AN ETHICS OF CANDOR APPLIED TO

THE CREATIVE USE OF ENERGY

AS POWER OR AS CARE

By

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Abstract: In this thesis I establish an *ethics of candor* by which I assert that one *ought* to act with awareness, intentionality, and candor. I apply this ethics of candor to *the creative use of energy* where creatively using energy is a reordering of environment or media stemming from exploration, interaction, and reflection and where this reordering is intentional, willful and has a corresponding sense of satisfaction, pleasure, and/or joy. I limit the thesis to two possible creative uses of energy: as power or as care. Because I am working from an ethics of candor and neither an ethics of power nor of care, I take neither power nor care as an *a priori* "good." In this thesis, my purpose is to facilitate the awareness of involvement in exertions of power or of care such that intentionality and candor may and ought to follow awareness. In formulating a theory of power, I use and synthesize elements from Friedrich Nietzsche's (1887) *On the Genealogy of Morals,* George Orwell's (1949a) *1984,* and Michel Foucault's (1977a) *Discipline and Punish.* I formulate a theory of care using a few core concepts from Nel Noddings' (1984) *Caring* and then reworking her theory substantially from there. Using clear and thorough understandings of power, disciplinary power, and care, I offer a method to distinguish between the two especially in situations where distinction is difficult, and especially focusing on situations that apply to education and traditional public schooling. Finally, I demonstrate the necessary connection between ethics, education, and economics such that education for economic success must lead to education rooted in the same ethics as the current economy. Consistent with my formulation of an ethics of candor, I conclude by addressing some issues of candor relevant to the writing of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I establish an ethics of candor and apply the ethics to the creative use of energy as power or as care. I formulate separately a theory of power and a theory of care with the goal of clearly distinguishing between the purposes, functions, individual effects, and educational and economic effects of each. While I assert without hesitation that care produces better effects on individuals and society in general, I do not set up my "better" as a foundation either for my theory of power or of care. Instead, I proceed without taking an ethical stance except the ethical stance of candor: that one ought to exert energy as power or care with full awareness, intentionality, and candor.

The goal is to present two clear visions of the world such that the reader may be able to see and understand her position and involvement in either one, much like the narrator at the beginning of John Steinbeck's (1945) *Cannery Row*:

> Its inhabitants are, as the man once said, "whores, pimps, gamblers, and sons of bitches," by which he meant Everybody. Had the man looked through another peephole he might have said, "Saints and angels and martyrs and holy men," and he would have meant the very same thing. (p. 111)

As the word "another" indicates, I am neither suggesting there are only two ways to see the world nor am I presenting the visions of power and of care as binary opposites. Rather, I build the two visions as two different realities existing alongside and even within and through each other. In

this thesis I provide a way to understand clearly to which reality the actions of individuals and institutions may be contributing and the effects of each reality on other individuals and society.

I clarify the distinctions between the purposes and functioning of power and of care with a particular focus on and application to education. Educators use concepts that speak to power such as "mastery of content," "empowerment of students," and "preparation for success" alongside concepts that speak to care such as the cultivation of "empathy" and "compassion" and the establishment of a "nurturing environment." The space and function of education may appear, through one peephole, very much like that of a prison, through another, like that of a caring and nurturing environment. As educators play an important role in the creation of the reality of education, I believe it is particularly useful to clarify how the realities of power and of care function differently and for different purposes so that educators may consciously and actively shape the reality of education.

Methodology

I am using a conceptual/analytic approach to write what is ultimately a work of educational philosophy. Consistent with the theorists upon whom I rely for my evidence—including D. W. Winnicott (1971, 1986), John Dewey (1897, 1934), Friedrich Nietzsche (1887), Michel Foucault (1977), and Nel Noddings (1984)—I have not collected quantitative or qualitative data. These theorists work with concepts within the history of thought. Similarly, I position my theoretical ideas to build upon the work of those theorists I name. Additionally, I use literature as philosophy. I assert that the use of fiction as philosophy is as valid as the use of historical examples or philosophy written as such; however, I understand that some justification or explanation may be necessary. The validity of philosophical work derives from its author's careful and thorough examination of thinkers who have come before. Philosophy builds upon past

philosophy such that it does (or should) carry the weight of centuries of thought. Literary writers, especially the literary writers I use in this thesis, demonstrate a thorough background in theories within their writing.

In addition to drawing theory directly from philosophical literature, I also use literature as evidence for theory. Drawing from literary source material resembles Foucault's (1977b) use of history and literature in his genealogical method. Rather than looking at aggregated data or broad historical trends, Foucault examines the specifics, the exceptions and builds theory therefrom (Foucault, 1977b, p. 144). I position literature alongside the kind of specific, detailed historical examples Foucault relies upon as evidence. The difference between history and literature is a degree of transparency or candor. Historians claim to be working toward a kind of truth or fact, but history is formulated in memory and language. Literary writers claim to be formulating stories from memory and language, but these stories are informed by real experience and thoughtful reflection. I have been careful to choose literary figures whose writing demonstrates a philosopher's depth of thought and reflectiveness: George Orwell (1936, 1949), Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1868), and Rebecca West (1940), among others. Furthermore, writing literature, and fiction in particular, makes the author capable of something unique from both the historian and the philosopher; the literary writer may test theory through the lens of verisimilitude. Where a philosopher tests theory against the rules of logic and against the theories of other philosophers, a literary writer may test theory in a world designed to function and feel as the real world does. Fiction may serve as a kind of laboratory to test the validity of philosophical claims against experience that goes beyond the strict limitations of logic and formal argumentation. The literary writer offers an alternative formulation of truth. The events of history may demonstrate theory in the real world, but the writer does not have the same perspectival limitations as the historian. Finally, theorists' frequent use of hypothetical scenarios justifies using literature as philosophy or as evidence for philosophical claims. One way to look at literature as philosophy is to look at

stories as rigorously honest hypothetical scenarios expertly crafted and informed by theory. As I build concepts, I work primarily with philosophical and psychological theories, but I occasionally use literature to inform the concepts I build.

Consistent with the theorists that inform my philosophy, I use a materialist framework within which all happenings and interactions occur in the physical world with a particular interest in occurrences on the human body. John Dewey's (1934) concept of aesthetic experience must result in expression in the physical world. Winnicott's (1971) concept of play must involve mind and body. Foucault's (1977a) work on torture and discipline concern how these affect real bodies; even his concept "modern soul" ultimately involves the body. Noddings' (1984) theory of care includes rejecting abstraction through a "process of concretization" (p. 8). While will and inner reality factor importantly into my theory, my ultimate concern is the effects of power and of care on the bodies of persons.

I clarify my use of the terms "body," "person," and "human." Body refers to the physical being and includes the brain and sensory apparatuses. I take it as a false separation to say the brain controls the body. As the brain is part of the body, training of the body includes training of the brain and vice versa. The inclusion of the brain within the body becomes important in discussions of how inner reality works in terms of power and care. I use the terms "person" and "individual" to refer to one individual person where "individual person" includes elements beyond the physical being, the two most important to my thesis being motivation or will and inner reality. I use the term "human" to designate a person who is human as distinct from persons that are not human. I take it that personhood is not exclusive to humans; however, I decline to address specifically issues of power and care as they apply to nonhuman persons. While Martha Nussbaum and Noddings make admirable attempts at addressing issues of care and dignity for nonhuman persons, both run into serious problems as they proceed. The first step toward addressing the issues of nonhuman persons must be establishing sufficient lines of

communication between human persons and other persons without which human formulation of ethics of interactions with other species must be severely limited. In this thesis, I use the term "person" as often as possible with the assumption that the theory herein may apply to nonhuman as well as human persons; however, I will make no attempt to explain how. I leave it open for a time when interspecies dialogue is possible.

Outline

In this thesis I establish an *ethics of candor* by which I assert that one ought to act with awareness, intentionality, and candor. I apply this ethics of candor to *the creative use of energy* where creatively using energy is a reordering of environment or media stemming from exploration, interaction, and reflection and where this reordering is intentional, willful and has a corresponding sense of satisfaction, pleasure, and/or joy. I limit the thesis to two possible creative uses of energy: as power or as care. As I build the ethics, I take neither power nor care as an *a priori* "good." Instead, the "good" is the exertion of energy—whether as power or as care—in a way that is aware, intentional, and candid. In developing my ethics, I seek to facilitate the candid exertion of energy as power or as care by accomplishing two specific goals: revealing the purposes and functions of power and of care and presenting a way to distinguish between exertions of power and of care especially where such exertions may be subtle or difficult to trace. In presenting clear theories of both power and care as well as method to distinguish between the two I promote awareness of the exertions of either such that intentionality and candor may and ought to follow. I am particularly concerned with the creative use of energy on persons as media, where there is an understanding that persons, and ultimately the bodies of persons, may serve as media for the creative use of energy in much the same way paint or clay may serve as medium for artistic expression. In formulating a theory of power, I use and synthesize elements from

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Friedrich Nietzsche's (1887) *On the Genealogy of Morals*, George Orwell's (1949a) *1984*, and Michel Foucault's (1977a) *Discipline and Punish*. I formulate a theory of care using a few core concepts from Nel Noddings' (1984) *Caring* and then reworking the theory substantially from there. Because I establish both power and care as creative uses of energy, I am able to connect them along *planes of theoretical symmetry,* such that—where the theories of power and care are symmetrical in structure—power and care may be understood as exertions in distinguishably different directions. Using symmetrical theories of power and care, I present a method for distinguishing between the two especially in a number of situations where distinction is difficult, and especially focusing on situations that apply to education and the traditional public school setting. Finally, I demonstrate the necessary connection between ethics, education, and economics such that education for economic success must lead to education rooted in the same ethics as the current economy. I examine the existing economy as an "advantage-taking" economy based on an ethics of power, and, to provide a contrast, I envision an economy based on an ethics of care. I conclude by addressing candidly problems and inconsistencies of candor that arise in the writing of this thesis as a use of creative energy in itself.

Ethics of Candor

Ethics is a problematic branch of philosophy; the goal is to establish "ought" based on a conception of the "good." However, building a conception of the good is inherently contentious. Ethicists ultimately must proceed from an assertion of the "good" in order to reach an "ought." While I have a clear personal conception of the good and while that conception of the good happens to align closely with the theory of care I build in this thesis, I do not wish to limit my potential audience to those whose conception of the good is sufficiently similar to mine. Further, I rely on Nietzsche whose conception of the good aligns much more closely with my theory of

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power and is starkly different from my theory of care. I must at least acknowledge different, basic

conceptions of the good, and I go one step further to construct an ethics that is open to multiple

conceptions of the good. In developing an ethics of candor, I neither affirm nor deny conceptions

of the good except to assert that those conceptions and the resulting exertions of energy ought to

be held and practiced with awareness, intentionality, and candor. Therefore, the "good" of the

ethics of candor applied specifically to the creative use of energy as power or care is clarity in

understanding between exertions of energy as power or care, and the "ought" is intentionality and

candor concerning one's involvement in either or both. Note that the "ought" I assign my ethics

of candor contradicts neither such theory of care as Noddings' nor such theory of power as

Nietzsche's. My reading of these theorists indicates both may agree that power and care "ought"

to be exercised intentionally and candidly and that one should not masquerade as the other.

CHAPTER II

THE CREATIVE USE OF ENERGY

My ethics of candor serves as a tool to distinguish between exertions of power and of

care to reveal clearly the purposes and functions of each and to promote awareness, intentionality,

and candor in the exertion of either. The first step is a clear and thorough exploration of the

exertions of power and of care including the purpose and functions of each. In this chapter, I

begin by connecting the two as both creative uses of energy such that the connection will lead to

symmetrical theories of power and care, and from there I may establish a method to distinguish

between the two along planes of theoretical symmetry. I establish the concept of "the creative use

of energy" as an inchoate exertion which may but has not taken a willful direction as power or as

care. I proceed with a thorough explication of my term "the creative use of energy."

Energy

I use the term "energy" to designate that which may but has not yet had an effect in the

real world. Energy may potentially take the form of power or of care (or possibly some other

form entirely as the two are not binary). In my use, energy implies the energy has not yet

taken willful direction. As such, the use of energy is an abstract concept. It exists as a hypothetical moment with zero duration; it is "paralyzed force[1]."

The Greek root of energy indicates little more than that something is happening. Energy, therefore, is "happening" and should be understood as a gerund, a verb functioning grammatically as a noun. Nietzsche's (1909) concept of the action as everything is helpful:

> A quantum of force is…nothing else than just those phenomena of moving, willing, acting, and can only appear otherwise in the misleading errors of language (and the fundamental fallacies of reason which have become petrified therein), which understands, and understands wrongly, all workings as conditioned by a worker, by a "subject."…But…there is no "being" behind doing, working, becoming; "the doer" is a mere appendage of the action. The action is everything. (Essay 1, para. 13)

Nietzsche (1909) explains there is no such thing as lightning that does not flash (Essay 1, para. 13), no noun without the verb. Energy is only that which happens, and, according to Nietzsche, there are no things that are not happenings. In a literal, physical sense, Nietzsche is correct in his rejection of things, his rendering the noun an erroneous part of speech. In a real and concrete way, matter and energy are interchangeable across Einstein's relativity equation. All existence may be described as energy. Objects, nouns in a state of non-action, are perceptions of the senses informed by what Nietzsche calls the "fallacies of reason which have become petrified" in language. For my purposes, I assume nouns exist and are necessary, including subject "doers" and objects upon which the subjects act. For Nietzsche (1909), there is no possibility for an inchoate force existing in the hypothetical state of energy that has not taken willful direction because there is no being at all, only exertion of force. Where he needs only the one term "force," I require the additional term "energy" for force-not-yet-exerted by the subject.

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[1] "Paralyzed force" is an allusion to T. S. Eliot's poem "The Hollow Men." While the poem and the ideas therein are not directly related to the idea of "energy" in this thesis, the phrase "paralyzed force" is a helpful illustration of energy that has not taken a willful direction.

To further clarify my term "energy," I explain its distinction from "force" and "power." "Energy" is the most basic of the terms, happening without direction or duration. "Force" is energy with directionality. Force is always a "force of _____ upon _____." Because Nietzsche sees the subject as an illusion of erroneous grammar, he may take "force" as the most basic term for happening. Nietzsche's (1909) most basic conception of happening includes the will of the subject, or, rather, Nietzsche (1909) holds that what is falsely construed as the will of the subject is actually inherent in force. I, however, acknowledge the existence of subjects and take the will of the subject to be an important factor in the discussion of the use of energy. Therefore, "energy" is happening with no willful direction, and "force" refers to energy that includes a willful direction (and therefore includes the will of a subject directing energy toward or upon an object). In this thesis, I rely on the two terms "energy" and "power" where "energy" is force-not-yet-exerted and "power" is force-exerted-in-real-space-and-time.

Power is energy not only with directionality but also with duration as the equation implies—power equals force multiplied by distance over time. Thus power is concrete, functioning in both space and time. "Energy" is abstract in that it refers to a potential happening before it has taken willful direction or been exercised in space or time. From a materialist framework, the examination of abstract energy creates a conflict. Such an examination would require dealing entirely in hypotheticals and the inner factors that contribute to exertions of energy that may be but are not yet. The result would be contrary to a materialist framework. Thus I am limited to a *post facto* application of the ethics of candor to the creative use of energy. The ethics distinguish between two directions the creative use of energy may have taken in real space and time; the ethics function only after the exertion of energy becomes concrete as power or as care. Note that I distinguish power from care. In the strictest physical sense of the word "power," care may be a form of power; however, as I develop my theories of power and care, I clearly distinguish between the two according to their separate purposes, functions, and strategies. For

this reason, mine is an ethics of "the use of" creative energy as power or care where "use" denotes willful direction in real space and time. For brevity's sake, I use the term "exertion" for "the creative use of energy as" such that the "exertion of power" means "the willful direction of creative energy as power in a real, concrete situation, that is, in real space and time," likewise for the phrase "exertion of care.[2]"

Creative Use

It remains to define the word "creative" and to distinguish "the creative use of energy" from the use of energy that is not creative. Much of the concept of creative I take from Winnicott's (1971, 1986) concept of play derived from how children, infants, and adults play. Creativity involves what Winnicott (1971) calls "an intermediate area of *experiencing*, to which inner reality and external life both contribute" (p. 3). The intermediate space is the space between inner reality and outer reality, the "me" and "not me" (p. 16). It is the space through which a person may invest an object from the real, concrete, outer world with her own inner reality. This intermediate area is in "direct continuity with the play area of the small child" (p. 18).

> Into this play area the child gathers objects or phenomena from external reality and uses these in the service of some sample derived from inner or personal reality…In playing the child manipulates external phenomena in the service of the dream and invests chosen external phenomena with dream meaning and feeling. (p. 69)

Playing develops directly into shared playing and from there into cultural experiences (p. 69). Adults retain this "intermediate area" of play "in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work" (p. 19). The

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[2] Because "the creative use of energy" is a key term for the thesis and I am using the shorthand "exertion," I will use the long form and the beginning of each chapter and remind the reader of the shorthand in a footnote.

intermediate space plays the crucial role of reality generation; it is both the means by which and the space wherein individuals negotiate whose inner reality will ultimately have real effects on the outer reality.

Winnicott (1971) writes (with his own emphasis), "*It is play that is universal*, and that belongs to health: playing facilitates growth and therefore health; playing leads into group relationships…The natural thing is playing" (p. 56). As indicated by the phrase "group relationships," playing together is possible and creates an "area of overlap between the playing of the child and the playing of the other person." (p. 67). Playing together involves sharing the intermediate space which is necessarily a sharing of inner realities such that multiple persons negotiate and share the investment of the intermediate space with their multiple inner realities resulting in effects on the outer world that are collaborative or cooperative. Playing together is the means by which multiple people may have elements of the inner reality in common; in a word, it is the process that leads to "culture," to access to "a common pool of humanity, into which individuals and groups of people may contribute, and from which we may all draw *if we have somewhere to put what we find*" (p. 133, emphasis in original). Winnicott emphasizes the importance of having an intermediate space in order to contribute to and draw from cultural experience. Finally, and importantly, "*playing is essentially satisfying*" and has a "pleasurable element" (p. 70, emphasis in original).

From Winnicott's (1971, 1986) theory of play comes the following elements of my conception of "creative": creativity involves an "intermediate space" through which the "inner reality" interacts with the outside world; where interactions between and among persons are concerned, creativity involves interactions between and among inner realities within the intermediate space; creativity is natural and universal; creativity is inherently satisfying, pleasurable, or joyful.

Additional elements of the term "creative" come from a separate Winnicott essay (1986) entitled "Living Creatively." The creative use of energy requires "no special talent" but is "a universal need, and universal experience" (p. 44). One need not be an artist in any traditional sense in order to use energy creatively. Furthermore, the creative use of energy is possible in any activity at any time. Winnicott (1986) uses the example of a woman scrubbing floors while investing the task with a vicarious experience of the joy of her child playing in the garden and tramping in the mud (p. 42). It is perhaps helpful to imagine her laughing at the memory of her playful child as she works. Persons are capable of investing a creative and therefore joyful inner reality within what appear to be the most menial of tasks. Humans are prone to whistle while they work, regardless of the job. Thus the distinction between the creative use of energy and the use of energy that is not creative is determined not by the outcome or effect but rather by the inner reality invested through the intermediate space.

To complete my definition of "creative," I draw from Dewey's (1934) concept of "*an experience*" (p. 36) to inform Winnicott's (1971) concept of the intermediate space as the space of experiencing. Allowing these theories to overlap adds important elements to my concept of "creative" and helps to position it securely within a materialist framework. While Winnicott (1971) does specify that "playing involves the body" (p. 69), Dewey's theory grounds creativity more clearly in the material world. From Dewey's (1934) aesthetic theory, the use of energy is creative when it involves a relation with an environment by which the user changes the environment. This change takes the form of an expression through which the "resistance and tensions" felt in the environment are converted into "a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close" (p. 58). Dewey gives the example of a bird building a nest; the nest is both part of her and also her expression (p. 25). The human, however, is distinct from other animals in that it acts in this way consciously with an understanding of cause and effect, that is, in time (p. 25). It is "not just quantitative, or just more energy, but is qualitative, a transformation of energy into

thoughtful action, through assimilation of meanings from the background of past experiences" (p.

63). Dewey differentiates "experience" from "*an* experience." There are two "poles" of

experience that do *not* constitute "*an* experience":

> At one pole is the loose succession that does not begin at any particular place and that
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> ends—in the sense of ceasing—at no particular place. At the other pole is arrest,
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> constriction, proceeding from parts having only a mechanical connection with one
>
> another. (p. 41)

Dewey (1934) contrasts this common kind of experience with having "*an* experience" which

occurs "when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment" and therefore is "integrated

within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences" (pp. 36–37).

Synthesizing Winnicott's (1971) concept that the intermediate space is the space of experiencing

and Dewey's (1934) concept of "*an* experience" leads to my understanding of the intermediate

space as the space of having "*an* experience," that is, the space of experience that stems from

reflection on past experiences and runs its course to a fulfilling close that includes expression in

the material world.

The creative use of energy, therefore, must involve Winnicott's intermediate space

through which the user invests environment or media with her inner reality in such a way that

produces real, concrete effects. The energy may be used creatively on the environment where

"environment" is the real space occupied by persons and defined by the persons' experience of

the space. The creative use of energy on the environment results in a change of environment for

persons within. Energy may be used creatively on media where media are objects specifically

intended for the creative use of energy. Media may include persons as media where energy is exerted creatively in such a way as to produce a concrete, material effect directly upon persons.[3]

The investment of Winnicott's (1971) inner reality aligns with Dewey's (1934) necessary element of reflection, both of which are ways of expressing that the energy takes a willful direction. The necessary culmination in expression that has a real effect on the surrounding environment or media brings the use of energy into real space and time. Where the definition of energy is abstract, the creative use of energy is the abstract becoming real and concrete. Because creativity is natural and universal, the creative use of energy is accompanied by and may be distinguished by a sense of satisfaction or pleasure. The creative use of energy may become real and concrete for a variety of purposes and by a variety of functions. In this thesis I reveal the purposes and functions specific to power and to care to create a means to distinguish clearly between the creative use of energy as power or as care in order to facilitate awareness and ultimately intentionality and candor.

To further clarify the concept of "the creative use of energy," I include limitations on "creative" to demonstrate some of the ways energy may be used that are not creative. The use of energy that fails to culminate in a real effect on the outside world—for example fantasy that never becomes any kind of reality—is not the creative use of energy. When the inner reality remains inner, without ever entering the intermediate space to interact with the outer, it never invests in anything and therefore never becomes involved in the creative use of energy. Additionally, the use of energy is not creative when it does not involve the inner reality or reflection at all, when it is exerted with "aimlessness [or] mechanical efficiency" (Dewey, 1934, p. 40). The investment of

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[3] As an important limitation of this thesis, I will be focusing on the creative use of energy on the outside world including persons who may be part of that outside world, and I will not address the creative use of energy on the self. I limit the thesis in this way for two reasons: first, because I take it that persons and particularly human persons exist in a basic state of relatedness to each other such that the creative use of energy that changes the self ultimately has an impact on the outside world and other persons related to the self and, second, because an exploration of the creative use of energy on the self would require substantial groundwork in defining the self and the way the self relates to the self and would therefore broaden the scope beyond the limitations of single thesis.

inner reality and the incorporation of reflection indicate that creative use of energy is willful. The use of energy that is divorced from the inner reality, from the will—that is coerced, manipulated, burdensome, or perfunctory—is not creative. Nor is the use of energy creative when it is thoughtless or blindly reactionary, that is without conscious intent.

The combination of the necessary elements willfulness and pleasure raises an important question about whether freedom is a prerequisite for the creative use of energy. I state that that which is "coerced, manipulated, burdensome, or perfunctory" cannot be the creative use of energy because I take all those words to be exclusive of pleasure. However, I argue it is too far a leap to add, "therefore it must be free." While the use of energy under the total control of another cannot be creative, it is not clear that one can ever entirely be free from outside influence or control. I limit my term to "will" where "will" involves the investment of inner reality into the intermediate space, and "inner reality" is understood as the "me" that is distinct from all that is "not me." "Inner reality" and "will," therefore are, in my usage, distinctly individual. I do not include the descriptor "free" with "will" because the question whether one's inner reality is free from influence, that is, entirely and freely one's own becomes complicated. As I continue to examine power and care, the intermediate space where inner realities interact becomes a crucial and contended space. Freedom or the lack thereof may be more a result of creative uses of energy rather than a prerequisite. My thesis is therefore limited in scope to more specific results of the exertions of power and of care in concrete situations and upon real bodies. The complex and abstract concept of freedom, therefore, falls outside the scope of my argument though the relationship between freedom and the creative use of energy as power or as care might be an interesting topic for a separate study.

In the next three chapters, I examine how the creative use of energy may take the form of power or of care. During my examination, I take established theories of power and care and explain how they involve interactions of inner realities in the intermediate space that result in real

effects on the environment and on media with a special focus on persons as media. In so doing I propose theories of power and of care, both as the creative uses of energy. In positioning power and care as uses of creative energy, I create planes of theoretical symmetry along which one may clearly see the different directions power and care take. From there I apply the ethics of candor and present a method to distinguish between the exertions of power and of care such that each may be exerted with full awareness, intent, openness, and candor.

CHAPTER III

THE FUNCTION AND PURPOSE OF POWER

One of the ways the creative use of energy may take willful direction in real space and time is as power[4]. I devote this chapter to understanding the functioning and purpose of exerting power. I begin by revisiting Nietzsche's (1909) definition of power that includes will as inherent in the exertion. I then progress to demonstrate that will and power are not inherent in each other, and I explain the relationship between power and will, including the ways that power interacts with the intermediate space. From there I delve into increasingly complex relationships of subjection and objectification. While the subject exerting power may become lost in diffuse networks, the workings upon the object remain clear and concrete. Thus the chapter moves toward an explanation of how power—even in its most complex and subtle forms—effects concrete changes in real human bodies.

Power and Will

I have defined energy as an abstract "happening" that has not yet taken willful direction. Nietzsche's definition of power is close to my definition of energy; power does not require directional will because will is inherent in power. Everything returns to power; "all happening in the organic world consists of overpowering" (Nietzsche, 1909, Essay 2, para. 12). All real things

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[4] The shorthand for "creative use of energy that takes a willful direction resulting in concrete effects in real space and time" is "exertion."

exist as verbs, as power in action. Power is not merely a right of the powerful; it is an inalienable state of being:

> To require of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a wish to overpower, a wish to overthrow, a wish to become master, a thirst for enemies and antagonisms and triumphs, is just as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength. (Nietzsche, 1909, Essay 1, para. 13)

Nietzsche (1909) links human perfection to "a genuine consciousness of power and freedom" (Essay 2, para. 2). This free exercise of power and the accompanying enjoyment thereof describes precisely the concept of the creative use of energy as power. However, for Nietzsche there is no question of choosing power over some alternative, such as care. Power expresses itself as power, can only expect to express itself as power, as certainly as lightning expresses itself as a striking flash. Nietzsche's ethics of power is not to say one "ought" to choose power, but rather that one "ought" to acknowledge the desirability of power. Even "these weaklings" who have devised a religious morality that elevates suffering and sacrifice desire to overpower and imagine (in the Christian Beatitudes) a time when they will do just that (Nietzsche, 1909, Essay 1, para. 15). Nietzsche's frustration is the elevation of weakness to a moral good.

Unlike Nietzsche, I neither elevate power or caring as moral goods nor denigrate them as evils. Instead, I reveal and expose their functions, with the specific goal that subjects may choose to exert either intentionally. I must, therefore, move from Nietzsche's position to demonstrate that there are indeed subjects exerting and objects exerted upon, that is to say, I must demonstrate the necessity of nouns, or actors whose will may or may not take the direction of power. To do so, I turn to an essay and later to an historical example closely related to it.

As an occupying military police officer in Burma, George Orwell (1936) wrote the essay "Shooting an Elephant" as a reflection on his time there. As a military policeman, he "saw the

dirty work of Empire at close quarters; the wretched prisoners huddling in the stinking cages of the lock-ups, the grey, cowed faces of the long term convicts, the scarred buttocks of the men who had been flogged with bamboos…" (Orwell, 1936, p. 1). The evidence seems clear: British forces, of which Orwell is a part, are subjects acting upon the Burmese object-bodies-media. However, Orwell's essay reveals a more complicated power dynamic; specifically, there is an inconsistency in the exertion of power manifesting itself on the bodies of the Burmese and the domination of the intermediate space. While Orwell, the military policeman, appears to be in the position of power, or to possess power, the intermediate space of reality creation is dominated by the will of those whom he is supposed to control.

> Here was I, the white man with his gun, standing in front of the unarmed native crowd—seemingly the leading actor of the piece; but in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces behind. I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys. He becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy, the conventionalized figure of a sahib…He wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it. I had got to shoot the elephant…To come all that way, rifle in hand, with two thousand people marching at my heels, and then to trail feebly away, having done nothing—no, that was impossible. The crowd would laugh at me. And my whole life, every white man's life in the East, was one long struggle not to be laughed at. (Orwell, 1936, p. 2)

Orwell reveals that power does not follow the rules of formal organization. Power is not necessarily positional, nor is it a substance or essence one may possess. Power is a creative use of energy, an exertion.

Nietzsche (1909) might liken Orwell to the bird of prey whose existence is striking, exerting power—the bird strikes just as the military policeman fires a gun. However, Orwell did

not act of his own will. He shot the elephant only to avoid being laughed at. Orwell writes explicitly, "I did not want to shoot the elephant" (Orwell, 1936, p. 3), and he eventually walks away in disgust at his own actions. Orwell feels the crowd's will has manipulated him, and his actions are, if not forced, at least perfunctory. The shared inner reality of the crowd dominated the intermediate space in a way that caused Orwell to take the real, concrete action of shooting the elephant even thought that action conflicted with his own will, his own inner reality. Orwell's actions exemplify a destructive resistance to the imposition of the inner reality of the crowd into the intermediate space. More simply put, Orwell did not exert power willfully but rather reacted violently to the overpowering will of the crowd. The key distinction here is that the use of energy (which, in this case, is not creative as it is not willful) is divorced from the will. The will of the crowd displaced Orwell's will and hijacked his ability to use energy creatively. The crowd, and not Orwell, exhibited the sense of satisfaction that results from the creative use of energy; they sighed "the deep, low, happy sigh" when they realized he would in fact shoot the elephant and they rushed to strip the carcass for its meat. Orwell's action of shooting the elephant fails to be a creative use of energy; he acted against his own will, the crowd acted through him, willfully, and with the sense of satisfaction that accompanies the creative use of energy. The events of the essay exemplify displaced will in the exertion of power.

If will is not inherently bound up in the exertion of power, then there must be a distinction between the willful exertion of power (which may be creative) and the exertion of power that is not willful (and therefore does meet a necessary criterion for being creative). The separation of will from exertion also results in the acknowledgement of subjects whose will may not be aligned with the action. Here arises a clear and obvious critique of Nietzsche's conception of power and weakness: he commits an error of essentializing. The bird of prey, thinks Nietzsche (1909), exists as striking the lamb; the lamb exists as being struck such that there is only striking and being struck (Essay 1, para. 13). Nietzsche essentializes the bird of prey to the action most

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associated with it. In reality, birds of prey spend a great deal of time simply watching or even sleeping. Lambs do a great deal more than get eaten by birds of prey. Lambs themselves prey, viciously if you will, upon clover. Further, there are interactions of physical power that invert Nietzsche's essentializing. To borrow a line from Shakespeare: "The poor wren,/The most diminutive of birds, will fight,/Her young ones in her nest, against the owl."[5] If—as in the case of the owl and the wren—it is possible for the subject and object to switch position, then what Nietzsche called the "misleading errors" of language are, in fact, useful and necessary.

If will does not inhere in the exertion of power, if the two are separate, there must be a relation between the two, between will and power. This relation is fixed and especially important to identifying power. Remaining with Orwell (1949a) as a philosopher of power, I turn to his novel *1984* to show how power relates to will in general and to subjects' and objects' wills specifically.

The exertion of power as a creative use of energy involves the will of the one exerting power dominating the intermediate space and the wills of others who may share that space. The intermediate space where play and creativity occur, where culture may be shared, is a potential dominion for power. Power involves the conquest of the intermediate area by the inner reality of the one exerting power; it involves pushing out, conquering, or subjugating the inner reality of those who may share the intermediate space such that the one exerting power monopolizes the space and therefore the ability to invest his inner reality in the outer world. In *1984*, the focal point of power is the human mind, "Power is power over human beings. Over the body—but, above all, over the mind. Power over matter—external reality, as you would call it—is not important" (Orwell, 1949a, p. 218). Orwell (1949a) gives his character, O'Brien, the one exerting

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[5] This line comes from Act IV scene 1 of *Macbeth*. I use the line only as an allusion that describes a general idea. In my personal experience, I have seen a dove (the very symbol of peace and passivity) aggressively chase a hawk (the very symbol of power and aggression) off a powerline that was too close to the dove's nest for her comfort.

power, what is essentially a constructivist perspective: because the mind creates and shapes reality, power over reality must be power over the mind. The context of O'Brien's speech is important for he exerts power over the mind of another, Winston, not only through reasoned arguments, but, perhaps primarily, through torture of the body. The constructivist framework, that the mind constructs reality, is consistent with a materialist framework; the brain is not separate from but part of the body. O'Brien breaks down Winston's mind through the body in concrete, physical ways, even by simply and directly administering electrical shocks to the brain. External forces upon the body control the mind just as the mind-brain-body constructs reality and reshapes the external. It is a two-way relation.

To explain further how exertions of power work on and through the intermediate space, I begin with Winnicott's (1971) object-relations theory and take my own additional theoretical step therefrom. Winnicott's (1971) object-relations theory involves an infant and a "good-enough" mother who provides for the infant's needs (p. 13). In the earliest period of infancy, the infant cannot distinguish between whether it found or created an object because the infant has not yet distinguished between inner reality—where he exercises omnipotence and creates all—and outer reality—where he may find external objects that are not her creation (pp. 15-16). The infant must transition successfully from this period of perceived omnipotence to an understanding of inner reality, outer reality, and the intermediate space through which he may invest his inner reality in order to exert energy creatively in the outer world. While Winnicott (1971) addresses problems of maturation that result from an unsuccessful transition out of the phase of perceived omnipotence (p. 20), he does not draw a direct connection between perceived omnipotence in infancy and the ethics and exertion of power in later life.[6] Winnicott (1971) does offer that "the task of reality

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[6] It may appear that I am implying that an ethics of power is a result of failed maturation. In the interests of candor, I do not hesitate to say that this is exactly what I am implying. However, I proceed with an ethics limited to candor. At this point, I neither assert that my Winnicottian view of maturity and immaturity is foundational nor do I claim that one "ought" to be mature as I have defined it. In the final chapter, when I lay out my own ethics of care, I include this critique of an ethics of power.

acceptance is never completed" and "that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality" (p. 18). From here I take the additional step of drawing a connection between an ethics of power and the "strain of relating inner and outer reality." Unlike the infant, the adult understands that there is an inner reality and an outer reality. (He must understand this because he has, at some point, encountered something outside himself over which he was unable to exert total control.) The adult who exerts power dominates or conquers the intermediate space such that it is invested with his inner reality and his inner reality alone. His inner reality pushes out (conquers) and excludes (dominates) all other inner realities, and he monopolizes the creative use of energy by dominating the intermediate space. The domination of the intermediate space results in material effects on the outer reality such that it is increasingly invested with only his inner reality. In this way, the one exerting power may restore perceived omnipotence such that finding and creating again become one and the same and the "strain of relating inner and outer reality" is relieved. Groups of people may also dominate in this way such that the inner reality of a group of people forms a culture that pushes out and excludes the inner realities of other groups or individuals and monopolizes the intermediate space and investment in the outer world.

As power is domination, it is also domination of the intermediate space; further, power must be exerted *against* the will of the object. It is not an exertion of power to allow or encourage what another would do willingly. For this reason, Nietzsche (1909) uses the phrasing "overpower…overthrow…become master," have "antagonisms and triumphs" (Essay 1, para. 13). Antagonism is a necessary element in the exertion of power. Orwell (1949a) explains the concept in *1984*:

> How does one man assert his power over another?…By making him suffer. Obedience is not enough. Unless he is suffering, how can you be sure that he is obeying your will and not his own? Power is in inflicting pain and humiliation. (p. 220)

Power exerted over human minds and against these objects' wills leads to Orwell's (1949a) next sentence, one that clearly illustrates the workings of power: "Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing" (p. 220).

Orwell's language elucidates power as creativity, a willful reordering of environment or media, specifically of persons as media and, even more specifically, of minds as media. The mind is the essential medium because the brain is the organ that accesses the intermediate space through which a person may invest his inner reality in the outer world. The exertion of power on the mind as medium must have a material effect in the outer world which may include the body as direct object or that on which the body-object of power acts. The creative use of energy as power brings a sense of pleasure or, as Orwell (1949a) put it "intoxication," (p. 220) or, in Nietzsche's (1909) words, a "highest degree of happiness" that accompanies the infliction of suffering (Essay 2, para. 7).

The question remains why one may wish willfully to exert power. What is the end and goal of power? What is the will of the subject who exerts power? When Winston considers the exertion of power in *1984*, he understands *how,* but he does not understand *why* (Orwell, 1949a, p. 179). O'Brien explains the *why* of power: "We are interested solely in power…Power is not a means, it is an end…The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power" (Orwell, 1949a, 217). As the exertion of power is a creative use of energy, and as creativity is natural and fundamental (Winnicott, 1971), it follows that the exertion of power is an end in itself. Depending on one's ethics, it may even be a good. Nietzsche (1909) links human perfection to "a genuine consciousness of power and freedom" (Essay 2, para. 2). While my personal ethics are starkly different from Nietzsche's, I cannot deny that his ethics are rooted in what I have called both natural and creative. This reason, among others, is why I build an ethics of candor or of "genuine consciousness" by which the "good" is to be genuinely conscious of the ways one creatively uses energy. Through a combination of elements of Orwell's

(1949a) and Nietzsche's (1909) theories of power, I arrive at an understanding of power as a creative use of energy, a definition of power that includes willful domination of the wills of others, and a purpose of power as an end in itself. In the remainder of this chapter, I raise complications of will and begin to explore the subtle and elusive functions of power.

Orwell's (1936) "Shooting an Elephant" offers a clear and well-organized presentation of subjection and objectification and thereby sheds some light on the more complex workings of power. Orwell's (1949a) *1984* presents a simple picture of what one might call pure power; the novel functions almost as Orwell's definition of power. The clear organization of literature around an intentionally constructed narrative is one of the advantages of using it as philosophical source material; however, there may be real complications an author avoids as he constructs an organized narrative. To introduce some of the complex functions of power I begin with a historical sample that leads to an in-depth study of the complexities using Foucault's (1977a) *Discipline and Punish.*

When Orwell (1936) concludes his essay "Shooting an Elephant" with the line, "I had done it solely to avoid looking a fool," (p. 4) he is almost certainly alluding to the real circumstance of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in which General Dyer fired upon a crowd of thousands killing and wounding hundreds. When Dyer faced a commission investigating the event, he explained, "I think it quite possible that I could have dispersed the crowd without firing[,] but they would have come back and laughed, and I would have made, what I consider, a fool of myself" (Saha, 2015). While one might say it was the inner reality of the crowd dominating the intermediate space that caused Orwell to shoot the elephant, one hesitates to say the same of Dyer. It can hardly be the inner reality of the members of the crowd willing Dyer to shoot themselves. Jallianwala Bagh was a massacre, not an assisted suicide. At the same time, one can hardly assert that Dyer acted willfully. While he certainly intended to shoot into the crowd and to kill them—he stated that he "considered it [his] duty to fire on them and to fire

well" (Saha, 2015)—his motive was not the exertion of power but rather some protection he, in his own insecurity, believed he needed. Ultimately Dyer acted out of weakness. Something subjected him, objectified him, "controlled him" so to incite his ordering a massacre, but it is difficult to determine what. It was certainly neither the crowd nor was it in any direct way a commanding officer above him nor even the British Empire in the abstract. Something more subtle was at work.

Physics and Micro-Physics of Power

In his investigation of "the micro-physics of power," Foucault (1977a) explores that which "is diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous discourses…made up of bits and pieces" (p. 26). The creative use of energy may be exerted as power by a subject upon an object; however, this simple and clear process rarely suffices to explain the exertion of power. Foucauldian power as "a network of relations, constantly in tension" obfuscates the search for the exerting subject (Foucault, 1977a, p. 26). The subject of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre disappears, one might even say escapes, in diffuse networks of power. Foucault's study of the micro-physics of power as a strategy that works along these networks provides an opportunity to explore the creative use of energy as power in the complexities of larger apparatuses and institutions. This exploration is necessary not only for a comprehensive understanding of the exertion of power, but also to make progress toward understanding the exertion of power within educational institutions.

Foucault (1977a) explores two different paths for power: power as torture and power as discipline. Where I discuss torture and discipline, I discuss them both as two possible paths for the exertion of power. Although Foucault's (1977a) study of torture is useful as a clear example of a subject's creative use of energy exerted as power on an object, I primarily use *Discipline and Punish* to elucidate the exertion of power that is subtler, "gentler" than the exertion of power in

the form of torture; this subtler, gentler exertion of power is the exertion of disciplinary power, the strategy of power as a "micro-physics" (Foucault, 1977a, p. 104). To clarify the reasons for transitioning from torture to discipline, I now briefly explain torture before moving to my primary focus of discipline.

Torture, including execution, is a direct and obvious example of the exertion of power upon the body as media. It is a kind of sculpting. Torture is by definition against the will of the object, and from Orwell's fictional account, its only purpose and goal is torture, that is, the exertion of power over the object-body and against the will of the object-body. It is easier and simpler to create a fictional character who says candidly that the object of torture is torture—and there may be a greater truth in this candor, fictional though it is—than it is to capture the motivations behind torture in real, historical examples. The results are not necessarily different, though history proves more complex (and, I might add, stranger) than fiction.

Similar to Dewey's (1934) use of organization and expression when defining aesthetic experience, Foucault (1977a) defines "penal torture" as "a differentiated production of pain, an organized ritual for the marking of victims and the expression of the power that punishes" (p. 34). Pure sadism, torture for torture's sake seems to arise from Foucault's (1977a) extremely detailed account of the torture of a convict—aligning with Orwell's (1949) theory. Unlike Orwell (1949), Foucault (1977a) further theorizes identifying another motive for torture at work: the search for the truth worked out in the body of the condemned.

> The body has produced and reproduced the truth of the crime—or rather it constitutes the element which, through a whole set of rituals and trials, confesses that the crime took place, admits that the accused did indeed commit it, shows that he bore it inscribed in himself and on himself, supports the operation of punishment and manifests its effects in the most striking way. The body, several times tortured, provides the synthesis of the

reality of the deeds and the truth of the investigation, of the documents of the case and the

statements of the criminal, of the crime and punishment. (Foucault, 1977a, p. 47)

The body of the condemned is the medium for the creative expression of law and order, of crime

and punishment, of the sovereign's absolute power and authority.

Torture provides an example of the domination of the intermediate space combined with

Orwell's (1949a) understanding that power must be power over humans. The sovereign's exertion

of power, his omnipotence, both finds and creates the body of the convict as convict. The

sovereign's domination of the intermediate space is so complete that the inner reality of the

sovereign conquers the inner reality of the convict even with respect to the convict's own body as

object. Torture is not a method for finding an objective truth in the outer reality of the convict or

the crime. It is an exertion of power by which the sovereign's inner reality conquers the inner

reality of the convict to effect a material change in the convict's body as proof of the total

domination of the intermediate space by the sovereign's inner reality. It is "a liturgy" that

functions as an "affirmation of power and its intrinsic superiority" (Foucault, 1977a, p. 49). In

this way, the object of torture is the affirmation of power. It is not immediately clear that the

sovereign tortures playfully or creatively, although the spectacle of torture is consistent with the

display of art. Further, Foucault (1977a) uses such phrases as "the art of inflicting pain" (p. 8) and

"an art of unbearable sensations" (p. 11) to describe torture consistent with describing the creative

use of energy. Foucault's explanation of torture shows the sovereign essentially commissioning a

work of art, specifically a sculpture the executioner performs using the medium of the convict's

body. The sovereign is author and subject. From his inner reality comes the tortured body of the

convict as a completed sculpture. The sovereign conceives of the wax model and passes it along

to the executioner who functions as bronzer. In so doing, the sovereign places the executioner in

the position of object of his command and subject performing torture of which the body of the

convict is object-medium. The executioner brings the "wax model" from the sovereign's inner

reality into material existence through physical changes in the body of the convict. The sculpture is complete.

The chain of physical actions that result in the separation and destruction of the body of the convict demonstrates the simple, unsophisticated physics of power. Many of the machines employed by the sovereign fit the formal definition of simple machines from elementary physics: wedges in the form of blades, a variety of applications of levers and pulleys. Torture employs the simple machinery of physics in the creative use of energy to effect change upon the body of the convict as medium; it is at once the exertion and affirmation of power.

Understanding power exerted as torture through blunt physics is important in developing a theory of what power is and how and why it functions. However, an ethics of candor hardly need apply to exertions of power as torture. Torture is candid. In the following chapter I shift from a theory of power in general to a focus on disciplinary power. Because disciplinary power is subtler, the need for awareness and the demand for intentionality and candor apply more significantly.

CHAPTER IV

THE CREATIVE USE OF ENERGY AS DISCIPLINARY POWER[7]

The close examination of purpose and function of power exerted as discipline is essential to an ethics that calls for awareness and candor in the creative use of energy. The exertion of power as torture is inherently candid; the brute physics of power are manifest in acts of violence against the body. However, disciplinary power employs much more subtle strategies. Disciplinary power employs strategies that may manipulate every fiber of the object-bodies without ever actually touching them. Because disciplinary power need not actually touch the body (Foucault, 1977a, p. 11) and does not separate or destroy the body, it may appear or be construed as benevolent. However, it certainly is still the exertion of power over the body. Foucault (1977a) states explicitly that resistance to softer forms of control including "model prisons, tranquillizers, isolation, the medical or educational services…have been about the body and material things" (p. 30). These revolts demonstrate an awareness on the part of the controlled—those whose bodies are media for the creative use of energy as power—that discipline is an exertion of power by which the powerful reorder the bodies of the controlled.

Through the ethics of candor, I insist that an awareness of disciplinary power on the part of the controlled is not sufficient. Awareness, intentionality, and candor are necessary at every point in the creative use of energy. A close examination of the subtle strategies of disciplinary power is necessary in order to reach a means by which persons may distinguish between subtle

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[7] The shorthand for "creative use of energy that takes a willful direction resulting in concrete effects in real space and time" is "exertion."

exertions of power and of care and thereby be fully candid about their involvement in either or both. From an examination of these subtle strategies of disciplinary power arise the planes of theoretical symmetry along which I build a method to distinguish between exertions of power and care. As I build separate theories of disciplinary power and care, I structure both theories using the concept of "micro-physics," issues in language, particularly, complications with subject/object and active/passive distinction, and the concept of interactions in the intermediate space. In this chapter I proceed with a theory of disciplinary power.

Power-Knowledge

Torture affirms the exertion of energy as power as it creates, discovers, and knows the body of the convict as convict and object of torture. The power-knowledge tension for which Foucault is so well known, the exertion of energy as power exercised to create/discover and know, becomes a new mechanism of the exertion of power. This new mechanism arises as disciplinary power and functions according to a new strategy of micro-physics. Because power is energy willfully exerted in a specific time and space, it is necessarily active; because power and knowledge are inextricably linked in tension, knowledge is active, a means not a product. Thus "to know" in power-knowledge context is not to discover, come to obtain, learn, or otherwise possess knowledge; it is at once to create and discover knowledge. The exertion of power-knowledge results in the absolute control of the material world, including the body, through and by means of the mind resulting in a more efficient, effective, and ultimately greater exertion of power. Foucault (1977a) refers to the "stupid despot" who uses the body as the locus of control; the new way, the way of the

> …true politician…binds them even more strongly by the chains of their own ideas…this
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> link is all the stronger because we do not know what it is made of and we believe it to be

our own work…on the soft fibres of the brain is founded the unshakable base of the soundest Empire. (p. 24)

The shift from the exertion of brute force as power in the form of torture to the exertion of power-knowledge manifested through disciplinary mechanisms presents a much more sophisticated, less direct, exertion of power upon the medium of the human body.

Disciplinary Power and the Intermediate Space

I take Foucault's (1977a) concept of power-knowledge and examine how it interacts with Winnicott's (1971) intermediate space. The more sophisticated exertion of power-knowledge through disciplinary mechanisms relates even more clearly and directly to the intermediate space. Like torture, power-knowledge is the complete monopolization of the intermediate space by an omnipotent inner reality. Unlike torture, the one enacting power-knowledge does not rely on the manipulation and material reordering (and destruction) of the body to make manifest the dominant inner reality. Through discipline, power-knowledge works both from the body to the intermediate space and from the intermediate space to the body. The act of knowing is the direct domination of the inner reality such that the object-person becomes (is created and discovered) as object. At the same time, the use of disciplinary mechanisms brings the dominant inner reality into the material world through constant, comprehensive, and minutely specific control of the object-body. This disciplined body lacks any inner reality except that of the one exerting disciplinary power.

While the exertion of power through torture exhibits the domination of the inner reality in the material world, it does not accomplish the domination of the inner reality of the object-person. Through torture the dominant inner reality wins against the object-person's inner reality through the intermediate space and in the arena of the material world. However, the tortured body proves

a poor medium for the manifestation of the dominant inner reality. The tortured body dies upon completion; it is a single-use, disposable medium for the creative use of energy. (One might go as far to say that in death, the body actively ends the exertion of power such that the body as medium—and not the one exerting power—controls the conclusion of the exertion.) In a more complete and total exertion of power, the dominant inner reality overcomes and replaces the inner reality of the object-person such that the object-person would have no inner reality except the dominant one or perhaps no inner reality at all. In writing a complete portrait of power, Orwell (1949a) sets up the total control of the inner reality as the ultimate goal of power, as O'Brien explains to Winston:

> Did I not tell you just now that we are different from the persecutors of the past? We are not content with negative obedience, nor even with the most abject submission…We do not destroy the heretic because he resists us; so long as he resists us we never destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind, we reshape him. (p. 210)

Foucault's (1977a) tracing of the change in the exertion of power from torture to discipline aligns with the portrait of total power Orwell (1949a) imagines in *1984*. Foucault describes the entire project of *Discipline and Punish* as "a correlative history of the modern soul" (p. 23). Importantly, the "soul" in this context is not of an essence different or separate from the body. Rather, it is created by the exertion of power upon the body.

> It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished—and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. (p. 29)

Foucault's concept of "the modern soul" is a creation of the exertion of disciplinary power as a foothold for the exertion of disciplinary power. It is both a product of and a means for the act of power-knowledge.

Both the Foucauldian and Orwellian theories of power are consistent with my concept of the monopolization of the intermediate space changing from torture by which conflict is engaged and resolved by a material exertion of the brute physics of power in the outer reality to discipline by which the dominant inner reality conquers not only the intermediate space but also the inner reality of the object-person, and this conquest is accomplished by and manifested in the micro-physics of power, the constant, comprehensive, and minute control of the object-body.

The Docile Body, the Automaton

The new strategy of exerting power as discipline over the entire person—including both the body and the inner reality—ends not, as torture did, in a pile of corpses, but rather in an army of automata or "docile bodies," that is bodies "that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved" (Foucault, 1977a, p. 36)—normalized in order to control. In the same way that torture enacted knowledge upon the body of the condemned and found/created him to be a corpse, discipline finds/creates bodies to be automata. "Discipline 'makes' individuals. It is the specific technique of power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise" (p. 170). No longer is power exhausted upon the body as a final object; power now invests the body-medium, and the body-medium transmits power. The result is a machine, the goal of which is always the exertion of power, but the perfection of which (as is the case with all machines) is peak efficiency. The docile bodies that make up the machine are capable of obedient action that transmits power, but they are not capable of the willful and creative use of energy. The docile body, obedient and useful, acts only with the same "mechanical efficiency" Dewey (1934)

excludes from experiences that may be "*an* experience" and which I therefore exclude from exertions of energy that may be creative (p. 40). The docile body, the body as automaton, the machine made up of automata is the object and purpose of power even as it is also a means to transmit, amplify, and receive power. The broad term for this strategy is "discipline," and discipline functions by disciplinary mechanisms. The control of space, time, and movement resulting in a composed group of organized, disciplined bodies is a "disciplinary machine" (Foucault, 1977a, p. 221) and the space of the disciplinary machine is a "carceral" (p. 229).

Strategies of Discipline: The Micro-physics of Power

Control of Space, Time, and Movement

Discipline controls space, time, and movement so comprehensively and in such minute detail that scheduled, predetermined movement overtakes the entire consciousness of the object of discipline. Foucault (1977a) calls discipline the "gentler" way, and it is gentler in that it works on the body by a series of minute adjustments none of which compromise the integrity of the body, some of which may recreate the body to be stronger. The result, however, is hardly gentle: where torture produces a corpse, discipline produces an automaton.

Discipline begins with the control of space and may require enclosure and often requires separation at once containing a group of bodies and separating each into an individual cell. It is a procedure "aimed at mastering and knowing," one that "organizes an analytical space" (p. 143). Additionally, function separates space, where any separate activity requires a separate space (pp. 143–144). Discipline "individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations" (p. 145). Each element in the machine "is defined by the place it occupies in a series, and by the gap that separates it from others," that is by "the rank: the place one occupies in a classification, the point

at which a line and a column intersect, the interval in a series of intervals that one may traverse one after the other" (p. 145).

The disciplinary machine codifies and controls space; additionally, and not unrelated, it controls time. Just as there are designated places already invested with the reality of command, there is also a rigid schedule laid out in the same way. In general terms, the disciplinary machine "divide[s] time duration into successive or parallel segments, each of which must end at a specific time" (p. 157). The more efficient disciplinary machine schedules in increasingly minute segments such that the persons within the machine "count in quarter hours, in minutes, in seconds" (p. 150). Foucault refers to the timed prayers of the monastery and gives additional examples of the factory bells and the bells in schools as signals to work or study or pray (pp. 149–150). The disciplinary machine plans the use of every square inch of space and every moment of time.

The strict control of space and time necessarily results in a total control of movement, a "degree of precision in the breakdown of gestures and movements, another way of adjusting the body to temporal imperatives" (p. 151). At every moment there is a particular and precise movement to perform in a predetermined space. Foucault illustrates using the example of troop drills. The commander has power over every movement of each individual soldier. The micro-physics of power are at work in minutiae: a single gesture of a soldier's heel or the placement of a student's hand over the heart during a pledge of allegiance. Discipline separates and apportions time so that every movement and even every thought is planned and scheduled by the command. Discipline divides and assigns spaces such that all interactions with the environment are the desired interactions of the command. The separate, controlled bodies are then composed as a machine: "power is introduced, fastening them to one another. It constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex" (p. 153). As the machine is capable of executing commands, the disciplined bodies are also subjects executing the command; they are subjected to that

position. In this way the disciplinary machine functions to transmit and amplify power. It has "the function not so much of deduction as of synthesis" (p. 153). Through the composition of forces, the disciplinary machine is capable of exercising a greater power than the sum capability of the persons who make up its parts, and it achieves this capability through the monopolization of the intermediate space by the hegemonic reality of the command. It is, in short, "the individual and collective coercion of bodies" (p. 169).

Bodies as Replaceable/Interchangeable Parts in a Machine

As an addition to Foucault's (1977a) explanation of the micro-physics of power including the control of space, time, and movement, I theorize that the result is a machine with bodies as replaceable and interchangeable parts and that disciplinary power renders the bodies replaceable and interchangeable through the negation of the creative use of energy. The organized army demonstrates one of the earliest uses of bodies as interchangeable parts: the front rows of a formation fight to death or fatigue then fall back to let the back rows come forward and fight to death or fatigue while the back rows rest and regroup. The unit consists of a collection of individuals who, even with specialized roles, are ultimately interchangeable and replaceable. There may be only one standard bearer in the unit, but when that soldier falls, another raises the flag and assumes the role.

In a military unit, the officers are as replaceable as the foot soldiers. Ranking results in a hierarchy such that an officer replaces his immediate superior when necessary. In a factory, a floor worker may become supervisor or foreman. Even in the prison and the schoolhouse, where inmates and students are not interchangeable with guards and teachers, the bodies are highly replaceable and interchangeable within the separate levels of the hierarchy. In a properly functioning unit, the replacement should take place smoothly with no interruption to the workings

of the machine because, ultimately, the supervisors have no more will than the supervised. They transmit rather than generate commands. Only the command is irreplaceable, and the command, once spoken, need not attach to any particular body. (Stanley Kubrick (1964) satirizes this abstract quality of command and the lack of will of the soldier in his film *Doctor Strangelove*.) The military unit serves an ideal example of the purpose of the disciplinary machine. The function of a military unit is neither limited to any one specific objective nor even to a limited list of objectives: to conquer, to kill, to take territory forcibly. A military unit may be tasked to rescue, to build a bridge, to repair a levy. Consistent with Orwell's (1949a) assertion that the goal of power is power, the purpose of a military unit is to obey and execute a command. More broadly stated, the purpose of a disciplined machine is to store, transmit, amplify, and execute an exertion of power.

I pause to address briefly the objection that the purposes of these disciplinary machines are other than the execution of an exertion of power. My use of "machine" is defined by its purpose and function; a machine is that which it is doing. For example, a wrench is a wrench when it is wrenching a bolt, but it becomes a hammer if one were to turn it sideways and use it to pound a nail. The limits of a machine are that which it cannot do, and, as many machines could be used for a wide variety of purposes—the wrench could become a very uncomfortable pillow, for example—often the limitations of a machine better serve to define it (where "define" is understood in the etymological sense of bringing from infinitude to finitude). The machine is not that which it certainly cannot do—the wrench cannot be a rocket. If a disciplinary machine such as a hospital or a school were defined by the commonly stated purposes of increasing patients' well-being or facilitating students' empowerment (respectively), the machines must not be able to perform functions contrary to their purposes. Both examples of the hospital and the machine fail this test. Hospitals have been used in the active harm of patients both directly, for example in the forced or non-consensual sterilization of marginalized women, and indirectly, for example in the

exploitation of patients for the profit of insurance and pharmaceutical corporations. Likewise, the school may function to normalize or even simply bore students into submission. As the machine is defined by that which it cannot do, the definition and purpose of the hospital and school cannot be limited to the promotion of patients' well-being and the facilitation of students' empowerment. The versatility of disciplinary machines demonstrates that their purpose is solely to execute the exertion of power.[8]

The negation of the inner realities of persons in the machine is essential to the versatility and efficiency of the machine, and it is the means by which the parts become replaceable and interchangeable. The body is sufficiently similar to allow for interchangeability (and physical exercise in the military, as a specific example, ensures maximum similarity and interchangeability); the inner reality is not. The control of space, time, and movement ensures a strict control over the interactions between bodies and the surrounding environment rendering impossible the willful exploration of and interaction with the environment in such a way that has an effect on the environment. The control of time further negates the possibility of reflection, another essential element of the creative use of energy. The disciplined body does not reflect, it does not consider thoughtfully the experiences of the past. It merely counts. Persons within the machine are unable to invest their inner reality through an intermediate space resulting in a culmination in the outer reality. They become bodies incapable of using energy creatively, and they are, therefore, replaceable and interchangeable. The machine is both most efficient and most secure when the intermediate space is dominated by only one reality, that belonging to one commander, ideally a commander who is sufficiently distant from the functioning of the machine as to be untouchable and unknowable, a "Big Brother" of sorts.

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[8] Foucault (1977a) frequently refers to the disciplinary machine controlling labor. If the disciplinary machine's function is the control of labor, then the disciplinary machine's purpose may be stated as the control and generation of *wealth*. In the chapter on the economics of power, I explicate how the control of wealth is another form of the control of bodies such that the control of wealth reduces again to the creative use of energy as power on bodies as media.

Foucault (1977a) provides an example of the explicit negation of the creative use of energy on the part of the factory workers, the bodies in the machine: "It is expressly forbidden during work to amuse one's companions by gestures or in any other way, to play at any game whatsoever, to eat, to sleep, to tell stories and comedies" (p. 151). In other words, the creative use of energy is strictly forbidden the workers, the objects of the exertion of disciplinary power. The workers are forbidden to engage in the intermediate space, to create and share the creation of reality. Reality is entirely the domain of the command. A better machine need not have these rules stated explicitly; at its most efficient, the disciplinary machine should allow no possibility of amusement, story-telling, or play of any kind because all space, time, and movement would be predetermined. In this way, the control of external factors, time, space, and movement, results in domination of the intermediate space and inner realities. The only inner reality is the mechanical function of the body in obedience to constant and specific scheduled movements to and from designated places.

The Gaze, Examination, and Ranking

The picture of the disciplinary machine consists of a carefully controlled environment with divided spaces in which bodies move with clockwork precision and persons do not think but count. What exactly the bodies are doing does not matter providing they are executing the command. The bodies may be building products in a factory or writing at desks or standing and marching. (The latter example is perhaps best as military units drill and perform maneuvers simply to practice and demonstrate their ability to do so.) It remains to answer the question *how* the disciplinary machine is capable of controlling time space and movement.

The answer is most generally, through the exertion of power, and more specifically, through the exertion of knowledge-power—through the act of knowing or finding/creating

persons to be docile bodies, and even more specifically through gaze, examination, and ranking, three strategies of power-knowledge that lead to normalization. The disciplinary machine turns each individual into "a 'case'…the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained, corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc." (Foucault, 1977a, p. 191). A disciplinary gaze is constant and omnipresent. There is no possibility of movement the gaze does not monitor; therefore, at every moment there is only the possibilities of correct movement or movement that must be corrected—normalization or pathologization. The pathological bodies—the ones that move incorrectly—are subject to examination, the purpose of which is "to measure, assess, diagnose, cure, transform individuals" (p. 227). The gaze finds/creates normal or pathological bodies, and the examination of pathological bodies leads to their transformation toward normalization. Where torture exerted power through the division of the individual body, discipline exerts power through the normalization and composition of individual bodies.

The "gaze that supervises" proves a more useful and effective strategy of control than the physical manipulation of bodies (p. 153). It is not necessary to move or adjust the body, as a yoga instructor or physical therapist might; it is only necessary to watch. The division of space provides paths for the gaze. The supervisor is above the factory floor. The teacher stands in front of the class, the officer in front of the troops. Birmingham, Alabama serves as a specific, large-scale geographical example. Factory and mine owners designed the entire city to facilitate the disciplinary gaze. Housing for former slaves and immigrants who worked the mines and factories occupies the valley while housing for the white factory and mine owners occupies the surrounding hills from which the owners gazed downward on the bodies over which they exerted disciplinary power.

Using not only the gazes of the ones exerting disciplinary power but also the gazes of those within the disciplinary machine compounds the effectiveness of the strategy of the gaze and

results in a gaze that is disembodied and omnipresent. The geometrical organization of the physical environment combined with the division of bodies by ranks results in a "network of gazes that supervised one another" (p. 170). The system of ranks that transmits the supervisory gaze may even create an incentive to participate in the disciplinary machine. The idea of "climbing the corporate ladder" is an excellent example. If the individual accepts the certain reality of the disciplinary machine, he may wish to pass various examinations and to move up in rank such that his position is more consistently one of subject exerting rather than object exerted upon. As the bodies within the disciplinary machine transmit the disciplinary gaze through ranks, the machine itself becomes self-disciplined, and, in the ideal functioning of the disciplinary machine, the bodies within internalize the gaze. While it is possible to identify individual strategies of disciplinary power, these strategies exist simultaneously and maintain each other. Even as the gaze normalizes and creates ranked, docile bodies whose movements are strictly controlled, the ranked, docile bodies move in ways to transmit the gaze.

Networks of subjection and objectification result from the transmission of the exertion of disciplinary power through the machine. The disciplinary machine not only controls the specific movement of bodies, it also serves to position bodies in these networks such that an individual body may be (and almost always is) at once the object of the exertion of disciplinary power and also function as a subject exerting—or, more accurately, transmitting—disciplinary power to another object-body. Disciplinary power creates bodies that are at once useful subjects and docile objects. What results are vast, subtle, and diffuse networks of power that exist within and across institutions. It is in these networks of power that the subject exerting power, especially the "subtler" form of disciplinary power disappears or escapes. Even a high-ranking military person, such as General Dyer, who evidently has the power to give commands still is subjected to his position; the difficult question is subjected *by whom*? From an ethical position that holds candor as the "good," I do not demand an answer to the *by whom?* question, nor do I call for a search to

root out the subjects exerting power. Rather, I demand that individual persons each be aware of their own positions in the networks of subjection and objectification such they are candid about the positions to which they are subjected, the forms of energy they exert as subjects, and upon whom they exert energy.

Candid Ethics of Disciplinary Power

Within the ethical framework of candor, I proceed to provide brief examples of an ethics of disciplinary power. I do so for two reasons: first, to remain rooted in the limited ethics of candor by demonstrating that there are ethical arguments not only for power (e.g. O'Brien's and Nietzsche's) but also for power in the form of discipline, and, second, to provide examples of candid statements of disciplinary power as "good." My aim is not to establish that disciplinary power is "good" any more than it is to establish that power is "good" or that care is "good." Rather, I assert that candor is "good," and these examples demonstrate how those who believe in power or disciplinary power as "good" ought to be candid about their ethics. The first example is from Foucault (1977a) and demonstrates not only an acknowledgment of discipline as "good" but also the accompanying sense of satisfaction that affirms that the exertion of disciplinary power can be a creative use of energy. The second example is from Dostoyevsky (1880), and it provides a detailed and candid explanation of how one might consider disciplinary power to be necessary, natural, and good.

While watching a regiment drill, the Grand Duke Mikhail remarked, "Very good, only they breathe" (Foucault, 1977a, p. 188). The Grand Duke exults in his power to drill the troops. Importantly, the troops are not accomplishing any particular objective, apparently having no effect on any environment or media. However, the troops are objects of their own subjection. They are both actors and acted upon. Their bodies are the medium, and the Grand Duke is

pleased, satisfied with the effect of a near perfect transformation of their bodies into automata—perfect, except that they breathe. This sense of satisfaction is evidence that the Grand Duke is using energy creatively in the exertion of disciplinary power. Further, the Grand Duke's comment is a candid and blunt acknowledgement of the exertion of disciplinary power as good. The Grand Duke's comment further reveals how the "good" of disciplinary power leads to the "good" of power over the body in general. He approves because he dominates both the inner reality and the bodies of the troops entirely. The only use of energy on their part is for the maintenance of life and the execution of the command. If only the former were not needed for the latter. Perhaps the suggestion underlying the Duke's assessment of the troops is that perfect power would combine both torture and discipline; he implies a wish to exert complete control over the troops to the point of their death and beyond. It is a moment in real life when a commander genuinely wishes for the zombie army of speculative fiction. It is not the wish itself, but the candid statement of the wish that is "good" under the ethics of candor.

The Grand Duke's statement reveals an ethics that holds the exertion of disciplinary power as "good." The second example holds that it is "good" or at least natural and necessary for the vast majority of people to be objects of disciplinary power exerted by a small minority. In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dostoyevsky uses his character Ivan Karamazov to outline just such an ethics through a morality play entitled "The Grand Inquisitor." The Grand Inquisitor explains that it is the very nature of humanity to be automata (or "sheep") and that to exert power as discipline is good and even a self-sacrificing good.

> But we will gather the sheep once more and subject them to our will for ever. We will prove to them their own weakness and make them humble again…We will give them that quiet, humble happiness, which alone benefits such weak, foolish creatures as they are, and having once had proved to them their weakness, they will become timid and obedient, and gather around us as chickens around their hen…Yes; we will make them

work like slaves, but during their recreation hours they shall have an innocent child-like life, full of play and merry laughter…We will tell them that every kind of sin will be remitted to them, so long as it is done with our permission; that we take all these sins upon ourselves, for we so love the world, that we are even willing to sacrifice our souls for its satisfaction…And all will be happy, all except the one or two hundred thousands of their rulers. For it is but we, we the keepers of the great Mystery who will be miserable. (Dostoyevsky, 1880)

The primary assumption is that the vast majority of humans are by nature docile bodies and, therefore, that the few who are capable of controlling and providing for them ought to do so in such a way that allows them to remain docile bodies. William Golding (1961) expresses a similar sentiment about the basic nature of humanity in his essay "Thinking as Hobby." He writes that for the "nine-tenths of the population" the mental process that is close to thought as they will get is really feeling and not thought at all, and he likens humanity to cattle that "graze all the same way on the side of a hill" (Golding, 1961, p. 2). This concept of human nature is consistent with the idea that humans must be disciplined and controlled for their own good, and that without discipline, they are incapable of living well or perhaps even incapable of living at all. The Grand Inquisitor outlines this concept candidly as an ethical good in precisely the way for which an ethics of candor calls.

Whether the exertion of power in the form of discipline is admitted as an ethical good or not, it is everywhere evident. The pervasive influence of the disciplinary machine makes up what Foucault (1977a) calls the "carceral city" whose center is "a network of diverse elements—walls, space, institution, rules, discourse" and the model of which is "a strategic distribution of elements of different natures and levels" (p. 307). Ultimately, the prison occupies a central position, but "it is not alone, but linked to a whole series of 'carceral' mechanisms which seem distinct enough—

since they are intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to comfort—but which all tend, like the prison, to exercise a power of normalization" (p. 308).

All institutions in the carceral city are prisons of a kind. At the factory, laborers work from opening time to close without creativity nor even individual will. At the hospital, physicians use the bodies of patients as media for the exercise of their power and to the profit of a vast medical-industrial complex. In the schoolhouse, students move through days and weeks and years punctuated by bells; they are processed and their successful completion bears little correlation to their learning, growth, or edification. It appears the purpose of school is to school children; aligning with Nietzsche's (1909) philosophy, the noun means nothing except the happening of the verb, but the verb seems to bear no meaning beyond its own doing—power for the sake of power. To understand the workings of the carceral is to see the machinations of discipline everywhere at work.

Foucault (1977a) hints at the idea of rebellion; he writes that in this carceral world "we must hear the distant roar of battle" leaving his reader with the reminder that where there is the exercise of power there is and must be also resistance (p. 308). I, however, am not advocating rebellion; my limited ethics of candor does not allow me to assert that the exertion of power whether it be in the form of torture or discipline is not "good." I make no attempt to refute or dispute the ethical claims of Nietzsche, O'Brien, The Grand Duke, or the Grand Inquisitor. Instead, I insist that, just as they are, one ought to be aware, intentional, and candid concerning participation in exertions of power. This thorough exploration of the exertions of power, both the direct physics of it and the subtle micro-physics, becomes an essential element in the ethics of candor. One must understand in order to be aware, intentional, and candid.

The ethics of candor are of little use if the exertion of power is the only possible creative use of energy. One hardly need be candid about that which is certain and exclusively universal. I propose there is another way to view the world entirely, or, more specifically, that the exertion of

power is not the only way people use energy creatively. Part two of my thesis is concerned with the creative use of energy as care. Using the same concept of "creative use of energy" I contrast the mechanisms of care with the mechanisms of power and discipline. In this way, I invite the reader to look through another peephole, not at a different world, but at the same world in a different light such that the reader may see a different reality—one formed by the creative use of energy manifesting itself in networks of care—alongside and even within and through the reality formed by the networks of power of the carceral world. In offering at least two alternate visions of the world, I demonstrate the need for candor. First, given at least two possible realities, candor serves the important function of identifying the reality *that could be otherwise.* Where there is more than one possibility, candor demands the understanding that one is involved in *this* creative use of energy and *not some other possible* creative use of energy. Second, in cases where exertions of power and of care are manifest not in clear physics but in subtle micro-physics, candor becomes both a means and an end. The close examination that is the rigorous foundational work of candor is absolutely necessary for awareness, intentionality, and candor. Here I conclude the close examination of the purpose and function, including the physics and micro-physics, of power and move on to a close examination of care.

CHAPTER V

THE CREATIVE USE OF ENERGY AS CARE[9]

My goal in this chapter is to reveal the function of care as a creative use of energy such that those who are involved in exertions of care may be fully aware of and candid about their involvement. Just as I proceeded with power, I am not elevating care to an ethical "good" but rather insisting on candor in the exertion of care. I begin the chapter with the core ideas of "receptivity" and "feeling with" from Noddings' (1984) *Caring*, a foundational work on the theory and ethics of care in general and particularly as it relates to education. I then demonstrate how care may fit the criteria for a creative use of energy. From there I branch away from Noddings' theory of care to develop my own theory of care that is symmetrical to the theory of disciplinary power from the previous chapter and that includes: interactions through Winnicott's (1971) intermediate space, issues with language, particularly a breakdown of subject/object and active/passive distinctions, and "micro-physics" of care. I conclude the chapter by returning to Noddings' ethics of care. Though I no more affirm her ethics of care than I do Nietzsche's ethics of power or the Grand Inquisitor's ethics of disciplinary power, I present her ethics of care as an example of a candid presentation of care as a "good" and I affirm her candor.

Elements from Noddings: Feeling With, Receptivity, Motivational Displacement, and Joy

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[9] The shorthand for "creative use of energy that takes a willful direction resulting in concrete effects in real space and time" is "exertion."

According to Noddings (1984), caring functions through "feeling with" which is accomplished from a position of "receptivity." Noddings distinguishes "feeling with" from empathy: the latter is a projection of the self into the position of the other (a putting of one's self in the other's shoes); the former is "receiving the other into [one]self" (p. 30). Feeling with involves "engrossment" with the other (p. 30). Noddings repeatedly returns to the mother caring for the infant to demonstrate the concept of care. She explains that the mother does not try to imagine herself in the position of a crying infant; she does not keep her reality and occupy the infant's space and time (empathy). Rather, she becomes fully receptive to the infant, opening herself up to consider any and all forms of communication he may use for his betterment (p. 31). She embraces his reality as her own and acts accordingly. Importantly, the one-caring maintains her own perspective even as she embraces the reality of the cared-for. In order to act as one-caring, the one-caring must have some kind of advantageous perspective or position that offers greater benefit to the cared-for than the cared-for is capable of generating on his own. The one-caring understands what is "appropriate" because she "assumes a dual perspective and can see things both from her own pole and that of the cared-for" (p. 63).

The attitudes of both the one-caring and the cared-for are essential to determining what care is and how it functions. Caring breaks down when it becomes a burden to the one-caring or when the one-caring is primarily interested in being credited with care (pp. 12–13). In both cases, the one-failing-to-care is interested in and existing in his own reality. The fundamental aspect of care is "apprehend[ing] the reality of the other" in such a way that it "arouse[s] in [one] the feeling, 'I must do something'" (p. 14). Through what Noddings terms "motivational displacement" the cared-for's imperative becomes the one-caring's imperative (p. 16). Motivational displacement requires a kind of "reciprocal receptivity" by which the one-caring becomes engrossed in the cared-for, and "the cared-for responds to the presence of the one-caring" (p. 60). This response is an essential part of the caring relationship; "the cared for must

receive the caring" (p. 69). Motivational displacement requires both receptivity on the part of the one-caring and some movement on the part of the cared-for. In order for caring to be complete, a "commitment to act in behalf of the cared-for, a continued interest in his reality throughout the appropriate time span, and the renewal of commitment over this span of time" (p. 16) must follow initial attitudes of reciprocal receptivity and motivational displacement. The attitude of receptivity eventually leads to actions that have effects in the outside world, but what distinguishes caring from acting that is not caring is the receiving of and engrossment with the reality of another, the willing displacement of one's own motivation with the motivation of another. Because caring affects and involves both the one-caring and the cared-for, Noddings notes the one-caring does not view the cared-for as object (p. 32).

Joy is a mark of caring just as it is a mark of creativity and play. Joy "is the special affect that arises out of the receptivity of caring" (p. 132). Noddings ties joy to "the relation, or our recognition of the relation" (p. 132). She connects "receptive joy" most strongly to "the world of relation," and refers to caring as "a fundamental, creative experience" (p. 140). When the one-caring displaces his motivation and accepts the reality of the other, it is akin to when an artist "quit[s] thinking and manipulating" and becomes receptive to inspiration (p. 140). The receptive mode is part of creative experience; it "is the beginning of creativity, the mode in which understanding begins and is completed" (p. 145). Here Noddings explicitly links care and creativity. I also see the link between care and creativity. In a forthcoming section I offer an explanation of care as a creative use of energy consistent with my definition of the terms in this thesis. Before I proceed to that explanation, I develop my own theory of care that is rooted in some of Noddings' core ideas but is nevertheless different in a number of important ways.

Care and the Intermediate Space

It should be clear that the theory Noddings (1984) develops and much of the terminology she uses is consistent with my concept of "the creative use of energy" and Winnicott's (1971) "intermediate space." Nevertheless, parts of Noddings' (1984) theory I find problematic, so I establish my own theory of care, including using Winnicott's (1971) object-relations theory and concept of the "good-enough mother" and from there formulating my own terms.

One problem with Noddings' theory of care is that the one-caring must receive the other into herself. The language reflects a direct superposition of self into self; there is no intermediate space. I have established creativity, including the intermediate space, as fundamental; therefore, I rework a theory of care that includes concepts similar to Noddings' (1984) "receptivity" and "motivational displacement," but these occur in an intermediate space rather than directly between self and other. I return to Winnicott's (1971) object-relations theory and use also his theory of the "good-enough mother" to establish a theory of care that includes the intermediate space.

According to Winnicott (1971), the good-enough mother is a person (not necessarily the biological mother herself) relating to an infant in a way that primarily concerns the intermediate space of creativity, reality generation, and cultural sharing. The good-enough mother is one who "makes an active adaptation to the infant's needs, an active adaptation that gradually lessens, according to the infant's growing ability to account for the failure of adaptation and to tolerate frustration" (pp. 13–14). The good-enough mother necessarily adapts to help transition the infant out of the phase of perceived omnipotence—when he believes he creates everything as he finds it or when he is unable to distinguish between creating and finding. The process of adaptation is one of both providing for the infant's needs and at the same time interacting with the infant through the intermediate space such that the infant begins to distinguish between inner and outer realities. Frustration occurs as the infant experiences objects in the outer reality that do not conform to his inner reality. Learning to tolerate this frustration is a healthy part of development.

In the context of caring and receptivity, the good-enough mother, or any one-caring makes room in the intermediate space to allow the cared-for to interact with the outer world and invest it with his inner reality. Like the good-enough mother, the one-caring does not cede the intermediate space entirely such that the cared-for's inner reality comes to dominate. Rather, the intermediate space becomes a shared space (and therefore a cultural space). The one-caring retains her advantageous position (for it must be by some advantage that the one-caring is able to be so) and invests the intermediate space with her reality while at the same time, through an attitude of receptivity, welcoming the investment of the inner reality of the cared-for. This "welcoming" may consist of allowing space for the inner reality of the cared for as well as ordering the intermediate space so it becomes a place that facilitates the investment of the inner reality of the cared-for. The intermediate space, shared by the both the one-caring and the cared-for and invested with the inner reality of the cared-for guides the actions of both one-caring and cared-for such that they act in real space and time in ways that effect material change. The end result is creative expression on behalf of the cared-for, which the cared-for could not have generated himself.

Theory of Care

My resulting theory of care is as follows. The one-caring expands and organizes the intermediate space to welcome the investment of the inner reality of the other where the term "welcoming" should be understood to encompass expanding space, making space more accessible, and organizing space better to accept the one coming (in the most literal sense creating a "well coming"). To reflect better the concept of welcoming, I replace Noddings' terms "receptivity" and "one-caring" with "welcoming" and "one-welcoming." In order for the exertion of caring to be complete, the cared-for must accept the welcome by investing his intermediate reality through the intermediate space (consistent with Noddings' concept of reciprocal

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receptivity). The result is a kind of movement in the intermediate space (consistent with Noddings' concept of "motivational displacement"). In my terminology, I replace "cared-for" with "investor." The term "motivational displacement" is no longer necessary as "welcoming" and "investment" suffice to explain the movement of inner realities in and through the intermediate space.

My theory of care aligns not only with some of Noddings' core concepts but also with Winnicott's (1971) concept of the good-enough mother. Like the one-welcoming of my theory, the good-enough mother expands and manages the intermediate space by first providing a "not me" object (the breast) and then gradually allowing the infant to adjust to external reality by "weaning" the infant not only from the physical dependency on the breast but also from the illusion of omnipotence over the breast. The good-enough mother facilitates the infant's ability to conceptualize an outer reality over which he may exert influence but not omnipotent control. While my theory of care is not explicitly focused on the mother-infant relationship, the one-welcoming functions much like a good-enough mother: where the good-enough mother is involved in the initial creation of the intermediate space, the one-welcoming functions to continue the expansion and ordering of the intermediate space to facilitate continued creative interactions with external reality. As Winnicott notes, "the task of weaning…continues as one of the tasks of parents and educators" (pp. 16–17).

In the exertion of caring, the intermediate space is necessarily cultural. The one-welcoming opens and organizes the space for the investor's inner reality; the result is a shared and negotiated space. Though the investor's reality primarily moves through the intermediate space, the involvement of the one-welcoming prevents the possibility of the investor's inner reality monopolizing the intermediate space. The result is an intermediate space occupied by the investor's reality but with boundaries established by the one-welcoming. The changes in the intermediate space culminate in expression in the material world in a way that results from and is

consistent with the investor's inner reality. Because the material effects stem from the investor's inner reality, they somehow provide for the investor's needs, motivations, or desires—within the boundaries created by the one-welcoming's organization of the intermediate space.

Just as I take creativity and play to be fundamental, I take it that functions of care across the intermediate space have progressively increasing effects on the ones involved in care and on the intermediate space itself. The act of welcoming on the intermediate space results in a cultural (because shared) space that is more expansive and accessible. Further, the one-welcoming develops an increased capacity to act as one-welcoming as the investor develops an increased creative capacity. Both ones-welcoming and investors become more comfortable and adept at interactions between inner realities and through the intermediate space which itself becomes increasingly versatile increasingly facilitating of investment. Thus the investor may also develop an increased capacity to be one-welcoming and the one-welcoming may develop an increased creative capacity. Further, as the exertion of care results in material changes for the betterment of the investor, the advantages of the material changes better position the investor to be one-welcoming for someone else. The following general statement results: the exertion of care results in the increased capacity for care for all involved. This statement works *only* when care functions as it should. If for example, the one-welcoming does not organize the intermediate space with appropriate boundaries and allows the investor to monopolize the space, the intermediate space becomes less accessible and less facilitating of investment, and the result is shrinking cultural space and a decreased capacity for care. When care functions fully and properly, it is expansive and, in way similar to power, it may form networks of care as both ones-welcoming and investors develop an increased capacity for care, and this increased capacity manifests itself in further interactions of care involving and including an increasingly expansive network of others.

Care as a Creative Use of Energy

My theory of care is consistent not only with a general idea of creativity (which Noddings includes in her theory) but with the specific concept of "the creative use of energy" I establish in this thesis. Both welcoming and investment are willful acts that involve inner reality in the intermediate space. Caring results in material effects in concrete space and time, and therefore meets the criterion that creativity must culminate in a material expression. The ones involved in caring (both ones-welcoming and investors) exert care on persons as media in multiple ways. The one-welcoming is a medium for the exertion of care in that the one-welcoming receives the inner reality of another into the intermediate space and allows this inner reality to influence her actions in concrete space and time. The investor is also medium for the exertion of care in that her inner reality invests the intermediate space in a way that it could not have done without the act of the one-welcoming and the result is the investor's increased capacity to act creatively as well as changes in the material world—which may be the environment or the investor's body—that benefit the investor. The exertion of care must have an accompanying sense of pleasure or joy, and Noddings' explanation of joy suffices for this criterion. Finally, exertions of care may work in networks. Because care meets all the criteria for the creative use of energy, I may position it as a way to use creative energy that is an alternate to power and that leads to alternate networks of care and ultimately an alternate reality of care that exists alongside and within the reality of power that Foucault (1977a) describes as the carceral world. The project of the ethics of candor is to promote awareness, intentionality, and candor in persons who may be involved in power or in care. To set up the distinction coming in the next chapter between exertions of power and of care, I extend my theory to include a micro-physics of care based on Foucault's (1977a) understanding of micro-physics but applied to the exertion of care rather than disciplinary power and later I explore how exertions of care break down subject/object and active/passive distinctions.

The Micro-Physics of Care

As I promote awareness of power and care with the end goal of candid exertions of either, I do not focus on the obvious exertions of power versus care. Instead, I focus on the micro-physics of both, the workings of power and care in minutiae where the distinctions may be difficult and from out of diffuse networks where the subjects may be lost. To accomplish this work of discernment in the service of the ethics of candor, I must include in my theory of care a micro-physics of care: an explanation of how care works itself out in space, time, and movement.

Care works on physical spaces in a way analogous to how it works on the intermediate space. It creates space, and it invites. Welcoming of the inner reality into the intermediate space becomes welcoming of the body in concrete space and time. Spaces of care are versatile and minimally restrictive; they remain open to the needs of the persons in the space. At the same time, spaces of care are ordered to promote the possibility of creative interaction with the environment and to reduce the threat of chaos. People tend to converge and interact in spaces of care. They are the physical spaces of culture. The presence of carceral institutions is everywhere apparent, but so too the presence of caring spaces. There are parks, community centers, cafes, and libraries. Within smaller circles of care, many homes become spaces of care. Often it is the undefined, public spaces—the sidewalks and corner stores and empty lots—where people interact that make up the cultural identity of a "neighborhood."

Spaces of care form around the needs of the persons in them. They become places where a person may play explore and experience and resolve needs and disequilibrium. Spaces of care are necessarily defined by boundaries. The vast arctic tundra is a versatile and minimally restrictive space, but it is not a space of care. Boundaries result in a space that is open to exploration but not so much so that a person would be overwhelmed and shut down. Spaces of care are relational in two ways. Different persons experience different spaces as potential spaces of care. For one person, a library might be just the right kind of versatile and minimally restrictive

space to allow for exploration, nourishment, and growth. A different person might go to a nightclub for precisely the same reason. Additionally, spaces of care are relational in that they are interactive. People meet as ones-welcoming and investors, and these interactions and relationships of welcoming and investing create both the boundaries (as one result of welcoming) that define the spaces and make them ordered and safe as well as the culture (as a result of investment) that identifies the space. Like the intermediate space in interactions of care, material spaces of care are increasingly accessible and facilitating of creative investment.

The allotment of time as a result of care tends away from scheduling and toward creative movement. The controlled scheduling of time is an important strategy by which power operates to limit the creative use of energy in the controlled. For care, time is defined by the creative use of energy. Complete and fulfilling expressions determine the end of an activity. Where time is scheduled, it is for the purpose of meeting and interacting with others. Time as a result of care is consistent with the results of care in physical space: it is open, versatile, and minimally restrictive.

As a result of the caring strategies of space and time, movement is primarily for play, exploration, and the resolution of disequilibria in the environment. In place of the disciplined efficiency of the carceral, comfort and enjoyment determine the placement and movement of bodies. Efficiency need not be absent, but it is evidently not a priority. A public beach serves as an example. Bodies lay, sit, walk, run, and swim according to what is most comfortable or enjoyable to the individual. Minute gestures serve the same purpose, to shade the sun or swat a fly or merely stretch a stiff muscle. Activity appears to be voluntary: some may take part in organized games like soccer or volleyball; others may search for shells, swim, read, or sunbathe. Efficient collaboration may be evident in activities such as a group of children building a sandcastle, but the entire beach can hardly be construed as an efficient machine (except perhaps as a machine of play or enjoyment, but the terminology breaks down). Space and time are

minimally restrictive and allow for movement. If a person in a space of care is checking the time, it is likely for one of two reasons: to meet and interact with another person in a space of care or to meet the schedule of a carceral institution to which the person must return.

The strategies of power including the gaze, examination, and the act of knowledge-power do not necessarily have a corollary in care. Care may employ a gaze, but the gaze derives from the act of welcoming, and the one-welcoming focuses the gaze on the environment with the intention of ordering it and expanding it to invite the investor. The caring gaze does not examine the investor to ensure that he moves obediently. It examines the environment to ensure it will facilitate investment. While care may involve something like training and even discipline, it is only as part of a longer process of expression. If a person wished to become an expert ballet dancer, he must go through many hours of rigorous training, but the end result would be movement that is creative and expressive. Knowledge, examination, and training may be strategies of care if they are part of process that increases the investor's capacity to be creative. Here arises a fundamental distinction between the micro-physics of power and of care. With respect to power, the micro-physics are strategies to create docile bodies and compose them into a disciplined machine the purpose of which is to execute commands. The micro-physics of power extract and monopolize the ability to use energy creatively. The micro-physics of care serve to diffuse and facilitate the creative use of energy within persons. Therefore, the very terms knowledge, gaze, examination, and training have quite different meanings depending on whether they are strategies of power or of care.

I hope it is evident that the micro-physics of power and of care may come very close to each other. The boundaries that make a space of care safe and manageable may be difficult to distinguish from the divisions that allocate specific spaces for specific purposes in the carceral. A child's training on a musical instrument may be the result of an exertion of power or of care, and it may be unclear, even to the child, which it is. The runner at the beach may be moving out of a

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celebration of her health and physical ability, or she may be following the precise commands of a regimented exercise schedule in order to conform to a body image demanded of her by the disciplinary gaze. The world of the carceral and the world of care exist alongside and within each other. For this reason, an ethics of candor is necessary to lead to more aware, intentional, and candid exertions of both.

The following chapter is devoted to promoting awareness of which one may be involved in such that intentionality and candor (both of which are dependent on awareness) become real, exercisable options. Before moving to the task of discernment for the sake of awareness, two sections remain for the present chapter. In the following section, I analyze how exertions of care break down subject/object and active/passive distinctions so that, later, the question of whether these distinctions apply to a given situation becomes another plane of theoretical symmetry along which I later distinguishing exertions of power from exertions of care. I conclude this chapter with one additional section that presents an example of a candid ethics of care.

The Breakdown of Subject/Object and Active/Passive Distinctions in Exertions of Care

Because welcoming and investment are both active, it becomes difficult to identify a subject and object in the exertion of care. In a sense, there is a subject who welcomes and an object who is welcomed (or more specifically whose inner reality is welcomed). However, this statement is complicated. The welcoming is only complete as an action when the investor's inner reality invests the intermediate space. The investor is now subject, one who invests, and the intermediate space is the object of the investment. As a further complication, the intermediate space invested with the investor's inner reality affects the creative activity of the one-welcoming such that the one-welcoming becomes object. One possible way to explain subject/object relationships in the exertion of care is to use the concept of reciprocity (similar to though not the

same as Noddings' concept of reciprocal receptivity): the one-welcoming and the investor have a reciprocal subject/object relationship through the exertion of care. This explanation, however, is not quite sufficient. Because all parts of the exertion of care—from the initial act of welcoming through the investment of inner reality to the material effects in concrete space and time—the exertion of care as a creative use of energy must be understood as a necessarily unified and complete whole. While it may be reasonable to say there is a reciprocal subject/object relationship *within* an exertion of care, I reject the possibility of *within* because the exertion must be unified and complete. The resulting understanding is that the very distinction between subject and object breaks down in exertions of care.

In a related way, active/passive distinctions also break down. While I have been using the phrasing "act of welcoming," the concept of "welcoming" confronts and resists the concept of "acting." Welcoming may be highly "active." It may involve a busy reordering of space as when a host cleans and moves furniture and puts out refreshments for a guest. In this sense, welcoming fits into a traditional understanding of "active." However, welcoming may also consist of non-acts, for example, leaving a door open or merely sitting silently and listening while another talks. I assert that these examples, too, are active, but I acknowledge the necessary confrontation with the traditional understanding of "active." The same follows for the traditional understanding of "passive." Welcoming as nothing more than leaving the door open seems "passive," while welcoming as busily preparing for a guest does not. Further, "investment" is an active verb; however, the "act" of the investor is dependent upon the "act" of the one-welcoming. The "act" of welcoming allows the "act" of investment; therefore, in a sense the "act" of investment "passively" receives the "act" of welcoming. If one were to attempt to describe the active/passive distinctions *within* an exertion of care, the language would become increasingly complex, difficult, and contradictory. However, I reject the possibility of a *within* the exertion and instead assert that the complexity and contradiction is evidence of breakdowns of both the active/passive

distinction and the subject/object distinction. These breakdowns become an important way to distinguish exertions of care from exertions of power which necessarily involve a subject (though it is not always possible to identify that subject) acting upon an object.

It is worth noting that the breakdown of subject/object and active/passive distinctions in exertions of care may be a result of the influence of power on language itself or, another way to put it, the breakdowns may be evidence that language has evolved to describe a carceral world rather than a caring one. Common conceptions of subject/object and active/passive involve something doing something to something else and are consistent with an exertion of power. The verbs "receive" and "welcome" are not active in this traditional sense, though they have counterparts that are: "seize" and "abduct." Shifting from a vision of a world of power networks to a world of care networks also involves a shift in the understanding of language. "Receiving" and "welcoming" are as much happenings, uses of energy, as "seize" and "abduct." Thus while the active/passive and subject/object distinctions, break down and fail, the concept of "the creative use of energy" remains intact.

Candid Ethics of Care from Noddings

Having established a theory of care as the creative use of energy including an understanding of the breakdown of subject/object and active/passive relationships—which later serves as a key distinction between exertions of power and of care—I conclude the exploration of care with an example of a candid ethics of care. I emphasize again, that I present this ethics not as "good" itself but as "good" in that it is a candid. I return to Noddings for the example of a candid ethics of care. Like Nietzsche, O'Brien, and the Grand Inquisitor, Noddings makes no attempt to disguise her ethics or gloss over difficulties. She exhibits candor throughout. In my brief presentation of her ethics of care, I focus on a few of the most difficult or problematic parts to

illustrate two things: first, that there are serious problems with an ethics of care, especially for those who assume an ethics of care is inherently "better" than an ethics of power or of discipline and, second, that candor is especially important where an ethical stance is difficult, complex, or problematic. While I am among those who find serious problems with Noddings' ethics of care, I celebrate her candor as "good."

Noddings' conception of care is primarily relational. Noddings (1984) argues that caring is moral because it derives from the "natural desire to be and to remain related" (p. 83). Care necessarily derives from relatedness and "in congruence with one's best remembrance of caring and being cared-for" (p. 94) which she illustrates thusly, "I have a picture of those moments in which I was cared for and in which I cared, and I may reach toward this memory and guide my conduct by it if I wish to do so" (p. 80).

Throughout *Caring,* Noddings (1984) emphasizes that caring takes place in concrete, real world situations; she denies the possibility of caring as abstraction and any kind of morality derived from an abstract concept. She writes, "Moral decisions are, after all, made in real situations" (p. 3). Caring must employ "a process of concretization" (p. 8) that takes hypotheticals and imagines them to be increasingly real; this is the inverse of traditional ethics that functions by abstraction, taking real situations and making them increasingly hypothetical to see how they align with predetermined and abstract principles. Noddings acknowledges the overwhelming burden the concretization of all hypothetical encounters must have upon the one-who-would-be-caring. She sorts this out by describing a "system of circles":

> In the inner, intimate circle, we care because we love…As we move outward in circles,
> we encounter those for whom we have a personal regard.…we are guided by at least three
> considerations: how we feel, what the other expects of us, and what the situational
> relationship requires of us…Beyond the circles of proximate others are those I have not
> yet encountered. Some of these are linked to the inner circle by personal or formal

relations…They are linked formally to those I already care for and they, too, enter my life potentially cared-for. Chains of caring are established, some linking unknown individuals to those already anchored in the inner circles and some forming whole new circles of potential caring. I am "prepared to care" through recognition of these chains. (pp. 46–47)

Noddings' (1984) next question is of particular interest, "But what of the stranger, one who comes to me without the bonds established in my chains of caring?" (p. 47). The one-who-would-be-caring

…dreads the proximate stranger, for she cannot easily reject the claim he has on her. She would prefer that the stray cat not appear at the back door—or the stray teenager at the front. But if he does present himself, he must be received not by formula but as individual. (p. 47)

The dread of the proximate stranger is a dread of sainthood consistent with the way Orwell (1949b) describes Gandhi as a kind of saint, "If one is…to love humanity as a whole, one cannot give one's preference to any individual person…To an ordinary human being, love means nothing if it does not mean loving some people more than others" (para. 6). If one stranger in need shows up at the door, the obligation is to be one-caring; if a million show up, the obligation is to be a saint, one for whom the boundaries of circles and chains no longer apply. The special caring relationship of the immediate family is drowned in caring relationships with an overwhelming number of proximate strangers.

Noddings (1984) explicitly rejects the concept of care as devotion to an abstract entity, principle, or even to humanity in the abstract (p. 44). Caring is always concrete and proximate; the rules for caring for strangers "are tempered a priori by thoughts of those in [the] inner circle" (p. 44). One cares for any person because and by means of the care that one has for some real and particular person in close relation to oneself. Noddings rejects the inverse, the concept that moral

principles of how to treat any person guide how one treats the real and particular persons in one's circles.

Noddings (1984) rightly notes that "caring about" which "always involves a certain benign neglect" by which "one is attentive just so far.…one contributes five dollars" is important but not sufficiently caring and not to be confused with caring which "requires engrossment, commitment, displacement of motivation" (p. 112). She goes so far as to limit the ethical obligations of care by proximity:

> Our obligation is limited and delimited by relation…We are not obliged to summon the "I must" if there is no possibility of completion in the other. I am not obliged to care for starving children in Africa, because there is no way for this caring to be completed in the other unless I abandon the caring to which I am obligated. I may choose to do something in the direction of caring, but I am not obliged to do so. (p. 86)

Here Noddings candidly addresses a difficult situation. In the globalized world, it is possible to contribute in some way to better the lives of people who may live a great distance from oneself and with whom one may never have a face-to-face interaction. Because Noddings begins with relatedness as natural and fundamental her ethics simply exclude ethical obligations to those with whom one will never have a relationship.[10] For one concerned with global justice and equity, Noddings' ethics may be insufficient, but to her credit she is candid about the limitations of her ethics.

Noddings approaches another difficult problem: the conflict between relational care and principle. In a hypothetical scenario, she imagines a "Ms. A" living in the sixties with a bigoted father, and a "hysterical" (that is hysterically bigoted) Aunt Phoebe. Ms. A is a professor who has

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[10] Noddings ignores the possibility of direct relatedness over great distances, for example, the direct relationship between a consumer in one country and the people in some distant country who sewed her clothes or picked her vegetables and thus touched the very objects that touch or enter her body.

a Black graduate student who "spoke eloquently of the prevailing injustice and inhumanity against blacks, of his growing despair" and of "going to the barricade" meaning resisting by means of physical violence. Ms. A sympathizes with her student (she is "nearly moved to tears"), and understands his position to be clearly right though she questions if it must come to violence. Noddings goes on to address the difficult question: if it did come to violence on which side would Ms. A stand? The rule of circles comes into play. "Years of personal kindness" drive Ms. A's decision. She stands with her family because of "the delight in [her father's] eyes as he shared [*her*] delight in a new bicycle; Aunt Phoebe staying up half the night to refashion a prom dress for her; the chocolate cakes for parties; the cold cloths and baking soda pastes for measles." When Ms. A considers that possibility that her family is in the wrong, she hopes her family "*wouldn't do such a thing!*" According to Noddings this hope is neither misplaced nor naïve: "[Ms. A] is trying to tell us that sensitive, well-informed relations are established in her inner circle, and that having been part of a caring relation over the years, it is unlikely that they would suddenly show themselves as violent and uncaring." The reader must imagine Ms. A with gun in hand, for she considers the possibility of picking up her student "in her sights." Would she fire? No, she would "note that it was [him] and pass on to some other target." The phrasing implies that Ms. A will fire on this other target (by the very definition of target as that which one fires upon). To Noddings' credit, she avoided the easier answer of neutrality; "going to the barricades" apparently allows no room for neutrality. Noddings concedes that this situation results in a "diminution of the ideal," but "to the one-caring, this is not diminution but agonized fulfillment. …always, always she warns the other: *Touch not these who are my beloved.* This is reality, and an ethic of caring faces it clear-eyed" (pp. 109–111).

Again, there arise serious problems in Noddings' ethics for those who are concerned with bigoted attitudes as a crisis of care and with the possible transmission of bigoted attitudes from older generations to younger through a perceived obligation to family loyalty. The above passage

is particularly problematic for those concerned with racial justice and the problem of white supremacist violence against people of color. The passage is problematic for those who understand that, in real historical situations, bigoted statements like Aunt Phoebe's "Ah would just die if a niggah touched me!" (p. 110) contributed in concrete ways to, for example, white Tulsans saying "Get a gun and get a nigger!" (Ellsworth, 2009) during the Tulsa Race Massacre of 1921. However, Noddings faces these problems "clear-eyed" and is perfectly candid about where her ethics of care lead.

I hope the brief presentation of Noddings' ethics of care has served its dual purpose: to demonstrate that an ethics of care may be problematic for those who consider care to be "good," and to provide an additional example of an ethical position that is candid even where it is problematic. Having established and provided examples (including those of Nietzsche, O'Brien, the Grand Inquisitor, and Noddings) for the ethics of candor and having formulated theories of power in general, of disciplinary power, and of care, I move now to the task of formulating a method to distinguish between exertions of or involvement in power or care. The ability to distinguish leads to awareness, and awareness leads to the possibility and ethical obligation of the intentional and candid exercise of either or both.

CHAPTER VI

AN INVESTIGATIVE METHOD FOR THE CANDID IDENTIFICATION OF THE

CREATIVE USE OF ENERGY AS POWER OR AS CARE[11]

The ethics of candor demand awareness, intentionality, and candor. Intentionality and candor are dependent upon awareness. Therefore, it is "good" to be aware and "not good" to be unaware. Awareness is not necessarily a choice. One may be obtuse, intentionally unaware, but one may be simply ignorant or oblivious, unintentionally unaware. This chapter provides tools that promote awareness. Laying the foundation for awareness facilitates full candor as an exercisable option; thence the ethics of candor may demand candor. Awareness can be difficult because power and care form two realities that exist alongside and within each other. Individuals may be involved in exertions of power and of care at the same time in different ways. As I laid out my theories of power and care, I intentionally aligned the theories to be symmetrical: both theories have a "micro-physics"; both theories address issues of language including the subject/object and/or active/passive distinctions; and both theories deal with interactions of inner realities in the intermediate space. These theoretical symmetries may function as planes on which both power and care move but in starkly different directions. I choose the image of movement on planes carefully. I say power and care "move" to emphasize that both are energy, "happenings" taking different, willful direction. I use "planes" to illustrate how the theoretical symmetries reduce the infinite complexity of reality to a manageable dimension, and I use "planes" rather

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[11] The shorthand for "creative use of energy that takes a willful direction resulting in concrete effects in real space and time" is "exertion."

than lines to emphasize that power and care are not binary opposites but rather two different possible directions among many for the creative use of energy.

In this chapter, I set up these planes of theoretical symmetry in the form of questions and answers such that the question identifies the plane and the answer explores which direction the creative use of energy may have taken. Though I write the initial questions in the present tense, I use past tense verbs for the continued investigation because the ethics is necessarily *post facto*. The creative use of energy as power or as care must culminate in concrete effects in the material world; therefore, a tool for understanding the creative use of energy can only explore what *has* happened. In the micro-physics "plane" of the chapter, I provide an example from my own teaching experience where investigating the intent of the one about to use energy creatively yields results that are different from investigating the material effects including the effects on bodies. In addition to using past tense verbs in the investigation, I use passive voice verbs in most of the initial questions. This is another intentional grammatical decision. At the point of asking the questions, the investigator does not know whether the situation involves an exertion of power or of care (or of something else). Part of the difficulty of determining which exertions may be involved is the tendency for the subjects exerting disciplinary power to escape into diffuse networks of subjection and objectification while in an exertion of care the subject/object distinction breaks down entirely. While the following questions may not reveal the subjects of disciplinary power, they should serve to identify exertions of disciplinary power such that a search for the subject may be another interesting kind of research to follow.

The investigations following the questions relate specifically to education and schooling. I am careful to use "schooling" as the process of a student progressing through a formal institution and "education" as the process of learning, and I fully understand that those two processes do not necessarily align even though the school's (i.e. the schooling institution's) purpose is purportedly education. Consistent with my conceptual/analytic framework for the

entire thesis, I do not include researched data in responses to the questions nor do I provide certain, complete answers. Consistent with a materialist framework, answers to these questions can only come out of concrete, specific situations. The value of this chapter, therefore, is in the questions and the investigative method, not necessarily in my responses to the questions. The questions demonstrate how an individual may investigate his own concrete situation to create awareness of the extent to which he might be involved in exertions of power or of care. My responses following the questions offer only a general idea of how to proceed with the investigative method; it is the work of the individual to formulate specific answers in concrete situations.

As I lay the groundwork for building an awareness of the exertions of power or of care along planes of theoretical symmetry, I understand that the method of investigation, including the specific questions, I develop in this chapter may become useful in future quantitative or qualitative research. I would consider such research valuable, especial if understood as discovering what "happened" (an exertion of power or care) in a concrete situation. The tendency to infer general principles from quantitative or qualitative research performed in limited, concrete situations conflicts with my philosophical framework in this thesis; however, my theories of power and care, ethics of candor, and investigative method to promote awareness for the sake of candor may apply in different philosophical frameworks and different fields of research.

As a final note before I continue to the list of questions and a demonstration of the investigative method, I resolve an apparent tension between this method and the theories of power and care I have developed thus far. Examination is a strategy of power-knowledge, a way of finding/creating/knowing as an exertion of disciplinary power. It seems highly problematic, therefore, to propose an investigative method to reveal exertions of power or care when the method itself may be a strategy of power-knowledge. I resolve this contradiction by emphasizing that the ethics of candor applies to one's own (or one's own group's) involvement in exertions of

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power or care. Thus the following investigative method is neither consistent with the disciplinary gaze by which a subject exerting disciplinary power finds/creates/knows the object of the exertion nor is it consistent with a caring gaze by which a one-welcoming examines an environment to ensure it is or create it to be welcoming to an investor. The intention of the investigative method is always to promote *one's own* awareness of involvement in exertions of power or care such that one may be candid about *one's own* involvement in either or both. It is a tool one ought to use to help answer questions like: Am I a subject exerting power? Am I an object upon whom power is being exerted? Am I a one-welcoming? Am I an investor for another one-welcoming? Am I involved in diffuse networks of subjection and objectification and, if so, how? The investigative method is not a tool to examine others; nor does the ethics of candor demand awareness and candor about exertions in which one is not involved. In most ethics, one cannot be "good" on another's behalf; similarly, the ethics of candor does not call for one to be candid on behalf of others. Rather it is the obligation of the ones involved to be candid. Though I intend the investigation to apply to one's own situation, I use third person pronouns throughout for the sake of readability and to present a clear picture of persons in specific situations. My specific phrasing and examples apply most directly to a teacher investigating his position in a schooling institution. However, the method may apply to anyone in any institution or community. The questions and specific lines of investigation given below are not concrete but hypothetical. The method should adapt to the concrete situation one is investigating.

On the following page is a table that organizes the initial questions according to the planes of theoretical symmetry between power and care. The rest of the chapter consists of a demonstration of the investigative method beginning with the initial questions.

Table of Investigative Questions for the Promotion of Awareness of Involvement in Exertions of Power or of Care for the Purpose of Facilitating Candor in Exertions of Power or of Care

Question Type		Question
Questions that Coincide with the Theoretical Planes of Symmetry	Plane of Symmetry	
	Micro-Physics	How is space divided or managed, and how is time scheduled?
		Why do bodies move the way they do?
	Issues of Language Including Subject/Object and Active/Passive Distinctions	What does the language used to describe or narrate what is happening reveal about what is happening? What does a careful accurate revision of the language further reveal?
	Interactions in the Intermediate Space	Is the intermediate space a dominion for power-knowledge or an accessible and welcoming space that facilitates investment? Does the act of knowledge monopolize the intermediate space or make it welcoming?
Other Questions		Are the bodies replaceable/interchangeable?
		How is danger, particularly the danger of chaos, addressed?

Micro-physics: *How is space divided or managed, and how is time scheduled?*

The investigation of an empty building can reveal much about whether it might be intended as a space of care or a carceral. Division, individuation, and specialization of spaces is evidence of disciplinary intent; cubicle office space is an excellent example. Open, versatile spaces organized for creative investment indicate a caring intent. The traditional school building, especially when empty, appears to be a carceral. Intersections of rows and columns on a seating charts define where students will be at which times. It remains only to insert any interchangeable student name. The organization and separation of desks individuates students even while collecting and containing them as a group. Classrooms separate by discipline and/or grade, and spaces within classrooms separate tasks more specifically. The place appears to be set up for the movement of automata, and the further investigation of the actual movement of bodies may confirm or deny this preliminary conclusion.

As the movement of students within individual classrooms ultimately determines how to understand the division of space, so the movement of students in other spaces within the school reveals differently functioning spaces. Students loiter in hallways and stairwells and other undefined spaces in much the same way workers in a carceral office gather at the water cooler or take smoke breaks on the sidewalk. These do not seem to be spaces of care for they lack the essential criterion of organization that facilitates creative investment. Nevertheless, what these spaces demonstrate is that even within a carceral institution persons may not always move as perfect automata. Their movements may contradict or resist the intended organization of the space. The hallways, stairwells, and lunchrooms of the carceral school are the places where students go to escape discipline, to interact, to use their own energies creatively. Persons who are not yet automata consistently find these places as places of escape or resistance.

The investigation of space may reveal the intended design of the institution as carceral or as potential place of care. One may find evidence of division, individuation, and specialization of

spaces consistent with the carceral. One may discover sightlines that transmit the disciplinary gaze; there may even be cameras. While the investigation of space alone may be informative, it is incomplete without the evidence of the movements of bodies in time, that is, the material effects on bodies in real space and time. It may be that bodies move in ways entirely different from the apparent intention built into the space.

I provide an example of the possible contrast between the way bodies move and the intended use of space, and this example further serves to emphasize why an ethics of the creative use of energy must be *post facto*, applied only after the culmination in material effects in space and time. At the beginning of my career in secondary public school teaching, a few days before the first day of classes, I set about arranging the desks in my room. I decided against the rows and columns of the "traditional" classroom. Instead I arranged the desks into a rough "U" shape such that there were three sections of twelve desks forming the two sides and the bottom of the "U," and the "U" itself opened to the front of the room. I vaguely remembered one of my favorite undergraduate teachers setting up her room this way, but that was not my primary reason for doing it (at least not my primary intentional and conscious reason). My primary reason was control. I had learned that proximity is a powerful strategy for "classroom management" (which in the context of my brief, initial training always meant control of bodies). It occurred to me that I could not be proximate to all students at once if the students were arranged in one large square of rows and columns. If I arranged them, instead, in three small groups, I could be proximate to all the students in any one of the three groups at a time. It was a simple divide-and-conquer strategy based on the hope that no more than one-third of the class would be out of control at any given time. Later in the year, my mentor teacher explained that I could control one of the three groups by standing among the desks and the other two by watching from that position and thereby "manage" the entire classroom with the combined strategies of proximity and the disciplinary gaze.

As it turned out, my first-year classroom was hardly a disciplined space. Students moved happily, playfully, and in ways that seemed both healthy and creative. At the end of the first semester, I solicited feedback from my students, and I found that students consistently approved of and liked the arrangement of the desks in particular. They wrote that facing across to see other students made the class feel more like an interactive community and that they liked it much better than being in rows all facing the same way. They felt that the arrangement facilitated discussion and student participation. The *post facto* investigation revealed that, despite my original intent, the arrangement of the desks facilitated creativity and care more than the transmission of disciplinary power. Either I had failed as subject attempting to exert disciplinary power or other strategies of care subverted my disciplinary intent. In real situations, the dual realities of power and of care exist alongside and within each other, and the same kind of investigation that promotes awareness must also reveal complexity. This complexity is more manageable if the micro-physics questions, the ones investigating space, time, and movement, are taken together rather than separately. I continue from the question concerning space to the question concerning time and then movement.

The control of movement happens through the control of space and time together. The disciplinary machine schedules time to the second. The schedule of care is determined by completion of expression and timing of interactions. The question is whether the schedule interrupts activity and divides people or whether activity determines the schedule and whether the schedule functions to bring people together.

Perhaps the most clear and obvious evidence of the school as carceral is the use and control of time. In secondary education—contrary to established theory as well as common sense—a rigid bell schedule interrupts learning and separates the class as a potential interactive learning community. Between the bells, predetermined learning activities schedule time down to minutes and seconds. "Bell-ringer" activities provide a way to control even the leftover time

between bells. "Good" teachers are expected to use the whole class time effectively. Many teachers ask questions without leaving time for students to formulate a response; when teachers do leave time, it is often a matter of seconds not minutes. The time limitation reveals that questions function as a form of behavioral control—or even simply stimulus-response interaction—rather than as a way to welcome student knowledge into the space.

As with the use of space, the students' use of time may not always align with the intended schedule. In my experience teaching, a substantial number of students function on a schedule of passing periods and lunch. They go through the school day five minutes at a time with fifty-four-minute waiting periods between. The class time before lunch serves to plan, organize, or (when communication is limited) at least think about the lunch period. (I taught at a high school with a sixty-minute open lunch.) The class time after lunch provides opportunity for group reflection on what took place at lunch. Just as students make use of undefined spaces like hallways to escape carceral space, they may function on an alternate internal schedule to escape the carceral schedule.

Micro-physics: *Why do bodies move the way they do?*

The disciplinary machine uses time and space to exercise a complete, comprehensive, and specific control over the movement of disciplined bodies. An essential question for distinguishing between the exertion of power in the form of discipline and the exertion of care is the question: why do bodies move the way they do? My theories of power and care make this opened-ended question more manageable. In a situation that may be caring, bodies move to be healthier or more comfortable, to play, to explore, and to interact with each other. Specific gestures may include settling into a more comfortable position, engaging the senses by a movement of the head or hands, freely moving the body just for the joy of doing so (e.g. skipping or dancing), or perhaps

settling against another body for the comfort of touch. Additionally, an actively and creatively engaged mind manifests itself in bodily movements including hand gestures, facial expressions, and changes in posture. By contrast, there are only two kinds of movement of bodies in a disciplinary machine: movement to conform and reactions to the pain and discomfort of forced normalization.

The traditional school setting illustrates how bodies act or react to the exertion of power as discipline. Students learn either to conform to the expectations of the disciplinary machine—to sit up straight with the head level, knees bent at a ninety-degree angle, feet on the floor or legs crossed at the thighs, and hands on the desk in front of them—or students exhibit pain and fatigue from the pressure to conform—bent spine, drooping head or head down on the desk, limp arms or restless, twitching limbs, fidgeting hands or arms wrapped around the torso defensively. There is, quite literally, little room for other movements or postures in the desk.

Not to be ignored are the larger-scale movements of bodies. The simple fact that students all walk into the same room at roughly the same time and sit in similar desks speaks volumes to the school building as carceral. Persons do not behave this way except as a result of discipline— not even herd animals act with the uniformity of students. (Cows do face, more or less, the same way when grazing on a hill, but there is hardly the appearance of uniformity.)

Physical education is also relevant and raises an interesting complication. In elementary education, recess provides an opportunity for bodies to move freely in play (or exploration or interaction or, usually, some combination of all of those). In fact, recess provides a useful baseline for how bodies move without the influence of discipline. Even the word "recess" is consistent with the concept of care happening in open and versatile space. At the same time, "recess" implies that it is a temporary break from the disciplined routine—temporary in terms of its duration and also only temporarily provided.

Recess disappears after elementary school, and formal training in sports replaces it. Sports training raises the difficult question of whether the purpose is to create automata or to increase the capacity of persons to play. Again, I assert that this distinction is not as difficult as it seems. Some forms of organized play and creative expression require rigorous training (e.g. soccer or ballet). While training to increase the capacity for play may be strenuous and exhausting, it is not miserable. The trainee moves, if not in play, towards play. Though repetition in training may not be playful, successes still bear a sense of satisfaction or accomplishment as the trainee envisions how he will play with his new skills; failures result in increased determination as the trainee is committed to play. Training in supposedly recreational activities that brings the trainee to the point of frustration, despair, and misery is consistent with the disciplinary machine. While the disciplinary system tolerates a certain degree of play in children (and even that only in a scheduled "recess"), it increasingly shifts the focus from play to discipline as the child grows up. Play in children may turn to sports in adolescence and young adulthood and eventually to fitness in adults. In the complex disciplinary machine that encompasses both the school and the factory, this progression is ideal. The child who began dancing circles during recess ends up as the adult who uses a fitness tracker to monitor his every step and heartbeat. Through a disciplinary process, movement as play turns into movement for the sake of "fitness," literally "fitting" into external ideals of health and beauty. Play is inherently exploratory and involves a relation between the body and the environment or other bodies. Fitness, what is left of bodily play after a process of discipline, is focused on the body itself and is a process of training toward normalization. While it is possible for adults to move their bodies in play as children do or to experience some of the benefits of play even in "fitness" activities, the mainstream culture of fitness functions as a gaze that controls the movements of bodies and trains them to normalization.

The investigation of movement informs and completes the investigations of space and time. Understanding the concept of micro-physics as a plane of theoretical symmetry along which both power and care move, creates a way to investigate in which kind of exertion one might be involved. More specific follow-up questions may apply to individual, concrete situations. Following are some examples of questions that may yield interesting results if the concrete situation happened to be within a traditional public school setting:

It is rather odd that thirty of my students walked into the same room over a duration of just a few minutes. Why do they all go to the same place at the same time?

Why did three students gather in a stairwell rather than go to class? Why might they find the stairwell more appealing than the classroom?

Why do students choose to eat lunch in that particular teacher's classroom? What about the space draws them there?

Why did that student lay her head down on her arms? What caused her body to move that way?

Why does that student arrive to class after other students? How is her schedule different from the bell schedule, and why is it different?

I have phrased the above researched questions carefully not as examinations of students—which would be a strategy of power-knowledge—but as reflective questions about a situation—not necessarily consistent with strategies of power or of care, only of candor. It would be likewise interesting to ask questions about teachers, administrators, and others involved in schools or similar institutions. *Why did I stop teaching when the bell rang?* strikes me as a particularly interesting question for teachers to ask themselves. Ultimately, it is up to the individual to investigate and become aware of his own concrete situation. The perspective and grammar of the questions will change upon real application, though I hope the questions and accompanying responses are sufficient to provide guidance on how to conduct an investigation

along the plane of micro-physics to promote awareness of involvement in exertions of power or of care. The following section guides toward the same kind of investigation along the plane of issues of language including subject/object and active/passive distinctions.

Issues of Language Including Subject/Object and Active/Passive Distinctions: *What does the language used to describe or narrate what is happening reveal about what is happening? What does a careful accurate revision of the language further reveal?*

The key theories I examine in this thesis include references to language patterns: Nietzsche (1909) sees the world as happenings, verbs without nouns; Foucault (1977a) introduces networks of subjection and objectification[12]; Noddings (1984) writes that the one-caring does not view the cared-for as object; and I maintain that the subject/object distinction breaks down entirely in interactions of care. Because the theories of power and care involve language patterns, a careful examination of the language used to describe or narrate what is happening—including when necessary revision of the language for accuracy—may help reveal whether one is involved in exertions of power or of care.

Power infuses English language grammar, such that the most common sentence patterns reflect power's workings. The subject-verb-object pattern of a simple sentence indicates that something is doing something to something else. To determine if the creative use of energy was an exertion of power, a close examination of grammar and language can be revealing.

Doug threw the ball.

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[12] Foucault (1977a) also discusses "discourse" prominently, and his discussion of discourse aligns with an investigation of language to reveal exertions of power or care. However, I do not include an in depth study of Foucauldian discourse within the scope of this thesis; instead, I investigate specifics of sentence patterns.

This use of energy seems to be an exertion of power. A subject (Doug) acted upon (threw) an object (ball). Here the action fits the literal definition of power from physics: Doug exerted force on the ball over a duration of time.

The executioner tortured the convict.

This sentence bears the same construction and similarly indicates an exertion of power in the literal, physical sense and in this example also in the theoretical sense. The executioner applied force to the body of the convict over a duration of time.

The King ordered the executioner to torture the convict.

This sentence has an added layer. The King is subject of the verb ordered and the executioner object; only now the executioner is also subject of the infinitive "to torture" of which the convict is object. This sentence demonstrates subjection/objectification. While there is an added layer in the ones exerting power, the exertion is still clearly an example of power in the literal, physical sense.

Attempting to reveal relationships of disciplinary power and care in sentence patterns is more complicated. While some verbs denote direct action in the physical sense, other verbs, like the verb "welcome" resist the active/passive distinction entirely (as I explain in the chapter on care). Still other verbs have meanings that are not clearly active in the physical sense nor, like "welcome," resistant to active/passive distinctions. The following sentence is a simple but difficult example:

The teacher taught the students.

The sentence pattern indicates a power relationship: a subject acts upon an object. However, the verb "teach" is not clearly active in the physical sense. In order for language to be a useful tool in an investigation of exertions of power or of care more specificity is necessary. In the concrete

situation one is examining, what it did mean that the teacher taught the students? Following are some possibilities:

The teacher offered the students knowledge.

"Offer," like "welcome" resists the subject/object and active/passive distinctions. While the subject does the "act" of offering, it is an inherently passive "act"—here the active/passive distinction breaks down—because offering transmits the active role to the ones who are being offered something (in this case, students) in that they now may actively accept or reject the offering. (The possibility of acceptance or rejection or even of ignoring the offering entirely is part of the meaning of "offer.") The language seems not to reflect an exertion of power, but only if "offer" is the correct verb and not a euphemism. The question of whether "offer" is the correct verb leads to the follow up question: *Did the students have the real options to accept, reject, or even ignore the knowledge offered by the teacher?*

If the answer is no, the language investigation requires more accurate phrasing.

The teacher required the students to accept knowledge.

The exertion of power becomes evident. The teacher is now clearly subject doing something to (evidently exerting power on) the object-students.

An additional example of this kind is useful because it is a common occurrence in the classroom:

The teacher asked the student a question.

Like the verbs "offer" and "welcome," "ask" may be inherently receptive and resistant to active/passive distinctions. However, "ask" may be a euphemism for a verbs like "interrogate" or "examine." More specific and accurate phrasing yields very different possibilities.

The teacher interrogated the student to determine if the student conformed to the expectations of normalization.

The teacher welcomed the student's knowledge into the classroom.

The first option clearly reveals an exertion of power while the second reveals an apparent exertion of care. An analysis of the language, including careful and accurate rephrasing to best reflect what is happening, may lead the investigation to other types of questions. The example leads to the question of how knowledge interactions take place over the intermediate space. Another example leads to micro-physics questions:

The students sat down. or *The students seated themselves.*

In the first sentence pattern the verb is intransitive (there is no direct object); in the second it is reflexive (the subject acts upon itself). There is no obvious indication of exertions of power or of care in the language; however, because the act involves bodily movement, the follow up question can be *Why did the students sit down?* a more specific form of *Why do bodies move the way they do?* The answers will vary according to the concrete situation, and may be revealing. Perhaps the students sat down because a bell rang or a teacher commanded them to, or perhaps they sat down because they were finished with a creative group activity or because they were curious about something the teacher was beginning to demonstrate. By a series of questions that begin with language, one may come to clear evidence of exertions of power or care.

One additional sentence construction is of particular interest:

The students were seated.

Passive verbs maintain the subject/object and active/passive distinctions and therefore may indicate an exertion of power. (*The convict was tortured by the executioner* indicates the same exertion of power as *The executioner tortured the convict.*) Passive verbs always demand the

follow up question: *by whom?* Perhaps the students seated themselves; the verb becomes reflexive. Perhaps the teacher seated the students. If the students sat down for no other reason than that a bell rang one might say: *The students were seated by the bell.* However, the goal of revision is accuracy, and this sentence personifies the bell such that it is acting as a person with a will. The bell did not will the students to sit. More accurately: *The students were seated* at *the bell. At the bell* does not indicate agency, it merely serves as an adverbial prepositional phrase indicating when the students were seated.

In many cases, it may be difficult to identify the agent of the passive verb. Passive voice construction, especially where agency is unclear, may indicate an exertion of disciplinary power where the subject exerting power has disappeared or escaped in diffuse networks of subjection and objectification. *The students were seated at the bell* serves as a simple example. It is highly unusual for people to behave in a uniform way at a signal without training. Someone commanded the students to sit at the bell, but who? The teacher may have transmitted the command, but it does not seem to be the case that individual teachers generate the command simultaneously as individuals exerting power. Some individual or group commands students to sit when bells ring, but whoever that may be is lost in networks of subjection and objectification. A similar but perhaps more important example is: *The students were required to take standardized tests.* The standardized test is a powerful disciplinary tool; it examines, measures, and ranks all at once. Again, teachers transmit the test, but they are not the source of the exertion of disciplinary power. Someone examines, measures, and ranks the students using standardized test, but the identity of that person or group disappears in networks of subjection and objectification and, often, in passive voice construction.

Examining language is not a perfect or sufficient method to reveal interactions of power or of care; however, it functions far better if one chooses precise and accurate language for what has happened. For an ethics of candor, this precision and accuracy is an obligation. People *ought*

to speak to happenings precisely and to avoid euphemism and dysphemism. In a number of ways, some of which I demonstrate, precise and accurate language may reveal evidence of exertions of power or care. This particular method of investigation aligns well with the discourse analysis research method. One might ask oneself: How do I describe what has happened? How do those descriptions reveal exertions of power or care? How do evident inaccuracies in language disguise exertions of power or care, and how might revision reveal more?

The final plane of theoretical symmetry is interactions in the intermediate space. The following investigation shifts somewhat to explore specifically how learning in the classroom may involve interactions of power or care.

Interactions in the Intermediate Space: *Is the intermediate space a dominion for power-knowledge or an accessible and welcoming space that facilitates investment? Does the act of knowledge monopolize the intermediate space or make it welcoming?*

The traditional understanding of teaching is the transmission of knowledge from teacher to student as a kind of gift from the teacher that empowers the student. Knowledge, in this paradigm, is an abstract substance that may be possessed and gifted. Through the lens of the creative use of energy, knowledge is not a substance but the result of an interaction through the intermediate space of reality creation. The teacher—in the traditional sense as so-called giver of knowledge— invests her knowledge (as an act of power-knowledge) through the intermediate space such that the students must accept it. The inner reality of the "giver" of knowledge conquers, dominates, and monopolizes the shared intermediate space. Domination through power-knowledge is the essential functioning of teaching as transmission of knowledge, and the test is an examination, an interrogation to ensure that the power-knowledge has pushed out any

alternate inner realities. Teaching of this kind results in an intermediate space that is increasingly narrow, uniform, and inaccessible except to the one exerting power-knowledge.

It should be no great surprise nor any mystery that students often have a diminishing capacity for creativity as they progress through traditional schooling. What the schooling process labels "mastery of content" on the part of the student may be the ceding of the intermediate space to the inner reality of the curriculum transmitted by the teacher. This kind of mastery of content sacrifices the student's creative capacity. The individual student may become increasingly capable of executing commands but decreasingly capable of investing the intermediate space with his own reality, decreasingly capable of accessing this space of play. In short, he progresses toward becoming automaton because traditional teaching as the transmission of knowledge aligns closely with the enactment of power-knowledge as a strategy of the exertion of disciplinary power.

Not all education necessarily includes this kind of teaching. I reiterate that a reality of care exists alongside and within the carceral reality. The initial and essential act of care is welcoming, creating and organizing space. With respect to the sharing of knowledge, "wonder" is a kind of welcoming. The term "wonder" breaks down the very concept of knowledge "transmission" in much the same way welcoming breaks down the active/passive and subject/object distinctions. Wonder is related to welcoming in that both expand the intermediate space and make it more accommodating and inviting. Wonder is the investment of inner reality upon the intermediate space in the form of a question. Jerome Bruner (1986) provides an illustration as he recalls one of his chemistry teachers who said, "It is a very puzzling thing not that water turns to ice at 32 degrees Fahrenheit, but that it should change from a liquid into a solid" (p. 126). The teacher formulates the question (though not grammatically as such): why should water change from a liquid to a solid at all? Bruner (1986) explains that this teacher was "inviting [him] to extend [*his*] world of wonder to encompass *hers*. She was not just *informing*

[him]. She was, rather, negotiating the world of wonder and possibility" (p. 126). Note the stark contrast between the examination question, "At what temperature does water to ice?" and the wondering, "It is a very puzzling thing that water should change from a liquid to a solid." The examination question is behavioral—stimulus response—and therefore tests for normalization; it is one of the strategies of disciplinary power. Has the inner reality that includes scales of Fahrenheit temperatures effectively dominated and monopolized the intermediate space and pushed out any alternate inner reality of the students'? The second question (or wondering statement) acts entirely differently; it both opens and organizes the intermediate space. The teacher shares a question of genuine wonder with the students, inviting them into an expanded intermediate space, a space to wonder why liquid water turns solid. The question also organizes the space by creating some limitations and directions. The teacher does not simply give the students buckets of ice water and let them engage in entirely undirected play. (There is a place for undirected play, but it is not the same as a welcoming act of knowledge sharing.) The specific question of liquids turning to solids sets parameters on the play and invites the students to explore a specific problem. Here lies the function of teaching as an act of welcoming, that is, teaching as an exertion of care: the teacher expands and organizes the intermediate space and in so doing invites the students to wonder, explore, and formulate. This formulation may occur as individuals, together as a group of students, or potentially with the teacher, as her wonder was genuine and she, too, needs to explore and formulate.

Concerning interactions in the intermediate space, the invitation to wonder is immediately and easily distinguishable from examination to ensure domination of power-knowledge. This distinction is particularly important for teachers who wish (as they ought) to be aware of whether they are exerting power or care through their teaching. The teacher might ask himself questions like the following:

Did I know the answer to the question I asked the students?

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If yes, the teacher was not genuinely wondering. He might have been inviting the students to wonder, but he was not wondering with them. If the teacher did not know the answer to the question, he may have been wondering with the students, and, most importantly, he used the question to make room in the intermediate space for the investment of the students' knowledge. The students had the opportunity to contribute knowledge from their inner realities into and through the intermediate, cultural space.

Did I expect the students to know the answer to the question I asked?

If the answer is yes, and particularly if the teacher also knows the answer, the question almost certainly served as an examination to ensure domination of power-knowledge. The teacher essentially communicated to the student, "I know this. You should know this. I am making sure you do." If the answer is no, the implication is that the teacher expected the students to formulate their own answers, perhaps individually or in groups. There arose the possibility for wonder and sharing in the intermediate space (provided, of course, there was sufficient time).

As I have indicated, wonder and the sharing of inner realities in the intermediate space makes a cultural space. Domination of power-knowledge monopolizes the space such that it is creative only for the one exerting power, and others have diminishing access to the intermediate space. Changes to the intermediate space resulting from exertions of power or care cause changes to the entire group dynamic.

Changes in the group dynamic offer an additional point of investigation within the context of interactions in the intermediate space. Exertions of disciplinary power increasingly normalize individuals resulting in a composition of the forces of docile and useful bodies who are decreasingly capable of investing the intermediate space with their inner realities. Furthermore, ranking, a strategy of disciplinary power, increasingly defines relationships between bodies by networks of subjection and objectification. In a community of care, the subject/object distinction

breaks down and relationships are defined by sharing of the intermediate space. Care builds greater capacity for welcoming and investment in both the ones-welcoming and the investors. An increasingly open and accessible intermediate space allows for greater creative capacity and greater individuality both of which contribute to the group culture. These distinctions lead to more follow up questions:

Did the group (or class) develop their own culture developed from the inner realities of all members? An affirmative answer is a good indication of a caring community. A negative answer may lead to the additional question of whether or not there was an opportunity for *all* group members to share the intermediate space.

Did some students have regular and substantial access to the intermediate space while others seemed to have little or rare access? Determining whether a person had no access to the intermediate space or simply chose not to invest his inner reality through it is admittedly difficult. However, the act of welcoming expands and organizes the intermediate space to facilitate investment. As a basic premise for this entire thesis, creativity is natural and fundamental; therefore, investing one's inner reality through the intermediate space occurs naturally if the intermediate space is sufficiently welcoming. In theory, a sufficient act of welcoming should always lead to the investor's investment of inner reality, but there may be factors involved that are beyond the influence of the one-welcoming. If, for example, the schooling process has disciplined a student into a nearly perfect automaton, a single welcoming act of teacher may not necessarily lead to the student investing inner reality through the intermediate space (though this is, of course, possible). Separately, the division of space and (in secondary schooling) groups by subject may result in a kind of ranking by which students who feel "good at" a subject more routinely invest their inner realities through the intermediate space compared to students who feel "bad at" the same subject. The presence of a group culture and the extent to which all group members contribute may indicate exertions of care within the group, and cultural limitations—

including limitations of both the quantity and quality of participation—may indicate exertions of power.

By contrast, a group may develop a dynamic of uniform obedience similar to that of a military unit. This dynamic is a clear indication of the exertion of disciplinary power. It is worth noting that a group may function at one moment with a distinct culture, for example during a class discussion, and then shift suddenly to uniform obedience, if, continuing the example, the closing bell suddenly interrupts the class discussion. The realities of power and of care exist alongside and within each other, and these realities may be manifest alternatingly or even simultaneously in different ways. Even while the micro-physics of power contain and control the bodies of students, a teacher may ask a "wonder"ful question that welcomes their inner realities into and through the intermediate space. The realities of power and of care are more complicated than any one plane of theoretical symmetry. To offer a means of further investigation, I continue with two additional questions that do not correspond directly with any of the planes of theoretical symmetry but that are nevertheless useful in distinguishing between exertions of power and of care.

Other Questions: *Are the bodies replaceable/interchangeable?*

In the disciplinary machine the technology of replaceable parts increases efficiency and necessarily requires the monopolization of creative energy and the domination of the intermediate space. The parts are replaceable and interchangeable because the machine reduces the persons to bodies with no inner reality. If one body dies or leaves, another replaces it with little functional disruption.

A community of care, on the other hand, results in an increasingly accessible intermediate space and thereby in the increase of creative capacity and creative expression in

individuals. The inner reality of each member of the community is an essential part of the culture; therefore, the members are irreplaceable persons rather than replaceable and interchangeable bodies. A community of care undergoes fundamental and permanent change if it loses one of its members. Healthy families experience this change when a family member passes away, especially if the passing is sudden and unexpected. The community of care may, and often should, fail to function as a machine. The group should "break down" and change when a member leaves.

To understand if one is involved in a group defined by the exertion of power, a disciplinary machine, or a group defined by the exertion of care, one may ask if the people are replaceable. I pose these questions in the form a teacher may ask them:

Are my students replaceable/interchangeable?

While a caring teacher may imagine that the students are not interchangeable, in fact, students routinely transfer in and out of classrooms with little disruption to the workings of the class. Not even the death of a student halts the functioning of the school; rather, a new task, grieving, requires a new space, perhaps the counselors' office, and the school-machine continues to work maintaining maximum efficiency with the minimum possible adaptation. This perspective reveals the school as a disciplinary machine. However, it may be that students are, in a sense, irreplaceable as parts of smaller groups within the school. Before I address that perspective, I add another question the teacher may ask himself

Is the teacher replaceable and interchangeable with other teachers?

In the traditional school, the teacher is as replaceable as the student. From the perspective of an entire school building, very little changes if a teacher is absent for a day, a semester, a year, or even if a teacher leaves or dies. A substitute replaces the teacher immediately and the machine continues working with some adaptation; a short time later, a sufficiently similar (i.e. equally

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qualified) replacement comes, and all returns to normal (and the machine continues the work of normalization). The development of "teacher-proof" curricula further demonstrates the replaceability of teachers. While an individual teacher may develop his own curriculum or substantially modify a given curriculum, the removal of that individual teacher does not stop the functioning of the classroom; some other material is found or generated (by whom it may not be clear) and some similar enough body stands in to deliver it.

From a different perspective, the experience of individuals within the school may be fundamentally changed by the loss of another student or a teacher. A class may appear to function with little interruption after such a loss, but the individuals within the class may understand the loss to be a defining factor that changes the class permanently. The fact that the school does not shutdown or fundamentally change the way a family might is evidence that the institution is a disciplinary machine. However, the fact that the experience of individuals within the machine does fundamentally change is evidence of exertions of care even within the disciplinary machine. In order for the question of the replaceability and interchangeability of parts to be useful in awareness of exertions of power or care, the individual must explore the question from multiple perspectives, potentially revealing different answers and different exertions of energy.

Following is one additional question to help distinguish between exertions of power and of care. While the question is relevant to most organized institutions, it is particularly relevant to education and addresses specifically the possible contention that power and care must exist simultaneously in a school.

Other questions: *How is danger particularly the danger of chaos addressed?*

As power and care are not binary opposites, it is possible to argue that schooling should include both care and disciplinary power, as it now often does. Discipline may be for the good of

students, for their protection, to reduce chaos. To be sure, chaos is antithetical to both care and discipline; however, care and discipline do not confront chaos in the same way nor is one dependent on the other to provide a reasonably safe and ordered environment.

Discipline reduces chaos by controlling space, time, and movement and through surveillance, a disciplinary gaze. In a disciplinary paradigm, individual inner realities and individual creativity are sources of chaos. The disciplinary machine eliminates such chaos. In the disciplined institution, persons become bodies without thought or will, and bodies have nothing to do except to execute commands. The disciplinary response to chaos is to ensure that a body may move in one specified way at one specified time in one specified space.

Where discipline reduces potential movement, care orders it. The one-welcoming manages and negotiates both the intermediate space and, as a result, the physical space to facilitate play, exploration, and creative expression. Management and negotiation include boundaries that reduce the space to avoid an overwhelming sense of disequilibrium. However, these boundaries are not imposed as walls. Rather, the one-welcoming organizes spaces to accommodate the needs of the investor such that the boundary is between the organized space that facilitates investment and the unorganized space beyond. The key distinction between how care and discipline organize space to avoid chaos returns to how and why bodies move. Disciplined bodies are limited in movement by all the places they cannot go and the one place they can, the times they cannot go there and the one time they can, the time it takes to get there, and the moves they make to get there within a particular time. In an increasingly efficient disciplinary machine, the options for where to go and what to do approach exactly one. In a community of care, persons move according to what they want to do and where they want to explore but within boundaries that facilitate play and exploration.

Conventional wisdom assumes that the disciplinary method of reducing chaos is the only possible efficient and cost-effective method. I do not take this wisdom to be necessarily correct.

Both the disciplinary method and the caring method confront the plethora of creative inclinations of persons within the machine or community. The disciplinary method must prevent all actions except one, the action that obeys the command; the caring method must provide outlets for creative inclinations and negotiate resulting activity. It may be that prevention is as difficult as providing reasonable outlets that remain consistent with a caring environment. Winnicott (1971) asserts that "growing up is an inherently aggressive act" and that childhood and adolescent inner realities include fantasies of death and murder (p. 195). An absolutely essential part of being a receptive, adult one-welcoming is allowing a child or adolescent investor to experience immaturity as "an essential element of health" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 198). The ordering of the intermediate space must include room for aggressive assertions of power as part of the natural maturational processes. Because welcoming does not mean ceding control or allowing domination, care may be an effective means to create an ordered space for maturation even maturation that includes aggressive exertions of power.

The question of how danger and chaos are addressed may lead to further investigative questions such as the following (again posed from the perspective of a teacher):

Do my safety/control measures reduce possible movements to just one correct movement or do they encourage a wide range of movements that are not dangerous or chaotic?

Is there some reasonable accommodation for movements/actions that are dangerous, chaotic, or aggressive within boundaries?

Do the boundaries limit what is inside such that the space is only this inside, or do the boundaries expand what is inside such that the space is everything but what is outside?

As a brief illustration I offer responses to these questions returning to the particular situation of a student in a desk (which I addressed briefly in the micro-physics, movement section). While desks may be part of a strategy to avoid students standing in clusters and pushing, hitting, or

otherwise engaging in chaotic activity, the desk limits movement and posture to one correct (and just a few additional incorrect) options. The traditional desk offers no accommodation (reasonable or otherwise) for acts of aggression as part of maturation. Even recent developments such as replacing the chairs with inflated balls or adding pedals (like those of an exercise bike) to the bottom of the desk only add a few options for movement. The desk of any kind is a boundary that limits the student to be "only here." By contrast, a welcoming space might invite students to be "anywhere but there." The illustration of the desk may apply to boundaries and limitations of all kinds, especially those that are purportedly for the purpose of safety or reasonable order.

The investigative questions covered in this chapter should elucidate a method by which one may examine one's actions and circumstances in order to determine if one is involved in exertions of power or of care. While I have focused on the context of schooling and the position of teaching, I expect that any individual may use the method and adjust the phrasing of the questions for his particular position and institution. I emphasize again that the investigation is *post facto* and limited in application to concrete situations concerning oneself. The goal is awareness of one's own involvement in exertions of power or care such that one may (and ought to) choose to be intentional and candid concerning those involvements. The question that follows below is somewhat separate from the investigative questions in the rest of this chapter. It is a question particular to education the response to which leads to a necessary connection between ethics, education, and economics.

For what kind of success are students being educated?

One final important consideration of educating by the exertion of power or by the exertion of care is the question of what sort of system the students will become part of after their schooling is finished. The reason both power and care become networks is because both are self-

perpetuating. Part of an ethics of candor is not only a method of investigating specific, concrete interactions but also investigating valuation at the systemic level, that is, economics. Are exertions of power economically valuable or are exertions of care? I proceed to an explanation of an economy of power and an economy of care. The economies of both are particularly relevant to the issue of discipline or training for the good of the student. Like Dewey (1897), I hold that education is a useful social experience in and of itself (Article 2, para. 1) which also "bring[s] the child to share in the inherited resources of [society] and to use his own powers for social ends" (Article 2, para. 1). There is a necessary connection between the social system of the schooling environment and the social system the child enters afterward; therefore, there is necessarily a severe conflict in educating students by care for participation in an economy of power (and vice versa). The final crucial question is: into which kind of economy do students graduate and for which kind of economic should schooling/education prepare them?

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIES OF POWER AND OF CARE

In this chapter I briefly investigate of economies of power and of care. While the purpose fits under the broad umbrella of the ethics of candor—one ought to understand whether one is involved in and potentially educating others to be involved in an economy of power or of care— the investigation is somewhat separate from the rest of this thesis and is intended specifically for educators. The ethics of candor demand that educators ought to be aware of and intentional and candid about the creative use of energy[13] as power or as care in education and schooling. I am well aware that many educators may take the additional step of trying to change or influence their involvement in power or in care (though the ethics of candor does not explicitly call for change). This chapter is devoted to educators who—having achieved a level of awareness and candor— may wish to change the underlying ethics of education to promote power or care. For such educators, I raise the important and difficult problem of the connection between ethics, education, and economics.

Wealth and Ethics

As I briefly address an economy of power and an economy of care, the essential question is the relation between wealth and ethics. What is valuable such that it becomes monetarily

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[13] The shorthand for "creative use of energy that takes a willful direction resulting in concrete effects in real space and time" is "exertion."

valuable? Because I do not focus on economics as an academic field, I provide only a few basics to help clarify the relation between the economies of power and care and ethics of power and care such that a change-oriented educator may see the relation and be aware of the resulting difficulties. I set forth five fundamental assumptions: 1) wealth has a currency; 2) one may trade that currency for goods and services; 3) such necessary goods (as food) and services (as rudimentary medical care) have inherent value because survival has inherent value; 4) the society's ethics determine the value of non-essential goods and services; 5) the existing economy is constructed on a valuation of exertions of power rather than care. Although I describe the power economy that exists, I only envision the care economy as a hypothetical what-may-be.

The Advantage-Taking Economy

Bodies, Labor, and Wealth

In previous chapters, I juxtapose Orwell's (1949a) conception of power's purpose as power and Foucault's (1977a) concept of power-knowledge exerted as discipline for the purpose of creating docile, useful bodies. While the control of bodies is consistent with power's purpose as power, the concept of "useful" bodies begs the question: useful for what purpose? In this section, I draw a connection between power's purpose as power and the purpose of creating bodies that are useful for the production of saleable goods and services. If the disciplinary machine is profitable, it exerts power for the sake of power in two ways: 1) it directly controls the bodies that make up the machine, and 2) in generating profit, it controls wealth where wealth is an abstraction of the movement of bodies outside the machine. The disciplinary machine has a dual function for a single purpose: the control of bodies, that is, the exertion of power. I have explained how the disciplinary machine directly controls the bodies that make up its parts; in this

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section, I explain how the production of goods and services for profit is a form of controlling bodies outside the machine, and I do so by connecting power over the body to wealth to currency.

In *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith (1861) premises all value is labor value. I take this premise as fundamental at least for a power economy (and possibly for all economies). Labor is the one real measure of exchangeable value for all commodities; rich or poor is determined by "the quantity of that labor which [one] can command or afford to purchase…The real price of every thing…is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth…is the toil and trouble which it can save to [one]self, and which it can impose upon other people" (Smith, 1861, p. 33). Smith's premise leads to the understanding that the real value of all things derives from real bodies moving in concrete time and space (i.e. labor). For example, an apple's value originates from the movement required to pick it from a tree even if this movement is substantially removed in time and space from a transaction involving the apple. If an apple were to fall from a tree into one's lunch pack, it would be free. That which requires no labor to produce, procure, or secure—e.g. rainwater or sunlight—is free. All else has a value, the value of the labor required to produce, procure, and/or secure it. Adding to Smith's premise, I posit that labor measures exchangeable value.[14]

All value is labor value, and wealth is an abstraction of labor. I carefully define "abstraction" not as distance in space and/or time but as removal from space and/or time. I assert that wealth is not an abstraction of labor because it allows for trading labor value over substantial distances and durations but an abstraction of labor value because wealth removes labor value from time and space. Although labor is the "first price, the original purchase-money," economies do not function on a labor standard because labor is difficult to measure (p. 34). Though one measures labor costs in "man-hours," one measures labor price in currency, an abstract, measurement-standard that functions alongside market fluctuations. Wealth in the form of

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[14] In this brief framing of a power economy, I do not delve into issues of intellectual property though these issues clearly relate to the concept of intellectual labor.

currency allows for a true abstraction of labor. It is possible to accumulate hundreds of hours of human labor in a bank account or, for that matter, under a mattress. It is possible to hold labor performed in the past for use in the future. Wealth abstracts labor and currency concretizes the abstracted labor into an exchangeable substance.

Under social contract theory, the premise for individuals coming together to form a society is mutual advantage (Nussbaum, 2007, p. 4). Laborers benefit when they are able to exchange their labor—that is, their labor abstracted in the form of wealth—with others. When exchanging labor, each individual benefits from the special skills of all other individuals. Labor exchange separates labor from the laborer. While this separation ideally occurs through fair trade, it may occur through exploitation, i.e. theft of labor value. This possible exploitation is central to Marx's (1888) critique of capitalism. Because all value is ultimately labor value, the laborers themselves are "a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market" (p. 18). Marx's conception of the laborer as commodity is consistent with a materialist framework. The bodily movement in concrete space and time is the real humanity of the laborers such that exploitation of labor value is exploitation of laborers themselves.

The power economy includes several strategies—the "vicissitudes of competition" and the "fluctuations of the market" among them—to justify and even facilitate monopolizing labor value and separating labor value from the laborer. A competition-based economy validates not only exchange for mutual advantage but more specifically exchange for advantage-taking. Market fluctuations are a means by which one may exchange as little as possible of one's own labor for as much as possible of another's. One may begin to accumulate others' labor under one's own control in the abstract form of currency. In a competition-based system one *ought* to take every advantage and to accumulate maximum stores. The *ought* of competition and advantage-taking is where an ethics of power manifests in an advantage-taking economy.

Private property and rent value, including interest as rent on wealth, are further strategies for accumulating labor in the abstract form of wealth which emerges as power exercised to control persons. Private property allows for rent; permanent control over the products of labor permits exchanging temporary control over the products of labor for wealth.

The Control of Bodies

Abstracting labor into an exchangeable substance (wealth as currency) allows for the exertion of power—i.e. the creative use of energy to control or manipulate persons against their wills—in two ways. First, the disciplinary machine may function to control labor. Foucault (1977a) notes that the transition from a penal system of torture to a penal system of discipline aligns with power in the body of the king transitioning to power in the property of society (p. 108). The disciplinary machine does not simply destroy persons who attack the property; it punishes them by correcting them into docile bodies, that is, normalizing them. Foucault writes, "the prison has an economic effect"; it produces "individuals mechanized according to the general rules of an industrial society" (p. 241). Even in a system without penal, forced labor, "the labour by which a convict contributes to his own needs turns the thief into a docile worker" (p. 243). Through the control of space, time, and movement, the disciplinary machine creates docile bodies whose labor may be normalized and controlled. As a power strategy, discipline functions to control "man-hours." Additionally, the disciplinary machine may cause docile bodies to produce saleable goods and services. The factory most directly serves this function though the prison may through penal servitude and the school indirectly as a pipeline to the factory (or the prison). Through the profitable exchange of goods and services those in control of the disciplinary machine (and these subjects may be difficult to identify as they disappear in the diffuse networks of subjection and objectification) also have the opportunity to accumulate wealth. Profitable exchange is a means by which the disciplinary machine may control bodies

(specifically, the abstracted labor of bodies as wealth) who may be entirely outside the direct control of the disciplinary machine. The disciplinary machine, therefore, is a tool for the control of bodies within the machine through the micro-physics of power as well as the control of bodies outside the machine through profitable exchange leading to the accumulation of labor abstracted as wealth.

Given the dual function of disciplinary power to control bodies through the control of labor, I posit that an economy of power is an economy of advantage-taking and ultimately an economy of exploitation. Among the clearest and most direct examples of a power economy, the American slave system stands out. White Americans in power combined the direct control of bodies through both torture and discipline with the strategy of personal property such that the body itself became personal property. Rather than controlling bodies through abstracting labor as wealth, the slave system involved the direct control of bodies as property such that slave owners controlled both the labor and the abstract value of the potential to produce labor (the rent value of the slaves' bodies).

The current economy of power is gentler, exerting power more often as discipline than torture, and the gentler economy includes new and subtle means that lead to nearly comprehensive control of labor value and of bodies themselves. Personal property allows for the control of wealth through rent or interest, and the strategy of compound interest allows for exponentially more effective control. The corporate structuring of labor creates a diffuse network of ownership (i.e. diffuse networks of subjects exerting power and controlling bodies). The diffuse networks of ownership separate the individual owners as persons and at the same time consolidate them only as owners such that the only will of the corporation of consolidated owners is the will to profit (i.e. to control not only the labor of those working for the corporation but also the labor value of bodies outside the corporation). The laborers' retirement system based on shares of corporate stock ensures the laborers have a personal and selfish interest in shareholder

profit. The laborer who wants to see his retirement account grow roots for the exploitation of his own labor. In the periods of time when the laborer is not under the direct control of the disciplinary machine (usually evenings, weekends, and vacations), a culture of advertising and consumption creates the laborer as consumer. In an increasing number of consumer transactions, the corporations as disciplinary machines again profit. When the laborer spends the wages of his labor, the corporation extracts labor value in the form of profit. At every moment, the gentler economy of disciplinary power enacts means to control the labor value and the bodies of laborers.

Among the most ingenious recent developments of the power economy is the for-profit prison. Foucault saw prison labor as a way to capture and exploit the labor of deviant persons resistant to discipline, that is, persons who resisted becoming docile and useful bodies. The for-profit prison is a more effective and efficient way of doing the same thing. It is no longer essential to turn the convict into a laborer, a useful body; it is sufficient merely to render him a docile body. The for-profit prison functions to recycle the value of persons who could not be both docile and useful (or who were not allowed to be useful) by making them at least docile. Especially poignant, the separation of persons that may become both docile and useful from those that may only be docile begins early in the disciplinary machine of the school system. In a power economy, school prepares students to become docile and useful laborers who may be exploited or at least docile bodies who may provide value through the for-profit prison system. By a variety of strategies—from compound interest to the for-profit prison system—the economy of disciplinary power exercises increasingly comprehensive control over bodies.

The Ethics of Power and the Advantage-Taking Economy

A power economy is based on advantage, specifically advantage-taking through the accumulation of wealth where wealth is an abstraction of labor. In this economy, the

accumulation of wealth is an economic good; therefore, the control of persons through the control of labor in this economy is also an ethical good. The economic rules that one ought to pay as little as possible for the best possible labor and, on the consumer end, that one ought to get the highest quantity and quality of goods or services at the lowest price derives from the ethical rule that one ought to exert power over others. The ethics and economics of power—including both the direct control of bodies and the exertion of power-knowledge that finds bodies to be both docile and useful—are indivisible.

In his essay "Privilege, Power, Difference, and Us," Alan Johnson (2001)—whose personal ethics seem to align more closely with care than power—realizes the connection between an advantage-taking economy and an ethics of power through his reaction to playing the board game Monopoly:

> I used to play Monopoly, but I don't anymore because I don't like the way I behave when I do. Like everyone else, as a Monopoly player I try to take everything from the other players—all their money, all their property—which then forces them out of the game. The point of the game is to ruin everyone else and be the only one left in the end. When you win, you feel good, because you're *supposed* to feel good. (p. 61)

Whenever I see the word "supposed," I always ask "supposed by whom?" In this case the ethics of the society suppose the economically successful ought to feel good about their success. Economics is a valuation system where an increase or accumulation of value determines success, and ethics determines which economic interactions are valuable and successful. The relation between the meanings of "good," "value," and "success" results in the in the inextricable intertwining of ethics and economics.

An economy of power and an ethics of power function together, but their functional unity does not exclude the possibility of exertions of care within an ethics/economy of power. I have

noted that power and care exist as separate realities alongside each other. There is a place for care in an economy of power, but it has a negative value. Consistent with receptivity/welcoming and care as space-creating, care, in the power economy, is a deficit, an expense, and it necessarily ought (in both the economic and ethical sense) to be reduced to a minimum. The framing of the United States' basic rights evidences care as an undesirable expense. Nussbaum (2007) points out that most of the rights are framed in the negative (p. 291). There are few positive guarantees, only guarantees against the active infringement of rights. Further evidence is in the pay attached to different labor. Much of the work of ones-caring is entirely unpaid. Professions focused on care, even those that require substantial education and expertise such as social work and teaching, pay little compared to professions that facilitate the exploitation and accumulation of labor. There is no value placed on a standard of care beyond the minimum required to keep bodies alive. The power economy prevents starvation but widely tolerates and even promotes food insecurity.

Those who envision education as a care-driven process should take some comfort in the low level of educator salaries. The power economy views education, for the most part, as a deficit, an expense to be minimized. In a power economy, the only justification for the expenditure of wealth is as an investment in the increasing exertion of power. Because it is difficult to demonstrate clearly and directly how education serves to exert power, educators do not earn substantial wealth. There are exceptions to this rule. The science, technology, engineering, and mathematics disciplines pay substantially more than the humanities especially at higher levels of education. These disciplines more closely align with the needs of corporations which are devices for the control of labor and ultimately the exertion of power.

Having clarified the connection between power ethics and the power economy through strategies that control bodies both directly and indirectly through profit, the accumulation of bodies' labor value in the abstract, I turn briefly to formulate a care economy. My formulation is admittedly incomplete, as there is no obvious existing model from which to develop or to which I

might refer for examples. I set out only the beginnings of what an economy of care might look like including some fundamental differences from the existing economy of power.

Economy of Care

Although the power economy is rooted in advantage, a care economy must not be rooted in its opposite, disadvantage. A care economy is fundamentally different from a power economy so I begin my formulation of a care economy by exploring a basic foundation for coming together as a societal alternate to advantage-taking. After critiquing social contract theories that hold that the basis for interaction is mutual advantage, Martha Nussbaum (2006) offers the alternative approach that a sufficient minimum standard of human dignity for each and all persons should be the source of political and social interaction (p. 70). Taking Noddings' (1984) position that relatedness is natural,[15] I go one step further to reject the hypothetical state of nature entirely. While social contract theorists did not intend to state literally that humans began as separate individuals and faced the decision to remain apart or come together, the framing of the question, "Why ought we to be together in the first place?" suggests that not being together is possible. Further, the conclusion that people come together for mutual advantage suggests that the individual human being, alone, may survive sufficiently well and may demand additional advantage from relating to others. Humans are relational beings by nature and do not survive consistently or well alone. An economy of care begins by acknowledging this nature, and proceeds from the question: "We are all certainly and necessarily together, how (not why) ought we to be together?" Nussbaum's (2006) capabilities approach seems to be a good step toward an economy of care. Although part of the reason she offers an alternative to the social contract

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[15] As I hope was clear in the section explaining Noddings' ethics of care, I do *not* accept relatedness as premise for why care is "good"; I *do,* however, accept that relatedness is natural to human existence.

theory is better to address "issues about the allocation of care, the labor involved in caring" (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 33), she does not go so far as to imagine a fundamentally different economy.

Even Smith's (1861) premise that value derives from labor must fundamentally change in a care economy because power labor and care labor must be fundamentally different. Wealth in the power economy is the ability to control labor and power labor is producing, procuring, and/or securing goods. By contrast, care labor must involve a welcoming interaction and an investment of inner reality through the intermediate space resulting in material effects in concrete space and time; therefore, care labor is inherently relational. It is difficult to imagine a wealth or currency system based on welcoming and investment. One might say something like, exertions of care justify the greater allocation of resources to the ones-welcoming. The ones-welcoming continue their acts of welcoming and continue to use the resources in exertions of care. Put differently, an economy of care might be an economy of space, where individuals and society in general owe labor and resources to welcoming spaces and to ones-welcoming. The caring actions that result from the welcoming and investment of the caring interaction are the most basic form of labor and therefore of value. Value derives from the empty space where the gift-just-given used to be.

Perhaps such a system would be open to exploitation. Some may pose as ones-welcoming for the advantage of controlling resources. There is already evidence of this trend in non-profit and governmental corruption. Exploitation and corruption of caring interactions is evidence of an ethics of power at work. It is a mistake to dismiss a hypothetical care economy based on corruption stemming from a power ethics. Ethics and economics are inextricably linked; therefore, a hypothetical care economy assumes a pervasive care ethics. It is impossible to envision a care economy in a society with a prevailing ethics of power, and yet it is difficult to imagine a society that rejects advantage-taking as a good. Steinbeck (1954) hints at a person's perspective when speaking from an ethics of care to those abusing or exploiting a care economy: "I hate a law that stifles generosity and makes charity good business…I don't mind taxes, God

knows! But I do mind the kind of law that makes of charity not the full warmness of sharing but stinking expediency" (pp. 435–436). The "good" in "good business" refers to the ethics of power that proscribes "expediency," profit, and ultimately controlling wealth as a form of controlling bodies. The economic good is rooted in the ethical good. From an ethics of care perspective, these "goods" must be rejected for the alternate "goods" of "charity" and "the full warmness of sharing." A care economy can only exist with a corresponding ethics of care that values such goods as "charity" and the "full warmness of sharing." If the goods of power (advantage-taking and the control of wealth/bodies) are still desirable, it is impossible for a care economy to develop. A hypothetical ethical shift necessarily accompanies a hypothetical economic shift, difficult to imagine as both may be.

It is still more difficult to imagine how a currency system by which caring labor could be abstracted and exchanged. It may well be that a care economy would have no currency system. Abstracting labor value is a strategy to control labor value, and controlling labor value is contrary to the ethics and economics of care. If there were a currency system of some kind, it would be fundamentally different from the current system in at least one important way. The economic strategies of power function to control labor and ultimately bodies; many of these strategies—human chattel slavery and compound interest are two notable examples—create and increase wealth viscosity. They adjust the system such that controlling wealth makes it much easier to control more wealth. Wealth viscosity and the strategies and technologies that produce it are obstacles to care; they are forces against which care must work as ones-welcoming seek to provide the investors—that is those who will invest the intermediate space with their inner realities—with necessary labor and resources. Greatly reduced wealth viscosity would also lead to a much more equitable distribution of resources. Combined with an ethics of care, it is reasonable to expect that the equitable distribution of resources resulting from zero or minimal wealth viscosity could provide a sufficient standard of dignity for all persons.

Phrases like "equitable distribution of resources" no doubt sound Marxist so I present a differentiation between Marxist economics and care economics. Marx's (1888) economic priority is the laborer's retention of his own labor value by the overthrow of the bourgeois system that exploits his labor's value. Marx formulates an economy of not-being-taken-advantage-of in reaction to the advantage-taking economy of capitalism. Though Marxist economics resists advantage-taking it is still ultimately attached to advantage-taking and an ethics of power. It is not surprising, therefore, that a revolution of not-being-taken-advantage-of turned into an alternately structured advantage-taking economy. The economics and ethics were still centered on who might take advantage of whom. By contrast, a care economy can only develop with and from a prevailing ethics of care. Without the prevailing ethics of care, it is impossible to construct a care economy in any detail.

One hint at what might be a general element of a care economy is the way art disrupts value in a power economy. Art is a product of aesthetic expression and creativity which are natural and fundamental (returning to an original premise of my thesis). As such, the control of bodies works contrary to the generation of art. Automata do not produce art. The existing power economy has no way to value the production or procurement of art. It is "priceless." On black markets, fine art functions as currency; it may be exchanged for valuable goods or services but never consumed. In a power economy, the only monetary value that attaches to art is the labor to secure it. Public access to art has little or no monetary value. (Museums often have only nominal fees, especially considering the "value" of the art within.) Monetary value attaches to art only when it becomes private (or in reverse when it goes from private to public). In a power economy, the value of art is in keeping others from it and in exclusive, private experience. This valuation of art is perfectly consistent with the monopolization of the intermediate space that happens through exertions of power-knowledge. An economy of care may value art and other forms of aesthetic expression in an inverse way. Expanding and facilitating access to the intermediate space and the

resulting products of art and culture would have value so long as both the creative/cultural space and the resulting products were open to public access. One might imagine (difficult though it may be) that public museums and art centers of all kinds would be the "banks," the places that hold the wealth, of the care economy. I reiterate that it is impossible to formulate a complete care economy from within a power economy. I conclude my partial formulation with a reminder of the purpose of this chapter: to demonstrate the necessary connection between ethics and economics and education. Having connected ethics and economics, I proceed to connect education to both.

Education, Ethics, and Economics

I offer only a brief and rough sketch of an economy of care as a precursor to this essential point: if public schooling is to prepare students for participation in society after completion, the ethics underlying that schooling and the economy must align. Students cannot at once be educated in a community of care with an underlying ethics of care and be schooled to succeed in the current economy of power. Care does not and cannot serve the function of controlling persons; therefore, care does not and cannot take advantage nor can it be profitable. Johnson (2001) uses the phrase "paths of least resistance" to describe how the underlying ethics guide actions in a society in general (p. 62). If the purpose of education is to facilitate success, that is to set up students on paths of least resistance to economic success, then the ethics underlying education must align with the ethics underlying the economy.

In addition to some of the philosophical limitations that led me to the construction of a ethics of candor rather than a specific ethics of care, there arises this practical limitation. It is not at all clear that it is the right of educators or parents or other potential ones-welcoming to attempt to instill in students an ethic that runs contrary to the economic system, that sets them on paths of greater resistance and makes it more difficult for them to become economically successful. It is

not an unreasonable position to expect education to be a process that prepares students for economic success. Because the ethics of economics and education must align, a caring revolution in education must be accompanied by or perhaps even preceded by a greater economic revolution based on an ethical paradigm shift. Here the problem becomes cyclical: what better way to shift ethical paradigms than by a revolution in the education system?

The ethics of candor does not address this question. Instead, it only demands awareness, intentionality, and candor regarding one's involvements with exertions of power or care, involvements which happen at all levels, from individual interactions to participation in the economic system. I have put particular focus on candor in the school setting because education and schooling are involved in both economics and ethics; these connections compound the importance of candor. Just as it is problematic to educate students by an ethics contrary to the economic system, it is also problematic to educate students to an ethics without communicating what the ethics is, how it works, and how the accompanying economic system functions. Paying lip service to values of sacrifice, duty, love, and care while educating students best to position themselves as advantage-takers in networks of power is precisely the kind of duplicity that infuriated Nietzsche. Proponents of the ethics of power *ought* to be aware of, open about, and perhaps even proud of their ethical position. To paraphrase Nietzsche (1909), power ought not to express itself as weakness. In the same way, those who, like the Grand Inquisitor, believe that humans are essentially sheep or automata ought to express those beliefs clearly and openly (as the Grand Inquisitor does to his credit). If one believes the only possible reality for humanity is within a disciplinary machine and the only possible hope of betterment is a higher rank in that machine, one ought to express clearly that this is the "good" and the goal of education.

I maintain and affirm that in all interactions of power and of care—and especially in interactions concerning education and schooling—one ought to be aware of one's position and intentional and candid about one's involvements. My intent in writing this thesis is to offer the

theories of power and of care connected along planes of theoretical symmetry by the concept of the creative use of energy leading to an investigative method as well as an exploration of economies of power and care such that one may be fully aware of all kinds of involvements in exertions of power or of care and may (and ought to) choose to be fully intentional and candid concerning those involvements.

CHAPTER VIII

TO BE PERFECTLY CANDID

To be perfectly candid may be impossible. Candor is not a substance one may obtain and keep hold of nor is it a state one may achieve. Candor, like power and care, is active. It requires a constant exercise of awareness and intentionality. It is an effort rather than an accomplishment. The ethics of candor I have constructed in this thesis demand that I put forth my best effort toward candor. I must candidly confess that I have not done this. I have neither been perfectly candid nor perfect in my effort to be so.

While I have a claimed an ethically neutral position (promoting only candor) with respect to the creative use of energy[16] as power or as care, my actual ethics are decidedly in favor of care. I have been careful to avoid phrasing that specifically privileges care or denigrates power; nevertheless, the perspectives I choose in illustrations, the theoretical sources I use, the subtle and sometimes subconscious decisions in phrasing all point toward care as "good." The theoretical framing of this entire thesis, including the ethics of candor itself, is a still greater failure of candor on my part. I have established that creativity and play are natural and fundamental and that candor is "good." I have further theorized that power reduces and restricts access to the intermediate space while care expands and facilitates access. Therefore, I have indirectly theorized that care is natural and power is not. I have relied heavily on Foucault's (1977a) concept of diffuse networks of subjection and objectification. I have used the clearly biased word

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[16] The shorthand for "creative use of energy that takes a willful direction resulting in concrete effects in real space and time" is "exertion."

"escape" to say that the subjects exerting power are lost in these diffuse networks. In calling for candor, and specifically candor of one's own involvement in exertions of power or care, I effectively call for the obscured subjects exerting power to reveal themselves and thereby disrupt the very networks through which they exert power. In these important ways, I have failed to be candid. In an attempt to rectify this failure, I conclude with a candid formulation of my own ethics of care including an explanation of how the entire project of the (supposedly neutral) ethics of candor serves to disrupt power and promote care.

Ethics of Care

I begin my construction of an ethics of care with what is universal and natural and proceed from there to what is good. First, I take energy to be universal; I take it that things happen. Second, I take creativity and play to be universal and natural. All organisms reach out explore and seek equilibrium with their surrounding environments. Human beings are special in that they have the capacity for reflective action and the ability to relate to the environment through an intermediate space by which they may invest the outer world with their own inner realities and thereby reshape it (and I define creativity by this process). Because creativity is natural and fundamental, access to and interactions in the intermediate space, including creative expression in the material world are good. Therefore, expanding the intermediate space and organizing it to facilitate the investment of inner realities (i.e. welcoming) is good. The resulting process by which the ones-welcoming and the investors exert energy creatively as care is likewise good.

I posit the will to dominate the outer reality exclusively with one's own inner reality may be an early failure of maturity. From Winnicott's (1971) object-relations theory, the infant must successfully transition through the trauma of realizing (in the most literal sense) that his inner

reality is not the only reality that there is, in short, that an outer reality exists and he is not omnipotent. An ethics of power may be the severest kind of arrested development, the infantile impulse to deny outer reality by the absolute imposition of one's own inner reality through the intermediate space. An attempt to recreate the illusion of omnipotence in this way results in an increasingly narrow and inaccessible intermediate space. Ones exerting power exclude the inner realities of others to their own cultural loss. The creative use of energy is still possible, but, as a dominant inner reality (which may be that of an individual or group exerting power) overtakes the intermediate space, the creative use of energy is limited more and more to the exertion of power by the dominant individual or group. This limitation results as the ones exerting power limit their focus to exerting power over others; the bodies of other persons become the only object-media for the creative use of energy. Just as I hold that an expanding and increasingly accessible intermediate space is "good" because it facilitates natural creativity and play, I hold that the narrowing of and diminishment of access to the intermediate space resulting from exertions of care is contrary to what is good and natural. Therefore, it is good both to be involved in exertions of care and to disrupt and resist exertions of power.

I believe a micro-physics of resistance to disciplinary power is not only possible, it is essential. The micro-physics of resistance works in minute instances of space, time, and movement against the exertions and strategies of disciplinary power. Resistance as micro-physics may be the physical removal of a wall, or perhaps merely the opening of a door or window. It may be the repositioning of desks or merely standing beside rather than sitting in one. It may be the willful ignorance of one bell at a time or the gradual expansion of undefined, versatile, and potentially caring spaces. I take it that my ethics are not a minority ethics, that—contrary to Nietzsche's (1909) strongest assertions—power only survives by expressing itself as something other than power because the bare face of power is so ugly people turn from it. Therefore, an ethics of candor is also an ethics of resistance to power as it serves to unmask power. I assert that

care is a natural exertion of energy and that the reality of care is all around us though it is minimally acknowledged socially and negatively acknowledged economically. Nevertheless, the world of care exists and its increasing manifestation is a matter of insistence upon its reality. Reality is an individual choice and a shared negotiation. The affirmation of the reality of care and denial of the reality of power is possible in much the same way Rebecca West (1940) denies the reality of evil and affirms the reality of goodness:

> Goodness is adorable, and it is immortal. When it is trodden down into the earth it springs up again, and human beings scrabble in the dust to find the first green seedling of its return. The stock cannot survive save by the mutual kindness of men and women, of old and young, of state and individual. Hatred comes before love, and gives the hater strange and delicious pleasures, but its works are short-lived; the head is cut from the body before the time of natural death, the lie is told to frustrate the other rogue's plan before it comes to fruit. Sooner or later society tires of making a mosaic of these evil fragments; and even if the rule of hatred lasts some centuries it occupies no place in real time, it is a hiatus in reality, and not the vastest material thefts, not world wide raids on mines and granaries, can give it substance. (p. 1146)

Power as torture has the problem that it destroys what it seeks to control; power as discipline has the problem that it requires constant, comprehensive, and minutely specific attention. West's first green seedling is analogous to the natural creative and playful impulses of human beings. Care promotes these impulses through an ordering and expanding of the intermediate space. Power seeks to negate them. As seedlings sprout and grow in every place they are not actively rooted out or cut down, so caring and play sprout and grow in every space that is not actively disciplined. In order to maintain power, the disciplinary machine may never rest. The simplest reflective pauses—including those necessary to formulate and exercise an ethics of

candor relating to the exertions of power and of care—function as rests, spaces that may lead to welcoming, investment, and care.

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