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DE-GENDERING HEGEMONY: HOW PARSING OUT ATTITUDES TOWARD  
PRODUCTIVE, REPRODUCTIVE, AND GENDER-ESSENTIALIZED LABOR  
HELPS EXPLAIN THE CROSS-NATIONAL STALL IN GENDER EQUALITY

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A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

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This work is dedicated to everyone who has suffered under complex and pernicious inequities, and to the scholars and activists who work every day at dismantling them. It is most especially dedicated to my dearest, Lindsey, without whom it would not exist, to my dearest, Becky, who came along (and stayed) at just the right time, and to Potter, who was always happy to wait in the food box and even happier to come out afterward. To Family, to Tribe—past, present, and still to come.  
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## Abstract

Starting with the problem of the two-decade stall in the developed world's gender revolution, this project applies Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) techniques to answer three related questions: (1) "How have attitudes concerning gender-labor equality asymmetrically penetrated the developed world?" (2) "Can researchers better refine measurement of gender-labor attitudes by modeling a gender-essentialized concept of labor roles as distinct from more conventional attitudinal measures?" (3) "Does modeling this separate dimension improve our understandings of persistent gender-labor biases?" To answer these questions, I explore markers of gender-labor attitudes using data from 29 OECD countries (N = 37,632) in the 2012 wave of the International Social Survey Programme, a transnational, level-matched data set drawing mostly from OECD nations. Much of the research in this area treats progressive gender ideology as being composed of a largely homogenous set of values categorized under an umbrella often labeled "Gender Egalitarianism," "Feminism" or something similar. However, my project works to demonstrate that this social construct is actually composed of a heterogeneous set of values that may vary widely in representation across country, sex, and labor status. I put forth a new theoretical framework—dubbed "Hegemonic Coupling Theory" (HCT)—which asserts that the intersections of hegemonic statuses (such as masculinity and paid employment) reinforce and sustain inequality independently of inequalities specific to either component status. I answer each of the project's main questions in a separate analysis. First, I explore descriptive statistics for key attitudinal asymmetries across my twenty-nine-country sample. Second, using SEM, I compare three measurement models to demonstrate that a model treating three latent dimensions of gendered labor attitudes as distinct from one another (as asserted in HCT) is a better fit than two other models that treat them as overlapping or uniform. Finally, I show that the distinct attitudinal dimensions vary significantly across national welfare regime, sex, and other demographic factors. In sum, this project demonstrates that (1) meaningful attitudinal asymmetries do exist at the national and international levels, (2) the value set commonly labeled "gender egalitarianism" consists of a heterogeneous set of values, and (3) A gender-essentialized conception of labor roles remains an important and anomalous factor perpetuating gender-labor biases. These findings support the usefulness of the framework outlined in HCT. I conclude by recommending policy initiatives that would target lagging dimensions of gender egalitarianism and promote equity more effectively than the broad-based, generalized policies of years past.

## **Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of the Project**

### **Discussion of the Problem**

#### *The Stalled Gender Revolution*

The revolution towards gender equality in the developed world has notoriously “stalled out” (England 2010; Friedman 2015; Hochschild 1989) since the mid-1990s. Women have continued to make progress in select areas—most notably educational attainment. However, most facets of gender inequality in labor spheres have remained relatively stagnant over the last two decades, including paid labor force participation, wages, household labor responsibilities, and so on. (Bianchi et al. 2006; Cotter et al. 2011). As early as 1989, Hochschild identified the reciprocal relationship between women’s progress toward equality and the evolution of men’s roles in society: without substantial movement of men into traditionally feminine roles such as caregiving, household labor, and other unpaid work activities, the gender revolution will remain forever incomplete.

The battle for gender equality has never been an exclusively gendered issue—that is, not exclusively a matter of achieving equal cultural prestige of gender identities. Rather, the various fields on which the battle has been waged reveal the underlying nature of the conflict. The earliest efforts toward suffrage in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century focused on allowing women to vote and hold public office (i.e., to be independent, public actors in civil society). Subsequent battles have been waged on fronts of reproductive rights and bodily autonomy, independence from and self-determination in the marital contract, equal access to education, equal access to, treatment, and compensation in paid employment, and equal treatment in the justice system, to name a

few. The common thread linking these fields is the goal of creating equality of labor activity—both productive and reproductive—regardless of gender identity.

*The Essential Links Between Gender Equality and Labor Equality*

That labor relations are foundational to gender equality should come as no surprise to sociologists, whose earliest and more modern theoretical traditions treat gender and labor as inherently linked. As early as 1884, Friederich Engels (with posthumous input from Marx) asserted in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* that the origins of class oppression began with the sociopolitical marginalization of women relative to men. This gender asymmetry was made possible by the sexual division of labor, which institutionalized the ancestral labor activities of the sexes: men in charge of productive (mostly agricultural) labor, and women's domain the home and its uncompensated, unquantified, largely unrecognized reproductive labor. Almost a century later, scholars in the Marxist and Material Feminist traditions framed gender as a performance, with people "doing" gender by routinely performing culturally prescribed labor activities, thereby fulfilling social constructions of what it means to be appropriately "man" or "woman" (West and Zimmerman 1987; Fenstermaker and West 2002).

The steps taken toward gender equality over the 20<sup>th</sup> century validate gender theorists' preoccupation with labor roles as lynchpins in the gender status quo. In the developed world, the largest gains toward equality have been made by feminist efforts toward equal access to and treatment in the paid labor force (Hochschild 1989) and (as a corollary to said labor force) in educational attainment (Bianchi et al. 2006; Cotter et al. 2011). Recall that the Marxist/Materialist feminist frames attribute the marginalization



of women to a system that fundamentally privileges and values productive labor over reproductive labor, thereby marginalizing reproductive laborers (traditionally women). Different facets of women's disadvantage, such as lack of political representation, lack of legal protections, lower earning potential, and so on, trickle down from the "master" disadvantage of being shackled to a type of labor that is framed as less valuable in the capitalist system of production. The fact that feminists have made several decades of progress loosening their attachment to reproductive labor, then, undeniably elevates the stations of women in society. However, such progress fails to modify the structurally unequal system that privileges productive labor roles over all others.

Examining the state and evolution of the reproductive labor market also reveals important truths about the state of gender equality. Reproductive labor—that labor which, while essential to the *reproduction* of society, is uncompensated and therefore unrecognized in a capitalist market system—has long been central to feminist dialogues on gender and labor equality (Vogel 2013). The reproductive labor market is often identified as a key stall point in the gender revolution (Friedman 2015; Hochschild 1989), both because of persistent asymmetry between men and women and also because women's historical attachment to its unrecognized labor lies at the root of much of their disadvantage. Despite women's increasing share of paid labor duties (which we must acknowledge as an important step toward equity), there is little indication that men are making balancing strides into reproductive labor activities. Hochschild (1989) famously coined the term "second shift" to describe the pattern that women with full-time jobs were still largely expected (by society, by spouses, and often by themselves) to perform most or all of the same domestic duties they always had. The exact parameters and

burden of this second shift work have been the subject of much debate, but the pattern itself has been substantiated in subsequent years (Lincoln 2008; Milkie et al. 2009; Pinto and Coltrane 2009). In addition to women voluntarily working a productive first and reproductive second shift, men have profoundly failed to compensate women's progress with their own share of reproductive labor and, in the last two decades, have failed to measurably increase that share at all (Bianchi et al. 2000; Maume 2008; Raley et al. 2012). Men's adherence to their traditional labor roles points to the structural inequality inherent in the current system: reproductive labor must be carried out if society is to continue but, so long as such labor is devalued, those most vulnerable in society will invariably perform it. Many/most of those will invariably be women and women of least privilege, at that.

#### *Asymmetrical Labor, Asymmetrical Progress*

A large suite of both structural and cultural barriers makes men's movement into reproductive labor a difficult, disadvantageous, and unappealing choice, not the least of which is the loss of cultural standing brought about by deviating from traditionally masculine (re: high prestige) gender performance (Connell 1987; Friedman 2015). Even *perceived* involvement in reproductive labor can considerably impact a person's career. Women who are perceived to be substantially attached to reproductive labor responsibilities (whether they are or not) experience substantial discrimination in the paid labor market (Correll et al. 2007; Hochschild 1997; Ridgeway 2011). Men, by contrast, generally benefit from married and parental life: not because their commitment to that sphere is seen as more positive than women's, but due to a default assumption that they will always be more attached to the productive than the reproductive labor

force and instead outsource their reproductive labor duties to their spouse (Coltrane 2004; Glauber 2008). In simplest terms, while a woman with a family appears an employment risk because of her potential reproductive labor responsibilities, a man with a family is seen as fulfilling his reproductive labor responsibilities *through* productive labor.

The patterns described above paint a meaningful and coherent picture: the incompleteness of the gender equality revolution is symptomatic of the state of gender-labor relations. The gender revolution's successes are found in the (generally desirable) productive labor market, where women have made substantial (if incomplete) strides toward inclusion and parity with men. Meanwhile, the reproductive labor market lags behind, with both sexes seeking ways to avoid its burdens altogether or at least offset the consequences of participation. However, because of women's historical association with this sphere, they tend to be less successful than men in their efforts. Despite institutionalized egalitarianism, cultural scripts essentializing productive labor as masculine and reproductive labors as feminine maintain material inequity. Even proposed solutions to these inequities are circumscribed by such cultural constructs: women are encouraged to "lean in" to labor and find a way to "have it all"—rhetorical devices that would seem bizarre and nonsensical if directed at men (Friedman 2015). However, it is from this cultural asymmetry that we find an important clue about the deeper nature of these complex inequalities.

Why have men made such meager movement into reproductive labor activity? Why does perceived attachment to reproductive labor harm women's productive labor careers? We know that men who engage in reproductive labor—especially in intensive

ways, such as pursuing traditionally feminine careers, stay-at-home fatherhood, and so on—experiencing substantial stigma, judgment, and material consequences as a result of their actions (Barnett et al. 2000; Jacobs 1993; Williams 1992; Wooton 1997).

Further, even when men do take on additional reproductive labor responsibilities in the home, they tend to pursue activities that carry culturally masculine stereotypes (Hook 2010). These observations suggest that substantial amounts of disadvantage are embedded in the *types* of labor traditionally associated with women, regardless of the sex of the actual laborer. It seems implausible to achieve substantial progress toward equality by encouraging men to move in large numbers into a sphere of activity that is seen as disadvantageous and burdensome. Thus, we come to an important postulate: further progress toward gender equality appears to depend upon achieving greater equality between *spheres* or *roles* of labor, and not just between the people who occupy them.

However, the ways that employers and workers interact with gender asymmetries suggest that the distinction between *gender* inequality and *labor* inequality (and the connection between them) is often missed or dismissed. As said, employers tend to discriminate against women because of the cultural association between feminine gender identity and reproductive labor (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012; Ridgeway 2011; Hays 1997) but favor men for the masculine gender identity's perceived resilient independence from that same type of labor (Coltrane 2004; Coltrane and Adams 2008; Benard and Correll 2010). More than simple gender discrimination, both of these practices represent discrimination based on gender's *associations* with labor. As much as these practice disadvantage many workers, a complimentary pattern exists among

workers, themselves. Despite women's rising levels of education and professional credentialing, feminine workers still tend to pursue professions and career paths that fulfill normative expectations for their gender—even when those choices may exacerbate inequalities (England and Li 2006; Hook and Pettit, 2016; Xie and Schauman 2003). Yet even when workers *do* deviate from gender norms, they still tend to reinforce the corollary hierarchy of productive over reproductive labor. Women move more readily into traditionally masculine professions (Friedman 2012). Meanwhile, men's movement into traditionally feminine work tends to be accompanied by some kind of reframing process that masculinizes (re: raises the status of) the work (Cottingham 2014). These trends, even if they may benefit some women, broadly perpetuate the hierarchy of masculine-type labor over feminine-type labor and so perpetuate the inegalitarian status quo.

The complex, intersectional nature of gender-labor constructs produces inequalities that resist and adapt to change without actually disappearing. As in the examples above, steps toward gender equality in paid labor have thus far had the unintended consequences of reinforcing the inferiority of reproductive labor, disadvantaging those (disproportionately women) most connected to it, and reinforcing (mostly for men) the barriers to greater participation. From a gender performance framework, women have lifted the sex barrier (referring to the actual biological sex of the individual) from productive labor, but the gendering (re: masculine/feminine) of labor type and the associated inequalities remain firmly entrenched in the cultural milieu. From a Marxist/Material Feminist perspective, this pattern is a consequence of failing to address the labor equality on the way to the goal of gender equality.

These two frameworks are inherently linked: (1) one of the most fundamental ways that people do gender is through their labor activities, which consist of (2) the activities necessary to produce and reproduce the conditions for life and society. If one arena of performance (reproductive labor) and one gender construct (femininity) are each framed as deeply inferior, it comes as no surprise that women should seek to escape them and men to resist them, leaving them to be occupied primarily by individuals of lower status and means, compounding and cementing their disadvantage over time. By contrast, the *hegemonic* statuses of productive labor involvement and masculinity (which can apply to an activity or identity independent of biological sex) become endorsed, their cultural *coupling* reinforced by the ever growing number of people aspiring to embody them. In sum, independent of gender-based divisions of labor, evidence points to the *cultural gendering of labor types* as central to persistent gender inequality.

#### *Cultural Hegemony and Hegemonic Masculinity*

The concept of *cultural hegemony* was developed by Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci to describe the ways that, in the process of conducting the activities inherent to being at the top of the socioeconomic hierarchy, a ruling class or culture establishes its ideological framework as universally applicable to all members of the society. Cultural hegemony enshrines the social, political, and economic status quo as natural, inevitable, and beneficial for all (Bullock and Trombley 1999). The hegemonizing process may take the form of a deliberate agenda by the dominant class or (more commonly) is simply the natural byproduct of cultural and material transactions undertaken in a stratified society. It is a truism to say that the beliefs and practices of the ruling class

inevitably become framed as the best or most correct beliefs and practices in a given culture—at least until unrest and dissidence begin to emerge and destabilize the ruling-underclass relationship. Regardless of mechanism, the result of the hegemonizing process is an ensconced cultural story that stabilizes the structure and positions of individuals within the social order.

Since its origins in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the cultural hegemony paradigm has been most prominently extended by gender scholars into the concept of *hegemonic masculinity*. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) describe hegemonic masculinity as the most culturally honored way of being masculine, requiring all men to define themselves and, thus, their position in the social system, in relation to that mode of gender performance. In practice, this means traits such as physicality, assertiveness, business acumen, earning potential, ability to attract mating prospects, and so on are the most legitimate ways of doing masculinity and, failing any such traits, a man must both accept his lower status and seek to justify and (hopefully) offset his lack of conformity to the archetypal model of manhood. Importantly, the hegemonic gender model's dialectical logic applies both within and across gender identities—particularly when discussing gender relations in labor. While it is certainly true that those identifying as men must define their identity in relation to hegemonic masculinity, a significant part of that identity is bound up in demonstrating that they are *not* feminine—which is a less hegemonic status, regardless of how it is expressed. Though masculine qualities tend to carry more privilege across *all* gender identities, men who deviate from masculinity do not retain those privileges but instead experience proportionately severe sanctions for displaying qualities perceived as feminine (Cohen and Huffman 2003; Connell 1987;

Kivel 1992; Pascoe 2007). Furthermore, the ideal (re: most employable and valuable, regardless of sex) worker in a capitalist labor market traditionally embodies hegemonically masculine qualities such as assertiveness, business acumen, and independence from reproductive labor. Thus, defining oneself in conformity with hegemonic masculinity has become an increasingly salient goal for women workers as well as for men, since doing so represents the most obvious path to equal standing in the capitalist labor force and society more broadly. In short, the ideal-typical worker remains archetypally masculine, while the ideal-typical homemaker remains archetypally feminine. Discriminatory gender associations follow the labor type, regardless of the actual laborer's gender, and labor discrimination devalues the gender identity, regardless of the laborer's ability. The cultural story legitimizing the status quo remains largely undisturbed.

### *The Hegemonic Coupling Framework*

The pattern observed above—of cultural constructs that define one another in reciprocal ways—serves as the foundation for this project's theoretical contribution to the literature on gender and labor. To add to our understanding of the cultural interplay between gender and labor roles, I extend the paradigms of cultural hegemony and hegemonic masculinity to inform the concept of *Hegemonic Coupling*. A hegemonic coupling (HC) is a pairing of two or more hegemonic statuses that reinforce, sustain, and/or amplify one another's cultural privilege. Typically, such statuses have been coupled in the collective consciousness for so long that they are seen as “naturally” paired (essentialized), as has been the case with masculinity and breadwinning or femininity and homemaking. The quintessential example of hegemonic coupling set



forth in this essay is that of masculine gender qualities (assertiveness, competitiveness, stoicism, independence from reproductive labor responsibilities) and productive labor involvement (particularly as one's primary, full-time role). As I've demonstrated, the associations between these constructs appear to have little or nothing to do with either the biological sex or gender identity of the individual laborer (in many countries, a woman may embody both sets of qualities almost as readily as a man), indicating a particularly strong *cultural* (as opposed to material) coupling.

The HC framework could include any high-prestige statuses that are tightly coupled in the cultural narrative. However, due to the framework's focus on cultural hegemony (re: status hierarchies), it is most useful when discussing statuses that confer privilege. One example would be the coupling of White ethnicity with white-collar work, where persons of color would be expected to exemplify traits of "whiteness" to prove they are "suitable" for employment in that sector (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Koedel et al. 2014). A second example might be found in sexuality, where qualities associated with cis gender identities are coupled with heterosexual orientations (Dunkle and Francis 1990; Valentova et al. 2011). Masculine men and feminine women are typically assumed to be heterosexual (and thus to be more highly valued), and so non-heterosexual persons who seek mainstream acceptance may be inclined to embody those traits. These patterned relationships could easily apply to un-hegemonic couplings, as well—such as perceived associations between ethnic minority status and criminality—but that is an extension for another work.

The privileges of maleness (referring to biological sex) and of being a man (referring to gender presentation) have mostly been identified and articulated through

popular and scholarly feminist efforts spanning more than two centuries. Cultural and policy-based efforts toward equality in various civic and private arenas have addressed some significant portion of these advantages, though of course cultural lag persists. However, the hegemony of the productive laborer role remains under-recognized, and its implicit gendering as “masculine” has not been properly parsed out or defined for purposes of either politics or scholarship. The fact that members of a society see the more desirable productive labor roles as embodying, necessitating, and conferring inherently “superior” masculine qualities—remains both structurally and culturally powerful (Friedman 2015). I argue that this conflation, far from being epiphenomenal to other biases, powerfully and independently shapes the gender equality “stall out.”

Distinguishing between gender and labor hegemonies (and their relationships with one another) is difficult yet important. The labor spheres have historically been gender segregated, so labor values are easily conflated with gender values. For example, in Western society, whether we investigate what traits are most valued in a worker or what traits are most valued in a person, the answer tends to mostly consist of a list of the qualities of hegemonic masculinity: assertiveness, dominance, toughness, emotional restraint, rational thinking, courage, competitiveness, professional success, business acumen, willingness to take risks, and so on. This apocryphal coupling leaves us with a chicken-or-egg problem: is masculinity hegemonic because it is seen as economically viable, or is economic viability defined and identified by what is masculine? The original answer to this question is probably indiscernible, but the contemporary answer is surely, “Both.”

A power system invariably coalesces in ways that are most advantageous to its most privileged members, and what is culturally prized over time (re: hegemonic) is determined by what repeatedly proves advantageous in that system. Because gender roles and labor roles are both defined by the same capitalist system of production, they self-organize according to capitalist definitions of advantage (Hartmann 1981; Vogel 2013). Thus, freedom to avoid reproductive labor responsibilities (disadvantageous under capitalism) and maximize one's availability to the productive labor market (advantageous under capitalism) becomes a prized set of qualities that are archetypally masculine. Men who embody those qualities rise to the top of the social hierarchy, simultaneously defining and reinforcing what it means to be hegemonically masculine. All other men (and women) must then define their own masculinity by degree of conformity to or deviance from the hegemonic standard.

The hegemonic coupling of masculinity and productive labor defines gender relations for a particular cultural epoch and shapes the path of change as individuals and groups vie for status over time. As the dual statuses of advantage define and reinforce one another over time, essentialist attributions coalesce around them. These attributions take the shape of a cultural hegemony "story" (or a collection of stories) explaining how the status quo is natural, beneficial, and inevitable. Cultural stories in this canon all commit some kind of essentialist fallacy regarding gender, labor, and status. Common examples include attributing natural caregiving instincts and responsibilities for emotional labor to women because women have "always" been the caregivers in families, giving men more respect as rational thinkers, conflating business or monetary success with masculinity, and so on. Telling these stories time after time in place after

place eventually leads to the predictable (and familiar) institutionalization of these cultural archetypes. The fact that the archetypes are a blend of multiple hegemonic statuses tied to a specific historical arrangement (such as a utilitarian division of labor) is “forgotten” by the collective consciousness. A “successful” person (man, woman, or otherwise) is *by definition* someone who embodies traditionally masculine qualities and participates intensively in productive labor. As with hegemonic masculinity, all other positions in the social hierarchy are defined by their degree of conformity to or deviance from these criteria.

*Investigating the Significance and Consequences of Hegemonic Coupling*

The societal consequences of the above process are obvious and prevalent, such as when women suffer discrimination in the paid labor force because of their gender’s cultural ties to a devalued form of labor. However, the implications for social science scholarship are equally profound. If the hegemonic coupling model is accurate, then social science researchers must use extra care when studying attitudes toward gender and labor relations. What may seem like a representation of a gender attitude may in fact represent bias concerning labor roles, and vice versa. For example, an analysis that finds that respondents to a survey hold egalitarian attitudes toward men’s and women’s participation in the paid labor force may in fact represent only an acceptance that people of either gender identity should have access to the hegemonic coupling of paid labor and masculine qualities. The same respondents may still hold distinctly discriminatory attitudes toward people who participate in (or are perceived to be attached to) reproductive labor or who embody traits that fail to conform to hegemonic masculinity, meaning they may still carry substantial bias against women. In other words, those

respondents who appear by conventional measurement to be relatively gender egalitarian may in fact be far from it. Of those respondents, some will inevitably be in charge of employing others in paid labor, which returns us to the societal consequences discussed at the beginning of this paragraph.

If the HC framework is valid, it indicates that there is room to improve social science scholarship's understanding of gender inequities by rendering with greater clarity those cultural constructs that exist at the intersection of the hegemonic couplings. However, the necessary first step in that effort is to validate that a dimension of intersection even exists. Conventional scholarship in this arena typically focuses on gender attitudes and/or outcomes in one of two major areas corresponding (unsurprisingly) to the two arenas of productive and reproductive labor. The third dimension we wish to identify is the presence of an essentialist coupling between gender and labor, which might look like attitudinal bias that particular labor roles are inherently more "appropriate" or more "natural" for individuals of a particular gender identity. If this coupling is truly a *hegemonic coupling*, then what is "appropriate" and "natural" will systematically pair the more hegemonic gender with the more hegemonic labor role, and vice versa. Finally, if the concepts and construct I have outlined are indeed valid, then the logical next step is to see if and how that construct correlates similarly to and differently from more conventional measures of gender-labor attitudes. If the construct is a novel and meaningful addition to the social science canon, then rendering it with greater clarity will provide novel insights unavailable from conventional measures.

### *Project Summary*

For this project, I make an explorative attempt to (1) find evidence for anomalous heterogeneity in the distribution of gender-labor attitudes, (2) validate the hegemonic coupling (HC) model as a superior representation of gender attitudes compared with models that do not measure hegemonic coupling, and (3) demonstrate that novel asymmetries exist between three dimensions of what might traditionally be thought of as the relatively monolithic construct of “gender egalitarianism.” Through descriptive analysis of international data, I find that evidence of peculiar attitudinal heterogeneity does exist. I then make use of confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling, constructing three latent attitudinal measures from a pool of twelve observed survey items. One latent construct represents the HC model as the degree to which a person sees labor as gender-essentialized in a way that favors the hegemonies of masculinity and productive labor. Two other constructs represent the extant literature, framing gender egalitarianism as attitudes toward gender equity in the (1) productive and (2) reproductive labor forces.

I compare three measurement models representing different theoretical configurations of the relationship between these latent dimensions. The first model treats the three dimensions as functionally non-distinct aspects of gender egalitarianism, indicating that further investigation is unnecessary. The second model treats all three dimensions as fundamentally distinct but covarying, which supports the hegemonic coupling model as an improvement. The third model is hierarchical, treating the three dimensions as covarying and adding a second-level construct labeled “Gender Egalitarianism.” This third model represents a middle ground between the first two,

suggesting that each of the three attitudinal dimensions partially overlaps with the others in a single, common value set. The second model proves to be the best fit of the three, supporting the hegemonic coupling hypothesis. I then use this model to inform a structural (predictive) model that estimates gender-attitudinal scores for all three latent measures by macro-level institutional environment and various micro-level demographic statuses. As hypothesized, scores on the three latent attitudinal dimensions vary substantially at both macro and micro levels, with the measure representing the hegemonic coupling concept offering the most surprises.

## Chapter 2: Review of the Literature

### Gendered Activity in the Labor Force

#### *The Path of Western Feminism*

Women in the developed world have had a rocky relationship with the paid work force for most of modern history, and much of that relationship can be attributed to the historically gendered division of labor. Popular cultural rhetoric has traditionally framed productive employment in an antagonistic relationship with women's prescriptive domestic labor duties. This rhetoric emerges partly from resource constraints and economic demand for unpaid laborers, and partly due to constructs of gender essentialism, cultural inertia in general, and the acute resistance of men to renegotiate the division of labor in a way that would (without dramatic economic and cultural shift) substantially reduce male privilege (Friedman 2015; Vogel 2013). Because there exists no path into reproductive labor that does not depreciate men's cultural and economic capital, "change" on the part of men in this socioeconomic system means sacrificing hegemonic privilege, so resistance to change is predictable and logical.

In OECD countries in particular, what evolution has transpired in women's relationships to labor roles has been guided by the cultural institution of feminism. The "gender revolution" has largely progressed in lockstep with the cultural evolution of feminist constructs. Priorities (Friedman 2015) have typically emphasized lifting the structural and cultural barriers to women's entry into male-dominated fields. Structural efforts in this vein have yielded the development and liberalization of institutional supports such as paid and unpaid parental leave, flex-time, and even greater access to



post-secondary and vocational education programs. Cultural efforts have focused on alleviating scripts that hamper women on the personal level, such as by raising women's career aspirations, promoting interest in STEM fields, and so on.

It is worth positing that Western feminism has followed the progression outlined above because it emerged within a capitalist world system and therefore uses capitalist metrics for defining value, hierarchy, and equality. The Western feminist focus on women's gains in productive labor equality has been guided by those areas of greatest leverage for reducing inequality in a capitalist system and as measured by capitalist standards. However, the most persistent sources of inequity facing women today are those that the capitalist economic system is fundamentally unable to address, since to do so would require a market-based system to have accounting mechanisms for human activities that occur outside of any market context. Critiques of Western feminism by Marxist/Material feminists emphasize that the system, not only women's place in it, must be changed to achieve gender equality (Ferguson and Hennessy 2010). The argument that Western feminism has been shaped by the socioeconomic contexts of Western-capitalist society will be the focus of sections of this paper discussing reproductive labor relations and changes in men's labor roles, as well as the theoretical basis for the project's empirical investigations.

#### *Women's Gains in Equality in Productive Labor*

Overwhelmingly, education has been the least stalled dimension of progress toward gender equality, with women matching or outpacing men in grades (Duckworth and Seligman 2006; Perkins et al. 2004), high school graduation rates (Snyder and Dillow 2007), enrollment in and graduation from college (Buchmann and DiPrete 2006;

Cotter et al. 2004; Freeman 2004), and graduate and professional degree attainment (Cotter et al. 2004; England 2010; Snyder and Dillow 2007). The academy only began admitting large numbers of women in America in the 1930s and 40s. In many cases, this was “justified” by explaining that higher education was primarily necessary for the modern woman’s roles as wife and mother, and secondarily for her roles as citizen and professional (Nash and Romero 2012). This cultural lag remains evident in that even in the present there still exist substantial (and in some cases growing) gaps in the professional fields of study pursued by men and women (Ashcraft and Blithe 2010; Margolis and Fisher 2003). Qualifications aside, the academy remains the poster child for gains in gender equality. It may be that women’s initial success in this field was mediated by the fact that “student” is a consumer role rather than a producer one, and thus women’s entry into education was seen as less threatening than their direct entry into the productive labor force. Whether this is true or not, the two paths of education and employment are intrinsically linked in modern economies and so one naturally feeds into the other.

The next most successful arena for gender equality has undoubtedly been the productive labor force. Women made large gains in this arena over the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Casper and Bianchi 2002; Cotter et al. 2008; Goldin 2006; Sayer et al. 2004), and even women with children made considerable progress despite the penalties associated with motherhood (Boushey 2008; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). However, this progressive trend has leveled off in the last two decades, with little measurable change occurring since the 1990s (Cohany and Sok 2007; Hollister and Smith 2014). In fact, men still maintain stronger attachment to the productive labor

force than do women by almost all standard metrics. Men have the dubious honor of working longer hours and doing so more frequently (Cha 2010; Jacobs and Gerson 2004). They also maintain greater flexibility in the workforce (Noonan and Glass 2012) than do their female counterparts. Further, when it comes to perks in the workforce that help with juggling family life (e.g., flex time), women (despite typically greater need) far more than men are either outright denied them or avoid them for fear of discriminatory consequences (Cech and Blair-Loy 2014; Crittenden 2001; Families and Work Institute 2012; Glass 2004; Hochschild 1997; Munsch et al. 2014; Stone 2007a; Williams 2001).

As with employment patterns generally, the wage gap that narrowed throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century has stabilized since the 1990s (Campbell and Pearlman 2013). A large portion of the famous 70-cents-on-the-dollar wage gap has actually been accounted for by more recent research, which attributes the lion's share of the gap to human capital factors (e.g., educational foci, employment gaps for childbearing, etc.) and occupational segregation (Bianchi et al. 2006; Cohen et al. 2009; England 2010). The remaining gap (about 9%) is difficult to account for (Blau and Kahn 2006) but is often attributed to implicit bias and subtle discrimination—particularly against mothers (Benard and Correll 2010; Byron and Roscigno 2014; Correll et al. 2007; Cuddy et al. 2004; Glass 2004; Kelly and Grant 2012). These findings support the assertion that there exists a persistent bias against the implicitly coupled statuses of femininity and reproductive labor roles.

Despite the persistent material and cultural consequences of reproductive labor involvement, both women and (less surprisingly) men tend to aspire to gender-

stereotypical professions more often than gender-deviant ones (England and Li 2006; Xie and Schauman 2003). However, women aspire to male-dominated fields far more than the reverse (England and Li 2006; Friedman 2012); which is to say that there is more frequent transfer from the non-hegemonic status to the hegemonic status, both for practical reasons and because doing so is less an affront to culture than (for example) a man who deviates in the direction of feminine associations (Kivel 1992; Pascoe 2007). Both the educational pipeline and concerted programmatic efforts have helped propel women into traditionally masculine STEM fields and other high-paying occupations since the 1970s (Mandel 2013; Padavic and Reskin 2002). Yet women's involvement in some prominent fields (such as computer science) has actually declined in recent decades (Ashcraft and Blither 2010; Margolis and Fisher 2003), perhaps because the rising prominence and prestige of computer-centric industries causes women to be placed in a hiring queue behind male applicants (Reskin 1994).

#### *Gendered Movement Patterns within Productive Labor*

Regardless of actual employment sector, there are generalized, gender-distinct paths through the career “pipeline” (Friedman 2015). Due to their reproductive labor attachments, women tend to “leak out” of the work force in pursuit of non-traditional (re: semi-committed) careers (Glass et al. 2013). Women also express lower “professional role confidence” (Cech et al. 2011), experience more glass ceiling effects (Maume 2004; Ridgeway 1997), and higher levels of discrimination and harassment (Bargh et al. 1995; Castilla 2008). Women tend to be perceived as less committed to work than men (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012; Ridgeway 1997) and to avoid using family-friendly policies due to the professional stigma associated with doing so (Correll et al.

2007; Hochschild 1997). In other words, femininity is associated with lacking qualities intrinsic to desirable employment. By virtue of their *presumed* association with reproductive labor activity, women are systematically funneled into the roles culturally expected of them. Such roles are inherently antagonistic to prevailing definitions of the committed (re: exploitable) productive worker, so sex and gender statuses themselves become labor statuses by proxy—a disadvantageous coupling of femininity and reproductive labor.

By contrast, men tend to experience what is known as the “glass elevator” effect (Williams 1992). Men employed in traditionally female-dominated fields frequently receive a larger share of company resources, enjoy more privileges, and are paid higher relative to women in the same fields (Ridgeway 2011). Men also gravitate toward more stereotypically masculine specializations within these fields (Snyder and Green 2008), and they tend to move up and out of lower, more female-occupied positions more quickly (Barnett et al. 2000). In other words, the qualities associated with maleness and masculinity are qualities that bestow the perception of being more valuable, competent workers in productive labor. The coupling of masculine status with specific labor qualities propels men upward, regardless of their field of employment.

However, while men experience advantage *within* a given female-dominated field, they tend to face considerable stigma from outsiders and in the general cultural milieu for deviating from gender-prescriptive employment patterns. Men in traditionally feminized professions are culturally marginalized, their labor-role deviance “explained” through narratives assigning them essentialist gender-deviant qualities: male nurses are labeled homosexual (re: not masculine enough) or too unintelligent/unmotivated to

succeed in medical school and become a doctor; male elementary school teachers are labeled gay or seen as possible pedophiles and sexual predators, and so on (Barnett et al. 2000; Jacobs 1993; Williams 1992; Wooton 1997). In other words, the implicit challenge to the essentialist masculinity/labor pairing must be explained with a “reason” why a person would voluntarily become deviant and thereby accept a lower status.

Movement of men into traditionally female-dominated fields (that is, against the hegemonic grain) has been predictably spotty and slow (England 2010). What movement there has been validates more about gender-labor hegemonic couplings than it challenges. Influxes of male workers tend to be centered in fields of growing pay and prestige, such as nursing (Landivar 2013). Trends of male movement into positions of lower or declining pay and prestige, or into positions that are characterized by traditionally feminine work or submissive expectations (e.g., secretarial or service work), are very uncommon (Charles and Grusky 2004; Hegewisch et al. 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2006; Truss et al. 2013). In some cases, men will even drop out of the labor force altogether and accept unemployment benefits rather than take jobs whose service demands would require them to deviate too far from the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity (Nixon 2009). In short, feminine-typical characteristics in a career field, if they are not easily replaced with new scripts, often prove to be sufficient barriers to turn men away from that field.

When cultural shifts propel men into a hegemony-challenging field in ways and numbers that become impossible to ignore or explain away, new cultural stories coalesce to preserve the traditional gender-labor hierarchy. Ad campaigns spotlighting men in traditionally feminized fields typically emphasize the masculinity of those fields,

for example by emphasizing the physical aspects of the duties of a nurse and comparing them to those of an athlete or a soldier (Cottingham 2014). However, these transformational stories remain the exception and the neutralizing force, rather than the norm or the basis for revolution. The gender revolution still owes much of its stall to the inability or unwillingness of men to pursue traditionally feminine fields and social roles (that is, to validate femininity), as well as the cultural and structural barriers discouraging such cultural shift (England 2010). These same conditions are also largely responsible for motivating women to vacate and avoid these roles since, under the current system, they are disadvantageous to everyone. In other words, patterns in worker choice and trends in the broader labor market work (intentionally or otherwise) to keep the hegemonic statuses tightly coupled, since doing so represents the lowest risk path to material success.

### *Gender in Reproductive Labor*

The stalled revolution more broadly is fundamentally connected to the persistence of the stalled revolution at home (Friedman 2015). Societal acceptance of gender equity has focused mostly on acceptance of working mothers and gender egalitarianism in the productive labor force (Cotter et al. 2011; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). In other words, support has been mostly confined to women whose activities support the hegemony of productive labor via either total allegiance to paid labor or willingness to shoulder the burden of juggling both desirable and undesirable roles. Whichever of these choices a given woman makes, she neither challenges the superiority of paid over unpaid labor nor asserts the need for change in men's labor roles. Such challenges as there have been to the gender-labor status quo have stalled or

in some cases backslidden since the mid-1990s (Coltrane 2004). Women, whether they choose to work or not, are still seen as being in charge of the majority of the reproductive labor (Bianchi et al. 2012; Hays 1997; Hochschild 1989; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010; Lincoln 2008; Pinto and Coltrane 2009).

This cultural association magnifies and sustains the disadvantage of women relative to men. Reproductive labor's fundamental antagonism with the prevailing employment model not only contributes to gendered discrimination in the work force but also informs women's self-perceptions, including their tendencies to both revise their career goals downward and to leave the workforce altogether (Boushey 2005; Cha 2013; Hewlett and Luce 2005; Stone 2007a; Stone 2007b). In contrast to women, men roundly benefit from their gender's labor associations, even experiencing enhanced career outcomes for their presumed reproductive obligations (re: bringing home the bacon) as father and husband (Correll et al. 2007; Glauber 2008; Kilbourne et al. 1994). There are multiple reasons why fatherhood is likely to boost a man's career trajectory. Having a family may make the individual man seem like a more dependable worker, since his responsibilities make him appear more stable than the stereotypical bachelor (Coltrane 2004). Fatherhood is also another box ticked on the checklist of hegemonic masculinity, and the fatherhood bonus is enhanced for each hegemonic attribute that the working father embodies, including whiteness, working a white-collar job, and being in a traditional, heterosexual union (Hodges and Budig 2010).

A man's ability to embody the hegemonic masculinity of an archetypal worker, therefore, appears to be positively correlated with his career trajectory. Women's careers, however, suffer for their familial duties because employers and colleagues



perceive female workers as being *naturally* pulled away from the workforce by the family (Benard and Correll 2010; Coltrane 2004; Coltrane and Adams 2008; Mahaffy and Ward 2002; Roth 2006), yet it is clear that no such association is made between maleness and family. According to our hegemonic coupling model, it follows that men's perceived "nature" as paid workers and not caregivers means that employers and colleagues see marriage as a relationship wherein a man outsources reproductive labor onto his (presumably female) spouse, freeing him up to be remain available as an employee. The fact that a traditional, heterosexual union is one of the bonus-enhancing statuses for men (Hodges and Budig 2010) only supports the outsourcing hypothesis, since two gay men in a relationship have no obvious female "outlet" to which they can outsource.

In short, the reproductive-feminine essentialist fallacy means women's attachment to roles such as homemaker, mother, and caregiver follows the narrative of cultural hegemony: a status quo that is framed as natural, inevitable, and beneficial (to men and the productive economy). This coupling is also, of course, framed as being in natural and inevitable conflict with a woman's potential as a paid worker. In sharp contrast, the productive-masculine fallacy translates to a man's reproductive role (breadwinner, father) being framed as enhancing his productive roles, since there's "no possible way" reproductive labor would pull the man out of the paid labor force—that would too sharply violate dominant narratives of masculinity. This pattern supports the theory that hegemonic coupling is itself an independent force of attitudinal bias.

Next we turn to arguably the most intensive reproductive labor role: childbearing. Parenthood only exacerbates the career-path divergence between men and

women. In fact, motherhood more strongly suppresses women's careers than does marriage (Hook and Pettit 2016; Metz and Tharenou 2001; Misra and Strader 2013; Schneider and Waite 2005). Parenthood is not only a bigger commitment than marriage alone (to wit: it is a near-compulsory form of reproductive labor once the role is first adopted), but motherhood is even more tightly culturally coupled with femininity than is wifedom. Rindfuss et al. (1999) suggest that women's widely recognized conflict between work and family is primarily a conflict between work and parenthood, which incorporates childbearing, domestic labor duties, and nurturing duties in a single role (Hays 1997; Hochschild 1989). Although attitudes in recent decades have shifted toward believing that women can be effective mothers and workers (Goldin 2006; Hollister and Smith 2014; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001), and employment policies have become more family friendly (Farber 2009; Hollister and Smith 2014; Kelly and Dobbin 1999), these "progressive" trends still only support women who choose either paid work or the juggling of paid work with other roles and, unsurprisingly, have not translated into much measurable progress in men's roles (Friedman 2015).

As in the work force, men's roles in the home remain largely consistent (and privileged) over time. Men do less household labor than do women, regardless of their own employment status or that of their partner (Hochschild 1989; Stone 2007a). In fact, research finds only minor progress in men's engagement with any reproductive labor roles over the last several decades (Bianchi et al. 2000; Bianchi et al. 2006; Sayer 2005; Williams 1995). Moreover, there is substantial evidence that, even when the sexes cross gender boundaries, they still "do gender," and engage with their labor in ways that

neutralize rather than condone gender deviance. Household work done by men still tends to take on distinctly masculine characteristics (Bianchi et al. 2000; Maume 2008; Raley et al. 2012). When men do take on the responsibilities of homemaking, it is typically for economic reasons rather than personal preference (Chesley 2011), indicating continued resistance to truly de-gendered divisions of labor. Women are complicit in this process as well, as when women who earn more than their husbands increase their own time spent doing housework (Brines 1994; Goldstein 2000). This type of gender neutralization could be considered a way of protecting traditional gender-labor narratives that are otherwise threatened by people's pragmatic choices: preserving the hegemonic coupling that is the clearest path to success.

#### *An Important Note Concerning Labor Hegemony*

It is both theoretically and ethically important to remember the central assertion from Marxist Feminist theory regarding gendered labor relations: reproductive labor is not inherently of lower value than productive labor. Rather, both types of labor are equally prerequisite to maintaining the conditions for life and society (Vogel 2013). Reproductive labor activities have been *relatively* devalued because of three major conflicts: their historical association with marginalized (re: feminine) gender characteristics, their historical-coincidental lack of measurability in a capitalist economic system, and the fact that they draw from the same pool of human time, energy, and material resources necessary to generate economically measurable outcomes such as market products, income, and profit.

In the preceding sections, we have traced the key fronts waged by Western feminists toward gender equality. Summarily comparing these fronts yields an

important insight: achieving greater gender *equality* via the current epistemology seems to hinge on supporting traditional labor *inequality*. The most successful efforts to date have focused on generating equality in education and the paid work force, which only endorses cultural reverence for the same productive labor force that systematically marginalizes women. Other efforts have emphasized freeing women to choose their individual levels of engagement with each sphere of labor (saving men that dilemma). While this approach has seen moderate success, women are still unilaterally penalized for *any* involvement (voluntary or involuntary, real or perceived) with still-marginalized reproductive labor. Third, public policy initiatives have sought to offset and redistribute the burdens women face as a result of their essentialist ties to reproductive labor. However, since these policies seldom exhort men to change, they often serve to offset discontent with the status quo rather than challenge it. Finally, some cultural and policy initiatives have focused on pushing men into traditionally feminine fields or into taking on an equal share of reproductive labor, and those have met with little to no measurable success. In short, reproductive labor is still largely framed as a burden for the individual (of any gender, but mostly women) to juggle or avoid. This appears to be the natural consequence of a socioeconomic system that awards status and privilege based on economically measurable activity and cultural conformity. As we will discuss in the next section, advancing insight into the stalled gender revolution requires reframing our understandings of gender inequities as *fundamentally* embedded in cultural narratives of the value of labor.

## **The Problem of Understanding and Removing the Gender Revolution “Stall”**

### *Past Framings and Attempted Solutions*

To understand and alleviate the stall in the gender revolution requires clarity on how and why past efforts have only been partially successful at fostering equity. As we have seen, norms for the most privileged gender constructs (masculinity) are intensely bound up with productive labor contributions (Friedman and Weissbrod 2005; Kivel 2007; Sayer et al. 2004; Stone 2007b; Townsend 2002). The ideal worker model in contemporary, Western society is based on the archetypal image of a male full-time worker financially supporting a female stay-at-home caregiver who, in turn, supports the man’s commitment to productive labor (Acker 1990; Blair-Loy 2003; Williams 2001). The ideal-typical woman model previously focused strictly on fulfilling the domestic worker roles but, due in large part to civil unrest over exclusion from the most desirable roles, has evolved over time into a hybrid or second-shift worker. Men, however, embody success in their domestic roles automatically so long as they are successful full-time workers and providers (Friedman 2015). Both cases affirm reproductive labor as the subordinate role (i.e., it is neither necessary *nor* sufficient for personal success).

Western feminism identified productive labor’s importance early on and, as scripts promoting equality spread, men’s and women’s expectations for dividing work and family labor by gender somewhat converged from the middle to near the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but the convergence trend halted thereafter (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). Convergence was concentrated in the acceptance of women’s rising involvement in historically masculine roles and activities (Friedman 2015). In other words, embodying traditionally masculine qualities and roles became an avenue to

legitimacy for women, and so popular support for traditionally masculine activities (supporting the productive economy) expanded substantially. Literature on this progressive trend has labeled it “egalitarian essentialism” (Charles and Grusky 2004), a cultural narrative that merges support for intensive mothering (Hays 1997) with rhetoric emphasizing personal “choice” and gender “equality” (Stone 2007b). This narrative encourages women to “lean in” to work (Sandberg 2013) which, while central to the progress women have made, has some unintended (or at least problematic) implications. At the individual level, the “lean in” narrative tacitly encourages women to work Hochschild’s (1989) “second shift” without offering alternative options or prescribing compensating cultural and structural changes for men. At the societal level, the narrative reinforces the hegemony of productive over reproductive labor, since it prescribes paid employment as the key to equality, as opposed to any efforts to balance the two labor arenas. In other words, the desegregation of productive labor alone neither challenges the hegemony of productive labor and masculinity, nor questions their “natural” connection.

While efforts to reduce discrimination and increase institutional support for working women and especially mothers are undoubtedly positive (Kelly et al. 2011), evidence suggests that the pursuit of gender equality will remain incomplete without redefinition of masculinity and the labor activities deemed appropriate for men (England 2010). Alleviating the male-driven side of the gender stall requires a special focus on removing the cultural (more than structural) barriers to men’s success in stereotypically feminine roles—in short, redefining and de-hegemonizing masculinity (Friedman 2015). Hegemonic gender norms set expectations about what is

“appropriate” for the genders (Connell 1987; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; West and Zimmerman 1987). Although the standard perception is that society confers more privilege on masculine roles than feminine ones (Cohen and Huffman 2003; Connell 1987; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999), the natural side effect of masculine hegemony is increased consequences for males who deviate. The sociocultural constraints on hegemonic masculinity are much tighter, with definitions of ‘appropriate’ masculinity being much narrower, and sanctions upon men for violating them much steeper than those surrounding ‘appropriate’ femininity and conformity for women (Pascoe 2007).

Though young men and women both tend to express desires for egalitarian work and home arrangements, *both* tend to prioritize traditionally masculine (productive labor) roles if egalitarianism fails (Gerson 2010). So while both men and women endorse fairness, both will pursue the more advantaged roles if compromise cannot be achieved. It is far more acceptable in general that women fail to conform to traditional femininity—that they exhibit masculine qualities, participate in masculine activities, and occupy masculine roles—than that men deviate from masculinity into (lower status) femininity (Kivel 1992; Pascoe 2007). This may be because men, who are expected by default to conform to high-status masculinity, challenge the presumed value of masculinity by deviating from it, while women who pursue traditionally masculine qualities tacitly endorse the greater value of those qualities. This finding validates our assertion that it is the hegemonic cultural arrangement—masculinity dominating femininity, productive labor dominating reproductive—rather than the physical domination of one sex by another, that is culturally more sacred in contemporary society. It logically follows that this arrangement would lead to (1) both men and

women avoiding the disadvantaged roles and (2) statistical disadvantage for women, who are circumstantially, culturally, and structurally more tied to those roles than are men. The traditional gender-labor arrangement, the current one, and the steps leading between them all support the conclusion that the gender-essentialization of labor is a potent force perpetuating inequality.

*Placing Gender and Labor in International Perspective*

Approaching the problems of gender and labor hegemony from an international lens provides unique opportunities for insight into problems of hegemonic coupling because, while most states with available data have long traditions of masculine/productive labor hegemonies and feminist efforts to address them, the institutional and policy environments tend to vary much more widely between countries/administrations than between regions of a single country or sectors of its labor force. Further, there is substantial evidence (e.g., Artazcoz et al. 2016; Bambra et al. 2009; Chung et al. 2013; Hallden et al. 2016; Misra and Strader 2013; Xavier et al. 2014) that state-level contexts—and most especially the institutional arrangement of the welfare regime—have pronounced effects on the outcomes of male and female workers' balancing of productive and reproductive labor responsibilities. There is even some evidence that citizens of particular nations may view generous welfare regimes less favorably than their otherwise-liberal gender norms would suggest (Bozendahl and Olafsfottir 2008).

Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1999) work represents the current gold standard on classifying welfare regimes. The Esping-Andersen model classifies countries into three general clusters based on their dispositions toward labor and gender role conflict:



conservative, liberal, and social-democratic. Countries in each of the three archetypes feature distinct patterns of social policy and varying levels of gender equality (Mandle and Shalev 2009). Conservative countries such as Germany, Italy, and Japan have strong breadwinner/homemaker arrangements, lower rates of female labor force participation, and higher rates of female economic dependence. Liberal countries such as the United States feature looser gendered arrangements, a free-market ideology, and lower levels of state intervention, including interventions concerning parental leave and childcare (Mandel 2009). Social-democratic states, such as those of the Scandinavian peninsula, have extensive welfare systems and social policies, including those focusing on family leave, as well as comparatively low levels of gender inequality.

Of interest, none of these institutional arrangements on its own appears to fully un-stall the gender revolution. Although some have more success than others, there appears to be no specific arrangement that reliably overrides the cultural inertia of the gender-labor hegemonic coupling. Even when policies and institutions such as paid parental leave are implemented or improved, without addressing cultural hegemonies, they can actually suppress women's employment, career trajectories, wages, economic independence, and generally widen the gaps between men's and women's career trajectories (Budig et al. 2012; Hook 2010; Mandel 2009). Further, these unintended consequences may be the worst for poorer women (Budig and Hodges 2010, 2014)<sup>1</sup>, who represent an even lower-hegemony group than women in general. Women living in these institutional regimes may end up temporarily or permanently exiting the labor force to address reproductive labor goals and obligations. They then stop accumulating

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<sup>1</sup> These conclusions are somewhat disputed in the literature (e.g., Killewald and Bearak 2014; England et al. 2016).

the human and social capital that their male counterparts continue accruing, employers develop statistical discrimination practices favoring men for their more predictable career paths, men reinforce employers' expectations by avoiding the "mistakes" of women, and women become locked into lower-status careers that are compatible with their dual commitments (Mandel 2012; Mandel and Semyonov 2005; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). In other words, institutional arrangements designed to combat inequality may actually enhance it. Policies appear unable to override the cultural constructs tying women to reproductive labor (Deven and Moss 2002). Instead, if they fail to address hegemonic couplings directly, they tend to be coopted to reinforce the systematically stratified status quo (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Stier et al. 2001).

On the other hand, policies that directly target and challenge cultural frameworks—such as those that are developed on the explicit premise of both sexes caring for children—prove substantially more successful in decoupling hegemonies (Haas 1992; Hook 2006). European policies vary widely in parental leave availability, usage, and regard for gender asymmetries (Deven 2011). Those that offer generic parental leave, such as in Denmark, France, Germany, and Poland, typically see it relegated to usage by women, with negative consequences and a perpetuated status quo. The old activist maxim that silence in the face of oppression is tacit support for the oppressor appears to apply here: a gender-neutral policy, interpreted through a hegemonic lens, tends to be perceived and employed in support of the status quo. To wit, generic parental leave is seen as being implemented to allow women to perform their "natural" reproductive labor while still pursuing paid employment.

States such as Iceland, Finland, Sweden, and Canadian province of Quebec have implemented policies that are deliberately asymmetrical (Deven 2011; Patnaik 2013). They challenge default cultural assumptions by targeting men: making a portion of parental leave only available to fathers, providing additional time if fathers take it, offering monetary incentives for leave shared equally between partners, and so on. These policies explicitly challenge hegemonic couplings by incentivizing deviance from those couplings. Such hegemony-challenging initiatives have profound potential for downstream effects. Fathers' usage of parental leave is also associated with other hegemonic deviations, such as an increase in household labor hours and greater participation in childcare labor (Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011; Tanaka and Waldfogel 2007). There is even some evidence that suggests that these structural changes, if given time to become normalized, feed into new cultural associations that normalize and destigmatize men's roles as reproductive laborers: new, more equal, perhaps less hegemonic couplings (Rangecroft 2016).

Importantly, there is reason to believe that some of these cultural changes may be a result of a trend toward postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1971, 1997, 2004). Evidence suggests (Dalton 2013; Inglehart 2008) that postmaterial scripts (which include gender egalitarianism both generally and in the labor force) may proliferate under conditions of greater wealth and equality: a "rising tide raises all boats" effect. However, wealth and development levels are relatively homogenous among many of the countries in this sample (with some exceptions), including among those from different welfare regime categories. While personal demographic factors likely play a role in egalitarian (re: postmaterialist) values, and are also connected to attitudes toward the

welfare state (Reingold and Smith 2012), the evidence discussed here strongly implicates the macro-level context of the welfare regime itself as a key variable and point of greatest leverage for inquiry. As such, I position an indicator of social welfare regime type at the center of the predictive model in Analysis 3.

## Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

### Setting Up the Hegemonic Coupling Framework

#### *Gaining Better Theoretical Vision on the Hegemonic Coupling*

It is important to note that the success of a few countries' policy regimes may seem idiosyncratic or coincidental at first glance. Indeed, in both popular and scholarly circles the relative gender egalitarianism found in the Scandinavian nations is often treated as the inscrutable or at least non-transferrable result of some perfect storm specific to those states (Borchorst and Siim 2008; Zahidi 2014). Our journey through these phenomena suggests that, to the contrary, there may be a clear theoretical thread connecting the relative success of the Scandinavian states with the comparative struggle in the rest of the developed world: policy regimes that explicitly challenge hegemonic couplings. If this assessment is accurate—if explicit challenge via carefully crafted policy is needed—then researchers and policy developers need better conceptual and empirical vision on these phenomena, their murky cultural definitions, and systematic interrelationships.

#### *Classical Marxist Thought on Labor, Class, and Gender*

Marxist theories of gender and labor are especially germane to inquiry into pernicious inequalities because they are preeminent in their treatment of gender, labor, and class as interconnected constructs. The Marxist tradition is also the home of concepts of cultural and gendered hegemony, which form the basis of this project. Marx and Engels, in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, assert that oppression based on sex began as far back as pre-agricultural societies with the sexual division of labor and the rise to prominence of productive labor (as farming,

pastoralism, and trading) as the dominant mode in society (Engels [1884] 1972).

According to Engels ([1884] 1972), the emphasis on private ownership and material production as status vehicles led to practices that shaped the family into an institution for supporting the productive labor market: men could offset necessary but unprofitable duties onto women, and they could retain property accrued through labor by passing it along state-legitimated bloodlines. As production was the male sphere of activity, men were the recognized owners of property, granting them power over public and private matters. This primacy translated into ownership (both legal and cultural) of their own family members and those persons' labor capacities. While the historical accuracy of some of these assertions has been a topic of considerable debate (Knight 2012), the tradition they began contributed prominently to much of early feminist thought and later schools of Marxist and Material Feminism.

#### *Contemporary Marxist Feminist Thought on Labor, Class, and Gender*

The Marxist Feminist tradition takes the Marxist maxim that labor lies at the core of human social systems and expands upon it to divide labor into two connected yet distinct categories: productive labor, which generates the goods and services that circulate through society for profit, and reproductive labor, which encompasses the labor necessary to produce and sustain human life (Vogel 2013). The production system itself (specifically but not necessarily capitalism) and the gendered division of labor types are instrumental in both structural and cultural gender inequality. As much of what is traditionally regarded as women's labor is not recognized in this economic system (Ferguson and Hennessy 2010), both the system that devalues said labor and the

fact that women are restricted to performing it (and performing it in conditions of cultural devaluation) are foundational pillars in a gender stratification system.

The Material Feminist tradition grew out of Marxist feminism to emphasize gender relations in regards to class struggle, while attempting to avoid the gender essentialist fallacies of the dominant feminist views from the previous era (Hennessy 1993; 1997). Material feminism is rooted in the premise that, rather than essential differences between the sexes, a complex web of material, social, and psychological relationships (in which labor relations are instrumental) is at the root of gender inequality (Ferguson 1994). Feminists in this tradition have extended their scope into the realm of intersectional feminism, where the school's focus tends to be on the intersection of statuses that make an individual more or less vulnerable to exploitation within the labor system (Mitchell 2013). The importance of the Marxist/Material feminist lineage is that it is a paradigm that frames gender and labor inequalities as co-emergent, intersectional phenomena. The implication of recognizing these complex interrelationships is that, to truly understand them, we must correctly untangle each piece as well as its connections to the others. That implication directly motivates this project's mode of inquiry.

#### *New Theoretical Model: Hegemonic Coupling*

A hegemonic coupling (HC) is a pairing of two (or more) hegemonic statuses that reinforce, sustain, and amplify one another. As a rule, such statuses have typically been coupled so long that they are framed in popular cultural narratives as “naturally” paired: masculinity and paid employment, or femininity and caregiving, for example. The central hypothesis of this project is that hegemonic couplings contribute to

persistent, complex, and intersectional inequalities, independent of any other forces involved. Any negative consequences of a coupling, such as asymmetrical privilege or discrimination, cannot be dealt with by only addressing the privilege of one status (e.g., masculinity) without the other (e.g., paid labor). Any strategy that does so will simply shift the power imbalance without dismantling it. The quintessential example of this is the 20<sup>th</sup> century's pattern of relatively upper-class, white women achieving substantial gains in labor equity while shifting the burdens they previously endured onto women of poorer means, women of color, immigrant women, and other disadvantaged groups.

To dismantle a hegemonic coupling, hegemonies and the relationships between them must first be correctly identified, and then both/all dimensions of the power imbalance must be addressed in close proximity. The necessity of comprehensive reform is evidenced by the fact that gender equality was not simply achieved by pushing more women into adopting traditionally masculine roles. Instead, we find that there exists substantial need for men to move into traditionally feminine roles, as well as for women to not abandon them entirely (Aumann et al. 2011; Friedman 2015). These needs exist in the present because they are necessary to address oversights in gender and labor revolutions of decades past. Had those past revolutionary efforts been able to properly frame gender and labor inequalities in their relationships to one another, and thus identify how changes in one field would affect dynamics in the other, such needs may have been addressed in the natural course of social change. The fine resolution of hindsight, of course, is what makes this project possible.

The gendered nature of the paid labor force can be characterized thus: standards of “success,” “value,” and “privilege” are culturally tied to productive labor



participation, they are characterized as inherently masculine, and they stand in antagonism to both femininity and reproductive labor involvement. I propose that all of these relationships are artifacts of the hegemonic coupling between multiple statuses advantaged in the economic system. The traditionally masculine, hegemonic labor-force status of wage earning has been sexually desegregated by women's entry in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but none of its actual hegemony has been attenuated. In other words, although people regardless of sex are mostly accepted as viable participants in the paid labor force, this is only so long as they conform to the "good worker" model that is based on hegemonic conceptions of masculinity. Meanwhile, scripts equating valuable labor with paid labor, success with employment, caregiving with femininity, femininity with low prestige, and family involvement with underemployment still predominate the cultural narrative.

Because these constructs and their associated qualities are inherently culturally and psychologically muddled, social science research cannot reliably represent a person's attitudes toward gender and labor equality as a monolithic disposition. An employer who is egalitarian toward men and women in the paid labor force may still hold considerable bias against parents, which represents an implicit discrimination toward women. Men who express egalitarian attitudes toward household labor duties may maintain those attitudes while subconsciously gravitating toward traditionally masculine activities and marginalizing "women's work." Women who espouse gender egalitarianism in all types of labor may still denigrate the stay-at-home dad for failing to exhibit hegemonic masculinity. In other words, any two people who appear equally gender egalitarian at face value or on a survey instrument may have wildly divergent

attitudes about facets of the gender-labor arena. The list of examples is almost infinite, but each hypothetical “contradiction” is readily tied back to subtle hegemonies that reinforce one another.

Traditional survey instruments fail to treat measurement of gender and labor ideologies with appropriate nuance. Any two scale-based questions that may seem to both be measuring the progressiveness of a respondent’s values can easily conflate substantively distinct dimensions of the gender-labor coupling.

- A measure asking whether women should be paid equally to men for equal work addresses attitudes about gender equity in the productive labor force, but it fails to properly account for the gendering and hegemony of productive labor. Productive labor is culturally masculinized and (partially as a result of this masculinity) assumed to be superior. Thus, the survey measure is effectively asking the respondent whether a woman’s claim to equal access to masculine privilege is legitimate or not. The measure indicates little about whether the respondent actually holds masculinity and femininity in equal esteem.
- A measure asking whether men should do an equal share of housework when both they and their female partners are gainfully employed addresses attitudes about gender in reproductive labor but, again, fails to account for the gendering and hegemony of labor. Reproductive labor is culturally feminized and regarded as a burden compared to “naturally” superior masculine-productive work. Thus, the item measures whether the respondent sees a man’s gendered privilege of avoiding feminization (re: devaluation) as legitimate or not. Again, it indicates little about actual regard for gender constructs.

- In both of these two examples, questions that seem to be asking for information about people’s attitudes toward gendered labor equality are actually committing two essentialist fallacies: (1) tying particular types of labor to gendered identities, and (2) assuming the superiority of one labor-gender coupling over the other. The result is that each measure contributes to answering the question, “Do men and women deserve equal access to or protection from the natural superiority of productive over reproductive labor and masculinization over feminization?”
- As a counter example, a more theoretically nuanced and useful measure might ask, “How equally should new mothers and fathers share paid parental leave?” The phrasing of this question directly addresses a gender-based division of productive and reproductive labor, but it leaves out hegemonic assumptions. It asks how the parents should distribute *both* types of labor, and it emphasizes that any hypothetical reproductive labor done would replace the more advantaged productive labor. Furthermore, because the measure asks about *paid* leave, it at least partially negates gender-stereotyped assumptions such as that the father’s leave from work would impact family income more than the mother’s leave. In short, this question much more narrowly measures the respondent’s attitudes about both the gendering and hegemony of labor involvement.

The above are just examples of how measures that seem to target a single ideological stance (i.e., gender egalitarianism) may make assumptions that skew their validity and interpretability.

Because gender and labor constructs define one another, they inevitably skew respondents' answers to seemingly straight-forward survey measures. People from wildly different walks of life may appear ideologically similar as a result. What is probably not as muddled are the relative prestige levels of various statuses and their alternatives: productive labor is regarded more highly than reproductive labor, masculine qualities more highly than feminine ones, breadwinning responsibilities more than caregiving ones, and so on. The hegemonic coupling model's goal is to inform survey instruments and statistical models that accurately measure people's gendered labor attitudes by isolating the nuanced couplings of gender, labor, and prestige. Investigations that respect these couplings are more properly positioned to identify which attitudinal constructs and demographic groups may be lagging behind and "stalling" continued efforts to achieve gender equality.

## Chapter 4: Research Design, Methodology, and Data

### Data

#### *Data Set*

The data for this project come from the 2012 wave of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP is a continuing annual programme (begun in 1985) of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics important for social science research. It brings together pre-existing social science projects and coordinates research goals, thereby adding a cross-national, cross-cultural perspective to the individual national studies. The ISSP researchers especially concentrate on developing questions that are meaningful and relevant to all countries and can be expressed in an equivalent manner in all relevant languages (ISSP 2010).

The 2012 wave consists principally of a “Family and Changing Gender Roles” module that is repeated every few years. The 2012 wave is the fourth repetition in the series, having been previously administered in 2002, 1994, and 1988. The raw data set contains data from 40 countries, with 60,753 unique cases and 413 variables. I have narrowed this sample to OECD countries and then divided those into theoretically distinct categories based on the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) tripartite model of liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes. The current sample includes the following countries (listed here according to social welfare regime):

1. Liberal Welfare Regime: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, United States
2. Conservative Welfare Regime: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, South Korea,
3. Social Democratic Welfare Regime: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden

4. Non-Categorized<sup>2</sup> States: Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey

This is the list of OECD countries in the data set with data available for this module and wave.

Using a cutoff of OECD membership helps produce a sample that can most reliably answer the questions motivating this investigation. First, due to having more developed infrastructures and more stable governments/infrastructure, OECD countries are more robustly represented among the measures in the data set than are other countries. Further, the tripartite set of OECD membership criteria (OECD 2016) selects for labor markets that are most likely to demonstrate the types of subtle biases upon which the hegemonic coupling model is based:

1. Democracy and respect for human rights: Countries that do not meet the OECD's basic standards of participatory government and human equity are unlikely to have achieved a level of *gender* equity that would make looking for subtle and pernicious biases meaningful. In short, such countries often have a starkly gendered division of labor and often reject women's full, basic participation in civil society.
2. An open market economy: An open market economy is a foundational assumption of Hegemonic Coupling Theory in that the theory is based on the

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<sup>2</sup> This category catches OECD countries that have not been or cannot be typified in the Esping-Andersen framework. While Esping-Andersen (1999) has explored frameworks with more than three categories, he warns that the resolution gained from them may not be worth the parsimony sacrificed. As this project already pushes the boundaries to establish new theoretical frameworks, I have opted to use the most well-established framework on welfare regimes as a stable base upon which to build my analyses. To simply omit the non-categorized countries from analysis would introduce non-random sample selection to the models, so I have created a catch-all category for them. Future analyses using hegemonic coupling could provide insight into where these countries might fall in the Esping-Andersen framework based on how they score relative to countries whose regime type is already established.

assumption of a long cultural history of privileging male wage-earners in the paid labor market.

3. GDP per capita (PPP) at least as high as the poorest OECD member: While no specific level of GDP can be said to directly predict a corresponding level of gender equity—and in fact some research suggests that the causal arrow in fact runs in the direction of gender equity increasing GDP (McKindsey and Company 2016)—level of development does broadly correspond with an expansion of human rights (Barro 2001). Given that Hegemonic Coupling Theory specifically applies to the contexts of more highly developed states, the OECD cutoff represents a vetted, relatively non-arbitrary developmental boundary for our sample.

Finally, in exploratory analysis, I have excluded all variables in the original data set that are not relevant to my theoretical model. I have also tested for and removed some missing data where appropriate.

#### *Demographics of the Sample*

I present the sample ( $N = 37,632$ ) demographics in tables 4.01-4.03, which can be found in the Appendix (p. 120). Respondents' ages range from 15 to 102, with a mean age of 48.49 years, with a standard deviation of 17.40. Years of education range from 0 to 30, with a mean attainment of 12.63 years, with a standard deviation of 4.21. This means the average respondent has approximately completed a high school education, while one standard deviation lower correlates with completing junior high school and one standard deviation higher correlates with a university degree. Regarding sex, 54.5% of the sample is female, and 45.5% is male. Concerning marital status,

24.54% of sample respondents have never been married, 58.09% are currently married, and 17.37% have been married in the past but are not currently. Regarding employment status, 9.5% of the sample has never been gainfully employed, 33.92% of the sample has been employed previously but is not currently, and 56.59% of the sample is currently employed. The “Formerly Employed” status does not specify reason for dropping out of the work force (e.g., age, childbirth, disability, etc.), so it is likely a heterogeneous group.

Concerning residential status, 31.80% of the sample lives in a rural region or village, 26.80% of the sample lives in an area designated a town by nation’s relative standards, 15.77% of the sample lives in a suburban area, and 25.63% lives in a city. Regarding self-reported health status, 24.35% of sample respondents report their health being “Poor” to “Fair,” 36.56% report “Satisfactory” health, and 39.08% report their health being “Good” to “Excellent.” I created the measure containing data on respondents’ household incomes as a relative measure. Using STATA’s “xtile” command, I divided country-specific sub-samples into quintiles based on the earning range of that particular nation, and then I merged the country-level variables into a single international-level measure. This measure does not provide insight into the income distribution of the sample, and there was no country-level income data for Turkey.

Regarding frequency of religious attendance, 32.77% of the sample do not ever attend religious services. 41.17% of the sample attend religious services a few times per year or less, 9.37% attend at least once per month or more, and 16.69% attend at least once per week or more. Concerning the Esping-Andersen welfare regime typology,



16.02% of the sample falls into the “Liberal” regime category, 33.30% falls into the “Conservative” regime category, and 10.86% falls into the “Social Democratic” regime category. The distribution of this measure relates specifically to the fact that Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology does not seek to distribute countries evenly, and far more of the world falls into the Conservative category than the other two types. Moreover, this typology doesn’t account at all for many states in the developed world, which is why the “Non-Categorized” type composes so much of the sample (39.82%).

Note that Table 4.03 (p. 122) contains country-level distributions of the sample, which are not elaborated upon here.

## **Measures**

### *Observed and Latent Measures for Analysis*

This project uses twelve key measures as the focal point of its analysis. The twelve measures are grouped into three sets of four using confirmatory factor analysis, and then each set is used to construct one of three latent measures. Each latent measure represents a theoretically distinct facet of a person’s gender-labor ideology. Observed measures do not overlap across latent constructs. The makeup of the constructs is as follows.

- 1) **Latent Construct:** De-Gendered Conception of Labor (DGCL): This measure explores the original question posed in this project by measuring the respondent’s views about how inherently gendered or gender-appropriate is a particular type of labor. It is coded such that higher scores represent gender-neutral conceptions of labor, while lower scores represent more traditional, gender-essentialist conceptions of labor. The usefulness of this measure serves as a direct indicator the hegemonic

coupling model's applicability to the field of gender-labor research. This construct is composed of four observed measures:

- a) "If both [parents] are in a similar work situation and are eligible for paid leave, how should this paid leave period be divided between the mother and the father?"
  - i) Possible answers: Mother entire, father not any; Mother most, father some; Mother and father half; Father most, mother some; Father entire, mother not any. Excluded responses: Can't choose; No answer; Not applicable.
- b) "Consider a family with a child under school age. What, in your opinion, is the best way for them to organize their family and work life?"
  - i) Possible answers: Mother at home, father full-time; Mother part-time, father full-time; Both mother and father full-time, Both mother and father part-time; Father part-time, mother full-time; Father at home, mother full-time. Excluded responses: Can't choose; No answer.
- c) "To what extent do you agree or disagree ... ? A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family."
  - i) Possible answers: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree. Excluded responses: Can't choose; No answer.
- d) "To what extent do you agree or disagree ... ? A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children."
  - i) Possible answers: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree. Excluded responses: Can't choose; No answer.

- 2) **Latent construct:** Gender Equality in Reproductive Labor (GERL): This measure addresses the critique set forth at the end of Chapter 3 by measuring how the respondent treats men's claims to avoiding feminine-reproductive roles versus women's obligations to them. It is coded such that higher scores indicate that a man spends more time engaged in reproductive labor relative to his female partner. It is composed of four observed measures<sup>3</sup> interacted with the sex of the respondent:
- a) "In your household who does the following things ... ? Who does the laundry?"
    - i) Possible answers: Always wife; Usually wife; About equal or both together; Usually husband; Always husband. Excluded responses: No partner; Is done by a third person; Can't choose; No answer.
  - b) "In your household who does the following things ... ? Cares for sick family members?"
    - i) Possible answers: Always wife; Usually wife; About equal or both together; Usually husband; Always husband. Excluded responses: No partner; Is done by a third person; Can't choose; No answer.
  - c) In your household who does the following things ... ? Does the household cleaning?"
    - i) Possible answers: Always wife; Usually wife; About equal or both together; Usually husband; Always husband. Excluded responses: No partner; Is done by a third person; Can't choose; No answer.

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<sup>3</sup> It is worth noting that the measures for the GERL construct are behavioral (account of division of labor) rather than attitudinal, and that responses to this question require that the respondent have a partner. While the possibility of conceptual heterogeneity exists, it is unlikely given the relatively homogenous loadings found in analysis 2 and the relatively predictable findings in analysis 3. Further, given that the ISSP 2012 Module exclusively focused on gender and family roles, the number of respondents who were partnerless was quite small, resulting in no substantial difference in sample sizes for any of the three latent measures.

- d) “In your household who does the following things ... ? Prepares the meals?”
  - i) Possible answers: Always wife; Usually wife; About equal or both together; Usually husband; Always husband. Excluded responses: No partner; Is done by a third person; Can’t choose; No answer.

3) **Latent construct:** Gender Equality in Productive Labor (GEPL): This measure addresses the critique set forth at the end of Chapter 3 by measuring how the respondent sees women’s claim to avoiding traditionally feminine-reproductive roles and entering traditionally masculine ones. It is coded such that higher scores indicate more acceptance of a woman distancing herself from reproductive labor activity while entering into the paid labor force (a “progressive” view of the subject). It is composed of four observed measures:

- a) “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all under the following circumstances: when there is a child under school age?”
  - i) Possible answers: Work full-time; Work part-time; Stay at home. Excluded responses: Can’t Choose; No answer.
- b) “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all under the following circumstances: after the youngest child starts school?”
  - i) Possible answers: Work full-time; Work part-time; Stay at home. Excluded responses: Can’t Choose; No answer.
- c) “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.”

i) Possible answers: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree;  
Disagree; Strongly disagree. Excluded responses: Can't choose; No answer.

d) "Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job."

i) Possible answers: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree;  
Disagree; Strongly disagree. Excluded responses: Can't choose; No answer.

In addition to the key latent constructs, the analytical models include controls for age, years of education, employment, marital status, rural/urban residence, self-reported health, religious attendance, self-reported income, and Esping-Andersen welfare regime type.

### **Research Design**

This project produces three distinct but related empirical analyses. Each analysis focuses on uncovering meaningful information for the subsequent analysis to build on so, while each analysis constitutes a distinct chapter, the three empirical chapters tell a unified story.

- Analysis 1 focuses on describing the characteristics of the data set, highlighting anomalous attitudinal distributions in the population in an effort to support the theoretical model's face validity. If it is valid, we would expect to find anomalies most prevalent in the measures representing the DGCL latent concept.
- Analysis 2 employs measures identified in Analysis 1, using structural equation modeling to construct three competing measurement models (and attempting a fourth) representing distinct theoretical interpretations of the subject of gender-labor ideology. The model that (if best fit) supports the hegemonic coupling hypothesis is the 3-factor model (Model 2).

- Analysis 3 takes the best-fit measurement model identified by Analysis 2 and uses it to inform a structural model with predictors and controls. Predictive relationships identified by Analysis 3 provide insight into where the three facets of gender-labor ideology overlap and depart from one another. According to the hegemonic coupling hypothesis, we should expect a stronger social welfare regime, as well as some micro-level indicators related to postmaterial values (education, income, etc.), to correlate positively with gender egalitarianism on our latent attitudinal measures, though with some unpredictability surrounding the DGCL measure.

## Chapter 5: Analysis 1

### Rationale and Methods

#### *Rationale for Analysis 1*

The theoretical complexity of this project makes thorough understanding of the data set especially important. The first analysis focuses on describing the data set's parameters, the distribution of key measures, and gives special attention to meaningful data patterns that I use to inform subsequent analyses. Of special importance in this section are findings related to skews in the gender attitude variables. Although answers to the attitudinal measures all exist on a scale of at least three-to-six points, some of the response distributions are dramatically skewed. For example, on the question asking "If both [parents] are in a similar work situation and are eligible for paid leave, how should this paid leave period be divided between the mother and the father?", answers range from very traditional "Mother entire, father not any" to the exact inverse "Father entire, mother not any." However, despite 30,228 unique respondents to this question, less than three percent of the sample answered that the father should take any more than half the responsibility for parenting. In some cases, despite multiple thousands of respondents representing a given country, the number of respondents from that country who said that the father should take any more than half the parenting duties was in the single digits or even zero.

Because the type of skew described above has direct implications for the theoretical foundation of this project, it is worth spending significant time investigating descriptive distributions within the data. In some cases, findings are surprising and raise new questions, while in others distributions are quite in the realm of expectation. In the

survey measure described above, respondents from the more conservative country of Japan actually indicated that men should take on more parenting responsibilities than did respondents from ostensibly more liberal United States. Although neither country's respondents tended toward truly egalitarian labor distribution, this finding goes against conventional wisdom for the countries and bears further inquiry. Despite some interesting and meaningful anomalies, the distributions of responses across country and across welfare regime type form a recognizable pattern that helps confirm the applicability of Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1999) typology of conservative, liberal, and social-democratic countries for analyses that follow. The anomalies, however, point to some unexpected findings in the structural models used later in Analysis 3.

#### *Methods for Analysis 1*

For the first analysis, I begin by examining percentage distribution of answers to the twelve substantive questions in the data set in sets of four based on their theoretical categories: those concerning a de-gendered conception of labor, those concerning distribution of household labor, and those concerning acceptance of women's involvement in the paid labor force. I observe some interesting patterns (and absence of patterns) in these data, and then I connect them to patterns observed at the level of the social welfare regime. Finally, I present the mean answer for each question by welfare regime as a means of distilling the insights gained from answer distributions. I also provide a comparison of sex-based distributions of answers. The tables for this section are presented in the Appendix (p. 123).



## **Findings**

### *Results for Analysis 1: De-Gendered Conception of Labor*

The first four factors I discuss in this section are those which represent the most theoretically novel of the three latent variables. They represent the degree to which respondents' conceptions of labor roles are inherently gendered. That is: whether they see a particular labor activity (e.g., working for pay outside the home, taking care of one's own children, etc.) as having an innately masculine or feminine character, how appropriate/desirable it is for a person of a particular gender identity to conform to, or deviate from, the type of labor traditionally ascribed to their normative gender roles, and so on. These tables are rather large and unwieldy, so I present them with countries sorted in descending order on a category I deem as the most progressive of available answers. This sorting is a tool used for parsimony and does not carry with it theoretical implications of its own.

Question 1.1 asks respondents "If both [parents] are in a similar work situation and are eligible for paid leave, how should this paid leave period be divided between the mother and the father?" This question represents perhaps the most theoretically useful item in the entire data set thanks to its particular verbiage. By holding the work situations of each parent equivalent and specifying that the parental leave is paid, the question effectively isolates gender as the factor upon which the respondent's answer hinges.

The most striking country-level pattern in the data for this measure (Table 5.01, p. 123) is the extreme skew in respondents across all countries. In most countries, less than one percent of all respondents felt that the father should take more than half of the parenting responsibilities, despite the leave being paid and the mother's working

situation being ostensibly equal. This pattern remains true even in the most notoriously progressive countries, which don't look substantively different from the most conservative states. Where the country-level pattern begins to emerge is in the distribution of the first three answer categories. Respondents from famously progressive countries (and social democratic welfare regimes) appear to far more frequently believe that the new parents should share the paid leave equally and to less frequently believe that women ought to be responsible for most or all of the new child's care.

A second pattern of interest emerges when we look at the answer category that suggests that the new mother ought to take most of the parental leave but that the father ought to take some. While respondents from more gender-progressive countries still frequently select this response category, there are some anomalous rankings. Respondents from Japan, famously traditional where gender is concerned, chose this answer more frequently than any other country in the sample. South Korean and Chilean respondents also chose this answer with surprising frequency: approximately equal to that of Danish and Canadian respondents. By contrast, respondents from the United States, France, and Sweden chose this answer approximately as often as those from Poland and Turkey. However, unlike French and Swedish respondents (who far more often responded that leave should be divided equally), American respondents were as likely to feel that a women should take all of the leave and her husband none as were respondents from Poland and Spain. Some other countries present similar patterns of partially gendered labor distribution, including those in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Chile, Switzerland, and even Finland and Norway.

The distribution of answers across welfare regime typology (Table 5.02, p. 124) reveals some interesting patterns, as well. While respondents from social democratic regimes predictably favor more equality than the other types, the most frequent response from that sub-population was “Mother most, Father some.” Likewise, less than one percent of respondents from this type felt that fathers should take any more than half of the paid leave. Comparing respondents from liberal regimes to conservative regimes, we find that those from liberal regimes actually appear more traditionally minded on this measure. Liberal-regime respondents more frequently answered “Mother All” and “Mother Most,” and less frequently responded “Equal.” Respondents from non-categorized regimes also appeared strongly conservative. This may be because countries not included in the Esping-Andersen typology tend (with a few exceptions, such as Iceland) to be less developed, but it is difficult to make any concrete claims to that effect.

The sex-based answer distribution for this question (Table 5.03, p. 124) mirrors the country-level distribution, meaning that less than one percent of either men or women were likely to respond that men should take more than half of paid leave. Women responded slightly more frequently than men that the leave should be shared equally, though they less frequently said men should take more than half of paid leave.

Question 1.2 asks “Consider a family with a child under school age. What, in your opinion, is the best way for them to organize their family and work life?” This question describes the same labor tradeoff that was so useful in Question 1.1, but it does not have the same verbiage expressing neutrality of circumstances, so it is slightly less useful in that way. I have ordered this table (Table 5.04, p. 125) in descending order

based on the frequency that respondents answered that both parents should work part time. This answer category is the most progressive because it suggests both an even distribution of care and *also* that both parents are deviating somewhat from their prescribed labor norms.

We can see here the same answer skew as in Question 1.1: seldom do more than one percent of all respondents from a particular country answer that the father should take any more than half of the parenting responsibilities. Likewise, respondents from the same notoriously progressive countries most often gave gender-equitable answers (though a few, such as Spain, scored unexpectedly progressive on this question). While respondents from famously traditionalist countries such as those of East Asia and Eastern Europe predictably favored prescribed gender roles more often, respondents from countries such as Australia, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain also seemed to favor a significantly traditional division of the labor described by this question. Again we see a pattern that suggests some otherwise culturally distinct nations clustering quite closely at the traditional end of the response spectrum.

The welfare regime distribution for this question (Table 5.05, p. 125) is also similar to that of Question 1.1. Respondents from social democratic regimes most commonly of all regime types responded with one of the “Both” categories that describes mother and father adopting the same employment pattern, though the most common answer within this regime type was “Mother most, Father some.” Again, however, respondents from liberal regimes were more likely to give gender-traditionalist answers than were respondents from any of Esping-Andersen’s other

regime types. Respondents from non-categorized regimes again favored traditionalist answers.

The sex-based distribution of this question (Table 5.06, p. 125) follows the same pattern: less than one percent of respondents answered that men should be primary caregivers, and slightly fewer women than men felt that way. Women more often than men favored the wife working part time while the husband worked either full or part time, while men favored full-time employment for fathers and lower levels for mothers.

Question 1.3 asks, “To what extent do you agree or disagree ... ? A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family.” This question is quite similar to Question 1.2 in that it expressly addresses gender normative labor expectations but fails to use verbiage that sets a tone of neutrality for the respondent. I have ordered the table (Table 5.07, p. 126) for this question in descending order by those who strongly disagreed with the prescribed gender roles described. However, there is a limitation to these answer categories, since there is no way of telling which part of the prescription the respondent disagreed with, nor what he or she would substitute in its place.

Notably, this question does not see the same response-category skew as Questions 1.1 and 1.2. Answers are relatively evenly distributed, and the “Strongly Agree” category is actually the least represented across most countries. The same famously progressive countries cluster as most progressive on this measure, while the more conservative Asian and Eastern European countries cluster on the opposite end. Exceptions to this pattern include Japan, whose respondents strongly disagreed with the prescribed gender roles almost forty percent of the time, and Great Britain and the

United States, whose respondents strongly disagreed with them only around twenty percent of the time. It is worth pointing out, however, that respondents from these nations did “Disagree” with the prescription roughly forty percent of the time. The pattern here is less pronounced than previously, but still present: some of the more developed, Westernized countries look pronouncedly traditional depending on how we assess the data.

Regarding welfare regime distribution (Table 5.08, p. 127), we see a slight trend reversal from the previous two questions. While respondents from social democratic regimes most strongly disagreed with the prescriptive statement, respondents from liberal regimes more often felt neutral or disagreed than did their conservative-regime counterparts. However, this was not a complete trend shift, since respondents from conservative regimes more often “Strongly” disagreed and less often agreed. Respondents from non-categorized regimes were fairly evenly distributed on this measure, with a slight majority of them favoring the “Disagree” category.

The sex-based distribution of question 1.3 (Table 5.09, p. 127) follows a predictable pattern, with men more often agreeing and women more often disagreeing with the prescribed gender roles, though both men and women tended to either disagree or strongly disagree relative to any other category.

Finally, question 1.4 asks, “To what extent do you agree or disagree ... ? A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children,” and I have again ordered the table (Table 5.10, p. 128) by percent of a country’s respondents answering that they strongly disagreed with the prescribed gender role. This question is the most limited of the four in this category because it neither mentions men nor specifies what

the respondent would substitute in place of the prescription. However, it does address the reproductive labor role as inherently gendered and implies a tradeoff with the productive labor role.

Distribution of responses to this question is similar to that found in question 1.3, with a relatively even distribution that veers away from the “Strongly Agree” category. Again, Many progressive countries sit at the progressive end of this list, while traditionalist countries tend to cluster toward the traditional end. Japan again looks perhaps uncharacteristically progressive on this list, while the United States and Great Britain appear more traditional than one might expect. Both East and West Germany also appear higher on this list than those of previous questions, while Switzerland appears lower.

Regarding welfare regime (Table 5.11, p. 129), again respondents from social democratic regimes were most likely to strongly disagree with the gender-prescriptive statement, while being the least likely to agree at all. Respondents from conservative regimes were more likely to strongly agree than those from liberal regimes, but they were also more likely to strongly disagree. Respondents from non-categorized regimes leaned towards agreement and overall indicated traditionalist views.

The sex-based distribution of question 1.4 (Table 5.12, p. 129) tended to cluster toward the center, with fewer respondents either strongly agreeing or strongly disagreeing. Men tended to agree more while women tended to disagree more, though a substantial portion of respondents felt neutral about this prescription, which is difficult to interpret given that “Neutral” could mean indifference, a view that it should be up to the individual woman, or any of a number of other possibilities.

### *Results for Analysis 1: Distribution of Household Labor*

The following four survey items differ both conceptually and substantively from the previous four or the four that follow in the next section. Conceptually, these four specifically refer to the sphere of household/reproductive labor traditionally ascribed to women. They do not describe any tradeoff of labor roles but rather the tradeoff of one role between the sexes. They also do not address attitudes, but rather are a measure of actual (self-reported) time spent in household labor relative to that of one's spouse. I created these measures by interacting the respondent's sex with their response to the survey item, thus creating separate response variables for men and for women. I then reverse coded one of these two variables and merged it with the other. The end result is that lowest answer categories represent the wife doing a greater share of household labor, while the higher numbers represent the husband doing a greater share. While this does not speak directly to gender-labor ideology, it does reflect a person's implicit ideology based on his or her actions. As response distributions on the Questions 2.1 through 2.4 were more uniform and in line with expectations, I will discuss them as a whole, rather than separately, and point out anomalies between questions at the end. I have ordered the tables (Tables 5.13-5.24, pp. 130-137) in descending order based on the "Equal" household labor distribution response category.

Questions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 ask spouses in heterosexual relationships how large a share of the laundry, sick care, cleaning, and cooking (respectively) they do relative to their opposite-sex partner. Response distribution across all four measures forms somewhat predictable patterns. Respondents from famously progressive countries such as those of Northern and Western Europe (as well as Canada) tend to share each of



these tasks most equally of the countries represented in the data. East Asian and Eastern European countries tend to see women taking on most of the domestic labor activities. Much of continental Europe (as well as the United States) makes up the middle of the spectrum where women do most of said labor but men still do a substantial portion.

Anomalies in this pattern include the fact that couples in the United States tend to more equally share the tasks of doing the laundry and cooking than they do the tasks of sick care and household cleaning. Meanwhile, couples in Belgium share the laundry task less equitably than they do any other tasks. Couples in Eastern Europe (Slovenia, Poland, East Germany, Latvia) appear to share care for sick family members more equitably than they do other tasks. As a whole, though, country-level findings in this section reinforce rather than challenge conventional conceptions of how equitable households in various states tend to be relative to one another.

As far as welfare regime typology, respondents from social democratic and from liberal regimes both tended to favor more equal response categories than did members of conservative regimes. However, the preferred response category for both liberal and social democratic regime members was that the wife usually but not always performed the household tasks. Members of liberal regimes, however, indicated that women did “All” of the labor substantially more frequently than those of social democratic regimes. Respondents from conservative regimes leaned characteristically traditionalist, with women most often doing all or most of the household labor. Members of non-categorized regimes responded in a similar pattern.

Regarding sex distribution, both sexes seem to agree that men do the least sick care of all tasks, while they do the most cooking, with cleaning and laundry falling

somewhere in between. However, respondents of both sexes also report that women do the least sick care of all tasks, while they do the most laundry, with cleaning and cooking falling somewhere in the middle. Both sexes agree that sick care tends to be the task distributed most equally. Aside from these patterns, the most obvious point of interest is that, across all tasks, both men and women tend to report doing a greater share of the labor than their spouses report that they do. This means that either respondents of both sexes tend to over-report how much they themselves do, or they tend to under-report how much their spouses do, or both.

*Results for Analysis 1: Attitudes toward Women in Paid Labor*

I have grouped the following four items based on the theme of attitudes toward women's engagement with productive labor and as juxtaposed with their traditional roles in family labor. The items do not make mention of men's roles or tradeoffs between partners, nor do they directly address gender ideology. Instead, they point to the respondent's belief about whether there may be material/social consequences to a woman's traditional domains of child and family if she is to deviate from her prescribed roles. This group of measures serves as a proxy for the traditional feminist concern for equality between the sexes in freedom to access the paid labor force and avoid the stigma of "abandoning" the home. These measures, combined with those in the previous group (concerning distribution of household labor), represent the traditional ways of thinking about gender-labor scholarship. Together, they are intended to serve as a counterpoint to the more novel concepts represented by the questions in group 1. I have structured the tables for this section in descending order based on the percent of a country's population that reports that a woman's attachment to the paid labor force is

acceptable and free from consequence. A limitation of these questions is that they fail to distinguish institutional environment from ideology. In other words, if a respondent (for example) feels that a child may suffer if his or her mother works, the verbiage of these questions does not allow us to distinguish whether the respondent feels this suffering comes from the absence of a caregiver whose identity is “mother” or simply because the society in question lacks the social infrastructure to adequately provide for that child’s care in the absence of a dedicated family member.

Question 3.1 asks, “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all under the following circumstances: when there is a child under school age?” while question 3.2 asks the same question but under the circumstances that the woman’s youngest child is in school. I have structured the tables for this question (Tables 5.25-5.30, pp. 138-141) in descending order based on the percentage of a country’s respondents who answered that they thought a woman should work full time, since this represents the furthest departure from her traditionally prescribed gender role. Responses to this question represent the respondent’s belief about how much a woman (and only a woman) should be available (at the cost of her professional career) during a child’s most dependent and vulnerable period and then during a period of relatively lower dependence.

Results for both of these questions are relatively similar, with the most progressive countries answering in the least traditional ways (excepting Slovenia and Poland, which appear unexpectedly progressive, perhaps due to a history of socialist childcare provided under Communism). One exception to this pattern is that respondents from Australia, North America, and several Germanic countries seem to be

more flexible about their attitudes toward a woman's caretaker responsibilities when her youngest child has entered school. Along the lines of welfare regime type, almost all respondents from social democratic regimes answered that a woman should work at least part-time or more regardless of her child's age. Members of conservative regimes most often indicated that a woman should work part time regardless of her child's age. Members of liberal regimes also most often prescribed part-time employment, though they more often prescribed unemployment for mothers of young children and full-time employment to mothers of school-age children than did their conservative counterparts. Likewise, the sex-based distribution of answers is relatively symmetrical. Both men and women appear more comfortable with a woman working who has no very young dependents. However, in all situations men more frequently respond that women should stay home, while women more often respond that women should work part-time.

Question 3.3 asks how strongly respondents agree or disagree with the statement that "A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works." I have structured the response table (Tables 5.31-5.33, pp.137-138) in descending order on the "Strongly Disagree" response category for reasons explained previously. This question differs only slightly from question 3.2 in that it asks specifically about the consequences to a school-age child if a mother works, rather than simply asking the respondent if a mother to such a child "should" work. However, there is still no way to parse out what the cause of said child's suffering might be.

The response pattern on this measure mirrors others in the sense that progressive countries tend to most often disagree with the statement. However, there are some interesting anomalies relative to the other measures in this group. First, several

relatively gender-traditional countries (East Germany, Japan, Czech Republic, Slovakia) have a large portion of respondents who strongly disagree with the statement.

Conversely, exactly zero of the respondents from the United States strongly disagree with the statement. It's possible that this is because of the lack of institutional support for young children in the United States. Across welfare regime type, respondents from social democratic regimes most often strongly disagreed with the prescriptive statement and least often agreed with it. Members of liberal regimes clustered toward neutral or less extreme responses and most often said they "Disagree" with the statement.

Responses from members of conservative regimes were fairly evenly distributed and tended toward disagreement (and stronger disagreement than their liberal counterparts). Members of non-categorized regimes leaned towards agreement and traditionalism. The sex-based distribution of answers, as with previous questions, clusters toward the center, with fewer people of either sex answer that they strongly agreed or disagreed with the statement. In general (and expectedly), more men agree while more women disagree.

Question 3.4 (Table 5.34-5.36, pp. 144-145) asks how strongly respondents agree or disagree with the statement that "Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job." As with other measures, I have structured this table in descending order based on the "Strongly Disagree" category. The main difference between this measure and previous questions in this group is that it generalizes to "family life" rather than focusing exclusively on children. Response pattern, however, is similar, with mostly respondents from progressive countries disagreeing and those from mostly conservative countries agreeing. As with Question 3.3, East Germany and Japan seem anomalous in

how many respondents strongly disagreed. However, unlike the previous question, respondents from the United States fell somewhere in the middle of the range, rather than on the conservative end. Across regime type, respondents from social democratic regimes clearly came across as most progressive, with over forty percent strongly disagreeing with the prescriptive statement. Members of liberal regimes most often disagreed, though with about one-quarter agreeing. Members of conservative regimes agreed slightly more often than they disagreed, and more often than did their liberal counterparts. Members of non-categorized regimes clustered toward the middle categories, though approximately one-third agreed with the statement. The sex-based distribution of responses is unsurprising and clusters toward the middle response categories for both sexes. As with Question 3.3, more women disagree and more men agree with the statement though, surprisingly, the most frequent response category for both sexes was “Agree,” while the least frequent was “Strongly Agree.”

#### *Synthesizing Results for Analysis 1*

The descriptive tables in this sample, numerous though they are, paint a fairly consistent picture of the data, and it is a picture borne out by a look at the mean response to each question grouped by latent variable and regime type (Table 5.37, pp. 146). On questions that address traditional understandings of sex-based divisions of labor (divided up into reproductive and productive labor), response patterns within and across nations, welfare regimes, and the sexes are relatively consistent with the extant literature. Progressive states tend to contain citizens that express more gender-egalitarian attitudes and habits than do their more traditionalist counterparts. They also tend to contain citizens who are less prescriptive/condemning of a woman’s

involvement in the paid labor force. While respondents from social democratic states exhibit the greatest egalitarianism, members of conservative regimes predictably exhibit the most traditionalism, with liberal regime members falling somewhere in the middle.

However, question group 1 represents a departure from the traditional ways that gender and labor are conceptualized in scholarly and popular writing, and the response patterns across state and regime type represent a similar break from form. While respondents from social democratic regimes predictably give the most progressive (re: de-gendered answers), responses from conservative regime members tend to be similar to or more progressive than their liberal counterparts. They are about as likely as members of liberal regimes to support the equal sharing of paid leave and parenting responsibilities, and more likely to reject the traditional breadwinner-homemaker model of the family. This observation supports the nation-level anomalous findings that countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and Australia (liberal regimes, according to Esping-Andersen 1990) sometimes scored surprisingly more traditionalist than conservative regime states such as Japan, South Korea, Spain, and Mexico.

We found a similar pattern of predictability and surprise among the sexes. On the measures from groups 2 and 3, men and women behaved rather predictably: men did less household labor than did women and were less friendly to women's activity in the paid labor force regardless of reason. Perhaps least surprising of all, both men and women indicated that they did more of the household labor than they were given credit for by their opposite-sex partners. However, across group 1 we found some surprising results. No substantial percentage of men nor women saw taking paid leave from work and adopting childrearing as primarily a man's responsibility and, of the tiny margin

that did, more were men than were women. Likewise, more women than men felt it was appropriate for women to reduce their involvement in the labor force to care for a child. While it is difficult from these data alone to distill a clear picture or pattern, it is clear that there are substantial differences between the three concepts that these groups of measures represent—both at the macro level and between the sexes. In addition to the inter-state and inter-sex differences, it is clear that the concepts represented by question group 1 behave in ways that are distinct from either of the more conventional questions from groups 2 and 3.

The next chapter uses structural equation modeling to try to clarify the relationships between the concepts represented by each group of questions, as well as to identify their relationships to sex.



## Chapter 6: Analysis 2

### Orientation and Design

#### *Rationale and Methods for Analysis 2*

For the second analysis, I employ structural equation modeling to confirm that the proposed theoretical model is appropriate for predictive analysis of men's and women's gender-labor attitudes. The first step in this endeavor is to validate each of the three latent constructs as appropriate for multiple groups analysis for men and women. The next step is to establish a best-fit measurement model to test the assertions set forth at the beginning of this project. The theoretical proposition for this analysis can be operationalized in the following statement: gendered labor attitudes are more accurately measured when attitudes toward productive labor, reproductive labor, and gender essentialism are treated as distinct than they can when they are treated as either partially overlapping or entirely uniform. I test this assertion by comparing the following measurement models (depicted graphically in Figures 1-4, pp. 153-156).

1. **Model 1:** Model 1 treats all twelve observed measures (discussed in Analysis 1) as indicators of a single value set we might label as a person's level of "Gender Egalitarianism." This model represents both the substantive and statistical baseline for comparison. It reflects the argument that one's gender attitudes regarding both productive and reproductive labor, as well as one's conception of labor as gendered in general, are all facets of a single value set that vary relatively uniformly. It is also the most statistically parsimonious model, meaning that any more complex models must provide a significantly superior fit than does this one if we are to employ them for predictive purposes.

2. **Model 2:** Model 2 (dubbed the 3-Factor Model) treats the twelve observed measures as loading in discrete groups of four onto three latent constructs (DGCL, GERL, and GEPL) that are functionally distinct but covarying. This model represents the central thesis for this project: that studying gender-labor attitudes requires properly nuancing gender's relationship with the hegemony of both masculinity and productive labor.
3. **Model 3:** Model 3 is a hierarchical SEM model. All three latent constructs (DGCL, GERL, and GEPL) are treated as covarying, but all three are also used to produce a second-level construct that represents the gestalt "gender egalitarianism" concept. This model suggests that, while there are distinct facets of gendered labor attitudes that deserve attention, they all exist within a relatively homogenous umbrella of a respondent's gender ideology. Note that this model proposes a stronger relationship between the three concepts than in Model 2, which hypothesizes only that they covary.
4. **Model 4:** Model 4 is a bifactor SEM model. The three latent constructs are generated, but then all twelve observed measures are also used to construct a latent measure of gender ideology that exists separately from the previous three latent dimensions. This model suggests that measures that I assert are measuring distinct ideological constructs can in fact be treated as parts of the same gestalt value system while also independently composing the three latent facets that are at the core of this project. While this model has conceptual promise, the data used here proved to be insufficient to successfully estimate such a bifactor model, so I mention it here only as a fertile avenue for future research.

Model 1 represents the baseline of conventional thought on the subject of gender-labor attitudes, model 2 most fully supports the theoretical basis of this project, while Model 3 partially supports that basis. As we will see below, Model 2 produces fit statistics (e.g.,  $\chi^2$ , SBIC) that are superior to the other two.

### *Analysis 2: Confirmatory Factor Analyses*

The first step in establishing the appropriate methods and models for this analysis is to determine the validity of the three latent constructs using confirmatory factor analysis. As we see from table 6.01 (p. 147), factor loadings are all within acceptable ranges. While the eigenvalue for the DGCL factor is on the low side, it is above the 1.0 minimum threshold (Matsunaga 2011), and the “proportion explained” for this factor is the highest of the three.

The second step is to assess both how applicable each latent measure is to respondents of each sex and also whether or not it is appropriate to compare the models for each group. To do this, I generate a single-factor measurement model separately for each of the three latent measures and employ multiple groups analysis to compare two models. The first model is a baseline in which I allow all values to vary freely between the groups of male and female. As we see on the left side of tables 6.02 (p. 148), fit statistics for all three measures are within acceptable bounds. RMSEA values are below 0.05 except in the case of DGCL, which is still below 1.0. CFI and TLI are also all equal to or above 0.95. While again the fit for DGCL is a bit below the others, I hypothesize that this is due to it being the most experimental measure, measuring a concept not intentionally sought after by the designers of the survey instrument.

*Analysis 2: Assessing the Appropriateness of Multiple Groups Analysis*

Next I compare the above model to a model in which I constrain the measurement coefficients across sex (seen on the right side of table 6.02, p. 148). While the fit statistics are also acceptable in this model, the SBIC value is higher (indicating poorer fit) for both DGCL and GEPL models and, while slightly smaller for the GERL measure, not the 10-point difference required to be significant (Jeffreys 1961; Raftery 1995). However, the  $\chi^2$  value rises (indicating poorer fit) for all three measures when moving to the model that constrains measurement loadings, and the likelihood-ratio test of the  $\chi^2$  values for both models suggests a significantly worse fit when going from an unconstrained to a measurement-constrained model.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, I conclude that the best fitting model is one that does not try to equate the loadings for men with the loadings for women.

In simplest terms, the analysis suggests that the underlying meanings of the observed measures differ for men and for women. To perform multiple groups analysis in this case would therefore be inappropriate. In effect, we are comparing apples and oranges, and so we must construct separate models for men and for women and interpret them independently. The fact that we find that the same gendered attitudinal measures from a survey are understood in fundamentally different ways depending on the sex of the respondent is itself a substantial finding independent of any findings from either gender-specific model.

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<sup>4</sup> If measurement invariance cannot be established, then there is no need to continue with multiple group analysis.

## Findings

### *Analysis 2: Male Measurement Model Results*

Using similar methods to those above, I test and compare the fit statistics for males only across single-factor (baseline), 3-factor (hypothesized), and hierarchical measurement models. As can be seen on the left side of table 6.03 (p. 149), the SBIC<sup>5</sup> value decreases from 5645.35 for the single-factor model to -29.52 for the 3-factor model. Likewise, the  $\chi^2$  drops from 6054.54 for the single-factor model to 353.55 for the 3-factor model, and the likelihood-ratio test is significant. However, as can be seen on the right side of table 6.03 (p. 149), the SBIC value rises again to 1111.72 for the hierarchical model, and the  $\chi^2$  value rises to 1564.45, and again the likelihood-ratio test is significant. The caveat to this second comparison is that STATA was unable to estimate the hierarchical model for men once I introduced the full set of error covariances to the model, so the accuracy of this test is limited (though supported by the female model comparisons performed in the next section). In sum, I conclude that the hypothesized 3-factor model is the best fit for males in this sample.

The results of the male 3-factor model are presented in table 6.04 (p. 150). All factors (each of which I originally coded positively in the directly of gender egalitarianism) load positively and significantly onto their respective latent measures. Loadings are strongest on the GERL measure, most likely because it is a concrete measure of time allotment composed of factors measured in a uniform way. Loadings tend to be slightly lower on the DGCL measure, which I attribute to its more ambiguous and exploratory nature. Fit statistics for this model (Table 6.05, p. 150) are quite strong,

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<sup>5</sup> Smaller SBIC values indicate better fit. Negative values are best because they favor the maintained model over the saturated model.

with an RMSEA of 0.03, a CFI value of 0.99, a TLI value of 0.98, and an SBIC value of -29.53. Overall, the 3-factor model seems to be a strong fit for the male sub-sample.

### *Analysis 2: Female Measurement Model Results*

In this section, I test and compare the fit statistics for females only across single-factor (baseline), 3-factor (hypothesized), and hierarchical measurement models.<sup>6</sup> As can be seen on the left side of table 6.06 (p. 151), the SBIC value decreases from 4686.12 for the single-factor model to -12.59 for the 3-factor model. Likewise, the  $\chi^2$  value drops from 5102.86 for the single-factor model to 368.68 for the 3-factor model, and the likelihood-ratio test is significant. However, as can be seen on the right side of table 6.06 (p. 151), the SBIC value rises again to 8.06 for the hierarchical model, and the  $\chi^2$  value rises to 407.07, and again the likelihood-ratio test is significant. Unlike for males, the female hierarchical model estimated with the full set of error covariances included in the model, meaning this is a comprehensive comparison between 3-factor and hierarchical models. While the 3-factor model remains the best fit, the hierarchical model fit is not poor, per se. While it is impossible to substantiate with these data, it may be that the hierarchical configuration is more salient to the views of women than those of men. Nonetheless, I conclude that the hypothesized 3-factor model is the best fit for females in this sample, as well.

The results of the female 3-factor measurement model are presented in table 6.07 (p. 152). As with the male model, all factors load positively and significantly onto their respective latent measures. Loadings are strongest on the GERL measure, while loadings tend to be slightly lower on the DGCL measure. Fit statistics for this model

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<sup>6</sup> For all measurement and structural models, I composed an *a priori* list of theoretically informed error covariates and systematically added them to each model, excluding those that did not significantly improve model fit.

(Table 6.08, p. 152) are also quite strong and very similar to those for men, with an RMSEA of 0.03, a CFI value of 0.99, a TLI value of 0.98, and an SBIC value of -12.59. Overall, the 3-factor model seems to be a strong fit for the female sub-sample, as well. However, the SBIC value is 16.94 points lower for males than for females, indicating that this measurement model fits slightly but significantly better for males.

### *Synthesizing Results for Analysis 2*

In this chapter, we have validated the three latent constructs hypothesized at the beginning of this project. We have also established that the hypothesized 3-factor model is in fact the best-fit model for both males and females. However, we have established that the three factors in question do not measure exactly the same attitudes in men that they do in women. However, all factors load in the same direction and at a similar magnitude for both sexes, indicating at least some symmetry. Finally, we have established that, while the observed factors load more strongly onto the conventional measures of gender-labor attitudes (GERL and GEPL), factors do load acceptably onto the exploratory factor representing a De-Gendered Conception of Labor. Having validated my measurement hypotheses, I use the best fit models to construct the structural analyses conducted in the next chapter.

## Chapter 7: Analysis 3

### Orientation and Design

#### *Methods for Analysis 3*

The third and final analysis consists of separate 3-factor structural models divided by sex. It estimates relationships between a key predictor, controls, and the best-fit 3-factor models of latent measures identified in Chapter 6. The key predictor consists of three dummy variables, one for each of Esping-Andersen's tripartite model of social welfare regimes: Liberal, Conservative, and Social Democratic. Liberal is excluded to serve as the reference category because the descriptive analyses from Chapter 5 suggest that there may be some unexpected differences between liberal-regime states and those from the other two types. Controls include age, years of education, employment status, marital status, rural/urban residence, self-reported health, frequency of attendance at religious services, and relative income level in quintiles. I also offer a comparison of the results across the two sex-segregated models, though this is necessarily speculative in nature. Though it is impossible to directly equate coefficients from two separate models, the differences and similarities between the two models may offer clues as to why and how the three latent measures do not measure identical concepts for men and women.

My theoretical model predicts the following findings.

- Because policy regimes are so influential in the gender-labor relationship, national context will be an important predictor of scores on the dependent measures. If the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) model proves appropriate, then social-democratic countries should score as the most gender egalitarian, with



liberal countries following, and conservative countries scoring as least egalitarian. However, the descriptive analyses from chapter 5 suggest that liberal countries may be more traditional than expected—particularly on the DGCL measure.

- Because men’s resistance to changing labor force roles and perspectives is heavily implicated in the equality stall, I expect men to be more resistant to labor egalitarianism than are women. Specifically, men should be more often influenced toward traditional views and less often toward progressive views than are women—especially on the DGCL measure, which represents a lynchpin in the equality stall.
- Because values concerning productive and reproductive labor involvement do not necessarily reflect actual gender egalitarianism, I do not expect patterns of predictive relationships on GERL and GEPL measures to be very similar to patterns seen on the DGCL measure.<sup>78</sup>

## **Findings**

### *Analysis 3: Male Structural Model Results*

Due to their unwieldy length, I have broken the structural model results down into separate sub-tables. The structural model for males (Tables 7.01-7.05, pp. 157-160) presents us with both expected and some surprising findings. We find that our key welfare regime measure behaves somewhat predictably in relation to both the GERL (Table 7.02, p. 158) and GEPL (Table 7.03, p. 159) measures, with the effect of living

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<sup>7</sup> For all predictors in all structural models, positive coefficients indicate more gender-egalitarian/progressive attitudes, while negative coefficients indicate more traditional, gender-segregated attitudes.

<sup>8</sup> All coefficients have been standardized, meaning they represent standard deviation units.

in a conservative regime being significantly negative compared to that of living in a liberal regime, and the effect of living in a social democratic regime being significantly positive. This creates the standard Conservative -> Liberal -> Social Democratic order of increasing progressiveness and egalitarianism predicted by the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) model. However, on the DGCL measure (Table 7.01, p. 157), the effect of living in a conservative regime is significantly positive as compared with that of a liberal regime, suggesting that respondents from conservative regimes see labor as inherently less gendered than do those from liberal regimes.

The magnitude of effect of welfare regime both within and across latent measures is also worth evaluating. The effect of social democratic regime status is always positive and significant for males. It is also the largest effect of all three regime types (0.26) for both the DGCL and GEPL measures. However, it is much smaller (0.07) for the GERL measure, suggesting less inter-regime difference. The effect of conservative regime status is most powerfully negative on the GEPL measure, indicating men in conservative regimes are most traditional regarding women's engagement in the productive labor force. Note that the effect of living in a non-categorized regime is always significantly negative compared to the liberal regime control group, suggesting a meaningful but ambiguous difference between the two.

As for controls, only years of education (in addition to social democratic regime status above) has a significantly positive effect for men across all three latent measures, and the effect size is largest for the DGCL measure, followed by GEPL and then GERL. Better health is significantly positive for both DGCL and GERL measures, while higher

relative income is significantly positive for both DGCL and GEPL measures. More urban residence is significantly positive only for the GERL measure.

On the other hand, both age and being currently married have significantly negative effects for men on all three measures, though the effect size is largest on GEPL and smallest on DGCL. More frequent religious attendance is significantly negative on both DGCL and GEPL measures but not on the GERL measure. Being unemployed (relative to never having been employed) does not significantly predict men's attitudes on any of the three latent measures. Neither more urban residential status nor higher levels of employment seem to significantly predict men's attitudes on DGCL or GEPL measures, which is somewhat surprising. Likewise, neither more frequent attendance at religious services nor higher income significantly predict men's attitudes on the GERL measure. Finally, better health does not significantly predict men's attitudes on the GEPL measure. While some of these non-relationships may be unexpected given the conventional literature, there is little obvious pattern of non-significant relationships for men.

Table 7.04 (p. 160) presents the measurement component of the male structural model. We can see that it changes little from the measurement model presented in chapter 6. All factors still load significantly positively onto their respective measures, and the loadings are quite close to what they were previously. Fit statistics (Table 7.05, p. 160) for this model are also quite similar. The RMSEA is the same (0.03) and, while the CFI (0.95) and TLI (0.93) drop slightly, the SBIC value (-863.04) is much better and an overall good fit.

### *Analysis 3: Female Structural Model Results*

As with the male structural model, I have broken the female structural model results down into separate sub-tables. The structural model for females (Tables 7.06-7.10, pp. 161-164) both aligns with and departs from the male model in key ways. The key welfare regime measure behaves similarly for women as it does for men. Both the GERL (Table 7.07, p. 162) and GEPL (Table 7.08, p. 163) relationships follow the standard Conservative -> Liberal -> Social Democratic order of increasing progressiveness and egalitarianism predicted by the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) model. However, as with men, women in conservative regimes appear more progressive on the DGCL measure (Table 7.06, p. 161) as compared with their liberal regime counterparts. This corroborates our finding that members of conservative regimes—regardless of sex—see labor as inherently less gendered than do those from liberal regimes.

Regarding the magnitude of effect of welfare regime within and across latent measures, the effect of social democratic regime status is always positive and significant for females as well. It is also the largest effect of all three regime types (0.26 SD units) for the DGCL measure, followed by the GEPL measure, and finally the GERL measure (a similar but not identical pattern existed for men). The effect of conservative regime status is most powerfully negative on the GEPL measure (as with men), indicating women in conservative regimes are most traditional regarding women's engagement in the productive labor force. Note that the effect of living in a non-categorized regime is only significantly negative (compared to the liberal regime control group) for DGCL and GEPL measures, and more powerfully so for the DGCL

measure. This stands in contrast to men, for whom the relationship was always significantly negative. The non-categorized regime status is significantly related to only DGCL and GEPL measures for women, suggesting a slight difference from men (for whom it was universally negative).

Regarding the control measures, years of education is again significantly positively related to all three measures for women across all three latent measures. The effect size is (again) largest for the DGCL measure, followed by GEPL and then GERL. Unlike men, however, being currently employed is also significantly positive for women across all three measures, though the effect size this time is largest on the GEPL measure. Contrary to men (and expectation), age is significantly positively related to both DGCL and GEPL measures for women. Having formerly worked, being in better health, and having higher relative income are all significantly positively related to both DGCL and GEPL measures but not to the GERL measure. As with men, more urban residence is significantly positive only for the GERL measure.

On the other hand, only being currently married has a significantly negative effect for women on all three measures, and again the effect size is smallest on DGCL. Similar to men, more frequent religious attendance is significantly negative on both DGCL and GEPL measures but not on the GERL measure. Living in the suburbs has a negative relationship for women on only the GEPL measure, while being in satisfactory (relative to poor) health significantly negatively predicts a woman's score on the GERL measure. In general, women have fewer negative predictor relationships than do men. On the other hand, there is very little obvious pattern of non-significant relationships for women. More urban residence does not significantly predict a woman's score on the

DGCL measure. Neither age, good health, religious attendance, nor higher relative wealth significantly predict a woman's score on the GERL measure. Higher relative wealth also does not significantly predict a woman's score on the GEPL measure except in the richest quintile.

Table 7.09 (p. 164) presents the measurement component of the female structural model. As with men, it changes little from the measurement model presented in chapter 6. All factors still load significantly positively onto their respective measures, and the loadings are quite close to what they were previously. Fit statistics (Table 7.10, p. 164) for this model are also quite similar. The RMSEA is the same (0.03) and, while the CFI (0.95) and TLI (0.93) drop slightly, the SBIC value (-842.57) is much better and an overall good fit. However, it is still slightly but significantly worse than the male model's SBIC score of -863.04, suggesting a slightly poorer fit.

### *Synthesizing Results for Analysis 3*

The structural model results overall provide substantial insight into the questions that motivated this project. Most importantly, the anomalous pattern of the DGCL measure (i.e., making liberal regimes appear more traditional than conservative regimes) validates three key suspicions: (1) that it is appropriate to parse out the gendered conception of labor from more conventional measures of gender-labor attitudes; (2) that parsing that dimension out from the others shows that some populations (specifically those living in liberal welfare regimes) are less gender-egalitarian than they appear otherwise, and (3) that this effect occurs in both male and female populations (Figures 5-12, pp. 165-167). We also find that respondents from social democratic regimes appear broadly more egalitarian, including across this novel

measure (Tables 7.01 and 7.06, p. 157 and 161). When we compare the traditional measures (GERL and GEPL), we find that across both sexes there is less egalitarianism towards women in the work force and more towards distribution of household labor tasks (Figures 11 and 12, pp. 166-167). In the same figures, we also see a general pattern across sex of respondents from non-categorized regime states being more traditional and less egalitarian.

Regarding our control variables, a broad pattern appears to emerge across sex and latent measure. Years of education proves to be the only control with a universally positive (progressive) effect (Figure 5, p. 165), while currently married status is the only control with a universally negative (traditionalist) effect (same figure). Better health and higher relative income generally prove to be positive predictors, while marriage and more frequent religious attendance prove to be broadly negative (Figures 6-10, p. 165). Level of urban residence proves surprisingly positively significant only for the GERL measure, while not having much relationship to either of the others (Figure 9, p. 165). As expected, women tend to have more positive and fewer negative predictor relationships than do men, though this is not universally true (Figures 11 and 12, pp. 166-167). Age proves to be a predictor of traditional attitudes for men (Figure 11, p. 166) but (surprisingly) of progressive attitudes for women (Figure 12, p. 167). Income seems to be a stronger predictor of progressivism for men than for women, while work status occupies this role for women more than men (same figures). There is no measure in the data that is universally non-significant across all combinations of sex and latent measure (Figure 5, p. 165).

In the next chapter, I discuss the substantive implications of these findings in light of the theoretical context that informs this project.



## Chapter 8: Discussion, Conclusion, and Future Directions

### Discussion

#### *Synthesizing Analyses 1, 2, and 3*

This project set forth to assess the following broad questions:

1. Are gender egalitarian scripts concerning labor roles asymmetrically distributed across parts of the developed world? If so, do patterns exist?
2. Can social science improve its understanding of gender-labor attitudes by parsing attitudes into distinctly behaving dimensions? If so, is the hegemonic coupling model a useful improvement?
3. If the above dimensions are conceptually distinct from one another, what macro- and micro-level asymmetries exist between them?

This project's analyses offer relevant and novel insights on all of the above and, in particular, provide three lynchpin findings that weave together a single story.

First, asymmetry of gender egalitarian scripts does indeed exist at international, national, and personal levels. For example, while a large number of countries and people of both sexes are relatively accepting of women's participation in the work force, people regardless of nationality or sex appear to be profoundly resistant to seeing men as primary reproductive laborers even when the material circumstances of the hypothetical man and his female partner are held equal. This finding and the others like it support our premise (and that set forth in the literature) that men's resistance to moving into reproductive labor roles is a powerful and pervasive source of cultural lag against achieving gender egalitarianism. However, of note in our findings is that both sexes perpetuate this narrative, rather than only men doing so. In fact, the women in our

sample appeared to *more* often perpetuate this narrative than did the men. In other words, our findings point to a common thread underlying men's and women's common biases in this area. That this pattern also existed overwhelmingly at the levels of the nation state and the social welfare regime suggests a common factor that transcends region or border.

The above pattern of asymmetry (described in detail in Chapter 5) hints at the second lynchpin finding of the project: gender egalitarianism is demonstrably not a gestalt value set in any sense of the term, and it is inappropriate for social research to assess it as such. We identified at least three distinct facets of gender-labor ideology in this sample: two conventional measures of egalitarianism in the spheres of productive and reproductive labor, and a novel measure that represents to what degree a person's conception of labor roles is inherently gendered. We could find no model treating these dimensions as either uniform or parts of a common whole. Instead, supporting our theoretical construct, we found that a model assessing the dimensions separately was significantly superior.

Our third lynchpin finding relates to one particular dimension of the above model: the coupling of gender with labor roles remains a powerfully distinct social fact that exists and operates independently of more conventionally recognized gender attitudes. In other words, a person or population may still see labor roles as inherently gendered (complete with gender-based biases) no matter how progressive or egalitarian that person or population otherwise appears to be. In general, our findings strongly implicate macro-level context in the gender egalitarianism scripts of the population. That is: states with more progressive welfare regimes are generally and predictably associated with

more egalitarian attitudes. However, there is a non-linear relationship between progressiveness of the welfare regime and scripts that gender-essentialize labor. It appears that members of liberal regime states, while mid-level egalitarian about distribution of labor activities, still see labor roles as more inherently gendered than members of either other regime category. Lag in this dimension likely plays a powerful role in the notorious two-decade ‘stall out’ (England 2010; Friedman 2015; Hochschild 1989) on the journey towards gender-labor equality in these (and possibly other) states. Note that this macro-level pattern exists in the presence of a robust set of demographic controls, and reflects a logical extension of Bolzendahl and Olafsdottir’s (2008) findings.

Examining those demographics yields further insights, the most obvious of which is that labor roles remain inherently gendered social constructs for both men and women. Supporting this is our finding that both sexes (across nationality) continue to treat women as primarily responsible for domestic labor duties. While both men and women tend to believe that they do more household labor than do their partners, both broadly agree that women do more than do men. They also both tend to be less friendly toward wives’ and mothers’ equal participation in the work force. Further, the pattern and degree of asymmetries suggests an inordinate bias specifically against men deviating from traditionally masculine roles and into feminine ones, which is what we would expect from the literature. Men and women remain in relative lockstep on the above patterns, with the biggest departure being women’s relative friendliness to mothers and wives participating in the paid labor force (which, again, is unsurprising). It seems likely that both men and women retaining biases in favor of traditional gendered

divisions of labor (regardless of the fact that women tend to be relatively more egalitarian compared to men) is a direct result of their persistent views that labor is an inherently gendered construct. However, it is difficult to support that hypothesis with these data alone.

Descending below the levels of regime or state, two patterns relating to gender egalitarianism tend to emerge. First, a somewhat positive pattern emerges where education, health, and wealth/employment generally predict more egalitarian scores. This pattern is indicative of a post-materialist trend (Inglehart 1971, 1977; Inglehart and Welzel 2005), where individuals whose basic needs are securely met undergo a value shift toward prioritizing autonomy, inclusiveness, and self-expression. A (partially) competing hypothesis would be that script sharing as a result of institutional isomorphism is occurring across developed economies and causing homogenization of cultural values (Meyer et al. 1997). A second pattern—that of religious involvement and engagement in traditional relationship structures (e.g., marriage) predicting less egalitarian attitudes—also emerges from our controls. Cultural lag seems the most parsimonious explanation for this pattern. Urban residence proves surprisingly non-relevant either the post-materialist or cultural lag patterns, though this may be the result of the measure's effect being swamped by obvious covariates such as wealth, health, and education.

In sum, our substantive findings paint a picture of a pernicious and under-studied facet of gender-labor ideology: the cultural coupling of labor roles with implicit gender characteristics, regardless of the sex of the person presently occupying that role. The literature cited at the beginning of this work pointed us in the direction of identifying

this measure, and our results validate both its existence and its salience to the problem under investigation. We find that this ideological facet pervades both micro- and the macro-level contexts. We also find that it behaves in ways that the extant literature might fail to predict. Employing it as a metric makes some ostensibly progressive states look more traditional, and some notoriously traditional states appear more progressive. In short, it calls into question the ways these societies are conceptually positioned relative to one another and, therefore, requires we reassess our conceptual models. Finally, although the data are presently insufficient to validate this assertion, reason and parsimony implicate the rogue ideological dimension as an underlying source of stall in the progress toward more egalitarian attitudes and behaviors among people across regional, socioeconomic, and other demographic statuses.

## **Conclusion**

### *Limitations and Future Directions*

This project draws from a wide and interdisciplinary swath of social scholarship. It attempts to draw somewhat expansive conclusions from comparatively limited, cross-sectional data. The cross-sectional limitations of this data make it impossible to draw and difficult to infer temporal relationships between effects. Moreover, several models proposed in the original project design could not be estimated from the available data for unknown reasons. Further, because the three distinct latent measures proved to not represent the same concepts for men as for women, it was difficult to compare the attitudes of men to those of women. I was thus mostly limited to identifying meaningful patterns within sex and speculating about between-sex differences. The implication here is that we may have as many as six distinct concepts, if all three concepts mean different things for men than they do for women. However, attitudinal measures do all point in the same directions for both men and women (i.e., progressive means progressive, and traditional means traditional), suggesting some substantive overlap across sex.

All told, creating such complex models from a single wave of a single data set, no matter how detailed or far-reaching it may be, presents considerable challenge. However, the limitations of these data actually validate the need for such a project. When searching for data to use for this project, the ISSP was the only data set available with measures that could even begin to approximate the conceptual model. Further, several survey measures that lay at the core of these analyses existed only in the latest (2012) wave of the survey. Eschewing them in an attempt to create a longitudinal model both violated the core theoretical premises and caused the models to fail to estimate.

The limitations of this data set, and more so those of the broader body of available sociological data, form the basis for the primary scholarly recommendation that emerges from this project.

As of this writing, there is a profound gap among surveying institutions in the construction and implementation of gender measures that will help researchers achieve more nuanced vision on pernicious problems of gender inequality. The need lies in measures that deliberately challenge status-quo assumptions based in gender essentialism. Such measures include those that, like Q1.1, Q1.2, and Q1.3, ask the respondent to prescribe behavior for men and women in relation to one another (e.g., which combination of mother and father involvement is the best care option for a child). Such measures also include those that, like Q1.1, use verbiage that compares men and women in equal material situations (e.g., both are equally employed and eligible for paid leave). Finally, such measures include those that ask prescriptive and proscriptive questions related to men's behavior, and not only related to women's behavior (e.g., whether or not a man should work full time if he has a young child at home). I could find no such questions of this last type in this or any other survey instrument I was able to obtain. Even if researchers are able to distance themselves from the gendered assumptions this project seeks to expose (which, to be fair, they must if our vision on such problems is to continue to improve), a rigorously minded researcher is still limited by his or her available tool set.

### *Theoretical Implications*

We have now identified and taken steps to validate the theoretical model established at the outset of this project. The model's veracity is validated by both its

predictable and unpredictable results. On the constructs that serve as proxies for conventional understandings of productive and reproductive labor, our sample and measures behave predictably, suggesting conformity with the existing literature. However, our key construct—the one representing hegemonic coupling between gender and labor constructs—proves an anomaly. It behaves erratically by conventional understanding, yet quite in line with our theory that vestigial gender ascriptions continue to marginalize entire fields of labor.

The hegemonic coupling model, therefore, appears quite germane to inquiry into attitudes, biases, and relationships between gender and labor constructs. Furthermore, applying the hegemonic coupling framework to such inquiries provides us with insights we would otherwise miss. So-called “Liberal” welfare states present with higher levels of discriminatory bias than we might expect, and those biases seem eerily relevant to the hallmarks of the gender revolution’s stall out. Furthermore, while we have found a distinctly post-materialist attitudinal trend across the sexes, there are key differences in what influences the attitudes of men versus those of women. We have also identified a very short list of statuses that relate the same to all three facets of gender-labor attitudes, regardless of sex. However, as hypothesized, the hegemonic coupling indicator does exist and function independently of more conventional measures. It thus represents a novel contribution to the canon of research on this topic.

#### *Preconditions for Un-stalling the Gender Revolution*

Hegemonic status functions by requiring all other statuses in a cultural category (e.g., gender, labor, etc.) to define themselves in relation to it (Connell 1987). Labeling a status “hegemonic” denotes its position at the top of a cultural (and likely material)



power gradient, which confers descending degrees of power downward based on how well subordinate statuses mimic, ally with, reinforce, or otherwise support the hegemony. As we have discussed previously, the current peak of this power gradient is occupied by a suite of constructs embodying the ideal masculine individual dedicated to productive employment. The logical implication follows naturally: labor, if gender-coupled, will be devalued when associated with a gender construct that is of lower status. Further, devalued labor will be avoided by those with the privilege to avoid it (most obviously cisgendered, white men) and relegated to those already of lower privilege (typically women, people of color, and so on). The statuses of low-privilege persons will continue to be culturally associated with low-status labor, and the coupling of low-hegemony statuses will perpetuate and compound disadvantage for both.

While women in the developed world have made great strides toward accessing this suite of privileged constructs, the hegemonic gradient remains firmly in place. The net effect of the current system is to leave no incentive for anyone who *can* avoid doing reproductive labor to do so. Further, since women are historically, culturally, and biologically less able to avoid such labor, the current system also perpetuates the systematic marginalization of women, as well as the young, elderly, and infirmed, who depend upon reproductive labor. Though not often framed as such, this status quo represents what conventional scholarship calls the “stall” in gender equality: a two-decade languishing of these feminine-associated statuses and activities at the bottom of the sociocultural hierarchy.

As we have seen, however, these statuses and activities are only tied to cultural constructions of *femininity*: they are not actually restricted to *women*. A person of any

gender identity may occupy them, and current scholarship suggests that men failing to occupy them in numbers that compensate for women's exit has been a lynchpin in the equality stall (England 2010; England and Li 2006; Ridgeway 2011). A new gender-labor paradigm is therefore required in the policy sphere to unstick the gender revolution and begin addressing stall-associated problems, just as a new paradigm is required in the academic sphere to properly investigate the important role hegemonic coupling plays in attitudinal configurations. The old paradigm conflates gender and labor, failing to recognize the inherent contradiction in espousing equality while framing masculine-productive employment as the sole land of opportunity. In such a labor system, groups of people and statuses will invariably pursue the most advantageous labor types available to them, outsourcing the less desirable responsibilities onto lower status groups. If the groups in conflict are gender groups, then there is no reason to think that true gender equality is achievable in such a system.

A new paradigm oriented towards true equality would neutralize the *potential* for inequality in the system. It would expand on the work that Western feminist traditions have done so far in decoupling a person's sex (male/female) and gender identities (man/woman) from their participation in labor. It would decouple gendered *constructs* such as masculinity and femininity from labor. It would also address the hegemonic power gradients that privilege masculine qualities over feminine ones and productive labor involvement over involvement in reproductive labor. Such a paradigm would redefine the relationships between cultural constructions of masculinity, femininity, and the valuation of reproductive labor such that hegemony is not *essentialized* to identities.

Put in simple, tangible terms, addressing the hegemonic masculine-productive coupling requires at least three fundamental preconditions be achieved:

1. Women must no longer be penalized in productive labor roles for their association with or participation in reproductive labor activities.
2. Men must *voluntarily* participate in reproductive labor, and do so without experiencing substantial structural or cultural penalties.
3. Neither productive nor reproductive labor can be fundamentally attributed to a particular gender construct.

The crux of all of three preconditions lies in removing the hegemony (cultural and structural power advantage) of productive labor over reproductive labor, since such a change will axiomatically remove labor's power to confer hegemonic status to a particular individual or gender identity.

Countries such as Sweden, Iceland, and Finland have had some success pairing reproductive labor participation with positive consequences for the laborer by rewarding men specifically for their involvement (Deven 2011, Patnaik 2013). Doing so has produced positive ripples along multiple avenues. In addition to freeing women up to remain more engaged in paid employment, men's changes have reduced the motivations for employers to discriminate by gender because both men and women are likely to need time away from the work place for family involvement at one time or another. More importantly than these material consequences, this new paradigm has over time permeated cultural constructions surrounding gender and work (Rangecroft 2016). The ideal man may now be one who has significant reproductive labor responsibilities—even those that may remove him from the paid labor force. Because masculinity has

previously shaped definitions of the ideal worker, the ideal worker therefore becomes someone whose commitment to paid employment exists in plurality with other activities. These changes make men and women look substantially more alike as employees than they once did, further weakening the incentive to discriminate. Moreover, these changes narrow the value gap between productive and reproductive labor, since more people than ever are likely to participate in both. In other words, these are all steps toward decoupling masculinity and productive labor and neutralizing the hegemonic advantage of each of those statuses, making alternative couplings both materially and culturally viable. These relatively small changes represent a substantive basis for theorizing about dismantling the system of gendered labor stratification.

#### *De-coupling Hegemonies*

The logical corollary to hegemonic coupling has become obvious: if coupling of devalued statuses compounds disadvantage, then pursuing equality means pursuing their decoupling. Decoupling femininity from care labor should over time allow both to gain a more egalitarian standing in the cultural imagination. Femininity, decoupled from low-status, low- or no-wage labor, might be a less stigmatized suite of characteristics for people of all gender identities to embody. Some evidence suggests this trend is already occurring among members of the Millennial generation (Wong 2015). Care labor, on the other hand, if freed from its stigma as being of ‘lower’ (re: feminine) value, might see a rise in the participation of men and other non-feminine identifying persons. I suggest that this is precisely what has happened in the case of Sweden’s surging success in participatory fatherhood (Deven 2011; Haas 1992; Patnaik 2013). In short, freed from the well of their collective gravity, two historically devalued statuses

may over time begin to orbit independently, coupled and re-coupled with other statuses more arbitrarily. I expect this to be a simple, painless, and relatively quick transition with no foreseeable hiccups.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Sarcasm.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Tables for Chapter 4

**Table 4.01. Sample statistics for continuous variables.**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b>Age</b>	37492	48.49	17.40	15	102
<b>Years of Education</b>	36536	12.63	4.21	0	30

**Table 4.02. Sample statistics for categorical variables.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Male	17,100	45.50%
Female	20,482	54.50%
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,582</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Never married	9,134	24.54%
Currently married	21,624	58.09%
Post married	6,467	17.37%
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,225</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Work Status</b>		
Never	3,572	9.50%
Formerly	12,759	33.92%
Currently	21,288	56.59%
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,619</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Residence Status</b>		
Rural	11,884	31.80%
Town	10,015	26.80%
Suburbs	5,894	15.77%
City	9,577	25.63%
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,370</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Self-Reported Health</b>		
Poor to Fair	9,073	24.35%
Satisfactory	13,621	36.56%
Good to Excellent	14,560	39.08%
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,254</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Income Quintiles</b>		
Lowest	6,058	22.92%
Second Lowest	5,727	21.67%
Middle	4,946	18.71%
Second Highest	5,222	19.76%
Highest	4,479	16.95%
<b>Total</b>	<b>26,432</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Frequency of Attendance at Religious Services</b>		
Never	11,369	32.77%
Few times per year or less	14,286	41.17%
1+ times per month	3,251	9.37%
1+ times per week	5,790	16.69%
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,696</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Esping-Andersen Welfare Regime Typology</b>		
Liberal (e.g., US)	5,603	16.02%
Conservative (e.g., Germany)	11,644	33.30%
Social Democratic (e.g., Sweden)	3,798	10.86%
Non-Categorized	13,922	39.82%
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,967</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 4.03. Sample representation by country.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Australia</b>	1,495	3.97%
<b>Austria</b>	1,034	2.75%
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	481	1.28%
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	1,029	2.73%
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	463	1.23%
<b>Canada</b>	800	2.13%
<b>Chile</b>	1,417	3.77%
<b>Czech Republic</b>	1,720	4.57%
<b>Denmark</b>	1,352	3.59%
<b>Finland</b>	1,137	3.02%
<b>France</b>	2,062	5.48%
<b>Germany-East</b>	550	1.46%
<b>Germany-West</b>	1,165	3.10%
<b>Great Britain</b>	933	2.48%
<b>Hungary</b>	962	2.56%
<b>Iceland</b>	1,110	2.95%
<b>Ireland</b>	1,081	2.87%
<b>Israel</b>	1,134	3.01%
<b>Japan</b>	1,103	2.93%
<b>Latvia</b>	970	2.58%
<b>Mexico</b>	1,190	3.16%
<b>Netherlands</b>	1,249	3.32%
<b>Norway</b>	1,309	3.48%
<b>Poland</b>	1,094	2.91%
<b>Slovakia</b>	1,112	2.95%
<b>Slovenia</b>	1,005	2.67%
<b>South Korea</b>	1,288	3.42%
<b>Spain</b>	2,418	6.43%
<b>Sweden</b>	945	2.51%
<b>Switzerland</b>	1,220	3.24%
<b>Turkey</b>	1,510	4.01%
<b>United States</b>	1,294	3.44%
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,632</b>	<b>100%</b>



## Appendix 2: Tables for Chapter 5

**Table 5.01. How should mother and father divide paid leave?**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Mom All</b>	<b>Mom Most</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Dad Most</b>	<b>Dad All</b>	<b>Total</b>
Sweden	1.13%	28.73%	69.76%	0.38%	0.00%	<b>2.64%</b>
France	13.65%	36.08%	50.07%	0.13%	0.07%	<b>4.94%</b>
Germany-West	16.42%	33.05%	50.00%	0.43%	0.11%	<b>3.08%</b>
Netherlands	11.70%	40.08%	47.57%	0.53%	0.13%	<b>2.52%</b>
Iceland	2.94%	49.36%	47.50%	0.20%	0.00%	<b>3.38%</b>
Germany-East	14.35%	38.61%	45.99%	1.05%	0.00%	<b>1.57%</b>
Denmark	5.29%	47.50%	45.94%	0.88%	0.39%	<b>3.38%</b>
Belgium-Flanders	13.51%	40.97%	45.37%	0.15%	0.00%	<b>2.25%</b>
Belgium-Wallonia	15.47%	40.61%	43.92%	0.00%	0.00%	<b>1.20%</b>
Finland	3.17%	52.84%	43.78%	0.00%	0.22%	<b>3.03%</b>
Norway	4.07%	52.54%	43.20%	0.19%	0.00%	<b>3.58%</b>
Belgium-Brussels	16.18%	41.64%	41.91%	0.00%	0.27%	<b>1.25%</b>
Switzerland	19.68%	41.25%	37.97%	1.09%	0.00%	<b>3.33%</b>
United States	32.51%	30.25%	36.68%	0.34%	0.23%	<b>2.93%</b>
Poland	33.40%	32.90%	33.30%	0.30%	0.10%	<b>3.29%</b>
Spain	33.99%	33.37%	32.31%	0.24%	0.10%	<b>6.91%</b>
Mexico	47.81%	15.81%	31.62%	3.73%	1.03%	<b>2.57%</b>
Canada	22.74%	45.66%	31.42%	0.17%	0.00%	<b>1.91%</b>
South Korea	22.00%	47.13%	30.46%	0.41%	0.00%	<b>4.03%</b>
Ireland	17.82%	53.06%	28.86%	0.13%	0.13%	<b>2.49%</b>
Australia	21.43%	51.76%	26.58%	0.23%	0.00%	<b>2.83%</b>
Chile	33.96%	41.49%	24.25%	0.30%	0.00%	<b>4.39%</b>
Great Britain	21.73%	54.49%	23.46%	0.16%	0.16%	<b>2.10%</b>
Austria	39.13%	38.90%	21.62%	0.23%	0.11%	<b>2.89%</b>
Israel	56.65%	22.09%	20.42%	0.84%	0.00%	<b>3.16%</b>
Japan	18.84%	61.66%	19.28%	0.11%	0.11%	<b>3.02%</b>
Slovenia	41.71%	42.86%	15.43%	0.00%	0.00%	<b>2.59%</b>
Latvia	60.00%	25.76%	14.12%	0.00%	0.11%	<b>2.93%</b>
Turkey	60.63%	26.32%	12.76%	0.15%	0.15%	<b>4.51%</b>
Hungary	67.92%	22.52%	9.20%	0.24%	0.12%	<b>2.73%</b>
Czech Republic	69.40%	21.32%	8.77%	0.45%	0.06%	<b>5.17%</b>
Slovakia	72.19%	19.96%	7.36%	0.39%	0.10%	<b>3.41%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.51%</b>	<b>37.56%</b>	<b>31.40%</b>	<b>0.41%</b>	<b>0.11%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering “Equal”.

**Table 5.02. How should mother and father divide paid leave?**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>Mom All</b>	<b>Mom Most</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Dad Most</b>	<b>Dad All</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	23.60%	46.39%	29.68%	0.22%	0.11%	<b>13.29%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	18.73%	41.90%	38.91%	0.38%	0.07%	<b>32.62%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	4.21%	50.93%	44.30%	0.36%	0.20%	<b>10.83%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	45.01%	30.92%	23.44%	0.49%	0.13%	<b>43.26%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>29.18%</b>	<b>38.73%</b>	<b>31.58%</b>	<b>0.41%</b>	<b>0.11%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.03. How should mother and father divide paid leave?**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>Mom All</b>	<b>Mom Most</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Dad Most</b>	<b>Dad All</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	32.59%	37.21%	29.54%	0.51%	0.14%	<b>44.61%</b>
<b>Female</b>	28.85%	37.83%	32.92%	0.32%	0.08%	<b>55.39%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.52%</b>	<b>37.55%</b>	<b>31.41%</b>	<b>0.41%</b>	<b>0.11%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.04. What is the best care option for a young child?**

Country	Mom home, Dad ft	Mom pt, Dad ft	Both ft	Both pt	Dad pt, Mom ft	Dad home, Mom ft	Total
Netherlands	19.75%	32.06%	2.83%	44.91%	0.27%	0.18%	<b>3.73%</b>
Sweden	9.81%	31.45%	16.48%	40.63%	1.38%	0.25%	<b>2.63%</b>
Switzerland	26.03%	40.15%	3.25%	29.79%	0.34%	0.43%	<b>3.86%</b>
Iceland	6.55%	45.45%	20.43%	26.78%	0.68%	0.10%	<b>3.38%</b>
Norway	8.93%	41.85%	26.69%	21.66%	0.78%	0.09%	<b>3.82%</b>
Spain	25.82%	41.81%	12.36%	19.09%	0.93%	0.00%	<b>7.47%</b>
Belgium-Brussels	23.08%	43.03%	14.90%	18.51%	0.48%	0.00%	<b>1.38%</b>
Belgium-Wallonia	18.29%	52.20%	12.20%	17.07%	0.24%	0.00%	<b>1.36%</b>
Germany-West	29.29%	50.74%	2.58%	16.58%	0.50%	0.30%	<b>3.33%</b>
Mexico	50.56%	24.07%	6.49%	16.02%	1.56%	1.30%	<b>3.82%</b>
Denmark	5.41%	47.54%	30.41%	15.49%	0.82%	0.33%	<b>4.04%</b>
France	20.53%	48.76%	15.47%	14.55%	0.46%	0.23%	<b>5.75%</b>
Finland	19.83%	43.58%	23.33%	12.73%	0.32%	0.21%	<b>3.12%</b>
Belgium-Flanders	20.72%	52.63%	14.58%	11.73%	0.33%	0.00%	<b>3.02%</b>
Germany-East	9.57%	49.69%	28.51%	11.41%	0.81%	0.00%	<b>1.62%</b>
Ireland	28.18%	52.09%	8.00%	11.05%	0.56%	0.11%	<b>2.93%</b>
Australia	41.18%	45.76%	2.00%	10.57%	0.33%	0.17%	<b>3.98%</b>
Austria	47.18%	39.09%	2.77%	10.30%	0.11%	0.55%	<b>2.99%</b>
Chile	33.14%	49.71%	7.51%	8.69%	0.59%	0.37%	<b>4.49%</b>
Canada	35.42%	39.54%	18.29%	6.10%	0.16%	0.49%	<b>2.01%</b>
United States	38.97%	42.58%	11.55%	5.98%	0.21%	0.72%	<b>3.21%</b>
Great Britain	41.71%	47.99%	4.95%	5.21%	0.00%	0.13%	<b>2.47%</b>
South Korea	42.62%	42.55%	9.16%	4.81%	0.70%	0.16%	<b>4.26%</b>
Israel	27.51%	52.61%	13.96%	4.42%	0.90%	0.60%	<b>3.29%</b>
Slovenia	22.79%	41.92%	30.93%	3.89%	0.11%	0.34%	<b>2.89%</b>
Turkey	71.68%	19.70%	4.99%	2.94%	0.14%	0.55%	<b>4.84%</b>
Poland	45.83%	31.60%	19.33%	2.65%	0.39%	0.20%	<b>3.37%</b>
Latvia	59.18%	30.35%	7.13%	2.59%	0.22%	0.54%	<b>3.06%</b>
Czech Republic	59.00%	28.25%	9.22%	1.99%	0.83%	0.70%	<b>5.16%</b>
Hungary	54.43%	33.05%	10.91%	1.40%	0.00%	0.22%	<b>3.06%</b>
Japan	57.77%	37.23%	3.96%	1.04%	0.00%	0.00%	<b>3.17%</b>
Slovakia	57.02%	29.42%	11.94%	0.86%	0.00%	0.76%	<b>3.46%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.51%</b>	<b>37.56%</b>	<b>31.40%</b>	<b>0.41%</b>	<b>0.11%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering “Both part-time”.

**Table 5.05. What is the best care option for a young child?**

Welfare Regime	Mom home, Dad ft	Mom pt, Dad ft	Both ft	Both pt	Dad pt, Mom ft	Dad home, Mom ft	Total
Liberal	37.38%	45.85%	8.04%	8.13%	0.27%	0.32%	<b>14.15%</b>
Conservative	29.89%	43.80%	8.93%	16.79%	0.38%	0.20%	<b>33.41%</b>
Social Democratic	10.73%	44.44%	27.10%	16.85%	0.66%	0.21%	<b>10.63%</b>
Non-Categorized	40.80%	36.47%	12.54%	9.22%	0.55%	0.42%	<b>41.81%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>33.47%</b>	<b>41.10%</b>	<b>12.25%</b>	<b>12.41%</b>	<b>0.47%</b>	<b>0.31%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.06. What is the best care option for a young child?**

Sex	Mom home, Dad ft	Mom pt, Dad ft	Both ft	Both pt	Dad pt, Mom ft	Dad home, Mom ft	Total
Male	37.39%	37.67%	12.74%	11.32%	0.51%	0.37%	<b>45.48%</b>
Female	31.34%	42.42%	11.79%	13.65%	0.50%	0.30%	<b>54.52%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>34.09%</b>	<b>40.26%</b>	<b>12.22%</b>	<b>12.59%</b>	<b>0.51%</b>	<b>0.33%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.07. It's the man's job to earn money, the woman's to keep the home.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>S. Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	2.22%	4.44%	8.67%	11.33%	73.33%	<b>3.90%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	1.40%	3.44%	11.51%	25.59%	58.06%	<b>2.69%</b>
<b>France</b>	3.24%	7.51%	12.76%	20.23%	56.26%	<b>5.88%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	8.11%	8.78%	15.09%	22.52%	45.50%	<b>1.28%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	1.40%	3.50%	11.12%	39.11%	44.87%	<b>3.71%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	7.30%	10.30%	14.81%	22.75%	44.85%	<b>1.35%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	3.32%	6.27%	10.70%	35.24%	44.46%	<b>1.57%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	0.81%	5.69%	8.57%	43.14%	41.79%	<b>3.20%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	7.37%	16.67%	24.49%	12.98%	38.49%	<b>3.14%</b>
<b>Finland</b>	2.10%	6.75%	15.05%	38.59%	37.50%	<b>3.17%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	1.89%	9.19%	16.25%	37.28%	35.39%	<b>2.29%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	8.77%	11.23%	11.32%	35.79%	32.89%	<b>3.29%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	3.68%	7.92%	14.33%	41.85%	32.23%	<b>3.06%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	2.83%	9.48%	19.20%	37.07%	31.42%	<b>3.47%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	4.84%	11.71%	19.17%	35.52%	28.76%	<b>2.86%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	2.82%	12.92%	19.59%	37.39%	27.29%	<b>4.20%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	2.73%	18.20%	18.60%	36.30%	24.17%	<b>2.86%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	5.19%	19.60%	15.73%	37.73%	21.75%	<b>3.51%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	5.76%	15.56%	17.81%	39.30%	21.58%	<b>3.21%</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	3.41%	11.32%	21.87%	42.31%	21.10%	<b>2.63%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	11.04%	23.28%	24.28%	20.80%	20.60%	<b>0.00%</b>
<b>United States</b>	4.96%	17.65%	17.57%	42.00%	17.81%	<b>3.67%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	14.32%	24.20%	18.52%	27.63%	15.33%	<b>3.71%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	22.34%	21.25%	21.46%	23.43%	11.51%	<b>4.24%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	18.85%	28.78%	24.05%	18.09%	10.22%	<b>4.89%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	5.40%	25.00%	24.43%	36.86%	8.31%	<b>4.07%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	18.58%	29.65%	14.02%	29.98%	7.77%	<b>3.42%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	16.05%	29.06%	16.05%	31.83%	7.01%	<b>3.13%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	17.46%	26.29%	32.39%	17.35%	6.52%	<b>2.75%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	22.99%	30.95%	26.79%	13.76%	5.52%	<b>3.19%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	23.66%	29.21%	23.56%	20.10%	3.46%	<b>2.76%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.41%</b>	<b>16.13%</b>	<b>17.84%</b>	<b>29.89%</b>	<b>27.74%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering "Strongly disagree".

**Table 5.08. It's the man's job to earn money, the woman's to keep the home.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>S. Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	3.44%	12.24%	18.00%	40.12%	26.20%	<b>17.15%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	6.78%	13.98%	17.02%	27.85%	34.36%	<b>35.67%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	1.90%	4.80%	11.39%	28.91%	53.00%	<b>11.66%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	13.59%	23.03%	20.28%	29.44%	13.66%	<b>35.51%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.06%</b>	<b>15.83%</b>	<b>17.69%</b>	<b>30.64%</b>	<b>27.78%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.09. It's the man's job to earn money, the woman's to keep the home.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>S. Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	9.27%	18.24%	19.02%	30.46%	23.01%	<b>45.23%</b>
<b>Female</b>	7.71%	14.39%	16.85%	29.39%	31.66%	<b>54.77%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.41%</b>	<b>16.13%</b>	<b>17.83%</b>	<b>29.88%</b>	<b>27.75%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.10. What a woman really wants is a family and children.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>S. Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	5.12%	11.86%	15.43%	23.10%	44.50%	<b>3.86%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	4.21%	12.43%	13.19%	31.93%	38.24%	<b>1.56%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	3.76%	15.53%	25.53%	23.53%	31.65%	<b>2.54%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	1.29%	14.04%	18.69%	37.12%	28.85%	<b>3.47%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	11.31%	18.55%	22.40%	20.81%	26.92%	<b>1.32%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	7.27%	17.09%	12.64%	36.09%	26.91%	<b>3.29%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	2.07%	12.84%	20.38%	38.36%	26.35%	<b>3.61%</b>
<b>France</b>	10.35%	23.10%	21.72%	20.60%	24.22%	<b>5.86%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	3.35%	13.92%	27.96%	32.99%	21.78%	<b>2.32%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	2.76%	21.14%	21.42%	33.09%	21.60%	<b>3.25%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	4.91%	19.92%	21.75%	32.34%	21.08%	<b>3.11%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	14.08%	22.77%	20.66%	21.83%	20.66%	<b>1.27%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	15.17%	18.26%	33.14%	13.33%	20.10%	<b>3.10%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	9.09%	22.83%	23.68%	24.42%	19.98%	<b>2.83%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	5.71%	18.53%	24.89%	33.19%	17.67%	<b>2.78%</b>
<b>Finland</b>	5.53%	25.63%	23.42%	28.74%	16.68%	<b>2.98%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	5.58%	21.14%	24.91%	32.17%	16.19%	<b>4.29%</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	5.36%	23.55%	25.89%	31.81%	13.39%	<b>2.68%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	18.95%	24.41%	19.89%	24.73%	12.01%	<b>3.83%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	7.06%	33.09%	23.92%	25.92%	10.01%	<b>2.84%</b>
<b>United States</b>	6.68%	29.32%	24.27%	29.97%	9.77%	<b>3.67%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	7.08%	27.83%	23.58%	32.92%	8.58%	<b>3.59%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	11.91%	29.17%	26.83%	25.70%	6.38%	<b>3.19%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	17.54%	31.07%	32.37%	13.09%	5.93%	<b>4.84%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	10.12%	31.71%	19.46%	33.66%	5.06%	<b>3.07%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	21.75%	33.48%	31.24%	9.38%	4.16%	<b>2.81%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	16.88%	33.65%	25.32%	20.30%	3.85%	<b>2.80%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	21.25%	35.24%	15.02%	24.91%	3.58%	<b>3.50%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	32.99%	31.41%	19.89%	12.28%	3.43%	<b>4.36%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	24.32%	38.63%	28.06%	7.48%	1.50%	<b>3.20%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	6.87%	42.88%	29.85%	19.11%	1.29%	<b>4.18%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.70%</b>	<b>24.98%</b>	<b>23.27%</b>	<b>25.30%</b>	<b>15.75%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering “Strongly disagree”.

**Table 5.11. What a woman really wants is a family and children.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>S. Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	5.34%	22.13%	24.76%	31.76%	16.01%	<b>17.35%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	9.58%	20.65%	21.57%	27.02%	21.18%	<b>35.53%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	4.18%	16.12%	19.42%	29.98%	30.30%	<b>11.28%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	16.00%	33.27%	23.95%	20.92%	5.86%	<b>35.85%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.54%</b>	<b>24.92%</b>	<b>22.74%</b>	<b>25.99%</b>	<b>15.82%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.12. What a woman really wants is a family and children.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>S. Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	10.39%	26.68%	25.51%	24.33%	13.09%	<b>44.47%</b>
<b>Female</b>	10.96%	23.61%	21.50%	26.04%	17.88%	<b>55.53%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.71%</b>	<b>24.98%</b>	<b>23.28%</b>	<b>25.28%</b>	<b>15.75%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.13. Division of household work: doing the laundry.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	35.31%	27.79%	27.35%	5.35%	4.20%	<b>2.82%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	50.97%	20.62%	21.40%	3.50%	3.50%	<b>1.05%</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	40.84%	31.73%	20.69%	4.50%	2.25%	<b>3.81%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	39.35%	31.62%	20.62%	5.50%	2.92%	<b>2.38%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	34.86%	35.62%	20.40%	5.94%	3.20%	<b>2.68%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	38.55%	34.45%	18.42%	6.20%	2.39%	<b>4.28%</b>
<b>Spain</b>	55.30%	22.09%	17.70%	2.39%	2.52%	<b>6.33%</b>
<b>Finland</b>	35.68%	42.20%	17.14%	3.84%	1.15%	<b>3.20%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	36.23%	38.50%	17.11%	6.28%	1.87%	<b>3.06%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	36.92%	39.34%	17.03%	4.62%	2.09%	<b>3.72%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	43.50%	32.76%	16.84%	4.91%	1.99%	<b>3.08%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	39.55%	31.00%	16.83%	3.09%	9.54%	<b>2.91%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	56.30%	19.16%	16.40%	3.54%	4.59%	<b>3.11%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	55.54%	20.98%	16.10%	3.48%	3.90%	<b>5.86%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	59.22%	19.00%	15.95%	3.61%	2.22%	<b>2.95%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	56.43%	23.99%	15.42%	1.71%	2.45%	<b>3.34%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	41.62%	36.99%	14.84%	4.05%	2.50%	<b>2.12%</b>
<b>France</b>	63.86%	18.00%	13.68%	2.48%	1.98%	<b>5.77%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	53.37%	27.75%	12.70%	2.58%	3.60%	<b>3.64%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	55.33%	27.25%	12.45%	3.04%	1.94%	<b>2.95%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	55.11%	29.55%	12.22%	1.42%	1.70%	<b>1.44%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	29.30%	16.89%	11.59%	12.91%	29.30%	<b>2.47%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	56.94%	25.35%	10.91%	3.82%	2.97%	<b>2.88%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	63.07%	19.56%	10.78%	2.59%	3.99%	<b>2.05%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	59.89%	25.69%	10.71%	2.34%	1.37%	<b>2.97%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	62.26%	25.79%	10.06%	0.16%	1.73%	<b>2.60%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	71.49%	17.11%	9.94%	1.02%	0.44%	<b>2.80%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	70.77%	14.44%	9.86%	1.06%	3.87%	<b>1.16%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	64.11%	21.56%	7.81%	3.62%	2.89%	<b>2.82%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	58.38%	33.52%	5.73%	1.12%	1.26%	<b>2.93%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	71.27%	21.04%	3.75%	1.28%	2.65%	<b>4.47%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>51.33%</b>	<b>26.88%</b>	<b>14.80%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>3.43%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering "Equal".



**Table 5.14. Division of household work: doing the laundry.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	39.41%	32.16%	20.27%	5.18%	2.99%	<b>16.07%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	56.56%	22.90%	12.42%	3.46%	4.66%	<b>32.84%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	37.94%	37.49%	18.36%	4.34%	1.87%	<b>11.55%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	54.51%	25.00%	14.44%	2.88%	3.16%	<b>39.53%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>50.84%</b>	<b>26.90%</b>	<b>15.17%</b>	<b>3.61%</b>	<b>3.48%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.15. Division of household work: doing the laundry.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	42.23%	31.66%	16.59%	4.53%	4.98%	<b>47.48%</b>
<b>Female</b>	59.55%	22.55%	13.17%	2.70%	2.03%	<b>52.52%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>51.33%</b>	<b>26.88%</b>	<b>14.80%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>3.43%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.16. Division of household work: care for sick family members.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	7.89%	28.85%	58.24%	3.05%	1.97%	<b>2.63%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	15.21%	24.52%	58.17%	1.33%	0.76%	<b>2.48%</b>
<b>Finland</b>	8.78%	29.93%	57.41%	3.17%	0.72%	<b>3.28%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	9.47%	30.00%	57.11%	2.37%	1.05%	<b>3.59%</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	10.19%	28.55%	56.48%	2.77%	2.01%	<b>3.75%</b>
<b>Spain</b>	23.30%	16.08%	56.47%	2.25%	1.91%	<b>6.93%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	9.09%	33.62%	54.69%	1.88%	0.72%	<b>3.27%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	24.28%	17.88%	54.53%	1.32%	1.99%	<b>2.14%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	21.40%	15.72%	54.15%	3.93%	4.80%	<b>1.08%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	16.91%	27.21%	50.37%	1.47%	4.04%	<b>1.28%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	21.41%	21.27%	49.58%	4.65%	3.10%	<b>3.35%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	16.67%	31.08%	47.97%	2.48%	1.80%	<b>2.10%</b>
<b>France</b>	26.47%	23.05%	45.57%	2.45%	2.45%	<b>5.38%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	31.02%	19.18%	45.31%	1.22%	3.27%	<b>1.16%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	12.42%	36.25%	45.21%	4.68%	1.43%	<b>2.32%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	21.61%	28.61%	44.90%	3.35%	1.52%	<b>3.10%</b>
<b>United States</b>	23.11%	25.41%	44.75%	3.61%	3.11%	<b>2.88%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	20.03%	31.20%	44.01%	2.63%	2.13%	<b>2.87%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	17.44%	33.79%	43.60%	2.45%	2.72%	<b>3.46%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	19.38%	35.46%	41.24%	3.09%	0.82%	<b>2.29%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	25.64%	28.37%	41.12%	2.29%	2.58%	<b>3.29%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	20.72%	34.84%	39.74%	2.45%	2.26%	<b>2.51%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	30.41%	25.12%	38.71%	3.69%	2.07%	<b>2.05%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	30.39%	21.71%	38.16%	5.48%	4.27%	<b>6.20%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	25.66%	24.20%	38.05%	4.81%	7.29%	<b>3.24%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	19.06%	39.51%	36.51%	3.10%	1.82%	<b>4.41%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	18.59%	41.78%	35.33%	2.46%	1.84%	<b>3.07%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	32.18%	27.16%	33.75%	4.24%	2.67%	<b>3.01%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	26.10%	37.89%	29.96%	4.59%	1.46%	<b>4.52%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	45.74%	19.38%	28.68%	2.48%	3.72%	<b>3.04%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	36.61%	32.98%	22.09%	5.45%	2.87%	<b>3.12%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>21.80%</b>	<b>28.03%</b>	<b>44.57%</b>	<b>3.17%</b>	<b>2.43%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering "Equal".

**Table 5.17. Division of household work: care for sick family members.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	19.46%	32.39%	42.45%	3.39%	2.31%	<b>16.07%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	24.88%	28.90%	40.68%	2.96%	2.58%	<b>31.72%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	9.51%	29.47%	56.98%	2.76%	1.29%	<b>11.44%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	24.23%	23.99%	45.76%	3.19%	2.83%	<b>40.78%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>21.99%</b>	<b>27.53%</b>	<b>44.90%</b>	<b>3.10%</b>	<b>2.49%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.18. Division of household work: care for sick family members.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	14.03%	27.13%	51.24%	3.94%	3.66%	<b>47.16%</b>
<b>Female</b>	28.74%	28.83%	38.63%	2.47%	1.33%	<b>52.84%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>21.80%</b>	<b>28.03%</b>	<b>44.57%</b>	<b>3.17%</b>	<b>2.43%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.19. Division of household work: household cleaning.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Finland</b>	14.52%	38.56%	40.87%	5.14%	0.90%	<b>3.17%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	12.80%	38.41%	39.18%	7.01%	2.59%	<b>2.68%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	28.51%	28.51%	38.71%	3.17%	1.10%	<b>2.96%</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	15.47%	38.78%	38.45%	5.69%	1.61%	<b>3.80%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	13.92%	41.77%	38.42%	5.49%	0.40%	<b>3.05%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	15.05%	40.31%	36.85%	6.40%	1.38%	<b>2.36%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	25.20%	32.73%	36.45%	2.70%	2.92%	<b>3.63%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	29.57%	26.07%	35.80%	2.33%	6.23%	<b>1.05%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	37.30%	22.12%	34.69%	3.80%	2.09%	<b>3.12%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	22.91%	38.81%	33.96%	1.89%	2.43%	<b>1.51%</b>
<b>United States</b>	28.47%	30.49%	33.82%	4.05%	3.18%	<b>2.82%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	15.29%	43.67%	33.44%	5.94%	1.65%	<b>3.71%</b>
<b>Spain</b>	35.14%	27.60%	32.62%	2.90%	1.74%	<b>6.32%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	29.00%	35.50%	31.60%	2.60%	1.30%	<b>3.14%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	25.84%	36.84%	31.39%	4.78%	1.15%	<b>4.26%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	26.26%	37.53%	30.77%	4.24%	1.19%	<b>3.07%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	24.17%	42.67%	29.50%	2.50%	1.17%	<b>2.45%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	38.95%	23.51%	28.77%	4.91%	3.86%	<b>1.16%</b>
<b>France</b>	36.08%	31.32%	28.69%	2.49%	1.42%	<b>5.74%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	33.96%	35.53%	27.83%	1.57%	1.10%	<b>2.59%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	41.19%	27.95%	27.22%	2.91%	0.73%	<b>2.80%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	32.92%	35.87%	27.15%	2.46%	1.60%	<b>3.32%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	46.67%	21.11%	26.11%	3.75%	2.36%	<b>2.94%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	35.25%	28.09%	25.28%	2.39%	8.99%	<b>2.90%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	43.71%	27.74%	22.95%	2.99%	2.59%	<b>2.04%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	31.73%	40.96%	22.50%	3.27%	1.54%	<b>2.12%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	40.65%	29.60%	20.82%	6.52%	2.41%	<b>2.88%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	28.35%	50.28%	18.99%	1.54%	0.84%	<b>2.92%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	35.66%	41.29%	18.06%	3.27%	1.72%	<b>4.49%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	50.84%	25.77%	16.41%	3.35%	3.63%	<b>5.84%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	47.91%	31.31%	14.43%	4.76%	1.59%	<b>2.83%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.84%</b>	<b>33.87%</b>	<b>29.43%</b>	<b>3.76%</b>	<b>2.11%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering "Equal".

**Table 5.20. Division of household work: household cleaning.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	24.43%	36.12%	32.67%	4.64%	2.14%	<b>16.00%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	32.80%	32.77%	29.22%	3.23%	1.97%	<b>33.02%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	15.13%	40.41%	37.43%	5.61%	1.41%	<b>11.50%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	37.11%	30.71%	26.63%	3.12%	2.43%	<b>39.47%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>31.13%</b>	<b>33.38%</b>	<b>29.69%</b>	<b>3.69%</b>	<b>2.11%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.21. Division of household work: household cleaning.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	22.56%	36.08%	33.16%	4.89%	3.31%	<b>47.60%</b>
<b>Female</b>	38.37%	31.85%	26.03%	2.72%	1.02%	<b>52.40%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.84%</b>	<b>33.87%</b>	<b>29.43%</b>	<b>3.76%</b>	<b>2.11%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.22. Division of household work: preparing meals.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
Norway	13.96%	37.47%	33.96%	12.64%	1.98%	<b>3.71%</b>
United States	29.52%	28.80%	29.23%	7.96%	4.49%	<b>2.82%</b>
Denmark	17.58%	32.48%	28.72%	15.65%	5.57%	<b>3.80%</b>
Sweden	17.66%	36.07%	28.61%	13.24%	4.41%	<b>2.68%</b>
Iceland	15.80%	39.76%	27.31%	14.06%	3.08%	<b>3.05%</b>
Australia	25.82%	35.12%	27.06%	8.83%	3.17%	<b>4.25%</b>
Finland	17.59%	43.26%	25.80%	11.30%	2.05%	<b>3.18%</b>
Canada	18.79%	41.55%	25.69%	11.21%	2.76%	<b>2.36%</b>
Belgium-Flanders	31.51%	30.27%	25.62%	8.49%	4.11%	<b>2.98%</b>
Switzerland	29.53%	34.44%	25.37%	7.72%	2.94%	<b>3.33%</b>
Netherlands	27.28%	32.58%	25.37%	9.36%	5.41%	<b>3.62%</b>
Spain	40.94%	24.37%	23.79%	6.06%	4.84%	<b>6.32%</b>
Germany-East	33.15%	32.08%	23.45%	7.82%	3.50%	<b>1.51%</b>
France	37.07%	26.79%	23.25%	8.65%	4.25%	<b>5.75%</b>
Ireland	26.92%	36.74%	23.21%	9.02%	4.11%	<b>3.07%</b>
Belgium-Wallonia	43.86%	22.46%	22.46%	5.96%	5.26%	<b>1.16%</b>
Slovenia	37.64%	34.80%	22.36%	2.36%	2.83%	<b>2.59%</b>
Germany-West	37.86%	32.25%	22.19%	4.44%	3.26%	<b>3.12%</b>
Poland	47.74%	25.91%	21.54%	3.64%	1.16%	<b>2.80%</b>
Austria	34.89%	38.90%	21.20%	3.17%	1.84%	<b>2.44%</b>
Latvia	32.69%	38.85%	21.15%	5.58%	1.73%	<b>2.12%</b>
Belgium-Brussels	39.69%	26.07%	19.84%	9.73%	4.67%	<b>1.05%</b>
Hungary	48.50%	25.15%	19.56%	3.79%	2.99%	<b>2.04%</b>
Israel	48.16%	24.54%	18.90%	5.25%	3.15%	<b>3.11%</b>
Mexico	38.54%	29.82%	18.42%	4.08%	9.14%	<b>2.90%</b>
Turkey	52.86%	23.32%	16.62%	3.35%	3.84%	<b>5.84%</b>
Chile	56.94%	20.00%	16.53%	4.03%	2.50%	<b>2.94%</b>
Slovakia	38.41%	44.69%	14.25%	1.54%	1.12%	<b>2.92%</b>
Czech Republic	42.03%	37.77%	13.77%	4.08%	2.36%	<b>4.50%</b>
South Korea	54.96%	30.17%	10.62%	2.55%	1.70%	<b>2.88%</b>
Japan	59.68%	28.32%	8.96%	1.73%	1.30%	<b>2.82%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>35.22%</b>	<b>31.89%</b>	<b>22.26%</b>	<b>7.11%</b>	<b>3.51%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering "Equal".

**Table 5.23. Division of household work: preparing meals.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	25.49%	35.16%	26.17%	9.23%	3.95%	<b>15.99%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	38.38%	30.69%	21.05%	6.44%	3.44%	<b>33.03%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	16.32%	37.41%	29.67%	13.31%	3.28%	<b>11.52%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	42.48%	28.94%	20.10%	4.94%	3.54%	<b>39.46%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>35.40%</b>	<b>31.49%</b>	<b>22.49%</b>	<b>7.09%</b>	<b>3.54%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.24. Division of household work: preparing meals.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>All Wife</b>	<b>Us. Wife</b>	<b>Equal</b>	<b>Us. Husb</b>	<b>All Husb</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	27.44%	34.55%	24.04%	8.74%	5.23%	<b>47.59%</b>
<b>Female</b>	42.28%	29.48%	20.64%	5.64%	1.96%	<b>52.41%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>35.22%</b>	<b>31.89%</b>	<b>22.26%</b>	<b>7.11%</b>	<b>3.51%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.25. Should women work: youngest child under school age.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Stay home</b>	<b>Work pt</b>	<b>Work ft</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	5.50%	56.03%	38.47%	<b>3.62%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	7.11%	59.09%	33.81%	<b>2.92%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	11.56%	54.93%	33.50%	<b>3.49%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	18.75%	48.20%	33.05%	<b>2.80%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	6.83%	60.24%	32.93%	<b>1.48%</b>
<b>Finland</b>	16.77%	50.42%	32.81%	<b>2.85%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	11.29%	61.72%	26.99%	<b>2.42%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	21.04%	56.33%	22.62%	<b>2.62%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	36.35%	41.97%	21.67%	<b>3.01%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	26.75%	51.81%	21.45%	<b>1.23%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	34.84%	46.72%	18.44%	<b>1.90%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	8.75%	73.66%	17.59%	<b>3.05%</b>
<b>United States</b>	34.01%	48.78%	17.21%	<b>2.91%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	34.86%	48.46%	16.68%	<b>2.79%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	40.10%	44.12%	15.78%	<b>4.72%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	25.66%	58.75%	15.59%	<b>1.24%</b>
<b>France</b>	25.54%	59.92%	14.54%	<b>5.37%</b>
<b>Spain</b>	26.26%	59.61%	14.13%	<b>6.65%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	59.00%	27.63%	13.37%	<b>3.02%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	30.57%	56.25%	13.18%	<b>2.61%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	42.99%	46.58%	10.43%	<b>2.82%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	45.78%	44.42%	9.80%	<b>3.69%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	57.05%	33.68%	9.26%	<b>4.23%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	39.07%	52.96%	7.97%	<b>3.46%</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	41.54%	52.18%	6.28%	<b>2.31%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	32.91%	60.81%	6.28%	<b>4.16%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	68.51%	25.40%	6.09%	<b>2.58%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	28.67%	65.28%	6.04%	<b>3.29%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	26.24%	68.98%	4.77%	<b>2.86%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	24.72%	71.51%	3.76%	<b>3.47%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	44.35%	51.99%	3.66%	<b>3.65%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	53.88%	44.42%	1.70%	<b>2.79%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>31.40%</b>	<b>52.75%</b>	<b>15.85%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering "Work full-time".



**Table 5.26. Should women work: youngest child under school age.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>Stay home</b>	<b>Work pt</b>	<b>Work ft</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	37.58%	51.41%	11.01%	<b>14.42%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	33.26%	55.80%	10.94%	<b>32.97%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	10.85%	54.04%	35.11%	<b>10.72%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	33.25%	50.98%	15.77%	<b>41.90%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>31.48%</b>	<b>52.96%</b>	<b>15.56%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.27. Should women work: youngest child under school age.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>Stay home</b>	<b>Work pt</b>	<b>Work ft</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	35.27%	48.85%	15.88%	<b>45.24%</b>
<b>Female</b>	28.20%	55.96%	15.84%	<b>54.76%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>31.39%</b>	<b>52.74%</b>	<b>15.86%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.28. Should women work: youngest child in school.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Stay home</b>	<b>Work pt</b>	<b>Work ft</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	2.93%	18.93%	78.14%	<b>2.84%</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	0.41%	27.93%	71.66%	<b>3.62%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	1.36%	30.96%	67.68%	<b>3.50%</b>
<b>Finland</b>	2.52%	34.61%	62.88%	<b>2.95%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	9.69%	31.88%	58.43%	<b>3.06%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	1.91%	39.92%	58.17%	<b>2.96%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	1.10%	43.41%	55.49%	<b>2.43%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	13.99%	31.20%	54.81%	<b>3.05%</b>
<b>United States</b>	4.58%	40.70%	54.72%	<b>3.05%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	4.23%	41.63%	54.15%	<b>1.90%</b>
<b>Spain</b>	4.56%	41.36%	54.07%	<b>6.70%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	2.65%	43.67%	53.67%	<b>1.45%</b>
<b>France</b>	1.80%	44.97%	53.23%	<b>5.28%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	3.12%	44.28%	52.60%	<b>2.57%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	3.31%	44.74%	51.95%	<b>3.04%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	2.70%	50.37%	46.93%	<b>1.21%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	7.40%	46.89%	45.71%	<b>2.76%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	11.38%	47.13%	41.49%	<b>2.79%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	12.95%	45.99%	41.05%	<b>4.74%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	2.29%	59.63%	38.07%	<b>2.59%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	1.94%	61.50%	36.56%	<b>1.22%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	13.92%	53.80%	32.28%	<b>3.67%</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	2.44%	66.75%	30.81%	<b>2.31%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	1.69%	72.43%	25.88%	<b>3.69%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	12.95%	62.24%	24.81%	<b>2.70%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	39.50%	39.78%	20.73%	<b>4.24%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	3.45%	76.02%	20.53%	<b>3.27%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	16.44%	63.40%	20.16%	<b>4.15%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	6.99%	74.24%	18.77%	<b>2.84%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	17.85%	64.89%	17.26%	<b>2.51%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	29.85%	57.57%	12.57%	<b>3.47%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	7.96%	80.41%	11.63%	<b>3.47%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.52%</b>	<b>49.00%</b>	<b>42.47%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering "Work full-time".

**Table 5.29. Should women work: youngest child in school.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>Stay home</b>	<b>Work pt</b>	<b>Work ft</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	2.94%	57.55%	39.51%	<b>14.57%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	7.17%	60.20%	32.63%	<b>32.52%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	1.36%	30.94%	67.71%	<b>10.84%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	13.27%	42.76%	43.97%	<b>42.07%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.49%</b>	<b>49.31%</b>	<b>42.21%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.30. Should women work: youngest child in school.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>Stay home</b>	<b>Work pt</b>	<b>Work ft</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	10.06%	46.94%	43.00%	<b>45.14%</b>
<b>Female</b>	7.26%	50.66%	42.08%	<b>54.86%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.53%</b>	<b>48.98%</b>	<b>42.49%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.31. Working mom: preschool child is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>S. Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	5.00%	16.95%	10.75%	16.73%	50.56%	<b>3.91%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	5.90%	11.44%	11.07%	29.34%	42.25%	<b>1.58%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	2.43%	11.59%	21.19%	27.48%	37.31%	<b>2.65%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	4.16%	16.75%	30.40%	14.23%	34.46%	<b>3.02%</b>
<b>France</b>	9.54%	22.87%	18.42%	21.07%	28.11%	<b>5.85%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	1.27%	13.16%	15.86%	41.95%	27.76%	<b>3.68%</b>
<b>Finland</b>	4.17%	16.76%	12.96%	38.52%	27.59%	<b>3.16%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	10.05%	18.69%	19.16%	25.47%	26.64%	<b>1.25%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	1.18%	11.92%	15.74%	47.68%	23.48%	<b>3.21%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	15.37%	20.49%	17.37%	23.61%	23.16%	<b>1.31%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	10.02%	22.40%	22.83%	24.15%	20.59%	<b>4.84%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	4.92%	21.97%	18.81%	33.84%	20.45%	<b>2.31%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	10.73%	22.39%	21.18%	27.33%	18.38%	<b>3.13%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	11.41%	26.61%	11.58%	32.36%	18.04%	<b>3.30%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	4.65%	20.51%	16.90%	40.65%	17.28%	<b>3.08%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.88%	23.40%	19.61%	35.86%	16.25%	<b>3.47%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	4.80%	22.73%	26.17%	31.49%	14.81%	<b>2.80%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	4.70%	25.64%	18.80%	36.70%	14.17%	<b>4.23%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	3.78%	26.89%	20.14%	36.20%	12.99%	<b>2.86%</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	3.95%	26.54%	22.48%	35.53%	11.51%	<b>2.66%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	7.24%	35.44%	18.30%	29.87%	9.15%	<b>3.51%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	19.56%	38.52%	15.35%	18.15%	8.43%	<b>2.91%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	22.32%	28.42%	22.32%	19.47%	7.47%	<b>2.78%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	8.00%	39.39%	19.06%	27.70%	5.85%	<b>3.25%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	10.02%	36.33%	14.33%	33.61%	5.71%	<b>3.12%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	22.99%	46.14%	14.81%	11.46%	4.60%	<b>3.75%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	23.19%	35.57%	18.26%	18.60%	4.38%	<b>4.27%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	19.35%	39.64%	15.59%	21.44%	3.97%	<b>2.79%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	26.94%	43.67%	10.81%	15.37%	3.21%	<b>3.46%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	12.25%	55.74%	15.79%	14.59%	1.63%	<b>4.13%</b>
<b>United States</b>	6.74%	27.43%	50.47%	15.36%	0.00%	<b>3.73%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.85%</b>	<b>27.46%</b>	<b>19.06%</b>	<b>26.81%</b>	<b>16.82%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering “Strongly disagree”.

**Table 5.32. Working mom: preschool child is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	5.07%	24.69%	26.42%	31.88%	11.93%	<b>17.30%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	10.59%	27.32%	18.56%	24.29%	19.24%	<b>35.41%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	3.48%	15.60%	13.15%	31.77%	36.01%	<b>11.62%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	14.07%	34.83%	17.19%	25.57%	8.34%	<b>35.66%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.05%</b>	<b>28.18%</b>	<b>18.80%</b>	<b>26.93%</b>	<b>16.04%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.33. Working mom: preschool child is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	10.31%	30.03%	19.72%	26.19%	13.75%	<b>45.09%</b>
<b>Female</b>	9.48%	25.36%	18.51%	27.30%	19.36%	<b>54.91%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.85%</b>	<b>27.46%</b>	<b>19.06%</b>	<b>26.80%</b>	<b>16.83%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.34. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>S. Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	5.51%	12.72%	8.63%	14.21%	58.93%	<b>3.92%</b>
<b>Germany-East</b>	4.61%	12.73%	11.44%	31.37%	39.85%	<b>1.58%</b>
<b>Finland</b>	2.77%	10.81%	12.01%	34.75%	39.65%	<b>3.16%</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	2.51%	13.43%	16.38%	28.49%	39.19%	<b>2.67%</b>
<b>Japan</b>	6.92%	18.96%	29.76%	14.79%	29.57%	<b>3.08%</b>
<b>France</b>	11.25%	21.65%	17.72%	22.35%	27.03%	<b>5.86%</b>
<b>Belgium-Brussels</b>	12.86%	22.62%	14.86%	22.84%	26.83%	<b>1.32%</b>
<b>Iceland</b>	2.08%	14.66%	16.11%	41.45%	25.70%	<b>3.22%</b>
<b>Canada</b>	3.82%	21.12%	15.78%	34.22%	25.06%	<b>2.29%</b>
<b>Norway</b>	1.99%	18.20%	18.92%	37.84%	23.05%	<b>3.67%</b>
<b>Belgium-Wallonia</b>	11.63%	24.42%	20.23%	22.09%	21.63%	<b>1.25%</b>
<b>Germany-West</b>	13.62%	25.02%	13.00%	27.32%	21.04%	<b>3.30%</b>
<b>United States</b>	5.78%	22.63%	11.79%	40.03%	19.78%	<b>3.69%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	9.84%	21.73%	26.55%	22.15%	19.73%	<b>4.83%</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	6.93%	27.35%	13.11%	33.71%	18.90%	<b>3.07%</b>
<b>Australia</b>	6.69%	29.31%	16.90%	30.41%	16.69%	<b>4.23%</b>
<b>Belgium-Flanders</b>	5.85%	27.17%	20.90%	29.99%	16.09%	<b>2.79%</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	5.99%	28.12%	20.05%	29.95%	15.89%	<b>3.51%</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	12.90%	25.16%	22.69%	24.61%	14.64%	<b>3.19%</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	4.50%	24.92%	24.15%	32.60%	13.83%	<b>2.66%</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	5.13%	33.95%	21.64%	28.92%	10.36%	<b>2.84%</b>
<b>Austria</b>	18.31%	36.82%	16.12%	19.00%	9.75%	<b>2.93%</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	17.98%	25.29%	23.44%	23.79%	9.50%	<b>4.27%</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	18.32%	26.74%	26.74%	19.05%	9.16%	<b>2.77%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	7.34%	29.63%	14.11%	40.64%	8.28%	<b>3.10%</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	10.61%	36.98%	16.75%	27.45%	8.21%	<b>3.52%</b>
<b>Israel</b>	9.03%	32.43%	26.47%	25.29%	6.78%	<b>3.23%</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	19.33%	32.71%	19.54%	22.99%	5.43%	<b>2.79%</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	19.78%	42.76%	16.36%	15.81%	5.30%	<b>3.74%</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	27.93%	43.38%	11.04%	14.18%	3.48%	<b>3.44%</b>
<b>Chile</b>	10.67%	56.26%	20.77%	11.31%	1.00%	<b>4.10%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.92%</b>	<b>26.92%</b>	<b>18.33%</b>	<b>26.21%</b>	<b>18.62%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\*Ordered by percent answering “Strongly disagree”.

**Table 5.35. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.**

<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	5.75%	25.48%	16.03%	34.19%	18.56%	<b>17.23%</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	11.36%	28.01%	18.17%	23.55%	18.92%	<b>35.54%</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	3.50%	14.03%	13.14%	28.31%	41.02%	<b>11.62%</b>
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	13.22%	32.58%	20.24%	24.75%	9.21%	<b>35.62%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.14%</b>	<b>27.58%</b>	<b>17.95%</b>	<b>26.36%</b>	<b>17.97%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.36. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>S. Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	9.75%	27.60%	19.14%	26.74%	16.77%	<b>45.18%</b>
<b>Female</b>	10.07%	26.35%	17.68%	25.76%	20.15%	<b>54.82%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.92%</b>	<b>26.91%</b>	<b>18.34%</b>	<b>26.20%</b>	<b>18.62%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Table 5.37. Mean answers to all observed measures by latent category.**

<b>Gendered Labor Category</b>				
<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>Division of Paid Leave (Mean out of 5)</b>	<b>Best Child Care Option (Mean out of 6)</b>	<b>Breadwinner-Homemaker (Mean out of 5)</b>	<b>Women Really Want Family (Mean out of 5)</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	2.07	3.73	1.89	3.31
<b>Conservative</b>	2.11	3.69	2.15	3.3
<b>Social Democratic</b>	2.41	4.26	2.53	3.66
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	1.79	3.07	1.94	2.67
<b>Reproductive Labor Category</b>				
<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>Chores: Laundry (Mean out of 5)</b>	<b>Chores: Sick Care (Mean out of 5)</b>	<b>Chores: Clean House (Mean out of 5)</b>	<b>Chores: Cook Meals (Mean out of 5)</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	2.00	2.37	2.24	2.31
<b>Conservative</b>	1.77	2.29	2.09	2.06
<b>Social Democratic</b>	1.95	2.57	2.38	2.50
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	1.75	2.36	2.03	1.98
<b>Productive Labor Category</b>				
<b>Welfare Regime</b>	<b>Wom Work: Young Child (Mean out of 3)</b>	<b>Wom Work: School Child (Mean out of 3)</b>	<b>Wom Work: Child Suffers (Mean out of 5)</b>	<b>Wom Work: Family Suffers (Mean out of 5)</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	2.37	1.73	3.21	3.34
<b>Conservative</b>	2.25	1.78	3.14	3.11
<b>Social Democratic</b>	2.66	2.24	3.81	3.89
<b>Non-Categorized</b>	2.31	1.83	2.79	2.84

Note: Higher scores correspond with more progressive attitudes.



### Appendix 3: Tables for Chapter 6

**Table 6.01. Results of confirmatory factor analyses for three latent measures.**

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Eigenvalue</b>	<b>Prop. Explained</b>
DGCL	1.25	1.33
<b>Variables</b>	<b>Loading</b>	<b>Alpha</b>
Q1.1	0.47	0.66
Q1.2	0.55	0.62
Q1.3	0.63	0.54
Q1.4	0.57	0.59
<b>Factor</b>	<b>Eigenvalue</b>	<b>Prop. Explained</b>
GERL	1.73	1.27
<b>Variables</b>	<b>Loading</b>	<b>Alpha</b>
Q2.1	0.67	0.71
Q2.2	0.56	0.75
Q2.3	0.73	0.68
Q2.4	0.67	0.71
<b>Factor</b>	<b>Eigenvalue</b>	<b>Prop. Explained</b>
GEPL	1.57	1.12
<b>Variables</b>	<b>Loading</b>	<b>Alpha</b>
Q3.1	0.56	0.68
Q3.2	0.61	0.71
Q3.3	0.66	0.58
Q3.4	0.68	0.58

DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor

GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor

GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor

**Table 6.02. Results of assessing structural equations model fit across sex.**

<b>De-Gendered Conception of Labor</b>			
<b>Group Invariant: none</b>		<b>Group Invariant: mcoef</b>	
<b>Fit Statistic</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Fit Statistic</b>	<b>Value</b>
RMSEA	0.081	RMSEA	0.065
CFI	0.98	CFI	0.98
TLI	0.95	TLI	0.96
SBIC	292.56	SBIC	313.51
$\chi^2$	333.10	$\chi^2$	384.45
<b>DEGENDER (lrtest)</b>			0.00
<b>Household Labor Distribution</b>			
<b>Group Invariant: none</b>		<b>Group Invariant: mcoef</b>	
<b>Fit Statistic</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Fit Statistic</b>	<b>Value</b>
RMSEA	0.023	RMSEA	0.024
CFI	0.999	CFI	0.998
TLI	0.997	TLI	0.996
SBIC	-14.36	SBIC	-19.444
$\chi^2$	25.41	$\chi^2$	50.16
<b>HOUSEHOLD (lrtest)</b>			0.00
<b>Attitudes toward Women in Workforce</b>			
<b>Group Invariant: none</b>		<b>Group Invariant: mcoef</b>	
<b>Fit Statistic</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Fit Statistic</b>	<b>Value</b>
RMSEA	0.044	RMSEA	0.051
CFI	0.997	CFI	0.992
TLI	0.99	TLI	0.987
SBIC	76.26	SBIC	210.33
$\chi^2$	117.48	$\chi^2$	282.45
<b>WOMWRK (lrtest)</b>			0.00

**Table 6.03. Male measurement model comparisons.**

<b>Comparing Male 1-Factor to Male 3-Factor</b>		<b>Comparing Male 3-Factor to Male Hierarchical</b>	
<b>Fit Statistic</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Fit Statistic</b>	<b>Value</b>
<b>M1F SBIC</b>	5645.35	<b>M3F SBIC</b>	-29.53
<b>M3F SBIC</b>	-29.53	<b>MHF SBIC (limited covariance)</b>	1111.72
<b>M1F <math>\chi^2</math></b>	6054.54	<b>M3F <math>\chi^2</math></b>	353.55
<b>M3F <math>\chi^2</math></b>	353.55	<b>MHF <math>\chi^2</math></b>	1564.45
<b>M1F M3F lrtest:</b>	0.00	<b>M3F MHF lrtest:</b>	0.00

**Table 6.04. Male 3-factor measurement model results.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>Divleave &lt;- DGCL</b>	0.37***	0.01
Cons	2.40	
<b>Bestcare &lt;- DGCL</b>	0.51***	0.01
Cons	1.96	
<b>Bwhmmodel &lt;- DGCL</b>	0.75***	0.01
Cons	2.54	
<b>Womwant &lt;- DGCL</b>	0.66***	0.01
Cons	2.40	
<b>Divlaundryf &lt;- GERL</b>	0.69***	0.01
Cons	1.80	
<b>Divsickf &lt;- GERL</b>	0.60***	0.01
Cons	2.76	
<b>Divcleanf &lt;- GERL</b>	0.80***	0.01
Cons	2.31	
<b>Divcookf &lt;- GERL</b>	0.70***	0.01
Cons	2.04	
<b>Wmwrkschool &lt;- GEPL</b>	0.52***	0.01
Cons	3.48	
<b>Wmwrkyoung &lt;- GEPL</b>	0.61***	0.01
Cons	2.65	
<b>Presuff &lt;- GEPL</b>	0.65***	0.01
Cons	2.38	
<b>Famsuff &lt;- GEPL</b>	0.67***	0.01
Cons	2.41	

p<.000\*\*\*

n = 6041

DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor

GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor

GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor

**Table 6.05. Fit statistics for male 3-factor measurement model.**

<b>Fit Stats</b>	<b>Value</b>
<b>RMSEA</b>	0.03
<b>CFI</b>	0.99
<b>TLI</b>	0.98
<b><math>\chi^2</math></b>	324.33
<b>SBIC</b>	-29.53

**Table 6.06. Female measurement model comparisons.**

Comparing Female 1-Factor to Female 3-Factor		Comparing Female 1-Factor to Female 3-Factor	
Fit Statistic	Value	Fit Statistic	Value
F1F SBIC	4686.12	F3F SBIC	-12.59
F3F SBIC	-12.59	FHF SBIC	8.06
F1F $\chi^2$	5102.86	F3F $\chi^2$	368.68
F3F $\chi^2$	368.68	FHF $\chi^2$	407.07
F1F F3F lrtest:	0.00	F3F FHF lrtest:	0.00

**Table 6.07. Female 3-factor measurement model results.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>Divleave &lt;- DGCL</b>	0.37***	0.01
Cons	2.56	
<b>Bestcare &lt;- DGCL</b>	0.52***	0.01
Cons	2.05	
<b>Bwhmmodel &lt;- DGCL</b>	0.75***	0.01
Cons	2.77	
<b>Womwant &lt;- DGCL</b>	0.68***	0.01
Cons	2.38	
<b>Divlaundryf &lt;- GERL</b>	0.60***	0.01
Cons	1.75	
<b>Divsickf &lt;- GERL</b>	0.57***	0.01
Cons	2.34	
<b>Divcleanf &lt;- GERL</b>	0.75***	0.01
Cons	2.10	
<b>Divcookf &lt;- GERL</b>	0.66***	0.01
Cons	1.93	
<b>Wmwrkschool &lt;- GEPL</b>	0.45***	0.01
Cons	3.75	
<b>Wmwrkyoung &lt;- GEPL</b>	0.58***	0.01
Cons	2.89	
<b>Presuff &lt;- GEPL</b>	0.70***	0.01
Cons	2.41	
<b>Famsuff &lt;- GEPL</b>	0.69***	0.01
Cons	2.37	

p<.000\*\*\*

n = 7093

DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor

GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor


GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor

**Table 6.08. Fit statistics for female 3-factor measurement model.**

<b>Fit Stats</b>	<b>Value</b>
<b>RMSEA</b>	0.03
<b>CFI</b>	0.99
<b>TLI</b>	0.98
<b><math>\chi^2</math></b>	368.68
<b>SBIC</b>	-12.59

**Appendix 4: Figures for Chapter 6**

**Figure 1. Path diagram of single-factor measurement model.**



**Figure 2. Path diagram of three-factor measurement model.**

**Measurement Model 2: 3-Factor Model**








Figure 3. Path diagram of hierarchical-factor measurement model.



**Figure 4. Path diagram of bifactor measurement model.**



Appendix 5: Tables for Chapter 7

Table 7.01. Results for male 3-factor structural model DGCL latent measure.

Standardized	Coef.	Std. Err.
<b>DEGENDER &lt;- (DGCL)</b>		
<b>Liberal Welfare Regime</b>	---	---
Conservative Welfare Regime	0.09***	0.02
Social Democratic Welfare Regime	0.26***	0.02
Non-Categorized Welfare Regime	-0.11***	0.02
<b>Age in Years</b>	-0.07***	0.02
<b>Education in Years</b>	0.25***	0.02
<b>Never Worked</b>	---	---
Not Currently Working	-0.06	0.09
Currently Working	-0.06	0.09
<b>Never Married</b>	---	---
Currently Married	-0.05**	0.02
Post Married	-0.01	0.02
<b>Rural Residence</b>	---	0.02
Town Residence	-0.04*	0.02
Suburban Residence	0.00	0.02
City Residence	0.00	0.02
<b>Poor Health</b>	---	---
Satisfactory Health	0.05*	0.02
Good Health	0.08***	0.02
<b>Never Attend Religious Services</b>	---	---
Attend few times per year or less	-0.05**	0.02
Attend once per month or more	-0.09***	0.02
Attend once per week or more	-0.16***	0.02
<b>Poorest Income Quintile</b>	---	---
Second Poorest Income Quintile	0.02	0.02
Middle Income Quintile	0.08**	0.02
Second Richest Income Quintile	0.11***	0.03
Richest Income Quintile	0.17***	0.03

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.000\*\*\*, p<.10†      n = 4043

DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor

**Table 7.02. Results for male 3-factor structural model GERL latent measure.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>HOUSEHOLD &lt;- (GERL)</b>		
<b>Liberal Welfare Regime</b>	---	---
<b>Conservative Welfare Regime</b>	-0.09***	0.02
<b>Social Democratic Welfare Regime</b>	0.07**	0.02
<b>Non-Categorized Welfare Regime</b>	-0.07**	0.02
<b>Age in Years</b>	-0.17***	0.02
<b>Education in Years</b>	0.09***	0.02
<b>Never Worked</b>	---	---
<b>Not Currently Working</b>	-0.12	0.09
<b>Currently Working</b>	-0.28**	0.09
<b>Never Married</b>	---	---
<b>Currently Married</b>	-0.10***	0.02
<b>Post Married</b>	0.03	0.02
<b>Rural Residence</b>	---	---
<b>Town Residence</b>	0.05**	0.02
<b>Suburban Residence</b>	0.05*	0.02
<b>City Residence</b>	0.08***	0.02
<b>Poor Health</b>	---	---
<b>Satisfactory Health</b>	0.06**	0.02
<b>Good Health</b>	0.07**	0.02
<b>Never Attend Religious Services</b>	---	---
<b>Attend few times per year or less</b>	-0.02	0.02
<b>Attend once per month or more</b>	-0.01	0.02
<b>Attend once per week or more</b>	0.05*	0.02
<b>Poorest Income Quintile</b>	---	---
<b>Second Poorest Income Quintile</b>	-0.01	0.02
<b>Middle Income Quintile</b>	0.03	0.03
<b>Second Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.02	0.03
<b>Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.04	0.03

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.000\*\*\*, p<.10†      n = 4043      --- Ref. Cat.

GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor

**Table 7.03. Results for male 3-factor structural model GEPL latent measure.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>WOMWRK &lt;- (GEPL)</b>		
<b>Liberal Welfare Regime</b>	---	---
<b>Conservative Welfare Regime</b>	-0.16***	0.02
<b>Social Democratic Welfare Regime</b>	0.26***	0.02
<b>Non-Categorized Welfare Regime</b>	-0.03	0.02
<b>Age in Years</b>	-0.09***	0.02
<b>Education in Years</b>	0.20***	0.02
<b>Never Worked</b>	---	---
<b>Not Currently Working</b>	0.00	0.09
<b>Currently Working</b>	-0.02	0.09
<b>Never Married</b>	---	---
<b>Currently Married</b>	-0.08***	0.02
<b>Post Married</b>	-0.05*	0.02
<b>Rural Residence</b>	---	---
<b>Town Residence</b>	-0.02	0.02
<b>Suburban Residence</b>	-0.02	0.02
<b>City Residence</b>	-0.00	0.02
<b>Poor Health</b>	---	---
<b>Satisfactory Health</b>	0.03	0.02
<b>Good Health</b>	0.04	0.02
<b>Never Attend Religious Services</b>	---	---
<b>Attend few times per year or less</b>	-0.07**	0.02
<b>Attend once per month or more</b>	-0.12***	0.02
<b>Attend once per week or more</b>	-0.18***	0.02
<b>Poorest Income Quintile</b>	---	---
<b>Second Poorest Income Quintile</b>	0.05†	0.02
<b>Middle Income Quintile</b>	0.09**	0.03
<b>Second Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.12***	0.03
<b>Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.17***	0.03

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.000\*\*\*, p<.10†      n = 4043      --- Ref. Cat.

GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor

**Table 7.04. Results for male 3-factor structural model measurement component.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>Divleave &lt;- DEGENDER</b>	0.41***	0.02
Cons	2.31	
<b>Bestcare &lt;- DEGENDER</b>	0.51***	0.01
Cons	1.74	
<b>Bwhmmodel &lt;- DEGENDER</b>	0.77***	0.01
Cons	2.24	
<b>Womwant &lt;- DEGENDER</b>	0.66***	0.01
Cons	2.15	
<b>Divlaundryf &lt;- HOUSEHOLD</b>	0.62***	0.01
Cons	2.42	
<b>Divsickf &lt;- HOUSEHOLD</b>	0.52***	0.01
Cons	3.43	
<b>Divcleanf &lt;- HOUSEHOLD</b>	0.75***	0.01
Cons	3.15	
<b>Divcookf &lt;- HOUSEHOLD</b>	0.64***	0.01
Cons	2.71	
<b>Wmwrkschool &lt;- WOMWRK</b>	0.57***	0.01
Cons	3.81	
<b>Wmwrkyoung &lt;- WOMWRK</b>	0.63***	0.01
Cons	2.70	
<b>Presuff &lt;- WOMWRK</b>	0.63***	0.01
Cons	2.40	
<b>Famsuff &lt;- WOMWRK</b>	0.68***	0.01
Cons	2.38	

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.000\*\*\*, p<.10†      n = 4043    --- Ref. Cat.

**Table 7.05. Fit statistics for male 3-factor structural model.**

<b>Fit Stats</b>	<b>Value</b>
RMSEA	0.03
CFI	0.95
TLI	0.93
$\chi^2$	1088.57
SBIC	-863.04

**Table 7.06. Results for female 3-factor structural model DGCL latent measure.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>DEGENDER &lt;- (DGCL)</b>		
<b>Liberal Welfare Regime</b>	---	---
<b>Conservative Welfare Regime</b>	0.11***	0.02
<b>Social Democratic Welfare Regime</b>	0.22***	0.02
<b>Non-Categorized Welfare Regime</b>	-0.11***	0.02
<b>Age in Years</b>	0.08***	0.02
<b>Education in Years</b>	0.29***	0.02
<b>Never Worked</b>	---	---
<b>Not Currently Working</b>	0.10**	0.03
<b>Currently Working</b>	0.24***	0.03
<b>Never Married</b>	---	---
<b>Currently Married</b>	-0.07***	0.02
<b>Post Married</b>	-0.00	0.02
<b>Rural Residence</b>	---	---
<b>Town Residence</b>	-0.02	0.02
<b>Suburban Residence</b>	0.03†	0.02
<b>City Residence</b>	0.00†	0.02
<b>Poor Health</b>	---	---
<b>Satisfactory Health</b>	0.04*	0.02
<b>Good Health</b>	0.12***	0.02
<b>Never Attend Religious Services</b>	---	---
<b>Attend few times per year or less</b>	-0.03†	0.02
<b>Attend once per month or more</b>	-0.10***	0.02
<b>Attend once per week or more</b>	0.16***	0.02
<b>Poorest Income Quintile</b>	---	---
<b>Second Poorest Income Quintile</b>	0.02	0.02
<b>Middle Income Quintile</b>	0.05*	0.02
<b>Second Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.05*	0.02
<b>Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.07**	0.02

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.000\*\*\*, p<.10†      n = 4539    --- Ref. Cat.

DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor

**Table 7.07. Results for female 3-factor structural model GERL latent measure.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>HOUSEHOLD &lt;- (GERL)</b>		
<b>Liberal Welfare Regime</b>	---	---
<b>Conservative Welfare Regime</b>	-0.08**	0.02
<b>Social Democratic Welfare Regime</b>	0.10***	0.02
<b>Non-Categorized Welfare Regime</b>	-0.03	0.02
<b>Age in Years</b>	-0.00	0.02
<b>Education in Years</b>	0.15***	0.02
<b>Never Worked</b>	---	---
<b>Not Currently Working</b>	0.03	0.04
<b>Currently Working</b>	0.17***	0.04
<b>Never Married</b>	---	---
<b>Currently Married</b>	-0.12***	0.02
<b>Post Married</b>	-0.07***	0.02
<b>Rural Residence</b>	---	---
<b>Town Residence</b>	0.07**	0.02
<b>Suburban Residence</b>	0.06**	0.02
<b>City Residence</b>	0.12***	0.02
<b>Poor Health</b>	---	---
<b>Satisfactory Health</b>	-0.04*	0.02
<b>Good Health</b>	-0.01	0.02
<b>Never Attend Religious Services</b>	---	---
<b>Attend few times per year or less</b>	0.02	0.02
<b>Attend once per month or more</b>	-0.03	0.02
<b>Attend once per week or more</b>	-0.03	0.02
<b>Poorest Income Quintile</b>	---	---
<b>Second Poorest Income Quintile</b>	-0.02	0.02
<b>Middle Income Quintile</b>	-0.03	0.02
<b>Second Richest Income Quintile</b>	-0.01	0.03
<b>Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.01	0.03

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.000\*\*\*, p<.10†      n = 4539      --- Ref. Cat.

GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor



**Table 7.08. Results for female 3-factor structural model GEPL latent measure.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>WOMWRK &lt;- (GEPL)</b>		
<b>Liberal Welfare Regime</b>	---	---
<b>Conservative Welfare Regime</b>	-0.15***	0.02
<b>Social Democratic Welfare Regime</b>	0.19***	0.02
<b>Non-Categorized Welfare Regime</b>	-0.05**	0.02
<b>Age in Years</b>	0.08***	0.02
<b>Education in Years</b>	0.20***	0.02
<b>Never Worked</b>	---	---
<b>Not Currently Working</b>	0.18***	0.04
<b>Currently Working</b>	0.33***	0.04
<b>Never Married</b>	---	---
<b>Currently Married</b>	-0.12***	0.02
<b>Post Married</b>	-0.05**	0.02
<b>Rural Residence</b>	---	---
<b>Town Residence</b>	-0.03†	0.02
<b>Suburban Residence</b>	-0.04*	0.02
<b>City Residence</b>	-0.01	0.02
<b>Poor Health</b>	---	---
<b>Satisfactory Health</b>	0.09***	0.02
<b>Good Health</b>	0.15***	0.02
<b>Never Attend Religious Services</b>	---	---
<b>Attend few times per year or less</b>	-0.03	0.02
<b>Attend once per month or more</b>	-0.10***	0.02
<b>Attend once per week or more</b>	-0.16***	0.02
<b>Poorest Income Quintile</b>	---	---
<b>Second Poorest Income Quintile</b>	0.02	0.02
<b>Middle Income Quintile</b>	0.02	0.02
<b>Second Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.04	0.03
<b>Richest Income Quintile</b>	0.06*	0.03

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.000\*\*\*, p<.10†      n = 4539      --- Ref. Cat.

GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor

**Table 7.09. Results for female 3-factor structural model measurement component.**

<b>Standardized</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
<b>Divleave &lt;- DEGENDER</b>	0.43***	0.01
Cons	2.02	
<b>Bestcare &lt;- DEGENDER</b>	0.53***	0.01
Cons	1.24	
<b>Bwhmmodel &lt;- DEGENDER</b>	0.79***	0.01
Cons	1.56	
<b>Womwant &lt;- DEGENDER</b>	0.65***	0.01
Cons	1.40	
<b>Divlaundryf &lt;- HOUSEHOLD</b>	0.57***	0.01
Cons	1.49	
<b>Divsickf &lt;- HOUSEHOLD</b>	0.544***	0.01
Cons	2.21	
<b>Divcleanf &lt;- HOUSEHOLD</b>	0.70***	0.01
Cons	1.87	
<b>Divcookf &lt;- HOUSEHOLD</b>	0.63***	0.01
Cons	1.71	
<b>Wmwrkschool &lt;- WOMWRK</b>	0.46***	0.01
Cons	3.60	
<b>Wmwrkyoung &lt;- WOMWRK</b>	0.63***	0.01
Cons	2.28	
<b>Presuff &lt;- WOMWRK</b>	0.67***	0.01
Cons	1.72	
<b>Famsuff &lt;- WOMWRK</b>	0.69***	0.01
Cons	1.61	

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.000\*\*\*, p<.10†      n = 4539

**Table 7.10. Fit statistics for female 3-factor structural model.**

<b>Fit Stats</b>	<b>Value</b>
<b>RMSEA</b>	0.03
<b>CFI</b>	0.95
<b>TLI</b>	0.93
<b>χ<sup>2</sup></b>	1136.23
<b>SBIC</b>	-842.57

**Appendix 6: Figures for Chapter 7**

**Figure 5. Predictor relationships consistent across sex and latent measure.**

Universally Positive	Universally Negative	Universally Non-Significant
Years of Education	Currently Married	(None)
Social Democratic Welfare Regime		

**Figure 6. Predictor relationships consistent for men across all latent measures.**

Positive for All Men	Negative for All Men	Non-significant for All Men
Years of education	Age	Not currently working
Social democratic welfare regime	Currently married	Second-poorest quintile

**Figure 7. Predictor relationships consistent for women across all latent measures.**

Positive for All Women	Negative for All Women	Non-significant for All Women
Years of education	Currently married	Yearly religious attendance
Currently working		Second-poorest quintile
Social democratic welfare regime		

**Figure 8. Predictor relationships consistent for both sexes within DGLC measure.**

Positive for both sexes	Negative for both sexes	Non-significant for both sexes
Years of education	Currently married	Post-married
Satisfactory health	Monthly religious attendance	Suburban residence
Good health	Weekly religious attendance	City residence
Middle quintile	Non-categorized welfare regime	Second-poorest quintile
Second-richest quintile		
Richest quintile		
Conservative welfare regime		
Social democratic welfare regime		

**Figure 9. Predictor relationships consistent for both sexes within GERL measure.**

Positive for both sexes	Negative for both sexes	Non-significant for both sexes
Years of education	Currently married	Not currently working
Town residence	Conservative welfare regime	Yearly religious attendance
Suburban residence		Monthly religious attendance
City residence		Second-poorest quintile
Social democratic welfare regime		Middle quintile
		Second-richest quintile
		Richest quintile

**Figure 10. Predictor relationships consistent for both sexes within GEPL measure.**

Positive for both sexes	Negative for both sexes	Non-significant for both sexes
Years of education	Currently married	Town residence
Richest quintile	Post-married	City residence
Social democratic welfare regime	Monthly religious attendance	Second-poorest quintile
	Weekly religious attendance	
	Conservative welfare regime	

**Figure 11. Predictor relationships from male structural model by latent measure.**

Male	Progressive	Traditional	Non-Significant
De-Gendered Conceptions of Labor	Years of education Satisfactory health Good health Middle quintile Second-richest quintile Richest quintile Conservative welfare regime Social democratic welfare regime	Age Currently married Town residence Yearly religious attendance Monthly religious attendance Weekly religious attendance Non-categorized welfare regime	Not currently working Currently working Post-married Suburban residence City residence Second-poorest quintile
Equitable Distribution of Household Labor	Years of education Town residence Suburban residence City residence Satisfactory health Good health Weekly religious attendance Social democratic welfare regime	Age Currently working Currently married Conservative welfare regime Non-categorized welfare regime	Not currently working Post-married Yearly religious attendance Monthly religious attendance Second-poorest quintile Middle quintile Second-richest quintile Richest quintile
Equitable Attitudes Toward Women in Paid Labor	Years of education Middle quintile Second-richest quintile Richest quintile Social democratic welfare regime	Age Currently married Post-married Yearly religious attendance Monthly religious attendance Weekly religious attendance Conservative welfare regime	Not currently working Currently working Town residence Suburban residence City residence Satisfactory health Good health Second-poorest quintile Non-categorized welfare regime

Positive  
 Negative  
 Non-Significant

**Figure 12. Predictor relationships from female structural model by latent measure.**

Female	Progressive	Traditional	Non-Significant
De-Gendered Conceptions of Labor	Age Years of education Not currently working Currently working Satisfactory health Good health Middle quintile Richest quintile Conservative welfare regime Social democratic welfare regime	Currently married Monthly religious attendance Weekly religious attendance Non-categorized welfare regime	Post-married Town residence Suburban residence City residence Yearly religious attendance Second-poorest quintile
Equitable Distribution of Household Labor	Years of education Currently working Town residence Suburban residence City residence Social democratic welfare regime	Currently married Post-married Satisfactory health Conservative welfare regime	Age Not currently working Good health Yearly religious attendance Monthly religious attendance Weekly religious attendance Second-poorest quintile Middle quintile Second-richest quintile Richest quintile Non-categorized welfare regime
Equitable Attitudes Toward Women in Paid Labor	Age Years of education Not currently working Currently working Satisfactory health Good health Richest quintile Social democratic welfare regime	Currently married Post-married Suburban residence Monthly religious attendance Weekly religious attendance Conservative welfare regime Non-categorized welfare regime	Town residence City residence Yearly religious attendance Second-poorest quintile Middle quintile Second-richest quintile

Positive

Negative

Non-Significant