Leibnizian perspectivism in *The Logic of Sense* falls short of its ideal objectivity fulfilled by Nietzsche (*LS* 174). Deleuze thereby takes the path that Leibniz mapped out, but does not take in the affirmation of 'disjunctive synthesis'. That is whereby distances in topological space implicate the virtual potential of the extension of series and 'the communication of events replaces the exclusion of predicates' (*LS* 174, translation modified). How is it then, we might ask, that Leibnizian perspectivism is read in *The Fold*? Is it that the element of the baroque brings a mannerist expression to the fore in relation to Leibniz's perspectivism, the philosophical text thus assuming a position of not merely *speaking about* its subject but enunciating it?[13] The focal point of the distinction of 'intrinsic singularities' (*TF* 15) articulated within a Leibnizian geometry of perspective in *The Fold* is that this is at the

same time an outline of points of view of perceptions. Change along the path of curvature is read as a tendency of variation to infinity. This informs the abstract level of the problem of reading change: putting elements into play, thereby including the whole, is a form of the continuity of variation from a certain point of view. As Deleuze points out 'singularities, or unique points, belong fully to continuousness. Points of inflexion, make up the first kind of singularity in space, and constitute envelopes in accord with indivisible relations of distance' (*TF* 20). This abstract calculus underpins the judgement of cases with respect to the points of view in the world they implicate. A level of objectivity of problem posing attains a pure machinic functionality: 'a *power of arranging cases*, [is] a condition for the manifestation of reality' (*TF* 21).

The theatre of the monad's reading of its internal states of perception, as an expression, is not something that is merely presented in *The Fold*; it resonates through the allegory of the form of the book in the architectonic of the two floors. If there is an alignment of *The Fold*, as a book with the text of the world, read through the distinction of the monad's perceptual states and their affects, this is because of the intervention into 'the organisation of the home and its nature' (*TF* 1370). The significance of the vertical harmonic in the monadic production of accords ('what determine the affective states that conform to the text' (*TF* 136)) has radically altered. While 'accords no longer convey our world or our text', the principle of 'what matters' remains; that there is a 'folding, unfolding, [and] refolding' of the world and its text (*TF* 137). The infinite process of reiteration of the world and its text through effectuating the concept of the fold is identified as Leibnizianism. The potential of the new in *neo-Leibnizianism* is always already there, depending on the 'enclosure' or the 'signature' of the concept that would give it expression and hence the event in the world that is its predicate (*TF* 41). *The Fold* resembles any other book, unfolding a world or a text in the mind of the reader, and yet it is singular because it enunciates the process of reading as something which takes place through the irreducible differential of clear/confused thoughts and distinct/obscure ideas. Deleuze's writing 'with' Leibniz in relation to an ontology of 'being-for a world' disavows that Leibniz can be read by means of tracing a path through a linear history of philosophy. Staging the 'baroque theatre of reading' as a 'temporal synthesis' in *The Fold*, Leibniz is, for Deleuze, a philosopher to be read through baroque allegory. Leibnizianism is a practice of philosophy in the multiplication of concepts created through reading the texture of matter and the study of the material production of histories thereby opened up.

Introduction to the chapters in this reader on *The Fold*

The contribution by Mogens Laerke, 'Four things Deleuze learned from Leibniz', draws a comparison between Deleuze's reading of Leibniz's baroque philosophy and Benjamin's allegorical interpretation of the baroque world view. The tragedy of the baroque in Benjamin's account is set against its 'joyful' aspect in Deleuze's accentuation of conceptual creativity in Leibniz's rendering of allegory. The objectivity of determination figured in Leibniz's baroque perspectivism, pre-dating the modern conception of the subject, is for Laerke a characteristic of Deleuze's affirmation of 'being-for the world'. While both Deleuze and Benjamin dwell on the expressive nature of perception relative to an infinite world, the latter retains the authenticity of these expressions insofar as they testify to the intentionality of the subject. Hence, the melancholy of Benjamin's subject and its lack of self-determination are distinguished from the affirmative account of monadic expression in *The Fold*, which figures the world and its perspectives rather than intentions. In 'The Free and Indeterminate Accord of "The New Harmony": The significance of Benjamin's study of the baroque for Deleuze', Timothy Flanangan looks at the excess underpinning the figure of the allegory and how this is mobilized by Deleuze in the space between the appropriations of either philosopher. The use of the allegory is an inclusion of a compossible world, a circumscription of the real. The difference does not imply the disjunction of concepts, but an effectuation of excess at the heart of the 'organon of conceptual production' in the baroque.

Deleuze's interest in the philosophical implications of the objectivity in Leibniz's approach to problems through mathematics, in relation to an ontology of being-for a world of pre-individual singularities, is a theme running through a number of the contributions. Niamh McDonnell's chapter 'Leibniz's Combinatorial Art of Synthesis and the Temporal Interval of the Fold' locates the Deleuzian question of individuation in *The Fold* by examining how the concept of the fold draws upon the metaphysical logic of the monad's inclusion of a world. This logic is traced back to the mathematical abstraction of whole–part relations contained in Leibniz's 'On the Art of Combinations'. Conceived as a 'difference in depth' of the outside imitated on the inside, the capacity of parts to repeat in series is the object of Leibniz's study of internal variation and the synthesis of an external view enveloping the whole. The tendency to vary on the level of the infinitely small parts is explored in terms of how it acts as the site or 'situs' for the projection of perception; the means by which Leibniz assigns perceptions passive and active forces

and conceives the passage of their states is considered as a temporal interval that is intrinsic to the concept of the fold as a doubling over of the outside on the inside, whereby the distinction of singularity is at the same time a continuity of unfolding the series of the world folded into the monad. The projective geometry of the monad's projection of a point of view in the world is the juncture at which Deleuze asserts the new ideal of monadic determination as 'capture' rather than 'closure'.

'Leibniz, Mathematics and the Monad', the chapter by Simon Duffy, shows how *The Fold* can be read as an exposition of Deleuze's mapping of modern developments in mathematics onto the structure of Leibniz's metaphysics, most notably the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity and Poincaré's theory of automorphic functions. The mathematical idealization of Leibniz's system, which Duffy claims to be the aim of Deleuze's mapping scheme, puts into question how we might read Leibniz's rationalist idealism. A lucid account is given of the mathematical significance of the 'ambiguous sign' in Leibniz's mapping of change on the path of curvature, according to successive levels of the order of differentials. The objectivity of the outline by which means change is read through the 'intrinsic singularity' (*TF* 15), derives from what Duffy calls the 'change in sign' of the 'higher order differential'. Deleuze's concept of the 'point-fold' is prompted by the correspondence between the intrinsic singularity and the 'ambiguous sign' (ibid.). Reading across these chapters therefore, it is possible to see that the ideal of the new harmony Deleuze poses in *The Fold* inflects on Leibniz's logic in another sense than that in which his negative and exclusionary rules of identity based on the convergence of series serve as the *limit case* of the problem, allowing Deleuze to assert his own non-exclusive affirmation of difference and divergence. To keep the monads 'half open', 'astraddle over several worlds' (*TF* 137), Deleuze builds on the trajectory of idealism in Leibniz's logic as part of the invention of new ways of reading in a baroque expressionism further testament to its 'organon of production of concepts' unrestricted to any one discipline.

Deleuze's relationship to Leibniz's philosophy through Kant is taken up by Daniel W. Smith and Gary Banham, where the question of philosophy's outline of conditions for the genesis of thought in terms of the knowledge of objects and of real experience comes to the fore. In 'Perception, Justification and Transcendental Philosophy', the latter takes up the invitation to investigate Deleuze's assertion of Leibnizian philosophy as a transcendental philosophy of the event rather than the phenomenon. The movement from the monad's perception to the account of the conditions for the emergence of the faculty of

conceptual thought is posed as an 'apparent slippage' in *The Fold*, when read against the terms of the necessary justification given by Kant's transcendental deduction. Concepts have universal application but at the same time emerge out of subjective thought, which determines the possibility of knowledge of objects in the first instance. Maïmon's post-Kantian reading of Leibniz is considered by Banham to 'authorize' it, while also providing for 'a different move of justification'.

Smith's chapter concentrates more specifically on Deleuze's debt to Maïmon's post-Kantianism, with respect to his transcendental empiricism. The relationship between perceiver and the perceived, necessarily positing the separation of subject and object in Kant's *Critique*, as highlighted by Banham, is the point of Maïmon's revision of the justification of subject and object relations *immanent* to consciousness. Tracing Maïmon's investment in the rationalism of Leibniz's thought alongside that of Hume and Spinoza, Smith brings out how the reconciliation of Maïmon's retaining of the transcendental subject in tandem with immanence is the problem Deleuze inherits. Maïmon's question as to how to think the genesis of thought in relation to real experience pivoting on 'the unconditioned' in thought is propelled by Leibniz's '(material) principle of difference'. The subject is not 'constitutive' and there are 'processes of objectification' rather than the given 'universal object = x'. One of the consequences of Deleuze's incorporation of Leibniz's philosophy of the 'monadic subject', already underway in *The Logic of Sense* and further developed in *The Fold*, is that it becomes the 'nomadic subject', the ideal of 'closure' around the reason for its existence becomes the ideal of 'capture'.

In their respective chapters, Sjoerd van Tuinen and Keith Robinson set out to investigate the ways in which *The Fold*, more often implicitly than explicitly, relates to the phenomenological tradition of reading Leibniz proposing its own versions of the concept of the fold. In 'A Transcendental Philosophy of the Event: Deleuze's Non-Phenomenological Reading of Leibniz', van Tuinen broadly follows three trajectories, each of which starts out from an investigation of what is at stake in phenomenological interpretations of Leibniz and then develops an opposition of Leibniz to phenomenology from the perspective of *The Fold*. First, whereas for Husserl, Leibniz's account of the constitution of the phenomenon is a forerunner of the phenomenological reduction, Deleuze argues that since the phenomenon's realization obeys different rules than its actualization, it must be irreducible to either. What transcendentally insists and subsists independently from both consciousness and its embodiment is not of the order of the

phenomenon, but of the event. Second, while Husserl has proposed a monadological account of the lived body as a solution to the problem of solipsism, he did so at the cost of turning the body into the organic substratum of human subjectivity. By contrast, Deleuze discovers in Leibniz' account of monadic appurtenances an animal monadology and even a non-organic vitalism (animism and materialism). The other is not a transcendence within immanence, but the animal within ourselves, a 'half-other'. Third, Deleuze shares his reservations towards intentionality with the later Merleau-Ponty. By 'folding back' the transcendental subject onto its abyssal ground in existence, the latter replaced Husserl's 'windowed monad' with a windowless being-in-the-world. But for Deleuze this is not enough, since in order to free the transcendental from Urdoxic organization, it is precisely the enduring relation between ego and world that has to be undermined. That the monad is windowless means that it is an instance of a world's actualization that is not *in*, but *for*, the world. In this way it forms the condition of the new, of disjunctive syntheses between possible worlds instead of being merely the factual condition describing the world as it is, always already constituted.

In 'Towards a Political Ontology of the Fold: Deleuze, Heidegger, Whitehead and the "Fourfold" Event', Robinson argues that Deleuze's use of the concept of the fold amounts to a confrontation with Heidegger's philosophy of the event. This confrontation culminates in Chapter 6 of *The Fold*, entitled 'What is an Event?'. Here Deleuze draws a parallel between Heidegger and Whitehead, but only in order to substitute for the 'fourfold' structure of the event found with the former another fourfold structure found with the latter, in which the attributive 'is' gives way to the disjunctive inclusion of 'and'. Whitehead offers Deleuze an advance upon both Leibniz and Heidegger insofar as he is better equipped to allow the event to be taken beyond the world of representation and intentionality towards the self-differing difference of the play of the world. In his conclusion Robinson explores some of the political consequences of this choice for questions regarding our manners of inhabiting, dwelling, or belonging to the world, such as the necessity of resistance to the present and of a politics of life.

Birgit M. Kaiser's contribution 'Two Floors of Thinking; or, Deleuze's Aesthetics of Folds' argues that Deleuze's later understanding of aesthetics is bound less to what Rancière calls the post-Kantian 'modern aesthetic regime', based on a relation of incommensurability between the sensate and the intelligible, than to the baroque aesthetics found in Leibniz and Baumgarten, which is not concerned with the limits

of reason but with the cognitive induction of thought. Of particular importance here is the concept of a 'ground', whereby, corresponding to the inseparability of clarity from obscurity, forms are dissolved and from which art arises like a monument to the zone of indiscernibility between the animal and the human. Kaiser traces the transformation of the essentialist concept of ground in *Difference and Repetition* (Leibniz's sufficient reason as foundation (*fondement*)) into its mannerist conception in *The Fold* (sufficient reason as basis or dark background (*fond*)). She demonstrates that with the latter, what distinguishes the power of a ground and the monuments of art is merely the fold of both their differentiation, one side of which is constantly repeating or echoing the other in a 'higher analogy'.

Finally, the contribution of Matthew Hammond entitled 'Capacity or Plasticity: So Just What is a Body?' seeks to trace the development of the dynamic relation between Leibniz and Spinoza throughout Deleuze's work. He demonstrates that in three different stages, it is Leibniz who invariably defines the problem, while Spinoza offers the solutions. In *Expressionism in Philosophy* Deleuze uncovers a Leibnizian concept of 'differentiation' in Spinoza by arguing that Leibniz and Spinoza develop the same anti-Cartesian argument, even to the extent that in *Difference and Repetition* Spinoza and not Leibniz is presented as the penultimate thinker of difference. Then Guattari challenges Deleuze to allow the modal essences the same degree of deterritorializing freedom that Leibniz's monads seem to enjoy, leading to the discovery in Spinoza of the theory of univocal materiality and disjunctive aggregates that in *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze had still attributed to Leibniz. Finally, these first two stages lead to a third, following Deleuze's remark that *The Fold* enabled him to rigorously distinguish between affect, percept and concept for the first time, a distinction he elsewhere conjoins with Spinoza's distinction between the 'three kinds of knowledge'. Hammond concludes that if, in the Deleuzian theatre of philosophy, Spinoza is the 'Christ of philosophy', Leibniz must be its 'John the Baptist'.

Notes

1. For an overview of recent Leibniz scholarship, see Look (2002).
2. In *The Fold*, the baroque would be the plane of immanence; Leibniz, the persona and the fold, the ('operative') concept. In *What is Philosophy?* conceptual personae 'carry out the movements that describe the author's plane of immanence, and they play a part in the very creation of the author's concepts' (*WP* 63), such that 'the persona establishes a correspondence between each throw of the dice and the intensive features of a concept that will occupy this or

that region of the table, as if the table were split according to the combinations' (*WP* 75). In *The Fold* the plunging into obscurity from which the clarity of perceptions emerges (*TF* 32) is consistent with the performance of the conceptual persona as 'it plunges into the chaos from which it extracts the determinations with which it produces the diagrammatic features of a plane of immanence' (*WP* 75). Between these two texts the role of a physics of impulsion in distributing the intensive features of a concept is the key to the potential affects of perceptions as points of view in the world.

3. In a famous passage from a letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte from 8 May 1704, Leibniz says that 'my great principle of natural things is that of Harlequin, Emperor of the Moon (…), "that all the time and everywhere everything's the same as here". That is to say, nature is fundamentally uniform, although there are differences of degree and different levels of perfection' (*GP* III 343).

4. Conley (1997), pp. 260–3. Or consider, for example, Deleuze's warning at the outset of his course from 1980, which is clearly inspired by baroque allegory: 'Assume that I'm telling you a story. This story consists in taking up one of the central points of Leibniz's philosophy, and I tell it to you as if it were the description of another world, and there I also number the principal propositions that go into forming a funny thought (*drôle de pensée*)' (*CGD* 15 April 1980).

5. In itself, the concept of the fold, or rather, the trait of the fold, is not new in Deleuze. Its potential appears already in *Proust and Signs* and *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, in which Deleuze reverts to the Neoplatonic 'trinity' of *complicatio-explicatio-implicatio* – notions derived from the Latin stem '*-plica*', that is, folding words (*PS* 44–6; *EPS* 169–86; *TF* 24) – in order to describe the immanent relation between the expressor, the expressed, and the expression. In *Difference and Repetition* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze discusses the controversy between Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire concerning the unity of the composition of life forms and insists that it finds 'its poetic method and test in *folding*: is it possible to pass by folding from Vertebrate to Cephalod?' (*DR* 215; *ATP* 46, 254–5). Finally, in *Foucault* the fold is also given a post-phenomenological sense, borrowed from, but developed in opposition to, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who literally fold back the transcendental subject on the abyss of its own existence (*DR* 64–6; F 95–123).

6. Badiou claims that Deleuze's philosophy poses truth as accessible to thought only in its movement, demanding a temporal synthesis in the philosophical text as the site of engagement with philosophers and their concepts. Insisting on the transtemporal value of truths as actual multiplicities he maintains that 'we *really* are the contemporaries of Archimedes and Newton, Spartacus and Saint-Just, Dame Murasaki and Héloïse, Phidias and Tintoretto. Which means that we think with – and in – them, without the least need of a temporal synthesis' (Badiou 2000, p. 60). For Badiou, Deleuze's assertion of the Bergsonian value of 'non-chronological time grasped in its foundation' (*C2* 80) over the value of truth stems from his concoction of a 'pared-down version of "Platonism"' (Badiou 2000, p. 56). Philosophy after Plato proceeds by 'authenticating' claims to truth, according to Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*: 'The one problem which recurs throughout Plato's philosophy is the problem of measuring rivals and selecting claimants. This problem of distinguishing between *things and their simulacra* within a pseudo-genus or a large species presides over his classification of the arts and sciences' (*DR* 60).

7. The entire quote is rather illustrative of Deleuze's own argument that the new always appears behind masks and never as such: 'A metaphysics should be written with accurate definitions and demonstrations, but nothing should be demonstrated in it apart from that which does not clash too much with received opinions. For in that way this metaphysics can be accepted; and once it has been approved then, if people examine it more deeply later, they themselves will draw the necessary consequences. Besides this, one can, as a separate undertaking, show these people later the way of reasoning about these things. In this metaphysics, it will be useful for there to be added here and there the authoritative utterances of great men, who have reasoned in a similar way; especially when these utterances contain something that seems to have some possible relevance to the illustration of a view' (*A* VI.iii, 573–4). In a different context, Isabelle Stengers has argued that for Leibniz (and Whitehead), but not for Deleuze who is said to be a 'killer', what counts is tenderness in 'saving' the world: 'common sense itself can only be enriched by new habits of thought' such that 'the name of the line of flight is exactly "coherence"' (Stengers 2005, pp. 9–10, 15–7). In contrast, Deleuze writes: 'The eternal return is indeed Coherence, but it is a coherence which does not allow my coherence, the coherence of the world and the coherence of God to subsist' (*LS* 340).

8. In his courses as well as in *The Fold*, Deleuze uses the word *chevaucher*, which means both 'to grow together' (a botanical term used for the rhizomatic effect created when one branch grafts or implants itself on another, or for a transplantation instead of genetic branching – one should also think of Whitehead's *concrescence* or Deleuze's definition of a *con-cept* as a *con-crete* unity of variation) as well as to 'overlap' (such as the strata of the earth's crust) and 'to sit astride' (such as on a witch's broom).

9. See the chapter one in this volume, where 'infinite iteration' is seen as the trope in Leibniz's philosophy which affirms the monad's determination in 'being-for a world' as opposed to its negation through lack. The latter can be identified with the Freudian foundation of the unconscious through primary repression and testifies to a subject-centred ontology tracing representations to acts of intention, whereas Laerke emphasizes the objectivity of determination in a world constituted by perspectives.

10. See also Frémont (1991) and Bowden (2006).

11. On the passage from exclusion to inclusion, see Baker (1995). Robinson has posed similar questions on the 'compossibility' of Deleuze's early reading of Leibniz and emphasizes the difference between early Deleuze's emphasis on the 'yoke' and 'rights of representation' and later Deleuze's emphasis on Leibniz freeing the fold from all representation by taking it to infinity (Robinson 2003).

12. One could say that this procedure is irenic, in the sense given to it by Erasmus, but taken furthest by Leibniz (Frémont 1981, pp. 15–23). It is our contention that irenism is also an important influence in Deleuze's own work, as becomes apparent from his praise of his old teacher Gandillac, whom he respected greatly: 'There is a kind of Renaissance man in Gandillac. His lively sense of humor is apparent in his fabric of immanence: complicating the most diverse things and persons in the self-same tapestry, at the same time that each thing, each person, explicates the whole' (*TRM* 263). It is true that

this approach always runs the risk of falling into the trap of what Hegel called the 'beautiful soul (*schöne Seele*)', who continually says 'we're different, but not opposed'. But the aggression found in Deleuze's texts not only stays clean from this risk but also allows for a kind of modernist and minimalist perversion of the irenic strategy. Cf. footnote 7.

13. In *What is Philosophy* Deleuze and Guattari write about philosophical enunciations as follows: 'we do not do something by saying it but produce movement by thinking it through the intermediary of a conceptual persona' (*WP* 64). The principle of division of *The Logic of Sense* into chapters as successive series alludes to its form through the trope of the displacement of the virtual object of thought, the 'ambiguous sign' or the 'aleatory point' bringing the series into resonance. This places *The Logic of Sense* on the cusp of the transition between the structuralist approach concerned with compositional form and the constructivist approach, found in *The Fold* among other texts, most notably *A Thousand Plateaus*. The latter is characterized by the concern with a force of displacement underlying thought as a movement and an immanent creation of concepts in the style or manner of the philosophical writing.

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1
Four Things Deleuze Learned from Leibniz

Mogens Lærke

Introduction

According to Deleuze's critique of the 'regimes of representation' in *Difference and Repetition*, Leibniz belongs, with Hegel, in the category of philosophers who instead of overcoming representation made it infinite, hereby producing a 'delirium' which 'is only a pre-formed false delirium which poses no threat to the repose or serenity of the identical' (*DR* 50, 42–3, 88, 263–5). According to the same work however, there is still something about Leibniz which makes him superior to the German master of negativity: 'the ground rumbles with greater power in the case of Leibniz […] the intoxicaton and giddiness are less feigned in his case, why obscurity is better understood and the Dionysian shores are closer' (ibid., 264, 49). It is this 'Dionysian' Leibniz to whom Deleuze admits his indebtedness in the preface to the English edition of *Expressionism in Philosophy* (cf. *EPS* Preface). It is also the Leibniz that Deleuze refers to when, in *Negotiations*, he says: 'Leibniz is fascinating because perhaps no other philosopher created so much. They're at first sight extremely odd notions, almost crazy' (*N* 154). Finally, and most importantly, it is the Leibniz that we encounter in *The Fold*.

In the following, I will discuss four doctrinal points that I consider to be fundamental for Deleuze's re-evaluation of the Hanoverian philosopher in the monograph from 1988. They are: (1) a conception of objects as events, folds and forces; (2) an expressionist and perspectivist account of subjectivity; (3) a conception of a differential unconscious; (4) a joyful affirmation of the infinite. In my discussion of these four points, I will argue that Deleuze's reading of Leibniz's philosophy as a 'baroque' philosophy *par excellence*[1] can be seen as a 'joyful' alternative to Walter Benjamin's 'tragic' conception of the baroque in *The Origin*

of German Tragic Drama (1928). Thus, throughout the following, I will compare Deleuze's conception of a Leibnizian 'baroque' philosophy with Benjamin's famous 'allegorical' interpretation of the baroque world view.[2] In *Expressionism in Philosophy*, Deleuze sees Leibniz's philosophy as a philosophy of 'symbolization' and 'analogy' (*EPS* 232, 328–34). In *The Fold*, on the contrary, he insists on 'allegorization' as an essential feature of Leibniz's philosophy: 'one must see Leibniz's philosophy as an allegory of the world and no longer in the old way as the symbol of a cosmos' (*TF* 127). Here, by 'allegory' is meant a type of emblem or trope which contains an element of infinite iteration, as opposed to a symbol which is based on determinate reference, recognition and identity. This concept of 'allegory' is of course something that Deleuze picks up from Benjamin.[3] What I will show in the following is how Benjamin's allegorical notion of the baroque allows Deleuze to *bring out the creativity in Leibniz's philosophy*, namely its essential relation to a non-circular form of infinity, its affirmation of an open-ended production of meaning, an incessant creation of concepts. However, I will also show how Deleuze, now in opposition to Benjamin, *makes an affirmation of the baroque* or *makes the baroque itself affirmative* by means of Leibniz's *optimism*. While taking over central figures of Benjamin's interpretation of the baroque 'way of seeing' – which is both a form of experience, a form of expression, and a form of reasoning – Deleuze thus proposes an entirely different *evaluation* of it: whereas Benjamin's baroque is a world of 'mourning' (*Trauer*) and melancholy, Deleuze's baroque is a world characterised by a certain form of joy that Leibniz terms 'delight' (*laetitia*).

Objects as events, folds and forces

According to *The Logic of Sense*, 'the first important theoretician of the event' (*LS* 171) is Leibniz. Deleuze returns to this idea in greater detail in Chapter 4 of *The Fold*, 'What is an event?'. Here, he argues that Leibniz and Whitehead share a conception of the world as a series of events rather than as a set of things. However, Deleuze also affirms this: 'But you can make this abstraction, you consider the world. How do you consider it? You consider it as a complex curve […]. For Leibniz, that is what the world is' (*CGD* 6 May 1980). Hence, in Deleuze's reading, Leibniz holds that the world is both constituted by *events* and constituted by *folds* or *inflexions*.[4] The problem is to understand how this amounts to saying the same thing.

   The conception of the world as constituted by folds corresponds to Leibniz's assumption that '*atoms of matter* are contrary to reason'

(Leibniz 2001, p. 142). Folding is a way to differentiate matter without introducing discontinuity, that is, without pulverising the world of extension (cf. Bouquiaux 2005, pp. 43–5). The 'analogy with folds', as Leibniz himself calls it, first shows up in a text entitled *Pacidius Philalethi* written in October 1676. Pacidius, Leibniz's mouthpiece, explains:

> I myself admit neither Gassendi's atoms, i.e. a body that is perfectly solid, nor Descartes' subtle matter, i.e. a body that is perfectly fluid [...]. Accordingly the division of the continuum must not be considered to be like the division of sand into grains, but like that of a sheet of paper or tunic into folds [...]. It is just as if we suppose a tunic to be scored with folds multiplied to infinity in such a way that there is no fold so small that it is not subdivided by a new fold: and yet in this way no point in the tunic will be assignable without its being moved in different directions by its neighbors, although it will not be torn apart by them. And the tunic cannot be said to be resolved all the way down into points; instead, although some folds are smaller than others to infinity, bodies are always extended and points never become parts, but always remain mere extrema.[5]
>
> (Leibniz 2001, pp. 184–7)

This early passage is Leibniz's most developed account of the paradigm of folding, a physics where 'particles have been turned into folds' (*GP* VII 553). As Laurence Bouquiaux has pointed out (cf. Bouquiaux 2005, p. 39), most of the later Leibniz texts Deleuze quotes are much more allusive. Recently published material (very probably unknown to Deleuze) does, however, attest to the fact that it is a persistent metaphor in Leibniz's physics. Thus, in the 'Definitiones Cogitationesque Metaphysicae' from around 1680, he writes: 'For unity always remains as great as it can be while maintaining plurality, which is the case if bodies are understood to be folded rather than divided' (*A* VI, iv, 1401). In the 'Conspectus Libelli Elementorum Physicae' from approximately the same period, Leibniz maintains: 'It seems like everything actually is fluid, but folded in different ways, without any loss of continuity' (*A* VI, iv, 1990). Finally, the metaphor resurfaces in some comments on Saint Augustin's 'Confessions' written around 1688–90: 'The whole world is one continuous body. It is not divided, but transfigured like wax or like a tunic is folded in various ways' (*A* VI, iv, 1686–7).

It is important to note that what is folded is not *extension* or *passive matter* in the Cartesian sense. What is folded is the fundamental component of Leibnizian physics, namely *force*: 'matter is a force which

refolds itself incessantly' (*CGD* 16 December 1986). As is well known, in his 'reformed physics' or 'dynamics', Leibniz argues that the essence of physical objects is not, as it is for Descartes, quantity, motion and shape, but *action* and *force*. As Leibniz says it in the 'Discourse of Metaphysics', 1686, 'the nature of body does not consist merely in extension, that is, in size, shape and motion' (*AG* 44), but 'the force or proximate cause of these changes [that is, of a body that moves] is something more real' (*AG* 51). This is the conception that Deleuze links to the idea that the world, like a continuous curve, is not fundamentally constituted by points (or things), but by a continuous series of differentials, variations or actions: 'The fold is Power [...]. Force itself is an act, an act of the fold' (*TF* 18, cf. *N* 158).

But how do *folded forces* relate more precisely to actions, that is, to *events*? Deleuze connects these notions as early as *The Logic of Sense*: 'What is an ideal event? It is a singularity – or rather a set of singularities or of singular points characterizing a mathematical curve [...]. Singularities are turning points and points of inflexion' (*LS* 52). In Leibniz, the conception of the world as a complex curve is tightly linked to 'the labyrinth of the continuum' he explores through the calculus. The curve of the world cannot be described as a composition of *points* (*x,y*), but must be understood as a continuous succession of relations or, as it were, *differential relations* (*dy/dx*).[6] Any such differential relation expresses the *curving* itself, that is, the way in which the curve *varies*. In other words, the differential relation is an expression of the fact that something *happens* on a curve; it is an action or event (Leibniz calls it a *derivative force*), which is the actualisation of a substantial force (Leibniz calls it a *primitive force*). Leibniz's 'world' consists of such differential relations, *variations* of the curve, and it is in this sense that it consists of singular *events*. The dynamic paradigm of the fold is thus construed around the equation: *differential relation = event = action = actualised force*.

Accordingly, to determine the nature of an object x in the world, you do not ask 'what is x?' You rather ask 'what does x do?' or 'what is done to x?'. The nature of any thing is determined by a set of actions or events. It is in this sense that Leibniz's philosophy is a *mannerism*, as opposed to an *essentialism* (*TF* 53–6). All things that we perceive are things that *happen* to us, and there is no essential difference between things and events: both 'crossing the Rubicon' and 'the Pyramids' are happenings, that is, complex organisations of actions or events: 'It is a manneristic object, and no longer an essentialist one: it becomes event' (*TF* 19, 41, 52–3).

The conception of things as events has important consequences for Deleuze's reading of Leibniz's propositional logic. For, insofar as

Leibniz construes his notion of individual substances on the model of logical subjects, conceiving all phenomena given in our perception as *events* also involves turning all logical predicates into *verbs* rather than adjectives. Thus, according to Deleuze, the fundamental propositional form in Leibniz's logic is not the traditional attributive proposition *subject-copula-qualitative adjective* (such as 'Adam is a sinner'), but rather a verbal proposition of the form *subject-verb* ('Adam sins').[7] This rather unusual reading of Leibniz's logic does become a lot less odd when seen in the light of Leibniz's (provisional) nominalism.[8] According to Leibniz, all real predicates are individual, that is, *singular*. Abstract terms have no reality; only individual, concrete terms are real. Thus, if we consider Adam insofar as he is a 'sinner': the abstract and general term 'sinner' is grounded in the concrete singular term 'sinning'. In other words, the *general attribute* 'sinner' is grounded in the *individual event* of sinning that Adam envelops and actualises. Here it becomes clear how Leibniz's denial of the reality of abstract terms and his insistence on the singularity of all properties corresponds to a conception of predicates as events.

Subjects: Expression and perspectivism

In the preface to the English translation of *Expressionism in Philosophy*, Deleuze explains that Leibniz is the one who has gone the furthest in accounting for the 'expressive character of particular individuals' (*EPS* 11). At first, such an affirmation may come as a surprise. How can a philosopher like Deleuze, who claims with Hume that the 'I' is nothing but a contraction of habits[9], learn anything about the nature of the individual from a philosopher, who makes the 'I' or things analogous to the 'I' – namely monads which are soul-like substances – into the fundamental 'support' (*suppositum*) of all being and action (Fichant 1997, pp. 135–48)? Certainly Deleuze cannot endorse anything like a conception of individuals as independent, individual substances or 'windowless monads': according to him, we are all constantly traversed by actions, events, words, passions and perceptions. Indeed, we are nothing but clusters of 'powers to affect and to be affected' as he often says it with Spinoza. So what could Leibniz possibly teach Deleuze about individuality? I think the reply to this question is twofold.

First, it lies in the conception of the individual as a primitive, *expressive* force. The individual is that which *expresses* the world, hereby bringing it into existence. Leibniz's monadological conception of subjectivity involves an understanding of this expressive mechanism in terms of

a subject *enveloping* the world, thus 'folding in' the fold of the world. This explains why Deleuze speaks of a 'refolding' or 'folding back' in this context. It is important to distinguish these two distinct aspects of 'expression in the folds': there is, on the one hand, the fold of the world which must be *expressed* or *actualised*; on the other hand, there is the folding or enveloping of the world in the subjects that *express* or *actualise* it. The world in which we live is thus folded into us; it is us who bring this world into actual existence through our inner perception of it.

Second, it lies in Leibniz's 'perspectivism'. According to the *New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances*, 1695, 'every substance represents the whole universe exactly and in its own way, from a certain point of view, and makes the perceptions or expressions of external things occur in the soul at a given time' (*AG* 143). This theory brings Leibniz and Nietzsche together:

> The theory of viewpoints introduces what one must indeed call a perspectivism in philosophy [...]. In Nietzsche as in Leibniz, perspectivism does not mean that everyone has his own truths, it means that the viewpoint will be the condition of the manifestation of truth.[10]
>
> (*CGD* 16 December 1986)

Thus, all monads express the same infinite world, but they do not express it in the same way, because they do not express it from the same perspective but each from their determinate, individual point of view. Deleuze agrees: 'Leibniz then was right to say that the individual monad expresses a world according to the relations of the other bodies with its own' (*LS* 110). This perspectivist theory has the virtue of allowing for both *determination* (of the individual subject) and *infinity* (of the world in which the subject exists and that it expresses): 'Leibniz will tell us: the individual envelops the infinite' (*CGD* 16 December 1986). Such perspectivism, however, involves no relativism or subject-dependence of truth:

> To the degree it [the subject] represents variation or inflexion, it can be called point of view. Such is the basis of perspectivism, which does not mean a dependence in respect to a pregiven or defined subject; to the contrary, a subject will be what comes to the point of view, or rather what inhabits the point of view.
>
> (*TF* 19)

The subject does not ground a view point on the world, but 'the subject is that which comes to a view point' (*CGD* 16 December 1986). In

Leibniz, this corresponds to the fact that the world is *preestablished*: everything that will happen in the world is determined in God's mind beforehand. He only needs to create us, along with an infinity of other monads, to incarnate the chosen series of events and give it actual existence: 'the world, as that which is expressed in common by all monads, pre-exists its expressions. […] God did not create Adam as a sinner, but rather the world in which Adam has sinned' (*DR* 47–8).

Perspectivism is thus a doctrine of expression according to which the individuality of the soul, the truth of its perceptions, and its perspective on the world are tightly connected. The formula which sums up the expressive relation between the world and the subjects which inhabit it is the following: the world exists *in* the monads, but the monads exist *for* the world (*TF* 105–7).

At this point, we can already discern some of the features which will characterise Deleuze's Leibnizian conception of the baroque. More precisely, we can already see that Deleuze's baroque does *not* announce modern conceptions of subjectivity, but remains firmly placed within the theological paradigms of the seventeenth century: it is never about subjective (lack of) autonomy and self-determination, but always about objective, divine determination. It also gives us a first indication of how Deleuze's conception of the baroque is opposed to Benjamin's. According to the *Origin of German Tragic Drama*, the baroque corresponds to the melancholic and subjective experience of a fragmented, hopelessly ruined world that '[piles] up fragments ceaselessly, without any strict idea of a goal […] in the unremitting expectation of a miracle' (Benjamin 1998, henceforth '*OGT*', p. 178).[11] There is none of this in Deleuze's Leibnizian baroque. Quite on the contrary, the subject's lack of self-determination – that is, the fact that it is born into a world that it does not control – does not correspond to an experience of chaos and fragmentation, but rather to the rational affirmation that the individual subject is embedded in the best of all possible worlds, since it is folded into a world controlled by God. In other words, the existing subject's situation is joyful, not mournful or melancholic.[12]

How do we get to this conclusion? Everybody knows that, in Benjamin's reading, the baroque world of mourning (*Trauer*) is *allegorical* in the sense that it is engaged in 'a successively progressing, dramatically mobile, dynamic representation of ideas which has acquired the very fluidity of time' (*OGT* 165). Now, for Benjamin, allegory is a *form of experience*, an 'allegorical way of seeing' (*allegorischen Betrachtung*) (ibid., 166). Interestingly, in the Leibnizian context, it is also a *form of expression* (*Ausdrucksform*) (ibid., 162, 167). By this, we should

understand a form in which nature presents itself to our experience.[13] So far, Leibniz and Deleuze agree with Benjamin. Experience is not simple impression, but subjective expression. Indeed, for Leibniz, our perceptions are spontaneously produced by ourselves, insofar as we are independent, active substances: 'God originally created the soul […] in such a way that everything must arise for it from its own depths, through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself' (*AG* 143). Benjamin, however, sees the perceptions of the soul as a subjective form of expression, an *intention*, insofar as the nature which expresses itself in allegory is presumed to be essentially linked to the subject, namely as expressing the authentic nature of the subject. Thus, in the context of his analysis of evil, Benjamin explains that the 'allegorical form' is a 'subjective phenomenon', that allegories 'point to the absolutely subjective pensiveness, to which alone they owe their existence', and that they are 'related to the depths of the subjective' (*OGT* 233).[14] Benjamin's argument clearly remains governed by the modern (or at least post-Kantian) idea that self-representation (*ein Sich-Darstellendes*) is the method of truth (ibid., 28–9). But insofar as such 'authentic' self-representation seems to elude us permanently, the baroque form of experience becomes inextricably linked to a lack of subjective self-determination and a sense of arbitrariness: 'the triumph of subjectivity and the onset of an arbitrary rule over things, is the origin of all allegorical contemplation' (ibid., 233).

Deleuze's Leibnizian approach to the baroque will save it from this abyssal subjectivity and turn the allegorisation of the world into an affirmation of divine truth, *ad majorem Dei gloriam*. In Leibniz, the ground of subjective experience is not subjectivity as such. The truth of the subject has nothing to do with self-representation. The ground of subjective experience must be sought after in the objective world in which the subject is embedded. The individual does not express a subjective *intention* through its experience, but it expresses an objective *perspective*, that is, a world or series of events *for which* it was created. Our experience of the world is thus necessarily ordered according to the objective element of divine harmony: subjective expression is 'in perfect conformity relative to external things' (*AG* 143). It is in this way that perspectivism comes out as an alternative to the post-Kantian phenomenology which underlies Benjamin's account of the baroque. In Leibniz's baroque, our experience is governed by *perspectives*, not by *intentions*.

This is what is at stake when Deleuze repeatedly insists that the world is *in* the monads, but the monads are *for* the world: 'There is an antecedence to monads, although a world does not exist outside of the

monads that express it' (*TF* 60). The essence of truth is not self-represen-
tation, but the representation of the divine order folded into each soul.
Subjects are destined to live in the same world, insofar as they 'come to'
the world that they each express from their individual perspective, as
'a circle of convergence on which are distributed all the *points of view*'
(*DR* 273). This 'distribution' is nothing but divine harmony. Thus, inso-
far as it is created to express a world it was made *for*, the subject does
not express *lack of self-determination*, but quite on the contrary the *omni-
presence of divine determination*: the soul only expresses the world it was
created to express, in perfect harmony with all the other souls. It here
becomes clear why Deleuze insists so strongly on distinguishing baroque
perspectivism from mere relativism. Perspectivism is not a principle
leading away from order towards a subjective experience of fragmenta-
tion. Quite on the contrary, it is an objective principle which describes
the subject as embedded in a pre-established order of divine harmony.

The differential unconscious: Order and uneasiness

Leibniz's baroque philosophy takes its point of departure in a feeling of
uneasiness: the Dionysian rumbles in the obscure depths of the 'differ-
ential unconsciousness' of 'minute perceptions' that Leibniz describes
in the preface to the *New Essays*.[15] According to this theory, 'each soul
knows the infinite – knows all – but confusedly […]. Confused per-
ceptions are the result of impressions that the whole universe makes
upon us' (*AG* 211). Because of the universal connectedness of all things,
the effects of all things must have their expressions in the mind, albeit
not always with the same clarity:

> Since everything is connected because of the plenitude of the world,
> and since each body acts on every other body, more or less, in pro-
> portion to its distance, and is itself affected by the other through
> reaction, it follows that each monad is a living mirror […], which
> represents the universe from its own point of view.
>
> (*AG* 207)

The whole world constantly murmurs in the back of our head, a point
that Leibniz puts very nicely in the *Principles of Nature and of Grace*,
1714, using the notion of folding: 'One could know the beauty of the
universe in each soul, if one only could unfold all its folds' (*AG* 211).

   The concept of 'uneasiness' captures two aspects of how the soul
relates to this disintegrated, permanent representation of the world.

First, on the descriptive level, all souls relate directly to the differential unconscious through a feeling of *dizziness*. As Deleuze puts it: 'dizziness is an example that recurs constantly in Leibniz's work. I get dizzy, I faint, and a flow of minute unconscious perceptions arrives: a buzz in my head'.[16] Leibniz writes:

> We experience within ourselves a state in which we remember nothing and have no distinct perceptions; this is similar to when we faint or when we are overwhelmed by a deep, dreamless sleep […] when there is a great multitude of small perceptions in which nothing is distinct, we are stupefied. This is similar to when we continually spin in the same direction several times in succession, from which arises a dizziness that can make us faint and does not allow us to distinguish anything.
>
> (*AG* 215–6; see also *TF* 11–2)

Second, on the normative or moral level, uneasiness is a form of *anxiety*. It corresponds to our experience of evil. Perceptions of apparently unjust events swell up from the depths of the obscure, differential unconscious; all kinds of minute appetitions incline us to do things that seem morally bad. And insofar as we do not grasp the reason or ground of these evil events and inclinations, we fear that they are without explanation. We thus find both a *dizzy* Leibniz, trying to get his thoughts together, and a *worried* Leibniz, caught in the middle of a threatened providential order (cf. Frémont 2003, p. 20).

It could thus appear that we are cast back into the Benjaminian dichotomy between unfulfilled subjectivity and the sense of fragmentation and arbitrariness. The paradox, however, is that, amidst all this uneasiness, Leibniz does not complain about the absurdity of the world or the wretchedness of man. Contrary to Benjamin's 'melancholy man' (cf. *OGT* 142–3), Leibniz is the exact opposite of Pascal on this point, and takes a much more affirmative stand towards the world in his natural theology. This constitutes the whole meaning of the famous allegory about Sextus Tarquinus in the *Theodicy*. Sextus *mourns*, *laments* himself: 'Why should *I* be granted the ungracious role of being a rapist?', he asks Jupiter (cf. *Theodicy* § 409; *GP* VI, 359). His preoccupation is merely subjective. Like Benjamin's melancholic man, he regrets his lack of self-determination, his incapacity to control his individual inclinations and to seize the principle of his unconscious. But as Leibniz already explains in the *Confessio Philosophi* from 1672–3, such complaints are, in a certain sense, the expression of a hatred of God. By questioning and

rejecting the choice of world made by God, Sextus condemns himself to damnation.[17] Instead of regretting our lack of autonomy, or complain about our determinations, *we should make an affirmation of our state of determinedness*, not passively, like the quietists, but actively, by living up to what occurs to us, affirming it as divine will (*CGD* 24 April 1980). Leibniz calls it the *fatum christianum*:

> It is as if one said to man: perform your duty and be content with what will happen, and not only because you cannot resist divine providence or the nature of things […] but also because you are dealing with a good master. And this is what one can call a *fatum christianum*.
>
> (cf. *Theodicy* Preface, GP VI, 31)

The sense of unfulfilled subjectivity – that is, our experience of lacking autonomy – must thus serve to affirm divine providence. This is the lesson that Pallas Athena will teach Theodore about the justice of Sextus's fate when showing him a vision of all the possible worlds in the form of a pyramid of rooms where the room at the summit represents the actual, chosen world, that is, the best one, where Sextus performs his ungraceful deeds for the sake of this best world (cf. *Theodicy* § 416; *GP* VI, 364).

To further support his affirmative approach to the 'Christian destiny', Leibniz develops the idea that no harmony is more 'delightful' than the one derived from dissonance and apparent chaos:

> The most distinguished masters of composition often mix dissonances with consonances in order to arouse the listener, and pierce him, as it were, so that, anxious about what is to happen, the listener might feel all the more pleasure when order is soon restored […], just as we delight on the spectacle of ropewalkers or sword dancing for their very ability to incite fear, or just as we ourselves laughingly toss children, as if we are about to throw them off […]. Pleasure does not derive from uniformity, for uniformity brings forth disgust and makes us dull, not happy: this very principle is a law of delight (*laetitiae lex*).
>
> (*AG* 153)

In the Leibnizian theory of uneasiness, we find an epistemology driven by the pleasure that our general dizziness affords us when we occasionally manage to extract a clear idea from it. But, more importantly, we

also find a *moral philosophy* driven by the joy that anxiety can yield when it is finally dispelled. This deterministic moral theory is governed by the *lex laetitiae*, which expresses the nature of baroque harmony as a 'dissonant accord' (*TF* 131). Delight is an almost aesthetic experience: it is like a peek down into the depths of the differential unconscious which constitutes the condition of our experience: we are afraid to look down, but we are reassured when we do; we are frightened we may only see chaos and mayhem, but order reduplicates itself in depth: *c'est partout comme ici*, as Harlequin said after his visit to the moon. Our visits to the depths of the differential unconscious reveal landscapes which are not essentially different from the ones we already know from the surface, and we're delighted … There is order everywhere, a reason for everything, however obscure it may initially appear to our understanding or evil to our moral sense: 'We consider that we can find no true or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known' (*AG* 217). There are certain 'hidden reasons' which elude us, but nevertheless we can be assured that the order of nature is nowhere violated, that the same best world is everywhere:

> We can take it for certain that God made everything in the most perfect way, and that he does nothing without a reason, and that nothing happens anywhere unless he who understands, understands its reason, that is, why the state of things is this way rather than that […]. Nor should we doubt that there are hidden reasons that completely transcends the grasp of a creature, reasons why God prefers one series of things, although it includes a sin, over another.
>
> (*AG* 96–7)

It is in such affirmations that we must look for Leibniz's most powerful objection to the Skeptics' doubts concerning the meaningfulness of the world. The principle of sufficient reason leads straight to affirming that the world is perfectly organised through and through. That is the promise of his 'strange' optimism which appears at the time of 'a long moment of crisis' (cf. *TF* 68; Frémont 2003, p. 73).

Certainly, this sort of theologically grounded optimism has no place in Deleuze's philosophy. In his view, all kinds of monsters and injustices roam in the back of our heads. There is no longer any delight to be derived from our uneasiness: order is never reinstated or rediscovered; it is always produced and becoming. The determination of our actions and inclinations are left in the hands of impersonal forces and unregulated

desires working in the depths of a chaotic *fuscum subnigrum*. Nietzsche describes very well the sensation this must provoke in the last man: 'an immense vista opens up to him, a possibility takes hold of him like a dizziness, every sort of mistrust, suspicion, fear springs forth' (cf. Nietzsche 1998, Preface §§ 6, 5). In this world, Bouaniche writes, 'the regime of *uneasiness* does not appear as a determinist factor, but as the dynamic element in which we act' (Bouaniche 2005, p. 87). The differential unconscious becomes the element of disorganised desire, the expression of the *Corps sans Organes*, which is also the place of genuine, Nietzschean affirmation, of *irresponsibility* and *laughter* rather than Leibnizian order and delight. It is still the case, however, that there is more *affirmation* in Leibniz's objective delight than in Benjamin's subjective mourning. At least, Leibniz's account of uneasiness is not driven by the sense of *lack*. In this sense, it is perfectly understandable why Deleuze maintains that, contrary to in Hegel, in Leibniz, 'intoxicaton and giddiness are less feigned' and 'obscurity is better grasped' (*DR* 264).

Infinity

'Everything goes to infinity in nature', says Leibniz (*AG* 209). Deleuze often quotes Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who characterised the philosophers of the classical age by their 'innocent way of beginning in the infinite' (*CGD* 22 April 1980). Indeed, according to Deleuze, 'classical thought may be recognized by the way in which it thinks of the infinite […]. Classical thought is certainly not serene or imperious. On the contrary, it continually loses itself in infinity' (*F* 103). Now, this *classical* element is also an eminently *baroque* element in Leibniz's philosophy: 'The baroque trait is the fold going to infinity' (*TF* 3). Thus, on this point, the baroque reveals itself as a part of what Michel Foucault called the 'classical episteme': 'The classical and the baroque are two poles of the same enterprise' (*CGD* 20 May 1980).

As we have seen, the individual envelops infinity. It is the very essence of the Leibnizian monad to be a unity of multiplicity. In his efforts to understand the relations between ideas and history, Walter Benjamin already points to this conception as a place where the baroque cosmos and Leibniz's philosophy converge:

> The idea is the monad. The being that enters into it, with its past and present history, brings […] an indistinct abbreviation of the rest of the world of ideas, just as […] every single monad contains, in an indistinct way, all the others. The idea is the monad – the

pre-established representation of phenomena resides within it, as in their objective interpretation [...]. The idea is the monad – that means briefly: every idea contains the image of the world.

(*OGT* 47–8, translation modified)

Benjamin's reading of Leibniz in this passage is of course, at best, creative. Leibniz would reject identifying the monad with 'an idea'. Monads are souls or soul-like substances which act, and thus *have* ideas. Monads *are* not ideas. This latter position is a Spinozistic thesis that Leibniz strongly and repeatedly rejects.[18] Moreover, from a strict Leibnizian point of view, the idea of monads 'containing' other monads is really quite nonsensical. But over and above such petty objections, it is true that all monads perceive what all the other monads perceive, namely the world, although they do not perceive the same regions of the world with the same clarity. It is also true that all ideas (or ideal events) are connected to all other ideas or ideal events belonging to the same world, because everything 'conspires'. By a more good-willed approach to Benjamin's account, one can sense the idea he is trying to convey, namely that the representation of ideas in the world has become inextricably entangled in the infinite. In other words, it has become *allegorical*.

As already noted in the introduction, Deleuze agrees with Benjamin's original formulation of the baroque as an 'allegorical' world, that is to say, as a world of signs engaged in infinite iteration of meaning:

Walter Benjamin made a decisive step forward in our understanding of the baroque when he showed that allegory was not a failed symbol, or an abstract personification, but a power of figuration entirely different from that of the symbol.

(*TF* 125; *CGD* 20 January 1987)

In Benjamin's formulation, however, infinite iteration is *evaluated* as being fundamentally *traurich*. The allegory describes indefinite postponement of the advent of proper meaning, of *authenticity*. While never attaining such authenticity, the baroque man instead fills up his world with empty diversions, with allegories without determinate referent or content: 'Allegory goes away empty-handed' (*OGT* 233). From there on, Benjamin construes the baroque experience taking departure in a modernistic conception of an absent eschatology.[19] Consequently, the way he conveys the 'allegorical way of seeing' is never liberated from the idea of constitutive negativity. Even though we are denied escape, the eschatological motive is still prominent in the form of an

insurmountable absence, and we thus get caught up in 'the supposed infinity of a world without hope' and 'taken up entirely with the hopelessness of the earthly condition' (*OGT* 81).

A description such as this, where our most profound experience of existence is grounded in some sort of insurmountable *lack*, is alien to a ferociously anti-Hegelian Deleuze who does not long to escape at all and who constantly rejects that anything is constituted by negativity. This might be the reason why Deleuze admits that he 'can't really get into [Benjamin's] text' (*CGD* 20 January 1987). In contrast to Benjamin's 'negative' evaluation of the allegorical experience, Leibniz turns it into an affirmative practice. In a certain sense, he *makes an affirmation* of the infinite iteration involved in allegorisation of the world.[20] Deleuze explains:

> The great Aristotle – who, incidentally, greatly influenced Leibniz – gives somewhere in the *Metaphysics* a very beautiful formula: 'One must stop' (*anankstenai*). It is a great cry. It is the philosopher confronted with the abyss of the conceptual iteration [*enchaînement*]. Leibniz doesn't care; he doesn't stop.[21]
>
> (*CGD* 15 April 1980)

This is the 'innocent' attitude that characterises Leibniz. He does not dream of overcoming infinity, he does not reduce infinity to indetermination (as the absence of finitude), but embraces it or rather lets himself be embraced by it. This is all about affirmation. We are miles away from Benjamin's 'melancholic immersion'.[22] It may be that the reasons for our actions and passions elude us indefinitely, but this is only an expression of the fact that the world, including ourselves, is infinitely determined by God as the best. This is the sort of affirmation of infinity that Deleuze himself proposes as an anti-dote to a Kantian modernity much too preoccupied with the opposition between finitude and indetermination:

> What could it mean to be Leibnizian today? One has to take seriously one of the Kantian revolutions that Kant left aside, notably that the infinite is truly the act of finitude insofar as it overcomes itself. Kant had left that aside because he was content with a reduction of the infinite to the indefinite. To return to a strong conception of the infinite, but in the manner of the Classics, one has to show that the infinite is an infinite in the strong sense […] doing that means returning to Leibniz, but on a basis different from Leibniz's.
>
> (*CGD* 20 May 1980)

But what does Leibniz's affirmation of infinity consist in more precisely? It all harks back to the choice of the best possible world and the way in which *contingency* plays a role in the constitution of optimism. Consider the proposition: 'It is contingent that God creates the best of all possible worlds'. Leibniz affirms this in two distinct meanings, which involve taking the proposition as being true both *de dicto* and *de re*. Not only is it a contingent fact that God chooses the best possible world and not some other world (*de dicto*), but it is also a contingent fact that the best possible world chosen is in fact the best (*de re*). There is thus both a contingency in the *choice* of the best possibility and in the *bestness* of this possibility (cf. Lærke 2008, pp. 820–34).

Let us first consider contingency *de re*. Why is bestness contingent? Leibniz replies: because the determination of the world's bestness requires an *infinite analysis* which takes into consideration the entire, infinite series of events of which it is constituted. We object: that might be, but God performs this analysis. In that case, is the contingency of bestness not only for us, insofar as we have only finite understanding? The answer is no. Leibniz very clearly affirms that the infinite analysis of the world which leads to the determination of bestness *is no less infinite for God than it is for us*:

> In contingent truths […] the resolution proceeds to infinity, God alone seeing, not the end of the resolution, of course, which does not exist, but the connection of the terms or the containment of the predicate in subject, since he sees whatever is in the series.
>
> <div align="right">(AG 96; see also CGD 22 April 1980)</div>

God performs the analysis, but he does not finish it, because it is *constitutively infinite* and not simply *indefinite* for some finite creatures perpetually searching for some meaning which eludes them. *The determination of the bestness of the chosen world thus involves a constitutively infinite determination.* Thus, infinite iteration does not represent perpetual *lack* of a final determination, truth and authenticity, but presents finality and truth itself as an *infinite determination*.[23] Exactly because he never reduces it to mere indeterminacy, that is, lack of finitude, Leibniz's affirmative form of infinity permits to grasp the bestness of the world as contingent *and* true: 'Those things are *true and contingent* whose resolution requires that we continue [the analysis] infinitely' (*A* VI, iv, 758). On this understanding, contingency no longer poses a threat to the determinacy of truth, not any more than it threatens morality or divine providence. We may *experience* the contingency of the world as

an epistemological tragedy insofar as 'the analysis goes on to infinity, in such a way that one never obtains an achieved demonstration' (*GR* 303). But the contingency of the world is not, as in Benjamin, a sign of fragmentation or impending chaos. On the contrary, it is a sign of infinite determination.

Contingency *de dicto* corresponds to the affirmation that it *could have been otherwise*. According to Leibniz, there is *an infinity of other possible worlds* that God conceives in his mind before creating the actual world. In Leibniz however, the theory of such a *regio idearum* in God's mind containing infinitely many virtual worlds (cf. *GP* VI, 314; *GP* VII, 305) does not give rise to any eschatology; it does not involve wishing for the world to be or become different from what it actually is. Quite on the contrary, for Leibniz, establishing that the world could have been otherwise is only an occasion for affirming that the world which is must necessarily be the *best*, since in the opposite case there would no reason for it not to be, in fact, otherwise. Under the auspices of the principle of reason, contingency *de dicto* is thus far from involving the regret of some lost happiness or authenticity, but corresponds to the very condition under which we affirm providence, divine intellect and will; *because* it could have been otherwise, this world *must* be the best, because God must have had a *reason* to choose this and not that: 'the world could not have been produced in any other way, because God cannot fail to operate in the most perfect way. For since he is supremely wise, he chooses what is best' (*A* VI, iii, 364). Hence, contingency *de dicto*, that is, the affirmation of infinitely many possible worlds, does not open a path towards Benjaminian eschatology, but forms the very basis of metaphysical optimism.

Conclusion: From the Leibnizian to the Deleuzian theatre

According to the *The Logic of Sense*, 'we must always return to the theatre of Leibniz' (cf. *LS* 113). But what kind of play will an audience see on the Leibnizian stage? Surely, they will see nothing like the German *trauerspiel* analysed by Walter Benjamin. Leibniz's baroque theatre of thrills and delight has nothing to do with the ironic *risus sardonicus* that Benjamin's *Trauerspiel* provokes in the insightful spectator (cf. Cowan 1981, 118). The theatregoers should expect much anguish, but also a happy ending. This is the joyful, optimistic Leibniz that Deleuze describes in *Le Pli*, and to which he acknowledges his 'debt'. Deleuze however, mainly 'considers [himself] to be Spinozist' (*EPS* 11). Such proclamations surely deny him entry to the Leibnizian theatre: Leibniz

did everything he could to keep the 'atheist' Spinoza off his stage.[24] Thus, rather than a truly Leibnizian play, Deleuze will in fact recast a 'Nietzscheo-Spinozistic' play where divine providence disappears and where 'the belief in morality, in all morality totters', as Nietzsche writes (cf. Nietzsche 1998 §§ 6, 5). This new, rival play is not construed on the model which 'subordinates sufficient reason to the identical' (cf. *DR* 213–4). It is a neo-baroque theatre of all kinds of actions and passions. It is Artaud's theatre of cruelty and organ-less bodies (cf. *LS* 88–93). But it is still a comic theatre, dedicated to laughter and cheerfulness which are purer forms of joy than Leibnizian delight. When Spinoza proclaims that 'laughter and joking are pure Joy',[25] this already announces the end of Leibniz's baroque optimism, as well as the beginning of a neo-baroque which is more of a *joke*, some sort of schizophrenic *Lustspiel*.[26] Rather than a play designed to create and dispel anxiety, it will be a play devoted to the 'joys of cruelty', as Nietzsche says (Nietzsche 1998 II, § 7, 44). And it will be for children. For, as Deleuze and Guattari maintain in *Mille Plateaux*, 'Spinoza is the becoming-child of the philosopher'[27] (*ATP* 256). Here, at least, Deleuze and Benjamin can agree about 'the affinity between the strict joke and the cruel'.[28] For, as Benjamin quotes F. J. Mone, 'who has not seen children laugh where adults are shocked? […] There is something devilish at work here'.[29]

Notes

1. Thus, Leibniz 'provides [the baroque] the philosophy it lacks' (*TF* 126).
2. Deleuze is not the first to characterise Leibniz as a 'baroque' philosopher. Herbert Knecht also argues that 'one must always return to the baroque to understand Leibniz's thought' (Knecht 1981, pp. 335, 34, 340, 352). Deleuze refers to the work, but in quite critical terms: 'those who have compared Leibniz to the baroque have often done so in the name of too broad a concept, such as Knecht with his "coincidence of opposites"' (*TF* 33). Deleuze disapproves of the logic of negation which still lingers in Knecht's account. Knecht argues for example that 'the baroque man, who certainly is conscious of the *contradictory* aspects of his situation and of the world in which he lives, accepts the multiplicity of his state by integrating it on a higher level in a conception of the unitary whole *where the antagonisms are conciliated*' (Knecht 1981, pp. 14, 16, 339). Deleuze fails to recognise other substantial proximities between his own analysis and Knecht's, especially with respect to the *optimism* of the baroque paradigm (cf. ibid., pp. 16, 341).
3. Leibniz arguably also notices the specificity of the allegory when he describes it as a 'continuous metaphor'. The expression appears in Leibniz's 1676 notes on Spinoza's letters to Henry Oldenburg, in the context of his critique of Spinoza's allegorical interpretation of the Resurrection of Christ: 'Haec a mortius resurrectio, utique non nisi metaphorica sit, aut si mavis allegorica

(Allegoria enim metaphora continuata est)' (*A* VI, iii, p. 366). Deleuze does not, however, refer to this text.

4. 'We begin with the world as if with a series of inflexions or events' (*TF* 60). See also *N* (217); Bouaniche (2005, pp. 75–92).

5. Deleuze quotes the text (*TF* 6). On the notion of folding in the *Pacidius Philalethi*, see Bouquiaux (2005, pp. 42–3).

6. Cf. *TF* (170); *N* (214). On the differential calculus and Deleuze's conception of continuity and vanishing differences, see Smith (2006).

7. Cf. *N* (218). See also *CGD* 20 January 1987. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze notes that 'Leibniz was thus extremely conscious of the anteriority and originality of the event in relation to the predicate' (*LS* 171).

8. On Leibniz's 'provisional' form of nominalism, see J.-B. Rauzy, 'Leibniz et les termes abstraits: un nominalisme par provision', *Philosophie* 39 (1993), pp. 108–128.

9. See H (x). Cf. *H* (31, 107); *DR* (78–9); *WP* (48).

10. On the connection between Leibniz and Nietzsche, see also *LS* (203) and Smith (2007, pp. 66–73).

11. See also ibid. (139): 'For those who looked deeper saw the scene of their existence as a rubbish heap of partial, inauthentic actions'. For Benjamin on ruins, see *OGT* (177–82).

12. For Benjamin's definition of mourning (*Trauer*), see *OGT* (139): 'Mourning is the state of mind in which feeling revives the empty world in the form of a mask, and derives an enigmatic satisfaction in contemplating it'.

13. Ibid., 170: 'From the point of view of the baroque, nature serves the purpose of expressing its meaning (*Ausdruck ihrer Bedeutung*), it is the emblematic representation (*Darstellung*) of its sense, and as an allegorical representation it remains irremediably different from its historical realisation'.

14. Objective truth, on the contrary, is 'an intentionless state of being (*intention-sloses sein*), made up of ideas [...]. Truth is the death of intention (*Wahrheit ist der Tod der Intention*)' (ibid., 36).

15. On Deleuze's conception of the differential unconscious, see also *TF* (114–7); *DR* (165, 213–4); *WP* (205).

16. *CGD* 29 April 1980. Benjamin also stresses this as distinctly baroque, even though he formulates the point in a dialectical way by referring to spiritual *contradictions* rather than, like Deleuze, to a *differential* unconscious: 'That characteristic feeling of dizziness (*Schwindelgefühl*) which is induced by the spectacle of the spiritual contradictions of this epoch is a recurrent feature in the improvised attempts to capture its meaning' (*OGT* 56).

17. Cf. Leibniz (2005). On Sextus and the love of God in the context of Deleuze's interpretation of Leibniz, see also Frémont (1991, pp. 119–20).

18. See Leibniz (2002, p. 9): 'Anima non est idea, sed fons innumerabilium idearum'. See also the *Ad Ethicam B.D.S* from 1678 in A (VI, iv, 1713): 'Ideae non agunt, mens agit'.

19. As Benjamin writes, 'the baroque knows no eschatology and for that very reason it has no mechanism by which it gathers all earthly things in together and exalts them before consigning them to their end' (*OGT* 66).

20. For an erudite, but in my view problematic article which explores similar issues while taking a critical stance towards the Deleuzian perspective, see Fenves, '*autonomasia*: Leibniz and the Baroque', in *MLN* (105/2, 1990,

pp. 432–52). According to Fenves, Leibniz's philosophy is a philosophy of 'autonomasia', that is, of epithets and infinite substitutions of epithets, rather than a philosophy of 'analogies' which always refer to 'proper names'. Much of Fenves' analysis hinges on a reading of Leibniz's preliminary discourse to Marius Nizolius' *Anti-Barbarus*, 1670. Leibniz here develops a normative theory of language use according to which a philosophical language must be derived from common usage by means of 'continuous sorites of tropes' (*GP* IV, 140). According to Fenves, 'analogy is conspicuously absent from the tropological sorites Leibniz proposes' (Fenves 1990, p. 438). As I read Fenves, this should indicate, somewhat negatively, that Leibniz, in his theory of language use, is not laying down a principle of *analogy* for such derivations, but is committed to a theory of *autonomasia*, that is, 'an endless string of epithets which never arrives at a proper name at all' (ibid., 444). This is a stimulating idea, but the textual premise of the reading is to my mind incorrect. Leibniz does in fact speak of analogy as a form of language derivation in the preface to Nizolius. It is even the normative form of language derivation *par excellence*. Leibniz thus explains that 'analogy is a meaning reached by shifting, or by derivation' and that such 'an analogy should be both generally accepted and fitting, so that the definition of the new word we intend can be molded from the meaning of the root and the analogy' (*GP* IV, 140–1). For details concerning Leibniz's theory of language use, see Lærke (forthcoming).

21. For Aristotle, see Aristotle (1984, II, ii, 994b24). See also Smith (2006).
22. Cf. *OGT* (232–3): 'And this is the essence of melancholic immersion: that its ultimate objects, in which it believes it can most fully secure for itself that which is vile, turn into allegories, and that these allegories fill out and deny the void in which they are represented, just as, ultimately, the intention does not faithfully rest in the contemplation of bones, but faithlessly leaps forward to the idea of resurrection'.
23. Peter Fenves seems to hint at a similar connection between optimism and infinite iteration when he states that 'optimism itself – the most widely known name for the Leibnizian tradition – turns out to be nothing but the outcome of autonomasia taken to its limit. The limit is a divine decree' (Fenves 1990, p. 434).
24. For an extensive survey of Leibniz's encounter with Spinoza, see Lærke (2008).
25. Cf. Spinoza (1985, p. 572). It should be noted that the term 'joy' in Curley's translation of Spinoza refers to the same Latin term as the term 'delight' in Ariew and Garber's translation of Leibniz, namely *laetitia*. On the reward of cheerfulness and gay science see Nietzsche (1998, Preface, § 7, p. 6).
26. On the *Lustspiel* in relation to the *Trauerspiel*, see *OGT* (127).
27. The statement must seen in the light of the well-known anecdote – told by Colerus, Spinoza's first biographer – according to which Spinoza staged combats between spiders and flies, and roared with laughter looking at them (cf. Colerus 1999, p. 569). The mixture of cruelty and joy that this play testifies to corresponds, I believe, to the becoming-child of the philosopher.
28. *OGT* (126). Benjamin is quoting Mone (1864).
29. Ibid. On devilish laughter, see *OGT* (227–8).

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2
The Free and Indeterminate Accord of 'The New Harmony': The Significance of Benjamin's Study of the Baroque for Deleuze

Timothy Flanagan

Of a necessarily ineliminable affinity

Whatever the more demanding elements of Benjamin's 1925 *Habilitationschrift*, a clear characteristic of this otherwise obscure study is the concern to exhibit the sense of drama so typical of the baroque. In some ways this is what motivates Deleuze in the closing chapter of *The Fold*, with regard to 'the new harmony' that is to be found in seventeenth-century aesthetics, to acknowledge that indeed 'Walter Benjamin made a decisive step forward in our understanding of the baroque' (*TF* 125, translation modified). However, beyond what Deleuze here recognises as the perspicacity of the earlier study, it is imperative to note that the ostensibly art-historical implications of either thinker's 'baroque book' does not circumscribe the ultimately philosophical problem of the baroque; since the significance of these works' affinity with one another is, in the end, something whose own reality includes, only to exceed, whatever at all might be said of their true relation to one another.

This much at least is evident from the manner in which Deleuze himself relates the significance of Benjamin's thesis by describing the world presented in the *Trauerspiel* book not in terms of specific theatrical or literary techniques but rather 'as a cone or cupola, whose base, always in extension, no longer relates to a centre but tends towards an apex or a summit' (*TF* 125). Rather than subsuming Benjamin's thesis under a single concept in respect of which his own study of the baroque might be thought, by describing the *Trauerspiel* study as a 'cone or cupola', Deleuze here instead sets the earlier study into an emblematic schema

that does not so much catalogue as multiply the relation between both texts. Written (or better: 'signed') in such a manner, here the very opacity of Deleuze's arcane reflection suffices to conceive formally the idea integral to each study: by combining seeing with reading, Deleuze's citation adduces allegory's philosophical significance as bearing witness to the continued presence of something in the world that is inescapably real – a presence that is, in short, necessary.

Importantly however, to say that the citation regarding the *Trauerspiel* book appears 'by necessity' in Deleuze's work says nothing at all of the authority of Benjamin's older study. What *necessitates* the citation is the authority of an antecedent whose order is purely logical – or better, metaphysical – rather than simply chronological (let alone one given by the disciplinary strictures of art-history). In other words and somewhat paradoxically, beyond the text of either monograph, although the citation manifests itself by denoting an interest in the earlier study, the relation between the two texts is not to be understood following some canonical disjunction of concepts but rather in accord with the very organon of conceptual production itself[1] – a production which takes place in the ineliminable world both studies name baroque.

Singular productions without end

For both Benjamin and Deleuze this baroque task of adequately conceiving the singularly unique, individual aspects of the world is given its most rigorous philosophical formulation by Leibniz who, in section 8 of the 'Discourse on Metaphysics', claims that 'the subject term must always include the predicate term in such a way that anyone who understands perfectly the concept of the subject will also know that the predicate pertains to it' (*L* 307). Of great importance here, alongside the questions 'for whom?' and 'of what?' such an understanding might obtain, is the bizarre sense of apodicticity denoted by the term 'always'. For even though it may very well not be apparent at all times that a particular term can indeed be said of a given subject, it is precisely from such a confusion that the peculiarly allegorical combination of seeing and reading so integral to the baroque view of the world emerges; even though a subject may appear to be determined by particular terms (and even represent as much to itself consciously), subjects themselves are in fact never determined: rather, they come about by having determinations. Following Leibniz, what predication proposes is that determinations belong to subjects and though this certainly can take place subjectively, the relationship of subject and predicate is something that

is not sufficiently explained by the identity of either term providing the copula for the other but is instead truly set forward in their forming an individual relation to the world; 'all true predication has some basis in the nature of things' Leibniz insists (ibid.), since the entire world is included in any one perspective or point of view.

Moreover this is why Leibniz describes, first in the preface to the *New Essays on Human Understanding* (*NE*) and then again ten years later in 'The Monadology', that 'he who sees all could read in each everything that happens everywhere, and, indeed, even what has happened or what will happen' (*L* 649). Importantly however, to be clear at all about such a view of the world requires that one also realise the present limitations of what can indeed be seen or read for, as Leibniz continues, 'a soul can read within itself only what it represents distinctly; it cannot all at once develop all that is enfolded within it, for this reaches to infinity'. What appears, then, to such a view of the world is something that arises not despite a blurring of reading and seeing but rather precisely because of the bizarre perspective that arises from their indiscernible combinations with one another. For here the phenomenal aspect of 'what is seen' is no longer something simply contiguous with 'what is read' since ultimately seeing and reading are not actions attributable to the unity of a subject. Instead in what must be regarded as a radical overhaul of the transcendental project, of the respective limits of the sensible and the intelligible (*TF* 151), seeing and reading are *already themselves* operations of a continuous variation: aspects of a presence in regard to the world, a presence by means of an always-overwhelmed subjective unity produces or realises a relation to the world that is somehow both 'personal' and yet without end.

A vivid appreciation of this unending sense of things is, for Deleuze, precisely what makes Benjamin's *Trauerspiel* study so impressive for it is there that Benjamin painstakingly presents a world where the historical coincidence of the eternal and the momentary is never united once and for all in a cosmic *kairós* but rather only according to the problematic nature of events themselves. Indeed as Benjamin explains in several preparatory fragments from 1916, the reason *Trauerspiele* differ from tragedy is that they do not contain the source of their own resolution[2]; rather than realising any contented synthesis of one another, in such a drama history emerges as something produced from nature only to be forever transformed into nature. It is in following Benjamin's patient development of this distinction that Deleuze reiterates how allegory articulates the disruptions of a decentred sensibility whereby providence is no longer an object of representation

to be understood for all time but rather a pure fact of repetition to be encountered – or better, something felt – again and again. At the outset of the final division of the *Trauerspiel* study – the division that Deleuze references in his citation – Benjamin charts the convoluted historical emergence of allegory as a mode of expression distinct from that of the symbol:

> Whereas in the symbol destruction is idealized and the transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed in the light of redemption, in allegory the observer is confronted with the *facies hippocratica* of history as a petrified, primordial landscape. Everything about history that, from the very beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face – or rather in death's head. And although such a thing lacks all 'symbolic' freedom of expression, all classical proportion, all humanity – nevertheless, this is the from in which man's subjection to nature is most obvious and it significantly gives rise not only to the enigmatic question of human existence as such, but also of the biographical historicity of the individual. This is the heart of the allegorical way of seeing [*Betrachtung*], of the baroque, secular explanation of history as the Passion of the world; its importance resides solely in the stations of its decline.
>
> (Benjamin 1998, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, henceforth '*OGT*', p. 166)

To paraphrase Deleuze's development of this distinction, then, whereas the symbolic conception of things purifies their relation to eternity ('the universe'), the allegorical consideration of the world is forever intrigued by the complexity of natural relations themselves since the baroque perspective is one that is itself generated through personal or individual – which is to say, *necessarily* embodied – points of view. And so while both allegory and symbol are forms of expression in so far as they each say something about the world, the important difference between them is that they do so from radically distinct perspectives: whereas in the symbolic scheme of things expression is satisfied through what is expressed, there is (already) more told in allegory than what allegory can ever tells us.[3] Allegory, whose form of expression originates in the Neoplatonism of Patristic *kataphasis* and the 'problem of divine Names' (*EPS* 323), reveals an 'inadequacy' of discourse in the face of an excess of the world where it seems as if any sign will do, since here things 'may not accord with the authority of nature; but the voluptuousness with which significance rules, like a stern sultan

in the harem of objects [*Dinge*], is without equal in giving expression to nature. It is indeed characteristic of the sadist that he humiliates his object and then – or thereby – satisfies it. And that is what the allegorist does in this age drunk with acts of cruelty both lived and imagined' (*OGT* 184–5). The baroque manifestation of providence only expresses the ultimately 'untimely' sense of history: nature as a product without end, 'a teleological conversion of philosophy' (*TF* 79) as Deleuze says, whereby the tension between nature and history (a tension underwritten by the transcendental distinction between the sensible and the intelligible) is problematised in such a way as to adduce an altogether radically different sensibility.

Mourning and anxious embodiment

As the *Trauerspiel* study shows, when history is no more than the narration of purely natural events, any and every experience of the world is all the more extreme. And while this intensity of things is most clearly manifest in the juridical struggles of the seventeenth century – Benjamin cites, for example (*OGT* 65), the 1682 publication of the Gallican articles – importantly, the acutely 'theological crisis' of the baroque concerns life itself and is not exhausted by political or ecclesiastical matters alone. This is not at all to say that the church and state are not significant elements in the tension of this historical period but rather only to speak of the sense in which the baroque experience of the world is something involuntarily visceral (even supersensuous). This is why Benjamin explains how:

> The religious man of the baroque era clings so tightly to the world because of the feeling that he is being driven along to a cataract with it. The baroque knows no eschatology; and for that reason it possesses no mechanism by which all earthly things [*alles Erdgeborne*] are gathered in together and exalted before being consigned to their end. The hereafter is emptied of everything which contains the slightest breath of this world [*Welt*], and from it the baroque extracts a profusion of things which customarily escaped the grasp of artistic formulation and, at its high point, brings them violently into the light of day, in order to clear an ultimate heaven, enabling it, as a vacuum, one day to destroy the world [*Erde*] with catastrophic violence. A variation of the same idea is touched upon by the insight that the naturalism of the baroque is 'the art of least distances … In every case naturalistic means are used to reduce distances … The

most vivid and concrete actuality is sought as a contraposition from which to revert all the more surely into formal elevation and the forecourts of the metaphysical'.

<div align="right">(*OGT* 66)</div>

Borrowing a formulation from Wilhem Hausenstein's contemporary study *Vom Geist des Barock* (1921) Benjamin here suggests that baroque view of the world is consumed by a Kafkaesque myopia in which any clear perspective of things is haunted by the feeling that there is always more than can be distinctly represented; since only the world itself can be called upon to testify in the great trial of nature, the baroque appears as the salvific attempt to justify the present world to eternity through a stifling 'art of least distances'. For while there is no ultimate resolution or end to the drama of things (no final, eschatological judgement) this is precisely because the appearance of ends themselves is ubiquitous and the feeling experienced in the baroque is not one of grace (something given) but rather one of frenzied production. Similarly, it is for this reason that Deleuze cites Heinrich Wölfflin's summation that the 'baroque underlines matter: either the frame disappears totally, or else it remains, but, despite the rough sketch, it does not suffice to contain the mass that spills over and passes up above' (*TF* 123, translation modified) as a way of intimating how, through the perfervid multiplication of matter, the baroque realises a manner of form to be regarded not only in the complexity of those great works that have come to define a period of art-history, but as the multiplication of matter in extension itself.

For although often found in 'religious' art, the baroque aesthetic is spiritual not because it represents certain doctrines or instantiates typical styles but because it expresses the torsion of embodiment.[4] When, for example, Deleuze relates how 'the presence of the world within me, my being-for the world, is an "anxiousness" (being on the lookout)'[5] (*TF* 130) this is not so much to account existentially for the mood of a given subject as to render the ingenuous caducity of individual bodies' real subjection to the world. And though this gives rise to a transcendental schema of sorts, what cannot be overlooked here for Deleuze, following Benjamin, is that the coincidence of the world and any point of view is never a straightforward conditioning. For alongside those objectively given 'conditions for the possibility of experience', allegory always complicates any appearance of things with the endlessness of their emblematic relation to the world. This is why Deleuze describes how in the paintings of the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries, anticipating twentieth century painting's break with the easel:

> the object of the *still life* is the study of folds. The usual formula of the baroque still life is: drapery producing folds of air or heavy clouds; a tablecloth, with maritime of fluvial folds; jewellery that burns with folds of fire; vegetable, mushrooms, or sugared fruits caught in their earthly folds. The painting is so packed with folds that there results a sort of schizophrenic 'stuffing'. They could not be unravelled without going to infinity and thus extracting its spiritual lesson. It seems that this ambition of covering the canvas with folds is discovered again in modern art with the *all-over* fold.
>
> (*TF* 122–3, translation modified)

What is significant for Deleuze is the way in which 'matter tends to flow out of the frame, as it does so often in *trompe l'oeil* compositions' (ibid.). Here, sensibility is composed within a *spatium* before becoming extended (*TF* 20) since the origin of things, the physis whose 'allegorization' Benjamin details in his section on 'The Corpse as Emblem' (*OGT* 217), that comes about in any apperceptive point of view is one of *nature morte*.[6] With regard to such an unstable or caducous state of things, Benjamin explains how 'nature remained the great teacher for the writers of this period. However, nature was not seen by them in bud and bloom, but in the over-ripeness and decay of her creations. In nature they saw eternal transience, and here alone did the saturnine vision of this generation recognize its history' (*OGT* 179). The mourning that nature provokes in this way reveals how the baroque aesthetic is not so much a straightforward transposition of perception – from optical horizon to tactile ground, which would invite 'the dangers of pantheism or immanence' (*TF* 24) – but rather the realisation of a sensibility 'in accord with indivisible relations of distance' (*TF* 20). This is why in his section 'What does perception look like?' Deleuze repeatedly insists on the productive aspect of experience whereby 'the perceived *resembles* something that it forces us to reflect upon' (*TF* 95). For rather than looking to assign either mind or body primacy with respect to the world, the baroque aesthetic is instead confronted by their spiritual (which is to say eternal) complication in the world.

  The reason this relation is purely spiritual is that, although always and only ever embodied in individuals, this is not something amenable to the body itself but rather something that, for Deleuze, 'passes up above': not something substantively mental, opposed to extension, but

rather something extraordinary which refers to the ordinary (the 'sacred and profane' for Benjamin), a 'relatum' (*TF* 86) that does not so much deduce as envelope the individual in the world:

> And when the folds of clothing spill out of painting, it is Bernini who endows them with sublime form in sculpture, when marble seizes and bears to infinity folds that cannot be explained by the body, but by a spiritual adventure that can set the body ablaze … Saint Theresa does not find her spiritual unity in the satyr's little arrow, that merely spreads fire, but in the upper origin of the golden rays above.
>
> (*TF* 121–2)

Crucially, this ascensional scheme of things whereby the soul is realised as something projected from the body is the very element that distinguishes the essence of the baroque aesthetic[7]; corresponding to Benjamin's account of mourning, what Deleuze describes variously as the anxious neurosis or schizophrenic tension of having to contain the universe from a single point of view is given expression here in Saint Theresa's realisation of an 'ecstatic' unity that somehow belongs to her, a realisation that is spiritual rather than conscious for while this form of realisation is not content to be explained by the body, this is not to say that the soul comes about out with the world. Instead, the soul is the presence that results from of an individual body's relation to the world and it is in this way, as Benjamin sought to show in his own study, that the baroque does not represent a particular period or style of art history but rather expresses an aesthetic of pure production without end that continually looks to sanctify the temporal world for eternity;[8] in forever relating the body's subjection to the universe the baroque is the moment of a melancholic transcendental genesis, 'the splendid moment when Some Thing is kept rather than nothing, and where the response to the world's misery is made through an excess of principles, a hubris of principles, and a hubris inherent [*propre*] to principles' (*TF* 68).

This is why, in his chapter on the 'Folds in the Soul', Deleuze insists that truth is not something which varies with individual points of view but is instead the condition in which individuals realise themselves to be the subjective determination of a perspective. 'Because it includes what I am doing right now – what I am in the act of doing – my individual notion also includes everything that has driven me to do what I am doing, and everything that will result from it, all the way to infinity' (*TF* 70). Deleuze explains later, describing how if one must speak of a phenomenology then this must be one where events or

motifs themselves replace the primacy of phenomena and where Being is replaced by Having; 'it is very difficult for everyone of us to make a list of our own belongings. It is not easy to know what we own and for what length of time. Phenomenology does not suffice' (*TF* 109). For truth is no longer the modality that has expiated error and illusion but rather is to be seen as the overwhelmed, obsessed form of a predication that includes all possibilities at once and 'does not put us into an element of calm, which would be a relation of proprietor and property that could be easily established [*déterminés*] once and for all' (*TF* 110). For the soul is not an exclusively intellectual vision whose unity would overlook multiplicity but rather the perspective or feeling whose unity is the very power of realising ever more continuities between differences – the power of naming Benjamin describes as that of 'truth' when he explains how

> Truth is an intentionless state of being, made up of ideas. The proper approach to it is not one of intention and knowledge, but rather a total absorption in it … The structure of truth, then, demands a mode of being which in its lack of intentionality resembles the simple existence of things, but which is superior in its permanence. Truth is not an intent which realizes itself in empirical reality; it is the power which determines the essence of this empirical reality. The state of being, beyond all phenomenality, to which alone this power belongs, is that of the name. This determines the manner in which ideas are given. But they are not so much given in a primordial language [*Ursprache*] as in a primordial form of perception [*Urvernehmen*], in which words posses their nobility as names, unimpaired by cognitive meaning.
>
> (*OGT* 36)

This power of pure naming operates so as to combine the differences between phenomena and in so doing realises their very reason in an accord that Deleuze later describes as a 'harmony' where the integral element of things is not so much whatever happens to be perceived so much as the very fact of perception itself: '*I produce an accord* each time I can establish in a sum of infinitely tiny things differential relations that will make possible an integration of the sum – in other words a clear and distinguished perception' (*TF* 130–1). In this way, the selection presently involved in any apparent synthesis of differences never issues from a point of view but rather always, and only ever, in the ongoing process of analysis (what Benjamin describes above as pure naming) that

recognises the 'original' genesis of those conditions necessary for any perspective at all. This is why Deleuze insists repeatedly 'that it is the likeness that is the model, and that it determines whatever it resembles' (*TF* 98) for the variation of perspective itself expresses the operation or 'projection' of a continuous power which does not refer to a modality in which a substantive point of view might perdure in the world but rather to a possessed understanding of things that is 'increasingly compressed, interiorised, wrapped in an instance that can ultimately be called "personal"' (*TF* 125) – a supersensuous figuration of the sensible and the intelligible which, at least for the baroque, is understood as the soul.

Staging the inner drama of concepts

As Deleuze recognises, this baroque understanding is given one of its most rigorous formulations in Benjamin's study of mourning in German baroque theatre. For whereas tragedy can be identified through the heroic assertion of existence in the face of all eternity, *Trauerspiel* can only be defined or characterised by a feeling of melancholy whose ultimate resolution is not to be found in anything represented within the play itself but rather in the feeling that is produced through the actual presentation of the play. Importantly however, like the Brechtian theatre that prompted Benjamin's interest in baroque drama, this feeling awoken by *Trauerspiel* is not to be explained as a cathartic development of actions or events but stands rather on the presentation of their conditions since, as Benjamin explains in his section that distinguishes 'Mourning and Tragedy', the being of this feeling, although certainly something experienced, cannot be explained in terms of the categories of empirical psychology:

> For these are not so much plays which cause mourning, as plays through which mournfulness finds satisfaction: plays for the mournful. A certain ostentation is characteristic of these people. Their images are displayed in order to be seen, arranged in the way they want them to be seen. Thus the Italian renaissance theatre, which is in many ways an influential factor in the German baroque, emerged from pure ostentation, from the *trionfi*, the processions with explanatory recitation, which flourished in Florence under Lorenzo de Medici.
>
> (*OGT* 118–9)

Whereas for 'Greek eyes … the stage is a cosmic *topos*' (*OGT* 119), and even the intrigue of Shakespeare's works takes place within the Globe,

to recall Deleuze's Leibnizian distinction between *spatium* and *extensio*, for the spectator of the German *Trauerspiel* 'on the stage, a space which belongs to an inner world of feeling [*Innenraume des Gefühls*] and bears no relationship to the cosmos, situations are compellingly presented to him' (*OGT* 119). The difference between the tragic outlook and that of the *Trauerspiel*, then, is that while the classic and later romantic drama of things is simply the production (no matter how complicated) of a series of 'historical' events according to supposed laws of Nature, baroque theatre on the other hand is to be seen instead as a production without end. This is why the death of the tragic hero is never revealed to be something hopeless but rather the momentary justification of existence for all eternity. As Benjamin explains in an early fragment, 'the hero dies because no one can live in fulfilled time. He dies of immortality' (Benjamin 1996, p. 56) as circumstances fated by the world's providential order are played out in a course of events that are literally realised in the end of a particular person. It is in this way, for Benjamin, that

> When the tragic development suddenly makes its incomprehensible appearance, when the smallest false step leads to guilt, when the slightest error, the most improbable coincidence leads to death, when the words that would clear up and resolve the situation and that seem available to all remain unspoken – then we are witnessing the effect of the hero's time on the action, since in fulfilled time everything that happens is a function of that time. It is almost a paradox that this becomes manifest in all its clarity at the moment when the hero is completely passive, when tragic time bursts open, so to speak, like a flower whose calyx emits the astringent perfume of irony.

Whereas the end of the individual in tragedy is at the same time (if for a moment) a perspective on the rightful end of things, death in *Trauerspiel* is not at all contained neatly within the order of such a nature; death is merely another stage that is the witness of yet another production. For there

> It is no conclusive finality; without the certitude of a higher existence and without irony, it is the *metabasis* of all life *eis allo genos*. The mourning play is mathematically comparable to one branch of the hyperbola whose other branch lies in infinity. The law governing a higher life prevails in the restricted space of an earthly existence, and all play, until death puts an end to the game, so as to repeat the same

game, albeit on a grander scale, in another world. It is this repetition on which the law of the mourning play is founded.

(*OGT* 56–7)

In this way, in the universal history that is the theatre of *Trauerspiel*, the poles of immanence and transcendence are dislocated so as to reveal the present world as merely an aspect of eternity, an expression of those conditions that provide for experience at all. What must be emphasised, then, is that these conditions are not timeless universals in themselves but rather the ineliminable presence of a feeling or 'inner space' with respect to the world. For just as the 'inner sense' of time no longer refers simply to the receptivity or expectancy of what is to come, here space is no longer the outer appearance of things but rather (like the figures suspended between redemption and damnation in El Greco) their determination from a certain point of view. So too this is why the feeling that *Trauerspiel* brings about with respect to the world is one of sorrow and mourning and so too why, following Kafka's maxim, there is at the same time an infinity of hope and yet none for us. For the mourning and sorrow that characterise *Trauerspiel* are not reactions to what might be or what ought to be (the ultimately bourgeois petulance of a claim to entitlement) but rather the recognition of the eternally valid, indeed suprasensuous, feeling of logic realising its own limitations.

For although the world may seem to have become truly unhinged for Oedipus or for Hamlet, at least their actions, their existence and even their death speak out against those cruel twists of fate that their suffering witnesses, at least the tragedy of their life says something about the world, something that will stand for ever. However, by contrast, the logos of *Trauerspiele* is without cosmic purchase and instead (like Benjamin's own study) forever remains a ruin or a torso, a mere product without an end, as Benjamin explains in another fragment: 'Whereas in tragedy the eternal inflexibility of the spoken word is exalted, the mourning play concentrates in itself the infinite resonance of its sound' (Benjamin 1996, p. 61). Almost ten years later, in the section on the 'Fragmentation of Language' from the study itself, Benjamin elaborates further on how the very origin of mourning that characterises seventeenth-century theatre emerges in the presentation of the play itself and in so doing reveals the difficulty in formally codifying these plays in terms of a literary-historical research with any pretensions to universality:

For the baroque sound is and remains something purely sensuous; meaning has its home in written language. And the spoken word is

only afflicted by meaning, so to speak, as if by an inescapable disease; it breaks off in the middle of the process of resounding, and the damming up of the feeling, which was ready to pour forth provokes mourning. Here meaning is encountered and will continue to be encountered as the reason for mournfulness. The antithesis of sound and meaning could not but be at its most intense where both could be successfully combined in *one*, without their actually cohering in the sense of forming an organic linguistic structure.

<div align="right">(OGT 209)</div>

For just as there is hope, but not for us, so too a formal classification of these plays may well be possible however this does not detract from the fact that essentially, despite their lack of sophistication – or rather *because* of the crudity of their ostentation (expressed in the attitude recounted by Wysocki (in *OGT* 53) 'that these plays were written by brutes for brutes') – unlike the theatre of Calderon's Spain and Shakespeare's England, the *Trauerspiele* of the German stage remain plays to be performed rather than studied. That they are not substantively intelligible is not to say that they remain ineffable but rather to underline the peculiar experience that their repetition opens up to our inner sense – an experience that would later be termed alienation in the break with conscious representation that takes place in what both Benjamin and Deleuze recognise as Brecht's emphatically non-Aristotelian theatre. To be sure, the distinction here is that whereas in tragedy the ultimate unity of things is made possible from within the dramatic content of the play (from a logic which, in turn, provides for its critical reception), by contrast the experience of the *Trauerspiel* is a resolution of multiplicity not into a unity (or at least not into a unity whose intuitions are conditioned by the forms of space and time) but rather into singular accords that emerge in the repetition of the material that is under performance, an accord 'of least distances' whose ultimate identity can be no more determined from without than from within and so must remain indiscernible in every repetition. That 'there is hope but not for us' provokes mourning as we come to realise that, as created beings, we can never determine the ends of nature. Yet while this means that the drama of things can never come under any determinate resolution, *Trauerspiele* show how the very repetition of things adduces the feeling of a productive (if cryptic) unity in our world – a unity that realises proximity by means of ever-increasing complications.

   In this way an understanding of these plays is not to be found in concepts that are simply given but rather through a peculiar construction

of concepts, what Benjamin suggestively describes throughout his study as the perception of their 'origin'. For the conceptual recognition of this origin is not something guided from within or without and yet, in a reworking of the transcendental project, there obtains a radical (perhaps even supersensuous) continuity between the sensible and the intelligible whereby

> alongside the emblems of the attire, the words and the names remain behind, and, as the living contexts of their birth disappear, so they become the origins of concepts [*Ürsprungen von Begriffen*] in which these words acquire a new content, which is predisposed to allegorical representation … The deadness of the figures and the abstraction of concepts are therefore the precondition [*Voraussetzung*] for the allegorical metamorphosis of the pantheon into a world of magical, conceptual creatures [*Begriffskreaturen Voraussetzung*].
>
> (*OGT* 225–6)

The reason that allegory is so philosophically significant is that no other form of expression is apt to elucidate the emergence of any perspective on the world without also requiring that things be resolved in terms of a disjunctive schema that would require an abstract, or at least determinate, beginning and end – limits not only to specific objects but so too to the drama of life, or physis, in general. By contrast, by a process of repetition whereby meaning is produced through the continuous presentation of events rather than represented in the unity of a narration, allegory suspends the lessons to be learned from life in general and instead adduces an apprenticeship of recognition towards the very reality of those indiscernible conditions of life itself. In other words, that is, by other means, allegory as a form of expression stands for nothing other than its own telling – although this is always more than what is expressed since this life is to be understood on its own terms, terms which cannot be understood as the timeless conditions of present things but rather which must be regarded as both the individual itself and its reason.

The baroque space between the One and the Multiple

For both thinkers, then, the overhaul of experience brought about by the transcendental simultaneity of the individual and the concept (what Benjamin describes as a metamorphosis and what Deleuze describes as hallucinatory perception) reorients the valences of the One

and the Multiple and can be seen as figured in the construction of the philosophical concept. Importantly this is not to say that this relationship can be given through concepts in and of themselves but rather that the very production of concepts adduces the baroque accord of the One and the Multiple; the significant element here is not what a concept is said to represent but rather the power that both accounts for the very concept of the individual and yet, as in the *Trauerspiel*, at the same time in so doing necessarily exceeds the individual without fully determining its relation to the world. As Deleuze explains, this conception of the individual is neither something before or after but always at the same time (and without end) in the world since whereas:

> For some, Nominalists, individuals would be the only existants, concepts being only carefully ordered words; for others, the Universalists, the concept has the power [*pouvoir*] of being infinitely determinable, the individual referring only to accidental or extraconceptual determinations. But for Leibniz, at the same time only the individual exists, *and* it is by virtue of the power [*puissance*] of the concept: monad or soul. Thus this power of the concept (to become a subject) does not consist in determining a genre to infinity, but in condensing and in prolonging singularities.
>
> (*TF* 64)

This is why for all his demonstrative interest in mathematics, Deleuze insists that the calculus remains 'merely a well-founded fiction' (*TF* 96) and that, lest they become simple symbols, its differentials must be understood as doing nothing other than merely extending or mapping (Benjamin would say 'allegorizing') the essentially spatial relations of this world. For just as the understanding of the *Trauerspiel* cannot be deduced from extant genres but must come about through a 'familiarisation' or 'apprenticeship' [*Schulung*] (*OGT* 56) of what is remarkable in these plays, here even the singularities that are prolonged in 'honeymoon' with concepts (*TF* 67) evince a power that is no longer substantively mathematical.[9] Instead this indiscernible, even spiritual, determination of the individual is what Deleuze describes repeatedly in his chapter on the 'Folds in the Soul' as the way in which '[f]orce [*puissance*] itself is an act, an act of the fold' (*TF* 18), a 'power of envelopment and development' (*TF* 22), 'a *power of arranging cases*' (*TF* 21), and later in his final chapter as 'a force [*puissance*] of variation' (*TF* 135). What underlies this conception of power is of course the individual, however this is not a substrate that acts for all time but rather only over

and over again. For Deleuze, these variations show how 'the difference between two individuals must be internal and irreducible (= 1), while it must vanish and tend towards 0 by virtue of continuity' (*TF* 65). The reason for this is that

> what vanishes is merely all value that can be assigned to the terms of a relation for the gain of its inner reason, which precisely constitutes difference. Difference no longer exists between the polygon and the circle, but in the pure variability of the sides of the polygon; difference is no longer between movement an inertia but in pure variability of speed. Difference ceases being extrinsic and palpable [*sensible*] (in this sense it vanishes) in order to become intrinsic, intelligible or conceptual, in conformity with the principle of indiscernibles. And should we desire the most general formulation of the law of continuity, we might perhaps locate it in the concept [*idée*], which is unknown and which cannot be known, *where the sensible ends and the intelligible begins*: this is a new way of saying that two worlds do not exist.
>
> (*TF* 65–6)

For all its 'inexact rigour' in reformulating the theological relation of the One and the Multiple, to the extent that any universalising abstractions of mathematics propose a disingenuous account of the present world then philosophy might be better served by the space of thought proposed by allegory – a space whose form suffices to conceive the singular expressions (what Benjamin describes as *Darstellungen*)[10] of the world by means of the soul. For the baroque realisation of things takes place according to the spiritual torsion an individual's embodied relation to the world: a relation or 'accord' whose terms are always overwhelmed and yet whose product or unity – 'in so far as it is the product of an intelligible calculus in an affective [*sensible*] state' (*TF* 130) – always remains something fully real and, as such, without end.

This is why although Deleuze suggests that reading, seeing and signing might be approached as 'three elements that help us understand the basis of allegory' (*TF* 125), their unity must be conceived as pertaining to an individual's embodied relation or point of view with regard to the world.

> The principal examples of this philosophy are shown in the transformation of the perceptible [*sensible*] object into a series of figures or aspects submitted to a law of continuity; the assignation of events

that correspond to a these figured aspects, and that are inscribed in propositions; the predication of these propositions to an individual subject that contains their concept, and is defined as an apex or a point of view, a principle of indiscernibles assuring the interiority of the concept and the individual.

(*TF* 126)

If there is a synthesis of the One and the Multiple, then, for the baroque view of the world this is not something already given or even something which we might expect or intend but rather something whose integrity emerges from the acutely spiritual perspective that is engendered by the caducity of a body's subjection to the world. For while this resolution by means of the soul may very well resemble a synthesis of things, this resemblance itself is nothing other than infinity under a certain, indeed, for our sensibility, necessarily finite relation, which is both 'already' and also 'yet to be' determined with respect to the universe.[11] And so although the peculiar sensibility of such an allegorical perspective is engendered by the individuality of its own terms rather than through universal conditions, this free and indeterminate accord of the faculties must not be seen as a state of grace that would stand forever (either as the restoration of a lost past or the hope of a future to come), but rather always and only ever one to be regarded as pure repetition of the multiple: a truly hallucinatory harmony whose unity Deleuze himself recognises in the cupola-space of Benjamin's baroque study, a harmony of accords that is always 'new'.

Notes

1. 'The best inventors of the baroque, the best commentators', Deleuze explains in the section on 'The search for a concept' from the chapter 'What is Baroque?', 'have had their doubts about the consistency of the notion, and have been bewildered by the arbitrary extension that, despite themselves, the notion risked taking. The baroque was seen as being restricted to one genre (architecture), or to an increasingly restrictive determination of periods and places, or yet again to a radical disavowal: the baroque never existed' (*TF* 33, translation modified). In this way, Deleuze's very citation of Benjamin's own baroque book can be said to function as what Benjamin describes as an 'authoritative quotation [*Zitat*]' (*OGT* 28) in the opening section on methodology, 'The Concept of the Treatise', where he contrasts the contemplative, even digressive, character of the approaches of doctrine, esoteric essay and mosaic against any conclusive or coercive 'syncretism' of inquiry that asserts its own authority once and for all *more geometrico*.
2. As Benjamin goes on to explain in the *Trauerspiel* study, this 'is not the antithesis of history and nature but the comprehensive secularization of

the historical in the state of creation. It is not eternity that is opposed to the disconsolate chronicle of world-history, but the restoration of the timelessness of paradise. History merges into the setting' (*OGT* 92).

3. Deleuze explains how 'description replaces the object, the concept becomes narrative, and the subject becomes point of view or subject of expression' (*TF* 127).

4. So too, according to Benjamin: 'It has quite correctly been observed, by Hausenstein, that, in paintings of apotheoses, the foreground is generally treated with exaggerated realism so as to be able to show the remoter, visionary objects more reliably. The attempt to gather all worldly events into the graphic foreground is not undertaken only in order to heighten the tension between immanence and transcendence, but also in order to secure for the latter the greatest conceivable rigour, exclusiveness and inexorability. It is an unsurpassably spectacular gesture to place even Christ in the realm of the provisional, the everyday, the unreliable (*OGT* 183).

    Compare Deleuze's interest in El Greco – an interest informed by Jean Paris' 1963 account of an 'ascensional space' in which, 'like Cartesian divers [*des ludions*], men thus balance earthly gravity and divine attraction' (*TF* 147).

5. Following Georges Friedmann, Deleuze describes 'Leibniz's philosophy as the thinking of universal anxiety' (*TF* 152).

6. 'Seen from the point of view of death, the product of the corpse is life. It is not only in the less of limbs, not only in the changes of the aging body, but in all the processes of elimination and purification that everything corpse-like falls away from the body piece by piece. It is no accident that precisely nails and hair, which are cut away as dead matter from the living body, continue to grow on the corpse. There is in the physis, in the memory itself, a *memento mori*; the obsession of the men of the middle ages and the baroque with death would be quite unthinkable if it were only a question of reflection about the end of their lives' (*OGT* 218).

7. As Deleuze explains a little later: 'the essence of the baroque is that it is given unity, through a projection that emanates from a summit as a point of view … the essence of the baroque entails neither falling into nor emerging from illusion but rather *realizing* something in illusion itself, or of tying it to a spiritual *presence* that endows its spaces and fragments with a collective unity' (*TF* 124–5, translation modified).

8. This is why Deleuze explains how in the baroque 'the question surges forth in philosophy that will continue to haunt Whitehead and Bergson: not how to attain eternity, but in what conditions does the objective world allow for a subjective production of novelty, that is, of creation?' (*TF* 79).

9. See the lecture from 29 April 1980, 'we remain with examples, and we are making a childish inquiry, we are talking mathematics, but we don't know a word of it'. In his lecture the following week Deleuze suggests that Leibniz's correspondence (especially with respect to his interlocutors' knowledge of calculus) allows the imagination to spill over from between the 'vulgar and scholarly' understanding of things.

10. 'The more clearly mathematics demonstrate that the total elimination of the problem of representation [*Darstellungsproblem*] – which is boasted by every didactic system – is the sign of knowledge, the more conclusively does it reveal its renunciation of that area of truth to which language is directed' (*OGT* 27).

11. 'Always a unity *of* the multiple, in the objective sense, the one must also have a multiplicity 'of' one and a unity 'of' the multiple, but now in a subjective sense' (*TF* 126).

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3
Leibniz's Combinatorial Art of Synthesis and the Temporal Interval of the Fold

Niamh McDonnell

Introduction

By looking at the theory of synthesis,[1] located in one of Leibniz's earliest texts, this chapter examines how it informs Deleuze's concept of the fold. In his doctoral dissertation, 'On the Art of Combinations' ('De Arte Combinatoria', 1666), Leibniz's approach to the problem of part–whole relations involves the analytic reduction[2] of elements to 'first terms'[3] that are combined. It would appear that in Leibniz's nominalism[4] 'first terms' serve to denominate the properties of the substance as its attributes. *The Critique of Pure Reason* supports this view, as Kant claims that the elements of synthesis in Leibniz's combinatorial are units representing the concepts of the monads in God's infinite understanding. A primary passivity resides in the monad's closed interiority, symbolising its blindness to the reason for its existence, which sets the horizon line of its determination according to a rationalist idealism. As 'the basic material of the universe' monads 'have no other active power, save only that which exists in representations, the efficacy of which is confined, strictly speaking, to themselves' (Kant 2003, A274/B330, henceforth '*CPR*').

By contrast, Deleuze presents Kant's problem with the finitude of the monads' limits in their closed interiority, which necessitates God's mediation in their communication, in a different light. This is in so far as monadic closure is reconfigured as that which allows 'the infinite opening of the finite' (*TF* 26). The world is thus given 'the possibility of beginning over and again in each monad' (ibid.). Deleuze brings forth the singularity of the distinction in the monad's perception as

an unfolding of the world it.[5] The monad's inclusion of the world is an expression, which undermines the logic of opposition grounding receptivity as a passivity and the spontaneous representation of thought as an activity.[6] It is also that the ideal of synthesis is reconfigured and is no longer attached to securing reason in the clear and distinct rationality of thought in the predication of the attributes of the substance. Leibniz's mannerism challenges the essentialism of Descartes (*TF* 32, 56) and the nomination of properties belonging to the substance as its attributes. The division of the continuous is not a dissolution into points or minima, but rather into folds. The mathematical abstraction of 'The unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth' (*TF* 6) cannot be located in a Cartesian 'form of finite bodies or in an infinity in the form of points' (ibid.). The enfolding of the world in the monad in its perception is a doubling over of what is already included and is orientated around the possession of affects in 'being-for the world' (*TF* 26).

This essay looks at the mathematical abstraction of the elements of synthesis in Leibniz's combinatorial art in terms of how this informs the logic of the fold. The a priori conditions of synthesis are not those pertaining to a universal subject but to a world. Leibniz's combinatorial art attains objectivity by virtue of how parts are conceived as inclusions of the whole, their selection in combinations accounts for a certain point of view that is thereby integral to the overall outline of the problem. The definition of the part through 'situs', concerns its 'location' (*L* 77). It is examined how a difference in depth, according to a power of repetition in series, underlying the situs of parts is central to the constitution of the monad's point of view. Deleuze says that for Leibniz 'extension (*extensio*) is 'continuous repetition' of the *situs* or position – that is, of point of view' (*TF* 20). Leibniz's approach is contrasted with the collective composition of the whole in Kant's conception of the unity of apperception, whereby its elements necessarily 'stand together', constituting the extension of the self.

The focal point of the combinatorial art based on parts as situs does not follow the Kantian operation, insofar as combining is an analogy with the composition of the form of intuition. This poses the identification of the part through its 'location', by which means the whole is already given through parts having a *common* relation of belonging together. In Leibniz's approach, noted by Deleuze through Tarde, the parts share a resemblance with the whole – 'a displaced repetition' (*DR* 25), whereby a distributive[7] dynamic effects its variation. In conjunction with the variation of the whole posited by the tendency of infinitely small parts to vary, Leibniz introduces the theory of affection

as a metaphysical state of the whole. The difference in scale by which the whole is an affection of its parts is assigned the active and passive forces of perceptual states.[8] The pivotal point of the synthesis in the succession of the monad's states of perception is a temporal interval engendered by the polarity of its internal active and passive states. Projection onto the infinitely small perceptions of the body, or 'affective qualities' (*TF* 96), is recognised by Deleuze as 'an active expression of the monad, as a function of its own point of view' (*TF* 79). The ideal of the complete in synthesis is thus a fulfilment of potential and an *objectification* of activity (ibid.). It is investigated how this is necessarily so because receptivity is not a passivity but a potential. Likewise, if there is a spontaneity in the distinction of perception, it is expressive of a *presence* in 'coming to a point of view' (*TF* 19), rather than demonstrative of an act of a subject.

Kant's reading of the simple as units in the summation of the whole from parts

As objects of the pure understanding, Kant states that 'every substance must have inner determinations and powers which pertain to its inner reality' (*CPR* A266/B322). In this context Leibniz's monads are simple substances without 'whatever might signify outer relation, including also, therefore, *composition*' (ibid.). This presents the problem of assigning inner states to simple substances – 'that which is inner in things-in-themselves' (*CPR* A274/B30). This leads Kant to conclude: 'we can assign to substances no inner state save that through which we ourselves inwardly determine our sense, namely, the *state of the representations*' (ibid.). As the 'basic material of the whole universe', monads are only active in their power of representation, confined to themselves. The necessity of a 'third cause' making the monad's inner states correspond to one another is a synthesis of the monad's passive receptivity to sense and its activity of representation. The outline of this problematic prompts Kant's assertion that it is necessary to posit sensible intuition as a subjective condition, which lies *a priori* at the foundation of all perception, as its original form. This circumvents the necessity that matter is the a priori given serving as the foundation of the objects of the understanding in a purely formal logic of concepts. The form of intuition is given by itself, which allows the possibility of matter in the first instance.

Kant thus presents the case for the adequate grounds of the empirical representation of sensibility. This figures the means of synthesising in

relation to judgement, whereby the objective terms of authenticating the representations of a reproductive imagination can be secured. Deleuze challenges Kant's supposition of the infinite understanding in 'The Monadology': 'tiny perceptions as representatives of the world in the finite self [supposes that] [...] the relation with infinite understanding devolves from it, and not the inverse' (*TF* 89, translation modified). This is put forward in the context of Maïmon's post-Kantian reading of Leibniz: 'the infinite is taken here only as the presence of an unconscious in finite understanding, of something that cannot be thought in finite thought, of a nonself in the finite self, the presence that Kant himself will be forced to discover when he will hollow out the difference between a determinant and a determinable self' (*TF* 89).

In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze regards that the way is prepared for a 'post-Kantian syntheses' (*DR* 58) because Kant introduces a schizophrenia into the 'pure Self of the "I think"' (ibid.). He aligns a spontaneity in the 'I think' with 'that of an Other' (ibid.). Consequently, 'the Self of "I think" includes in its essence a *receptivity of intuition* in relation to which *I* is already an other' (ibid. emphasis added). We will see that a Leibnizian spontaneity of the 'I think' is orientated around a capacity to be affected, while a receptivity of intuition is not envisaged in terms of a subject 'that would undergo a passive effect' (*TF* 78). In Leibniz's formulation of synthesis, the conditions of the genesis of difference in thought do not revolve around an equivalence between an activity of the subject in the empirical sense and a transcendental unity of self-consciousness already given in intuition.

In his transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, as restated in the second edition, Kant considers the combination of the many:

> the combination (*conjunctio*) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition.
>
> (*CPR* B130)

It is rather 'an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation'. Whether empirical or not, conscious or not, or of various concepts, 'all combination [...] – is an act of the understanding' (ibid.). Kant designates this act a synthesis because such representation to ourselves of anything as combined in the object is not possible without already having been 'previously combined' by us. The possibility of representation through combination is thus bound to the necessity of

a prior presentation. The spontaneous act also posits the subject of the activity. In its activity of representation belonging to the understanding, a dissolution in analysis presupposes its opposite in combination: 'For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve, since only having been combined *by the understanding* can anything that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of representation' (*CPR* B131). There is a 'synthetic unity' of the manifold and combination is its representation. Kant conceives the possibility of combination according to the prior addition of synthetic unity to the representation of the manifold. This synthetic unity is qualitative and itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgement. There is a singularity in self-consciousness because it generates the representation 'I think', and it cannot 'itself be accompanied by any further representation' (*CPR* B132). The representation 'I think' 'must be capable of accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same' (*CPR* B132). In order that the possibility of both one *and* all representations can belong to the subject of self-consciousness 'they must conform to the condition under which alone they *can* stand together in one universal self-consciousness' (*CPR* B133).

There is an equivalence between the activity of uniting representations (a movement of decomposition and recomposition) and the unity of the representations already given in intuition. This is 'in so far as I *conjoin* one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them' (*CPR* B133). Although there is no consciousness of the synthesis of representations, the unity of the representations in intuition is the means by which that possibility of realisation is secured. Kant's formulation of synthesis posits the combination of the manifold given in intuition and the identification of the 'I' as 'simple representation'. We can see how Deleuze reads a schizophrenia in the identification of the 'I', by virtue of the fact that the *not* 'I' or the Other is that without which the former could not become the 'I'. But if there is a gap between the realisation and the possibility given in the manifold of intuition, that Deleuze alights on as part of a schizophrenia in thought in relation to a spontaneity, nevertheless this conforms to a 'dogmatic image of thought'. He maintains that in Kant's second edition of *The Critique*, Kant attempts to conceal the basis of his formulation of synthesis in 'the psychologism of a tracing method'. Kant 'traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological consciousness: the transcendental synthesis of apprehension is directly induced from an empirical apprehension' (*DR* 135).

Kant reads the basic elements of Leibniz's synthesis in 'The Monadology' according to a mode of representation of units serving a formal logic of concepts. The conception of monads as substances that are necessarily *simple* is considered by Kant to be the demand of the composition of the whole from units that stand as abstract representations in the nomination of monadic properties as essences. The position that Kant adopts here derives from what he regards to be imperative to the possibility of the belonging of representations in 'one universal self-consciousness' (*CPR* B133) 'without exception' to the subject of self-conscious representation. That is to say a conformity of representations in the '*transcendental* unity of self-consciousness' is a matter of 'the condition under which alone they *can stand together* in one universal self-consciousness'. Kant's criticism of Leibniz's synthesis reflects an approach prioritising the epistemological aspect of synthesis in terms of how it serves the judgement of the evidence of representations. With this objective the requirement is that there must be the 'possibility of *a priori* knowledge arising from it [the unity of apperception]' (*CPR* B132).

While this unity of apperception is generative of the spontaneous representation of 'I think', it also is a containment of all other possible representations accompanying *this* or *that* one representation. In the conformity to the conditions under which representations 'stand together' in the unity of apperception, the way in which this poses that we might read the requisite of any one representation is compromised by the fact it is already turned into a universal to satisfy the demonstration of the conditions for the possibility of experience.[9] The necessity that absolute possibility is contained in the transcendental unity of self consciousness, in order that any one representation can belong to a subject of self-conscious representation, goes hand in hand with the mathematical abstraction of combining representations as units that are already presented to be represented. Also the singular nature of the representation of self-consciousness – 'an act of spontaneity' is necessarily complete, as the realisation of a possibility. This is so because it 'cannot be accompanied by any further representation', while it is generated within the absolute possibility of all representations along with which the 'I think' extends itself.[10]

Leibniz's investment in establishing the 'authority of the senses' in relation to experience does not rely primarily on the self that thinks: 'within myself I perceive not only myself who thinks but also many differences in my thoughts, from which I conclude that there are other things outside of me' (*L* 232). These differences in thought are not the possibilities of other representations, already contained in the synthetic

unity of apperception necessarily 'standing together' in conformity with its condition, as the extension of the self. In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze indicates how a transcendental field cannot be thought through the 'Kantian manner': 'with the personal form of an I, or the synthetic unity of apperception, even if this unity were to be given universal extension' (*LS* 105). When Deleuze regards Leibniz's approach to synthesis in *The Fold* from the vantage point of the analytic involved in the definition of its 'first terms', he maintains that for Leibniz 'analysis of existents cannot be separated from the infinity of the world, [the rationale being that God would not be submitted to] the indefinite existing in the world' (*TF* 42). Insisting that both propositions of essence and existence involve infinite analysis, the infinity of the world precedes God. Referring to Leibniz's text 'On Freedom', 1679, Deleuze points out that while there is no end to analysis, the infinite analytic for finite beings does not mean a commensuration of knowledge and understanding for divine being:

> only God being able to see, not the end of the analysis indeed, since there is no end, but the nexus of terms or the inclusion of the predicate in the subject, since he sees everything which is in the series.
>
> (*L* 264)

God's perfection, equated with the harmony of the series is for Deleuze the defining characterstic of 'good sense' (see *DR* 224–7; *LS* 97) presiding over the combinatorial synthesis; the potential of divine affection is conceived through a primary incommensurability between the intuition of seeing everything in the series and not seeing its end. The monad's potential affection in relation to its simple substance in the succession of its states of perception imitates God's perfection and is a conjunction with the harmony of series of the actual world. For God's attributes 'are absolutely infinite or perfect, and in created monads […] – they are nothing but imitations in the degree to which the monad has perfection' (*L* 647). While the monad's determination follows the force of appetition, this is tied to the 'accommodation of all created things to each other' (*L* 648). The sense in which the monad is a 'perpetual living mirror of the universe' is by virtue of how it is in 'accord' with the universe (*TF* 132–4). Deleuze's reading of the originary state of closure of the monad brings out another ideal of synthesis than that of absolute closure around the cause for its existence. (*TF* 26, 70) In his elucidation of an ontology of the monad 'being-for the world' rather than 'being-in the world' (ibid.), he calls into question the notion of the monad's blindness to the reason for its existence. Indeed if the monad imitates

God's perfection, it is not by virtue of its imperfection but because of 'the degree to which [it] […] has perfection'. God's not seeing the end of the series cannot be a compromise to divine perfection; reading the order of infinity of the events in the actual series of the world cannot be a form of blindness to causality as if it were under concealment and duly revealed in the phenomenon within the temporal order of the monad's states of perception. The nature of incommensurability is a difference in mode of reception and engagement between seeing and reading in relation to orders of infinity.

This is substantiated by the fact that, according to Deleuze, the pursuit of 'real definitions' in Leibniz's philosophy does not employ demonstration as some kind of analogy with the defined as cause. It is rather that the defined is the point of orientation of demonstration insofar as it is an inclusion of other definitions and it is itself included in others. In the chain of definitions, the demonstration is distinguished from the Aristotelian principle of antecedence and temporal order: 'the definers or reasons must precede the defined since they determine its possibility, but only by following the "power" and not the act' (*TF* 43). The demonstration does not figure the defined as the antecedent or cause of the definition. The stopping point of the analysis 'making use of a definition as if it were a final Identical' takes place through demonstration with its ideal in inclusion. In 'On Universal Synthesis and Analysis', Leibniz says: 'those real definitions are most perfect which resolve the thing into simple primitive notions understood in themselves' (*L* 231). These 'simple primitive notions' are identities, but cannot be seen as elements of the 'pure understanding' in the sense that they are mere reflections of existent things-in-themselves. Deleuze calls them 'auto-inclusions' – 'each of which includes itself and only itself' (*TF* 43). The requisite of demonstration is the employment of such identicals, as they are the 'auto-positions of the infinite'; the ideal they serve is the attainment of knowledge that is 'adequate' or 'intuitive'. The emphasis is placed on the 'real definition', which demands that 'we cannot combine notions arbitrarily'. The consistency of the 'first terms' is the aim of the analytic reduction in the combinatorial: 'for, if there were any inconsistency, it would appear here at once, since no further resolution can take place' (*L* 231). 'Consistency' of terms must be seen from the vantage point of the objectivity of the inclusion of the infinite in the identicals.

Kant reads the analytic reduction to identities in Leibniz's combinatorial as a testament that the ideal of monadic determination lies in the sensible as the intelligible in God's understanding. By virtue of giving primacy to the understanding, 'demanding that something

be first given' in order to determine anything, matter is prior to form (*CPR* A627/B323). This leads, for Kant, to the false assumption that the intuition of things as they really are is a 'confused representation', owing to the finitude of the monad's blindness to the reason for its existence. Ishiguro's response is:

> Kant was wrong to criticise Leibniz for not making the distinction of the sensible and the intelligible, and for treating the former as a confused form of the latter.

> (Ishiguro 1990, pp. 31–2)

Ideas or concepts, for Leibniz, Ishiguro claims, are not due to 'any structural property of the brain, which enables us to have such thoughts' (Ishiguro 1990, p. 32). It is not thereby the objective of the analytic reduction within the combinatorial to mathematise sense rendering it intelligible insofar as it can be reduced to a 'particular mental act of thinking'. Having an idea is not a matter of the consciousness of thinking about it. It is rather 'a capacity' or ability to use expressions corresponding to truths. Ishiguro points to how in Leibniz's *New Essays* ideas or concepts are 'of possibles'. As 'the internal objects of thought', *having* them means 'to have a disposition or ability to think about them' (ibid., 33). Through such a disposition of thought, the concept 'combines with other concepts to become something for which the question of truth arises' (ibid., 34). She also says that Leibniz's originality in the conception of the nature and role of the concept lies in the notion of 'the capacity to use expressions' in which sense the identity of the concept can never be discussed without referring to expressions expressing these concepts. The spontaneity of language, as opposed to the understanding, is something that Deleuze speaks about as a post-Kantianism in Foucault – 'the "there-is" of language' (*F* 52). In view of Ishiguro's reading, bringing forward the significance of the 'expressive use' of concepts as a 'disposition' of the mind, this can be extrapolated from Leibniz's approach in the combinatorial art. The analytic reduction to 'first terms', equally concepts, serves the ideal of the consistency of concepts[11] when they are combined in expressions. Ishiguro takes the view that Leibniz's logic is concerned with the nomination of the relational properties of things as real. The fact that their reality consists in 'the modification of individual substances and in the *harmony or agreement between them*' (Ishiguro 1990, 140, translation modified) does not take away from the reality of substances themselves. But it does put into question the readings of Leibniz's nominalism that are premised on its

conformity to the essentialist tradition of substance attribution, while also imposing a purely Kantian mathematical formulation of synthesis on the combinatorial as a logical language.[12]

Ishiguro's reading also brings forward the two levels on which the combinatorial art of synthesis operates – the modification of individual substances in the actual world is thought of in conjunction which ply concepts about the world; the infinity of the former cannot be seen without that of the latter, whereby the disposition of the mind is characterised by the underlying variation of its infinitely small perceptions and the succession of its states of clear/confused perceptions. This outline of Leibniz's philosophy of logic and language given by Ishiguro correlates with what Deleuze says in *The Fold* about how Leibniz's logic of the predicate revises the Classical tradition. Predicates are not the 'solid and constant attributes of substance' but are expressive of a 'spontaneity of the manner' in which the world is an inclusion in the monad's substance through its perception (*TF* 56). The modification of individual substances[13] in the actual world is an ontology of being-for the world with predicates as the events of the world. Deleuze describes it as a movement 'from "seeing" to "reading"' (*TF* 41) – from the event of the thing seen to the reading of its concept. The aspect of perception that is an inclusion is a placement of the event of the thing in the monad as a metaphysical point (*TF* 23, 41). While this inclusion follows the logic of sufficient reason governing the actual things and the agreement of substances in the world through events, the concept is an expression of the identity of the event and the predicate. The incommensurability between seeing and reading generative of affects does not point to the ineffable nature of expression as that of a divine language. The placement of the event in the metaphysical point as an inclusion involves the concept that 'resembles a signature or an enclosure' (*TF* 41). On the one hand it informs deductive thought in respect of sufficient reason, but it is also the reading of the 'disposition' of mind. This is what Deleuze calls the second aspect of mannerism: 'the omnipresence of the dark depths which is opposed to the clarity of form, and without which manners would have no place to surge forth from' (*TF* 56).

Deleuze's engagement with Leibniz's 'theatre' (*LS* 113) of predicates as events involving an ontology of monadic appurtenance[14] is evident in his work preceding *The Fold*.[15] However, it is not until *The Fold* that 'having' is articulated in conjunction with the concept of the fold itself: 'To have or to possess is to fold, […] to convey what one contains "with a certain power"' (*TF* 110). We will see presently that the distributive dynamic contained in the mathematics of the combinatorial

of whole-part relations informs the baroque mathematics of an 'affection' of 'variable sizes' (*TF* 17). The monad's perception, reading the world folded into itself in the passage of its internal states is considered as an *expression* in its simple substance. This expression is constitutive of a point of view relative to a substance defined through a principle of activity and change (*TF* 55). Hence *The Fold* attests to the inventive aspect of Leibniz's logic of the combinatorial, especially in the context of its concern with opening out ways of reading variation as part of the judgement of cases of problems (*TF* 21, 48) to which point of view is integral.

It is here that we find that Deleuze takes an affirmative stance on Leibniz's logic in relation to a baroque mathematics. Essences are thought of as logical inclusions of the whole and the elements of a combinatorial synthesis are differences in depth put into play, rather than being counted through the analogy of their prior combination. The consequences for the theory of the subject are that the extension of the self[16] is put forward in accordance with 'a continuous repetition of the *situs* or point of view'. Through tracing the initiation of Leibniz's theory of situs, as it appears in 'On the Art of Combinations', it is considered how the theory of the affective quality of the whole from the combination of its parts forms the basis of Leibniz's theory of perception thought through force. Within this context, the nature of analysis *and* synthesis in Leibniz's combinatorial art can be seen in light of its critical importance to the concept of the fold, as it performs within the architectonic of the baroque house. The folding of the world in the monad accounts for the division of the two floors, the distinction of the monad's perceptions is at the same time a continuity of the series of the world in its unfolding, hence the connection between the two levels (*TF* 28–30).

Situs – The elements of Leibniz's combinatorial synthesis

Leibniz's theory of affection is put forward in 'On the Art of Combinations' in terms of which a synthesis of the whole through the combination of parts is articulated in relation to the infinitely small. The Cartesian notion of the complete as a distinction of reason in the denial of what does not belong to a subject of thought is distinguished from the notion of the complete contained in the combinatorial art. (*TF* 54) In 'The Monadology' Leibniz confronts the Cartesians on this point: 'for they disregarded perceptions that are not perceived' (*L* 644). In this context Tarde observes that Leibniz rejects the reduction of

intelligence in an order of decreasing smallness, positing the judgement of intelligibility by analogy to an absolute intelligence (Tarde 1999, p. 53). Descartes' procedure of exclusion of error depends on the infinitely small as unintelligent, indistinct and indifferent, as the means by which error is identified by a subject. The negation of the homogeneity of the infinitely small therefore stands for the logical opposition through which difference is identified. Equally, Leibniz's approach is distinguished from the abstraction of the quality of the manifold of sense by Kant, whereby the minimum requirement is the conformity to the condition of 'standing together' in the unity of apperception. A collectivity of the parts in the composition of the whole that is thereby already given is not the starting point for Leibniz's approach to synthesis in 'On the Art of Combinations'.

Leibniz figures the problem of combinations relative to the 'parts assumed to be the smallest (that is, the unities) in relation to each other and the whole [as that which] can itself also be varied' (*L* 77). Such a 'disposition' he calls 'situs'. By grounding the measure of parts through absolute movement or continuous change of place, the approach makes the variation of the infinitely small the focal point of examining the tendency of the whole to vary. The whole is considered through the movement of its parts: 'If all its parts [the moving body] are moved, the whole is moved' (*L* 73). Parts are understood to have commonality in relation to the whole through their resistance and are thus conceived by their location. It is by virtue of the fact that 'the continuum is infinitely divisible' (*L* 74) that the location of parts is considered in relation to the smaller parts and their infinite variation.

Defined by a resistance to movement, parts are determined by the continuity of repetition of their location. Because combinations implicate infinitely smaller parts, their variations are thresholds of resistances through which successive states of the whole can be read. It is thus that the power of parts to repeat is not seen as the focal point of reading the sameness of an identity in the composition of the whole, but it is instead considered as a difference in depth of the potential variation of the whole. Deleuze's theory of inclusion of the outside on the inside can be traced to the notion of the part, so defined; its role within the variation of the whole owes to an inclusion implicating a difference in depth as a potential that is explicated in various combinations. The method thus proposes to read variability, or 'the quantity of all variations' (*L* 77). Leibniz's formulation of synthesis as a combinatorial art is not concerned with parts that are relative to a whole that is already their summation, as is the case with Kant's theory of synthesis. Leibniz

prefers to consider parts in terms of 'the limits of powers' (ibid.), which involves a distributive dynamic of the synthesis of parts, as opposed to their collectivity. This is where the infinitely smaller parts bear upon the variational status of the whole with respect to its successive state.

In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze refers to Kant's 'positing of a whole of reality as an *Ens Summum*' (*DR* 45). It is Leibniz to whom Deleuze refers to retrieve what is missing from the theory of synthesis, taking place 'only in a false depth […] [that is] the original, intensive depth which is the matrix of the entire space' (*DR* 50, cf. 231).

By Kant's addition of the sum of the whole to the parts as a synthetic unity of apperception, the possibility of any part is a reflection of its realisation (*DR* 212). Leibniz's approach comes closer to the notion of the virtual and its actualisation, as the mirroring of the whole through the part by virtue of the power of its inclusion. Deleuze argues that resemblance of the whole as 'displaced repetition' aims at a real repetition corresponding 'directly to a difference of the same degree as itself' (*DR* 25–6). This is put forward against the submission of difference to analogy, such as we find in the mathematical foundations of the Kantian abstraction of the combinatorial. Parts are counted and thus can 'stand together' in the unity of apperception serving as an analogy of 'place' grounding the 'transcendental topics'. 'Transcendental topics' do not represent the object according to what constitutes its conception (quantity, reality) but set forth 'the comparison of the representations, which is prior to the concept of things' (*CPR* A269/B325). This comparison 'requires in the first place a reflection, that is, a determination of the location to which the representations of the things that are being compared belong' (ibid.). The transcendental topics thus demands that in order for there to be a form of judgement in the synthesis of representations there must be an apparatus of reflecting the place to which representations belong. In this respect the parts of the whole in the synthesis of representations, as conceived by Kant, necessarily have a location that reflects their conceptual difference. 'Logical locations' are the ranking together of the concepts.

In contradistinction with Kant's 'transcendental topics', Leibniz's 'loci' or transcendent relations form the basis of 'the art of invention' associated with combining propositions. In 'Method for Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence', 1667, such transcendent relations comprise 'whole, cause, matter, similarity' (*L* 140). Leibniz's outline of the problem of synthesis with respect to the 'consistency' of concepts draws upon the excess in the expressive use of concepts, rather than their regulatory function (*TF* 119). The analytic reduction to concepts as

'first terms' of the combinatorial is more about the difference in depth they implicate that is explicated in their use, than about the truth of the identity of an essence they represent. It is directed towards the specification of properties belonging to things through their relations in the actual world as part of an 'adequate knowledge'. The 'disposition' of thought Ishiguro speaks about in terms of the use of concepts can be traced to Leibniz's notion of 'disposition of situs' appearing in 'On the Art of Combinations'. Considering the operation of combining parts, the potential for variation of the whole through the infinite variation of the parts is the way in which the latter project onto the former. A certain species of monad is identified by Deleuze with the attachment to such infinitely small variations – 'units of organic generation and corruption (composition)' (*TF* 116). They are powers that he qualifies as 'dispositions' or 'habitus' 'inasmuch as they are arranged beneath a vinculum' (ibid.).

Leibniz further develops the analysis of situs later in his career (around the same time as 'The Monadology') in 'The Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics', 1714. Here more particularly, the approach to measuring the relations between things in accordance with 'loci' pertains to the simultaneity of relations of parts and the power of their repetition. Situs is redefined as 'a mode of coexistence […] which involves not only quantity but also quality' (*L* 667). Counting the movements of transformation of determinations into one another is the measure of their difference in depth and the power of repetition of parts. Concepts are mirrors of transformations of forms in folded space, reiterating Deleuze's notion of 'enclosures'. The focus on the cohesion of the whole through its infinitely smaller parts reflects the concern with maintaining equilibrium through variation. Deleuze highlights how the baroque makes productive *both* the equilibrium and the disequilibrium of the infinite it discovers in finite determinations (*TF* 89). The indeterminacy of the whole comprising parts of infinite variation induces a fervour for collating the difference between parts in terms of scale, accounting for Leibniz's endless 'drawing up [of] linear and numerical tables' (*TF* 27). A 'new affection of variable sizes' introduced by Leibniz's baroque mathematics refers to the notion of the affection of the whole through the internal variation of parts, whereby the difference in scale is the site of the projection of an external view. Deleuze's discussion of the theory of inflexion, as a 'variation', branching to become a point of view concerns this projective geometry – 'not exactly a point but a place, a position, a site' (*TF* 19). It leads to the inclusion of the distinct point, as mathematical, in the metaphysical point, or the monad. This projection

implies a difference in dimensions of perception between activity and passivity. To examine this notion of the two dimensions of the combinatorial assigned active and passive forces, we turn to Loemker's comments on Leibniz's revision of the text and the paper dated the following year 'Method for Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence', 1667, over ten years later in 1679. Loemker says that the revision note shows how Leibniz shifts the emphasis from thought to perception, which shows how 'early Leibniz had formulated the psychological basis of his monadology' (*L* 92). It is notable therefore that the abstract synthesis of the combinatorial is foundational to the psychology underlying 'The Monadology'. Perceptions are conceived in terms of a quantitative difference in size, thus designating the two dimensions in scale to which Leibniz assigns active and passive forces. By virtue of the quantitative difference there is a qualitative state of the whole as an affection to the distribution of parts, which is the focal point of the formation of monadic attachments. In the combination of parts the degree of variation en masse[17] gives to the parts a power or difference in depth. The emphasis is thereby placed on the *distribution* of these parts as a way in which the whole is an affective state with respect to the smaller parts they bring into play. Such a distributive *dynamic* constitutes the whole from the parts by virtue of how active and passive forces are assigned to the differences in scale of parts and the potential affections of the whole they engender.

Leibniz revises his thinking on causality and as Loemker says, develops a theory of perception in relation to force. As a sensible quality, Leibniz regards thought as 'either of the human intellect or of something 'I know not what' within us which we observe to be thinking' (*L* 89). Thought is not given primacy in accordance with a principle of collectivity of its differing representations in an extended self, as presented in Kant's schema. Instead the background to thought in – the 'I know not what' that is observed to be thinking – attains significance:

> Only two qualities are perceived in mind: *perceptivity* (or the power of perceiving) and *activity* (or the power of acting). *Perception* is the expression of many things in one or in simple substance; if it is combined with the reflection of the percipient it is called thought.
>
> (*L* 91)

This lays down the basis for the theory of perception as a distinction of a singular repetition within its background of continuous infinitely small repetitions. The approach to synthesis is characterised less by its orientation around the subject of an act than by the abstract selection of

the distinct within its background of the obscure and infinitely varying smaller repetitions. In 'The Monadology' the notion of a background from which the distinction of perception is drawn pertains to the state of the naked monads: 'if we had nothing distinctive in our perceptions, and nothing lifted out, so to speak, and of a higher flavor, we should always be in a state of stupor' (*L* 645). The naked monads are considered by Deleuze as 'lacking the zone of light' (*TF* 91) that would render any distinction within the infinity of minute perceptions. They are embedded in a 'darkness', a 'giddiness of minute and dark perceptions' (*TF* 91–2). That there is nothing 'remarkable' about them is not to say that they attest to a primary lack and account for a normativity, as the negation by which the clarity of distinction is determined. Instead naked monads are 'enclosed' by the entirety. An abstraction, the naked monads are a 'limiting condition' (*TF* 92) in respect of a primary threshold with an outside. They represent a capacity to be affected at its most minimal degree. When Leibniz ascribes passive force to the infinitely small parts in terms of the resistance to absolute change of place, passivity is simultaneously a potential change of the state of the whole;[18] a potential that is dormant in the naked monads, as there is no resistance to change of place.

Activity or force is perceivable in the mind alone; that is, the state of a thing from which change follows. We experience this intimately in ourselves, but also infer it in others from its effects. There is a double force – that of acting and that of resisting. The former is immaterial, the latter material, which resists action though it does not act unless impelled from without (*L* 92).

The material force of resistance to movement is conceived as a folding or envelopment of an outside, whereby an inside is constituted through its imitation. The capacity to be affected is a spontaneity to the outside directed towards 'the state of a thing from which change follows'. This folding of the outside on the inside substantiates the difference in depth or the power of parts to repeat. The continuous and infinitely small repetitions of situs characterise a force of resistance, referred to by Leibniz as 'a difficulty in giving place'.[19] The futural orientation in a successive state of perception is prompted by the 'affective qualities' of the infinitely small resistances. A resembling of 'matter in extension' (*TF* 96) produces these 'affective qualities' – 'confused or even obscure perceptions that resemble something by virtue of a projective geometry' (ibid.). The degree of variation on the level of the infinitely small renders the 'the spontaneity of the manner' of perception as an expression. They are not the object of an exclusion in the clear and

distinct thought nor are they the result of an abstraction submitted to the condition of 'standing together' in the unity of apperception; these 'affective qualities' constitute a certain abstraction nevertheless, in terms of how the resembling of the outside produces matter through 'material forces of resistance'. This is tied to the 'immaterial force' in the activity of perception as a projection. The abstract relation between a physical calculus of impulsions and a psychic calculus of perceptions is the architectonic structure of the baroque house and its 'two floors'.

The Abstraction of the 'Two Floors' architectonic

In the acknowledgement that the 'true logical criterion' of the simple substance is inclusion, Deleuze reconfigures the argument posed by Kant in accordance with the latter's 'tracing method of psychologism'. If the differences in thought point to something outside the monad, it is not a matter of only a realisation of possibility but also the actualisation of the virtual because this outside is already an inclusion in the monad. In this distinction of the monad's simple substance as a closed interiority and a unity, the spontaneity of the act of representation of the outside on the inside is redefined as a spontaneity within an interiority that includes the exterior in a certain way. If there is a split in the being of the monad, 'the torsion that constitutes the fold of the world and of the soul' (*TF* 26), the ideal of completeness in synthesis is an integral of the varying states of the world and the internal variation of monadic states of perception. Deleuze reads the ideal of synthesis in the movement towards inclusion as 'the inner unity of an event, the active unity of a change' (*TF* 55). The 'psychological criterion' is 'perception and appetite' (ibid.). Inclusion is not an act, because 'predication is not an attribution' (ibid.). Deleuze insists: 'the condition of closure, of being shut off, has an entirely different meaning' (*TF* 70) that pertains to the conferral of unity on the movement of inclusion.

The power of this inclusion, as an unfolding, depends on the duplication of the process of folding in matter on the lower level of the baroque house: 'bent back according to the folds determined by a heavy matter'. We thus have 'an infinite room for reception or receptivity' (*TF* 29). The resistance in the 'difficulty in giving place' as both an obstacle and simultaneously a potential force has been traced to the notion of a continuity of repetitions of parts as situs, presented by Leibniz in his combinatorial art. This resisting force is double sided in that it pivots on the event of encounter in the actual world and it implicates a tendency to change of state. The architectonic of the baroque house mirrors this

doubling of force in the material and the immaterial dimensions of the floors. The upper floor is distinguished by the tendency to change state; as an immateriality it is distinct from the folds of matter on the lower floor, while at the same time it is also inseparable from it: 'The upper level is closed, a pure inside without outside, […] its walls hung with spontaneous folds that are now only those of a soul or a mind' (ibid.). Spontaneity cannot be an act of representation in opposition to a passive receptivity to sense because the reception on the lower level is itself a dimension of expression in the imitation of the outside on the inside.

The lower level 'represents the figure that meets with a minimum of resistance from a fluid' (*TF* 102). The ideality of the figure is thus measured by its degree of variability as a capacity to be affected in respect of the infinite variation or change of place implicit in the fluid state. The requisite of the synthesis of the whole in corporeal bodies is a minimal degree of motion. It is as Deleuze says: 'mixed up in the very condition of bodies or of material parts, as a relation with a surrounding, a successive determination, a mechanical linkage' (*TF* 116). The need for a second floor is an affirmation of the metaphysical cause in all movement as something interior to bodies: 'all movement that goes, according to the law, to infinity under the force of exterior bodies nonetheless possesses an inner unity, without which it could not be ascribed as movement, discerned as inertia' (ibid.). This interiority is in accordance with the principle of elasticity of material particles, whereby a relationship with an outside is a matter of an activity of an inner force 'that conforms to the extrinsic state' (ibid.). Hence the event of encounter is the occasion of this state of an inner expression, a force that switches from dead to living 'in a proportion' (ibid.) with this extrinsic state. There is a doubling over of force implicit in elasticity, a folding that implicates the temporal interval of the torsion of the world in the monad. A force of resistance or passivity initiates the polarisation of forces[20] producing an internal space onto which an external point is projected. Deleuze describes these tendencies 'to the degree that what they await on the outside is not a movement towards action, but the "sole suppression of impediment"' (*TF* 117). A 'difficulty in giving place' is a *tendency* insofar as it is linked to the desire to change state in the force of appetition, by virtue of a minimal difference in repetition.[21] In view of how the tendency is 'extinguished in a flash' (ibid.), Deleuze says that what matters here is not its disappearance but its passage into the next instant.

The stress is placed on the 'inner unity of movement, to be recreated or reconstituted at each and every instant' (ibid.). It is also that this movement of disappearing is at the same time a disposition of

situs – smaller parts that are not integrated, but are themselves smaller wholes. The polarity between such a passive and an active state is the pivotal point of a temporal interval insofar as it is the site onto which a perception is projected. What Deleuze calls the presence of the upper floor on the lower is a projection of an external point, the limit that envelops the movement in the convergence of series and in so doing generates the external view. The confused state of the infinitely small perceptions resembling matter is an 'affection of quality' because it underpins the activity of perception that will imitate it, projecting onto the movement.

In the baroque mathematics born with Leibniz, Deleuze says that such a transformation through a geometry of projection is deferred in a suspension between dimensions in an 'erasure of contour' (*TF* 17). The variation of the infinitely small in the disposition of situs becomes a fluctuation. Instead of abstracting the infinitely small according to some common dimension, the principle is that such fluctuation generates the reading of 'variation itself' through the proliferation of the 'affections of variable sizes'. In terms of how Leibniz's art of combinations outlines a way of reading the inclusion of the whole in the parts put into play, this does not centre on the clear perception as a force of projection that could be seen as an act. Deleuze says: 'Force is presence and not action' (*TF* 119). He locates this according to an essence of the baroque that entails: 'neither falling into nor emerging from illusion but rather *realizing* something in illusion itself' (*TF* 125). Deleuze recognises that there is an abstraction pertaining to the relationship between the calculus as 'a psychological reality' (*TF* 96) and the reality of physical mechanisms: 'infinitely tiny fluvia that form displacements, crisscrossings, and accumulations of waves, or tiny "conspiracies" of molecular movements' (*TF* 97) The psychological calculus is fictive because its mechanism 'belongs to a hallucinatory perception' (*TF* 96) but this is not to say that both calculi can be collapsed into one another. Hence the baroque house is organised 'with its division into two floors' (*TF* 102). By this division of the two floors there is a theatre of reading in 'the effort or tendency' (*TF* 72) by which conditions in states of perceptions follow on from one another that depends on the fictive nature of the psychological calculus.

Conclusion

The reading of the conditions of succession of states of perception owing to the spontaneity of manners rather than the essentiality of

the attribute reconfigures the opposition of a passive receptivity to sense and the rationality of an active representation. This is so because the synthesis of the monad's states is conceived through the *temporal* interval[22] in the generation of a site upon which the active force of perception projects onto its passive dimension. However reading the monad's states is problematic in view of its complicity with natural force 'Reading does not consist in concluding from the idea of a preceding condition the idea of the following condition, but in grasping the effort or tendency by which the following condition itself ensues from the preceding "by means of a natural force"' (*TF* 72). The spontaneity of change is relative to having affections in 'being-for the world'; the production of the monad's internal space, whereby the monad attaches to a body, assigning the real cause in the movement, is at the same time the site of God's apparent passage into the monad (*TF* 72–3). Nevertheless this is the point of Deleuze's intervention into the organisation of the baroque house, following Kant's intervention into the combinatorial art of synthesis. In the geometry of perception based on the theory of the continuous repetition of situs, the singularity of distinction must be 'intrinsic' (*TF* 15). The spatio-temporal position it constitutes cannot adhere to the coordinates of the vertical and horizontal axes, as this would be to assign significance to the elevation of the two floors as a moral progress of reasonable monads. This revises the ideal of the 'reasonable monad' attaining 'public status' through the requisitions of the 'multitude or in-mass' of the body (*TF* 118). The status of the primary passive resistance of the body in its infinite variation of little perceptions, through which the 'reasonable' monad reads the world folded into it, shifts. Affective states are not in *conformity* to the text of the world (*TF* 136) legible in the 'multitude or in-mass' of the body. Secondly, and in tandem with this, the ideal of synthesis is reconfigured in a 'world of captures instead of closures'[23] (*TF* 81). In the temporal interval of the monad's switch in state of perception, this 'change as predicate' (*TF* 53) is the site of capture rather than closure. In the staging of the inclusion of the world in the monad – 'the inner act in the priveleged region of the monad' (*TF* 31), we are not referred back to its essence. In the 'combinations of the visible and the legible [we are referred to a] […] new kind of correspondence or mutual expression' (ibid.). This kind of expression 'fold after fold', as the reading in between the folds, relies on a temporal interval unique to the theory of synthesis presented in 'On the Art of Combinations'.

Notes

1. Leibniz refers to synthesis as a combination: 'Combination or synthesis is the better means for discovering the use or application of something […]. Analysis, on the contrary, is best suited for discovering the means when the thing to be discovered or the proposed end is given' (*L* 233).
2. In 'On Universal Synthesis and Analysis, or the Art of Discovery and Judgement', 1679, Leibniz defines analysis according to two kinds: 'The common type advances by leaps and is used in algebra. The other is special and far more elegant but less well known; I call it 'reductive' analysis' (*L* 233). 'Analysis is by degrees when we reduce the proposed problem to an easier one, […] until we arrive at one which is in our power' (*L* 234; cf. *C* 351).
3. The possession of 'the alphabet of human thoughts' would be both a means to formulate 'molecular concepts' from its 'conceptual atoms' (*LLP* xv) and 'in knowing how all derived concepts are reduced to it', would serve as an instrument of deductive proof. Parkinson says that in this context, Leibniz's use of the 'term' 'indicates that he regards such terms as concepts. […] The indefinable concepts are called by Leibniz, "first terms"' (*LLP* xiii).
4. Leibniz's nominalistic thesis lies in the conviction that 'concrete things are really things; abstractions are not things but modes of things. Modes are usually nothing but the relation of a thing to the understanding' (Ishiguro 1990, 139; see *GP*, iv, 147). Badiou claims that Leibniz's 'logical nominalism' is characterised by the fact that 'being and the name are made to coincide only insofar, as the name, within the place of the complete language named God, is the effective *construction* of the thing' (Badiou 2005, p. 320). Under the infinite divisibility of being the restriction of the excess liberated is according to 'control of singularities, by "intrinsic nominations"' (ibid.).
5. In 'The Monadology' Leibniz states: 'The passing state which enfolds and represents a multitude in unity or in the simple substance is merely what is called *perception*' (*L* 644). It is only in 'perceptions and their changes' that the internal actions of the simple substance can consist.
6. Deleuze considers a post-Kantianism in Foucault, whereby receptivity is not equated with passivity and spontaneity with activity. He regards that Kant already pointed the way to 'the spontaneity of the "I think" […] as something other' (*F* 52). However, the a priori conditions are 'those of real experience […] not a universal subject'. The spontaneity of language and the receptivity of light, superceding the spontaneity of the understanding and the receptivity of intuition, could equally be traced to the reading of Leibniz. See the chapter by Smith in this volume: 'Genesis and Difference: Deleuze, Maïmon, and the Post-Kantian Reading of Leibniz'.
7. See Introduction for an account of how *Difference and Repetition* presents Leibniz's theory of distribution of 'the distinctive points and the differential elements of a multiplicity throughout the ground'.
8. Deleuze shows how 'an unconscious psychic mechanism […] engenders the perceived in consciousness' (*TF* 95). A difference in scale between microperceptions or minute perceptions and macroperceptions means that the latter are 'the product of differential relations that are established among [the former]' (ibid.).

9. Deleuze emphasises how Leibniz's mathematical abstraction figures axioms dealing with problems that 'surely escape demonstration' (*TF* 48). The implication is that 'axioms are conditions; not always conditions of experience in the Kantian fashion that still turns them into universals, but the conditions of a problem to which the thing responds in one case or another, the cases referring to the value of the variables in the series' (ibid.).

10. Deleuze discusses the extension of the Self, as a 'matter constituted by a continuity of resemblances' (*DR* 257). It is 'the universal matter' of the form of psychic life, at the end of which the 'I' appears. The 'I' and the 'Self' continuously explicate each other and each begin with differences, which are 'distributed in such a way as to be cancelled, in accordance with the requirements of good sense and common sense' (*DR* 257). Kant is most notably the object of the criticism of the latter, and Leibniz the former.

11. Leibniz introduces a novelty in the use of the copula 'est' in that propositions therefore do not 'assert existence, as this would normally be understood, but rather assert consistency' (*LLP* xlvi). He defines this as the assertion of a subject–predicate proposition wherein 'the concept of the subject includes the concept of the predicate' (*LLP* xxi). This implies the precedence of predication for the actualisation of the series of the world and its consistency of concepts.

12. *The Fold* tends less towards a renewal of a constructivist orientation in mathematics than one of intuitionism. For a critique of Badiou's reading of constructivist mathematics into Leibniz's logic as part of a 'complete language', see Mount (2005, p. 81). This opens the question at to whether a post-Kantian recuperation of Leibniz via Maïmon would be compatible with a baroque mathematics (TF 121–3, 136–7). This is given that Maïmon invests in an immanence read through Hume that he considers can be reconciled with a post-Kantian transcendental empiricism. See n. 16 below and chapter 6 in this volume.

13. The qualification of 'state' or 'modification' is given by Deleuze 'in the sense of predicate, but as a status or a (public) aspect' (*TF* 117). Derivative forces are associated with the modification of substances through their states, 'they are taken in a mass and become elastic' (ibid.). The degree of change at every instant means that they are continually reconstituted.

14. Tarde's 'substitution of having for being, as a true inversion of metaphysics that issues directly from the monad' (*TF* 158) is significant to Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* (see *DR* 25, 307–8). In *The Fold*: 'The true opposite of the self is not the non-self, it is the *mine*; the true opposite of being, that is, the having, is not the non-being, but the *had*' (*TF* 110).

15. In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze sees Leibniz's predication as a matter of definition through synthesis, whereby its elements are not analogies of prior combinations: 'predicates *define* persons synthetically, and open different worlds and individualities to them as so many variables or possibilities' (*LS* 115). The implications of Deleuze's reading in *The Fold* on Leibniz's analytic reduction to the 'first terms' of the combinatorial is that this serves the 'opening' to variables or possibilities in view of how identities or primitive notions are inclusions, the power of which is explicated or unfolded through concepts.

16. The notion of the passive self Deleuze reads through Hume, constituted by the contraction of habits is a theory of individuation in close proximity to

that which Deleuze develops around monadic appurtenance: 'The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification – this term designating precisely the difference drawn. Finally one is only what one *has*: here, being is formed or the passive self *is*, by having' (*DR* 79). However this trajectory takes on a constructivist orientation as part of a reinvestment in transcendental empiricism through Hume. The critique is empirical when the point of view is immanent to the questioning of the constitution of the subject. As such Deleuze subscribes to a constructivism (see *H* 87).

17. This level of variation within the abstraction of the combinatorial is associated with the derivative forces, which differ from the primary forces of the monad in 'status' or 'aspect' in that they are instantaneous and many (*TF* 117).

18. Leibniz's inertial or 'natural' motion is not a state of forcelessness, but rather, a situation more aptly described as 'force changelessness'. Bernstein writes: 'it is not quite true to say that nothing happens when bodies move uniformly in a straight line (i.e. that there is no process) but rather that nothing *new* happens to alter the present series of changes' (Bernstein 1994, p. 279).

19. In his writing to Clarke replying to the criticisms of a Newtonian conception of space, Leibniz maintains, 'it is not so much the quantity of matter as its difficulty of giving place that makes resistance' (*L* 701). Therefore the principle of the limit is not in respect of filling space with the maximum quantity of matter but is rather through the repetition of the place of parts constituting the resistance of matter to absolute change of place.

20. Deleuze speaks about Leibniz's theory of the passive force of material resistance as a limit that generates an internal dynamic of state and 'expresses [the fold] in its pure state' (*TF* 36). A polarisation of fields of force is suggested by the reference he makes in this context to 'the lapse of magnetic fields after their causes' (*TF* 148).

21. Leibniz outlines the transition from dead to living force in 'Specimen Dynamicum', 1695. An 'elementary or infinitely small' impulsion, or 'solicitation' becomes the 'continuation or repetition of these elementary impulsions, that is, the impetus itself' (*L* 438). The latter is 'vis viva': 'ordinary force combined with actual motion' (ibid.). By virtue of the elastic force of a body, the living force 'arises from an infinite number of *continuous impressions* of dead force.' (ibid., emphasis added) Leibniz continues: 'I do not mean that these mathematical entities are really found in nature as such but merely that they are means of making accurate calculations of an abstract mental kind' (ibid.). By claiming the inseparability of the physical and the psychical calculi (i.e. the imitation of the former by the latter), which is at the same time an abstraction, Deleuze adheres to the notion of a psychic switch in state of perception through active and passive forces and the event of expression of the inner cause of the body.

22. The polarisation of the monad's internal state in terms of passive and active forces is the dynamical aspect of the mathematical distribution of a multiplicity. The physical and the psychical dimensions of the calculus are thus in parallel. See chapter 4 in this volume, where Duffy speaks about the change in sign of the differential relation from positive to negative or visa versa, as successive levels of the relation map the change of the path of curvature; the singularity associated with this is necessarily 'intrinsic' as it corresponds to the 'ambiguous sign'.

23. Under the terms of 'the play of the world [that] has changed in a unique way', the choice of the properties of inflexion no longer depends on a God but on pure process. Deleuze shows how a theory of synthesis particular to the monads bears upon modern mathematics: ''monads' test the paths in the universe and enter in syntheses associated with each path' (*TF* 81). The notion of paths that are *tested* can be seen in the context of problems that 'escape demonstration', an experimentation in which a performance of thresholds maintaining a 'baroque equilibrium or disequilibrium' informs the affective state of the whole in variation. For the discussion of 'capture of code' in relation to 'becoming', (TP 10). See also 'statements' and 'visibilities' of capture in the diagram read through Foucault, (F 67).

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4
Leibniz, Mathematics and the Monad

Simon Duffy

The reconstruction of Leibniz's metaphysics that Deleuze undertakes in *The Fold* provides a systematic account of the structure of Leibniz's metaphysics in terms of its mathematical foundations. However, in doing so, Deleuze draws not only upon the mathematics developed by Leibniz – including the law of continuity as reflected in the calculus of infinite series and the infinitesimal calculus – but also upon developments in mathematics made by a number of Leibniz's contemporaries – including Newton's method of fluxions. He also draws upon a number of subsequent developments in mathematics, the rudiments of which can be more or less located in Leibniz's own work – including the theory of functions and singularities, the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity, and Poincaré's theory of automorphic functions. Deleuze then retrospectively maps these developments back onto the structure of Leibniz's metaphysics. While the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity serves to clarify Leibniz's work, Poincaré's theory of automorphic functions offers a solution to overcome and extend the limits that Deleuze identifies in Leibniz's metaphysics. Deleuze brings this elaborate conjunction of material together in order to set up a mathematical idealisation of the system that he considers to be implicit in Leibniz's work. The result is a thoroughly mathematical explication of the structure of Leibniz's metaphysics. This essay is an exposition of the very mathematical underpinnings of this Deleuzian account of the structure of Leibniz's metaphysics, which, I maintain, subtends the entire text of *The Fold*.

Deleuze's project in *The Fold* is predominantly oriented by Leibniz's insistence on the metaphysical importance of mathematical speculation. What this suggests is that mathematics functions as an important heuristic in the development of Leibniz's metaphysical theories. Deleuze

puts this insistence to good use by bringing together the different aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics with the variety of mathematical themes that run throughout his work, principally the infinitesimal calculus. Those aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics that Deleuze undertakes to clarify in this way, and upon which this essay will focus, include the definition of the monad and the theory of compossibility. However, before providing the details of Deleuze's reconstruction of the structure of Leibniz's metaphysics, it will be necessary to give an introduction to Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus and to some of the other developments in mathematics associated with it.

Leibniz's law of continuity and the infinitesimal calculus

Leibniz was both a philosopher and a mathematician. His infinitesimal analysis encompassed the investigation of infinite sequences and series, the study of algebraic and transcendental curves and the operations of differentiation and integration upon them, and the solution of differential equations; integration and differentiation are the two fundamental operations of the infinitesimal calculus developed by him.

Leibniz applied the calculus primarily to problems about curves and the calculus of finite sequences, which had been used since antiquity to approximate the curve by a polygon in the Archimedean approach to geometrical problems by means of the method of exhaustion. In his early exploration of mathematics, Leibniz applied the theory of number sequences to the study of curves and showed that the differences and sums in number sequences correspond to tangents and quadratures respectively, and he developed the conception of the infinitesimal calculus by supposing the differences between the terms of these sequences infinitely small (See Bos 1974, p. 13). One of the keys to the calculus that Leibniz emphasised was to conceive the curve as an infinitangular polygon:

> I feel that this method and others in use up till now can all be deduced from a general principle which I use in measuring curvilinear figures, that a curvilinear figure must be considered to be the same as a polygon with infinitely many sides.
>
> (*GM* V 126)

Leibniz based his proofs for the infinitangular polygon on a law of continuity, which he formulated as follows: 'In any supposed transition, ending in any terminus, it is permissible to institute a general reasoning,

in which the final terminus may also be included' (Leibniz 1920, p. 147). Leibniz also thought the following to be a requirement for continuity: 'Two instances […] approach each other continuously [if] the difference between [the] two instances […] can be diminished until it becomes smaller than any given quantity whatever' (*L* 351). Leibniz used the adjective *continuous* for a variable ranging over an infinite sequence of values. In the infinite continuation of the polygon, its sides become infinitely small and its angles infinitely many. The infinitangular polygon is considered to coincide with the curve, the infinitely small sides of which, if prolonged, would form tangents to the curve; where a tangent is a straight line that touches a circle or curve at only one point. Leibniz applied the law of continuity to the tangents of curves as follows: he took the tangent to be continuous with, or as the limiting case (*terminus*) of the secant. To find a tangent is to draw a straight line joining two points of the curve – the secant – which are separated by an infinitely small distance or vanishing difference, which he called a differential. (*GM* V 223) The Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus was built upon the concept of the differential. The differential, *dx*, is the difference in *x* values between two consecutive values of the variable at P (See Figure 4.1), and the tangent is the line joining such points.

The differential relation, that is, the quotient between two differentials of the type *dy/dx*, serves in the determination of the gradient of the tangent to the circle or curve. The gradient of a tangent indicates the slope or rate of change of the curve at that point, that is, the rate

Figure 4.1   The tangent to the curve at P.

at which the curve changes on the *y*-axis relative to the *x*-axis. Leibniz thought of the *dy* and *dx* in *dy/dx* as 'infinitesimal' quantities. Thus *dx* was an infinitely small nonzero increment in *x* and *dy* was an infinitely small nonzero increment in *y*.

Leibniz brings together the definition of the differential as it operates in the calculus of infinite series, in regard to the infinitangular triangle, and the infinitesimal calculus, in regard to the determination of tangents to curves, as follows:

> Here *dx* means the element, that is, the (instantaneous) increment or decrement, of the (continually) increasing quantity *x*. It is also called difference, namely the difference between two proximate *x*'s which differ by an element (or by an unassaignable), the one originating from the other, as the other increases or decreases (momentaneously).
>
> (*GM* VII 223)

The differential can therefore be understood on the one hand, in relation to the calculus of infinite series as the infinitesimal difference between consecutive values of a continuously diminishing quantity, and on the other, in relation to the infinitesimal calculus as an infinitesimal quantity. The operation of the differential in the latter actually demonstrates the operation of the differential in the former, because the operation of the differential in the infinitesimal calculus in the determination of tangents to curves demonstrates that the infinitely small sides of the infinitangular polygon are continuous with the curve.

In one of his early mathematical manuscripts entitled 'Justification of the Infinitesimal Calculus by that of Ordinary Algebra', Leibniz offers an account of the infinitesimal calculus in relation to a particular geometrical problem that is solved using ordinary algebra (*L* 545). An outline of the demonstration that Leibniz gives is as follows (Figure 4.2):[1] since the two right triangles, ZFE and ZHJ, that meet at their apex, point Z, are similar, it follows that the ratio *y/x* is equal to *(Y – y)/X*. As the straight line EJ approaches point F, maintaining the same angle at the variable point Z, the lengths of the straight lines FZ and FE, or *y* and *x*, steadily diminish, yet the ratio of *y* to *x* remains constant. When the straight line EJ passes through F, the points E and Z coincide with F, and the straight lines, *y* and *x*, vanish. Yet *y* and *x* will not be absolutely nothing since they preserve the ratio of ZH to HJ, represented by the proportion *(Y – y)/X*, which in this case reduces to *Y/X*, and obviously does not equal zero. The relation *y/x* continues to exist even though the terms have vanished since the relation is determinable as equal to *Y/X*. In this

Figure 4.2　Leibniz's example of the infinitesimal calculus using ordinary algebra.

algebraic calculus, the vanished lines *x* and *y* are not taken for zeros since they still have an algebraic relation to each other. 'And so [Leibniz argues], they are treated as infinitesimals, exactly as one of the elements which […] differential calculus recognises in the ordinates of curves for momentary increments and decrements' (*L* 545). That is, the vanished lines *x* and *y* are determinable in relation to each other only insofar as they can be replaced by the infinitesimals *dy* and *dx*, by making the supposition that the ratio *y/x* is equal to the ratio of the infinitesimals, *dy/dx*. When the relation continues even though the terms of the relation have disappeared, a continuity has been constructed by algebraic means that is instructive of the operations of the infinitesimal calculus.

What Leibniz demonstrates in this example are the conditions according to which any unique triangle can be considered as the extreme case of two similar triangles opposed at the vertex. Deleuze argues that, in

the case of a figure in which there is only one triangle, the other triangle is there, but it is there only virtually (*CGD* 22 April 1980). The *virtual* triangle has not simply disappeared, but rather it has become unassignable, all the while remaining completely determined. The hypotenuse of the virtual triangle can be mapped as a side of the infinitangular polygon, which, if prolonged, forms a tangent line to the curve. There is therefore continuity from the polygon to the circle, just as there is continuity from two similar triangles opposed at the vertex to a single triangle. Hence this relation is fundamental for the application of differentials to problems about tangents.

In the first published account of the calculus, Leibniz defines the ratio of infinitesimals as the quotient of first-order differentials, or the associated differential relation. He says that 'the differential dx of the abscissa x is an arbitrary quantity, and that the differential dy of the ordinate y is defined as the quantity which is to dx as the ratio of the ordinate to the subtangent' (Boyer 1959, p. 210) (see Figure 4.1). Leibniz considers differentials to be the fundamental concepts of the infinitesimal calculus, the differential relation being defined in terms of these differentials.

Newton's method of fluxions and infinite series

Newton began thinking of the rate of change, or fluxion, of continuously varying quantities, which he called fluents such as lengths, areas, volumes, distances, temperatures, in 1665, which predates Leibniz by about ten years. Newton regarded his variables as generated by the continuous motion of points, lines, and planes, and offered an account of the fundamental problem of the calculus as follows: 'Given a relation between two fluents, find the relation between their fluxions, and conversely' (Newton 1736). Newton thinks of the two variables whose relation is given as changing with time, and, although he does point out that this is useful rather than necessary, it remains a defining feature of his approach and is exemplified in the geometrical reasoning about limits, which Newton was the first to come up with. Put simply, to determine the tangent to a curve at a specified point, a second point on the curve is selected, and the gradient of the line that runs through both of these points is calculated. As the second point approaches the point of tangency, the gradient of the line between the two points approaches the gradient of the tangent. The gradient of the tangent is, therefore, the limit of the gradient of the line between the two points as the points become increasingly close to one another (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3 Newton's geometrical reasoning about the gradient of a tangent as a limit.

He conceptualised the tangent geometrically, as the limit of a sequence of lines between two points, P and Q, on a curve, which is a secant. As the distance between the points approached zero, the secants became progressively smaller, however they always retained 'a real length'. The secant therefore approached the tangent without reaching it. When this distance 'got arbitrarily small (but remained a real number)' (Lakoff, Núñez 2000, p. 224), it was considered insignificant for practical purposes, and was ignored. What is different in Leibniz's method is that he 'hypothesized infinitely small numbers – infinitesimals – to designate the size of infinitely small intervals.' (ibid.) (See Figure 4.1) For Newton, on the contrary, these intervals remained only small, and therefore real. When performing calculations, however, both approaches yielded the same results. But they differed ontologically, because Leibniz had hypothesised a new kind of number, a number Newton did not need, since 'his secants always had a real length, while Leibniz's had an infinitesimal length' (ibid.). Leibniz's symbolism also treats quantities independently of their genesis, rather than as the product of an explicit functional relation.

Deleuze uses this distinction between the methods of Leibniz and Newton to characterise the mind–body distinction in Leibniz's account of the monad. Deleuze distinguishes according to the distinction canvassed earlier between the functional definition of the Newtonian fluxion and the Leibnizian infinitesimal as a concept. 'The physical mechanism of

bodies (fluxion) is not identical to the psychic mechanism of perception (differentials), but the latter resembles the former' (*TF* 98). So Deleuze maintains that 'Leibniz's calculus is adequate to psychic mechanics where Newton's is operative for physical mechanics' (ibid.), and here again draws from the mathematics of Leibniz's contemporaries to determine a distinction between the mind and body of a monad in Leibniz's metaphysics.

Both Newton and Leibniz are credited with developing the calculus as a new and general method, and with having appreciated that the operations in the new analysis are applicable to infinite series as well as to finite algebraic expressions. However, neither of them clearly understood nor rigorously defined their fundamental concepts. Newton thought his underlying methods were natural extensions of pure geometry, while Leibniz felt that the ultimate justification of his procedures lay in their effectiveness. For the next 200 years, various attempts were made to find a rigorous arithmetic foundation for the calculus; one that relied on neither the mathematical intuition of geometry, with its tangents and secants, (perceived as imprecise because its conception of limits was not properly understood); nor the vagaries of the infinitesimal, which cannot be justified either from the point of view of classical algebra or from the point of view of arithmetic; the latter made many mathematicians wary, so much so that they refused the hypothesis outright despite the fact that Leibniz 'could do calculus using arithmetic without geometry – by using infinitesimal numbers' (Lakoff, Núñez 2000, pp. 224–5).

The emergence of the concept of the function

Seventeenth-century analysis was a corpus of analytical tools for the study of geometric objects, the most fundamental object of which, (thanks to the development of a curvilinear mathematical physics by Huygens) was the curve, or curvilinear figures generally. The latter were understood to embody relations between several variable geometrical quantities defined with respect to a variable point on the curve. The variables of geometric analysis referred to geometric quantities, which were conceived not as real numbers, but rather as having a dimension: for example, 'the dimension of a line (e.g. ordinate, arc length, subtangent), of an area (e.g. the area between curve and axis) or of a solid (e.g. the solid of revolution)' (Bos 1974, p. 6). The relations between these variables were expressed by means of equations. Leibniz actually referred to these variable geometric quantities as the *functiones* of a

curve,[2] and thereby introduced the term 'function' into mathematics. However, it is important to note the absence of the fully developed concept of function in the Leibnizian context of algebraic relations between variables. Today, a function is understood to be a relation that uniquely associates members of one set with members of another set. For Leibniz, neither the equations nor the variables are functions in this modern sense, rather the relation between x and y was considered to be one entity. The curves were thought of as having a primary existence apart from any analysis of their numeric or algebraic properties. In seventeenth-century analysis, equations did not create curves, curves rather gave rise to equations (Dennis, Confrey 1995, p. 125). Thus the curve was not seen as a graph of a function but rather as 'a figure embodying the relation between x and y' (see Bos 1974, p. 6). In the first half of the eighteenth century, a shift of focus from the curve and the geometric quantities themselves to the formulas which expressed the relations among these quantities occurred, thanks in large part to the symbols introduced by Leibniz. The analytical expressions involving numbers and letters, rather than the geometric objects for which they stood, became the focus of interest. It was this change of focus towards the formula that made the emergence of the concept of function possible. In this process, the differential underwent a corresponding change; it lost its initial geometric connotations and came to be treated as a concept connected with formulas rather than with figures.

With the emergence of the concept of the function, the differential was replaced by the derivative, which is the expression of the differential relation as a function, first developed in the work of Euler. One significant difference, reflecting the transition from a geometric analysis to an analysis of functions and formulas, is that the infinitesimal sequences are no longer induced by an infinitangular polygon standing for a curve, according to the law of continuity as reflected in the infinitesimal calculus, but by a function, defined as a set of ordered pairs of real numbers.

Subsequent developments in mathematics: The problem of rigour

The concept of the function however did not immediately resolve the problem of rigour in the calculus. It was not until the late nineteenth century that an adequate solution to this problem was found. It was Karl Weierstrass who 'developed a pure nongeometric arithmetization for Newtonian calculus' (Lakoff, Núñez 2000, p. 230), which provided the

rigour that had been lacking. The Weierstrassian programme determined that the fate of calculus need not be tied to infinitesimals, and could rather be given a rigorous status from the point of view of finite representations. Weierstrass's theory was an updated version of an earlier account by Augustin Cauchy, which had also experienced problems conceptualising limits.

It was Cauchy who insisted on specific tests for the convergence of series, so that divergent series could henceforth be excluded from being used to try to solve problems of integration because of their propensity to lead to false results (see Boyer 1959, p. 287). Extending sums to an infinite number of terms caused problems to emerge if the series did not converge, since the sum or limit of an infinite series is only determinable if the series converges. It was considered that reckoning with divergent series, which have no sum, would therefore lead to false results.

Weierstrass considered Cauchy to have actually begged the question of the concept of limit in his proof.[3] In order to overcome this problem of conceptualising limits, Weierstrass 'sought to eliminate all geometry from the study of […] derivatives and integrals in calculus' (Lakoff, Núñez 2000, p. 309). In order to characterise calculus purely in terms of arithmetic, it was necessary for the idea of a curve in the Cartesian plane defined in terms of the motion of a point, to be completely replaced with the idea of a function. The geometric idea of 'approaching a limit' had to be replaced by an arithmetised concept of limit that relied on static logical constraints on numbers alone. This approach is commonly referred to as the epsilon-delta method (see Potter 2004, p. 85). The calculus was thereby reformulated without either geometric secants and tangents or infinitesimals; only the real numbers were used.

Because there is no reference to infinitesimals in this Weierstrassian definition of the calculus, the designation 'the infinitesimal calculus' was considered to be 'inappropriate' (Boyer 1959, p. 287). Weierstrass's work not only effectively removed any remnants of geometry from what was now referred to as the differential calculus, but it eliminated the use of the Leibnizian-inspired infinitesimals in doing the calculus for over half a century. It was not until the late 1960s, with the development of the controversial axioms of non-standard analysis by Abraham Robinson, that the infinitesimal was given a rigorous foundation (see Bell 1998), thus allowing the inconsistencies to be removed from the Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus without removing the infinitesimals themselves.[4] Leibniz's ideas about the role of the infinitesimal in the calculus have therefore been be 'fully vindicated' (Robinson 1996, p. 2), as Newton's had been thanks to Weierstrass.[5]

In response to these developments, Deleuze brings renewed scrutiny to the relationship between the developments in the history of mathematics and the metaphysics associated with these developments, which were marginalised as a result of efforts to determine the rigorous foundations of the calculus. This is a part of Deleuze's broader project of constructing an alternative lineage in the history of philosophy that tracks the development of a series of metaphysical schemes that respond to and attempt to deploy the concept of the infinitesimal. The aim of the project is to construct a philosophy of difference as an alternative speculative logic that subverts a number of the commitments of the Hegelian dialectical logic which supported the elimination of the infinitesimal in favour of the operation of negation, the procedure of which postulates the synthesis of a series of contradictions in the determination of concepts.[6]

The theory of singularities

Another development in mathematics, the rudiments of which can be found in the work of Leibniz is the theory of singularities. A singularity or singular point is a mathematical concept that appears with the development of the theory of functions, which historians of mathematics consider to be one of the first major mathematical concepts upon which the development of modern mathematics depends. Even though the theory of functions does not actually take shape until later in the eighteenth century, it is in fact Leibniz who contributes greatly to this development. Indeed, it was Leibniz who developed the first theory of singularities in mathematics, and, Deleuze argues, it is with Leibniz that the concept of singularity becomes a mathematico-philosophical concept. (*CGD* 29 April 1980) However, before explaining what is philosophical in the concept of singularity for Leibniz, it is necessary to offer an account of what he considers singularities to be in mathematics, and of how this concept was subsequently developed in the theory of analytic functions, which is important for Deleuze's account of (in)compossibility in Leibniz, despite it not being developed until long after Leibniz's death.

The great mathematical discovery that Deleuze refers to is that singularity is no longer thought of in relation to the universal, but rather in relation to the ordinary or the regular (*CGD* 29 April 1980). In classical logic, the singular was thought of with reference to the universal, however that does not necessarily exhaust the concept since in mathematics, the singular is distinct from or exceeds the ordinary or

regular. Mathematics refers to the singular and the ordinary in terms of the points of a curve, or more generally concerning complex curves or figures. A curve, a curvilinear surface, or a figure includes singular points and others that are regular or ordinary. Therefore, the relation between singular and ordinary or regular points is a function of curvilinear problems which can be determined by means of the Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus.

The differential relation is used to determine the overall shape of a curve primarily by determining the number and distribution of its singular points or singularities, which are defined as points of articulation where the shape of the curve changes or alters its behaviour. For example, when the differential relation is equal to zero, the gradient of the tangent at that point is horizontal, indicating, for example, that the curve peaks or dips, determining therefore a maximum or minimum at that point. These singular points are known as stationary or turning points.

The differential relation characterises not only the singular points which it determines, but also the nature of the regular points in the immediate neighbourhood of these points, that is, the shape of the branches of the curve on either side of each singular point. Where the differential relation gives the value of the gradient at the singular point, the value of the second-order differential relation, that is if the differential relation is itself differentiated and which is now referred to as the second derivative, indicates the rate at which the gradient is changing at that point. This allows a more accurate approximation of the shape of the curve in the neighbourhood of that point.

Leibniz referred to the stationary points as *maxima* and *minima* depending on whether the curve was concave up or down respectively. A curve is concave up where the second-order differential relation is positive and concave down where the second-order differential relation is negative. The points on a curve that mark a transition between a region where the curve is concave up and one where it is concave down are points of inflexion. The second-order differential relation will be zero at an inflexion point. Deleuze distinguishes a point of inflexion, as an intrinsic singularity, from the *maxima* and *minima*, as extrinsic singularities, on the grounds that the former 'does not refer to coordinates [but rather] corresponds' to what Leibniz calls an 'ambiguous sign' (*TF* 15), that is, where concavity changes, the sign of the second-order differential relation changes from + to –, or vice versa.

The value of the third-order differential relation indicates the rate at which the second-order differential relation is changing at that point.

Figure 4.4   The singular points of a curve.

In fact, the more successive orders of the differential relation that can be evaluated at the singular point, the more accurate the approximation of the shape of the curve in the 'immediate' neighbourhood of that point. Leibniz even provided a formula for the nth-order differential relation, as n approaches infinity. The nth-order differential relation at the point of inflexion would determine the continuity of the variable curvature in the immediate neighbourhood of the inflexion with the curve. Because the point of inflexion is where the tangent crosses the curve (see Figure 4.4) and the point where the nth-order differential relation is continuous with the curve, Deleuze characterises the point of inflexion as a *point-fold*; which is the trope that unifies a number of the themes and elements of *The Fold*.[7]

Subsequent developments in mathematics: Weierstrass and Poincaré

The important development in mathematics, the rudiments of which Deleuze considers to be in Leibniz's work and that he retrospectively maps back onto Leibniz's account of (in)compossibility is the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity. The Leibnizian method of approximation using successive orders of the differential relation is formalised in the calculus according to Weierstrass's theory by a Taylor series or power series expansion. A power series expansion can be written as a polynomial, the coefficients of each of its terms being the successive derivatives evaluated at the singular point. The sum of such a

series represents the expanded function provided that any remainder approaches zero as the number of terms becomes infinite; the polynomial then becomes an infinite series which converges with the function in the neighbourhood of the singular point.[8] This criterion of convergence repeats Cauchy's earlier exclusion of divergent series from the calculus. A power series operates at each singular point by successively determining the specific qualitative nature of the function at that point, that is, the shape and behaviour of the graph of the function or curve. The power series determines not only the nature of the function at the point in question, but also the nature of all of the regular points in the neighbourhood of that singular point, such that the specific qualitative nature of a function in the neighbourhood of a singular point insists in that one point. By examining the relation between the differently distributed singular points determined by the differential relation, the regular points which are continuous between the singular points can be determined, which in geometrical terms are the branches of the curve. In general, the power series converges with a function by generating a continuous branch of a curve in the neighbourhood of a singular point. To the extent that all of the regular points are continuous across all of the different branches generated by the power series of the singular points, the entire complex curve or the whole analytic function is generated.

The mathematical elements of this interpretation are most clearly developed by Weierstrassian analysis, according to the theorem on the approximation of analytic functions. According to Weierstrass, for any continuous analytic function on a given interval, or domain, there exists a power series expansion which uniformly converges to this function on the given domain. Given that a power series approximates a function in such a restricted domain, the task is then to determine other power series expansions that approximate the same function in other domains. An analytic function is differentiable at each point of its domain, and is essentially defined, for Weierstrass, from the neighbourhood of a singular point by a power series expansion which is convergent with a 'circle of convergence' around that point. A power series expansion that is convergent in such a circle represents a function that is analytic at each point in the circle. By taking a point interior to the first circle as a new centre, and by determining the values of the coefficients of this new series using the function generated by the first series, a new series and a new centre of convergence are obtained, whose circle of convergence overlaps the first. The new series is continuous with the first if the values of the function coincide in the common part of

the two circles. This method of 'analytic continuity' allows the gradual construction of a whole domain over which the generated function is continuous. At the points of the new circle of convergence which are exterior to, or extend outside the first, the function represented by the second series is then the analytic continuation of the function defined by the first series; this is defined by Weierstrass as the analytic continuation of a power series expansion outside its circle of convergence. The domain of the function is extended by the successive adjunction of more and more circles of convergence. Each series expansion which determines a circle of convergence is called an element of the function. In this way, given an element of an analytic function, by analytic continuation one can obtain the entire analytic function over an extended domain. The domain of the successive adjunction of circles of convergence, as determined by analytic continuity, actually has the structure of a surface. The analytic continuation of power series expansions can be continued in this way in all directions up to the points in the immediate neighbourhood exterior to the circles of convergence where the series obtained diverge.

Power series expansions diverge at specific 'singular points' or 'singularities' that may arise in the process of analytic continuity. A singular point or singularity of an analytic function, as with a curve, is any point which is not a regular or ordinary point of the function or curve. They are points which exhibit remarkable properties and thereby have a dominating and exceptional role in the determination of the characteristics of the function, or shape and behaviour of the curve. The singular points of a function, which include the stationary points, where $dy/dx = 0$, and points of inflexion, where $d^2y/dx^2 = 0$, are 'removable singular points', since the power series at these points converge with the function. A removable singular point is uniformly determined by the function and therefore redefinable as a singular point of the function, such that the function is analytic or continuous at that point. The specific singularities of an analytic function where the series obtained diverge are called 'poles'. Singularities of this kind are those points where the function no longer satisfies the conditions of regularity which assure its local continuity, such that the rule of analytic continuity breaks down. They are therefore points of discontinuity. A singularity is called a pole of a function when the values of the differential relation, that is, the gradients of the tangents to the points of the function, approach infinity as the function approaches the pole. The function is said to be asymptotic to the pole, it is therefore no longer differentiable at that point, but rather remains undefined, or vanishes. A pole is therefore the limit point of

a function. The poles that arise in the process of analytic continuity necessarily lie on the boundaries of the circles of convergence of power series. The effective domain of an analytic function determined by the process of the analytic continuation of power series expansions is therefore limited to that between its poles. The poles of the two discontinuous analytic functions are non-removable, thus analytic continuity between the two functions is not able to be established.

This is the extent of the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity that Deleuze retrospectively maps onto Leibniz's theory of singularities and that he deploys in his account of Leibnizian incompossibility, which is explicated in the following section. A singularity is a distinctive point on a curve in the neighbourhood of which the second-order differential relation changes its sign. This characteristic of the singular point is extended into or is continuous with the series of ordinary points that depend on it, all the way to the neighbourhood of subsequent singularities. It is for this reason that Deleuze maintains that the theory of singularities is inseparable from a theory or an activity of continuity, where continuity, or the continuous, is the extension of a singular point into the ordinary points up to the neighbourhood of the subsequent singularity. And it is for this reason that Deleuze considers the rudiments of the Weierstrassian theory to be in the work of Leibniz, and that it is therefore able to be retrospectively mapped back onto the work of Leibniz.

Weierstrass did recognise a means of solving the problem of the discontinuity between the poles of analytic functions by postulating a potential function, the parameters of the domain of which is determined by the poles of the two discontinuous analytic functions, and by extending his analysis to meromorphic functions.[9] A function is said to be meromorphic in a domain if it is analytic in the domain determined by the poles of analytic functions. A meromorphic function is determined by the quotient of two arbitrary analytic functions, which have been determined independently on the same surface by the point-wise operations of Weierstrassian analysis. Such a function is defined by the differential relation:

$$\frac{dy}{dx} - \frac{Y}{X}$$

Figure 4.5   The meromorphic function.

where X and Y are the polynomials, or power series of the two local functions. The meromorphic function is the differential relation of

the function between the two discontinuous analytic functions. The expansion of the power series determined by the repeated differentiation of the meromorphic function generates the graph of a composite function that consists of curves with infinite branches, because the series generated by the expansion of the meromorphic function is divergent. The representation of such curves however posed a problem for Weierstrass, which he was unable to resolve, because divergent series fall outside the parameters of the differential calculus, as determined by the epsilon-delta approach, since they defy the criterion of convergence.

Henri Poincaré took up this problem of the representation of composite functions, by extending the Weierstrassian theory of meromorphic functions into what was called 'the qualitative theory of differential equations', or theory of automorphic functions (Kline 1972, p. 732). While such divergent series do not converge to a function, in the Weierstrassian sense, they may indeed furnish a useful approximation to a function if they can be said to represent the function asymptotically. When such a series is asymptotic to the function, it can represent an analytic or composite function even though the series is divergent. The determination of a composite function requires the determination of a new singularity in relation to the poles of the local functions of which it is composed. Poincaré called this new kind of singularity an essential singularity. Poincaré distinguished four types of essential singularity, which he classified according to the behaviour of the function and the geometrical appearance of the solution curves in the neighbourhood of these points: the saddle point or dip (col); the node (nœud); the point of focus (foyer); and, the centre (Barrow-Green 1997, p. 32; *DR* 177). Singularities develop increasingly complex relations with the increasing complexity of curves. The subsequent developments that the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity undergoes, up to and including Poincaré's theory of automorphic functions, is the material that Deleuze draws upon to offer a solution to overcome and extend the limits of Leibniz's metaphysics. The details of this critical move on Deleuze's part are examined in the final section of the essay.

Deleuze's 'Leibnizian' interpretation of the theory of compossibility

What then does Deleuze mean by claiming that Leibniz determines the singularity in the domain of mathematics as a philosophical concept? A crucial test for Deleuze's mathematical reconstruction of Leibniz's metaphysics is how to deal with his subject-predicate logic.

Deleuze maintains that Leibniz's mathematical account of continuity is reconcilable with the relation between the concept of a subject and its predicates. The solution that Deleuze proposes involves demonstrating that the continuity characteristic of the infinitesimal calculus is isomorphic to the series of predicates contained in the concept of a subject. An explanation of this isomorphism requires an explication of Deleuze's understanding of Leibniz's account of predication as determined by the principle of sufficient reason.

For Leibniz, every proposition can be expressed in subject-predicate form. The subject of any proposition is a complete individual substance that is a simple, indivisible, dimensionless metaphysical point or monad. Of this subject it can be said that 'every analytic proposition is true', where an analytical proposition is one in which the predicate is identical with the subject. Deleuze suggests that if this principle of identity is reversed, such that it reads: 'every true proposition is necessarily analytic', then this amounts to a formulation of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason (*CGD* 15 April 1980). According to this principle each time a true proposition is formulated, it must be understood to be analytic, that is, every true proposition is a statement of identity whose predicate is wholly contained in its subject. It follows that if a proposition is true, then the predicate must be either reciprocal with the subject or contained in the concept of the subject. That is, everything that happens to, everything that can be attributed to, everything that is predicated of a subject – past, present and future – must be contained in the concept of the subject. So for Leibniz, all predicates, that is, the predicates that express all of the states of the world, are contained in the concept of each and every particular or singular subject.

There are however grounds to distinguish truths of reason or essence, from truths of fact or existence. An example of a truth of essence would be the proposition 2+2=4, which is *analytic*, therefore, there is an identity of the predicate, 2+2, with the subject, 4. This can be proved by analysis, that is, in a finite or limited number of quite determinate operations, it can be demonstrated that 4, by virtue of its definition, and 2+2, by virtue of their definition, are identical. So, the identity of the predicate with the subject in an analytic proposition can be demonstrated in a finite series of determinate operations. While 2+2=4 occurs in all time and in all places, and is therefore a necessary truth, the proposition that 'Adam sinned', is specifically dated, that is, Adam will sin in a particular place at a particular time. It is therefore a truth of existence, and as we shall see, a contingent truth. According to the principle of sufficient reason, the proposition 'Adam sinned' must be analytic. If we

pass from one predicate to another to retrace all the causes and follow up all the effects, this would involve the entire series of predicates contained in the subject Adam, that is, the analysis would extend to infinity. So, in order to demonstrate the inclusion of 'sinner' in the concept of 'Adam,' an infinite series of operations is required. However, we are not capable of completing such an analysis to infinity.

While Leibniz is committed to the idea of potential 'syncategorematic' infinity, that is, to infinite pluralities such as the terms of an infinite series which are indefinite or unlimited, he ultimately accepted that in the realm of quantity infinity could in no way be construed as a unified whole by us. As Bassler clearly explains: 'So if we ask how many terms there are in an infinite series, the answer is not: an infinite number (if we take this either to mean a magnitude which is infinitely larger than a finite magnitude or a largest magnitude) but rather: more than any given finite magnitude' (Bassler 1998, p. 65). The performance of such an analysis is indefinite both for us, as finite human beings, because our understanding is limited, and for God, since there is no end of the analysis, that is, it is unlimited. However, all the elements of the analysis are given to God in an actual infinity. We cannot grasp the actual infinite, nor reach it via an indefinite intuitive process. It is only accessible for us via finite systems of symbols that approximate it. The infinitesimal calculus provides us with an 'artifice' to operate a well-founded approximation of what happens in God's understanding. We can approach God's understanding thanks to the operation of infinitesimal calculus, without ever actually reaching it. While Leibniz always distinguished philosophical truths and mathematical truths, Deleuze maintains that the idea of infinite analysis in metaphysics has 'certain echoes' in the calculus of infinitesimal analysis in mathematics. The infinite analysis that we perform as human beings in which sinner is contained in the concept of Adam is an indefinite analysis, just as if the terms of the series that includes sinner were isometric with $1/2+1/4+1/8$, etc., to infinity. In truths of essence, the analysis is finite, whereas in truths of existence, the analysis is infinite under the above-mentioned conditions of a well-determined finitude.

So what distinguishes truths of essence from truths of existence is that a truth of essence is such that its contrary is contradictory and therefore impossible, that is, it is impossible for 2 and 2 not to equal 4. Just as the identity of 4 and $2+2$ can be proved in a series of finite procedures, so too can the contrary, $2+2$ not equalling 4, be proved to be contradictory and therefore impossible. While it is impossible to think what $2+2$ not equalling 4 or a squared circle may be, it is possible to think of an

Adam who might not have sinned. Truths of existence are therefore contingent truths. A world in which Adam might not have sinned is a logically possible world, that is, the contrary is not necessarily contradictory. While the relation between Adam sinner and Adam non-sinner is a relation of contradiction since it is impossible that Adam is both sinner and non-sinner, Adam non-sinner is not contradictory with the world where Adam sinned, it is rather incompossible with such a world. Deleuze argues that to be incompossible is therefore not the same as to be contradictory, it is another kind of relation that exceeds the contradiction.[10] Deleuze characterises the relation of incompossibility as 'a difference and not a negation' (*TF* 150). Incompossibility conserves a very classical principle of disjunction: it is either this world or some other one. So, when analysis extends to infinity, the type or mode of inclusion of the predicate in the subject is compossiblity. What interests Leibniz at the level of truths of existence is not the identity of the predicate and the subject, but rather the process of passing from one predicate to another from the point of view of an infinite analysis, and it is this process that is characterised by Leibniz as having the maximum of continuity. While truths of essence are governed by the principle of identity, truths of existence are governed by the law of continuity.

Rather than discovering the identical at the end or limit of a finite series, infinite analysis substitutes the point of view of continuity for that of identity. There is continuity when the extrinsic case, for example, the circle, the unique triangle or the predicate, can be considered as included in the concept of the intrinsic case, that is, the infinitangular polygon, the virtual triangle, or the concept of the subject. The domain of incompossibility is therefore a domain different from that of the identity/contradiction. There is no logical identity between sinner and Adam, but there is a continuity. Two elements are in continuity when an infinitely small or vanishing difference is able to be assigned between these two elements. Here Deleuze shows in what way truths of existence are reducible to mathematical truths.

Deleuze offers a 'Leibnizian' interpretation of the difference between compossibility and incompossibility 'based only on divergence or convergence of series' (*TF* 150). He proposes the hypothesis that there is compossibility between two singularities when their 'series of ordinaries converge', that is, when the values of the 'series of regular points that derive from two singularities […] coincide, otherwise there is discontinuity. In one case, you have the definition of compossibility, in the other case, the definition of incompossibility' (*CGD* 29 April 1980). If the series of ordinary or regular points that derive from singularities

diverge, then you have a discontinuity. When the series diverge, when you can no longer compose the continuity of this world with the continuity of this other world, then it can no longer belong to the same world. There are therefore as many worlds as divergences. All worlds are possible, but they are incompossibles with each other. God conceives an infinity of possible worlds that are not compossible with each other, from which He chooses the best of possible worlds, which happens to be the world in which Adam sinned. A world is therefore defined by its continuity. What separates two incompossible worlds is the fact that there is discontinuity between the two worlds. It is in this way that Deleuze maintains that compossibility and incompossibility are the direct consequences of the theory of singularities.

Overcoming the limits of Leibniz's metaphysics

When Deleuze makes the comment that '[t]he differential relation thus acquires a new meaning, since it expresses the analytical extension of one series into another, and no more the unity of converging series that would not diverge in the least from each other' (*TF* 8), this should be understood in relation to what is presented in this essay as the Weierstrassian development of the meromorphic function as a differential relation. Poincaré's subsequent development of the Weierstrassian meromorphic function means that a continuity can be established across divergent series. What this means is that the Leibnizian account of compossibility as the unity of convergent series, which relies on the exclusion of divergence, is no longer required by the mathematics. The mathematical idealisation has therefore exceeded the metaphysics, so, in keeping with Leibniz's insistence on the metaphysical importance of mathematical speculation, the metaphysics requires recalibration. Leibniz's metaphysics is limited by the part–whole or one–multiple structure according to which this unity of convergent series is fundamentally determined, whether in terms of the one monad containing the infinite series of predicates which express all of the states of the world, as determined by the principle of sufficient reason; or in terms of one God establishing the harmony of a multiplicity of monads, as determined by the pre-established harmony.

What Poincaré's theory of automorphic functions does is offer a way for the part–whole structure of Leibniz's metaphysics to be problematised and overcome. Post Poincaré, the infinite series of states of the world is no longer contained in each monad. There is no pre-established harmony. The continuity of the states of the actual world and the

discrimination between what is compossible and what is incompossible with this world is no longer pre-determined. The logical possibilities of all incompossible worlds are now real possibilities, all of which have the potential to be actualised by monads as states of the current world. As Deleuze argues 'To the degree that the world is now made up of divergent series (the chaosmos), [...] the monad is now unable to contain the entire world as if in a closed circle that can be modified by projection' (*TF* 137). So while the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity is retrospectively mappable onto the Leibnizian account of the unity of convergent series, the subsequent developments by Poincaré provide a solution that can be understood to overcome the explicit limits of Leibniz's metaphysics. It is these aspects of Deleuze's project in *The Fold* that foreshadow the 'new Baroque and Neo-Leibnizianism' (*TF* 136) that Deleuze explores elsewhere in his body of work – the mathematical account of which is offered most explicitly in *Difference and Repetition*.

Notes

1. The lettering has been changed to reflect more directly the isomorphism between this algebraic example and Leibniz's notation for the infinitesimal calculus.
2. Leibniz, 'Methodus tangentium inversa, seu de fuctionibus' (1673), see Katz (2007, p. 199), seu de fuctionibus' (1673), see Katz (2007, p. 199).
3. For an account of this problem with limits in Cauchy, see Potter (2004, pp. 85–6).
4. The infinitesimal is now considered to be a hyperreal number that exists in a cloud of other infinitesimals or hyperreals floating infinitesimally close to each real number on the hyperreal number line (Bell 2005, 262). The development of non-standard analysis however has not broken the stranglehold of classical analysis to any significant extent, however this seems to be more a matter of taste and practical utility rather than of necessity (Potter 2004, p. 85).
5. Non-standard analysis allows 'interesting reformulations, more elegant proofs and new results in, for instance, differential geometry, topology, calculus of variations, in the theories of functions of a complex variable, of normed linear spaces, and of topological groups' (Bos 1974, p. 81).
6. For a more extensive discussion of this aspect of Deleuze's project, see Duffy (2006a).
7. In addition to several mathematical examples of the inflexion as a *point-fold*, including the transformations of René Thom and the continuously deferred inflexion of the Koch curve (*TF* 16–7), Deleuze offers an example drawn from baroque architecture, according to which an inflexion serves to hide or round out the right angle, which is figured in the Gothic arch that has the geometrical shape of an ogive.

8. For a more extensive account of Deleuze's deployment of the Weierstrassian theory of analytic continuity and the role of power series, see Duffy (2006b).

9. It was Charles A. A. Briot and Jean-Claude Bouquet who introduced the term 'meromorphic' for a function which possessed just poles in that domain (Kline 1972, p. 642).

10. Deleuze characterises this as 'vice-diction' (*TF* 59).

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5
Perception, Justification and Transcendental Philosophy

Gary Banham

> A Leibnizian transcendental philosophy, which bears on the event rather than the phenomenon, replaces Kantian conditioning by means of a double operation of transcendental actualization and realization (animism and materialism).
>
> —(*TF* 120)

The discussion of the nature of transcendental philosophy has a long and intricate history. The reception of and response to Kant has a prominent role in this history, not least because the conception of 'transcendental philosophy' while not perhaps conceptually originating with Kant, certainly has a nominal origin with him.[1] In relation to the reception of Kant, while a number of distinct problems have received differential priority at various times, the question of the structure of the transcendental deduction and the nature of 'transcendental arguments' have received in recent years particular attention.[2] While the epigraph above from *The Fold* does not refer to transcendental deduction in particular in its contrast of a Leibnizian transcendental philosophy to a Kantian one, it is in relation to this that I will be presenting my response to its overall argument for the view that Leibniz is a transcendental philosopher.

The rationale for this decision is that while the statement to the effect that Leibniz is a transcendental philosopher is given at the close of Chapter 8 of *The Fold*, it is in Chapter 7 that Deleuze effectively reconstitutes the basis of a transcendental deduction in Leibniz. I will here revisit and evaluate the nature of the argument presented in Chapter 7, an argument that touches on the Leibnizian view of perception. The basic argument, it will be suggested, is intended to be understood as an

alternative to the one set out by Kant in his transcendental deduction. In order for it to be seen this way however, we will first need to remind ourselves of some key elements of Kant's transcendental deduction. After doing this we will uncover that not only is the argument reconstituted by Deleuze as one that is an alternative to Kant's, but it is an alternative that changes the terms that are presented as relevant for the task of a transcendental deduction, not merely one that alters the order of argumentation.

Kant's transcendental deduction

While Kant's transcendental deduction has been subjected to a variety of readings that have emphasised sharply different aspects of its argument, there are some parts of it that have to be accounted for in any view of its task, regardless of views concerning its success or failure as an argument. Firstly, Kant views the deduction as a question of right: *quid juris* (Kant 2003, A84–5/B116–17, henceforth '*CPR*'). The question in these terms concerns the right by which we employ certain concepts, namely the concepts of pure understanding, in experience. These concepts are otherwise known as the categories. This question of the right by which the pure concepts are used however, only becomes interesting when we are reminded of the character of the concepts in question. Another way of describing the pure concepts is as concepts that are *a priori*, that is, that are completely independent of experience. Once we remember this point, we can focus the question of the deduction somewhat more fully: 'The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate *a priori* to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction' (*CPR* A85/B117).

The nature of the pure concepts being thus further described, we have encountered a problem that justifies asking by what right do we employ them in experience, namely the problem of how concepts that do not arise from experience of objects nonetheless relate to the objects that are given in experience. In elucidating this question Kant reminds us of the distinction between the matter of experience (which concerns sensation) and its form, and in so doing he distinguishes his enquiry from that of Locke who had a parallel problem concerning the relation between particular perceptions and universal concepts. Kant's difference from Locke concerns the claim that the universal concepts do not arise from experience and he states of them that: 'they speak of objects through predicates not of intuition and sensibility but of pure *a priori* thought, they relate to objects universally, that is, apart from all

conditions of sensibility' (*CPR* A88/B120). Here Kant is sharper in defining the basis of his claim that the pure concepts are *a priori* through reference to one of the criteria for the *a priori*: universality.[3] So it is a justification of universal judgements that is at issue and these universal judgments are ones that 'speak of' objects and it is this 'speaking' that requires justification. Another way of expressing this point is given when Kant says that what the deduction has to show is 'how *subjective conditions of thought* can have *objective validity*', a problem treated by him as equivalent to the question of how such conditions describe 'the possibility of all knowledge of objects' (*CPR* A90/ B122).

So to summarise: the problem of the transcendental deduction in Kant's terms concerns a set of concepts that have special conditions in that they do not derive *from* experience of objects yet have a relation *to* the experience of objects. The concepts in question are described further as *a priori* and one of the two crucial elements of this notion is that it entails that the concepts in question have universal applicability despite apparently only emerging from thought itself. This peculiar connection between concepts and objects is then finally treated as providing us with an understanding of how it is that we have knowledge of objects at all, thus these concepts have an important double modality as being both necessary for us and also providing the conditions of possibility for objects. Having thus clarified the tasks that Kant outlines as necessary to be performed by the argument of the transcendental deduction I will now turn to how, by contrast, Deleuze articulates the basis of an argument that I will subsequently suggest is presented as a Leibnizian alternative to the Kantian transcendental deduction.

Deleuze's reconstruction of the conditions of Leibniz's argument concerning perception

In Chapter 7 of *The Fold* Deleuze assesses the rationale Leibniz provides for the view that 'I *must* have a body'. Stated in the form of an imperative necessity, we see immediately two connections to the themes of Kant's transcendental deduction. There is here something that involves a prescription, hence a normative requirement and as such is the subject of a deduction, an argument purporting to justify it. Secondly, this justification is not of one element among others but of something primary. The primacy does not apparently pertain, as it did for Kant, to something conceptual and formal but rather to something physical and material. Hence the nature of the question this poses is different in terms of that which is engaged with, but the need for the question and

its answer is of the same order as Kant's. The deductive strategy requires the address of a justification of that which is primary. As this primary something is of a material and sensory nature, we have a mixture that Kant subsequently termed an 'amphiboly'.[4]

The argument that Deleuze traces in this chapter has many intricacies but two basic nodes. The first involves the move from the obscurity of an object within the mind to the need for a body. The second, by contrast, involves a move from a clear zone of expression that is favoured by the mind to a requirement for a body. While these two nodes seem initially at variance, it will become clear that they harmonise.

Prior to presenting the view that this argument is a kind of transcendental deduction, we need an outline of how the argument is reconstructed by Deleuze. The argument turns on the analysis of monads. This is hardly surprising since the model of the mind (at least in Leibniz's later stages and in those that have become classical) is formed by means of assessment of the monad. In understanding the monad we naturally begin with the primary datum that is given to it by Leibniz and that would be the element that would be allowed by even those who conceive of the mind in the most basic way, that is, even by phenomenalists. This basic datum would simply be perception. There is always something perceived and it is the act of such perceiving that is basic to the view that there exists a monad or mind-like simple entity. If we stay at this level for a moment we will note that there must be more than one perception, that is, in some sense a multiple experience of discretely different impressions, noted as being received, noted at least in the sense that something (however obscure) is registered.

The type of register that is involved would be at the minimal level necessarily of a sort that would not permit more than a state of affection, a state that is, in which a feeling is given and this feeling is a stimulus to something, even if the something is merely the crudest pain or the slightest pleasure. These perceptions are what Leibniz terms, in the *New Essays*, *Petites Perceptions* or 'little perceptions'. They have two significant characteristics. One is that while they are sensible and provide stimuli in some sense, their basic elements are received at the very edge of insensibility. The edge of insensibility is denoted here, as the obscurity of what is given is *almost* complete. However, despite being at this edge of insensibility, the particular perceptions stand in relation to each other such that the promptings or excitations of each one are connected both to prior impressions and subsequent ones following a law of continuity. The connection of these impressions with each other

is the first thing that is obscure in the argument but it is clearly affirmed in Deleuze's reconstruction as a requirement of the assessment of perception: 'Tiny perceptions are as much the passage from one perception to another as they are components of each perception' (*TF* 87).

Without, at this point, doing more than attending to the understanding of the perceptive state itself (leaving aside wider metaphysical points for now), the relation of the perceptual elements to each other, even though each is at the edge of insensibility, is part of a generalised comprehension of perception as involving what Leibniz terms in 'The Monadology' 'appetite' (*L* 644). This notion of 'appetite' at any rate provides the connection between a present state of stimulation and a future one with the futural state understood as a kind of anticipation that the monad has at any moment with regard to the next. Since, however, the anticipation involves some contact with the present near-edge of stimulation, this present edge is not merely 'big with future' but the future-edge is also inclusive of the past-point. This can be put more clearly by stating that perception, even at its most liminal level, is not purely of the existent excitation, as the latter is part of an ongoing state and this ongoing state involves the relation of the monad to the element expected to grow out of what is present. This expectation includes however also a protention such that the previous state lingers in the present one, as something whose trace is still given in it.

We are confronted with the following question at this stage of the analysis. How do we move from the edge of insensibility, from which something is experienced (where the nature of the experience is almost completely obscure) to the point where a conscious perception occurs (apperception that is conspicuous). How, in other words, do perceptions happen in a manner that permits their distinction not merely to be dully and obscurely felt but rather expressed, understood and thought?

When Leibniz's question is posed at this level, namely – how does it occur that minds do not merely *perceive* but also *conceive* in relation to data – Kant's transcendental deduction comes into view again. Kant's question concerned precisely the manner in which subjective conditions of thought (concepts) related to objects. In Leibniz the question is posed at an earlier level. The problem is not one concerning objects in the first instance at all. It is rather how it is that monads do not remain only perceptive, but also become capable of thought; the condition of thought being something like the ability to express the difference (at the most basic level) between one percept and another. For there to be thought, there must then be something like the possibility of expressing difference. Deleuze puts it like this: 'a conscious perception is produced

when at least two heterogeneous parts enter into a differential relation that determines a singularity' (*TF* 88).

There is a perception, that is, a dull response to some general kind of stimuli with its attendant expectation or futural relation brought with it, which orients the monad towards the next percept. The edge of insensibility is such that the distinction between any given percepts appears vanishingly small until the movement between two percepts becomes one in which a difference of kind between what was given at one moment and what appears at the next is marked. It is this marking that is the appearance of a differential relation between the two percepts and the appearance of this differential relation is the expression by the monad of a difference. Differential relations are marked universally by monads but it is the expression of them in a determination that denotes a singularity and what is more, it is what produces concepts. With concepts come the relation to objects, rather than perceptions. In other terms, the singularity produced through the determination of differentials, is expressed by concepts and this expression describes (or projects) the order of the object.

This view that Deleuze presents of the emergence of the concept within the monad as something that it expresses at a point of minimal statement of what is impressed upon it is analogous to what Wilfrid Sellars terms *quale*.[5] The *quale* are the conceptual expressions of an almost absent capture of an impression such that quality is noted to appear but its statement remains at the edge, constantly in trail to the particularity of each movement and moment. This is what Deleuze terms the 'threshold' at which consciousness operates, surfaces and performs acts of differentiation. The key point concerning it however and what would orient the Leibnizian move of understanding the concept would be the claim, mentioned in an earlier chapter by Deleuze, that 'only the individual exists, *and* it is by virtue of the power of the concept' (*TF* 64) where however the concept is then simply identified by Deleuze with the monad. In one sense the understanding of the Leibnizian view that all that exists is particular through the concept, as expressive of something that is singular, follows precisely the path of the argument so far. However, in another sense, the abrupt identification of the monad with the concept threatens the strategy of uncovering how Leibniz moves from the treatment of perception to the statement of the conditions for emergence of conceptuality as a faculty that is expressed by the monad.

Why is there this apparent slippage in Deleuze's treatment? The basis of it is the claim, borrowed from Salomon Maïmon, that perception should be understood not as a process of affection which supposes

something separate from that which is perceiving that impacts on the perceiver, but instead that the differential relations within the monad constitute (or project) the conditions of there being even quality, let alone 'objects'.[6] Seen at this level the issue for the monad in its articulation of a perceptive process is, as it were, the formative act that constitutes its perception whereas expressive articulation of this Idea would be the possession of a distinct capacity for conceptuality. This would permit the slippage and authorise it while in its turn requiring a different move of justification. If this intertwining of percept and Idea is the basis of the elaboration of a move from percept to concept, it remains to ask whether the Idea itself is something that must be obscure for Leibniz. A second question related to this would be considering whether the Idea exceeds any thing that can be perceived while also being that whose projection would enable the possession of perception as such?

The monad's infinite folding would be grounded in precisely its existence by means of Ideas. The salient characteristic of the Idea, as opposed to the concept, is after all the width of the former's expressive capacity by comparison to that of the latter.[7] The emergence of the concept is hence the elaboration of a domain of relative clarity due to its demarcation of distinct zones of expressibility. The basic experience, that we term with rather easy facility, 'unconscious', is one in which the experiences that occur are minute, obscure and marked in degrees of faintness of register and response. This basic level of experience, with all its degrees, reaching to but never attaining the point of non-perception, is automatic and constant. The automaticity of it is what marks the monad as an infinite machine, a machine, as Leibniz puts it, 'into infinity' (*L* 649). The degree of response to the infinite elements of the perceptive process at distinct points indicates the individuality of the monad as no two monads ever perceive the same thing in exactly the same way and, due to this difference (be it infinitesimal), the clarity of one is the obscurity of the other. This is evidently not merely a comparative statement about the relation between any two monads though as within any given monad the move from clarity to obscurity and vice versa is constant. On these grounds we can also follow Deleuze in viewing the classification of monads through the perceptive qualities that they are each effectively functions of.

Perception and hallucination in Leibniz

The reconstruction of the conditions of the argument has now been outlined, although the implications of Chapter 7 of *The Fold* have only

been partially conveyed. The question that emerges next concerns the relation between the monad and what it perceives. What I mean here is that since the account thus far has effectively undercut the sense that perception is a process whereby what occurs is that the perceiver responds to a datum given to it from without, the question that we face next concerns the relationship between 'true' and 'false' perceptions. The sensibility or insensibility of the monad is related to its waking or sleeping state and hence to its zone of distinctness. These zones in fact have infinite degrees, as the passage to the ultimate edge of insensibility (=0) is one of asymptotic style.[8] Since the perception is one that occurs at some degree, at some level, even with the most minimal conceivable response, there is never an occasion on which datum utterly escapes the monad. Another way of putting this, to turn matters around and repose our question, would be to say that there could be no datum that was not a projection of the monad. The monad dreams and the world ensues.

Deleuze describes this conclusion in a stark formulation whose sense I wish now to probe: '*Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object*' (*TF* 93). Leibniz poses the problem of the object in a radical fashion. It would appear that objects are constructs of monads and hence that, in the strictest sense, they, like space and time, are fictions.[9] The processes of the monads are based on automatic regulations as already stated. Deleuze describes these regulatory elements within the monad as 'folds', with each fold moving over or under the one contiguous to it. The 'folds' do not represent objects but, in the cases of greater clarity, they do 'project' them. Since however we are faced here with degrees of clarity and since it appears that there is a certain sense in which the monad has achieved a kind of success in becoming expressively aware of the 'object', there surely is something that marks the distinction between a 'true' and a 'false' perception such that a demarcation can be marked between perception and hallucination.

Having reached this stark formulation and the problem that it creates for our understanding of the nature of Leibniz's argument, we can now begin to probe the question of the sense in which the argument is a transcendental deduction. In turning to this assessment, we will have to probe deeper the problem that has emerged and been stated in such stark form by Deleuze, the problem of understanding what sense can be given by Leibniz to the suggestion that some perceptions are 'true' while others are 'false'. Having reached this problem himself, for the first time in Chapter 7, Deleuze uses the term 'deduction' mentioning that the first stage of the 'deduction' has gone from the monad to what is perceived and that everything then seems to reach a point of suspense

wherein we appear not even to be able to authorise the view that one body, among others, might be 'ours'.[10]

What can be said at this point is that we have now a scheme for reduction of phenomena into the components of perceptive activity of the monad. A general point here is that while the conscious perception is the result of differential relations amongst perceptions of greater or lesser approximation to absolute indifference, the data of the latter can be re-expressed in forms that appertain to the analysis of the former. If the consciously perceived 'object' appears as a unity, then its unity is dissolvable into a multiplicity that produced it, so that while we appear to have particulars before us, these particulars are expressive of the actions of collectives and hence that the one is dissolvable into many. The unity in that which is consciously present now appears purely mental, an effect of the relations between the percipients that is produced by the ideality of events being given in a certain form. This merely leads to a new problem: 'The whole question is of knowing if, in ascribing to itself the force to engender the perceived and the unity of the perceived in the monad, Leibniz does not also ascribe to itself the force to engender bodies outside of monads and outside of their perceptions' (*TF* 95).

This question evidently concerns the nature of Leibniz's 'idealism'. The engendering of bodies would be of a piece with the suggestion that the mind-like monad made the body in some sense appear and that bodies, like space and time, are mere fictions, albeit ones of some significance. However, we need to add, that we have not yet found any criterion for distinguishing between the body in physical terms and the bodies that are given in a more general sense to the unconscious and may have no correlation with the former. We thus now have two difficulties: firstly, how to distinguish between 'true' and 'false' perceptions; secondly, how to understand the status of the bodies that are perceived and whether the reduction of them to the collectivities of the unconscious does not threaten to lead to an idealism that denies effective existence to substances of a corporeal type.

Why are bodies necessary?

We noted above the first mention in Chapter 7 of the word 'deduction'. Now the justification of viewing Deleuze's use of this term in connection with the Kantian question of transcendental deduction begins to become clearer. If, for Kant, the problem was one of justifying the applicability of subjective conditions of thought to objects, then, for

Leibniz, we can see, the problem has the reverse character. For Leibniz the conditions of perception are the primary data and, as such, the question now posed is not how these conditions connect to something that pre-exists them but rather how its products are to be assessed in terms of the nature of the claims that some perceptions convey in a more accurate way than others. Thus the problem is one of understanding the internal sense of perception such that perception can be said to be distinguishable into expressions that articulate correctly or falsely the world that they are not only part of but constitutive of. This problem connects in a general sense to the difficulty of asking whether bodies are not purely a creation of a mental operation.

These questions however can be posed in relation to a third problem that will finally enable us to begin to understand the trajectory of Leibniz's argument. This question concerns the assumed necessity of bodies. While Kant wondered how concepts expressed necessity and universality, Leibniz by contrast wonders how it is that bodies (and particularly the assumption of possession of a body) appear to be necessary. The deduction thus has to show how the perceptual process that has so carefully been uncovered is part of the understanding that seems constant to us, that there is one type of perception at any rate that cannot be doubted, namely that there is a particular body that is one's own distinct from all others.

In responding to the question of how to grasp this necessity of reference to the body, Deleuze elaborates precautions and initially retreat to the earlier problem of the understanding of adequate perception. In retreating to this earlier problem, Deleuze refers us to a notion that is stated in the *New Essays* in reference to a term we have used earlier without having defined as yet. This is the notion of 'projection', a notion explicated in the *New Essays* as a response to the difficulty of connection between some experienced sensation (such as pain) and some given quality being presented to perception (such as the sight of a colour). Here Leibniz writes the following:

> I would say […] that there is a resemblance of a kind – not a perfect one which holds all the way through, but a resemblance in which one thing expresses another through some orderly relationship between them. Thus an ellipse, and even a parabola or hyperbola, has some resemblance to the circle of which it is a projection on a plane, since there is a certain precise and natural relationship between what is projected and the projection which is made from

it, with each point on the one corresponding through a certain relation with a point on the other.

<div align="right">(*NE* 131)</div>

So between the quality perceived and the sensation felt, or between, as it were, the two types of perception experienced here, there is a resemblance. The resemblance in question is one in which the relation between the two types of perception is expressive of a certain order. Rather than thinking about the order however, let us attend to the *expression* of the order as this expression is what is really at issue in the stated resemblance of the two types of perception. In the 'Discourse on Metaphysics' Leibniz described the way nature is expressed by our substance as related to degrees of perfection stating there that what we express more perfectly belongs to us in a particular way as this expression conforms to our nature (*L* 314).

In the example given in the *New Essays* citation, the resemblance relation is described through a mathematical analogy that captured isomorphic connections between points. This isomorphic connection was described there in terms of 'projection'. The key point concerning this argument is that by means of it Leibniz circumvents the expected correlation between percipient and perceived. The relation is not one of perception resembling an object. It is rather an expressive-projective resemblance between two orders of perception. Given that perception is extended as a term in such a way that each experienced response of the monad to its world is understood as a perception, it is the relation between types of perception that is the central point and this is what is stated in the understanding of expression and projection. The mathematical analogy introduced in the *New Essays* presents a way of representing the differential relation between these orders of perception. The circle is expressed on a plane by the ellipse. Since Leibniz understands mathematical entities as creations of thought, the type of expression here is one between ways of expressing thought in different media.

Similarly, there are different media of perceptual expression and yet these distinct media are related to each other. It is this relation that is stated through the resemblance where each element of the resemblance (let us say two for convenience) stands isomorphically in connection with the other. If however the two levels of perception are presented this way, then the mathematical analogy has one problem essential to it. This is that mathematical expressions are static in presentation while the elements of perception are necessarily not. The mutability of perceptual processes are captured precisely in the reduction of 'objects' to

the excitations of the monadic mechanism. The excitations are variable, mobile, constant and experienced in infinite degrees. While the perception can consciously be presented of a given quality or a given sensation felt, the effective experience is rather of a degree of one or the other being felt while something else is also felt simultaneously. The simultaneity of the coordinated elements here precisely short-circuits not only the need but even the efficacy of reference to 'objects' of perception. As Deleuze carefully puts this: 'it is the relation of resemblance, it is the likeness that is itself the model, that makes matter be that which it resembles' (*TF* 96).

If we think of matter as what is produced, as what is stated by means of resemblances between perceptive processes, resemblances that hence give matter the generality of the medium of resemblance, matter appears then to dissolve and become a well-ordered phenomenon, not an existence in itself.[11] As Leibniz puts this in the *New Essays*: 'organic bodies as well as others remain "the same" only in appearance, and not strictly speaking' (*NE* 231). This characteristic of bodies of general mutability is one of the difficulties with them. However to set against this we can appeal to the way in which the characteristics of perception for monads are given the expression they have by means of bodies and this will enable us to grasp the necessity of bodies. What bodies essentially possess are organs. What is an organ? It is that element of the body that enables it to *collect* or *gather* or *contract* innumerable impressions of one of the orders of perception such that in the union that ensues a distinct perceptual order emerges that is not at the edge of the insensible (*L* 645).

The terms I have given here as synonymous indicate a process of what we might in general term 'synthesis'.[12] However if the organs of the body are what enable the body to unify data in a manner that permits distinct apprehension, then the necessity of the body will precisely emerge from this need for distinctness. Leibniz argues indeed in 'The Monadology' that without distinctness there could only be what he terms 'naked' monads, or monads that existed at the very edge of insensibility. Thus if sensibility emerges through degrees, the means of this emergence is the development of specialisation within perceptual processes, a specialisation realised by means of the emergence of organs. Organs would thus be specialised receptive centres of receptivity of stimuli that permit greater distinctness of expression of these stimuli. Deleuze describes this in a similar manner when he states: '*I have a body because I have a clear and distinguished zone of expression*' (*TF* 98). I would prefer: there is a need for expression to be distinguishable.

This need emerges internally in the perceptual process itself due to the number of perceptual levels operating simultaneously. The relation between the levels of perception is what is projected or expressed. However for the regulation of this projective–expressive relation to be one that is ordered requires the filtering of perceptions on a number of levels to be correlated. The process of this filtering is what constitutes zones of distinct expression and the manner in which the filtering takes place is in orders of degree, which can be understood in terms of the manner of sophistication of what carries out the filtering. That which filters has to compress, contract and collect, in a word, synthesise. The organs of the body carry this out.

Let us return now to the questions that led us into this investigation of the need for a body. The third question concerned why there was a need for bodies. We have addressed this by means of the manner in which expression of perception is capable of being distinct. This enables us to review the two questions that led us to this culminating one: what is the status of the body and how, if at all, can we distinguish between 'true' and 'false' perceptions. The status of the body arose from the question of whether bodies were engendered outside of monads by the monads. This touches on the nature of Leibniz's 'idealism'. Since each monad is a world unto itself, we can see that the projection of bodies distinct from our own is something that emerges from our own activity and in this sense the 'external' bodies are not external as they appear to be. However, our own body is not something we are deceived about. It is a necessity, as without it we could not progress beyond the stage of the edge of insensibility. While the body we have does not have the constancy vulgar notions would suggest, its connection with the monad is assured in the sense that a unification of disparate elements into one central activity of synthesis is a continuing and present need that is given through the organs of our bodies. These organs are not purely an effect of 'thought' but rather are the perceptual–affective requirement of development of the monad's life.

This now leads us back to the first question concerning the distinction between 'true' and 'false' perceptions. The difficulty with this question concerns the level of perceptual processes. At the level of conscious articulation or expression, it has sense as here the monad responds in a manner to constant regulations of life. The monad that has a 'false' perception in the conscious sense misattributes the action of its organs.[13] What occurs here is a problem located in the multiple attribution of organic interactions for the given body resulting in something less than optimal for the body as a whole. Hence the understanding of

'true' perception here is displaced by a comprehension of functional coordination. At the level below conscious perception, the problem cannot be posed since here the levels of impression are not necessarily merely multiple but always given in degrees of confusion. The confusion in question cannot be dispelled but can be intensified. What moves the monad to a greater degree of confusion could thus be said to diminish its range of expression and in this sense be 'false'.

Leibniz's argument concerning perception viewed as a transcendental deduction

The initial suggestion I made was to the effect that Leibniz's argument concerning perception is a form of transcendental deduction. I will now provide some reasons for understanding it in this way. Firstly, the argument that we have, following Deleuze's reading, reconstructed from Leibniz concerning perception is one that indicates the basis for understanding the connection between Ideas, concepts and percepts. Secondly, the argument in fact indicates how, given a minimal starting point (equivalent to Wilfrid Sellars' conception of *quale*), it is possible to arrive at a sophisticated justification of the view of experience as governed by complex patterns. Thirdly, we find in the account that Leibniz gives of perception a discussion of synthesis that gives a justification for the view that bodies are necessary.

Let us now review these elements in turn and relate them to the Kantian understanding of transcendental deduction. Firstly, the relationship shown to pertain between Ideas, concepts and percepts. Kant's basic task in his transcendental deduction concerned the justification of a special class of concepts in relation to the perceptual flux of experience.[14] The basic move of the transcendental deduction is clearly in some sense regressive on conditions since what Kant aims to show is that the organisation and coherence of perceptual experience requires the possession of this special class of concepts and is not conceivable in any sensible sense without them.[15] Deleuze, in the citation we have given as our epigraph opposes to this conception of conditioning, the Leibnizian notions of actualisation and realisation. The senses of these terms are not explored in the argument of Chapter 7 of *The Fold* but in the succeeding account in Chapter 8 of the relation between the two floors of the baroque house. Here Deleuze distinguishes the virtualisation of the world in the monad from its actualisation in bodies and presents the process of resemblance as something given to bodies rather than monads in a strictly soul-like sense (*TF* 105). This dualism is

connected to revisiting the status of the body.[16] It mirrors one element of Chapter 7 that I have, until now, left out of my discussion. This is the suggestion that the connections at work at the level of the soul-like monad should be radically distinguished from those at the level of the body. Deleuze articulates this view as follows:

> there exists a great difference between an always extrinsic physi-cal causality, which goes from one body, to all those from whom it receives the effect, to infinity in the universe (the regime of influx or of universal interaction), and an always intrinsic psychic causality, which goes from each monad on its account to effects of perception of the universe that it produces spontaneously, independently of all influx from one monad to another.
>
> (*TF* 97)

The point of this distinction is subsequently made clear when Deleuze distinguishes the Newtonian from the Leibnizian interpretation of dif-ferential calculus with the Newtonian interpretation marked as one that expresses physical causality while the Leibnizian one articulates psychic causality. However while the distinction between the types of calculus presented here has some pertinence, it threatens to undercut the gen-eral account that has emerged from Leibniz. Rather than seeing the relation between bodies as always extrinsic, a view that entails adopting the picture of body as something solidly constituted, it is better to view the body as ultimately given only through the organs that constitute its perceptual apparatus. Viewed in this latter way, we avoid the Lockean fixation on solidity and are capable instead of a dynamic conception of bodies through forces.

If we adopt this more Leibnizian conception of bodies, we can then see that the inclusion of physical relations within the one world of each monad is part of the necessary first stage of the deduction that Deleuze isolated and this permits the sense that there is not the dualistic gap between bodies and souls that Deleuze indicates. There is instead the projective interpretation of bodies that requires the understanding of bodies as necessary for the stability of the monad's perceptual distinct-ness. Moving away from the kind of dualism suggested by Deleuze's picture enables a return to the question of whether Leibniz's deductive strategy can really be opposed to the Kantian quest for conditions. The answer will be in the negative with the distinction between Kant and Leibniz here concerning rather the type of conditions that are being sought and the direction of the deduction being different due to the

adoption by Leibniz of a procedure which is initially more austere but whose outcome is correspondingly more metaphysical.[17]

Concepts are revealed by Leibniz to be an outcome of a process whose initiator is however the prior and necessary possession of Ideas. While the Idea only emerges in the Kantian discussion at the level of regulation of a constituted law-governed world whose rules operate by means of concepts, the reverse is the case for Leibniz for whom the condition of possibility of concepts must be the prior existence of Ideas. The deductive strategy could be said to go from Ideas as the grounding basis of percepts to the analysis of percepts themselves as requiring for their development the possession of bodies and concepts. The deduction thus in a sense does justify concepts though it must also justify bodies.[18]

Secondly, the move of the argument from minimal conditions (as already discussed) to the justification of experience as governed by complex patterns. The strategy of elaboration of an argument by reference to the most austere level of statement of awareness is one that is suggested by many readers of the *Critique* to also be at work in its deduction.[19] The question only concerns what level of simplicity or austerity to proceed from. In the A-Deduction, Kant explicitly articulates the synthetic process as what will enable articulation of experience and this is presented in a tripartite manner. The B-Deduction argument does not eschew this move as the opening requirement; there is an understanding of combination, but it does include a more extended discussion of the nature of judgement. By contrast, Leibniz's account provides a discussion not only of how synthesis operates at the level of the body, but also involves in this discussion the consideration of the need for a body. In showing then that synthesis is an outcome, rather than a beginning, the argument in Leibinz's terms gives a more direct sense to the understanding of perception and includes no misleading suggestion of a possible 'object' beyond the level of affection that produces the level of affection. These clear advantages of Leibniz's deductive strategy are connected again to what it is that is being deduced, namely not in the first instance concepts (even a special class of them) but rather bodies and the relation of percepts to a world.[20]

This is the third point of the argument, that it provides a discussion of synthesis that provides a justification for the view that bodies are necessary. This is the broadest sense in which the argument reconstructed in Chapter 7 of *The Fold* is a transcendental deduction. While a transcendental deduction describes conditions that are shown to be required for experience to be possible in the Kantian sense of such a deduction, in

the Leibnizian sense they also touch on the events that render the world real. This is the point of the reference in the epigraph to our chapter from *The Fold* where Deleuze contrasts the Kantian concern with phenomena with the Leibnizian one with events. Another way of putting this, in terms of the argument we have uncovered and re-evaluated on the basis on Deleuze's reconstruction, is to say that the level of intensity is coeval with that of extensity and wound in with it.[21] Due to this move of implicating intensity with extensity, we find that the synthetic argument of the Kantian deduction is now perceived at a level later than that of Leibniz and operative in a way that does not enable clear recognition of the primacy of individuation.[22]

Leibniz's argument is thus a transcendental deduction in the sense of providing an account of intensity that promotes the view that it is possible, by providing a description of the most basic austere conditions of awareness, to arrive at a sophisticated justification of the complexity of experience that shows the processes of synthesis to be a product of primary stages of invention and that also demonstrates the necessity for embodiment (not least at the level of organs) for distinct apprehension to be possible. This demonstration is one that fully justifies then the attribution that Deleuze gives of the title 'transcendental philosophy' to Leibniz.

Notes

1. Edmund Husserl often traces the inspiration for his transcendental phenomenology not to Kant, but to Descartes. In his fullest meditation on the relation of his conception of transcendental philosophy to that of Kant, he also includes within the purview of the transcendental Hume and Leibniz. See Husserl 1974. Husserl's inclusive sense of whom to include under the heading of transcendental philosophy is matched by Deleuze as we see in our epigraph citation. For a rather negative view of Deleuze's relation to transcendental philosophy see 'Translator's Introduction', by Boundas in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, *An essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*. The one reference Deleuze makes to transcendental thought opposes it in principle to empirical critique (*H* 87).
2. The attention given to Kant's transcendental deduction in recent Anglo-American readings of Kant is not entirely equivalent to the discussion of transcendental arguments as the latter are frequently described in a kind of generality that abstracts from the specific tasks of the deduction. For a generic view of the problem of transcendental arguments, see Stern (1999). For a collection that looks at the nature of transcendental deduction across the board of Kant's philosophy, see Förster (1989), and for my own response to the argument of the deduction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, see Banham (2006, Chs 2–4).

3. The outline of universality and necessity as the two criteria of the *a priori* is described in the 'Introduction' to the second edition of the *Critique* (*CPR* B3–4). There it is specified that judgements that do not allow exception are truly universal and cannot be arrived at by means of an inductive process. In the 'Introduction' to the first edition by contrast the distinction between universal and necessary is conflated when Kant there says that 'universal modes of knowledge, which at the same time possess the character of inner necessity, must in themselves, independently of experience, be clear and certain' (*CPR* A2).

4. The amphiboly is the 'Appendix' to Kant's Transcendental Analytic (*CPR* A260/B316 – A292/B349) and marks Kant's reply to the dispute between Leibniz and Locke. The notion of an 'amphiboly' concerns a confusion of the empirical with the transcendental levels of understanding. In this section of the *Critique*, Kant replies to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles among other matters.

5. Sellars (1963, p. 63). The suggestion is presented that in monadic terms there is a conceptual frame in which: 'what is ostensibly a single particular exemplifying a number of universals, is actually a number of particulars exemplifying simple universals'.

6. The reference to Maïmon is explicit in this chapter of *The Fold* but arguably of key importance for its overall reading and is the subject of a separate piece in this collection. Arguably however the suggestion here being received in the name of Maïmon is of a piece with that received elsewhere in *The Fold* from Whitehead, particularly in the chapter on the event.

7. Here we do not merely mean that the Idea has greater extension, a conception that would evidently lead in the direction of set-theoretical questions. The difference between the Idea and the concept is not merely captured in this way, and in any event the viewing of the Idea in terms of classification leads to notable paradoxes that Aristotle expressed early. It is rather that the Idea is not of the order of the instance, while the concept can, and conventionally is, examined precisely in this way. Given the intensional character of Leibniz's logic, concepts must initially fit a pattern of predication that will not permit their assimilation either to set-theoretical paradigms or Quinean reduction, this does not prevent the concepts from being elaborated according to a distinct logic while such a logic would still be too restrictive for the sense of the Idea.

8. 'Asymptotic style' denotes that there is a passage towards a zero degree that is constant but in principle impossible to complete.

9. The discussion of space and time would be the subject of another and more detailed examination. In his letter to Des Bosses of June 16, 1712, Leibniz indicates that the labyrinth of the continuum is the best rationale for viewing space and time as fictions. The discussion of this was a subject to which Leibniz devoted many intriguing passages, which however date back to the 1670s and 1680s. How they relate to the late correspondence with Clarke would be a subject worth investigation on another occasion.

10. This also marks a point of proximity between Leibniz and Berkeley, as Deleuze mentions. The point of such convergence here is in terms of 'phenomenalism'. The divergence between the two expressions of such a view is marked by Deleuze in terms of the fact that the 'being of imagination' is a given for Berkeley but not for Leibniz. Another way of putting this would be to say that Berkeley effectively relies on a pre-given common understanding

of 'perception' which enables his reductive analysis of objects to have an easier purchase than Leibniz's view. For a conventional contrast between them that struggles very precisely with the problem of how to understand Leibniz's much wider view of 'perception', see Wilson (1999).

11. The connection here with Kant is too great to not mark. I do not merely mean the general dissolution of the in-itself into the relations that mark phenomena, but also the general view of the real as when Kant writes: 'The real of outer appearances is therefore real in perception only, and can be real in no other way' (*CPR* A376). See also the whole argument of the 'Anticipations of Perception', one of the profoundest parts of the *Critique*.

12. When Kant describes the first synthesis (that of apprehension) in the A-Deduction, he gives what is effectively a general statement of the action of synthesis. He states that for order (and unity) to ensue in intuition what must happen is that the manifold 'must first be run through, and held together' (*CPR* A99). This running through and holding together is of a piece with what Leibniz is describing as a collection and contraction of the data of sense by means of the organs of the body. Closer parallels with the Leibnizian account are found in Kant's more intensive accounts of force and embodiment, such as are given in both the so-called pre-Critical writings and in the 'post-Critical' ones. Similarly the extensive discussion of bodily synthesis is cardinal for Husserl's accounts in *Ideas II*.

13. For a view similar to this see, Descartes' 'Sixth Meditation'.

14. While this view of the centrality of attention to perception in Kant's argument is not shared by all analysts of Kant's argument, see for some considerations that are favourable to it the classic piece by Henrich 1994.

15. For the classic statement of the view that the argument of the deduction is regressive, see Ameriks (2003).

16. In Chapter 8 of *The Fold* unlike in the argument of Chapter 7 the relation between the monad and its body is presented through the articulation of the controversial theory of the *vinculum* and here Deleuze relies heavily on Leibniz's late correspondence, both with Des Bosses and De Volder. It would be the object of a different discussion to determine whether this theory of the *vinculum* can really be given the status it receives in Chapter 8 of *The Fold*. Suffice it to say we have, without recourse to it, found a ground in the argument of Chapter 7 alone, for understanding the necessity a monad has for a body.

17. The austerity of the initial assumptions of the argument as reconstructed by Deleuze is clear since we make no reference to bodies, objects or concepts in our initial quest. In this sense the austerity of the initial assumptions is more radical than that of Wilfrid Sellars' statement of a kind of logical deduction however close the Sellarsian notion of *quale* is to the Leibnizian sense of the edge of insensibility.

18. In a sense the fate of the reception of Kant's *Critique* was also one in which the demonstration of the justification of concepts, Ideas and percepts ultimately led to the need to give a demonstration of the necessity of bodies. This is, after all, the ground of his late 'Refutation of Idealism', a refutation required due to the assumption that the existence of bodies had not been guaranteed by his transcendental idealism.

19. For one of the clearest statements of such a view of the argument of Kant's deduction in the recent literature, see for example Brook (1994).

20. In my book on Kant's transcendental imagination I set out a ground for thinking that the argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic was something we needed to regress to rather than understanding it as providing a set of conditions for the Transcendental Deduction. The inevitable difficulties connected with the opposite approach were the subject of Chapter 1 of that book.
21. In reference to the architecture of the *Critique* this indicates that the distinction between the 'Axioms of Intuition' and the 'Anticipations of Perception' is a problematic one and that the argument of the latter should in any case precede that of the former.
22. Due to the necessary formality of the transcendental unity of apperception, it is misconceived to view it as contributory to a sustained conception of subjectivity, something made very clear by the arguments of the Paralogisms. However, while it is misconceived to view the *Critique* as Cartesian, the Leibnizian problem is rather one of articulating the material conditions of individuation. This again requires beginning with the level at work in the 'Anticipations of Perception' rather than with a commitment to apperception as an initial condition. The relation between the Kantian and Leibnizian senses of apperception is however complicated by the understanding that it emerges for Leibniz primarily as a result of reflection. Since attention to the role of reflection in the *Critique* suggests that the transcendental unity of apperception requires a level of complex articulation that is not evenly recognised in Kant's statements there is serious ground for bringing these conceptions together. Again see Banham (2006, pp. 133–44).

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6
Genesis and Difference: Deleuze, Maïmon, and the Post-Kantian Reading of Leibniz

Daniel W. Smith

Introduction: Deleuze, Maïmon, Leibniz

Deleuze's appropriation of Leibniz's philosophy is undertaken from a resolutely post-Kantian viewpoint. On this score, it would be difficult to overemphasize the influence on Deleuze of Salomon Maïmon, one of the earliest critics of Kant's critical philosophy. Maïmon's *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy* was published in 1790, one year before the publication of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. It was Maïmon's critiques of Kant that largely determined the subsequent direction of post-Kantian philosophy, at least with regard to the issues that would come to preoccupy Deleuze's early work. The two primary substantive exigencies laid down by Maïmon in his critique of Kant reappear like leitmotifs in almost every one of Deleuze's books up through 1969, even if Maïmon's name is not always explicitly mentioned: the search for the *genetic* elements of *real* experience (and not merely the conditions of possible experience), and the positing of a principle of *difference* as the fulfillment of this condition (whereas identity is the condition of the possible, difference is the condition of the real). One might say that these two exigencies of Maïmon's thought are the two components of Deleuze's own 'transcendental empiricism'.[1]

In this article, I would like to examine the way in which Deleuze's early interpretation of Leibniz was determined by his reading of Maïmon's critique of Kant. Deleuze considered Maïmon to be 'a great, great philosopher', (*CGD* 13 March 1978), and his own understanding of Maïmon was indebted to the well-known French interpretations of Martial Gueroult and Jules Vuillemin.[2] In general terms, Maïmon's influence on Deleuze can be traced to at least two factors.

First, within the context of the critical tradition, Maïmon is the great philosopher of immanence. 'For Maïmon', writes Gueroult, 'the only

untouchable aspect of the critical philosophy was the Copernican spirit of the method: nothing can be advanced that cannot be immediately justified from the viewpoint of the *immanent* consciousness in which alone the relation of the subject to the object must be determined' (Gueroult 1930, p. 110). Almost all Maïmon's critiques are aimed at eliminating the illegitimate vestiges of transcendence that still remain in Kant, given the presuppositions of a transcendental subject. Like Jacobi, for instance, Maïmon rejects the 'thing-in-itself' as the introduction of a transcendent element outside the immanent field of consciousness, an illegitimate transcendent application of the category of causality. Deleuze's own relation to Kant, of course, is far more complex: Deleuze aligns himself squarely with the critical project insofar as it is a purely *immanent* critique of reason;[3] yet in making the field of immanence immanent *to* the subject (or consciousness), Kant reintroduced an element of transcendence that Deleuze rejects.[4] Nonetheless, although Maïmon's thought operates entirely within the presupposition of the transcendental subject, he remains a model for Deleuze on how to reconcile immanence and transcendental philosophy.

Second, in pursuing these immanent aims, Maïmon produced a revised transcendental philosophy of his own described as a *Koalitionssystem*, a 'coalition system' that reached back to the pre-Kantians and incorporated elements of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume: a revised critical philosophy that deliberately combined the scepticism of Hume with the rationalism of Leibniz and Spinoza.[5] In this sense, Maïmon functions as a true precursor to Deleuze, who not coincidentally made use of the same three thinkers in formulating his own position, writing important monographs on each. Maïmon's use of the history of philosophy is not only a model of the kind of methodology Deleuze utilizes in his own monographs, but the thinkers Maïmon appeals to seem to have guided Deleuze directly in his own selection of precursors.

Using Maïmon as our guide, then, the following sections will examine (1) Maïmon's genetic critique of Kant, and Deleuze's appropriation of it in his reading of Nietzsche; (2) the reason a principle of difference is needed in a genetic philosophy (and Maïmon's own hesitations on this score); and (3) Deleuze's own attempt to deduce the principle of difference in his reading of Leibniz.

The problem of genesis

Let us turn first to Maïmon's genetic critique of Kant. Kant presents the critical philosophy as a tribunal of reason: reason is to sit in judgement

of itself. This is at once the greatness and limitation of the Kantian project. Kant's philosophy is a purely *immanent* critique of reason: what haunts reason are less the errors produced by *external* factors (the senses, the body, the passions) than the illusions generated *internally* by reason itself (the Self, the World, God). 'It is not the slumber of reason that engenders monsters', writes Deleuze, 'but vigilant and insomniac rationality' (*AO* 122). Beginning with Salomon Maïmon, however, the post-Kantians criticized this idea of a tribunal in which reason itself is at once defendant, prosecutor, and judge. 'Is this not the Kantian contradiction, making reason both the tribunal and the accused; constituting it as judge and plaintiff, judging and judged? Kant lacked a method which permitted reason to be judged from the inside without giving it the task of being its own judge. And in fact, Kant does not realize his project of immanent critique' (*NP* 91). The question then becomes: What method could fulfill this exigency of an immanent critique?

This is where Maïmon intervenes: his primary objection was that Kant ignored the demands of a *genetic* method. Kant relies on 'facts', for which he searches the conditions. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant does more than claim that reason implies *a priori* knowledge; he adds that the so-called universal knowledges of pure sciences such as mathematics are the knowledges in which reason necessarily manifests itself, they are *a priori* 'facts' of reason. The second Critique similarly takes as its point of departure the 'fact' of the judgement of value and moral action. Such is the circularity of Kant's method of conditioning: Kant simply assumes these 'original facts' of knowledge and morality as givens, and then seeks their conditions of possibility in the transcendental – a vicious circle that makes the condition (the possible) refer to the conditioned (the real) while reproducing its image. Maïmon, by contrast, argued that Kant's claim to ground the critique uniquely on reason would be valid only if these *a priori* knowledges had been deduced, or rather *engendered*, from reason alone as the necessary modes of its manifestation. The critical philosophy could not be content with Kant's simple method of *conditioning*, in other words, but had to be transformed into a method of genesis.[6]

The Kantian appeal to factuality has been critiqued on both *a posteriori* and *a priori* grounds. The *a posteriori* critique (Bachelard, Popper) rightly shows that Kant's 'facts' of both knowledge (Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics) and morality (Protestant Religion and the Prussian state) are historically contingent, and hence that Kant's transcendental is little more than an abstract and atemporal image of the science and morality of his own epoch. 'Kant's "proper usage of the

faculties"', Deleuze writes, 'mysteriously coincides with these established values' (*NP* 93). This is what Deleuze calls the method of *tracing*: Kant's simply traced the structures of the transcendental from the empirical. Kant believed he was able to determine the necessary conditions of all possible experience, but in reality the Kantian transcendental is a false transcendental, and the Kantian critique is a false critique. Kant's 'universal' is simply a reflection of the universe of his time.

But this *a posteriori* critique remains inadequate if it is not taken to a properly *a priori* level. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze argues that Nietzsche's philosophy, far from representing a rejection of Kant, was in fact the first philosophy to truly fulfill the immanent aims of Kant's critical project. 'Nietzsche seems to have sought a radical transformation of Kantianism, a re-invention of the critique which Kant betrayed at the same time as he conceived it, a resumption of the critical project on a new basis and with new concepts' (*NP* 52). The reason: Nietzsche brought the critique to bear, not merely on *false claims* to knowledge and morality, but on knowledge and morality themselves, on true knowledge and true morality – and indeed, on the values of truth and reason themselves. 'The will to truth requires a critique – let us thus define our own task – the value of truth must for once be experimentally *called into question* … We need a *critique* of moral values, *the value of these values must first be brought into question*'.[7] As Deleuze puts it, 'Critique has done nothing insofar as it has not been brought to bear on truth itself, on true knowledge, on true morality' (*NP* 90).

Nietzsche and Philosophy explicitly interprets Nietzsche's project as a fulfilment of Maïmon's demand for a genetic method. The post-Kantians, Deleuze writes, 'demanded a principle which was not merely conditioning in relation to objects, but which was also truly genetic and productive (a principle of internal difference or determination). They also condemned the survival in Kant of miraculous harmonies between terms that remain external to each other. […] If Nietzsche belongs to the history of Kantianism, it is because of the original way in which he deals with these post-Kantian demands' (*NP* 51–2). Nietzsche was not content to discover transcendental principles that would constitute the *condition of possibility* for the 'facts' of reason (knowledge and morality). Instead, he was intent on discovering immanent principles that were capable of giving an account of the *genesis* or genealogy of knowledge and morality (and which he thought he had found in the will to power and the eternal return).

Nietzsche in this way carries the critique of Kant to an *a priori* level. He does not simply critique Kant for deriving the 'fact' of knowledge from empirical and historically contingent models; what Nietzsche places in question is rather the value and *a priori* status of knowledge itself as a supposed 'fact' of reason in the first place. Maïmon's call for a genetic method, Deleuze suggests, found its fulfilment in Nietzsche's method of genealogy. The central chapter of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* ('Critique') outlines the means by which Nietzsche effected the transformation of Kantianism: conditions of real experience are substituted for conditions of possible experience; genetic and plastic principles are substituted for transcendental principles (in the Kantian sense of conditioning).

For Deleuze, then, the genetic method is the only means of fulfilling the immanent ambitions of the critical philosophy. 'Without this reversal', Deleuze writes, 'the famous Copernican Revolution amounts to nothing' (*DR* 162). But what exactly is the nature of the genetic method? And how does it transform transcendental philosophy (a transcendental philosophy *without* a subject)?[8] Throughout his work, Deleuze elaborates several requirements for these genetic conditions. First, the condition must be a condition of *real* experience, and not merely of *possible* experience. This means, second, that the condition cannot be (or be conceived) in the image of the conditioned, that is, the structures of the transcendental field cannot simply be traced off the empirical. Third, to be a condition of real experience, the condition can be no broader than what it conditions; that is, the condition must be determined *along with* what it conditions, and must *change* as the conditioned changes (conditions are not universal but singular). Fourth, the nature of the 'genesis' in the genetic method must be understood, not as a dynamic genesis (a historical or developmental genesis) but rather as a static genesis (a genesis that moves from the virtual to its actualization). Finally, in order to remain faithful to these exigencies, the genesis requires an element of its own, something distinct from the form of the conditioned, 'something ideational or unconditioned', that would be capable of 'determining at once the condition and the conditioned' (*LS* 122).

It is precisely this latter criterion that lies at the basis of Deleuze's break with the post-Kantian tradition. What is the nature of this unconditioned element that lies at the basis of the genetic method? Is the unconditioned the 'totality' (Hegel) or the 'differential' (Deleuze)? Is it external difference (the 'not-X' of Hegel) or internal difference (the *dx* of Deleuze)?

The principle of difference

This leads us, then, to the question of difference. Maïmon posed the fundamental exigency of a genetic philosophy: it requires something *unconditioned* capable of assuring a real genesis.[9] But Martial Gueroult showed that Maïmon himself hesitated between two ways of solving the problem of genesis:

> The principle of identity, not as a simple concept of reflection, but as a transcendental principle determining the object in general a priori, is alone absolutely pure and a priori; in relation to it, difference as reality, under whatever aspect it is perceived [*sous quelque aspect qu'on l'aperçoive*], even in mathematics, is only a given. How can one bring together, in an *a priori* synthesis, in view of a pure genesis, an empty principle that is absolutely a priori with a material principle that is not? Maïmon oscillates between two solutions: first, to turn difference into a pure principle like identity … In a certain fashion this is the path Schelling will choose in the philosophy of Nature … This conception everywhere has the same consequences …: the suppression of the immanence in the knowing subject of the constitutive elements of knowledge; the finite subject Ego [*Moi*] is posterior to the realities of which it has knowledge … But another solution presents itself: identity being absolutely pure, and diversity always being a given (*a priori* and *a posteriori*), identity can be posited as the property of the thinking subject, and difference as an absence of identity resulting from the limitation of the subject.[10]

My hypothesis is that this passage in Gueroult had an important influence on the early Deleuze, since it pointed the way to an alternate post-Kantian trajectory for him, one in which Maïmon occupied a strategic position. Gueroult outlines two possible solutions to Mamon's problematic of genesis: *either* one turns to a pure (formal) principle of identity, as does Fichte (the I = I); *or* one turns to a pure (material) principle of difference, which is the path that will be retrieved and pursued by Deleuze. In the latter case, as Gueroult notes, the subject would be 'posterior to the realities of which it has knowledge', that is, the subject would no longer be *constitutive*, as it is in Kant. Speaking very generally, the latter is the function that the 'genetic method' takes on in Deleuze's philosophy. There is no universal or *a priori* transcendental subject that might function as the basis of knowledge or a universal ethics, but only heterogeneous processes of *subjectivation*, each of which must be

analyzed for its own account. (*PV* 14–17) There is no universal form of an 'object = x', defined by its identity to itself, but only diverse processes of *objectification*. There is no 'pure reason' or rationality *par excellence*, but only diverse and historically variable processes of *rationalization*, of the kind analyzed by Alexandre Koyré, Gaston Bachelard, and Georges Canguilhem in the field of epistemology, Max Weber in sociology, and François Châtelet in philosophy. There is no 'One', but only processes of *unification*; there is no 'Totality', but only processes of *totalization*; and so on.

What one finds in Deleuze's early writings, then, is a reconsideration and inversion of the post-Kantian tradition. Starting with Fichte, the post-Kantian philosophers took up Maïmon's challenge, but they still subordinated the principle of difference to the principle of identity. In Fichte, identity is posited as the property of the thinking subject, with difference appearing only as an extrinsic limitation imposed from without (the non-self, the not-X). Hegel, against Fichte, placed difference and identity in dialectical opposition; but even in Hegel, this contradiction always resolves itself, and in resolving itself, it resolves difference by relating it to a ground. This is the movement one finds in Hegel's larger *Logic*: identity, difference, differentiation, opposition, contradiction and ground.[11] But although Deleuze's early writings are marked by an anti-Hegelian reaction, Deleuze pursued his critique of Hegel in a deliberately oblique manner. Rather than writing directly on Hegel, Deleuze's strategy seems to have been to return to the Maïmonian problematics that generated the post-Kantian tradition in the first place, but precisely in order to formulate a divergent solution to these same problematics. In this way, for the 'major' post-Kantian tradition of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, Deleuze substituted his own subterranean or 'minor' post-Kantian tradition of Maïmon, Nietzsche, and Bergson, which he linked up, following Maïmon's suggestion, with the more recognizable pre-Kantian trio of Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Deleuze's writings on Bergson and Nietzsche are infused with Maïmonian themes; in them, one can easily discern, alongside the negative criticisms of Hegel, Deleuze's positive movements toward an alternate formulation of the problems of genesis and difference. As Deleuze writes in another context, 'the philosophical learning of an author is not assessed by number of quotations […] but by the apologetic or polemical directions of his work itself' (*NP* 162). Maïmon's influence on Deleuze is all the more ubiquitous for not always being named: the questions Deleuze poses to Bergson and Nietzsche are most often Maïmonian questions.

This is the point at which Leibniz intervenes. Deleuze accepts Maïmon's claim that a viewpoint on *internal genesis* needed to be substituted for Kant's principle of *external conditioning*. But as he would later explain, 'doing this means returning to Leibniz, but on bases *other* than Leibniz's. All the elements to create a genesis such as the post-Kantians demand it are virtually in Leibniz'[12] (*CGD* 20 May 1980). In other words, it was through his rereading of Leibniz that Deleuze would develop a formulation of the principle of difference that was adequate to the problem of genesis. Hence, although Deleuze published his book-length study of Leibniz rather late in his career, his more profound – and, I believe, more important – engagement with Leibniz had already occurred in the work leading up to *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, as well as in an important series of seminars on Leibniz that Deleuze gave in 1980. In these earlier works, Deleuze approached Leibniz from a Maïmonian and post-Kantian point of view, claiming that the question of genesis (and the redefinition of the transcendental field) could only be resolved by returning to Leibniz, 'but on bases *other* than Leibniz's'. One of these other 'bases' was the formulation of a pure principle of *difference*, which alone would be capable of freeing thought from 'representation' (whether finite or infinite), and its concomitant subordination to the principle of identity. As Maïmon had shown, whereas identity is the condition of possibility of thought in general, it is difference that constitutes the genetic condition of *real* thought. But how exactly does difference function as a genetic principle?

Leibniz: From identity to difference

In the this section, I would like to show how Deleuze in effect *deduces* a principle of difference from Leibniz's thought – in a manner not evident in Leibniz himself – starting with the most simple expression of the principle of identity ('A is A'), and then making its way through the principles of sufficient reason and indiscernibility, and the law of continuity. What emerges from Deleuze's reading of Leibniz is, as Deleuze puts it, 'a Leibnizian transcendental philosophy that bears on the event rather than the phenomenon, and replaces the Kantian conditioning' (*TF* 120).

The principle of identity

Deleuze begins his deduction with the simplest statement of the principle of identity: 'A is A'. 'Blue is blue', 'a triangle is a triangle', 'God is God'. Leibniz himself had already asked: do these formal expressions

of the principle of identity make us think anything? Such formulae, he says, are certain but empty; they 'seem to do nothing but repeat the same thing without telling us anything' (*NE* 361). A more popular formulation of the principle of identity would be: 'A thing is what it is'. This formula goes further than the formula 'A is A' because it shows us the ontological region governed by the principle of identity: identity consists in manifesting the identity between the thing and what the thing *is*, what classical philosophy termed the 'essence' of a thing. In Leibniz, every principle is a *ratio*, a 'reason', and the principle of identity can be said to be the *ratio* or rule of essences, the *ratio essendi*. But Leibniz also provides us with a more technical formulation of the principle of identity, derived from logic: 'every analytic proposition is true'. What Leibniz means here is that the simple formal statement of the principle of identity ('A is A') has a *vector* running through it that moves from the predicate to the subject. This vector becomes clear when one considers the simplest form of judgement, the judgement of *attribution*, such as 'the sky is blue' or 'A is B'. Plato had already seen that every judgement of attribution (A is B) is a kind of an offence against the principle of identity (A is A).

   Philosophy explains this by saying that a judgement of attribution attributes a property to a subject, or an attribute to a substance. In a judgement of attribution, in other words, A and B *are not the same*: 'blue' is a predicate that is attributed to the subject 'sky'. But this implies that even the formal statement of the principle of identity (A is A) is vectorized, even though it conceals this *internalized difference* between A and A. An *analytic* proposition is simply a proposition in which the subject and the predicate are *identical*, even though the distinction between subject and predicate remains. 'A is A' is itself an analytic proposition, since the predicate A is contained in the subject A; and therefore 'A is A' is true. But to complete the detail of Leibniz's formula, we would have to distinguish between two types of identical propositions: an analytic proposition is true either by reciprocity or by inclusion. The proposition 'a triangle has three angles' is an identical proposition because the predicate ('three angles') is the same as the subject ('triangle') and *reciprocates* with the subject. In the proposition 'a triangle has three sides', by contrast, there is no reciprocity, but there is a demonstrable *inclusion* or *inherence* of the predicate in the subject, since we cannot conceptualize a single figure having three angles without this figure also having three sides. One could say that analytic propositions of reciprocity are objects of *intuition*, whereas analytic propositions of inclusion are the objects of a *demonstration*. What Leibniz calls *analysis* is the

operation that discovers a predicate in a notion taken as a subject. If I show that a given predicate is contained in a notion, then I have done an analysis. All this is basic logic: up to this point, Leibniz's greatness as a thinker has not yet appeared.

Principle of sufficient reason

Leibniz's originality emerges with his second great principle, the principle of sufficient reason, which no longer refers to the domain of essences but the domain of things that actually exist, the domain of existences. The corresponding *ratio* is no longer the *ratio essendi* but the *ratio existendi*, the reason for existing. The popular expression of this principle would be, 'everything has a reason' – the great battle cry of rationalism. Leibniz needs this second principle because existing things seem to be completely outside the principle of identity. The principle of identity concerns the identity of the thing and what the thing is, even if the thing itself does not exist. I know that unicorns do not exist, but I can still say what a unicorn is. Leibniz thus needs a second principle to make us think existing beings (real experience, in post-Kantian terminology). The technical formulation of the principle of sufficient reason reads: 'all predication has a foundation in the nature of things'. What this means is that *everything* that is truly predicated of a thing is necessarily included in the concept of the thing. What is said or predicated of a thing? First of all, its essence, and at this level there is no difference between the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason, which takes up and presumes everything acquired with the principle of identity. But secondly, what is said or predicated of a thing is not only the essence of the thing, but also the totality of the affections and events that happen to or are related to or belong to the thing. For example: 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'. Since this is a true proposition, Leibniz will say that the predicate 'crossed the Rubicon' *must* be contained in the concept of Caesar. 'Everything has a reason' means that everything that happens to something – all its 'differences' – must be contained or *included* for all eternity in the individual notion of a thing.[13]

Leibniz arrives at this remarkable claim, according to Louis Couturat, by reconsidering *reciprocity*. The principle of identity gives us a model of truth that is certain and absolute – an analytical proposition is necessarily a true proposition – but it does not make us *think* anything. So Leibniz reverses the formulation of the principle of identity using the principle of reciprocity: a true proposition is necessarily an analytic proposition. *The principle of sufficient reason is the reciprocal of the principle of identity*, and it allows Leibniz to conquer a radically new domain, the

domain of existing things.[14] By means of this reversal, the principle of identity forces us to *think* something. The formal formula of the principle of identity ('A is A') is true because the predicate *reciprocates* with the subject, and Leibniz therefore applies this principle of reciprocity to the principle of identity itself. But the purely *formal* formulation prevents the reversal of the identity principle. The principle of sufficient reason is produced only through a reversal of the *logical* formulation of the principle of identity, but this latter reversal is clearly of a different order: *it does not go without saying*. Justifying this reversal is the task Leibniz undertakes as a philosopher, and it launches him into an infinite and perhaps impossible task. The principle of sufficient reason says not only that the concept of a subject contains everything that happens to the subject (all its differences), but also that we should be able to *demonstrate* that this is the case (just as we can demonstrate that the predicate 'three sides' is contained in the concept of the triangle).

Once Leibniz launches himself into the domain of the concept in this way, however, he cannot stop. Aristotle proposes an exquisite formula in the *Metaphysics*: at a certain point in the analysis of concepts, he says, it is necessary to *stop* (*anankstenai*).[15] For classical Aristotelian logic, concepts are *general*, not individual: the order of the concept refers to a generality, whereas the order of the individual refers to a singularity. By nature, a concept comprehends a *plurality* of individuals; the individual as such is not comprehensible by concepts. Put differently, *proper names* are not concepts. At a certain point, then, the process of conceptual specification must stop: we reach the final species (*infima species*), which necessarily groups together a plurality of individuals. Leibniz, however, did not heed Aristotle's warning: he does not stop. Leibniz's attempted to push the analysis of the concept to the level of the individual: in Leibniz, 'Adam' and 'Caesar' are concepts, and not simply proper names.

But this cry of sufficient reason will propel Leibniz into an almost hallucinatory conceptual creation. For if everything I attribute with truth to a subject is contained in the concept of the subject, Leibniz realized, then I am also forced to include *the totality of the world* in the concept by virtue of the principle of *causality*. The principle of sufficient reason ('everything has a reason') is not the same thing as the principle of causality ('everything has a cause'). 'Everything has a cause' means that A is caused by B, B is caused by C, and so on; 'everything has a reason', by contrast, means that one has to give a *reason* for causality itself, namely, that the relation A maintains with B must in some manner be included or comprised in the concept of A.[16] This is how the principle

of sufficient reason goes beyond the principle of causality: the principle of causality states the *necessary cause* of a thing but not its *sufficient reason*. Sufficient reason expresses the relation of the thing with its own concept, whereas causality expresses the relations of the thing with something else. Sufficient reason can be stated in the following manner: for every thing, there is a concept that gives an account both of the thing and of its relations with other things, including all its causes and its effects. Thus, once Leibniz says that the predicate 'crossing the Rubicon' is included in the concept of Caesar, he is forced to include the totality of the world in Caesar's concept because all the causes and effects of this event (such as the establishment of the Roman Empire) are *also* included in the concept of Caesar. This is no longer the concept of inherence or inclusion, but the fantastic Leibnizian concept of *expression*: the concept of the subject expresses the entirety of the world.

But a second concept follows immediately: each individual notion comprehends or includes the totality of the world, he says, but only from a certain *point of view*. This marks the beginning of perspectivist philosophy, which has often been trivialized. Leibniz does *not* say that everything is 'relative' to the viewpoint of the subject, which would imply that the subject is prior to the point of view. In Leibniz, it is precisely the opposite: the subject is constituted by the point of view; points of view are the sufficient reason of subjects. The individual concept is the point of view through which the individual expresses the totality of the world. But what then determines this point of view? To be sure, the concept expresses most of the world in an obscure and confused manner in the form of *infinitely small perceptions* – a third concept. But there *is* indeed a finite portion of the world that I express clearly and distinctly, which is the portion of the world that affects my *body*. Leibniz provides a deduction of the necessity of the body as that which occupies the point of view: no two individual substances occupy the same point of view on the world because none have the same clear or distinct zone of expression on the world as a function of their body (I do not express clearly and distinctly the crossing of the Rubicon since that concerns Caesar's body). We can see how the problem of sufficient reason leads Leibniz to create an entire sequence of concepts – expression, point of view, minute perceptions, and so on – in accordance with Deleuze's definition of philosophy as the creation of concepts.

Principle of indiscernibles

But this leads us into a final set of problems. The world, Leibniz continues, has no existence outside the points of view that express it: what

is expressed (the world) has no existence apart from what expresses it (individuals). In other words, there is no world in itself: yet each of these individual notions must nonetheless express the *same* world. Why is this a problem for Leibniz? The principle of identity allows us to determine what is contradictory, that is, what is *impossible*. A square circle is a circle that is not a circle; it contravenes the principle of identity. But at the level of sufficient reason, things are more complicated. In themselves, Caesar not crossing the Rubicon and Adam not sinning are neither contradictory nor impossible. Caesar could have not crossed the Rubicon, and Adam could have not sinned, whereas a circle cannot be square. The truths governed by the principle of sufficient reason (truths of existence) are thus not of the same type as the truths governed by the principle of identity (truths of essence). But how can Leibniz at the same time hold that everything Adam did is contained for all time in his individual concept, and that Adam the non-sinner was nonetheless possible? Leibniz's famous response is that Adam the non-sinner was possible in itself, but it was incompossible with rest of the actualized world. Leibniz here creates an entirely new logical relation of *incompossibility* which is irreducible to impossibility or contradiction. At the level of existing things, it is not enough to say that a thing is possible in order to exist; it is also necessary to know with what it is compossible. The conclusion Leibniz draws from this notion is perhaps his most famous doctrine, which was ridiculed by Voltaire in *Candide*: among the infinity of incompossible worlds, God makes a calculation and chooses the 'Best' of all possible worlds to pass into existence, which is *this* world, a world governed by a harmony that is 'pre-established' by God.

But this sets us on the path of the third principle, the principle of indiscernibles, which is the reciprocal of the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of sufficient reason says: for every thing, there is a concept that includes everything that will happen to the thing. The principle of indiscernibles says: for every concept, there is one and only one thing. What this means is that, in the final analysis, *every difference is a conceptual difference*. If you have two things, there must be two concepts; if not, there are not two things. If you assign a difference to two things, there is necessarily a difference in their concepts. The principle of indiscernibles consists in saying that we have *knowledge* only by means of concepts, and this can be said to correspond to a third reason, a third *ratio*: *ratio cognoscendi*, or reason as the reason of knowing. The principle of indiscernibles has two important consequences for Deleuze. First, Leibniz is the first philosopher to say that concepts are proper

names, that is, that concepts are *individual* notions. But can we not say that the concept 'human', for instance, is a generality that applies to all individual humans, including both Caesar and Adam? Of course you can say that, Leibniz retorts, but only if you have *blocked* the analysis of the concept at a certain point, at a *finite* moment. But if you push the analysis to *infinity*, you will reach a point where the concepts of Caesar and Adam are no longer the same. According to Leibniz, this is why a mother sheep can recognize its little lamb: it knows its concept, which is individual. Second, in positing the principle of indiscernibles ('every difference is conceptual'), Leibniz is asking us to accept an enormous consequence. The reason: there are other types of difference, apart from conceptual difference, that might allow us to distinguish between individual things, such as numerical difference (for instance, I can distinguish drops of water numerically, or by number only, disregarding their individuality: one drop, two drops, three drops), spatio-temporal difference ('not *this* drop here, but *that* drop over there'), or differences in extension or figure (shape and size) and differences in movement (fast and slow). These are all non-conceptual differences because they allow us to distinguish between two things that nonetheless have the same concept. Once again, however, Leibniz plunges on; he calmly tells us, no, these differences are pure appearances, provisional means of expressing a difference of another nature, and this difference is always conceptual. If there are two drops of water, they do not have the same concept. Non-conceptual differences only serve to translate, in an imperfect manner, a deeper difference that is always conceptual.

It is here that we reach the crux of Deleuze's early reading of Leibniz. Although no one went further than Leibniz in the exploration of sufficient reason, Leibniz nonetheless subordinated sufficient reason to the requirements of 'representation': in reducing all differences to conceptual differences, Leibniz defined sufficient reason by the ability of differences to be represented or mediated in a *concept*.[17] In Aristotle, what 'blocks' the specification of the concept beyond the smallest species are the accidents of matter; in Kant, it is spatio-temporal intuitions that remain irreducible to the concept. Leibniz is able to reconcile the concept and the individual only because he gives the identity of the concept an *infinite* comprehension: every individual substance (monad) envelops the infinity of predicates that constitutes the state of the world. Where the extension of the concept = 1, the comprehension of the concept = ∞ (an actual infinity). It is one and the same thing to say that the concept goes to infinity (sufficient reason) and that the concept is individual (indiscernibility). In pushing the concept to the level of

the individual, however, Leibniz simply rendered representation (or the concept) infinite, while still maintaining the subordination of difference to the principle of identity in the concept.

For Deleuze, it is this subordination of difference to the identity of the concept that is illegitimate and ungrounded. In Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason is the reciprocal of the principle of identity, and the principle of indiscernibles is in turn the reciprocal of the principle of sufficient reason. But would not the reciprocal of the reciprocal simply lead us back to the principle of identity? (*CGD* 06 June 1980). The fact that it does *not*, even in Leibniz, points to the irreducibility of the principle of sufficient reason to the principle of identity – in other words, it points to the fact that sufficient reason finds it ground, not in a principle of identity, but rather in a principle of difference. Deleuze's thesis is that behind or beneath the functioning of the identical concept – even the concept rendered infinite – there lies the movement of difference and multiplicity within an *Idea*. 'If we ask what blocks the concept, […] It is always the excess of the Idea, which constitutes the superior positivity that arrests the concept or overturns the requirements of representation' (*DR* 289). Indeed, Deleuze presents *Difference and Repetition* in its entirety as a research into the roots of sufficient reason, which is formulated in a theory of non-representational Ideas, and which ultimately finds the ground of reason to be strangely 'bent' or 'twisted' into the ungrounded – the 'without-ground,' the *sans-fond* (difference-in-itself). Leibniz himself nowhere explicitly formulates a theory of Ideas, at least in the sense that Deleuze gives this term (in the Platonic and Kantian sense). Nonetheless whereas for Kant, Ideas were totalizing, unifying, and transcendent, in Deleuze's theory, Ideas must be differential, genetic, and immanent. Despite critiques of Leibniz, and his obvious distance from many of Leibniz's presuppositions (notably his theological presuppositions), it is in Leibniz himself that Deleuze find the key for his reformulation of the theory of Ideas on an immanent and differential basis.

The law of continuity (the differential relation)

This brings us, finally, to the law of continuity. What is the difference between truths of essence (principle of identity) and truths of existence (principle of sufficient reason)? With truths of essence, says Leibniz, the analysis is finite, such that inclusion of the predicate in the subject can be demonstrated by a finite series of determinate operations.[18] The analysis of truths of existence, by contrast, is necessarily infinite: the domain of existences is the domain of infinite analysis. If I perform

an *analysis* demonstrating the inclusion of the predicate 'sinner' in the individual notion 'Adam', the analysis will be *infinite* because it has to pass through the entire series of elements that constitute the world, which is actually infinite.[19] When I perform the analysis, I pass from Adam the sinner to Eve the temptress, and from Eve the temptress to the evil serpent, and so on. Moving forward, I demonstrate that there is a direct connection between Adam's sin and the Incarnation and Redemption by Christ. There are *series* that are going to begin to fit into each other across the differences of time and space. (This was the aim of Leibniz's *Theodicy*: to justify God's choice of *this* world, with its interlocking series.) What matters at the level of truths of existence, in other words, is not the *identity* of the predicate and the subject, but rather the fact that one passes from one predicate to another, from the second to a third, from the third to a fourth, and so on. Put succinctly: *if truths of essence are governed by identity, truths of existence, by contrast, are governed by continuity*. The best of all possible worlds would be the one that realizes the maximum of continuity for a maximum of difference.

Now it might seem that such an infinite analysis would be possible only for God, whose divine understanding is without limits and infinite. As finite beings, we humans seem to be incapable of undertaking an infinite analysis. In order to situate ourselves in the domain of truths of existence, we have to wait for experience: we know through experience that Adam sinned or that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Yet in Deleuze's interpretation, Leibniz indeed attempted to provide us finite humans with an artifice that is capable of undertaking a well-founded approximation of what happens in God's understanding, and this artifice is precisely the technique of the infinitesimal calculus or differential analysis. We as humans can undertake an infinite analysis thanks to the symbolism of the *differential calculus*. Most of the concepts Deleuze develops in *Difference and Repetition* to describe the nature of Ideas (differential relation, singularities, multiplicities or manifolds, virtual, problematic, etc.) are derived from the calculus. I will simply focus on the first of these concepts – the differential relation – since this is where we reach the point of inversion, so to speak, where Deleuze substitutes a principle of difference for a principle of identity. What does it mean to say that there is a continuity between the seduction of Eve and Adam's sin, and not simply an identity? It means that the relation between the two elements is an infinitely small relation; or rather, that *the difference between the two is a difference that tends to disappear*. This is the definition of the continuum: continuity is defined as the act of a difference insofar as the difference tends to disappear. Between the predicate 'sinner' and the subject 'Adam',

I will never be able to demonstrate a logical identity, but I will be able to demonstrate (and here the word demonstration obviously changes meaning) a continuity, that is, one or more vanishing differences.

What then is a vanishing difference? In 1701, Leibniz wrote a three-page text entitled 'Justification of the Infinitesimal Calculus by That of Ordinary Algebra', in which he explained the nature of the differential relation using an algebraic example (Figure 6.1) (*L* 545–6). Leibniz draws two right triangles – CAE and CXY – that meet at their apex, at point C. Since the two triangles CAE and CXY are similar, it follows that the ratio e/c (in the top triangle) is equal to $y/(x-c)$ (in the bottom triangle). What happens if we move the straight line EY increasingly to the right, so that it approaches point A, always preserving the same angle at the variable point C? Even though the length of the straight lines c and e will diminish steadily, the ratio between them will remain constant. When the straight line EY passes through A, points C and E will fall directly on A, and the straight lines c and e will vanish, they will become equal to zero. And yet, Leibniz says, even though c and e are now equal to zero, the relation of *c* to *e* is *not* equal to zero, since it remains a perfectly determinable relation that is still equal to the relation of *x* to *y*. Put differently, when the line EY passes through A, it is not the case that the triangle CEA has 'disappeared'; rather, the triangle CEA is still there, but it is only there 'virtually,' since the relation c/e continues to exist even when the terms have vanished. This is what the

Figure 6.1   An Algebraic Example of the Calculus.

term 'vanishing difference' means: it is when the relation continues even when the terms of the relation have disappeared. The differential relation can be said to be a *pure relation*, insofar as it is a relation that persists even when its terms have disappeared. The differential relation provides Deleuze with a mathematical formulations of a principle of pure difference, or what he calls *difference-in-itself*. Normally, we think of difference as a relation between two things that have a prior identity ('x is different from y'). With the notion of the differential relation, Deleuze takes the concept of difference to a properly transcendental level: the differential relation is not only *external* to its terms (which was Bertrand Russell's empiricist dictum), but it also *determines* its terms. In other words, difference here becomes *constitutive* of identity, that is, it becomes productive and genetic. This is what Deleuze means, in *Difference and Repetition*, when he says that relations such as identity, analogy, opposition, and resemblance are all secondary *effects* or results of prior relations of difference.

To give an example of how the differential relation functions as a *genetic* principle, consider the theory of perception that Leibniz developed in The *New Essays*. Leibniz had noted, famously, that we often perceive things of which we are not consciously aware, such as a dripping faucet at night. He concluded that our conscious perceptions are derived from the minute and unconscious perceptions of which they are composed, and which my conscious perception integrates. I can apprehend the noise of the ocean or the murmur of a group of people, for instance, but not necessarily the sound of each wave or the voice of each person that compose them. A conscious perception is produced when at least two of these minute and virtual perceptions – two waves, or two voices – enter into a *differential relation* that determines a *singularity* (another Deleuzian concept), an event that 'excels' over the others, and becomes conscious. Every conscious perception constitutes a constantly shifting threshold: the minute perceptions are like the obscure dust of the world, its background noise, what Maïmon called the 'differentials of consciousness', which themselves constitute a *virtual multiplicity* (a third Deleuzian concept). Indeed, it was Maïmon himself who drew out the consequences of such a psychic automatism of perception: it is the reciprocal determination of differentials (dx/dy) that produces the complete determination of the object as perception, and the determinability of space-time as condition. Space and time cease to be pure givens (as in Kant), but are engendered by the nexus of these differential relations in the subject; and objects cease to be empirical givens, but are the product of these relations in conscious perception. In Maïmon, space,

time and objects are determined *genetically* through the mechanism of the differential relation.

Kant had already objected that Maïmon, by returning to Leibniz, had thereby reintroduced the duality between finite understanding (consciousness) and infinite understanding (the divine) that the entire Kantian critique had attempted to eliminate.[20] Against Kant, however, Deleuze argues that the infinite here is only the presence of an *unconscious* in the finite understanding, an unthought in finite thought, a non-self in the finite self (whose presence Kant himself was forced to discover when he hollowed out the difference between a determining 'I' and a determinable 'me'). Indeed, Leibniz can be said to have developed one of the first theories of the unconscious, which is very different from the theory developed by Freud. Freud conceived of unconscious in a *conflictual* or *oppositional* relationship to consciousness, and not a *differential* relationship. In this sense, Freud was dependent on Kant, Hegel, and their successors, who explicitly oriented the unconscious in the direction of a conflict of will, and no longer a differential of perception. The theory of the unconscious proposed by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* is a differential and genetic unconscious, and thus thoroughly inspired by Leibniz.[21]

Conclusion

Were we to continue to follow Deleuze's deduction, we would have to show how, starting with this principle of difference, Deleuze on his own account systematically deduces his other metaphysical concepts: singularity, virtuality, multiplicity, convergent and divergent series, problematic, and so on. Our primary aim in this essay, however, has simply been to show how Deleuze derives a principle of difference starting from the purely formal statement of the principle of identity in Leibniz. (In *The Fold*, one could say that Deleuze's deduction moves in the opposite direction: from difference to identity, or, in the language of *The Fold*, from inflexion to inclusion.) But we can already see the broader consequences of reading Leibniz from a Maïmonian or post-Kantian point of view. One of the aims of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was to show that the Ideas of God, the World, and the Self or the Soul were transcendent illusions. To read Leibniz from a post-Kantian viewpoint would therefore amount to asking: What would Leibniz's philosophy look like *minus* the Ideas of the God, World and Self? Such a post-Kantian image of Leibniz would come close to a picture of Deleuze's philosophy. Its outlines can be found at the end of Deleuze's discussion of Whitehead's philosophy of the event (*TF* 81): (1) *God* would no longer be a transcendent being

who compares and chooses the richest compossible world, but would instead be an immanent Process (as in Whitehead) that affirms all incompossibilities and divergences and passes through them. (2) The *World* would no longer be a continuous world defined by its pre-established harmony; instead, divergences, bifurcations, and incompossibles must now be seen to belong to *one and the same universe*, a chaotic universe in which divergent series trace endlessly bifurcating paths, and give rise to violent discords and dissonances that are never resolved into a harmonic tonality: a 'chaosmos,' as Deleuze puts it (borrowing a portmanteau word from Joyce) and no longer a world. (Leibniz could only save the 'harmony' of *this* world by relegating discordances and disharmonies to *other* possible worlds – this was his theological slight of hand). (3) Finally, the *Self*, or the individual, rather than being closed upon the compossible and convergent world it expresses from within, would not be torn open, and kept open through the divergent series and incompossible ensembles that continually pulls it outside of itself: the 'monadic' subject, as Deleuze puts it, would become the 'nomadic' subject. 'Instead of a certain number of predicates being excluded from a thing in virtue of the identity of its concept, each 'thing' opens itself up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, as it loses its center, that is, its identity as concept or as self' (*LS* 174). The Leibnizian notion of *closure* would be replaced by the Deleuzian notion of *capture*. In the end, Deleuze does with Leibniz what he does with every figure in the history of philosophy: through an extraordinarily careful conceptual reading, Deleuze ultimately makes *use* of Leibniz's philosophy and Leibniz's concepts in the pursuit of his own philosophical aims.

Notes

1. Deleuze, for instance, applies this Maïmonian formula at various instances to the work of Schelling, Bergson, Nietzsche, Foucault, and even Pasolini: (1) 'Thus it is not the conditions of all possible experience that must be reached, but the conditions of real experience. Schelling had already proposed this aim and defined his philosophy as a superior empiricism: this formulation also applies to Bergsonism' (*DI* 36). (2) 'The Nietzsche and the Kantian conceptions of critique are opposed on five main points: 1. Genetic and plastic principles that give an account of the sense and value of beliefs, interpretations and evaluations rather than transcendental principles which are simple conditions for so-called facts' (*NP* 93). (3) 'Foucault differs in certain fundamental respects from Kant: the conditions are those of real experience, and not of possible experience' (*F* 51, the final phrase of this sentence is inadvertently omitted from the English translation). (4) 'If it is worth making a philosophical comparison, Pasolini might be called post-Kantian (the conditions

of legitimacy are the conditions of reality itself) while Metz and his followers remain Kantians (the falling back of principle upon fact)' (*C2* 276, translation modified).

2. Gueroult (1929); Vuillemin (1954). Gueroult's subsequent work on Fichte (1930) also contains an important discussion of Maïmon in the introduction.

3. See also *N* (145): 'Setting out a plane of immanence, tracing out a field of immanence is something all the authors I've worked on have done (even Kant – by denouncing any transcendent application of the syntheses of the imagination, even though he sticks to possible experience rather than real experience'. (translation modified) Albert Gualandi provides an insightful analysis of Deleuze's relation to Kant in his *Deleuze* (1998).

4. See also *WP* (46): 'Beginning with Descartes, and then with Kant and Husserl, the cogito makes it possible to treat the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness. Immanence is supposed to be immanent to a pure consciousness, to a thinking subject. Kant will call this subject transcendental rather than transcendent, precisely because it is the subject of the field of immanence of all possible experience from which nothing, the external as well as the internal, escapes […]. But in so doing Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to a Self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection)'.

5. Maïmon himself later renounced his 'Spinozism': 'I recognize that, in my first writing [the *Essay in Transcendental Philosophy*], I attempted this mortal leap and tried to reconcile the Kantian philosophy with Spinozism, but I am now completely persuaded that this undertaking is impracticable, and I believe it better to assure the synthesis of the Kantian philosophy with Hume's scepticism'. Maïmon, *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde* (1792), Teil (II, p. 143), cited in Gueroult (1929, p. 138).

6. See Forster (1998, p. 162): 'Such supposed 'facts of consciousness' fall squarely within the domain of the skeptically dubitable'.

7. Nietzsche (1967, Essay III, § 24, p. 153) (on truth); (Preface, § 6, p. 20) (on morality).

8. See *LS* (105, 102): 'the question of knowing how the transcendental field is to be determined is very complex. […]. We seek to determine an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field' (Translation slightly modified).

9. See *LS* (18–9 and 123) for Deleuze's statement of this exigency.

10. Gueroult (1930, I, p. 126).

11. See Hegel (1969, Vol. 1, Book 2, § 1, II), 'Determinations of Reflection' (Identity, Difference, Contradiction). Miguel de Beistegui has provided an important analysis of Deleuze's critiques of this section of Hegel's *Logic* in his chapter entitled 'Absolute Identity' (de Beistegui 2004, pp. 77–106).

12. In the following section, I follow closely the deduction of principles that Deleuze presents in his 1980 seminars.

13. See *TF* (41): 'If we call an "event" what happens to a thing, whether it undergoes the event or makes it happen, it can be said that sufficient reason includes the event as one of its predicates: the concept of the thing, or the notion. "Predicates or events", says Leibniz'.

14. See Couturat (1972, pp. 19–45). 'The principle of identity states: every identity (analytic) proposition is true. The principle of reason affirms, on the contrary: every true proposition is an identity (analytic)' (p. 22).
15. See Aristotle (1984, II, ii, 994b24).
16. See Mates (1986, p. 157): 'To discover the reason for the truth of the essential proposition 'A is B' is to analyze the concept A far enough to reveal the concept B as contained in it'. Deleuze, however, would disagree with Mate's statement that Leibniz 'appears to use the terms 'reason' and 'cause' interchangeably' (ibid., p. 158).
17. See *DR* (12): 'According to the principle of sufficient reason, there is always one concept per particular thing. According to the reciprocal principle of the identity of indiscernibles, there is one and only one thing per concept. Together, these principles expound a theory of difference as conceptual difference, or develop the account of representation as mediation.' See also *DR* (288): *difference* is always inscribed within the identity of the concept in general, and *repetition* is defined as 'a difference without concept', that is, in terms of the numerically distinct exemplars or individuals that are subsumed under the generality of the concept $(x^1, x^2, x^3, … x^n)$, and which block further conceptual specification.
18. However, Deleuze will argue, against Leibniz himself, that the analysis of essences must itself be infinite, since it is inseparable from the infinity of God. See *TF* (42).
19. See *TF* (51): 'In the area of existences, we cannot stop, because series are liable to be extended and must be so because inclusion cannot be localized'.
20. Letter to Marcus Herz, 26 May 1789, in Kant (1967, pp. 150–6).
21. See also *DR* (106–8), which contain Deleuze's most explicit avocation of a differential unconscious (Leibniz, Fechner) over a conflictual unconscious (Freud).

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7
A Transcendental Philosophy of the Event: Deleuze's Non-Phenomenological Reading of Leibniz

Sjoerd van Tuinen

Introduction

This chapter situates Gilles Deleuze's *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* in the context of its rejection of phenomenologically inspired readings of Leibniz. Though texts like *The Logic of Sense* and *Immanence: A Life* seem to be written almost entirely under the sign of a radicalised transcendental reduction, it is well-known that Deleuze takes an almost diabolical pleasure in dismissing the phenomenological tradition, which is 'too pacifying and has blessed too many things' (*F* 113). His critique of Husserl and Husserl's followers condenses in his critique of common sense in its transcendental functioning, in other words, of *Urdoxa*. Even if phenomenology replaces transcendent essences with the immanence of sense in intentionality, Deleuze argues that it nonetheless resurrects essences by imposing on us the alternative of *either* the non-sense of an undifferentiated groundlessness *or* sense as guaranteed by its imprisonment in common sense (*LS* 103, 106; *F* 14; *WP* 51, 160). Firstly, in its account of the genesis of sense, it confuses the *explanans* with the *explanandum*: it raises 'to the transcendental a mere empirical exercise in an image of thought presented as originary' (*LS* 98) and 'thinks of the transcendental in the image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground' (*LS* 105). Secondly, because it determines the lived flux of time as an experience immanent to human consciousness instead of vice versa, it inevitably reinstates a triple transcendence: the objective sensory World, the intersubjective Other and higher-level scientifico-cultural Communities[1], three proto-beliefs that carry away the flow of immanence by determining the 'significations' of the potential totality of the lived (*WP* 47, 142).

However, any transcendental philosophy that breaks with the particular contents and modalities of *doxa* merely by rationalising *Urdoxa* can never be more than a caricature. At stake for Deleuze is 'the concrete richness of the sensible' (*D* 54), in other words, 'the things themselves, but things in a wild and free state, beyond "anthropological predicates"' (*DR* xx–xxi, translation modified).

Central to both Deleuze's critique of phenomenology and his own project is his adaptation of Sartre's concept of the 'impersonal and preindividual transcendental field', populated by free and unbound singularities. These singularities are like 'transcendental events' that subsist and insist in a 'transcendental play' (*LS* 102–3) from which common sense emerges, but never the other way round. However, because Sartre follows Husserl in giving the transcendental field the form of a transcending Ego, it is not to him that Deleuze refers, but to Leibniz. Annexing Leibniz – besides the Stoics and Whitehead – as one of the three great philosophers of the event, he claims that 'we must always return to the theatre of Leibniz – and not to the cumbersome machinery of Husserl' (*LS* 113). Similarly on several occasions in *The Fold* he connects Leibniz to phenomenology, while simultaneously ascribing to him a 'transcendental philosophy, which bears on the event rather than the phenomenon, [and which] replaces Kantian conditioning by means of a double operation of transcendental actualization and realization (animism and materialism)' (*TF* 120).

What follows are three trajectories through *The Fold*, each of which articulates an opposition of Leibniz to phenomenology. These trajectories correspond broadly to critiques of phenomenology found in Deleuze's other books, but also shed new light on them when systematically contrasted with interpretations of Leibniz found in the phenomenological tradition. The first two arguments find their point of departure in Husserl, the third in Merleau-Ponty.

From phenomenon to event

When Husserl told his student Dietrich Mahnke 'I am a Leibnizian',[2] he was confessing to a double allegiance. First, throughout his works Husserl adopts Leibniz's *mathesis universalis* in the reformation and defence of intensional logic against both the revitalised advent of the extensional approach among his contemporaries, such as Russell and Couturat, and the neo-Kantian, epistemological approach of Cassirer. Second, in *Cartesian Meditations* (1929) Husserl adopts a monadological solution to the egological problem of solipsism.[3] Although his project

is precisely the relentless banishment of natural consciousness and therefore rules out any dogmatic metaphysics in a pre-Kantian sense, he recognises in Leibniz an important forerunner of Kant, the latter even 'lagging behind Leibniz' when it comes to 'the determination of the true meaning of the a-priori'[4] (*Hua* VII, § 27). To him, Leibniz is a phenomenologist *ante litteram*: '[W]ith the discussion of the fundamental properties of the monad under the titles of perception, aspiring transition from perception to perception and in particular representation of what is not really present and nonetheless perceptively conscious, Leibniz has grasped and applied metaphysically the fundamental properties of intentionality' (ibid.).

What is not really present and nonetheless perceptively conscious is what Leibniz calls the 'phenomenon'. Indeed, if before Leibniz the notion of the phenomenon entailed a negative dimension in the philosophy of knowledge, Leibniz brings about a profound change without which the idealist revolution remains incomprehensible. By revoking the Cartesian dualism of two equal substances into a hierarchy of uncountable individual substances, Leibniz transformed the relation of soul and body into relations between 'private' individuals and 'public' substantial composites respectively. Each monad represents, or expresses, the reality of all monads in its entirety, but each according to its own intrinsic 'spontaneity' or 'originating activity' and hence without any communication. A monad has no empirical knowledge of other monads, only phenomenal representations. Leibniz therefore sometimes equates the phenomenon with internal perception. Nonetheless, insofar as the phenomenon is 'well-founded', the finite understanding of each monad remains insurmountably bound to what is expressed by other monads and to an order of existence outside of itself.[5] In Deleuze's wording, the monad's condition of closure implies 'a torsion of the world, an infinite fold, that can be unwrapped in conformity with this condition only by recovering the other side', that is, 'a strictly complementary form of outside' (*TF* 111). As such, the well-founded phenomenon can also be equated with bodies or 'the things themselves', since these are never individual substances, but monadic aggregates or infinitely divisible composites, constituted by the relations in which the many monads feature for each other in representation. In this second sense, we can define the phenomenon as the public achievement of private perceptual subjectivity.

What Husserl appreciates about this concept of the phenomenon is above all its opposition to naïve realism. According to Locke, the mind or soul is like a *camera obscura* that functions solely as receptor of

sense impressions. For Leibniz, the soul is more like a windowless and doorless baroque chapel, endowed with a 'creative reason' that draws all its perceptions from its own dark background, the innate folded curtain that replaces Locke's sense organs: nothing is innate in the understanding, he argued, except the understanding itself. In a similar way, in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) Husserl opposes to the logical empiricism of his contemporaries the 'shadow or reflection' or 'blind angle'[6] (*dunkle Winkel*) of transcendental consciousness, which cannot be illuminated from the outside by scientific, logical or mathematical formalisms because it remains tied to the synthetic relationships of sense that make up the life world. Precisely because transcendental consciousness is independent of all natural affection and causality, the blind monad can figure as its analogon.

It is true that the monad does not yet possess the synthetic structure of transcendental apperception, but only an analytical principle of subjectivity in its objectivated, substantial form. Analogous to the structure of the Cartesian *cogito*, each state of perception is the objective self-realisation of the subject. If, despite its precritical conception, there can be discerned in Leibniz something similar to a transcendental *epoché*, it is, firstly, because consciousness is defined as the knowledge of having a perception, comparable to the consciousness of the correlation between act and object, and secondly, because its intentional correlates precede all external reality precisely by actively constituting it. Accordingly, Husserl's claim that '[t]he original donating experience is perception' (*Hua* III/1, etc.) seems to match with Leibniz's claim, in a letter to Des Bosses, where he maintained that 'I think that for the fundamental examination of things it is useful to explain all phenomena by the sole perceptions of monads'[7].

Deleuze, by contrast, argues that in Leibniz the path that leads from perception to the phenomenon is not at all that of an immediate correlation between act and object. Perceptions and 'objective' bodies are indeed two sides of the same coin, but between them there exists not a relation of constitutive intentionality, but one of 'non-causal correspondence'. What Deleuze opposes to Husserl is therefore the irreducibility of 'having a body' – a formula that echoes the phenomenological interpretation of the body as primordial fact – in Leibniz's foundation of the phenomenon, which determines that the phenomenon always divides over two 'really distinct and yet inseparable' causalities or 'regimes of expression' (*TF* 119).

According to the idealist empiricism of Berkeley, a phenomenon, or indeed all that exists, is nothing more than a mere appearance in the soul or 'given of the imagination' (*TF* 94). For Leibniz, on the contrary, a

well-founded phenomenon can by right only be actualised in the mind if it is also realised objectively (*TF* 94–5, 104–5). Firstly, a conscious perception possesses a double structure that allows for its genesis and secondly, since there virtually coexists an infinity of incompossible phenomena each of which exerts pressure to become realised, all actualised points of view depend on 'a body that expresses from its side, with its surroundings, what a soul expresses in its own region' (*TF* 106). In other words, the phenomenon is more than Berkeley's 'being of the imagination' but less than an 'object', insofar as 'the reality of the body' is precisely 'the realisation of phenomena in the body' (*TF* 120). Precisely because a monad (Julius Caesar) possesses a clear zone of expression (to cross the Rubicon) and actively distributes the phenomenal world, it must also possess the 'primary force' to realise these phenomena outside of itself in the passivity of bodies (Caesar's organic body which a flow of water will eventually soak) (*TF* 86, 94–9). An actualised phenomenon does not automatically constitute the real, but must itself be realised in the body according to a causality that is not just anterior to, but also of a different nature than actual phenomena (*TF* 104–5, 120). These processes of actualisation and realisation correspond to two different causal regimes that together make up 'a quadripartite system of folding': an always intrinsic psycho-metaphysical causality and an always extrinsic physico-organic causality respectively.

The first sees monads as psycho-cosmological 'machines' or 'spiritual automatons' that operate according to a psychic calculus. On the one hand, it is true that because the world only exists as included in monads, 'what happens to be a phenomenon in the strict sense is what is perceived by the monad' (*TF* 105). Yet since only a small part of it is perceived clearly by each, this means that, on the other hand, the rest of the world is included in the form of microperceptions, 'present and infinitely minute elements' that are not in any way representations of objects outside the monad or in the world, but rather the world's 'representatives'. They are infinitely small because they are 'differentials of consciousness' (*TF* 89): infinitely little perceptions that unravel in every direction and form the agitated background from which, through reciprocal determination, the series of our apperceptions are stabilised and integrated. It follows that the phenomenon can never be simply given by donating consciousness. Since the process of integration of microperceptions bears no similarity to the integrated apperception, conscious perception can never be the originary mode of the givenness of things themselves. Rather, self-conscious subjectivity itself depends on a pre-subjective or machinic genesis in 'unconsciously lived experience'.[8]

The second kind of causality is the physico-organic mechanism by which the phenomenon finds itself realised in composite substances. It produces a 'reduplication' or 'resemblance'[9] of the first kind of causality in the form of a projective analogy between perception and bodies (*TF* 95–9, 105). The organ is a contraction of infinitely small movements in matter which, in a projective 'relation of order', are made to resemble a perception. Hence the perception of pain does not consist of the resemblance between this perception and the movement of something digging into my flesh, but of the projection of the soul in an area of the body: an organ. But not only does this projective organisation of matter take place according to different laws than the genesis of perceptions – communication and propagation of extrinsic movement instead of integration of intrinsic differentials – neither is this organ constitutive of the organisation of perception. Rather, it is itself the product of a sedimentation of anorganic matter. In other words, if at the level of perception there is an internal genesis of consciousness, then similarly at the level of passive bodies an organ is in no way imaged on its material composition. In Deleuze's reading consciousness and its organic body do not form the foundation of the phenomenon, but the double process of actualisation and realisation – the phenomenon whose inner folds are 'similarly' arranged in outer pleats.

So what is the new status of the phenomenon? For Leibniz, the objectivity of the phenomenon is ultimately guaranteed by God, who endows each reasonable monad with the organs that accord with its clear zone of expression. It is only due to God that an apperception, an abstraction from a myriad of microperceptions functioning as so many representatives of the world, is 'no longer the representative of the world but becomes [again] the representation of an object in conformity with the organs' (*TF* 98–9). Deleuze however never ceases to stress that although a phenomenon is simultaneously perceived by the soul and projected in a resembling matter, it nonetheless remains irreducible to both. For this reason the result of *epoché* cannot be the monad understood as an internal relationship between subject and world or as a field of consciousness saturated with meaning. In fact, both subject and object are themselves constituted, or rather produced, in a double process of actualisation and realisation.

But then what is it that is both actualised and realised if it is not the phenomenon? Instead of phenomena, Deleuze says that '[w]e find ourselves before events' (*TF* 105). When Adam's soul sins, his body really absorbs the apple. But still distinguished from its actualisation and its realisation is 'this secret part of the event […] this ideal pre-existence

of the world, this silent and shaded part of the event … a potential that exceeds the souls that direct it and the bodies that execute it' (*TF* 105–6). Put differently, with Leibniz the phenomenon has attained the status of the Stoic '*Eventum Tantum* to which the body and soul attempt to be equal, but that never stops happening and that never ceases to await us: a pure virtuality and possibility, the world in the fashion of a Stoic Incorporeal, the pure predicate' (*TF* 105–6, cf. 52–3, 80). Deleuze thus returns to the argument made in *The Logic of Sense* 20 years earlier, in which Husserl is criticised for conceiving of the phenomenon as the attribute of a transcendental subject: 'the attribute is understood as predicate and not as verb, that is to say, as concept and not as *event*' (*LS* 118, 97–9). In Husserl's reading of Leibniz, the phenomenon is what is immanent *to* and appears *to* transcendental consciousness, which, as we shall see, is soul-like insofar as it is a centre of individuation (*TRM* 385). But precisely for this reason, phenomenology is unable to uphold the 'pure immanence' of the event over its actualisation and realisation. For Deleuze, in contrast, the event is a 'singularity' (*TF* 15; *LS* 100–8) that must be considered in itself, independent of its empirical actualisation in the soul or its realisation in the body and that obeys its own rules. The event pertains not to consciousness, but only to other events according to the only veritable *transcendental* criteria – the convergence and divergence of series of perceptions and series of bodily interactions. Events insist and subsist in an ante-predicative modality, in constant communication only with other events and with possible worlds (*LS* 109–11). Precisely insofar as they are considered independently, they make up what Deleuze terms the impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field, that is 'a strangely intermediate, or rather, original, zone' (*TF* 119) consisting of a 'pure emission of singularities' (*TF* 60–1, 66): not a phenomenon, but a 'Planomenon' or plane of consistency of appearing–disappearing events (*ATP* 50, 65; *WP* 38; *CGD* 20 May 1980).

Solipsism and the problem of appurtenance

In Husserl, the monad first appears in *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* (1910–11) and *Ideas II* (§ 26, 29). Yet his adaptation of monadological metaphysics is developed most extensively in the fifth of the *Cartesian Meditations*, in which it coincides with the the pre-egological foundations of consciousness, such as passive synthesis, the lived body and the problem of alterity. Consciousness possesses the ontological structure of a being which remains identical to itself in the flux of its perceptions,

acts and lived states and which unites these as its intentional correlates. Like a monad, the finite ego is thus said to 'unfold' or 'explicate'[10] itself in the infinite concatenation of its particular intuitions, that is of '"internal" determinations' within which the Identical expresses itself as an 'immanent transcendence' or 'primordial world'. Only from there it also constitutes the Other and the objective World (Husserl 1999, henceforth '*CM*', § 41). As Leibniz said, the monad is the synthesis of 'first, *myself* who am thinking of a variety of things and then, the varied *phenomena* or appearances which exist in my mind' (*L* 363). Whereas Descartes failed to develop the Ego in the full concretion of its transcendental life, Husserl argues, it is the merit of Leibniz's theory of the monad's 'peculiar ownness' or 'habitualities' to have thematised the 'following along' of the monad with its own concretion, according to which 'with every act emanating from him and having a new sense, he acquires a new abiding property' (*CM* § 32–4). Hence to say that I perceive the table is to say that the table appertains to the Ego and that intentionality consists of a possession – the transcendence of consciousness over the thing. (Cf. *CGD* 19 May 1987, 20 May 1987)

The theory of 'ownness', however, leads Husserl to a new problem, that of the transcendental Ego which finds itself closed in by solipsism (*CM* § 42). If the natural world follows directly from the immanence of the Ego, then the original experience of the I is also constitutive of the natural experience of intersubjectivity. Yet simultaneously, because it is bound to the consistency of an ante-predicative life world, it can only constitute a world that is the same as that constituted by other subjects, its Alter Egos. Without an account of the transcendental Other, phenomenology cannot gain full access to the world. The problem is therefore how to pass from immanent transcendence to objective transcendence? How can the monad escape from itself? How are the private and the public reconciled?

Leibniz of course did not have this problem, because he had discovered the plurality of monads 'at an earlier stage of phenomenological deduction' (*TF* 109): everything that exceeds my clear zone of expression and thus remains dark and obscure in me is only the shadow of other monads possessing their own clear zones, these zones of expression being distributed over a common plane according to the principle of pre-established harmony. Although this dogmatic solution is no longer available to Husserl, he nonetheless translates it into the acknowledgement that, if all perspectivistic experience is embedded in a horizon-structure of experience, a world consisting of the reciprocally constitutive or 'compossible' explications of other monads, then

other monads must be harmonically 'co-present' in my experience at least intuitively, even if I do not undergo this experience myself in an original fashion (*CM* § 43). As Husserl argues, a 'second reduction', conceived as the 'disregard of all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity', must abstract from all intentionality the 'sphere of appurtenance' of my being which delimits a more originary level of the 'I' embracing what is proper to me, my 'primordial world', rather than the phenomenal world in its entirety (*CM* § 44–7; *Hua* XVII, § 95). Within this sphere one must differentiate between what is possessed by the Ego and what belongs to it but is not possessed by it. The question thus becomes, in Husserl's own words: '*How* can my ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute under the name, "experience of the alien", precisely something *alien* – something, that is, with a sense that excludes the constituted from the concrete make-up of the sense constituting I-myself, as somehow the latter's analogue?' (*CM* § 44)

Corresponding to Leibniz's 'organic expressionism', in which each monad expresses or perceives the world according to a clear zone that corresponds to its body; for Husserl my peculiar zone within the phenomenal field consists of the experience mediated by my 'organism' or 'lived body' (*Leib*, as opposed to the empirically experienced *Körper*). My body exists not only in direct communication with others, but also, because it is mine, it is in sharp distinction from them. It is part of my sphere of possessions because, as a means of perception, I experience it in an 'immediate' or 'originary presence'. Yet through my body's 'empathy' with that of another, I can also apperceive the non-originary presence of other Ego's on the basis of analogy. I experience other monads not through representation within myself, but through 'appresentation' (*CM* § 49–50). An appresentation is a 'layer' added to the Ego that is no longer part of its sphere of appurtenance. Mediated by the body, each of my self-explications thus follows an assimilative course in association with the object-constitutions of the Other (*CM* § 54). Husserl refers to this 'associating' as 'pairing as passive synthesis' (*Paarung als passive Synthesis*), 'embrace' or 'entwinement' (*CM* § 51). Although selves cannot 'penetrate' each other, there is nonetheless a reciprocal horizon-constitution or 'communification (*Vergemeinschaftung*)' and 'unanimity (*Einstimmigkeit*, resulting from the co-determination (*Mitbestimmung*) of the objective world)' in all experience. I therefore explicate myself originally by unfolding the horizon of a communal being that is included both in my own essence and in the experienced object itself. It knows only one crucial 'restriction', namely that 'the unqualifiedly apodictic

evidence of self-explication brings out only the all-embracing structural forms in which I exist as ego' (*CM* § 46). It is due to this effective being-in-communion, distributed over so many centres of individuation, that a unity of similarity is constituted, that is, an objective World or Nature common to all and which 'must exist, if there are any structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads'. The *épochè*, then, is not the consequence of solipsism, but proves itself to be a bodily mediated linkage, turning pre-established harmony into a kind of 'real' *sensus communis*, a 'transcendental intersubjectivity' that functions as the condition of objectivity of the external world (*CM* § 56, § 60).

Animal monadology

This final transformation of pre-established harmony into common sense is what Deleuze takes Husserl to task for in Chapter 8 of *The Fold*. For Husserl the transcendental Ego is no longer 'windowless and doorless', but rather a 'windowed monad'[11]: it intuits other Egos in a non-originary experience, as if through a window, yet is a monad because it constitutes or expresses the world only from its own originary experience. Of course, for Deleuze such a distortion of Leibniz's original concept is not a problem in itself. He equally proposes a nomadic concept of the monad as 'kept half open as if by a pair of pliers' (*TF* 81, 137). However, he argues that Husserl's version is a solution to a badly defined problem, because the transcendental field remains subordinated to common sense and the 'natural' or 'organic' perception of human consciousness. Despite the fact that Husserl needs 'centers of individuation [...] in the manner of Leibniz, rather than a form of the I in the Kantian manner' (*LS* 99, 109–17), the appurtenance of the organic body to the experiencing soul presupposes the compossibility of the experienced world, which, in turn, presupposes the exclusion of divergent singularity-events. As a consequence, the bodily window of the transcendental Ego is only the empirical guarantee of a complementary and transcending common sense in transcendental constitution. The organism inserts humans into the world in a way that is completely determined by our all too human sensory and motor capacities to perceive the world. In this way, however, Husserl imposes an even more severe limit on the sense-event than did pre-established harmony in its dogmatic form. In Deleuze's Nietzschean phrasing: 'The reversal of values had to go so far – making us think that immanence is a prison (solipsism) from which the Transcendent will save us' (*WP* 46).

For Husserl, my body serves the process of apperceptive transposition through which I discover the Other. His position can be called Cartesian insofar as he understands the body as a compromise that allows only for the appresentation of the non-own in contrast to the immediacy of the own. For Leibniz, by contrast, '[n]othing obscure lives in us because we have a body, but we must have a body because there is an obscure object in us' (*TF* 85). In other words, given the difference in kind between souls and bodies, the question is rather how the soul can be immediately present in the body, instead of the other way around (*TF* 113).

Deleuze phrases this question drawing upon the Leibnizian distinction between actualisation and realisation. The community of souls is a 'first Nature' in which individual monads are constituted by their 'intrinsic possessions', which are reciprocally distributed according to a 'vertical immanent causality' (final causes). A 'second Nature' is made up of monads at the level of matter, which consists not of the community of individuals but of masses and mixtures, 'extrinsic possessions' and variable associations of lesser monads in organic and inorganic compositions that completely determine each other in a 'transitive horizontal causality' (efficient causes) (*TF* 107). In the first, the world is individuated and actualised according to hierarchy, accord and variety; in the second, it is realised according to relations of attraction, repulsion, elasticity and plasticity. Again, Deleuze concludes that, the difference between first and second Nature, is simply forgotten by Husserl. This becomes clear precisely when, in order to make the *Leib* into an intrinsic possession of the transcendental Ego and reduce pre-established harmony to a problem of intersubjectivity, Husserl equates the lived body with an organic unity that poses no special problems within my sphere of appurtenance. But already for Leibniz, pre-established harmony cannot be the complete answer since it concerns only the accord between monads considered for themselves and not the reality of intermonadic composites, that is, bodies. Contrary to the privacy of the soul, which is *intime praesens*, the body is always public, composed of *partes extra partes*. The question is therefore still 'what founds the appurtenance of one body to each monad, despite the real distinction and the difference of level or regime?' (*TF* 106). Far from replacing the problem of the immediate presence of the soul in the body, as Malebranche's occasionalism or Spinoza's parallelism do, the realisation of pre-established harmony makes it all the more necessary (*TF* 11, 106, 116).

Although in first nature the other is not related to my body, this certainly does not imply that Leibniz is a solipsist: monads do not contain others, but my intrinsic possessions are sufficiently marked by foreign monads whose shadow I discover within me. The intercourse of monads, namely, arises not from an influence but from a consensus originating in their preformation by God. Simultaneously Deleuze insists, even if my body communicates with another monad's body, this is not yet a meeting with the other self, but with 'an even more unexpected element' (*TF* 107). Although the requirement of having an organic body is 'quite individual', a body cannot simply belong to a monad, because it is itself composed of infinities of present material parts (*TF* 98, 113–5). My organic body envelops several crowds of monads that make up my organs, but which in turn animate their own bodies: '*the soul is never without an animal* or something analogous'[12]. Each of these monads possesses its own body, different from my organic body of which they are only the temporary 'requisites' (*TF* 46). Moreover, a distinction has to be made between 'non-symmetric and inverted appurtenances' of organisation (my monad has a body, but to each of the monads composing my body belongs its own composite of other monads) and 'constant or temporary appurtenances' in flux (my body is of limitation-matter, but it is composed of flux-matter). It follows that the other is not the Alter Ego; rather it is 'the animal in me as a concrete being' (*TF* 108–9).

'[T]he great gap that will open between Leibniz and Husserl' (*TF* 107) is that 'the latter does not face any special problem in organic composition' (*TF* 109). For Husserl, the Other appears only with the other body that does not belong to me. For Leibniz, in contrast, the union of soul and body implies that my body is itself a world teeming with others: 'if Caesar's soul (for example) were alone in nature, the creator of things need not have given it any bodily organs. But this same creator also wanted to make an infinity of other beings, which are contained in one another's bodily organs. Our body is a kind of world full of an infinity of creatures which also deserved to exist'[13]. Husserl seeks to overcome the naivety of assuming a plurality of empirical consciousnesses and ends up with a transcendental consciousness consisting of the organic apperceptions that are the privileged property of reasonable monads. In this way, the *Leib* remains fettered to the Christian problematic of the incarnation of the soul.[14] But animal monads, even vegetal or mineral ones, each possess a clear zone too (*TF* 92). Through projection and requisition, there are animal souls 'involuted' everywhere in inorganic matter. Matter consists of a 'vertiginous animality' (*TF* 11) such that 'there is no cause to ask if matter thinks or perceives, but only whether

it is separable from these little souls capable of perception' (*TF* 108, 14). These little souls might not have as many clear apperceptions as reasonable monads have, but they abound in microperceptions that demand an 'animal psychology' that is irreducible to the transcendental form of man (*TF* 87, 92, 113; *CGD* 19 May 1987)

Hence if for Husserl the body is 'immediately present' *in* the monadic Ego, this cannot be so for Leibniz, for whom the list of bodily possessions remains undefined. As Deleuze insists, 'it is not easy to know what we own, and for what length of time', but '[p]henomenology does not suffice'[15] (*TF* 109). The argument can even be reversed: not only do we 'not yet know what a body can do', '[t]here are no fewer things in the mind that exceed our consciousness than there are things in the body that exceed our knowledge' (*SPP* 18) and 'if an organism may be regarded as a microscopic being, how much more is this true of the Other in psychic systems' (*DR* 261). Leibniz offers an 'animal monadology' that paves the way for Deleuze's own concepts of becoming-animal and becoming-other, and ultimately of the 'nonorganic life of things' (*C1* 54; *WP* 180) and the 'non-psychological life of the spirit'[16] (*TF* 109). Ultimately, a de facto organic consciousness is replaced by a diffused consciousness by right and a de facto organic body is replaced by a body without organs by nature: 'animism' and 'materialism'.

The existentialist fold

Husserl recognises in Leibniz's theory of bodily appurtenances the public or intersubjective embeddedness of private transcendental subjectivity. To a certain extent, Husserl is right to do so. It seems undeniable that in the traditional, idealist interpretation of 'The Monadology', despite Leibniz's account of embodiment, a phenomenon is bound to be realised in bodies according to the 'pre-established harmony' of a supremely individuated 'world' divided over a vertical subordination of bodies to reasonable souls.

It has nonetheless been inherent to phenomenology itself to seek to overcome the particular contents of anthropocentric *doxa* ever since Hegel. Already early on, for example, Merleau-Ponty criticised Husserl's representationalism and the concept of intentionality: 'We started off from a world in itself which acted upon our eyes so as to cause us to see it and we now have consciousness of or thought about the world, but the nature of this world remains unchanged: it is still defined by the absolute mutual exteriority of its parts, and is merely duplicated throughout its extent by a thought which sustains it' (Merleau-Ponty 1962,

henceforth '*PP*', 39). Following Heidegger, he seeks to escape from psychology through the facticity of the ego and an ontology of the unthought. It is precisely in this turn away from a mere 'duplicity' that the concept of the 'fold' has appeared in phenomenology. The existentialists fold back the *for*-the-world of the intellectualist subject onto its foundation in being-*in*-the-world. The fold is a redistribution of the empirical and the transcendental, intimately entangling them while no longer allowing the one to be conceived in the image of the other. Rather than the intentional Ego, the interfold between *Dasein* and Being, between I and the other, between the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' or between a mutually implied subject and object, instates the horizon of experience. From now on, everything revolves around ontogenesis, the genesis of sense from being-in-the-world.

At key moments throughout *The Fold*, when discussing the double infinite fold between the two levels of expression that forms the essential trait of the baroque, Deleuze refers to Heidegger's concept of the 'fold-of-two' (*Zwiefalt*). Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, is strikingly absent. Yet it was he who, in the working notes of *The Visible and the Invisible*, proposed a radicalisation of Husserl's intersubjective monadology that might well be called expressionist or baroque.[17] Although he never addresses this work directly, Deleuze clearly paraphrases Merleau-Ponty when in Chapter 7, entitled 'Perception in the Folds', he insists that 'I am forever unfolding between two folds, and if to perceive means to unfold, then I am forever perceiving within the folds' (*TF* 93). Similarly, unmistakeable phenomenological resonances can be heard when Deleuze concludes in both a Merleau-Pontian and a Heideggerian manner: 'the question always entails inhabiting the world' which means that 'what always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding' (*TF* 137, translation modified). Deleuze's reservations towards Husserlian intentionality come close to those articulated by Merleau-Ponty, whose last writings, for which Deleuze had much admiration,[18] bear a strong Leibnizian stamp, insofar as they adopt the seventeenth-century philosopher's 'innocent way of setting out in one's thinking from infinity' (*EPS* 28). Finally Merleau-Ponty argues that one finds in Husserl's use of Leibniz a confusion of the empirical and the transcendental in the organic regime of common sense. Since to each spiritual perception there corresponds an essentially organic activity, Husserl's detour through the lived body serves to mobilise Leibniz only in order to found natural perception at a transcendental level (*Urdoxa*): 'Pre-established harmony' (Merleau-Ponty 1968, henceforth '*VI*', 133) is 'a useful synonym for the *urdoxic* relation between good and common sense' (*VI* 246), in other words, intentionality.

But is Merleau-Ponty capable of escaping from common sense? Whereas for Husserl the lived body functions as the 'window' of the otherwise solipsist monad, Merleau-Ponty discovers in the monad's windowlessness the paradigmatic precondition for 'folding back' subjective intentionality onto its abyssal ground in existence or facticity: a being-with-others-in-the-world. But for Deleuze this is not enough, since in order to free the transcendental from all doxic organisation, it is precisely the enduring relation between ego and world that has to be undermined. Even if one reads *The Fold* as an implicit realisation of the expressionist project that Merleau-Ponty had only sketched out, there remain several crucial disagreements.

Merleau-Ponty and Leibniz

In Merleau-Ponty, the fold appears as a solution to the Hegelian and Sartrian dilemma of how the 'for itself' and the 'in itself' are related to one another in embodied perception. Since a total transcendental reduction is impossible, it is not the being-*for*-the-world of the Ego and its intentions that forms the solid transcendental ground of lived experience, but our sensory-motor being-*in*-the-world, our synergetic body being the mobile 'interface' or 'fold' from which both objectivity and subjectivity arise. Already in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, we can recognise an existentialist prefiguration of the chiasmic structure of Being from *The Visible and the Invisible* in the way both the subject and the object of perception are described as implicates of the same ontological fabric. The subject is 'stuffed' with the world, the past and the Other, and the object is always already hollowed out by consciousness: 'I am not, therefore, in Hegel's [or Sartre's] phrase, 'a hole in being', but a hollow (*creux*), a fold (*pli*), which has been made and which can be unmade' (*PP* 215; cf. *VI* 233, 281). In addition, the incarnate domain of relations between body and world, a presubjective 'interworld', receives a structuralist definition derived from a similar semantics of folding as could be found in Husserl: 'an open and indefinite multiplicity of relationships which are of reciprocal implication' (*PP* 71). As with Leibniz, Being is nothing but perspective, made up of an infinity of decentred and co-implicated points of view.

However, just like Husserl, the *Phenomenology of Perception* still explains the lived body primarily as a compromise that, although a necessary precondition for knowledge, cannot but obfuscate it. Hence it reverts to a latent Cartesianism that separates the intelligible and the sensible into two worlds, unavoidably turning the one into a simple

reproduction of the other. Although the book deals with the 'question of recognizing consciousness itself as a project of the world' (xvii), it is nonetheless 'a study of the appearance of being to consciousness' (*PP* 61). In *The Visible and the Invisible*, the epistemological problem of perception is therefore traded in for an ontology of chiasmic sensation in the Flesh. If, for Husserl, the sensible world remains hypothetical to an interior, then in Merleau-Ponty, it becomes the constitutive condition of all subjectivity. Sensation takes place according to the dynamics of 'invagination', mutual 'welding', 'padding' or 'coiling over.' These terms express the impossibility of ever arriving at the 'things themselves', which always remain enfolded: 'It is impossible to see things "all naked" because the gaze itself already envelops them, clothes them with its own flesh, palpating it with its look' (*VI* 131, 138, 143) and 'he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he is of it' (*VI* 134–5). This chiastic reversibility of possession 'is a reversibility always immanent and never realised in fact. My left hand is always on the verge of touching my right hand touching the things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence eclipses at the moment of realisation' (*VI* 148). This hiatus is not an ontological void, however, but a 'dehiscence', (*VI* 146, 153) which, like Heidegger's *Zwiefalt*, is a 'negativity that is not nothing' (*VI* 151), a 'difference without contradiction, that divergence between the within and the without that constitutes its natal secret' (*VI* 135).

In the later Merleau-Ponty everything, man, animal or thing, is clothed with the flesh and sensation is now understood as an 'instinct' in matter. In addition, although the incarnate flesh is clearly derived from Husserl's layered body, Merleau-Ponty realises that 'to speak of leaves or layers is still to flatten and juxtapose, under the reflective gaze, what coexists in the living and upright body' (*VI* 138). The fate of the transcendental ego is no longer threatened by solipsism. Rather, without the Other there would not be an ego at all. Lived experiences are no longer constituted unilaterally as poles in frontal relations, as in Husserl, rather are they structured by lateral relations. As Merleau-Ponty argues, Husserl's attempt to install a demarcation between alien and proper layers of sense from the viewpoint of a transcendent subject is doomed to fail. It initiates a process of infinite regression, much like the peeling of an onion, which still presupposes some preformed centre of individuation. The flesh – and this is where Merleau-Ponty's Leibnizianism comes in – must rather be conceived of as an 'insertion of the world between the two leaves of my body' (*VI* 264). It is the proper body 'turned inside out', in other words, the originary appurtenance

or 'inherence' of the own and the non-own in a pre-individual world (*VI* 143). My intentions resonate directly with the world as sounding board, in 'sympathy' or 'telepathy' (as opposed to 'empathy', *VI* 244–5), 'mutual expression (*entr'expression*)', 'synchronizing modulation' or 'resonance' with those of the other. In the 'Working Notes' to *The Visible and the Invisible*, he even equates the relation of appearing to what appears with the relation of the differential to the integral (*VI* 230, 233). The sensing and the sensed are not opposed as different regions of being, rather, between them there is only an internal difference, a reversible 'fold' (*VI* 146).

Contrary to Husserl, therefore, it is precisely in the condition of the monad's windowlessness that Merleau-Ponty discovers the precondition for his own expressionist philosophy. The Ego is a monad that no longer has an intentional relation towards others, but is enveloped in an original experience, an original complicity with the world:

> The *In-der-Welt-sein* relation will take the place held in Leibniz by the relation of reciprocal expression of the perspectives taken on the world, and hence God as the unique author of these diverse perspectives which emanate from him as thoughts. The Being thus discovered is to be sure not the God of Leibniz, the 'monadology' thus disclosed is not the system of monads – substances; but certain Leibnizian descriptions – that each of the views of the world is a world apart, that nonetheless 'what is particular to one would be public to all', that the monads would be in a relation of expression between themselves and with the world, that they differ from one another and from it as perspectives – are to be maintained entirely, to be taken up again in the brute Being, to be separated from the substantialist and onto-theological elaboration Leibniz imposes upon them. – The expression of the universe in us is certainly not the harmony between our monad and the others, the presence of the ideas of all things in it – but it is what we see in perception, to be taken as such instead of explaining it. Our soul has no windows: that means *In der Welt sein*.
>
> (*VI* 222–3, cf. 169, 223, 262, 266)

Merleau-Ponty's remarks on Leibniz were never developed from their still very inchoate state. For this reason, it is difficult to do justice to this passage or to analyse it in full. Instead we shall focus on one element which, from the perspective of Deleuze, is the most problematic: the status of the expressive relation between monad and world.

Whereas phenomenological concepts of the world refer to a community which lies at the basis of all thought of possibilities, Deleuze rethinks, through the anteriority of the event to the souls and bodies between which it is expressed, Leibniz's doctrine of the ideal world as insisting and subsisting as a virtuality and a possibility. Husserl has defined the world as the 'community of monads, which […] constitutes the one identical world' (*CM* § 49). Merleau-Ponty defines our being-in-the-world as the belonging of I and the other to a transcendental fabric of 'encroachment of everything upon everything, a being by promiscuity' in which 'what is particular to one is public to all' (*VI* 234). For both, the primacy of existence and 'intercorporeity' eliminates the virtual presence of incompossible worlds within this world. The *Leib* or *chair* mediates subjective points of view such that all 'possible worlds' are stitched together.[19] By contrast, for Deleuze the subjective point of view is only the 'production' or 'result', the closure of the process of the world in itself 'at the cost of a torsion that causes the world to exist currently only in subjects, but that also makes subjects all relate to this world as if to the virtuality they actualise' (*TF* 26, translation modified). Due to its irreducibility to processes of actualisation and realisation 'the world is virtually first', yet at the same time, because it does not exist outside of the monads in which it is actualised and between which it is realised, 'the monad is actually first' (*TF* 52). Deleuze therefore contrasts the existentialist reading of the monad as being-in-the-world with his claims that 'if the world is in the subject, the subject is no less for the world' (*TF* 25, 50) and '[t]he soul is the expression of the world (actuality), but because the world is what the soul expresses (virtuality)' (*TF* 26; *LS* 346). In other words, by positing the world as the expression of the subject, Deleuze agrees with Merleau-Ponty, but it is so precisely because the world inheres in the subject and not vice versa. Yet what precisely is at stake here for Deleuze? Doesn't he commit the same mistake for which he blames Husserl, that is, making the transcendental field immanent to subjectivity? The argument is difficult and we'll have to proceed slowly, following three distinct but interrelated trajectories.

The monad vis-à-vis the world

The world as other-structure

First, in his engagement with Tournier's novel *Friday* (1967) in *The Logic of Sense* and in his discussion of psychic systems in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze derives from the genetic priority of the virtual in Leibniz a new conception of the world, starting from a transformation

of the phenomenological opposition of *Umwelt-Welt*. *Umwelt* is redefined as the synthesis of singularities according to convergent series, actualised around sedentary centres of individuation and realised in corporeal aggregates making up an 'Other-structure'; *Welt* is redefined as the 'chaosmos'[20] common to all worlds, a multiplicity unbound from any pre-established and fully individuated order, and traversed by nomadic 'persons' or 'Egos' that transcend their monadic individuality and form divergences between different worlds.

In the case of what Deleuze calls world (*Welt*), I do not share the same world-structure of fixed singularities with the 'a priori Other' (*LS* 113–5, 304–21; *WP* 17–8). In the expression of the other there is the virtual multiplicity 'beyond' the intertwining with some other-structure. When this structure is no longer transparent we see 'what other people were: the possible obstinately passing for the real' (*LS* 308). Others are then no longer intersubjective others or alter egos in the same world (the phenomenological *Welt* or *Urdoxa* equates with the Deleuzo-Leibnizian *Umwelt*), but expressions of potential worlds or structures 'in and of themselves', where the monadic continuum is broken and two incompossible worlds touch each other in a becoming of a new world in the same world[21]: a nomadic Caesar who doesn't, cross the Rubicon or a vagabond Adam who resists temptation (*TF* 63–4). A nomadology replaces a monadology when individuation becomes unlimited and decentred and when bifurcations and divergences of series cease to be genuine borders between incompossible worlds but form 'intraworldly connections' (*TF* 81): 'In this case, the subject is vis-à-vis the world, in a new sense of the word "world" (*Welt*), whereas the living individual was in the world and the world within him or her (*Umwelt*)' (*LS* 113).

Similar to Sartre, for whom the world is not a space of communication but of conflict between independent selves (*LS* 366n12; *DI* 79), and to Nietzsche, for whom incompossibility becomes precisely a means of transversal communication (a pathos of distance (*LS* 172, 174–8)), Deleuze points out that there is not an infinity of perspectives on or within the same structure, but rather so many structures as there are perspectives: 'The Other, as structure, is the expression of a possible world' (*DR* 260–1; *LS* 308). Unlike Merleau-Ponty, for whom 'each of the views of the world is a world apart' only on the condition that these other worlds are in 'pre-established harmony'[22] (*VI* 133) and belong to a 'common world' that can be lived if not known or thought (*VI* 11), and for whom these other worlds form so many transcendencies within my world,[23] for Deleuze, the appearance of the other 'does

not restore transcendence to another self', rather it 'is the condition for our passing from one world to another'[24] (*WP* 48, 18). Moreover, I myeslf am already a world full of encounters with other persons. Against Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, one can therefore read in *Difference and Repetition* the following ethical 'rule', namely 'not to explicate oneself too much with the other, not to explicate the other too much […]. For it is not the other which is another I, but the I which is an other, a fractured I' (*DR* 261).

The public and the private

Second, and here Deleuze sides with Merleau-Ponty rather than with Sartre, because of the affirmation of divergence it is necessary to reject the post-Kantian dialectics between 'in-itself' and 'for-itself' (or Sartre's *en-soi* and *pour-soi*).[25] Kant defines the transcendental subject as the a priori interiority that finds itself in an orientedness and replaces the metaphysical foundation of the givenness of a phenomenon by the abstraction of a noumenal object = x as an original transcending exteriority. Both Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze translate this back to Leibniz's division of the private soul and the public body, even if in the idealism of Kant the 'in-itself' has a merely regulatory value, whereas for Leibniz the soul and the body are of 'equal dignity'. As Merleau-Ponty continues his criticism of Leibniz: 'The pre-established harmony (like occasionalism) always maintains the in itself and simply connects it with what we experience through a relation from substance to substance founded in god – instead of making of it the cause of our thoughts [as in Kant] – but it is precisely a question of rejecting entirely the idea of the In Itself' (*VI* 222–3). Similarly, Deleuze demonstrates how Leibniz paves the ground for common sense, when he makes the realisation of a phenomenon dependent on 'the resemblance of the perceived to something = x, […], that is, the transformation of the currently perceived world into an objectively real world, into an objective Nature'[26] (*TF* 105).

Despite this compatibility of Leibnizian metaphysics with the dialectics of in-itself and the for-itself they seek to get rid of, both Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze stick to Leibniz's allotment of body and soul, but now on terms of 'the public and the private as phenomenological categories' (*TF* 117–8, 154; *VI* 223). However, Deleuze attributes the further development of these categories not to Husserl or to Merleau-Ponty, but to Tarde and Whitehead. Indeed, when at one point Deleuze does draw a parallel between Whitehead and Heidegger – and implicitly, Merleau-Ponty – in that both envisage a monad that is windowless precisely because it is naturally public, 'naturally open onto the world, without

having to pass through a window' (*TF* 81), this is not without irony, since now monads are closed not because their inside is already outside, but because the inside already includes the outside. Whether human, animal or mineral, it becomes important to distinguish between two 'states' in which a monad can be, or two 'aspects' under which it must be regarded: a monad is private insofar as in-and-of-itself it is the primitive condition of a collective body that indissociably appertans to it; and it is public or *en masse* insofar as through an inverted appurtenance, it belongs to a collective body from which it cannot free itself. In the first case, the monad is regarded from its inside as a subject; in the second, it is captured through requisition in an objective composite from the outside by a derivative force (*TF* 117–8, cf. 78–81; *WP* 164). In other words, we go from the condition of closure to that of 'capture' (*TF* 81, 137).

The whole problem of inverted and temporary appurtenance harks back to a problematics that has found no place in either Husserl or Merleau-Ponty but that was central to Leibniz: 'domination as a cipher of appurtenances' (*TF* 110).[27] Hence Deleuze contrasts Tarde's interpretation of Leibniz's concept of belonging to the phenomenological interpretation: 'Much more than Husserl, Gabriel Tarde fully discerned the importance of this mutation, and he called in question the unjustifiable primacy of the verb "to be". "The true opposite of the self is not the non-self, it is the mine; the true opposite of being, that is, the having, is not the non-being, but the had"' (*TF* 110). The event that appears with the other becomes a matter of possession or power, the force of others in me and others in others, of individuals interlocked through 'linkages without sufficient reason' (*TF* 103). Subjectivity is reduced to the power to express the influence of and on others, the capacity to perceive and affect and to be perceived or affected. Hence there is a 'vector of prehension' that moves from the world to the subject – or as Deleuze says, '[f]rom inflexions of the world to inclusion in its subjects' (*TF* 25, translation modified) – as we go from the public to the private: 'The world must be placed in the subject in order for the subject to be for the world' (*TF* 26).

The production of novelty

Since the Deleuzo–Leibnizian *Welt* is no longer a phenomenal world, but a 'chaosmological' field of converging/diverging events, the aim of the transcendental reduction has changed as well. It no longer seeks the conditions of the world's objectivity by explicating its conditions of possibility and verifying the genesis of the given. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty is a foundationalist insofar as he posits a common cultural–natural life world as inexhaustible source of perception and subjectivity. At the

origin lies what Deleuze and Guattari call an 'ideal coincidence' (*WP* 178) of body and world, which, even as it decentres the subject and makes it beholden to the world, enables the subject's continued function as the measurant of perception and experience. Merleau-Ponty founds the juridical priority of phenomenology over modern philosophy by arguing that the latter is only a theory of knowledge which neglects the making-appear of the appearance of the world 'itself', the unthought or invisible of this community-world.[28] Instead, with Deleuze foundational-ism gives way to constructivism: 'in what conditions does the objective world allow for a subjective production of novelty, that is, creation?' (*TF* 79, *D* vii). Hence the main question in *The Fold* is '[w]hat are the conditions that make an event possible?' (*TF* 76).

Now, for Leibniz the primal condition of all creativity is precisely an individuating closure, a private being-for-the-world. Only insofar as a subject actualises the world from a unique and unshareable point of view, insofar as it becomes truly singular, does it contribute to the world's infinite progress. The richer the world that God produces, the more individuals are necessary. In a more radical way, Deleuze insists that for a new event to come about, it is always 'necessary to depart from the world or the serial order [*Umwelt*]' (*TF* 25). An invention always implies a break with the other-structure, hence Deleuze defines the 'production of novelty' precisely as 'a liberation of true quanta of "private" subjectivity' (*TF* 79), the private person being 'a creative viewpoint which itself takes the role of an incongruous part within the whole' (*PS* 102, 99).

According to a dogmatic rationalist reading of Leibnizian monadol-ogy, individual expression is subordinated to the plane of essence so that closure has a primarily rigidifying function. But if neo-Leibnizianism is characterised by the suppression of the condition of closure, this does not mean that it disappears altogether. The entire second part of *The Fold* ('Inclusions'), as well as the last chapter of *Foucault* ('Foldings, or the Inside of Thought'), is dedicated to demonstrate that without an individuating 'screen' or 'brain',[29] the world as pure multiplicity (*Welt*) is only an abstraction (*TF* 76–7). Even if each individual is 'naturally open onto the world', if it is already a 'society', as Tarde and Whitehead say, it is still only 'half open',[30] its public-ness being only the other side of its privacy, where it is already pregnant of another world: 'the being-for the World of unconscious or minute perceptions' (*TF* 94). In the same sense, there no longer exists a transcending Other, but only a nomadic 'half-other' (*demi-étranger*) – and we now understand why Deleuze uses

this strange expression. What Deleuze recognises in Leibniz is the idea that the world is pre-individual and 'relations themselves are types of events' (*TF* 52). To each event there belongs an agency, a constitutive 'disparity' (*TF* 44) due to which it is both 'potential and real, public and private, participating in the becoming of another event and the subject of its own becoming' (*TF* 78). For example, '[e]verything prehends its antecedents and its concomitants and, by degrees, prehends a world. The eye is a prehension of light. Living beings prehend water, soil, carbon, and salts' (*TF* 78). What must be affirmed therefore is a constant process of 'chaosmosis' in which the categories of 'in-itself' and 'for-itself', 'public' and 'private' are multiple and confused, each captured or prehended by others in contrapuntal relations such that 'all object = x are 'persons'' enveloping different worlds within the world and new individualities 'as so many variables or possibilities' (*LS* 115).

An individuation emerges as one more fold from what is already a collective folding of events, as something half individual and half pre-individual, half soul and half body: 'a heterogeneous or heteromorphic creature' (*TF* 9, 13). The individual is not an individual being-in-the-world but an individuation of the world. Its condition of closure is a condition for the production of the world, the world in the making, an infinite activity in which each infinitesimal change goes together with the change of existing individuals in an 'aparallel evolution of two beings that have absolutely nothing to do with each other' (*ATP* 10–1). Or as Deleuze and Guattari put it in *What is Philosophy?*: 'We are not *in* the world, we become *with* the world' (*WP* 169).

Conclusion

Undeniably *The Fold* contains an intense debate with phenomenology, even if often only implicitly. But what interests Deleuze is not the irreducibility of the phenomenon, but of the event. Instead of Husserl's theory of individual appurtenances, Deleuze prefers Tarde's equation of being with pre- and trans-individual having. Instead of Merleau-Ponty's decentred chiasms in the flesh, Deleuze prefers Foucault's folding of exterior forces, Whitehead's prehensions and Bergson's durations. Although there are indications that Deleuze reads Leibniz through the lenses prepared by Heidegger – who proposed a hermeneutical *Erörterung* of the principle of reason as epochal foundation in the 'fold-of-two' (*Zwiefalt*) of being and thought – and by the later Merleau-Ponty – who in *The Visible and the Invisible* was rethinking his philosophy in light of

a serious engagement with Bergson – these other authors have proven to be closer to Deleuze's own constructivist reading of Leibniz.

According to Deleuze, phenomenology cannot return to the things themselves, that is pure immanence, because it conserves the form of consciousness within the transcendental, and retains the forms of good sense and common sense (the unity of saying 'I'), which are produced rather than originary. It is true that between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, there takes place an important paradigmatic change in the phenomenological reception of Leibniz, which revolves around the interpretation and application of the concept of the monad: the windowed monad as model for intellectualist intentionality (Husserl) or the windowless monad as model for existentialist being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty). Nonetheless both for Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the concept of the monad served the foundation respectively of logic and experience in transcendental common sense. Although we are well aware that the remarks of Merleau-Ponty we have focussed upon are only working notes that were never developed into an elaborate theory, it seems that the later Merleau-Ponty never really goes beyond Husserl's fifth Cartesian meditation when he postulates that one's sensations and those of the Other must always already be in understanding of each other, pacified and compossible.

What distinguishes Deleuze from phenomenology is the extent to which he lets common sense be undermined by its very principle of production. In Leibniz he discovers the means to do so, since he had already developed a logic of events in which convergence and divergence are the laws of individuation that *de jure* exceed all *de facto* existing centres of individuation. For as Leibniz writes, God produces the world 'before' creating souls since he creates them *for* this world that he invests in them. Nonetheless it is only when intraworldly divergence and incompossibility are affirmed over and against Leibniz's 'theological exigencies', that singularity-events finally become nomadic rather than monadic, insisting and subsisting independently of the sedentary envelopes that distribute and actualise them. A public individual is constituted by the connective synthesis it establishes between a finite number of singularities that belong to a particular world. A world (what Deleuze calls *Umwelt*) is constituted through the selection of an infinite number of singularities drawn from a chaosmos (what Deleuze calls *Welt*) through conjunctive synthesis. But the synthesis that constitutes the formation of private subjectivity and the production of the new is that of disjunctive synthesis or inclusive disjunction. If a process of individuation can still be described in terms of a subjectivation or

a personification, the grounds upon which an appeal to subjectivity can be made are therefore no longer those of phenomenology. Being-for-the-world rather than being-in-the-world is precisely what remains when there no longer endures *Dasein*. The production of the new is opposed to Husserl's individuated structure of windowed intersubjectivity or the windowless ecstasy of the Merleau-Pontian position: 'In this sense, it is indeed true that the thinker is necessarily solitary and solipsistic'[31] (*DR* 281–2).

Notes

1. Deleuze refers to the *Husserliana* (1950), henceforth 'Hua', I, §§ 55–6.
2. Cited in Cristin and Sakai (2000: 11).
3. Recently there has been much interest in Husserl's monadologism. See Cristin (1990) and (2000); Kaehler (1995) and (2000); Mertens (2000); Vergani (2004) and Pradelle (2007).
4. See also 'Abhandlung', (*Hua* VII, 241; VI, § 56).
5. See Leibniz's only explicit treatise on the concept of the phenomenon, 'On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena' (*L* 363—6). Cf. Poser (2000, esp. pp. 21–7).
6. The analogy of Leibniz's *camera obscura* and Husserl's *dunkle Winkel* is discussed by Cristin (2000, p. 213).
7. Letter to Des Bosses, June 1712, cited in *TF* (156n23).
8. For example, in the field of ethics Leibniz can be considered to present 'the first great phenomenology of motifs'. Deleuze describes the dynamic factors of action in which voluntary movements appear only as great amplitudes that abstract from all the minute involuntary inclinations that unconsciously modulate psychic life (*TF* 69; *CGD* 24 February 1987). Although Deleuze never states which might be a second phenomenology of motifs, he clearly suggests Leibniz to be a precursor to Bergson's account of free will.
9. Deleuze adopts the concept of resemblance from Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (*TF* 156n30), in which spiritual perception is directly linked with bodily actions. Bergson makes images in consciousness coincide with movements in space. Not in the phenomenological way of setting up as a norm 'natural perception', but through fluctuations of matter without a central consciousness or horizon, turning the eye or brain into one image among others. For Bergson, all consciousness therefore *is* something instead of there being consciousness *of* something. Deleuze argues that '[t]he opposition between Bergson and phenomenology is, in this respect, a radical one' (*C1* 56–61). What must be reduced in order to arrive at genetic conditions through transcendental reduction, both Deleuze and Bergson argue, is not the empirical world, but consciousness itself. Hence in Deleuze the reduction is precisely the reverse of that of phenomenology. See also Boundas (1996, pp. 84–5).
10. There is no explicit folding in Husserl in the sense of the existentialist phenomenologies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, that is, on the level of ontology. Nonetheless in a text like *Erfahrung und Urteil* (1939) he constantly refers to the movement of intensional logic as 'explication' (*Explikation*).

11. As he puts it in a description that exemplifies why for Deleuze the phenomenological appropriation of Leibniz is 'too tender' (*WP* 179): 'Leibniz said, monads have no windows. I mean, rather, that each monad has infinitely many windows. Every understanding perception of an alien body is such a window and every time I say, "please dear friend" and he answers me understandingly, an I-act has migrated from our open windows from my I to the I of my friend and vice versa. A mutual motivation has produced a true unity between us'. *Hua* (XIII); Beilagen (III, LIV).

12. Letter to Lady Masham, 30 June 1704, Woolhouse & Francks (2006, 215).

13. Ibid., cited in *TF* (109).

14. The same can be said of Merleau-Ponty, who argues that 'all zoology assumes from our side a methodical *Einfühlung* into animal behaviour, with the participation of the animal in our perceptive life and the participation of our perceptive life in animality' (cited Ansell Pearson 1999, 210), whereas for Deleuze becoming-animal has meaning not on the basis of empathy but solely of ethological expressionism. Becoming-animal is 'a zone of indiscernibility more profound than any sentimental identification [...] This is the reality of a becoming' (*FB* 25).

15. Similarly, in *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze asks with Husserl: 'what is it in the Ego that transcends the monad, its appurtenances and predicates?' and immediately answers that the answer 'cannot be the phenomenological one, since the Ego is no less constituted than the individual monad' (*LS* 113).

16. Leibniz must rather be regarded a spiritualist or animist rather than an intellectualist. A similar point is made by Barbaras in critique of Merleau Ponty. See Barbaras (2004, p. 230).

17. Though Merleau-Ponty's early texts testify to an interest in Malebranche, the working notes of *The Visible and the Invisible* inform us that the chapter that would have made up the first part of this work would have been a chapter on classic ontology consisting of a confrontation between Cartesian rationalism based on the clear and the distinct and Leibniz revolving around the key concept of 'expression' (*VI* 177). The flesh is not a pure positivity, but a pregnancy accessible to a kind of immanent, wild *Logos* at work in the sensible field which governs the unfolding of a topography or relief of the things in sizes and shapes and holds all things together in a system governed not by laws, but 'through the reflections, shadows, levels and horizons between things (which are not things and are not nothing, but on the contrary mark out by themselves the fields of possible variation in the same thing and in the same world)' Merleau-Ponty (1960, p. 160). His translator calls this wild *Logos* 'the "baroque" proliferation of generating axes for visibility in the duplicity of the real' and cites Merleau-Ponty: 'The "great unpenetrated and discouraging night of our soul" is not empty, is not 'nothingness'; but these entities, these domains, these worlds that line it, people it, and whose presence it feels like the presence of someone in the dark, have been acquired only through its commerce with the visible, to which they remain attached' (*VI* 150). For the only discussion of Merleau-Ponty's Leibnizianism by any major commentator, see Barbaras (2004, pp. 229–34). On Merleau-Ponty as a baroque thinker, see Buci-Glucksmann (2002, pp. 115–29) and Gambazzi (1994, pp. 27, 43–7). According to the latter, 'the most radical and most problematic dimension of the last Merleau-Ponty is the Leibnizian and

baroque dimension in his thought, which constitutes, it seems to me, the "future" of his ontology of the question and of difference, a direction which corresponds to a different will of the thinker, a different ethics' (Gambazzi 2004, p. 30).

18. Paul Virilio as cited by Beaulieu (2004, 157).
19. It is impossible to transcend our being-in-the-world because, as Barbaras has noted about Merleau-Ponty, on the one hand, '[a] world that would be only the correlate of a plurality of monads would not be a world, since it would not rest in itself', but on the other hand, 'subjects subsisting "before" the world would not be subjects since they would not have a world on the basis of which they might constitute themselves by making the world appear' Barbaras (2004, p. 242).
20. Or: 'a chaosmos and no longer a world' (*LS* 176).
21. 'The subject is an adventure which doesn't emerge but from an event', i.e., we go from inflexion to inclusion or envelopment (*CGD* 10 March 1987).
22. This seems to contradict our earlier quote in which Merleau-Ponty says that '[t]he expression of the universe in us is certainly not the harmony between our monad and the others'. Here the full quote is: 'The look, we said, palpates, espouses the visible things. As though it were in a relation of pre-established harmony with them, as though it knew them before knowing them [...] so that finally one cannot say if it is the look or if it is the things that command' (*VI* 133). This tension seems to remain unsolved in Merleau-Ponty's later work.
23. From a Deleuzean perspective, according to which the plane of immanence must always be conceived as an absolute horizon, the relative horizon of human consciousness marks the failure of the Husserlian phenomenological reduction. A second failure appears, however, as soon as the fold reinstates a form of transcendence or verticality that belongs to the Other. For Husserl, the negative movement of the *epoché*, the initial bracketing of the "natural attitude", suspends all transcendence and opens the way for a return to things themselves; it might be said to positively open the way for a return to immanence – albeit within consciousness. But this moment of immanence seems to be lost with Merleau-Ponty. See Reynolds and Roffe (2006, pp. 233–4).
24. Hence, '[w]hen Deleuze comes to bracket the structure of alterity, it is not at all the Sartrean otherness that he brackets. Rather, what he brackets is the human world of Merleau-Ponty' (Boundas 2001, p. 446).
25. 'Theories tend to oscillate mistakenly and ceaselessly from a pole at which the Other is reduced to the status of object to a pole at which it assumes the status of subject' (*DR* 260). The problem is that in, for example, the master–slave dialectic the relation is not external to its terms. If Sartre's analysis is based on dialectical conflict, then Merleau-Ponty proposes an anti-dialectics, or a dialectics without conflict, and Deleuze prefers to conceive of conflicts but equally without dialects.
26. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze argues how the same argument is valid for the Husserl of the *Ideas*, who needs an object = x as a 'transcendence in immanence' (*Hua* I, §§ 4, 48) which guarantees common sense by binding the noemata together to a general object and to conceptual intentions that go beyond pure intuition (*LS* 113; cf. *WP* 59). To this general element as

urdoxic nucleus (*LS* 96–8) he opposes his own paradoxical or problematic notion of a subject = x, an Ego straddling several possible worlds as derived from Leibniz's mentioning of a vague or general Adam = x (*LS* 114): 'This difference culminates in the opposition between the object = x as the identitarian instance of the representation in common sense, and the thing = x as the nonidentifiable element of expression in the paradox' (*LS* 145).

27. In this context it is illuminating that Deleuze sees the Other as a force that forces us to think and its question-being is that of the police officer, whose questions are imposed upon us asymmetrically and irreversibly. The Other commands a response, one has no choice but to 'explicate or develop the world expressed by the other, either in order to participate in it or to deny it' (*DR* 260). For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, interrogation is much more inspired by empathy. It is 'sym-pathetic, since all (com-)possible beings are unified as spectres in the same harmonic *Ineinander* of common sense: the '*Urgemeinschaftung* of our intentional life' (*VI* 180).

28. For example, Merleau-Ponty defines the dimension in which all experience is situated as 'the invisible *of* this world, that which inhabits this world, sustains it, and renders it visible, its own and interior possibility, the Being of this being' (*VI* 151). And as Merleau-Ponty affirms of Husserl, 'the unicity of the world means not that it is actual and that every other world is imaginary, not that it is in itself and every other world for us only, but that it is at the root of every thought of possibilities' (*VI* 228–9, 250).

29. In arguing that it is the brain that thinks, not man, Deleuze argues that phenomenology misses the opportunities that philosophy finds in modern neuroscience: 'thought, even in the form it actively assumes in science, does not depend upon a brain made up of organic connections and integrations: according to phenomenology, thought depends on man's relations with the world – with which the brain is necessarily in agreement because it is drawn from these relations, as excitations are drawn from the world and reactions from man, including their uncertainties and failures. "Man thinks, not the brain"; but this ascent of phenomenology beyond the brain towards a Being in the world, through a double criticism of mechanism and dynamism, hardly gets us out of the sphere of opinions. It leads us only to an *Urdoxa* posited as original opinion, or meaning of meanings' (*WP* 209–10).

30. Half-openness is a term taken from systems biology, in which systems are said to be half open when they are both sensitive to themselves and to their surroundings (*Umwelt*). It also lies at the basis of Peter Sloterdijk's theory of foams bubbles, which is 'avowedly neo-monadologically oriented' although the concept of the closed monad is replaced by that of the half-open dyad. See Sloterdijk (2004, p. 61).

31. This is however not a question of occupying a world without others, of retreating to some solipsist's paradise 'out of this world', as Peter Hallward has argued (2006), but of making a difference, starting from the midst of things and their habitual constitution: 'you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality […] You don't reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying' (*ATP* 160).

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8
Towards a Political Ontology of the Fold: Deleuze, Heidegger, Whitehead and the "Fourfold" Event

Keith Robinson

Introduction

In this essay I will show that Deleuze's deployment of the concept of the "fold," and its coupling in several texts with the concept of the "event," amounts not only to a general confrontation with Leibniz and phenomenology but especially with later Heidegger and his thinking of the "fourfold" and "event." This confrontation is approached in important ways, albeit indirectly and obliquely, throughout Deleuze's works but especially in his extraordinary book *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*. This book developed out of Deleuze's lecture courses on Leibniz given at Vincennes in 1980 and then again in late 1986 and 1987. In Chapter 6 of that book and elsewhere Deleuze invokes Whitehead in order, I argue, to press beyond and extend Heidegger's renewal of onto-logy and his onto-logy of the event to the point where, as Deleuze says, "is" finally gives way to "and." Deleuze finds in the fold not only a means of returning to Leibniz, but also an effective critique of phenomenology and, with the Whiteheadian event, the conceptual resources to displace Heideggerian being. Thus, Deleuze's challenge to phenomenology will also be a path beyond being, a path prepared by rethinking with Whitehead the concept of the event and its fourfold structure. This displacement of "being" implies a new answer to the questions of not only how thinking and experience are possible, but also of how to be at "home" in or in harmony with the world, of what it means to believe in and live in the world. Indeed, Deleuze's use of the fold points not just to a new sense of ontology but also a new non-representational politics of difference. This essay will sketch out some of the philosophical

moves that Deleuze makes with the concept of the fold in order to arrive at this novel political ontology by, firstly, showing the extent to which Heidegger for Deleuze remains tied to phenomenology at least, as Deleuze says, "in the 'vulgar' sense of the term: with intentionality" (*F* 108). Secondly, by showing why Deleuze, when he develops the "fourfold" in the context of Whitehead's "radical empiricism," is better able to surpass intentionality and elaborate an immanent thought of difference and a post-phenomenological understanding of being that emphasizes new ways of living in the world, a becoming of the world that offers new possibilities of life.

Heidegger, Leibniz and the fourfold event

Phenomenology in Husserl is the discourse that claims to return "to the things themselves" by describing the way in which things appear to consciousness. Each mental act appears correlated with or directed toward an object. This directedness of consciousness is of course what Husserl, following Brentano, named the movement of intentionality. One aspect of Heidegger's critique of intentionality in the Husserlian sense is that it remains tied to human thought and the Cartesian tradition. It remains tied to what Deleuze calls a "new psychologism," unable to rigorously think the "being" of intentionality itself or question that element of the intentional that withdraws itself from visibility. For Heidegger intentionality cannot be reduced simply to an epistemological structure of mental experience where everything that is, is determined by its presence to consciousness as in Husserl. Rather, for Heidegger intentionality is an ontological site or opening for the event of being where elements of things recede from view and escape our theoretical grasp. In order to get at the pre-theoretical layers of the event Heidegger's radicalized phenomenological "seeing" will dig down, in the early work at least, to these "existential" a priori structures revealing the temporal horizon of *Dasein* as the meaning of human existence. In the later work *Dasein* no longer refers exclusively to the meaning of existence but shares its proximity to being itself and it is by turning to art, poetry and language that Heidegger invokes the withdrawn or absent dimensions of being as the fourfold event (*Ereignis*) that being makes with itself.

The introduction of the concept of the fold in Heidegger's work is crucial in Deleuze's reading because it enables Heidegger to challenge the "vulgar" conception of intentionality and turn phenomenology toward ontology. The ontological difference becomes in Deleuze's description "the fold of Being and beings as the condition for any visibility

of phenomena and human reality as the being of distance" (*N* 112). Deleuze claimed in his book *Foucault* (1986) that Foucault had also found a route out of phenomenology by developing the concept of the fold in a direction that both borrows from Heidegger and also sharply diverges from him. Here Deleuze develops the concept as a "fourfold"[1] in order to interpret Foucault's turn toward the self and practices of "subjectivation" (*F* 104–5). The Heideggerian resonance here is clear and Deleuze says that "there is a final rediscovery of Heidegger by Foucault" (*F* 107). According to Deleuze, Foucault's "rediscovery" of Heidegger concerns precisely the concept of the fold since "the fold and unfolding is […] arguably the key to the whole of Heidegger's philosophy" (*N* 112). Indeed, Deleuze tells us that Foucault began to think of the fold no longer in terms of the spatiality of the "outside" but, like Heidegger, in relation to time. Foucault's fold, Deleuze declares, is "memory," an "absolute memory" that is not to be contrasted with forgetting but with the forgetting of forgetting. Although Foucault found inspiration in Heidegger for the thought of the fold, there is also, Deleuze claims, a "confrontation" between them. In this confrontation Deleuze argues that Foucault is able to think being as the fold without intentionality, and thus moves beyond the residual intentionality that Deleuze–Foucault still find present in later Heidegger by showing how the fold is ultimately an activity of force upon itself, constituting the fold of Being that surpasses any intentionality between forms.

The notion of being as a "fourfold" and a temporal folding of forces is taken up, I will argue, in *The Fold* which is written contemporaneously with the Foucault book and published immediately after it. But Deleuze's return to Leibniz with new concepts like the fold, almost 20 years after his original work on him in *Difference and Repetition*, allows him to explore the potentials of a system that, rather than providing an opening to an outside as was the case in *Foucault*, includes its own outside precisely by folds and folding. Indeed, whereas the process of folding as "subjectivation" in *Foucault* is described as an "interiorization" of the outside, in Deleuze's Leibniz the folding process is described in relation to "the autonomy of the inside, an inside without an outside" (*TF* 28), but an inside that includes its outside. This is of course a reference to Leibniz's famous idea of the monad or subject without windows or doors. In Leibniz's metaphysics monads are the most basic "units," individuals or substances of reality that already contain their "complete concept" without the need for a window to the outside. The "autonomy" of the monad is regulated by an internal principle or "appetition"[2] producing the changes from one internal state or perception

to another. Although every monad contains and "expresses the entire universe," each expresses its own clear and distinct zone against the vast backdrop of the obscure and confused universe. It is on these points in *The Fold* that Deleuze first makes explicit contact with Heidegger and diverges from him. As a way of moving beyond intentionality as an overly empirical relation with the world, Deleuze points out that Heidegger had himself already appealed to Leibniz's monad. "Dasein," Heidegger says, "does not require a window to see what is outside" (*TF* 146). And this is not because Dasein already contains the world as in Leibniz, but because "the monad, the Dasein, is already outside in conformity with its own being" (*TF* 154). Now, although Deleuze, as we will see later, finds precisely this principle of being "already outside" in Whitehead (and Foucault), he also argues that Heidegger's understanding of Leibniz's condition of closure is articulated, mistakenly, in terms of "being-in the world." Rather, for Deleuze's Leibniz "closure is the condition of being-for the world" (*TF* 26). Heidegger's Dasein does not require a window since it is always already outside as being-in the world. By contrast, the Leibnizian monad does not require a window since its "inside" already includes its "outside" as a finite representation of the infinite and so contains all of its perceptions as a finite sequence against the backdrop of an infinite series. The world does not exist "outside" but only exists insofar as it is in the individual substances that express it, and yet there is a world common to all monads since what each expresses is compossible with what the other monads express. In this sense for Deleuze Leibniz's monadic closure is a condition for the being of a world so that, as he says, the world is in the monad in order that the monad can be for the world.[3]

The monad includes the world in order to be for the world and in accordance with its baroque condition its interior is folded, as we have seen, along at least two levels. Deleuze says that the "ideal" fold is, in Heideggerian terms, the *Zwiefalt* but the "two-fold" is not a fold in two but a fold "of" two, an "*entre-deux*," a between the two. In Deleuze's terms the *Zwiefalt* is a "differentiator of difference" (*TF* 30) where differentiation produces difference through a process that "endlessly unfolds and folds over from each of its two sides" (*TF* 30). The question that Deleuze poses here to Heidegger is whether the fold of being or "between-two" that regulates the presencing and withdrawal of being in Heidegger is truly a fold "of" and "between" the outside. Rather than an outside that affects itself, Heidegger's "between-two" for Deleuze remains a fold between formal elements in a newly restored intentional field. This critique of Heidegger which Deleuze repeats on several

occasions, but only in a few paragraphs of highly compressed exegesis, can only be addressed adequately by looking at the later Heidegger's thought in more detail.

In Heidegger's later work the subject of the intentional field (*Dasein*) of the earlier work effectively withdraws into the event of the gathering of being, forming only one of its conditions. I want to show that the gathering in the event operates through a "fourfold" structure, where each half of the *Zwiefalt* of veiling–unveiling is itself folded. Earth and sky, divinities and mortals "dwell together all at once. These four, at one because of what they themselves are, dwell together" (Heidegger 1971, henceforth "PLT," p. 173). I would suggest that Deleuze's critique is much more ambiguous and difficult to establish if we take into account Heidegger's writings on the fourfold and its gathering of things and worlds. Indeed, not only do I want to suggest that we find this structure of folds and folding but also we find Heidegger's perhaps most challenging attempts to think beyond being and the ontological difference in terms that are close to Deleuze. For example, in his strange yet extraordinary essay-poem *The Thing* (1950) talk of the ontological difference between Being and beings seems to have been superseded by attention to the "thinging" of things and the "worlding" of the world. Heidegger tells us that we can only approach the thing in itself if we can think the thing as thing. The tradition thinks the thing either as a bearer of traits, a unity of sensations or as formed matter. Thinking the thing as thing will entail a "letting go" of these three ways of conceptually grasping or representing the thing as object so that the "thinging" of things may occur in their "nearness." The thing can no longer be understood as an object but withdraws itself into the event of its "thinging." Heidegger's famous jug is a thing insofar as it things (can we say the jug jugs?) its nearness or presence. This seems close in some respects to Deleuze's account in *The Logic of Sense* where the "greening" of the tree expresses a "fourth dimension" that "insists" or "subsists" outside of and irreducible to the three representational forms of the propositional relation: denotation, manifestation or signification. Deleuze will recognize this "logic of sense" in Husserl but Heidegger is never mentioned in the book. Yet in Heidegger's thinging of things, the "thinging" is not a quality or trait of an object but a withdrawn activity that is expressed in propositions without merging with them or being represented in them. As Heidegger says "the thingness of the thing is particularly difficult to express and only seldom expressible" (*PLT* 32). What is particularly difficult to express is that the thingness of the thing is expressed but concealed or withdrawn in its expression, inhabiting an extra "dimension"

in all its "nearness," much like Deleuzean "sense." I want to claim that Heidegger's "thinging" resembles the event or donation of sense in Deleuze's sense. But just how close is Heidegger's withdrawn thingness or "thinging" to Deleuze's logic of sense or differential "things in their wild state"?

In his *Origin of the Work of Art* (1960) Heidegger had started to talk of the withdrawn dimension or concealed "thingly character of the thing" (*PLT* 20) in relation to the sheltering of "Earth" and the opening of "World." This two-fold structure gives way to the first version of a fourfold (*das Geviert*) structure in Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy (On the Event)* (1989) where "Earth" and "World" are "paired" with "Man" and "Gods." This fourfold is then reworked in *The Thing* where "World" is replaced by "Sky" and "Men" by "Mortals." "World" is now said to express the play of the fourfold in their belonging or dwelling together. From the *Origin of the Work of Art* onwards Heidegger seems to have thought of "'Earth' as a concealing, or sheltering element" (*PLT* 49) withdrawn from appearances, a unifying "building bearer" or concealed groundless ground. Earth shelters and protects the things of the world. "Sky," by contrast, is a "cleared," revealed or actualized element, tied to the patterns of visible appearance in nature: "the sun's path, the course of the moon … the years seasons, the light and dusk of the day" (*PLT* 178). In *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* (1951) the divinities or Gods appear as a withdrawn and unifying element where the God "withdraws into his concealment" (Heidegger 1977, henceforth "*BW*," p. 328). The divinities are said to be the "beckoning messengers of the Godhead" (*BW* 327) and it is the "mortals" who "await the divinities as divinities." The mortals are human beings and therefore capable of death as death. "Only man dies" (*PLT* 178. By contrast Heidegger says the animal "perishes"). The mortals are a "presencing" or revealed relation in the concealed "shelter of being." Thus Heidegger's fourfold is composed of two folded withdrawn or concealed elements ("Earth," "Divinities") on the one hand and two folded cleared or revealed elements on the other ("Sky," "Mortals"). The relation between the fourfold elements Heidegger describes as "mirroring" and "appropriation (*ereignend*)" without any likeness. The mirroring "lights up" each of the four setting "each of the four free into its own but it binds these free ones into the simplicity of their essential being towards one another" (*PLT* 179). When we speak of any of these four elements Heidegger says "we are already thinking of the other three with it by way of the simple oneness of the four" (*PLT* 178) and in this simple oneness it is "*dwelling*" that brings the four into things and preserves the fourfold. Heidegger says,

"in saving the earth, in receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating mortals, dwelling comes to pass as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold" (*BW* 329).

By 1950, and in numerous essays after this, Heidegger constantly returns to the idea that the thinging of the thing is an event of dwelling that has a fourfold structure giving by "Earth" and "Sky," "Mortals" and "Gods." The jug things itself by gathering the fourfold together and, in the gathering, the fourfold elements let the jug dwell and "be," or rather "thing" itself. The gathering unifies and lights up the different elements and each of the four conditions or folds are required with their "play" and "mirroring" of each other for the thing to show itself. But this play and mirroring are not explicable in terms of any representational model—"causes and grounds remain unsuitable for the worlds world-ing" (*PLT* 180). All we can say is that in the "round-dance of appropria-tion" the unification of the fourfold takes place and the world appears, an occurrence of the worlding of the world. The event of the fourfold gives us the thinging of the thing and the worlding of the world. With the advent of the fourfold the primary dualism in Heidegger's late work moves from the opposition of "Earth" and "World" to an "intimacy" or "nearness" between thing and world. As a stepping back from the think-ing that represents and explains, intimacy escapes *Ge-stell*. To this "inti-macy" between thing and world Heidegger gives the name "dif-ference" (*Unter-Schied*), "now removed from its usual and customary usage" (*PLT* 202). It is dif-ference that unifies and keeps separate world and thing. It is the "middle" but not a middle that mediates by simply adding world and thing together. It is a "middle" that resembles the Deleuzean mid-dle, the "between-two" or *Zwiefalt*, marked by the hyphen that joins and separates in differentiating. Dif-ference is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences. Rather, Heidegger says,

> The word dif-ference […] exists only as this single difference. It is unique. Of itself, it holds apart the middle in and through which world and things are at one with each other. The intimacy of the difference is the unifying element of the *diaphora,* the carrying out that carries through. The dif-ference carries out world in its worlding, carries out things in their thinging.
>
> (*PLT* 202)

What allows this carrying out or "transport" of difference in the world-ing of world and thinging of things for Heidegger is the "dimension" of the "Open." The Open allows a thing to emerge in its dif-ference with

the world. In the Open the thing gathers itself into a unity with world and shows itself in its dif-ference (*PLT* 203).

Despite these similarities, and many others, between Heidegger's late writings and Deleuze's work, Deleuze will insist that Heidegger's thought of difference does not allow for a fully differential relation in which dif-ference differs from itself. This can be seen, Deleuze claims, by the way in which for Heidegger the *Lichtung* is the Open not only for light and the visible, but also for voice and sound. The Open in Heidegger, Deleuze declares,

> does not give us something to see without also providing something to speak, since the fold will constitute the Self-seeing element of sight only if it constitutes the Self-speaking element of language, to the point where it is the same world that speaks itself in language and sees itself in sight.
>
> (*F* 111)

For Deleuze this re-establishes an intentional relation, albeit between ontological forms rather than subject and object, and if the cor-respondence between forms gives us the "same world that speaks itself in language and sees itself in sight," then for Deleuze the Heideggerian fourfold has not reached the being of difference. For Deleuze it appears that even recourse to the differentiated opening of the fourfold in later Heidegger restores an intentional field, however radicalized, that falls short of providing the conditions required for the complex and paradoxical expression of difference. In order to move beyond Heidegger's fourfold event of the thing Deleuze will focus his renewed encounter with Leibniz around the concept of the fold as a pure "differentiator" and he will look to Whitehead's "event" to provide its four conditions.[4]

Deleuze, Whitehead and the fourfold event

In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze had already invoked Whitehead's "empirico-ideal" notions in order to address the "whole problem of being," the Heideggerian question of belonging together expressed as the problem of the "manner in which being is distributed among beings" (*DR* 285). There Deleuze appealed to a "nomadic" distribution where things "belong" only in "erewhon." However, the most sustained and detailed discussion of Whitehead in Deleuze's work appears in *The Fold* where Whitehead is this time placed at the forefront of a school,

the school devoted to thinking the whole problem and manner of being in terms of the "event." That Heidegger is not included in this group is significant in itself. Whitehead is, it is claimed, the *diadoche*, the new leader of a secret society that raises for the third time the question: What is an event? What is important here for Deleuze, I suggest, is the power of the Whiteheadian inflected event, finally, to displace the verb "to be" and its attributes. For Deleuze Whitehead's conception of the event constitutes this movement of displacement, subordinating intentionality to a more primordial relation of opening, ultimately displacing being in favor of the prehensive opening of creative process onto the "new." Indeed, Deleuze ventures nothing less than a condensed explication of Whitehead's whole system from the perspective of the question of the event. By asking "What is an event?" Deleuze says that Whitehead appears as the last great Anglo-American philosopher to address this question before "Wittgenstein's disciples spread their misty confusion, sufficiency and terror" (*TF* 76).[5]

On the Deleuze–Whitehead model events are not to be understood as simply a state of affairs, an issue of "what happens" to things or substances which can then be captured in factical propositions. Rather, the "Great Pyramid is an event, and its duration for a period of one hour, thirty minutes, five minutes […] a passage of nature, of God, or a view of God" (*TF* 76). Deleuze is referring here to Whitehead's concept of the event in his *The Concept of Nature* and, in his reconstruction of the event in Whitehead, he merges that text with *Process and Reality* (1929) and *Adventure of Ideas* (1933) into a composite.[6]

There are four conditions, components or folds that make up Deleuze's composite picture of the event in Whitehead and these folds parallel the Heideggerian fourfold. I want to suggest that the parallel operates at a number of levels but the most important for my purposes here are that Whitehead's fourfold, like Heidegger's, is a *Zwiefalt* doubled, a doubled twofold structure with one half of the structure withdrawn, concealed or *virtual* and the other half revealed and *actual*. The relation between the two halves in each case is one of reciprocal determination but I want to claim that for Deleuze the relation between the components in Whitehead's fourfold surpasses intentionality opening the event to a purely differential and creative determination.

The first condition or fold of Whitehead's (and Leibniz's) event for Deleuze is *extension*. The event is produced out of a chaos, what Whitehead in *Process and Reality* calls a "disjunctive diversity" or a pure many (Whitehead 1978, henceforth "PR," p. 21), a "barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities" (*PR* 40). How does the inefficient

disjunction of the many become one? Between the one and the many "a sort of screen intervenes" (*TF* 76), a formless membrane, a receptacle, an electromagnetic field that makes something emerge from nothing "*even if this something differs only slightly*" (*TF* 76, italics in original). The screen is like an "infinitely refined machine that is the basis of Nature" or, from a psychical perspective, a "universal giddiness" given by an infinity of perceptions, infinitely minute. The screen would extract differentials or singularities that could be integrated into ordered perceptions. For Deleuze's Leibniz, chaos does not exist as such since it forms the underside of the screen; it is merely an insufficiency of our own "screen" to see that everything is organized, an inability to see the whole by following the parts to infinity. Leibniz utilizes cosmological, physical and psychical versions of chaos but all amount to the idea of an extended element that gets stretched over others so that it forms a whole made of parts.

Whitehead also utilizes differing cosmological and metaphysical conceptions of the screen or filter in which, like Leibniz, "pure" chaos is impossible. Chaos for Whitehead is the bottom side of the screen, another layer, or a deeper remote "background" that offers actual entities a perspective on "a chaos of diverse cosmic epochs" (*PR* 112). In this "vast nexus" of diverse cosmic epochs we may barely discern epochs with characteristics incompatible with our own. From the standpoint of our current "screen" the "fundamental society" of infinite epochs appears as a "vast confusion" mitigated by a few faint elements of order. This is what in *Process and Reality* Whitehead calls the "*extensive continuum*," a society of pure extension, of potential regions and hypothetical regions of regions without end, conceivable to us as offering only the first glimmerings of our own order. Thus, the continuum is an infinite or pure potentiality for division but divided only in actualized extension. The pure continuum of extension, like Heidegger's "Earth," is a withdrawn or virtual element that gathers a many, organizing and connecting its elements into series.

Extensive series have intrinsic properties, "for example height, intensity, timbre of a sound, a tint, a value, a saturation of color" (*LF* 77). If extension gives us something rather than nothing then "*intension*" gives us "this" rather than "that." The demonstrative pronoun rather than the indefinite article. Matter or what fills space and time and divides the continuum always has characters, properties, degrees or "intensities" that determine its texture in relation to other materials that are a part of it. Deleuze says "how remarkable that Whitehead's analysis, based on mathematics and physics, appears to be completely independent of

Leibniz's work even though it coincides with it" (*TF* 77). It is tempting to add how remarkable that Deleuze's own analysis of the concept of intensity in *Difference and Repetition*, based on "minor" mathematics and physics, appears independent of Whitehead yet coincides with it. For Whitehead and for Deleuze intensity expresses the potential of the continuum, since for both actualized extensity relates to the empirical quality of an object whereas the pure conditions of space are intensive quantities. Intensity in Deleuze includes the unequal in itself, it affirms difference and is an implicated or "embryonised" quantity. These three characteristics are the positive characteristics of "depth" in what Deleuze calls an "intensive spatium" that conditions extensive quantity.

Whitehead's own critique of extensive quantity in *Science and the Modern World* (1925) and again in *Process and Reality* is well known. Whitehead claims that "the inclusion of extensive quantity among the fundamental categoreal notions is a complete mistake" (*PR* 97). This is a mistake to be found not just in Aristotle who includes quantity in his own categories but does not recognize intension, but also in Kant, who does recognize intensive magnitudes but still counts extensive quantities among the categoreal notions. For Whitehead space and time do not contain extensive quantities as conditions of experience since extensive quantities are actualized products or constructs. Perhaps Whitehead influenced Deleuze here since it's well known that Deleuze argues that philosophy and science collude by thinking intensity only after it is covered over in the qualities that fill extended space. However, in *Process and Reality*, Whitehead connects this idea to the work in projective geometry of Cayley and Von Staudt, and his own early efforts in his *Universal Algebra* (1898) to establish a pure geometry from which all other geometries would be derived. For Cayley and Von Staudt extensive quanta are "projections" of a more fundamental set of elements in a field of relations. In any given arrangement or variation of these fundamental elements certain relational properties remain constant through their projection. We have already seen that Deleuze first mentions Whitehead in *The Fold* in the context of a discussion of baroque "perspectivism" and "relativism." What remains "constant" in baroque perspectivism is the "point of view," the "superject" or "linear focus" in the variation but what expresses the variable relations are the lines of intensity. These abstract lines emerge from the depths and so intensive quantity cannot be reduced to parts, however infinitely small, of extended or quantified "stuff" but must be a relation of variation between elements or "singularities" in process. The intensities issue

from the depths of the spatium but they are "hidden" in the "projection" of extensive quantity. Interestingly, Deleuze also uses this same geometric notion when he claims that the ground as it appears in a homogenous extensity is a "projection" (*DR* 229) of something deeper. Depth, for Deleuze, indicates a relation between elements in a "spatium" that are expressed as intensities. This is no less the case for Whitehead, for whom the "depth of satisfaction" of the intensive field must be coordinated with a range of variable elements including "triviality," "vagueness," "narrowness" and "width." Hence intensity, grounded in the potential of the continuum, expresses those implicated features and degrees of difference that precede and condition the process of individualization and its actualization in quality and extensive quantity. As a key component of Whitehead's event "intension" is the second concealed, withdrawn or virtual element in the fourfold.

For Deleuze as well as for Whitehead the essential process of intensity is individuation and so the third component in Deleuze's reading of the event in Whitehead is *prehension*. We have already mentioned the importance of "prehension" for Deleuze. Here prehension is developed in relation to its role in individuation and individual unity. Individuals have parts and are parts, including the intrinsic or intensive features of those parts. This is concrescence, the individual as concrescence of elements. Concrescence can be analyzed into "phases" of "feeling" or prehensions that Deleuze himself will repeat with a difference in his own "repetitions" of the three passive syntheses of time. In a first phase concrescence is a "conformation" of feelings in the present, a physical prehension in which something is given, something is received and "re-enacted" or "reproduced" in a particular manner, a rich domain of contracted "habits," retentions, needs, rhythms. In a second phase of conceptual prehensions what is received, and received in a particular manner, are potentials or possibilities and these are "valued" in particular ways shaped by the "aim" of the concrescence. The physical and conceptual prehensions are drawn into a final "comparative" phase where "decision" is made and "satisfaction" achieved. A datum of elements is prehended into an individual unity. Everything prehends its antecedents and comcomitants and by degree prehends the world. "The eye is a prehension of light. Living beings prehend water, soil, carbon and salts. At a given moment the pyramid prehends Napoleon's soldiers (forty centuries are contemplating us), and inversely" (*TF* 78). Traces, phases, perspectives, folds, vibrations, rhythms and thresholds are prehensions that anticipate psychic life. Prehension has direction and aim,

a "vector quality" as Whitehead calls it, that moves from the world to the subject and from the subject to superject; from the datum as public elements to the prehended data as private world of the concrescing occasion. Each private element becomes public datum as each prehension becomes prehended and, as Deleuze points out, Whitehead continually returns to this private-public pair in *Process and Reality*. All prehension, then, is a prehension of prehension. "Each new prehension becomes a datum. It becomes public, but for the prehensions that objectify it; the event is inseparably the objectification of one prehension and the subjectification of another; it is at once public and private, potential and real, participating in the becoming of another event and the subject of its own becoming" (*TF* 78). This is the third component of the event and is a revealing, individualizing or actualizing element in the fourfold.

The fourth component concerns what Whitehead calls eternal objects or "*ingression.*" Extension is a continuous process of variation, gain and loss in movement, infinite passages of change and alteration. Intensities rise and fall by degrees, prehensions enter and leave variable components. Events are fluvia. To what extent can we claim that one process is the same: "is it the same flow, the same thing or the same occasion?" (*TF* 79) The event which is the life of nature in the great pyramid yesterday differs fundamentally from the event which is the life of nature in the great pyramid today but the object which is called the great pyramid is the same object. Permanence for Whitehead must be a part of the flux. The great pyramid is a flux or a passage of nature but is also ingressed by an "eternal object" that remains through the succession of occasions. For Deleuze eternal objects are possibilities realized in fluvia but also virtualities actualized in prehensions. Prehensions reach back to prehend but also apprehend eternal objects. Permanence is ingressed into fluvia in accordance with the conditions of their creation and destruction. This is the "dipolarity" of the event or actual occasion, having both physical and mental (or conceptual) prehensions. Thus, as "forms of definiteness" eternal objects are revealed or actualized elements in the fourfold.

The four conditions of the Deleuze–Whitehead event are extension, intension, prehension and ingression. As we have seen extension and intension are withdrawn or virtual conditions and prehension and ingression are processes of actualizing, individualizing or actual determination but the relation between the folds is given by a differential opening onto the creative. It is on this last point that the parallels between Heidegger's fourfold event and Whitehead's begin to break down since, for Deleuze,

Heidegger's fold refounds an intentional relation whereas the folds of the event in Deleuze–Whitehead create the new.

Equally, although the metaphysical conditions of Leibniz's own event also closely parallel Whitehead, it is Leibniz's "baroque condition" where, according to Deleuze, the greatest difference lies. For Deleuze's Whitehead, events are connected to each other because they open onto each other and form a world with each other. Prehensive events appropriate data (objectified actualities, eternal objects, prehensions realized in an earlier phase) and form a definite bond with them either by integrating data into feeling or eliminating them from feeling, but always in the same universe. For Leibniz monads exclude universes that are incompossible with their world. Monads that have come into existence all express the same world but the expressed world does not exist outside of the monad that expresses it. Thus monads have no contact or intra-worldly relations since famously they have "no windows or doors" but they express an indirect harmony, a "pre-established harmony." All compossible monads are subject to a condition of closure within a single and same world.

But in the Deleuze–Whitehead event all prehensions are conditioned by an opening onto the world either to feel other prehensions and integrate them or eliminate them from feeling and this prehensive opening is, for Deleuze, an interaction and communication with potential differences before their incarnation in any intentional relation, an opening onto the power of things in their "free and wild state": the creation of the new (*WP* 154). The presence of this constitutive opening in Whitehead's event is, for Deleuze, an advance over Leibniz's condition of closure and an advance over even the radicalized intentional relation found in Heidegger's fourfold event. It is the differential nature of the constitutive opening in Whitehead that, for Deleuze, represents a surpassing of intentionality and a "conversion" of its lingering abstraction and transcendence to a new sense of folds and folding. For Deleuze, Whitehead's event is an advance upon both Leibniz and Heidegger because Whitehead's "fourfold" already opens onto the production of novelty, creating nothing other than differential repetitions of itself through extensions, intensities, prehensions, ingressions and their continuous foldings. In contrast, as we have seen, for Deleuze's Leibniz the monads' being for the world is submitted to a condition of closure, and Heidegger's fourfold is already an opening for the difference between thing and world, but in both cases neither reaches the self-differing difference or fold "in which new creations are produced" (*TF* 79).

Ultimately the folding of events in both Leibniz and Heidegger for Deleuze remains within the world of representation. Although Leibniz pushes the fold to infinity it remains within the snares of representation and Heidegger, for Deleuze, does not fully pass the fold of the ontological difference through the "conversion" in which univocal Being belongs only to difference and revolves around being. In so doing Heidegger's *being* remains trapped in "relation to the identity of representation" (*DR* 66). Thus, for Deleuze, neither Leibniz's or Heidegger's conceptions of the event fully escape the "fourfold" of representation (identity, analogy, opposition and resemblance) and remain tied to the world of the Same. But for Deleuze the "play of the world has changed in a unique way" (*TF* 81) and this play can only be engaged through a non-representational event and a more fully differential conception of the fourfold.

Deleuze's use of the fold is then both a complex return (with a difference) to Leibniz and a confrontation with Heidegger's "fourfold," an attempt to press Heidegger's renewal of ontology and the ontology of the event to the point where "is" finally gives way to "and" such that the being turns around and is disseminated within difference. Following the critique of phenomenology in his *Foucault*, it is in *The Fold*, Deleuze's next book, that these concepts are taken in yet another post-phenomenological direction. By showing how Whitehead's concept of the "event" and its conditions, particularly prehension, surpass intentionality, Deleuze develops the notion of the fourfold as a fully differential event ontology capable of expressing the immanence of experience and the new play of the world. It is this fourfold that most closely resembles Deleuze's own, as worked out, for example, in the complex model of "different/ciation" in *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze thinks with Whitehead rather than Heidegger, with "radical empiricism" rather than phenomenological ontology, in order to develop the fourfold as a "model" for thinking thought, life and experience in terms of creativity and the new. Deleuze takes from Whitehead an empiricism that will help dispel the illusions (the eternal, universal, etc.) and "images of thought" that prevent us from thinking experience in itself and, with the illusions dispelled, the conditions under which something new is produced can be made visible. Radical or "transcendental" empiricism will not only reveal the extent to which phenomenology still participates in these illusions since "phenomenology is ultimately too pacifying and has blessed too many things" (*F* 113), but, as an innovative thinking of the conditions of real experience, it enables a decisive break with the ultimate illusion: the verb "to be" and its attributes.

A new politics: Deleuze–Whitehead beyond Heidegger and Leibniz

Finally, this empiricist critique of the ontology of representation and its events and foldings in Leibniz and Heidegger is transposed by Deleuze into urgent questions regarding a politics of life and resistance to the present. Deleuze asks: what are our folds and how might we live with them? "The question," Deleuze says, of the event and its folds, "always entails living in the world" (*TF* 137). The question of living in the present and of being "worthy of what happens to us" now entails a question of "belief in the world," of how to respond when "we do not even believe in the events that happen to us" (*C* 173). But for Deleuze this is not a problem of epistemological skepticism about the existence of the world or its events, but rather a concern for and a faith in the open possibilities of creation, of new immanent forms of thought and life. Ultimately these differences between Leibniz, Heidegger and Deleuze come down to questions about how we are to live in the world, the manner of being, dwelling or belonging in the world—given the "image of thought," the tasks of philosophy and the relation to non-philosophy that each philosopher is committed to. For Deleuze, however much they push it to the limit Leibniz and Heidegger remain tied to an image of thought that borrows from the "discourse of the representative." As an ontological category representation for Deleuze is premised on an image of thought that subordinates difference to identity and the identitarian attributes of being. This is carried through in a non-philosophical or political register in the context of the modern struggles of minorities for recognition of their identity and resistance to the dominance of the majority. For Deleuze, however, identity—whether majority or minority—is constructed in relation to an abstract standard that represents "nobody." This is the "majoritarian 'fact.'" In varying degrees the emptiness of the majoritarian model oppresses all identities constructed within it. Overcoming the political ontology of representation thus requires not merely an inversion of the dominant identity but a complete break with the model of identity itself and a dismantling of the image of thought that underpins it. This requires the "power of a new politics which would overturn the image of thought" (*DR* 137).

For Deleuze the new politics that would overturn the image of thought derives its power from a politics of the "event" with its "becomings" and "folds," concepts "capable of ousting the verb 'to be' and attributes." The political correlate of the differential fold in Deleuze is

becoming, a concept capable of eliminating identity, resemblance and analogy and emptying the universal of any vestiges of the "pure," the "origin," the "authentic," the filial, the "proper," etc. Only by entering into a universal "becoming everybody/ everything" (*ATP* 280) can there be a worlding of world.

In Deleuze's critique of Heidegger the worlding of the world does not achieve a universal becoming. As a response to things conceived in the "enframing" of modernity as merely technological and scientific objects, the fourfold Open gives things and human beings a "place" of their own, a homeland where one belongs, a "proper" place to let be and dwell "rooted" and "preserved" in a *Volk*, a "soil," and a world. Heidegger says "to preserve the fourfold, to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await the divinities, to initiate mortals—this fourfold preserving is the simple essence of dwelling" (*BW* 336). The "model" for this preserving and protecting of dwelling is given by Heidegger's German poets and his early Greeks whose specificity "is to dwell in Being and to posses its word" (*WP* 94). But Heidegger for Deleuze rushed things and "folded too quickly […] which […] led to the deep ambiguity of his technical and political ontology" (*F* 113). Deleuze directly ties Heidegger's failure to think the fold differentially to the inability to see the dangers of a persistent essentializing, a blindness to the potential destructiveness of a more "originary" thinking. By seeking to resume the movement of the Greeks in a "memorial" thinking Heidegger, for Deleuze, "betrays the movement of deterritorialization." "However close he got to it," Deleuze claims, Heidegger fixes this movement "once and for all between being and beings, between the Greek territory and the Western earth that the Greeks would have called Being" (*WP* 95).

By contrast, for Deleuze, there is no Greek light or miracle and "the Greeks have nothing universal about them" (*F* 114). The problems have changed in ways that require a renewed belief in the invention and creation of possibilities, new ways of responding to problems. The problem of "dwelling" for Deleuze cannot be construed as representing, identifying with, or reterritorializing upon a historical people and the "being-there" of their world as the unconcealed "origin". As Deleuze says, "what has changed now are the organization of the home and its nature" (*TF* 137). For Deleuze, rather, the "earth" and its "peoples" are out of place, acentered, unfixed, nomadic, uprooted and pulled outside any identity, territory or "homeland." The play of the world now expresses one borderless world in which divergent series are endlessly tracing bifurcating paths: "it is a 'chaosmos'" (*TF* 81). The problem now is how one might be "at home" in the endlessly diverging series of this chaosmos, how

one might cultivate a "manner" or "ethos" worthy of its events, movements, folds and becomings. This finally, is what Deleuze often referred to as the problem of a "new earth" and a "people to come" that would require a "fabulation" no longer tied to particular identities and communities in time and space, or the myth of an "original" contract, place or people. This would be a belief in the world in which dwelling would be an ongoing experimentation with new ways of folding and connecting with "things in their wild state," an experiment with the possibilities subsisting beneath the abstract territories of familial, religious, or national identifications. This would be an experiment in living with "becomings" in order to make new "multiplicities" that come before being, an invention with the "And" that comes before "Is". As Deleuze says, "Empiricism has no other secret: thinking with And instead of Is. It is quite an extraordinary thought, and yet it is life" (*D* 57).

Notes

1. Deleuze gives the four folds in Foucault as the folding of our bodies, the folding of force, the fold of truth and the fold of the Outside. See *F* 104–5; *N* 112.
2. Here Leibniz explicitly rejuvenates the Aristotelian substantial forms or "entelechies". Whitehead also retains this idea of an internal regulating principle for actual occasions. However, Whitehead's "subjective aim" governs the "becoming" of actual occasions whereas Leibniz's appetition governs "change" in the monad.
3. Deleuze will go on to credit Merleau-Ponty with having a "much stronger" understanding of Leibniz on these points than Heidegger on account of Merleau Ponty's claim that our soul does not have windows "which means in der Welt Sein" (*TF* 146n28).
4. Although we think that Heidegger comes remarkably close to Deleuze on these points, our primary objective is to articulate what we take to be Deleuze's reading of Heidegger and what he takes his differences with Heidegger to be. In this reading Deleuze insists—like Derrida—in reading Heideggerian difference in terms of a quasi phenomenological difference in order to assert a more primordial difference. I think that Alain Badiou in his book on Deleuze is quite canny when he suggests that "Deleuze is, on a number of critical points (difference, the open, time) less distant from Heidegger than is usually believed and than he no doubt believed himself" (Badiou 2000, p. 21). In any case it should be clear that Deleuze's encounter with Heidegger at least requires further attention rather than any simple repetition, and deserves a far more comprehensive study than is possible here.
5. Deleuze goes much further in his lectures on Leibniz accusing "English analytic philosophy," and Wittgenstein in particular, of "assassinating" Whitehead and philosophical pluralism. "In this sense I accuse English analytical philosophy of having completely destroyed everything that was rich in thought and I accuse Wittgenstein of having assassinated Whitehead, of

having reduced Russell, his master, to a kind of essayist who no longer had the courage to speak of logic any more" (*CGD* March 10, 1987).

6. Deleuze's conceptual "portrait" or "doubling" of the event of Whitehead thus has recourse to a blending of several texts in mixture and combination. This leads to questions regarding Deleuze's use of Whitehead's terminology. For example, strictly in technical terms, the chronological development of the concept of the event in Whitehead is supplemental by the time of *Process and Reality* where it has become a "nexus of actual occasions". In *Science and the Modern World* Whitehead's concept of event is very close to and shares a certain amount of semantic space with "prehension" and, in *Process and Reality*, is replaced by "actual occasion". One could, for example, suggest that these changes in terminology suggest deeper transitions in Whitehead's understanding of some of his key idea like events, time, perception, etc. However, such a principle of reading can be legitimated in this case for two reasons: firstly, there is no final and complete presentation of Whitehead's philosophy. His texts each contain various doctrines and aspects of his views that are interconnected but no one text contains these in their entirety. Secondly, Whitehead himself said his books elucidate each other and on numerous occasions pointed out that each individual text is complemented and supplemented by the others. Perhaps typical of this is the following preface from *Adventure of Ideas* "each book [*Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality*, *Adventures of Ideas*] can be read separately; but they supplement each others omissions or compressions" (Whitehead 1967, p. vii).

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9
Two Floors of Thinking: Deleuze's Aesthetics of Folds

Birgit M. Kaiser

> To think is to fold, to double the outside with a coex-
> tensive inside.
>
> —Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, 1986

In order to pose the question of how we have to imagine a Deleuzian aesthetics adequately, we need to do more than assemble the writers, painters, film-makers, composers, and musicians his texts frequently refer to and to whose works many of Deleuze's concepts are intimately linked—if we think, for example, of Kafka's minor peoples, Kleist's war-machine, or Bacon's sensations. We can also not contend ourselves with pointing out Deleuze's preferences for certain periods or styles, such as the baroque or Modern art. We will find that, in order to pose the question adequately, we will have to begin to reconsider what is usually referred to as aesthetics and its allegedly inherent relation to art. Approaching this question in his essay "Existe-t-il une esthétique deleuzienne?" (1998), Jacques Rancière begins with such a move. He reconsiders our understanding of aesthetics by dismissing the widely held view of it, according to which aesthetics—baptized as a discipline by Alexander G. Baumgarten in the mid-eighteenth century, and formed throughout the nineteenth century in the wake of such major influences as Kant's First and Third *Critiques*, Schelling's idealist philosophy of art and Hegel's history of aesthetics—is generally understood and undertaken as a philosophizing on art and on the subjective experiences of the pleasure and displeasure art evokes. The challenges sensibility poses to the operations of reason was one of its main concerns, and despite significant shifts throughout its disciplinary history, aesthetic theory from Kant's aesthetics of judgment up to Adorno's aesthetics of art has largely framed this challenge of pleasure and feeling

as something external—or at the most as supplementary—to reason. Taking art and the subjective experiences of it as its object, aesthetics first and foremost considered the *limits* of reason. In this vein, it formed a branch of philosophy, with methods of its own, and different schools and traditions.[1] This, we might say, is the master narrative, the "cliché," that prevents us from responding adequately to our initial question, and doing away with this *doxa* on aesthetics is without doubt the right move when thinking toward a Deleuzian aesthetics. A tentative answer, thus, has to start by challenging its disciplinary narration, precisely as Rancière does at the beginning of his essay on Deleuzian aesthetics.

> For me, the term aesthetics does not designate a discipline. It does not designate a philosophical subdivision, but an idea of thought. Aesthetics is not knowledge about works of art, but a mode of thought that unfurls in regard to them and calls upon them as witnesses to a question: a question that concerns the sensate and the power of thought that dwells there before thought, without thought knowing.
>
> (Rancière 1998, p. 525, translation is my own)

In contrast to viewing aesthetics as philosophy of art, Rancière—one of the most challenging readers of Deleuze's aesthetics—is correct to propose Deleuze's aesthetics instead as a mode of thinking in its own right. Rancière explains that it is a mode of thought that is preoccupied with the idea of a specific sensate, one that pertains and does not pertain to thought, a trait Rancière identifies as typical of what he calls the "Modern aesthetic regime" (Rancière 2004a). Such a mode of thought, in which the sensate oscillates between thought and sensation, rules the modern work of art, according to Rancière, and without the productive tension between the sensate and the necessity of figuration no work of art can come to be. Situating Deleuze within this paradoxical system of representation, Rancière sees Deleuze fulfilling the destiny of aesthetics (Rancière 2004b; 2002). However, Rancière continues to fix this mode of thinking on works of art, whereas Deleuze slightly dislocates—especially in *The Fold*, by turning to the baroque and therewith making perception an aesthetic, or better *aisthetic*, concern—this prominent focus on art; a focus that had only formed in the wake of the modern aesthetic regime, and upon which Rancière bases his argument. Deleuze, as we will see, not so much carries modern aesthetics to its end, but demonstrates the foundation of modern aesthetics upon a specific resolution of the relation between the sensate and the intelligible. By figuring a different

relation between the latter two the Leibnizian baroque is reinserted by Deleuze into aesthetic debates, allowing us to consider this specific mode of thought that is in a privileged way induced by works of art, but that neither exhausts itself by reflecting about art, nor is it fully absorbed in this reflection. Therefore, we need to be careful how to read the triad of art, aesthetics and thought, and this article hopes to provide a careful consideration of their relation.

We find the relation between art and thought most pointedly and explicitly discussed in *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze's last joint work with Félix Guattari from 1991. Here, art is explicitly named as one mode of thought, alongside philosophy and science, and although thought takes different shapes in all three—in art as affects and percepts, in philosophy as concepts, and in science as functions—their "labour," so to speak, is the same.

> What defines thought in its three great forms—art, science, and philosophy—is always confronting chaos, laying out a plane, throwing a plane over chaos. But philosophy wants to save the infinite by giving it consistency: it lays out a plane of immanence that, through the action of conceptual personae, takes events or consistent concepts to infinity. Science, on the other hand, relinquishes the infinite in order to gain reference: it lays out a plane of simply undefined coordinates that each time, through the action of partial observers, defines states of affairs, functions, or referential propositions. Art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite: it lays out a plane of composition that, in turn, through the action of aesthetic figures, bears monuments or composite sensations.
>
> (*WP* 197)

Along their specific routes, all three are forms of thought, and "no one of these thoughts is better than another, or more fully, completely, or synthetically 'thought'" (*WP* 198). But does such a thinking about the operations of *art* say everything that can be said about *aesthetics*? Is aesthetics merely the pursuit and description of art's laying out a plane of composition? With this question in mind, this essay turns to *The Fold*, and argues that here Deleuze lays out an idea of aesthetics that exceeds its exclusive concern for art.

Ten years before *What is Philosophy?*, in his book on Bacon, Deleuze already sketched art's labor as confronting chaos. Even before making the first stroke, Deleuze writes there, the painter struggles with the fact that the entire surface of the canvas "is already invested virtually with

all kinds of clichés, which the painter will have to break with" (*FB* 12). Only by destroying these opinions and images, by—in the case of Bacon's portraits—"*dismantl[ing] the face*, to rediscover the head or make it emerge from beneath the face" (*FB* 19) can painting arrive at its true task of painting sensation: at painting blocs compounded of percepts and affects. This was Cézanne's as much as Bacon's endeavor, which the book intricately pursues. A decade later then, *What is Philosophy?* expands these observations for art as a whole. Taking examples from literature, painting, and music, *What is Philosophy?* develops the logic of sensation that was closely tied to Cézanne's and Bacon's paintings into a philosophical assessment of and a statement about art.

> Whether through words, colors, sounds, or stone, art is the language of sensations. Art does not have opinions. Art undoes the triple organization of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs of sensations that take the place of language.
>
> (*WP* 176)

By wresting percepts from perceptions, and affects from feelings or affections, art creates blocs of sensation, whereby percepts "are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them" (*WP* 164). It is by their virtue alone that the work of art is made to "*stand up on its own*" (*WP* 164). Sensation created by carving out affects from affections and percepts from perceptions, is neither simply a more affective type of feeling, localizable in a physical body, nor an irrational sensibility that escapes but underlies the reflections and experiences of a rational subject. Nor is it a quality emanating from the object, as Deleuze makes clear in distinction to phenomenology.[2] Rather, sensation "has one face turned toward the subject […], and one face turned toward the object" (*FB* 31), and we can say that it marks or vibrates with a zone, in which our clear-cut distinctions between subject and object in as much as the self-identifying unity of subject and object dissolve. In this zone, something rather *passes* from one to the other (see *FB* 31–2).

> This something can be specified only as sensation. It is a zone of indetermination, of indiscernibility, as if things, beasts, and persons (Ahab and Moby Dick, Penthesilea and the bitch) endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation.

This is what is called an *affect*. […] Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation. This is because from the moment that the material passes into sensation […] art itself lives on these zones of indetermination. They are blocs. […] Painting [and all art, bmk] needs the power of *a ground* that can dissolve forms and impose the existence of a zone in which we no longer know which is animal and which human, because something like the triumph or monument of their nondistinction rises up.

(*WP* 173, emphasis added)

In these zones of indiscernibility—like Ahab's becoming-whale—things reach a point that lies prior to their "natural differentiation," a point from which this differentiation springs forth. Such a *prior* to natural differentiation is no origin and as such no point of departure, it is rather an indifference, harboring the power of differentiation, the potential of a dissolution of distinctions and forms, something which Deleuze calls "ground" in the above quoted passage. The relation that is implied here between a *ground* with its power to impose these zones, and *art* arising from it as created sensation erecting monuments of nondistinction, returns us to our initial question—*is there a Deleuzian aesthetics?* It is this slight but significant difference between the ground and the monuments, we will see, that makes all the difference.

Considering the ground might seem a detour, if we want to speak of aesthetics, but it is of aesthetic relevance, not only because it raises the question of *relationality*—of the relation of art and thought, of the sensate and thinking—but also because it poses the question of aesthetics rightly identified by Rancière as "a question that pertains to the sensate and to the power of thought which it inhabits before thought, without thought knowing" (Rancière 1998, p. 525). In *The Fold*, Deleuze treats this relationality precisely by means of the notion of ground, and in the sense of making aesthetics the question of the sensate and its power for and of thought, we might suggest *The Fold* as one of Deleuze's central texts on aesthetics.

Transformations of ground

Interestingly in Deleuze's own work the notion of "ground" undergoes a slight redefinition. In 1968, *Difference and Repetition* had compared Leibniz with Hegel and called them the two culminating moments in philosophy's effort to subject difference under the rule of representation.

Both thinkers, Deleuze noted, attempt to conquer the infinite in their effort to capture either the infinitely smallest (Leibniz) or the infinitely largest (Hegel) difference, and to integrate it back into a logic of identity. For Leibniz, who is of greater interest in our context, *Difference and Repetition* notes:

> Leibniz's technique […] consists in constructing the essence from the inessential, and conquering the finite by means of an infinite analytic identity […]. But what is the point of making representation infinite? It retains all its requirements. All that is discovered is a *ground* which relates the excess and default of difference to the identical, the similar, the analogous and the opposed: reason,—that is, sufficient reason—has become the ground which no longer allows anything to escape. Nothing, however, has changed: difference remains subject to malediction, and all that has happened is the discovery of more subtle and more sublime means to make it atone, or to redeem it and subject it to the categories of representation.
>
> (*DR* 263)

Leibniz is said to submit difference to the "quadripartite yoke" (*DR* 263) of resemblance, analogy, opposition, and identity, against which Deleuze's philosophy wants to retrieve a thinking of difference as such. "The ground or sufficient reason," the above passage continues, "is nothing but a means of allowing the identical to rule over infinity itself, and allowing the continuity of resemblance, the relation of analogy and the opposition of predicates to invade infinity" (*DR* 264). Two decades later, we find this critique of Leibniz revised, when *The Fold* rereads especially Leibniz's concept of "ground," and extracts on that basis the figure of the fold as one of Leibniz's crucial philosophical contributions. And along with the reconfiguration of ground, we also find the implications of the other concepts—such as resemblance and analogy—transformed.

Difference and Repetition hinged its assessment of Leibniz on reading the latter's concept of sufficient reason as a foundation, that is as an "operation of the logos" (*DR* 272) and "an infinite universal ground [where particulars] refer to essences as the true determination of a pure Self, or rather a 'Self' enveloped by this ground" (*DR* 49). Ground was that which provides a foundation, ties back to essences, and assures the rule of identity. According to this essentialist conception of sufficient reason or ground, conceived of in the sense of a Cartesian universal and logical attribute, the universal ground precedes and envelops the particular, is separable from it, and imposes

upon everything the logic of identity. In *The Fold*, this has changed.[3] The ground or sufficient reason has become a singular predicate, and as predicate it is an expression of difference itself, working according to a twofold paradox: on the one hand, the paradox of double antecedence—disavowing the assumption of a unilateral causality and a linear movement from ground to things—and on the other hand, the paradox of the inseparable but nonetheless really distinct—contradicting the atomistic assumption of separable minima. In conjunction, these aspects render plausible how something can be different without being separate: a paradoxicality that also allows for the three modes of thinking, differently expressed in art, science and philosophy, which, without being separate, are truly of equal value, but unique in their unfolding.

Let us first begin with the latter: the inseparable but nonetheless really distinct. "Essentialism makes a classic of Descartes, while Leibniz's thought appears to be a profound Mannerism. Classicism needs a solid and constant attribute for substance, but Mannerism is fluid, and the spontaneity of manners replaces the essentiality of the attribute" (*TF* 53, cf. 56). With a mannerist ground, replacing a formerly assumed essentialist one, the ground does not envelop and determine a "Self" or a "thing," as *Difference and Repetition* held, but it rather constitutes its enfolding, its inside, coextensive with its outside. Such a reading reconfigures the *relation* of the ground to that which appears on its basis: it is no longer a striated, external relation, which ties essential attributes to a universal ground, but an internal one of fluidity and spontaneous production. Rephrasing the relation of universal ground to attributes into this "coupling basis-manners disenfranchises form or essence" (*TF* 53). However, the spontaneity of manners—springing forth from rather than being determined by the basis—depends upon a second aspect, Deleuze notes: "[T]he omnipresence of the dark depths which is opposed to the clarity of form, and without which manners would have no place to surge forth from" (*TF* 56). The assumption and affirmation of these depths enables Leibniz to think the ground as a requisite, not as a universal determination. From this *dark background* of the monad, from these minute perceptions that escape notice, "everything is drawn […], and nothing goes out or comes in from the outside" (*TF* 27). Due to these depths, the monad can be closed, yet dynamic: with "the lower floor, pierced with windows, and the upper floor, blind and closed, but on the other hand resonating as if it were a musical salon translating the visible movements below into sounds up above" (*TF* 4). A blind, closed upper floor that resonates and translates something from the lower floor. Everything depends upon

our reading of this translation, of this resonance between the two floors, between the dark ground and the clarity that is drawn from it. "Clearly, the two levels are connected" (*TF* 4), but it is a paradoxical connection, marked, as Deleuze points out, by continuity *and* transition. One example, by which Leibniz tries to convey this paradoxical process, is the pain a dog feels upon being hit. Starting from the question, how pleasure could be followed by pain, if pain was not already distributed and spread through pleasure, to imperceptible degrees, Deleuze explains that the pain the dog feels does

> not abruptly follow […] pleasure, but has been prepared by a thousand minute perceptions—the pitter-patter of feet, the hostile man's odor, the impression of the stick being raised up, in short, an entire, imperceptible, "anxiousness" from which pain will issue "sua sponte," as if through a natural force integrating the preceding modifications.
>
> (*TF* 56)

The "sua sponte"—as if it was integrated "through a natural force"— directly addresses the issue at stake here. How can the pleasure the dog experienced from feeding be followed by pain—other than abruptly? How can the "series of minute perceptions that it had almost failed to remark because they were first buried" (*TF* 56) in the dark depths, in the "fuscum subnigrum" (*TF* 56), be integrated into becoming pain? How can indiscernible, minute perceptions—as if by natural force—transform and become conscious apperceptions? As Deleuze puts it, the whole point here "is one of knowing how we move from minute perceptions to conscious perceptions" (*TF* 87), how we think the relation between the lower floor and the upper floor. A prerequisite for such a relation are the pleats ascribed to matter, the dark depths that affirm—in clear opposition to Descartes—that the "unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the *fold*, not the point" (*TF* 6, emphasis added). Deleuze points out that by thinking matter as pleated, as "an infinitely porous, spongy, or cavernous texture without emptiness, [as] caverns endlessly contained in other caverns" (*TF* 5), it cannot be reduced to separable points or atoms, but infinitely unfurls into folds of different size. This division to infinity "in smaller and smaller folds that always retain a certain cohesion" (*TF* 6) affects how we think matter *as well as* how we think the resonances of the upper floor. This paradox of a continuity (inseparability), which nonetheless allows for distinctness will become clearer, when we consider Leibniz's critique of Descartes' categorization

of ideas, a critique which Leibniz developed precisely by drawing on this logic of folding.

Descartes had introduced the fourfold categorization of ideas into obscure, confused, clear and distinct ideas in his *Discourse on Method*, attributing obscure and confused ideas to the lower faculties or passions, on the one hand, and clear and distinct ideas to reason, on the other hand. According to Descartes, only clear and distinct ideas are true, because as long as there is "something confused and obscure about them," ideas contain some falsity, "because in this they participate in nothing" (Descartes 1994, p. 59). Truth for Descartes thus only pertains to clear and distinct ideas, while confused and obscure ideas are false and of no value for thinking and knowledge. Descartes' influential equation of the clear-distinct with thinking and reason, of the confused and obscure with nothingness, and, consequentially, of the lower faculties with falsity, was contested by Leibniz's revision of the categorization of ideas. Affirming the positivity of the "fuscum subnigrum," Leibniz argued that "confusion" and "obscurity" are not nothing, but rather only fall below the threshold of attention and therefore escape conscious notice or apperception. This, however, neither speaks for their separability, nor for a hierarchy between them. Rather, they are involved in a constant movement in and out of darkness and clarity in such a way that an infinite number of folds can be produced, as was discussed above. According to Leibniz's "Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas," (1684), an idea is *obscure* if it "does not suffice for recognizing the thing represented" (*L* 448), and is *clear* "when it makes it possible for me to recognize the thing represented" (*L* 449). Obscure ideas neither allow the recollection of an object, nor its recognition as something that has been seen or known before. An obscure idea of something does not permit to relate the object to anything else. Clear ideas, on the contrary, allow the recognition of an object. Clarity, however, and this is the crucial point in Leibniz's revision of Descartes, is a feature of both confused *and* distinct ideas. "Clear knowledge, in turn," Leibniz continues, "is either confused or distinct" (ibid.), and is therefore of a *clear-confused* and a *clear-distinct* kind. Our ideas are clear-confused, when we (re)cognize or know something, but are unable to enumerate the differences or marks of this object in respect to others. "Thus we know colors, odors, flavors, and other particular objects of the senses clearly enough and discern them from each other but only by the simple evidence of the senses and not by marks that can be expressed" (ibid.). In contrast, ideas are clear-distinct, when we know something, and the enumeration of marks is possible. Despite being different, these

ideas are not opposed to or severed from each other. Rather, they are part of a continuity that moves from the perception of confused wholes to the enumeration of more distinct, but less marks. Every apperception, or clear-distinct idea, is the conscious enumeration of the distinct marks of an object. These marks can again be differentiated into an infinite number of confused ideas, so that, as Jeffrey Barnouw writes in his work on Leibniz and Baumgarten, "no concept is ever wholly free of a residual confusion from its sensuous origin" (Barnouw 1995, p. 31).

In opposition to the Cartesian positing of separable minima, "either in the form of finite bodies or in infinity in the form of points" (*TF* 6) and to the deduction of two separate realms—that of reason, the mind and thinking, and that of sensibility, the senses and the passions—Leibniz argues for their relation as one of endless enfolding. While Descartes "believed that the real distinction between parts entailed separability" (*TF* 5), Leibniz's notion of the fold and his theory of perception can think difference without entailing separation. Intertwining the two floors already on a terminological level, Leibniz speaks of perception and apperception. The beginning of "The Monadology"—offering, in line with his metaphysics of simple substances, a new relation of matter and mind—states:

> The passing state which enfolds and represents a multitude in unity or in the simple substance is merely what is called *perception*. This must be distinguished from apperception or consciousness […] It is in this that the Cartesians made a great mistake, for they disregarded perceptions which are not perceived.
>
> (*L* 644)

This passing condition addresses the translation or resonance we encountered above. In "Discourse on Metaphysics," arguing against Descartes' attribution of nothingness to confused ideas, Leibniz explains:

> our confused sensations result from a really infinite variety of perceptions. This is somewhat like the confused murmur heard by those who approach the seashore, which comes from the accumulation of innumerable breaking waves. For if out of several perceptions, which do not harmonize so as to make one, there is no single one which surpasses the others, and if these perceptions make impressions that are about equally strong and equally capable of holding the attention of the soul, it can perceive them only confusedly.
>
> (*L* 325)

As long as no one of the many small perceptions stands out from among the others, they are given the same attention and their effect is of equal power. Their perception is confused, as an indifferent murmur. However, as soon as at least two waves are perceived as "heterogeneous enough to become part of a relation that can allow the perception of a third, one that 'excels' over the others and comes to consciousness" (*TF* 88), the *differential* relation between them allows the third to pass the threshold of attention, and surpasses the murmur by becoming "wave." This coming to consciousness is not due to a selection made by consciousness, but rather a question of appetition, a tendency. It is not the conscious mind that selects the perceptions and produces understanding, but the differential relation that performs the selection itself, an auto-selection that thereby *produces* consciousness, or distinct ideas. "*Differential relations always select minute perceptions that play a role in each case*, and bring to light or clarify the conscious perception that comes forth" (*TF* 90). The coming to consciousness is, thus, a question of *passing the threshold*, a result of a differential relation, of a coming to attention. As Deleuze notes, "Leibniz never fails to specify that the relation of the inconspicuous perceptions to conscious perception does not go from part to whole, but from the *ordinary* to what is *notable* or *remarkable*" (*TF* 87), and the difference is one of degrees of clarity, of manners of truth, not of its absence or presence—both the alleged absence of minute perceptions and presence of apperceptions are in that sense "hallucinatory."

Instead of a negatively construed opposition, we here find the affirmation of a relation of the *remarkable* to the *dark ground*, and consequentially of the ground to the remarkable. Small perceptions constitute "the obscure dust of the world, the dark depths [*fond*] every monad contains" (*TF* 90), and from among that *fond*, small perceptions cause themselves to be distinguished by way of a differential relation, bringing forth distinct apperceptions. Therefore, minute perceptions and pleats of matter are the *requisites* of distinct ideas and thinking, which is something very different from the *other* as the "opposite" or "negative" of distinct ideas, that is, excluded from thought.

This ground is in continuation with that which is distinct from it, because the distinct arises out of the obscure ground. At the same time, here, ground or sufficient reason has become a proclamation: "Sufficient reason proclaims, 'Everything has a concept!'" (*TF* 41). It is not the proclamation *of* the concept, but the proclamation of the *requisite* of a concept that belongs to everything. This is what Deleuze calls the metaphysical dimension and what distinguishes sufficient reason from

a ground that would essentially lay a foundation, which is also why he begins his discussion of it by noting "the exclamatory character of the principle [or] the cry of Reason par excellence" (*TF* 41). As a proclamation, it is unlocalizable, yet expressed in the two series of the actualized or the realized. Deleuze had developed this logic already in *The Logic of Sense*, making use of this transformed concept of sufficient reason. Whether we content ourselves, *The Logic of Sense* notes, with the three localizable dimensions of a proposition (denotation, manifestation, signification), or whether we add the un-localizable fourth dimension of sense to the series, in either case it is "a question *de jure*, and not simply a question of fact" (*LS* 17). Sense is the "sphere in which I am already established in order to enact possible denotations, and even to think their conditions" (*LS* 28)—the fourth dimension—that which is not essential, cannot be localized and fixed, is incorporeal. In close affinity to this unlocalizable sense, Deleuze argues that for Leibniz's theory of the monad, although the monad includes the world, such an inclusion cannot be localized. "The whole series is clearly in the monad, but the reason of the series—from which the monad receives only its particular effect or individual capacity to complete a part of it—is not" (*TF* 51, see also *L* 646). Such an unlocalizable ground or reason of the series is what Deleuze extracts from Leibniz and how he makes use of the notion of sufficient reason that is no longer securing the rule of the identical over infinity, but that is recast as an unlocalizable *vinculum*, "an unlocalizable primary link that borders the absolute interior" (*TF* 111).[4] With this question *de jure*, we have arrived at the second paradox noted above, the paradox of double antecedence: In Leibniz, "the world is virtually first, but the monad is actually first" (*TF* 52). These transformations allow Deleuze to reconsider the terms that were formerly associated with a logic of representation: analogy and resemblance. Deleuze notes this alteration in thinking resemblance when pointing out that for Leibniz perception does not "resemble […] an object, but […] evokes a vibration gathered by a receptive organ: pain does not represent the needle, nor its movement from one level to another […] but the thousands of minute movements or throbs that irradiate in the flesh" (*TF* 95). Consequentially,

> the meaning of resemblance […] entirely changes. Resemblance is equated with what resembles, not with what is resembled. That the perceived resembles matter means that matter is necessarily produced in conformity with this *relation*, and not that this relation conforms to a preexisting model. Or rather, it is the relation of resemblance,

it is the likeness that is itself the model, that makes matter be that which it resembles.

<div align="right">(*TF* 96, emphasis added)</div>

The reconfigured relation of resemblance is no longer resemblance of a model, but the continuous, productive modulation of two similar series. Before turning to the altered form of a "higher analogy" in more detail—likewise transformed on the basis of a reconsidered concept of ground, and addressing our underlying question of two analogous floors of thinking more directly—we should turn to the question of aesthetics to see better in what sense we need to alter our understanding of aesthetics to pose the question of Deleuze's aesthetics adequately.

Reinventing aesthetics

The Leibnizian ground is in fact an aesthetic concern, especially if we think of the early outlines of aesthetics envisioned in the work of Alexander G. Baumgarten, often referred to as the "founder" of aesthetics. In a way, Deleuze in *The Fold* suggests to reinvent aesthetics in the vein of these debates before the Kantian turn in philosophy. In his reading of Baumgarten's principle of continuity, Howard Caygill, arguing in favor of such a reinvention, remarks how strangely up-to-date Baumgarten's originary introduction and "invention" of the term aesthetics appears when we consider the reinventive impulses of it offered by Deleuze in turning to the baroque. Caygill summarizes these impulses as follows:

> Deleuzian aesthetics, as developed in the *Logic of Sense* and later in *The Fold*, provides a series of complex concatenations between a topology of perception—which stresses the continuity and complexity of concept and intuition in opposition to Kant's rigorous separation of them—and a theory of affectivity.
>
> <div align="right">(Caygill 2001, p. 234, translation is my own)</div>

This, Caygill points out, has a strange affinity to what Baumgarten's aesthetic project had attempted. Drawing on Leibniz's concept of the dark *fond* of the monad, Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* of 1742, laying the grounds for his later *Aesthetica* of 1750/58, introduced the idea of a dark ground: "There are dark perceptions in the soul (§ 510). Their complexity is called the soul's ground"[5] (Baumgarten 1983, p. 4, translation is my own). In distinction to the pejorative treatment of the lower faculties as unruly, unenlightened, and of no cognitive relevance

propagated by the rationalist Enlightenment philosopher Christian Wolff, Baumgarten's aesthetic project argued for their careful consideration. In his philosophical weekly *Philosophische Briefe von Aletheophilus*, published throughout 1741, Baumgarten laments the reductive equation of philosophy with logic: logic "has as its subject only understanding in the narrow sense and reason […], but we possess far more faculties of the soul, which serve understanding, than those attributed to understanding or reason" (ibid., 69). Thus, he continues, "logic promises more than it keeps, when it claims to improve our knowledge as such, and in the end attends only to distinct insight and its modification" (ibid., 69). Wishing to counter this reduction, Baumgarten—with reference to the "baron Leibniz, whose expanse of thorough insight I consistently admired the most" (ibid., 68)—aspires to a revision of a too narrowly conceived philosophy, and wishes to broaden it by considering forms of thinking that are other than purely "distinct." Aesthetics was to provide this broadening. Considering logic in the narrow sense to be "a science of the knowledge of reason or of distinct insight, [the letters' author, i.e. Baumgarten, B.K.] reserves the laws of sensate and vivid knowledge, even if it should not rise to distinctness, in its most precise sense, for a separate science. This latter he names aesthetics" (ibid., 69).

A decade later, the *Aesthetica*—eponymous founding document of the discipline, but presumably superseded by Kant's transcendental redefinition of the field[6]—outlines aesthetics as *scientia cognitionis sensitivae*. The first paragraph addresses its key issues: "AESTHETICS (as theory of the liberal arts, theory of knowledge of the lower faculties, the art of beautiful thinking, as the art of thinking analogous to reason) is the science of sensate thinking"[7] (Baumgarten 2007, p. 11, all translations are my own). Drawing on Leibniz's notion of the dark ground of the monad and his theory of perception, this "science" affirms the value and inescapable relation between "confused" and "clear" ideas. Aesthetics shall be the field that considers the relation between these two forms of ideas, and that arrives upon the basis of such consideration at other than rational and conceptual modes of thought. A sibling of rational thinking and logic (§ 13)—at the time both largely synonymous with philosophy—aesthetics was to address a different, but equally valuable realm of thinking or cognition, and the specificities of such *aesthetic* truth (§ 423–44). In one of the most interesting reconsiderations of Baumgarten's project, Anselm Haverkamp stresses precisely this point:

> Unlike philosophical aesthetics, which struggled from Kant to Adorno with the singularity, incommensurability and particularity

of the aesthetic object, Baumgarten's aesthetics evokes a cognitive interest […] an interest in the thinking of art—the thinking *of* and *about* art (genitivus subjectivus and objectivus).

                    (Haverkamp 2004, p. 95, translation is my own)

As *ars analogi rationis*, as § 1 of the *Aesthetica* had stated, it asserts an *analogous* relation between conceptual and sensate thinking. Throughout Baumgarten's reception, however, this coining of an *analogon rationis* was read as owing too much to rationalism, as merely modeling the *cognitionis sensitivae* after rational thinking. Reading Baumgarten thus in a rationalist Wolffian tradition, his proposition of analogy was dismissed. If, however, we read this analogy in the light of the Leibnizian paradoxicality of a *higher* analogy, which Deleuze has extracted from Leibniz, the complexity of the *analogon rationis* becomes apparent. Only then, Baumgarten's idea of a dark ground of the soul, partaking in confused ideas, can be understood as the enfolding of the sensate within the rational, and not as the "inferior" of two modes of thinking—despite the fact that he continues calling the faculties of *cognitio sensitiva* "lower" faculties, which does not refer to an inferior position in a hierarchical relation. It is in this sense of an enfolding that we have to read Baumgarten's stress on *twilight* in § 7 of the *Aesthetica*. Anticipating several charges that might be brought forth against this new "scientia," the paragraph lists and immediately refutes them. One of them—the allegation that "[c]onfusion is the mother of errors"—is answered by saying that confusion rather "is an indispensable prerequisite for the discovery of truth, since nature does not leap from darkness into the clarity of thinking. From night the path only leads through twilight to noon" (Baumgarten 2007, p. 15).

Baumgarten's use of the term twilight has often been misread, as either claiming that the noon of clarity is preceded by an inferior, confused dawn, assuming that Baumgarten unquestionably continues to prefer the noon's clarity, or claiming that the idea of twilight points to a sensate thinking that is incommensurable with logic, which Baumgarten wished to "emancipate" and integrate into the existing system of philosophy.[8] But if we stress Baumgarten's awareness of Leibniz's dark depths—a Leibniz that has been made accessible and fruitful again by Deleuze—we can say that as requisites of distinct knowledge (Baumgarten's *indispensable prerequisite* or Leibniz's *differentials of consciousness*) small perceptions are the "obscure ground," and that—given this relation of continuity between confused and clear—Baumgarten can assert an analogy between logic and aesthetic truth, between conceptual

and sensate thinking, without implying either a hierarchical relation, or a fundamental separation between the two. The crux has been and continues to be the understanding of the term analogy, a term that seems indebted to a logic of representation. Consequently it is not surprising that Baumgarten's discussion of the *analogon rationis* as a mode of thinking analogous to, but different from, conceptual thinking has been read as modeling the former on the latter. But following Deleuze's own rereading of analogy in terms of two series unfolding the same fold, the suggestion is to read the *analogon rationis* is this fashion: An analogy in the sense of arching from the same fold according to a different order, as sensate and conceptual thinking analogous precisely in the higher fashion that Deleuze stresses in *The Fold*.

A higher analogy

While *Difference and Repetition* had listed analogy among the components of the quadripartite yoke of representation, aligned with identity and essence, analogy is repeated in *The Fold* with a slight difference as "a higher analogy" (*TF* 29), in the name of difference. In accordance with the paradox of the inseparable yet really distinct, the two floors of the baroque house are analogous yet without being modeled on one another, or without one of the terms enjoying the privilege of a unilateral antecedence. We have already heard Deleuze couple the paradox of the inseparable yet really distinct with that of a double antecedence. The implication of the 'higher' quality of the analogy at stake here pertains to this double antecedence. "[T]he baroque contribution par excellence," Deleuze writes, "is a world with only two floors, separated by a fold that echoes itself, arching from the two sides according to a different order" (*TF* 29). Having the levels arch off from the two sides, that is thinking the two floors as the effect or product of differentiation, the fold (their differentiator) introduces a new link between the inside and the outside, between the lower and the upper floor: An analogous relation, in which two differentiated levels coexist, without inhabiting entirely separated worlds, so to speak. The baroque world—Wölfflin has shown this—"is organized along two vectors, a deepening toward the bottom, and a thrust toward the upper regions. Leibniz will make coexist, first, the tendency of a system of gravity […] and, second, the tendency to elevate, the highest aspiration of a system in weightlessness" (*TF* 29). Their being of a different order—a metaphysical, upper level (dealing with souls), and a physical, lower level (entailing bodies)—does not prevent them from comprising "a *similar* world, a *similar* house"

(*TF* 29, emphasis added). While the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition conceived of the world as "an infinite number of floors, with a stairway that descends and ascends" (*TF* 29), the baroque reduces this infinity to *only* two floors, and rediscovers infinity in the infinite folds that comprise each of these two levels, "as if infinity were composed of two stages of floors: the pleats of matter, and the folds in the soul" (*TF* 3).

In contrast to Platonic ideas transcending and preceding all images and representations made of these ideas, the baroque arrangement of two floors does not figure a hierarchical relation privileging one level over the other (as in Cartesianism), or determining one to model the other (as in Platonism). Rather, they coexist as similar. When considering the *analogon rationis*, the relation between the sensate and thinking, we are after this peculiar similarity. We had already heard that "[c]learly the two levels are connected (this being why continuity rises up into the soul)" (*TF* 4). The affirmed connection was phrased as a kind of translation, a resonance, an echo, despite the fact that the upper floor is blind and closed. According to "The Monadology" nothing can enter the monad, and yet there is movement between the two floors. The point is again one of knowing how to move from one floor to the other. It is too hasty to read the resonance as the echo of the lower floor *on* the upper floor, as one resonating the other according to the logic of the model, which would in fact be a simple relation of representation, a misunderstanding that came to bear in the criticism of Baumgarten's use of analogy. In contrast, we must read carefully: The baroque contribution is "a world with only two floors, separated by a fold that *echoes itself*, arching from the two sides according to a different order" (*TF* 29, emphasis added). Separated by a fold, the two floors are not pre-existing entities, but effects of a differentiation: that is, they are produced in the course of their separation. The fold, by differentiating them, brings them forth, arching from the two sides. They are both produced, according to a different order, as an effect of the fold echoing itself. Once the relation is thought as a *higher* analogy, analogy no longer subscribes to essences and identity, but expresses a differential relation between the world and that which was formerly called the "representation" of it. Such a relation, Deleuze notes, is particular to the baroque, which, as his study of Leibniz shows, "refers not to an essence but rather to an operative function, to a trait. It endlessly produces folds" (*TF* 3).

Whereas *Difference and Repetition* had seen Leibniz in the service of identity, here we have arrived at his principle concept, the fold, in the service of difference, at "a fold that differentiates and is differentiated" (*TF* 30). As such, it does not perform a differentiation that refers to

"a pregiven undifferentiated, but to a Difference that endlessly unfolds and folds over from each of its two sides, and that unfolds the one only while refolding the other" (*TF* 30). It is the fold that echoes itself and thereby permanently refolds its two floors, relating "one to the other by distinguishing them: a severing by which each term casts the other forward, a tension by which each fold is pulled into the other" (*TF* 30)—an incessant thrusting forth of two series along the differentiating threshold which is the fold, without a passing from one into the other. From this zone, separating the two series or levels and at the same time producing them, springs forth their differentiation, their arching out to two sides. From the quadripartite yoke of representation, we have moved into "a quadripartite system of folding" (*TF* 98), and remain Leibnizian, "discovering new ways of folding, akin to new envelopments" (*TF* 137). To this, Baumgarten's aesthetics had wanted to respond by considering an aesthetic manner of truth, calling it in his *Aesthetica* an *aestheticological* truth (§§ 427–44), a *manner* of truth that still awaits its Deleuzian unfolding in our readings of art.

A question of echology

With his remarkable rereading of Leibniz, Deleuze also assesses these potentials of aesthetics in a new light, and poses its question anew: a question regarding the sensate and its power of and for thought; a power, as Rancière rightly noted, that inhabits thought beneath itself, without its reckoning. In this sense, we can think of aesthetics as a baroque "echology" (*TF* 158), as the discipline that differs from ontology and pursues the questions that arise from the assertion of *having* a body, from the assertion that the body is not merely a given or lived body, but a deduction: "*I have a body because I have a clear and distinguished zone of expression*" (*TF* 98). A "cryptographer" is needed to unravel such a deduction—"account[ing] for nature and decipher[ing] the soul" (*TF* 3), as the opening page of *The Fold* states. Aesthetics in this sense does not merely offer a theory of a practice (art), or a descriptive discourse on specific art objects. Rather, it asks after the sensate and its import on or power of thought, making the sensate a concern of cognitive or epistemological—for lack of better words—import; a concern that had been crucial to aesthetics before its reterritorialization as a philosophy of art, as we saw in the brief excursus to Baumgarten's aesthetic project. By stressing the relation of the sensate to thinking as the crucial question of Deleuzian aesthetics—a relation that exemplarily comes to the fore in works of art, but is not restricted to them—we are

folded back to the "beginning" of aesthetics, to its scene of inception that we can, in light of Deleuze's Leibniz, decrypt differently.

Deleuze developed this relation of the sensate to thought most explicitly in his two books *Foucault* and *The Fold*, written in close sequence to one another. Significantly they follow his studies of art in *Francis Bacon* and the cinema books and precede the extension of this logic to art as a form of thinking in *What is Philosophy?* Both texts—*Foucault* and *The Fold*—envelop a thought that can be called specifically aesthetic in the sense stressed here: aesthetic as that which considers the relation of the sensate to thinking as one of enfolding of one in the other (as inseparable), and yet as operating according to two different orders (different), coexistent. In light of these texts we are able to appreciate the slight but significant distinction found in *What is Philosophy?* between the power of a ground and the monuments of art, between aesthetics as the question of the sensate—the *aisthetic*—and its relation to thought (that is of thought in the sensate and the sensate in thinking), on the one hand, and art as the creation of blocs of sensation, on the other hand. By drawing this distinction, Deleuze turns aesthetics away from a philosophy of art and towards an echology—*and* can make art plausible as one of the three modes of thought, which, given its creation of sensation as its true mode of expression, serves as marker of this *aisthetic* power of thought inhabiting thought before thought. Seeing confused perceptions as coexistent with apperception, Deleuze's Leibniz attributes to both the power of a thought of different orders, affirming

> the relativity of clarity […], the inseparability of clarity from obscurity, the effacement of contour—in short, the opposition to Descartes, who remained a man of the Renaissance […]. [For Leibniz, c]larity endlessly plunges into obscurity. Chiaroscuro fills the monad following a series that can move in either of two directions: at one end is a dark background and at the other is light, sealed.
>
> (*TF* 32)

The affirmation of a *zone of chiaroscuro*, which itself cannot be seen, but from which two series spring forth and come to pass as the differentiated states of a more or less dark background and a more or less lit foreground, makes the ground precisely not a foundation of the one *in* the other, but a production of the one *and* the other by way of differentiation. The two levels of the physical and the metaphysical are simultaneously proclaimed and produced. This, according to *The Fold*, is the contribution Leibniz makes. Aesthetics then becomes the name

for the recuperation of this coexistence, this analogy of a higher sort. However, rather than moving us outside of what might have been the stakes of aesthetics, we are cast into the heart of it. The affirmation of a *zone of chiaroscuro*, from which perceptions and apperceptions surge forth, and which thus poses the problem of how to account for the cognitive quality of confused perceptions was already the question of the *Aesthetica* and Baumgarten's *cognitiones sensitivae*. The affirmation of the twilight—since nature does not leap from darkness into the clarity of thinking—enables and calls for such a facing up to this problem. If we prefer to read this twilight as the dawn, which is to be surpassed in favor of a brighter noon, we are Cartesian; if we face up to it as a *chiaroscuro*, we remain Leibnizian, *and* Baumgartian, *and* Deleuzian.

Notes

1. This short article cannot do justice to the many transformations of the discipline of aesthetics, but it is important to note that they have hinged largely on the different conceptualizations of the notions of sensibility and sensation, in accordance with which diverse strands and emphases in aesthetics were formed. For these transformations with specific relevance to the present argument see Adler (2002); Barck, Kliche and Heininger (2000); Caygill (2001); Kaiser (2009); Menke (2001).
2. For the critique of phenomenology, see *FB* (Ch. 6 and 7); F (108–14); Smith (2003).
3. Certainly Deleuze makes Leibniz's idea of sufficient reason productive for his own work much earlier, starting really with his logic of series in *The Logic of Sense*, written only one year after *Difference and Repetition*. I will return to this point later on again, but this much be said here: It would certainly be too simple to think of the shift from *Difference and Repetition* to *The Fold* as a mere "development" in Deleuze's thinking. It might be more adequate to think of both texts as expressing different points of view, in the Leibnizian sense itself which, according to Daniel W. Smith, must be expressed in the following way: a point of view "is the portion or the region of the world expressed clearly by an individual in relation to the totality of the world, which it expresses obscurely in the form of minute perceptions. No two individual substances occupy the same point of view on the world because none have the same clear or distinct zone of expression on the world" (Smith 2006, p. 133). With this in mind, we could suggest that the "shift" in Deleuze's reading is not one of philosophical development, but that *Difference and Repetition* expresses the ontological, and *The Logic of Sense* and *The Fold* the aesthetic or—more precise—echological point of view (the end of this chapter returns to this). Cf. Thiele (2008), where Thiele develops such thought in much greater detail in relation to the expression of ontology and ethics in Deleuze's work.
4. For a discussion of this "special hook" (*TF* 109) see *TF* (109–17); for the shift it allows from Being to Having (a body) see Deleuze's own references: Frémont (1981) and Milet (1970).

5. For a detailed reading of Baumgarten's *fundus animae*, see Adler (1988).
6. Baumgarten's history of reception is a complex matter. Due to his studies with Wolff, his aesthetics was often regarded as indebted to Wolffian rationalism (see Groß (2001), pp. 21–64), confusing Baumgarten with the Enlightenment poetics of J. Ch. Gottsched, another of Wolff's students (see Caygill (2001), who argues that was the case e.g. in Kant's *First Critique*, which dismissed Baumgarten's aesthetics on the basis of this confusion). For the *Aesthetica's* complicated history of reception, see Haverkamp (2004) and Mirbach (2007).
7. For Baumgarten's use of beauty as perfection, contrary to Hegel's beautiful soul, see Groß (2001, pp. 110–25).
8. For these two trends in reading Baumgarten, see Naumann-Beyer (2003); Franke (1972); Scheer (1976); Ritter (1971).

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10
Capacity or Plasticity: So Just What is a Body?

Matthew Hammond

The problem

In an interview, Deleuze remarks that *The Fold* was a very important book for him because it allowed him to distinguish the Concept from the Affect and Percept, which he suggests he had previously confused in the Refrain Plateau, of *A Thousand Plateaus* (*N* 137). This remark is very significant because elsewhere Deleuze explicitly links affect, percept and concept with Spinoza's three types of knowledge (*N* 164–6); and yet this is all the more problematic in that one looks in vain for these terms within *The Fold* itself. So it appears that a relationship between Leibniz and Spinoza is both posited, and yet apparently occluded, and all the more so, as Deleuze in *The Fold*, unlike earlier works, is keen to stress the differences between the two thinkers (*TF* 44, 106). This last point reminds one that Deleuze, by the time of *The Fold* had developed many previous positions on both Leibniz and Spinoza, all of which are subtly reworked within *The Fold* itself. The aim of this essay is to go back to these earlier encounters with Leibniz and Spinoza, and by examining exactly how Deleuze habitually links these two philosophers, to elucidate exactly what *The Fold* might be clarifying, and what might follow on from this clarity.

My argument here is that Leibniz holds the key to Deleuze's understanding of Spinoza: It is Leibniz who invariably defines the problem, and Spinoza, the solutions. Moreover this is clearly no static relationship. On the contrary at three key points, progressively a richer interpretation of Leibniz triggers a new reading of Spinoza. *The Fold*, which is of course Deleuze's richest encounter with Leibniz, is therefore critical to the advent of the Spinoza of *What is Philosophy?*. Moreover it will also be argued that it is this dynamic that configures 'Spinoza's' peculiar journey

within the Deleuzian mind. A journey that starts from a Spinoza of *Expressionism* who is understood as an important milestone on the road to a philosophy of difference, moves through a Spinoza of *A Thousand Plateaus*, who is now the supreme philosopher of nature itself, to ending, in *What is Philosophy?* with a Spinoza, who is transfigured into a Christ for philosophy itself. However, as it is clearly impossible to consider in the scope of a single essay all the intricacies involved in this sequence, I will limit myself in two regards. Firstly I will concentrate more on the role of Leibniz, as problem setter, than of Spinoza as problem solver and secondly I will concentrate especially on the fate of the body within Deleuzian thought, and attempt to show how the evolving Leibniz–Spinoza dynamic, at each turn produced a new account of the Body.

The first conjunction

Perhaps unlike later encounters between Leibniz and Spinoza, there is a real urgency in the account of Leibniz within *Expressionism*. Deleuze wishes to argue that Spinoza has a concept synonymous with differentiation, and yet Spinoza explicitly at least, develops no such idea. Deleuze can therefore only uncover 'differentiation' within Spinoza by arguing that Leibniz and Spinoza are developing the same basic argument and that consequently at the point at which Leibniz clearly introduces a notion of the differential, one can infer that Spinoza will likewise require an equivalent (if obscure) concept. For the Leibniz of *Expressionism*, the differential derivative force is given by the 'forces of acting and suffering' (*AG* 160–2). Deleuze suggests that the equivalent to this differential force is found in Spinoza's fairly often-repeated claim that the mind is capable (or apt) to do many things, as its body is likewise capable. (*Ethics* II/97, II/103, II/239, II/305, henceforth '*E*')

Deleuze's argument for this equivalence is based on a supposed 'Anti-Cartesian Reaction'. Descartes had instituted a nature that was understood purely in terms of a mathematical and mechanistic science. Nature was thereby stripped of powers which became rather the preserves of beings outside nature. (Subject or God, *EPS* 227). This 'Reaction' involved the attempt to re-establish force and power within nature. Deleuze suggests that this was achieved via a threefold schema, of mechanism, force and essence, which he suggests applies equally to Spinoza and Leibniz, even if it is only explicitly stated in the latter. If one starts with purely extrinsic movements, it is clear that they explain everything that happens within the body in terms of mechanical laws. And yet it is also the case that such movements can only be related to a body (as

specific movements) if they already presuppose an inner nature that is capable of acting within a moment (as a force) to compose each successive motion. Such a derivative force, which operates upon an aggregate, constructs 'the inner nature of things which is no different from the forces of acting and suffering' (Deleuze here is quoting Leibniz, *EPS* 229). This inner nature however, although it links moments, is itself momentary, and must be referred to a primitive force 'or essence' which is capable of governing the series of moments (*EPS* 228–9, see also *L* 808–25). Deleuze argues that Spinoza's argument can be understood to involve a 'closely analogous' schema, which moves from a mechanism which governs bodies, to a dynamism related to a capacity to be affected, and finally to an essence which express itself in the variation of this capacity (ibid.).

And yet, if one considers Spinoza without regard to Leibniz, this interpretation is far from evident. Starting from the 'capacity for affection', Deleuze's interpretation is based upon a synthesis of arguments that, although they are clearly linked in *Ethics*, are never formally united in a single agency. *Ethics* talks not only of an aptitude to do many things, but also of a force for existing which perpetually fluctuates (*E* II/204), of joys and sorrows that relate to one's ability to think and do many things (*E* II/242), of actions that lead one to strive to perceive more things (*E* II/227), and of a relation with God which waxes as we can think and perceive many different things (*E* II/295). All of which clearly imply one another, and yet the nature of this implication is left implicit, and undeveloped. Hence the importance of Leibniz in making this argument, is that he offers the reader of Spinoza a clue by which the connections between linked concepts can be made, a connection which Spinoza himself singularly seems to lack.

Moreover the importance of Leibniz in setting up the schema is all the more evident when one considers its two aspects. Deleuze argues that essences constitute intensive quantities. (*EPS* 196–7) And yet he also notes that Spinoza does not use the term 'intensive', which was current up to the time of Descartes, and which Leibniz did use. Deleuze suggests that Spinoza's caution might well be due to not wanting to appear to reintroduce Precartesian physics (*EPS* 417–8), which is of course viable, and yet unprovable. What is however certain is that unless Deleuze can argue that the essence is an intensive quantity, he cannot get the required analogy between Leibniz and Spinoza. Likewise in his exposition of material reality, Deleuze very deliberately presents an accord between Leibniz and Spinoza's account of matter. Deleuze argues therefore that Spinoza's simple bodies involve extrinsic relations

of motion and rest that are always gathered together in greater and lesser *actual* infinities of parts within certain 'wholes' that correspond to a modal essence (*EPS* 205). It makes no sense to ask whether such bodies exist or not. These bodies lack any nature of their own, and are merely 'extrinsically distinguished' from one another: They have no existence of their own, even though all existence is composed of them (*EPS* 207). Again Spinoza, beyond making the claim that simple bodies are distinguished from one another by means of motion and rest (*E* II/97), does not actually claim any one of these moves. Leibniz by contrast explicitly makes them all – claiming not only that matter involves perpetual flux, but also that it is actually infinitely composite, and involves parts which lack reality of their own, even though they form the body of some substantial (intensive) form (*AG* 78–80).

So again in both these moves, while there is certainly nothing in Spinoza that prevents Deleuze from making them, there is nothing that explicitly argues for them. Deleuze's argument therefore needs to repeatedly draw upon Leibniz, in order to elucidate what is apparently so obscure within Spinoza. Only once this move has been made can the Spinoza of *Expressionism* be developed. Here only two things need be noted, both of which relate to the point at which Deleuze wishes to break from Spinoza. Firstly in *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze represents Spinoza as the penultimate thinker of difference. Spinoza was the philosopher who had all the ingredients to think difference (essence had become power, individuation was tied to a differential, being was univocal). And yet, the thinker whom in the last instance still argued that substance was 'independent' of its modes, which were made 'dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves', and so had failed to grasp that 'being must be said of becoming', not the other way around. That is, that difference needs to turn not on substance's infinite capacity to differ, but upon the modes perpetual differing, which thereby become the object of a 'pure affirmation' (*DR* 40, 304).

Secondly, and arising from this last point, modes can only express God's infinite capacity to differ in a fixed and determinate manner (*EPS* 93–4; *E* II/84). This capacity is physically delimited within a body: A horse has a different capacity for affection than does a man or a fish (*EPS* 217–8). Each intrinsic essence therefore 'corresponds' to a certain extrinsic relation of motion and rest (in which its capacity for affection is fixed), and specific individuation only occurs when extrinsic relations have been determined to enter into the 'precise given relation' for a specific individual (*EPS* 209–10). Once this relationship has been

fixed, the individual is free to discover within itself what it is 'capable of': hence the formula that the capacity is physically fixed, and yet ethically variable (*EPS* 225). The effect of this move is that the Spinoza of *Expressionism* cannot ultimately break with a degree of Aristotelianism, whereby capacity for affection (and so essence) is welded to an 'individual form', even as it remains distinct from it (*E* II/93, 209). In the course of one life, the same 'body' might involve different essences (*E* II/240), but there can never be more than one essence in one body at one time. Deleuze will of course directly counter this move in *Difference and Repetition*. Here he argues that extensive interpretation of individuation remains incapable of providing reasons 'why a synthesis of extensivity begins and finishes', and therefore that 'extensive parts are relative to the individual rather than the reverse' (*DR* 247). Hence there need be no correlation between external form and the individual. Each individuation no more depends upon the body than it does upon the soul. Each 'self' is therefore necessarily 'dissolved' into a shifting kaleidoscope of individualities that 'ceaselessly interpenetrate one another through fields of individuation' (ibid., 254).

The Spinoza of *Difference and Repetition* is therefore the thinker who has all the ingredients of a philosophy of difference and merely confuses exactly which is of prime importance. However if Spinoza's position in the history of the philosophy of difference is thereby secured, the same cannot be said of Leibniz. Although Leibniz is vital in the construction of Deleuze's Spinoza, as the philosopher who has a clear exposition of what was obscure in Spinoza, he is very much the loser in this exchange. Not only are some of his most characteristic ideas (such as differentiation) assigned to his rival, but also he is rendered incomprehensible in the process. Deleuze simply cannot afford to allow Leibniz problems of his own: Hence, there is no hint in *Expressionism* of a distinction between plastic or elastic force, nor of the fact that Leibniz's system requires a totally different account of the body than is found in Spinoza (both of which are found in *The Fold*). Where Leibniz does differ from Spinoza, Deleuze constantly argues that it is as a result of the former's desire to shield himself from the otherwise worrying tendency of expression towards pantheism, and so nothing substantive in itself (*EPS* 333).

This is the characterisation present within *Difference and Repetition*, where Leibniz is presented as a paradoxical thinker. The thinker who perhaps best defined the nature of a differential unconscious, and yet who then could only understand its actualisation in terms of a realised possibility, that accorded with 'good sense' (*DR* 213). What is lacking in

Deleuze's account at this point is any idea that for Leibniz realisation (as it is related to the body) involves a different (and parallel) relationship to that of the monad's actualisation (*TF* 104): likewise there is little hint at this point, of the importance of the monad's lived experience, in God's choice of which world to create (ibid., 73). In effect Leibniz, understood solely in the light of the Nietzsche–Spinoza axis, is found if not wanting, then essentially anomalous. Nonetheless it is clear both in *Expressionism*, and again in *The Logic of Sense*, that Leibniz does have one clear advantage over Spinoza. Spinoza's Mode is a single actualised individuating difference, whose differential singularities pertain to God. In contrast, each monad can directly envelope a set of singularities as its very own; all the more so, as God will only be able to think these singularities from the viewpoint of respective monads (*EPS* 329–34). This point is subsequently developed in *The Logic of Sense*, where Deleuze allows that Leibniz perfectly characterises the aggregates and mixtures into which events are actualised within a body. But Leibniz was then not able to affirm the disjunctive synthesis itself (in spite of assembling many of its key ingredients). Hence, it is not the monad which can inhabit a chaosmos, but rather a 'universal ego', which is common to many worlds (*LS* 111–7)

Enter Guattari

However at this point, another Leibniz emerges, from possibly a very surprising source: Guattari. Guattari on reading *Expressionism* remarks that Spinoza can only 'desubstantialise substance [...] without too much difficulty because he has somewhat reassuring modes to fit into it [...] For Spinoza, substance is empty, unique and indivisible because the modes he considers don't play around cutting themselves up and deterritorialising themselves!' (Guattari 2006, 262–3). Guattari argues that the model for this relationship was the idea of mercantile money that did not 'deterritorialise itself beyond the world of the bill' (ibid.). Guattari contrasts this position with Leibniz's, who if anything pushes the monad too far in the direction of deterritorialisation and needs to have recourse to a God, in order to save not only morality but also reality. That is 'creationist monads ... risk butting up against an a-substantial God, a Nothing-God, and all the more so if they are deployed on a *continuum*. But this continuum [...] is *limited in all directions, separated cut-off (sic) by God*' (emphasis in the original, ibid., 259). Guattari goes on to illustrate both points with long quotes from 'Discourse on Metaphysics' in the course of which, Leibniz argues that monads necessarily freely

'accommodate (themselves) to one another' and that it is only God who ordains the exact combinations which they must form (ibid., 260). Leibniz is therefore only more 'stuck' than Spinoza because the units he is dealing with are more creative (ibid., 262). Guattari goes on to suggest that one needs to reconcile the univocity of Spinoza with the ability of the monad to 'deterritorialise'. Monads would thereby be stripped of their 'artificial territoriality' and free to 'break and re-break onto one another' (ibid., 266).

Moreover Guattari argues, it is not good enough to simply accept a division between production and representation (power and capacity for affection), but one must rather include the former within the latter and thereby 'discover a certain complementarity to Spinoza's powers'. It is this move that will allow the development of 'a machinic composition of powers and non-equilibration of forces in a single body-structure' (ibid., 255). So that, rather than tying an actualised body to a fixed capacity for affection (and therefore *a* power), one needs to create body-structures which are capable of enfolding many distinct powers. Thence Guattari remarks that 'God as pure power of being affected is essentially the *power of nothingness*, the power to negativise any determination'. While the corresponding fixed ability of a mode to be affected, amounts to its separation from its own actual powers (ibid., 266–7); and will (although Guattari is not explicit here) only be possible through an appeal to perfection (each essence is always as perfect as it can be), a move which Guattari condemns ('Code doesn't call for, or require perfection' (ibid., 266)). The differential element in the body, is not some (arbitrarily) pre-fixed capacity, but is rather related to codes, which necessarily are 'conjugated, and act and exist through conjugation'. Individual powers (that is affects) then erupt from individual surplus values of such codes (modal surplus is therefore the same as code surplus (ibid.)). Power is both always related to the particular circumstances which configured it, and is always actual (and so not subject to perfection): Hence 'The degrees of power […] are thus "*identical to the power to act itself*"' (emphasis in the original, ibid., 267, internal quote *EPS* 231). From which it follows that specific powers are not to be related to a singular essence but rather involve events: 'If existence is only the factualness of the event, then the only thing that counts is the actualisation of power' (ibid., 266). Each power is therefore both always a response to events elsewhere (and given to it as an 'over-coding'), and itself an event, which necessarily involves others in over-coding (as they are caught up within it).

Hence Guattari curiously inverts Deleuze's own viewpoint on Leibniz and Spinoza. Monads do not themselves lack the ability to deterritorialise, and it is only God who stops this happening (ibid., 264). What Leibniz actually lacks is a theory of univocal materiality, by which can be articulated the 'aggregates' and 'mixture' of individuals which are in themselves disjunctive. This is the theory that Spinoza will provide, if he is allowed to advocate on the one hand, powers which both arise from events elsewhere, but also are able to be an event (for others) in themselves. And on the other hand a type of individuation which is capable of articulating these powers as events.

The second conjunction

Guattari thereby challenges Deleuze to allow his Spinoza the same degree of freedom that Leibniz's monad appears to enjoy: the freedom, in the absence of God, to wander across events, and through shifting powers. That is, Leibniz's God can embrace difference in a way that Spinoza's God cannot. Once again therefore it is Leibniz who has defined the nature of the problem that Deleuze's Spinoza must respond to. Firstly this move represents a significant augmentation in Spinoza's position in the Deleuzian pantheon. It is now Spinoza who provides a way to understand nature as a 'Plane of composition', populated by intensive affects, and extensive motions (*SPP* 122–30); and who thereby, if only on a global level, provides all tools by which one thinks individuality as a machinic 'assemblage of powers' (Guattari 2006, 226).

Secondly a more critical factor is the position of the ritornello as a key element in the development of this new position. It is the refrain's role to orchestrate the transcoding, which occurs 'when a code is not content to take or receive components that are coded differently, and instead takes or receives fragments of a different code as such'. A refrain involves nature as melodies in counterpoint, each of which serves as a 'motif for another'. So that, 'Whenever there is transcoding, we can be sure that there is not a simple addition, but the constitution of a new plane of a surplus value. A melodic or rhythmic plane, surplus value of passage or bridging' (*ATP* 314). It is therefore the refrain which opens up milieus, allowing them to exist as events 'for one another', and therefore communicates a difference, which is not subsumed within specific relations, and instead could be said to inhabit a space 'in-between' individual actualisations. Hence the refrain is the way in which Guattari's contention that power needs to be always in terms of surplus values – which both create it, and which it creates – is being articulated.

And yet it is this analysis that Deleuze suggests in the interview cited in the introduction, which failed to adequately distinguish concepts from affects and percepts. Deleuze actually says

> an analysis is sketched out in *A Thousand Plateaus*; the ritornello involves all three forces [of affect, percept and concept]. […] We tried to make the ritornello one of our main concepts, relating it to territory and Earth, the little and the great ritornello. Ultimately all these periods lead into one another and get mixed up, as I now see better with this book on Leibniz or the Fold.
>
> > (*N* 137)

The three periods in the above quote relate to the three separate branches of Deleuze's work: that is the work on the history of philosophy; Deleuze's own philosophical work; and his development (in the context of *Cinema 1* and *2*) of the ideas of affects and percepts. However, it is clear from the above discussion that this 'mixing up' of periods was in fact central to the Guattari project. If now one needs greater care in telling them apart, one is left wondering how much of that project is now put into question? Moreover this question is clearly bound up with the complex problem of exactly how *The Fold* allowed Deleuze to clearly distinguish percepts-affects from concepts? And why he then associated these terms with Spinoza in *Essays Clinical and Critical*?

These questions would, if considered in due detail, take one very far from what can be achieved within this essay. I will therefore concentrate only on three aspects to this problem. Firstly I will provisionally define exactly what has changed in the status of the Refrain between *A Thousand Plateaus*, and *What is Philosophy?* Secondly I will attempt to develop one theme (that of the Body) within *The Fold*, which clearly has a role to play within this shift; and finally I will indicate how this third stage in Deleuze's understanding of Leibniz, inspired a third stage in his understanding of Spinoza.

Towards the third Leibniz

In *What is Philosophy?* a very clear distinction is drawn between two types of becoming:

> Sensory becoming is the action by which something or someone is ceaselessly becoming-other (while continuing to be what they are) […] whereas conceptual becoming is the action by which the

common event itself eludes what it is. Conceptual becoming is heterogeneity grasped in an absolute form; sensory becoming is otherness caught in a matter of expression

(*WP* 177)

It is further claimed that the universes created by sensory becoming (which are linked to art and nature), are 'neither virtual or actual; they are possibles, the possible as aesthetic category ('the possible or I shall suffocate')' (*WP* 177). Each such sensation 'exists in its possible universe without the concept necessarily existing in its absolute form' (*WP* 178).

The move augured in *The Fold* is therefore no mean one, as it forces Deleuze to confront the 'non-philosophical' nature of the natural world. And yet this by itself begs a further question. How should this possibility be understood? In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze makes a very careful distinction between possibilities based on resemblance and those based on expression. The former he argues, are theoretically moribund, as they add nothing to one's understanding. A 'Possible' seen from this perspective is merely a non-existent actual, and can tell one nothing of reality beyond actualisation (*DR* 211–2). However the same is not true for the latter. The expressed does not 'resemble' the expressor, but rather it 'does not exist apart from the expressor, even though the expressor relates to it as though to something completely different'. Hence 'the terrified face does not resemble what terrifies it, it envelops a state of the terrifying world' (*DR* 260), which remains nonetheless distinct from the face itself. Moreover this world is expressed not as something real, but is enveloped within a constellation of possibilities. (Perhaps the terror is real, perhaps not, or not yet, or not now, perhaps, perhaps). Some of which (or none of which) might then be realised (in which case the face would cease to be conveying a possibility), and all of which are expressed in their very diversity by the look of terror expressed upon the face. Hence Deleuze argues that one grasps the other as such only at 'the moment at which the expressed has (for us) no existence apart from that which expresses it: the Other *as the expression of a possible world*' (*DR* 261).

Thus far, a possible world could be either related to concepts or affects and percepts. Indeed the example of a terrified face is the example used in *What is Philosophy?* to illustrate the sense that a concept has a possibility (*WP* 17). How then do these possibles differ? Conceptual becoming surveys the very heterogeneity of possible worlds. A concept of a terrified face, or China, endlessly transports the thinker into a land of possibilities all of which are enwrapped within the single concept. In

a sensory becoming by contrast, it is the sensation itself which necessarily enfolds other sensations, which enclose yet others, and therefore expresses a world of possibilities, in its very matter.

Moreover, although Deleuze does not invoke Leibniz here, it is nonetheless the case that Leibniz is peculiarly useful in understanding this difference. Leibniz is after all the philosopher who can make the apparently contrasting claims that God chose a certain world, as it was expressed with a certain set of monads: And yet also claimed that in every world each monad is free to choose other worlds, even if God knows they will not. Whence *What is Philosophy?* argues that Leibniz fails to think the possibility of the event, and yet still is vital in thinking the passive synthesis of the possible ('Leibniz possibles do not exist in the real world' (*WP* 17), and 'This is because the soul does not act, it preserves', *WP* 212). Each individual is therefore free as it involves matters of expression; Adam really could have found other desires within himself (affect), and so acted otherwise (*TF* 70); while each body contains a point of view which opens on a variety of possible connections (percept), and therefore worlds (ibid., 24). And yet at the same time, a monad (concept) will always only include within itself one of these options (ibid., 25), and only as it participates within a narrative of a story written by God (ibid., 127). Contra Guattari therefore, a monad is not free in regard to concepts, and yet still remains free with regard to matters of expression. It is therefore surely the role of the monad to supply a 'sufficient reason', which enables the potential chaos of affects to be resolved one way or other. That is, the world itself is folded into a concave cupola, at whose apex (that is point of view) there are included an infinity of folds. It is on this world of diversity, that an actualised event falls, as it implicates one particular point of view (ibid., 124–5). One says that it was *a* Caesar that crossed *a* Rubicon, and not merely an old, bald, bi-sexual man getting wet, because it is the monad called Caesar, that is included in the event of 'Crossing the Rubicon', and therefore peculiarly expresses it (ibid., 98–9). What is more, God clearly mirrors this process within the unique event of creation. He judges each world of events according to the rules of desire, and creates that world which, when taken together strives most to exist (*AG* 150). If events allow one to talk of a Caesar, it is this single event of creation, that necessitates it being this Caesar, and this world.

The third conjunction

However, the last point opens onto a whole series of questions as to how affective-desires (or accords) are related to the point of view, which is

contained within a body. Not only does Deleuze make this link explicit in the very last pages of *The Fold* where he argues that private-accords and public crowds, fuse together is a strange diagonal line (*TF* 137), but also this link is clearly at least implicit within Leibniz himself. If Adam is free to choose otherwise, then he must be able to find in his own soul other desires. Thence there must exist either within the body, or at least open for that body, other movements, which it could enfold within different plastic forces. So that both desire and body must open out on more reality than the monad itself can ever actualise, a reality that requires principles of its own.

This is all the more the case, as Deleuze himself cannot get the final part of this equation from Leibniz (as Leibniz does not formally break the accord-body combination off from the monad-concept combination). What will be attempted here is therefore the far more modest task of attempting to uncover what it is in Leibniz's account of the body, as it is presented in *The Fold*, which will allow the subsequent moves which are developed within *What is Philosophy?* before I briefly indicate how this move leads Deleuze back to Spinoza.

My question is therefore – what exactly in *The Fold* allows the body and wider nature to be configured as a 'matter of expression' (and therefore in terms of possibility)? The starting point for this argument clearly needs to be the re-configuration of notions of resemblance found in *The Fold*. As discussed above, Deleuze vehemently rejects the value of a possibility understood in terms of resemblance and the 'real' (and picks out Leibniz for special criticism in this respect). However in *The Fold* Deleuze turns this resemblance argument on its head. It is not perception that resembles something real in matter, but rather matter itself that resembles perceptions as they are engaged in actualisations. And yet this matter is not identical to the actual-virtual combination, as the differential has no 'real' status in matter (*TF* 96). A move that itself leads to two further questions. Firstly what is it in matter that is like, and yet not identical to, the virtual? And secondly, how does one understand the unity of body and perception by the body, if that unity cannot be founded on simple parallelism? The answer to the first of these questions, lies in what is so peculiar about matter. Matter essentially is not related to the virtual, but the possible. Matter (quite unlike the monad) encompasses all possible worlds. In the world of matter therefore an actual unsinning Adam remained still a possibility, even after the 'virtual world' of sin was created (*TF* 104). The role of the body is to realise, in matter, what would otherwise remain a possibility. Moreover it must do so, in a way which 'resembles' the actualisation process of the mind

(ibid., 105). The latter, Deleuze argues, takes the form of a series of differential filters, through which the mind actualises elements within its virtual unconscious (ibid., 91, see also 76–7). The body likewise involves a filtering process (ibid., 112–3), but which clearly bears not on the virtual (which can proceed from whole to part) but the possible (as the body 'successively submits to the impression of all the others' (ibid., 106). The problem becomes how this filtering is to be arranged.

This problem leads one back to the second question mentioned above – what is the status of the unity of body and mind, when that unity is not (as it is in Spinoza) linked to parallelism? The soul is present in the body as a presence (ibid., 119). The soul is never identical to a body, but rather is said to 'own it' (ibid., 106). This ownership involves a double process of belonging, inaugurated by a vinculum, or primal link. On the one hand, a body belongs to each soul; on the other hand multitudes of animal souls taken en masse are said to belong to a body (ibid., 108–9). Additionally a monad does not simply own its own body, but is rather yoked to it by a complex double belonging. Firstly each monad is linked to a vinculum, which ties it to other monads, and requires that they, taken en masse, constitute a body for it. Thus far, the body created does not have individuality of its own – it is merely a man, or a flea. Secondly individuality occurs when the vinculum is sent back from the body to the monad, which then envelops this body as its own (ibid., 112–3).

The twin aspects of belonging, clearly allow one to develop a domain in which one can only talk of 'a' body, which remains indefinite, as long as it pertains only to the first stage of this process. Moreover, it needs to be remembered that this unspecified body, composed merely of an act of realisation, is itself substantial, even though it realises something within an illusion (ibid., 110–1). The body might not be real, but that does not stop there being reality in its constant realising of phenomena within the body (ibid., 120). What is more, a body, which belongs to a soul (as a presence), is animated (ibid.). This peculiar status pitches the force for life within the body at its inception, in-between all specific individualisations or realities. On the one hand, as the phenomena realised, these are themselves extremely volatile, so that what realises it must do so in a way that could always be enfolding other possibilities. On the other hand, the realisation affected in the body will clearly not stop just because a phenomena has been 'realised' by it. Each 'real phenomena' must therefore, as it is in the body, also be 'realizing'. Hence each body does not merely realise phenomena, but also does so in such a way that that realisation, as it is given, contains other possibilities,

and they still contain others, to infinity. Each body only 'realises' phenomena by becoming a filter for possibility. And yet this last point leads to two further questions. Firstly exactly how is this filtering process operating? And how is it rendering the body 'substantial', as it realises something else? Secondly how does this process itself force one to rethink the nature of the matter, which now must be understood as providing the raw material for this filtering?

The first of these questions comes down to how a point of view is contained within a body (ibid., 10). This is because such points of view serve as the 'condition' by which the subject 'apprehends variation'. Each such a viewpoint envelops not only changes within a world (ibid., 20–1), but looks out onto other possible worlds (ibid., 24–5). It serves as a mathematical point (or focus) which envelops a 'variation', as that variation enfolds an objectile as the 'invariant' of a transformation (ibid., 21). Thence in terms of the living body, a point of view serves to focus the infinitely enfolded plastic forces (both those realised and unrealised in this world), and resolves them into a certain 'degree of unity' as 'a worm or a plant' (ibid., 10–1). What is significant here is that each point of view involves a 'power of arranging cases' (ibid., 21) and will therefore naturally arrange within this infinite possibility, shifting orders of realisations. Hence the argument made above: At any one time, a certain number of plastic forces will be real (and therefore no longer pertain to the body); and yet at the same time the body will also be 'realising' how these forces contain other possibilities for other forces, which likewise involve further possibilities ad infinitum. That is, in the terms of *Difference and Repetition*, it is the peculiar function of the body, to ensure that actual-real forces, are also matters of expression, within which other worlds are enveloped. The infinite chaos of pure possibility becomes arranged, and expressed (that is filtered), within an infinite set of series of enveloped plastic forces. However the point of view can only provide such unity as there is projected onto it a soul (ibid., 23), through which it is existing in the body as a presence. This last point immediately raises the problem of how a point of view can have any status of its own within the body, which remains independent from both the plastic forces which it focuses, and the soul that 'occupies' it?

To answer this question one must carefully assess the relative positions of the derivative forces and the vinculum. As discussed above, each dominant monad provides the principle of unity for a vinculum, which is quite unthinkable without it. And yet each monad can only take *this* body as its own, because it has created in matter '*a* body'. Thence the non-individualised body clearly corresponds to the point

to view, which the monad then possesses, by resolving it in some way (ibid., 25). Moreover, while the 'organic parts of the body' are composed of molar elements, these aggregates will only be bound in a body, as they are included with the vinculum of some dominant monad, whose presence is therefore necessary to 'corporeal substance itself' (ibid., 114). Hence, plastic forces might bend matter into a molar organism (ibid.), but they only do so in the name of a corporeal substance, which itself necessarily remains distinct from them. Each body can only serve as a filter, as it possesses a dominant monad which has yet to avail itself of its body's individual unity, and so that body is animated, and yet non-individual. What is more, it is surely this paradoxical status that allows it to function as a filter for possibility in the first place. It is, after all, only such an animation that defines the conditions by which plastic forces are real and yet also realising, unfolded in themselves, and yet always enfolding other possibilities, into infinity. Each body is therefore formed as an 'expressive matter' within which an infinity of possible worlds are constantly being generated.

However this last point merely intensifies the problem of exactly how the plastic forces that have been bent within the vinculum relate to the 'unbent' elastic forces. All that matters to the current argument are, however, three points. Firstly Deleuze reasons that elastic forces within the body fabricate the texture of its organic parts, and clothe the abstract structures that plastic forces build (ibid., 115). This point leads Deleuze to claim that as textures and properties are found in matter at large, so it must be possible to apply the same reasoning to the constitution of matter as a whole. He suggests that entelechies provide the inner principle for this outer movement and therefore always belong to the 'aggregate as such' (ibid., 116). Secondly the body itself remains really distinct from these derivative forces, which exist in relation to it, merely as a presence, and as its requisites, to be taken up as a 'unit of synthesis under the flash of an instant' (ibid., 118–20). Thirdly the monads as they belong to a body, 'accede to a public status', in which they always exist within a crowd or heap. At each instant a monad constitutes a tendency, which 'dies ceaselessly' in the instant it is given, and yet is then eternally reconstituted across other instants (ibid., 117). Monads thereby become 'collective without being statistical' (ibid., 115), and their very 'crowd' status, the sense in which they are always necessarily multiple, always in the middle of others, without ever being a whole, becomes in itself a creative force.

Two profound consequences follow from this argument. Firstly each fold of elastic matter will always capture other individuals who elsewhere

have their own individual plastic natures. Hence each vinculum only opens itself onto the world of matter, as it itself is spliced to a series of captures and being caught (ibid., 108). Secondly the process by which elastic forces are constituted within a body have become the paradigm case for matter as a whole. Each body will therefore be necessarily connected to all other bodies (ibid., 134–5). And yet this link will always be creative, both because these forces can only be folded up in a particular body according to its own distinctive plastic forces, and also because the very multiplicity of involving many bodies is in itself, creative.

Hence a vinculum fabricates corporeal substance as a filter over possibility, which necessarily opens upon a universe of constant collective creation. It is then this model of nature which is carried into *What is Philosophy?* and was moreover doubtless what served to 'clarify' Deleuze's own mind in relation to the refrain. This move however, cannot be finally accomplished within Leibniz, for whom the body remained bound up with the pre-established harmony. All I will attempt here is to mention five key pointers present in *The Fold,* (even if, due to the rigours of Deleuze's monograph they could not in that form, be further developed) before proceeding to a conclusion.

Firstly Deleuze clearly establishes an equivalence between the domains of mind and matter. Each mind has a clear zone, and an obscure molecular unconscious, which is inseparable (if really distinct) from similar divisions of body and matter. Thence nature itself expresses (within the domain of matter) the 'melodic' unconscious of the monad itself. That is, it contains within it an infinite kaleidoscope of shifting movements (or motifs) that a vinculum can take up into its own peculiar expression (ibid., 135).

Secondly although 'opened' by the world of matter, each vinculum can only bend elastic movement into itself, as if it were uncovering these movements as a possibility which it already had. It follows that the domain of aggregate matter opens out strange communications between disparate individuals. Deleuze notes that Leibniz teaches the valuable insight that communication itself is never the problem, as it is, in itself, a constant (ibid., 134). What is more problematic is how one resolves a 'communicative element', which is both only enfolded in a body by plastic forces, but also even as it communicates, is creative. What is shared, takes the form of a counterpoint, in which difference is both communicated and affirmed (ibid., 134–5).

Thirdly as soon as one moves beyond Leibniz, it is very clear that there is a real dynamic instability within the body. Each body must open out links to other natures, which will always be able to move

'otherwise' (ibid., 109–10). Likewise each nature is always only a fold away from the infinity of nature itself. Once that nature ceases to be a singular world, but becomes a chaosmos, each individual is caught up in that chaos, and straddles many possible worlds, and with them bodies (ibid., 137).

Fourthly the position of nature has changed. Nature is no longer the archetype of a machinic composition of powers, because the conditions that allow it to be posited, necessarily involve an 'irreducible variety' of distinct individuals (*WP* 213), from whom it must always be distinct (as it is the finite that restores the infinite, *WP* 197).

Fifthly it is not absolutely clear (once the monad loses its supremacy) at what exact point the soul is present in the body. Is it the soul that actually constitutes this unity? Or is it the fold itself that is real? And if it is not the soul, how does this fold link with other prehensions, which it captures, and is caught by? (ibid., 137).

However, it is plain that as Deleuze cannot answer these questions in terms of Leibniz, he once again turns to Spinoza. He now understands Spinoza's three forms of knowledge in terms of affect, concept and percept (*N* 165), and it is the first and the last of these elements that now offer to philosophy the 'non-philosophic tools', by which the 'possible universes' of sensation can be explored.

The resolution

This last point takes the relation between Leibniz and Spinoza full circle. The dynamic of a Leibniz who defined the problem, as well as an imperfect set of solutions, and a Spinoza who answered the problem correctly, is a perpetual presence within the thought of Deleuze. Initially the formation was relatively simple. Leibniz's problem merely concerned how one understood how a differential exists within an individual. Spinoza's solution was likewise limited, while Spinoza himself was merely the last stepping stone on the path to difference. All this is suddenly rendered topsy-turvy by Guattari's suggestion that Leibniz was better able than Spinoza to allow for difference. A move that then prefigured the Spinoza of *A Thousand Plateaus*, now revealed as the supreme philosopher of nature. In *The Fold* yet another Leibniz is encountered. This Leibniz in a sense vindicates both Deleuze's initial argument, that God created the world, and not the monad, whose task was not to have concepts, but rather to actualise the aggregate mixtures in one world. And yet at the same time Guattari (as non-philosopher) was also right, once it was realised that this 'aggregate' world has its own productive,

if non-philosophic dynamic. It is then this Leibniz, which triggered the final encounter with Spinoza, who is now understood not only as the supreme philosopher of nature, but also the 'Christ of Philosophy', who obliges the philosopher (Deleuze) to engage with non-philosophic worlds. That is, it is this threefold synthesis of Leibniz with Spinoza, which sees Spinoza move from being the closest 'near miss' in the history of philosophy to Nietzsche (and the eternal return), through being the supreme philosopher of nature itself, to his transfiguration in *What is Philosophy?* as the Christ of Philosophers, whose John the Baptist is no doubt revealed to be Leibniz.

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