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NGOS IN THE CROSSHAIRS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE TERRORIST THREAT

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NGOS IN THE CROSSHAIRS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE TERRORIST THREAT

A dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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In the end, a doctorate is less about how you perform than it is about the journey. I once thought the journey too long, too difficult, and myself unequal to the task. That in and of itself is true. However, I was not making this journey alone.

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Senri no michimo ippo kara (the thousand mile journey begins with one step).

-Japanese Proverb

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ABSTRACT

This study addresses the impact of terrorism and political violence on non-governmental organizations. The research is divided into two main sections. The first utilizes secondary source material to evaluate the nature and extent of the threat of terrorism and political violence to non-governmental organizations. Acts of political violence and terrorism will be categorized into acts upon non-governmental organizations and religious groups acting as non-governmental organizations depending on the nature and target of the attacks. The general threat characteristics can then be evaluated. The main source materials used are the Rand/Saint Andrews Terrorism Database as well as the Rand/MIPT Terrorism Database, both of which have been compiled primarily from news publications worldwide. Also used as secondary sources are the U.S. government reports *Political Violence Against Americans*, *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans*, and the *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000-2002*. A theoretical framework as to the nature of the threat of terrorism and political violence on non-governmental organizations will then be presented.

The second portion of this study will utilize the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints as a case study to determine how it evaluates and deals with the threats of political violence and terrorism against its organization, agents, and property worldwide. Further, the theoretical framework developed in the previous section will be applied to the case and the framework reinforced. The appropriateness of the framework in an in-depth scenario can be explored. Policy recommendations based on the framework and case will then be made.

CHAPTER 1: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE TERRORIST THREAT

INTRODUCTION

Why do terrorist groups target non-governmental organizations; and what can non-governmental organizations do to ameliorate the terrorist threat? This is an important question for a number of reasons. Certainly recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan have emphasized that terrorist groups do plan and carry out attacks specifically aimed at non-governmental groups. This study attempts to create a theoretical framework by which the targeting imperatives of terrorist groups can be understood. This is not just an intellectual exercise. If the targeting imperatives of terrorist groups are understood, it will allow non-governmental organizations to take action to reduce this threat—and potentially save lives.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are just that: non-governmental. If terrorism is a political phenomenon, and NGOs are non-governmental, then it is counter-intuitive that these types of organizations be the target of terrorist groups and political violence. Certainly this statement contains a number of assumptions. The first of which is that terrorism is a political phenomenon. There is also an assumption that NGOs are non-governmental. This assumption should also consider whether non-governmental equates to non-political. Finally, there is the assumption that terrorists select their targets solely on political criteria. All of these assumptions will be addressed by this study.

The importance of this question to the field of political science is threefold. First, it addresses the targeting strategies of international/transnational terrorist groups who perpetrate violence towards NGOs. There has been an explosion of research

relating to terrorism in the recent past. Despite this, there has been little research that looks at terrorism from the perspective of non-state organizations. This work can help to fill that gap in terrorism literature. Given the state of international relations and current events, this is a worthwhile goal.

Second, this study looks at the goals and strategies of non-governmental organizations. A review of the goal and strategies of NGOs might shed light as to why they are targeted for political violence and terrorism. This review is also necessary to see if the fundamental goals and strategies of NGOs will inevitably bring them into conflict with terrorists. The possibility of adjusting the goals and strategies in a way that does not adversely impact the mission of the NGO can then be evaluated. The literature in the field of International Relations is having a hard time keeping up with the exponential growth in the number and scope of NGOs operating worldwide. Further, the only literature that has focused on relating terrorism and political violence to NGOs has been narrow, security “how to” types of work. This study will take a broader look at this dilemma and address it from a macro, rather than a micro/security perspective. In other words, this study will address the larger, strategic reasons that terrorist organizations attack NGOs. It will also differentiate between terrorists and other non-state actors and NGOs. It will do this by creating a theoretical framework which will attempt to explain the targeting priorities which bring NGOs into the crosshairs of terrorist groups.

Finally, policy recommendations for both governments and non-governmental organizations with an eye toward threat reduction can be proposed. This study can have a real-world effect on reducing the threats to non-governmental organizations

and their agents. Setting aside the gaps in the literature that this study will attempt to fill, perhaps the most important function that this research will perform will be the real-world recommendations that could mean the difference in human lives.

THE CENTRAL QUESTION: TERRORISM AND NGOS COMBINE: CURRENT LITERATURE IN THE FIELD

In the field of the study of terrorism, there is little that looks at the threat or impact of terrorism on non-governmental organizations. The sole exception seems to be literature which includes non-governmental organizations with other “non-official Americans” (including tourists and businessmen) and discusses concrete security steps which can be done to reduce the risk of attack while in another country. A good example of this type of work is the *Prevention of Terrorism: Security Guidelines for Businesses and Other Organizations* where recommendations such as, “establish no patterns as to location or time” and “react properly in case of attack” are given.¹ These recommendations focus on target hardening, or making the attack more difficult.

Aside from these tactical prescriptions, very few scholars have looked at the threat strategically. Perhaps the best of these is work done by RAND, a nonprofit institution which focuses on security issues. Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Vice President for External Affairs and Director of RAND’s Washington Office, testified to the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations on April 3, 2001, commenting that the very fact that tourists, businessmen and NGO workers were United States citizens elevated them to target status in the eyes of

¹ William Cunningham and Philip J. Gross, *Prevention of Terrorism: Security Guidelines for Businesses and Other Organizations*, (McLean, VA: Hallcrest Press, 1978), also Paul Fuqua and Jerry Wilson, *Terrorism: The Executive’s Guide to Survival*. (Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing Company, 1978).

terrorists. He noted that the United States, and hence its citizens, were the most targeted nationality by terrorists.² This observation is echoed by both the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.³ Hoffman testified that this might be a function of the target-rich environment that American interests provide internationally as well as the symbolic and media value that American interests provide as targets.⁴ Hoffman further states that these are attributes that are almost impossible to remove from the targeting equation.⁵ The basic argument is that as the U.S. government hardens, or makes more difficult to hit, a target, terrorists will change their targeting priorities to less hardened “non official” targets like tourists, businessmen and non-governmental organizations. Indeed, statistics bear this out. In 1999, 86 percent of Americans killed in terrorist acts internationally were tourists, businesspeople, journalists or other ex-patriates.⁶

Drake illustrated this factor in a non-American example by showing that a non-governmental organization can become a target simply due to the fact that they represent something which the terrorist groups wish to remove. He cited the GIA (*Groupes Islamique Armee*) attacks on targets which represented foreign or secular influences as a way that the GIA could weaken the heavily in debt Algerian government through the intimidation of foreign workers. Their ultimate target was

² Bruce Hoffman, “Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses and Non-Governmental Organizations.” Testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, April 3, 2001.

³ Thomas Fingar, Acting Assistant Secretary, Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World,” Testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Congressional Quarterly Abstract*, February 7, 2001. Also George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a changing world,” Testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html.

⁴ Hoffman, pp. 5-6.

⁵ Hoffman, pp.6.

⁶ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999*, pg. 106.

the Algerian government, but instead they focused their attacks on foreigners, in this case French visitors to Algeria. This strategy would limit the expertise and investment that foreigners could bring into the country. The GIA justified their actions by calling the attacks on foreigners a way of limiting the colonization of Algeria with non-Muslims. The attacks were effective. The number of French in Algeria dropped from 10,000 to 1,000 in the space of two years.⁷

Even more specifically, Hoffman notes the increase in instances where NGOs were specifically targeted.⁸ Randolph Martin, Senior Director for Operations of the International Rescue Committee explains the heightened risk of NGOs due to the fact that there are more NGOs going to more conflicts worldwide. Many of those conflicts are civil wars wherein the primary combatants are irregular fighters less steeped in the rules of war and equally driven by greed for plunder. Add to this environment an entity which is enticingly “soft” in terms of targetability. This situation is further exacerbated by the increasingly non-neutral nature of many NGOs. This equates to an environment where non-governmental organizations become attractive targets of terrorist groups.⁹

In the above cited case of the GIA in Algeria, the foreign capital, expertise and investment which were brought by foreigners posed a threat to the environment the GIA was attempting to construct. The loss of the outside investment weakened the government making them more vulnerable to takeover. The GIA attacks on

⁷ Drake, pp. 51-52.

⁸ Hoffman, pp. 14.

⁹ Randolph Martin, “FMR 4 April 1999: NGO Field Security,” New York International Rescue Committee, <http://www.irc.org>.

foreigners were also justified on religious grounds given their belief that non-Muslims brought influences which polluted the hearts and souls of Algerians.

Certainly, leaving the country is an option for non-governmental organizations. However, as discussed previously, there is no way for NGOs to complete their mission without offering themselves up as targets for terrorist attack. In the end, Hoffman can only offer the prescription that NGOs need to be better educated as to the security threat posed by terrorist groups and efforts should be made to harden these types of groups as targets.¹⁰ There is room in the literature for research specifically addressing non-governmental organizations and the threat posed by terrorist groups.

Aside from the contribution this research can add to the literature in the field, perhaps the greatest impact it can have is in the real life applications that can be gleaned from its pages. Terrorist groups do target non-governmental organizations. People die and property is destroyed. Through the study of those attacks and the application of the framework, a better understanding of the targeting priorities can be obtained. Policies can then be implemented that may make the difference in people and property.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The first order of designing a useful model is the stating of the research question. In this case, the research question deals with the targeting strategies of terrorist groups and the reasons why NGOs fall within the target subset. This question is derived from the intuitive assumption that since, by definition, NGOs are non-governmental and independent of governmental association, they would be free

¹⁰ Hoffman, pg.16.

from attack from what, again by definition, is a group with a political or ideological agenda. The logical follow up to that question becomes: what can non-governmental organizations do to remove themselves from that subset or at least lessen the threat of terrorism?

The research question can be simply stated. Are NGOs targeted for terrorism and political violence? If so, why? The follow up question can then be asked: What can be done, if anything, by NGOs to reduce the threat of terrorism or political violence?

This study addresses the impact of terrorism and political violence on non-governmental organizations. The research is divided into two main sections. The first utilizes secondary source material to evaluate the nature and extent of the threat of terrorism and political violence to non-governmental organizations. Acts of political violence and terrorism will be categorized into acts upon non-governmental organizations and religious groups acting as non-governmental organizations depending on the nature and target of the attacks. The general threat characteristics can then be evaluated. Upon close scrutiny it is hoped that the targeting strategies of the perpetrators of the violence can be divined. With that information, a theoretical framework as to the reasons NGOs are targeted can be constructed.

METHODOLOGICAL OUTLINE

Political science has indeed progressed since its inception. While it is significant that the field has its foundations in classical philosophical thought through the discourses of Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides, it has expanded beyond the asking of fundamental questions to the answering of those questions. The foundation is

important. It created a discipline which asks the big questions and attempts to apply them to real life answers. In an article lauding the contribution and significance of Robert Putnam, a leading thinker in political science, much of the credit given to him is for his ability to ask the big questions and answer them in a rigorous way. Rochon described it as “methodological rigor combined with a refusal to let methodology obscure the message.”¹¹

It is this rigor which has expanded the field in the last century. V.O. Key, Jr. noted, “The work of the new crop is distinctly superior to that of my sample from the mid thirties.”¹² The various ‘new’ trends which have occasionally flooded the plains of the discipline have left behind new theories, techniques and technology which have combined to enrich the soil of the discipline. The establishment of the various societies and associations along with their journals has increased the discourse and the criticism that has kept the discipline healthy. Additionally, the technological revolution must be credited with the growth of political science. Computer programs and statistical methods have made comparison and modeling possible in situations where it was not previously.

Almond proposed the “separate tables” phenomenon as a way of describing the field of political science. Separate tables are not an obstacle, but an opportunity. The pluralistic free exchange of ideas serves to increase the discourse and rigor of the field. Beard pled with the field, “Let us put aside resolutely that great fright, tenderly and without malice, daring to be wrong in something important rather than right in

¹¹ Rochon, Thomas R., “Robert D. Putnam: For a Meaningful Political Science,” *PS Online*, September 2001, <http://www.apsanet.org/PS/sept01/rochon.cfm>.

¹² V.O. Key, Jr., “Presidential Address,” *American Political Science Review*, 1958, no. 970.

some meticulous banality.”¹³ This research does ask important questions—all the more so since September 11, 2001. It is hoped that through this research, greater understanding of terrorism can be accomplished as well as prescriptions for non-governmental organizations, which could possibly save lives.

What is significant is that the great political scientists do not seem to be bound by "separate tables." Indeed, in the case of Putnam, or Ostrum, or Skocpol, it is primarily because they had the courage to apply political science theories to important questions. Not only have they asked those questions, but they have also applied theory rigorously in a way that indeed expanded the discipline in general. Again, Rochon, in describing Putnam stated, "...it enabled academic specialists in one field to communicate with those in other fields about common causes underlying their disparate areas of concern.”¹⁴

This discussion about the field of political science is not simply an academic foray into the importance (or lack thereof) of the field. There is genuine discussion as to the appropriateness of certain methods compared to others. In the undertaking of this research, an understanding as to the researcher's disposition on the important matter of methodology must be addressed. To this end, a brief descriptive soliloquy is included:

The other day my car broke down and I had to take it to a mechanic. He was a pretty good mechanic and other people in the area thought he was competent. I stood by as he looked at my car and diagnosed the problem. "You have a broken whatsits," he said most gravely. "It will need to be replaced." After finding out what it would cost to replace my broken whatsits, I gave the mechanic permission to fix my car.

¹³ Beard, "President's Address," *American Political Science Review*, 1927, vol.11.

¹⁴ Rochon, 2001.

He pulled out his tools and I could not help but notice that he was using metric tools. Now don't get me wrong, metric tools are nice, but my car requires standard tools. I asked the mechanic about this and he replied that they were the tools he always used, and they would do the job. Well, he is, after all, the professional, so I kept silent as he worked on my car. Pretty soon, the mechanic pulled out a hack saw. Alarmed, I asked what that was for. He replied, "This is my favorite tool, and I use it on every car I work on." He then proceeded to cut the bolts off the whatsits and removed the part.

In the end, the mechanic removed and replaced the whatsits on my car. While he performed that operation successfully, I also had to pay for new bolts. Further, the bolts that were installed were partially stripped because the mechanic had used metric wrenches on my car.

Now comes the basic question. Why not just use the right tools for the right job? This seems like a simple question with an answer that fits the "interocular traumatic test." Sure, the hacksaw was able to accomplish the removal of the whatsits, but there was no logic for its use. A hacksaw is a great tool. But you shouldn't employ it to every case just because you can. If, to accomplish the desired end, you must use both metric and standard tools, then by all means use them both. Indeed, the end result will be better for the use of both tools. Let logic determine which tools are best.

Sadly, through stubbornness, arrogance, or ignorance, political scientists often insist on using metric tools (quantitative methods if you will), when standard tools (qualitative) are the best choice. Isn't this the ideal we are striving for? "Use the right tool for the right job." That is what my Dad used to always say.

The right tool for this research may not necessarily be the same tool that others might employ. It is hoped that at least the use of the tool is justified and appropriate.

Stephen Van Evera, in his book on methods for political science students, described four basic categories of political science dissertations: theory-proposing, theory-testing, theory-applying, and literature-assessing. He further notes that seven distinct types of dissertations fall into those four groups: theory-proposing, theory-testing, literature-assessing, policy-evaluation or policy-prescription, historical-

explanatory, historical-evaluative, and predictive. Often, a political science dissertation falls within more than one of these seven types.¹⁵

This research, like many other dissertations, falls within multiple categories. The primary emphasis of this research is theory-proposing. In order to adequately do this, there are also significant literature assessment and historical-explanatory aspects to the research. Finally, policy-prescriptions will also be made.

As theories will not be tested in this research, much of the literature on methods does not apply. While there is a dependent variable, in this case the instances of attack upon NGOs by terrorist groups, there are also independent variables or those things that affect whether or not the attack will occur. Tests will not be conducted on how the independent variables affect the dependent variable. As has been stated previously, there is a definite lack of theory in the field of terrorism research covering terrorism and NGOs. This research is meant to help fill in some of those gaps. While testing the theories created in this research might be an admirable goal, it is way beyond the scope and means of this research.

It is understood and implied in the previous section, that there is a certain segment within the political science field that feels unless a dissertation contains theory-testing, it is less significant and relevant. The problem remains, that theories must be created before they can be tested. Indeed, this is discussed by Van Evera:

Many dissertations are a blend of type 1 and 2 (theory-proposing and theory-testing). However, a good thesis can focus exclusively on proposing theory, or on testing theory, as long as it contributes useful knowledge.

¹⁵ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997). pp. 89- 95.

Dissertations of Type 1 and 2—theory-making and theory-testing—have the most cachet in political science, but all seven types are legitimate if they are well done.¹⁶

A research project which proposes theories typically “...advances new hypotheses. A deductive argument for these hypotheses is advanced. Examples may be offered to illustrate these hypotheses and to demonstrate their plausibility, but strong empirical tests are not performed.”¹⁷ The literature-testing dissertation “summarizes and evaluates existing theoretical and empirical literature on a subject. It asks whether existing theories are valuable and existing tests are persuasive and complete.”¹⁸ Finally, a policy prescriptive dissertation looks at a specific policy problem, analyzes the pros and cons of the policy and recommends possible prescriptions.¹⁹ In the case of this research, there is less analysis of public policy than analysis of a lack of policy, both public and private. In this vacuum, the challenge is to recommend prescriptions toward the development of policy which can ameliorate the problem of terrorism toward non-governmental organizations. The historic-explanatory aspect to this research tries to explain the “causes, pattern, or consequences of historical cases. Such works often provide a good deal of description but focus on explaining what is described.”²⁰

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS I-VI: RESEARCH AND FINDINGS

TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER II

Chapter 2 looks at the phenomenon of terrorism: its definition, characteristics, history and goals. This in and of itself is a daunting task. The term terrorism has no

¹⁶ Van Evera, 1997, pg. 90.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 89.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 90.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pg. 91.

²⁰ Van Evera, 1997, pg. 92.

accepted definition in either academia or governmental circles. This research establishes terrorism as a phenomenon with four defining aspects. The first definitional aspect of terrorism is the use or threat of violence. Terrorism is a sub-classification of political violence. As such the use or threat of violence is essential to an act being terrorism. This use or threat of violence is the means by which the terrorist entities conduct their mission.

The next defining aspect flows easily from the last: the purpose of the violence. In terrorism, the violence is for a political purpose. Terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon. Whether you accept the definition of politics as the control of state structures, or Laswell's definition of "who gets what, where, when and how;"²¹ or Easton's definition of "the authoritative allocation of values within a society,"²² terrorists conduct violence in order to affect political processes.

The third definitional aspect of terrorism is the use or exploitation of fear. The foundations of the word terrorism relates to the primeval emotion and survival trait known as fear. Terrorist groups seek to harness that primeval emotion in order to affect or control the actions of others: whether they are a political entity like a government or the general population which will, in turn, affect a political entity.

The final definitional aspect of terrorism relates to the targets of the terrorist groups. This research considers attacks against non-combatants to be terrorist acts. Certainly attacks against combatants outside of the context of formal war fit into the definition of political violence. However, one of the aspects of terrorism that is unique to it alone is the fact that the targets which are attacked are not usually the

²¹ Laswell, Harold. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936).

²² David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965).

final targets, or the targets which are intended to be affected. As a result, those being physically attacked are being attacked to send a message to someone else.

There are other characteristics of terrorism which are discussed in chapter 2. This research differentiates between the act of terrorism and the label terrorist. Certainly one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. An exploration of the term 'terrorism' as a value statement is next undertaken. Terrorism as a transnational and international phenomenon is also discussed as well as terrorism in terms of non-conventional warfare and the historical evolution of the term. The question of whether terrorism can be a rational act is also considered. Finally, this research will look at the actors perpetrating the terrorist acts.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER III

Chapter 3 focuses on non-governmental organizations. The definition, goals, actors and strategies of NGOs will be explored. The first NGOs were religious organizations opposed to slavery. As various social needs began to evolve, people understood that the best way to accomplish their interest's goals were to pool resources and create an organization. In the last part of the 20th century there was a dramatic increase in the number and scope of NGOs.

This increase can be partially explained by the rise in intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations. The United Nations recognized and granted a number of NGOs an official place in advising the U.N. in matters of policy. It has been theorized that this recognition was in part due to the fact that NGOs lend a legitimizing influence to intergovernmental organizations. Further, NGOs, due to their focused agenda, can amass what in essence is a monopoly of information

relating to their specific policy field. As such, NGOs become an effective way of collecting information for both IGOs and state governments. NGOs are also thought to be effective means by which problems are solved due to their ability to focus on specific interests without bureaucratic scleroses and government waste.

Another reason used to explain the increased role and function of NGOs is the withdrawal of the state. Since the end of the Cold War, the power and influence of the state has been retreating. Social spending is on the wane; spending intended to keep a potential ally in place has been eliminated. Added to this withdrawal has been a tighter marketplace. There has been a rise in ethnic and national violence and security within states has diminished. Non-governmental organizations have moved into the vacuum created by the receding state.

Like terrorism, one of the major difficulties with the study of non-governmental organizations is the lack of consensus over the definition of what truly is a non-governmental organization. Non-governmental organization is really a negative description: a description of what something is not. As such, the obvious assumption would be that non-governmental organizations are not associated with governments. This assumption will be shown to be false. In fact, many NGOs actually exist because of and are clients of states, acting as policy and resource clearinghouses.

The accepted definition of non-governmental organization is a private (non-state) entity engaged in a policy goal that is not-for-profit in nature. While this exemption eliminates for-profit companies, it leaves many other different types of organizations that are not typically considered to fall within the NGO aegis. Another

common attribute of NGOs is a focus on a public good. While this may be the case in general, there are cases where NGOs blur the line between public good and that which is decidedly not good. This will also be explored.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER IV

While this will be stressed in later sections, it is important to note that it is assumed that terrorist groups are acting based on rational thought with tactics and goals that fall within rational parameters. A framework of the targeting imperatives of terrorist organizations toward NGOs has been reliably constructed using the above stated methods.

If terrorist rationality is assumed, then a framework that helps to explain targeting strategies can be constructed. After carefully reviewing the database of terrorist attacks on non-governmental organizations and further refining the hypotheses in later interviews, a theoretical framework outlining the reasons terrorist groups might target NGOs has been created. The reasons terrorists execute an operation may be based on tactical or strategic reasoning. Often, attacks are carried out after weighing *both* tactical and strategic options.²³ Chapter 4 introduces and explores the theoretical framework which helps to explain the targeting imperatives which terrorist groups might consider when designating an NGO for attack. The framework offered by this research consists of both tactical and strategic reasons that might bring non-governmental organizations, and even more specifically non-profit or humanitarian NGOs, into the crosshairs of a terrorist group.

The theoretical framework is made up of five targeting imperatives which help to explain why terrorists might target non-governmental organizations. The first

²³ CJM Drake, *Terrorists' Target Selection*, (New York: St. Marten's Press, 1998).

reason has to do with perceptions. Terrorists might perceive that a relationship exists between an NGO and a political entity. When developing a target, the terrorist groups look at potential targets and develop a targeting strategy that will accomplish a political goal. Often, political targets are too difficult to attack. As a result, terrorists might target a non-political target that is associated with the political entity that is the true target. This association may simply be a relationship of citizenship, or the association may exist due to the fact that an organization is based in a certain place. Whatever the connection, as long as the terrorist group can establish an association—perceived or actual—between a potential target and the entity they wish to attack, the terrorists may attack the associated organization or people.

The next targeting imperative is related to actions in which non-governmental organizations engage. Terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon. As such, actions by a non-governmental organization which are political in nature might bring them into the targeting equation of terrorist groups. Non-governmental organizations are non-governmental, not necessarily non-political. Some NGOs engage in political activities, from endorsing and fostering political structures to opposing other political entities or programs. If the activities of the NGOs are politically different than those of a terrorist group, that group might attack the NGO to eliminate possible opposition.

NGOs could avoid overt political activities that they might be engaged in to attract terrorist attention. However, they could be engaged in strictly non-political operations and still attract terrorist attention. This is due to the fact that to a terrorist's eye, nothing is non-political. Some of the activities common to NGOs are humanitarian aid work and stability operations. These activities are often completely

non-political in nature. Everyone is fed, regardless of political views. However, such activities may be counterproductive to terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations thrive on chaos and lawlessness. Such conditions may be advantageous to insurgent terrorist groups due to the de-legitimizing effect lawlessness has on a government in power. Chaos might also be advantageous to terrorist groups because such chaos provides the terrorist groups ample supply of recruits and safe haven. As a result, they may attack NGOs engaged in non-political activities due to the political ramifications of their work.

Terrorist groups might attack NGOs based on what they feel are the polluting influences to the terrorist groups desired social, cultural or religious world-views. NGOs are often the carriers of outside values that are anathema to the terrorist groups. One of the main goals of terrorist groups is the desire to control the values—whether social, cultural or religious—of a given population. NGOs, either overtly or unconsciously, often are a vehicle by which new values are introduced. Terrorists might target NGOs as a means of reducing outside influence and maintaining control of a population's values.

The fourth targeting imperative relates to the fact that terrorist groups are engaged in activities in an environment of scarce resources. The world has become an increasingly difficult place for terrorist groups to obtain resources. Countries which were once willing to support terrorist groups are no longer able to provide that needed support. Further, countries are coming together to eliminate the financing and support pipeline that once existed. As such, some of the terrorist group's activities must be directed toward the securing of logistical support: both financing and

supplies. Terrorist groups may target NGOs due to the fact that NGOs may have access to the resources the terrorist groups need.

The final reason that terrorist groups might target NGOs is related to the relative “hardness” of targets in the current world environment. Due to terrorist attacks in the past, traditional targets have been hardened (made difficult to attack). The fact exists, however, that the world is a target rich environment. One of the classic problems that face counter-terrorist operations is the conundrum that when you harden one target, the terrorists simply shift to a less hardened target. Not every target can be hardened, due to either financial or mission conflicts. NGOs, by their natures, are fairly soft targets. Terrorists may simply target NGOs because they are easy to attack.

A possible criticism which could be directed toward this research is the use of secondary data sources rather than using primary data sources. This is less of a concern when the available data is reviewed. Theda Skocpol, in her work on comparative revolutions, justified her use of secondary sources:

The comparativist has neither the time nor (all of) the appropriate skills to do the primary research that necessarily constitutes, in large amounts, the foundation upon which comparative studies are built. Instead, the comparativist must concentrate upon searching out and systematically surveying specialists’ publications that deal with the issues defined as important by theoretical considerations and by the logic of comparative analysis...the challenges I have faced...have been challenges of surveying huge historical literatures and appropriately weighing and using the contributions of specialists.²⁴

Certainly, this research is less a comparative historical analysis than an analysis of a specific phenomenon over time. The justification continues to ring true.

²⁴ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979. pp. xiz-xv.

Therefore, this work uses the work of specialists' primary data for the initial section while focusing on applying the appropriate "theoretical considerations" and logic.

WEIGHING THE CASE: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 5

METHODS USED IN CHAPTER 5

Chapter 5 utilizes the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints as a case study to determine how they evaluate and deal with the threats of political violence and terrorism against its organization, agents, and property worldwide. Beyond the specifics of operations that this worldwide non-profit group might engage in to ameliorate its exposure to terrorism, this in-depth analysis of the LDS Church also bolsters the theoretical framework as to why NGOs are targeted and whether actions an NGO might take would make any difference to the terrorist threat. It is hoped that by looking at both a hypothetical framework as to why terrorists might engage in operations against NGOs as well as a specific NGO that has been targeted by terrorist groups, a more generalizable picture will emerge describing the phenomenon.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was chosen as the primary case due to its history in Latin America. The LDS Church is a Salt Lake City, Utah based international church which has more members outside of the United States than within. Despite this fact, it is widely recognized as an "American church." The LDS Church is appropriate as a case due to its active proselytizing and mission program. At any given time, the LDS Church has approximately 65,000 voluntary missionaries engaged in health and welfare activities, infrastructure building, and proselytizing. As such, LDS missionaries are a common sight in much of the world. Perhaps the best reason to choose the LDS Church as the primary case relates to its history as a

target of political violence and terrorism. In the two decades making up the 1980s and the 1990s, the LDS was the target of political violence or terrorism 142 times. This equates to almost one-third of all attacks on NGOs and religious organizations during the same time period. This fact alone makes the LDS Church and its reactions in light of those attacks appropriate for study. Additional justification will also be provided in a later section.

Herein lays an additional potential problem with regard to model deficiencies in this project. Case selection is one of the most important, and most methodologically dangerous steps in research. The selection of cases that fit the researcher's hypothesis can, in the short term, reinforce a hypothesis at the cost of true methodological rigor and true validity in the long term. In this case, selection was made for many different reasons, most important of which was the appropriateness of the subject.

It is important to point out that the case was also selected in some part due to the fact that the researcher is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and served as a voluntary representative on a two-year mission. As such, the researcher is intimately familiar with the church and its policies. The membership status further provides access which is an absolute necessity to this type of research. This poses an additional danger. As a member of the organization being observed, can the researcher be truly independent and unbiased?

Certainly, a danger exists for the researcher to be too familiar with the research subject and thus losing objectivity. This is a phenomenon that Fenno

addressed in his seminal work, *Home Style*.²⁵ While *Home Style* seems to be a “how to” on participant observation, there is much in this book which may be more important than the mechanics of the observational qualitative research method. Specifically, much of the beginning of the book focuses on the ethics and responsibilities of political scientists. Fenno is refreshing in his candor about the shortcomings of his research and his acceptance of the fact that much of what he said was normative in nature. This does not, in his opinion, breach the ethics of good political science research.

The first two chapters become an excellent comparative case study of the ethics of observers. In the first chapter, Fenno explains the steps he takes to ensure objectivity and the reliability of collected data. He also admits that he ignored his rules in one case and stood by his rules, despite acute mental anguish, in another. In the case of Barber Conable, Fenno admits that he moved beyond the role of objective observer. Admittedly, Fenno’s reasons were good: protection of a research source. However, after Conable emerged from the campaign victorious, Fenno discovered that he had lost Conable as a source due to the familiarity and friendship that was developed through their interaction.

In the case of Dan Quayle, Fenno was again thrust into ethical limbo. Fenno had material that could, quite possibly, have affected the campaign. Indeed, he admitted he wanted to use that material when he observed a less than objective treatment of

²⁵ Fenno, Richard F., *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*, New York, New York: Longman Publishers, 2003.

Quayle in the press. However, in this case, Fenno was able to restrain himself and follow the research through to its objective end with it being published in CQ Press.²⁶

Given the difficulties described above, the application of the theoretical framework will only be applied to the single case. This is not necessarily a negative to the research. It is hoped that by using both a large n aspect as well as the application of the findings of that aspect to a small n case study the advantages of both methodological approaches can be employed. This application of the theory to a single case, albeit with many observations, is an attempt to tap into the thick description that Fenno and Scott so successfully employed. This type of description provides the context whereby observers can understand the actions of those being observed.

Another possible criticism of the methods employed is the use of a single case study by which conclusions are drawn. Certainly, single case studies have methodological weaknesses. But they have their adherents. James Scott, in *Seeing Like a State*, attacks the more accepted quantitative method. Clearly, much of his book is dedicated to the richness of culture and individualism that quantitative methods must ignore. Scott's thesis argues that the simplification of complex entities for the purpose of counting is disastrous. Scott discusses the quantitative method explicitly by stating: "Providing one understands the heroic assumptions required to achieve this precision and the questions it cannot answer, the single metric is an invaluable tool. Problems arise only when it becomes hegemonic. It is hoped that the

²⁶ Fenno, 2003.

employment of the single case study will provide the richness and context that quantitative method alone cannot hope to achieve.”²⁷

Another advantage to the single case study was the knowledge of the theoretical framework derived in chapter 4. Specifically, using the theoretical framework, questions were crafted which were then submitted to the case in the second portion of the research. While there is but a single case, the multiple observations on the single case allowed the researchers to develop theories in confidence. This is the prescription asserted by King, Keohane and Verba for eliminating problems with small *n* case studies.²⁸ The myriad of experiences of the case can allow for generalization to other non-governmental organizations.²⁹ Also importantly, by applying the framework developed in the first section to the second section, refinements were made to the framework to make it more reliable and generalizable.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 5

Chapter 4 introduces and explores the theoretical framework that helps to explain the targeting imperatives by which NGOs are attacked. Chapter 5 seeks to look in depth at a religious NGO, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and see how it has approached the threat of terrorism. The organizational structure of the LDS Church will be introduced as the structure might affect the way the church perceives and deals with the threat of political violence and terrorism. The LDS Church was the most attacked religious NGO in Latin America during the time period

²⁷ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1998.

²⁸ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994).

²⁹ Van Evera, pg. 26.

between the 1970s through the 1990s with 143 documented attacks.³⁰ These attacks included both attacks on property and personnel.

Chapter 5 looks at policies the LDS Church has implemented which ameliorate the threat of terrorism. These policies will also be studied from the perspective of the street-level volunteers. Many of the policies are actually shown to represent an unconscious acceptance or understanding of the targeting imperatives that make the LDS Church a target to terrorists.

CONCLUSION: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER VI

As discussed in the previous section, the purpose of this research is to determine the terrorist threat to non-governmental organizations. In creating a theoretical framework which describes imperatives that terrorist groups use to select non-governmental organizations as targets, prescriptive suggestions as to the amelioration of the threat were made. These then, were measured against the real world experiences of the case study.

Because this is a non-experimental design dealing with subjective data, it is difficult to couch the research in terms of dependent and independent variables. However, in this design, the dependent variable or object being changed by outside stimulus (or independent variables), is the occurrence of an attack on a non-governmental organization. The dependent variable should be able to measure whether an attack was affected by the actions to avoid it. While this is a difficult task, a careful review of that data in light of the theoretical framework can determine the targeting imperatives used in planning terrorist attacks. Theory then can guide the actions taken by non-governmental organizations to evaluate their success in avoiding

³⁰ Database

attacks. While it is similar to proving why something didn't happen, methodological tools can be employed to assist in the creation and application of theory.

In this case, counterfactuals are an important tool in arriving at a workable thesis. Stephen Van Evera explains the use of counterfactuals in inductive theory building:

Counterfactual analysis can aid in inductive theorizing. The analyst examines history, trying to 'predict' how events would have unfolded had a few elements of the story been changed, with a focus on varying conditions that seem important and/or manipulable...

When analysts discover counterfactual analyses they find persuasive, they have found theories they find persuasive, since all counterfactual predictions rest on theories. (Without theories the analyst could not predict how changed conditions would have changed events.) If others doubt the analysis (but cannot expose the fatal flaws in it), all the better: the theory may be new, hence a real discovery. At this point the analyst has only to frame the theory in a general manner so that predictions can be inferred from it and tested. The analyst should ask, "What general causal laws are the dynamics I assert examples of?" The answer is a theory.

Counterfactual analysis helps us recognize theories, not make them. Theories uncovered by counterfactual analysis must exist in the theorist's subconscious before the analysis; otherwise the theorist could not construct the counterfactual scenario. Most people believe in more theory than they know. The hard part is to bring these theories to the surface and express them in general terms. Counterfactual analysis aids this process.³¹

A good research design will also limit extraneous variables which could affect the outcome of the study. Therefore, the research design should either incorporate a large number of cases, thus limiting the influence of extraneous variables, or select cases where those extraneous variables are controlled. Another option is to select cases wherein there is a high measure of homogeneity, thereby holding the extraneous

³¹ Stephen Van Evera, 1997, pp. 25-26.

variables constant. The large number of like cases in the first section is intended to fulfill this role.

As this research rests on theoretical grounds, the hypothesis will not actually be tested. While this may be considered problematic, it allows for meaningful study without becoming such a Herculean task so as to be unfinishable. It must also be noted that there may be many immeasurable extraneous factors which may affect the dependent variable or an attack on a non-governmental organization. Again, as no statistical test is being employed, this is less of a concern.

The subject of this research—attacks on non-governmental organizations—are usually discreet events. These events may or may not have indicators harbingering their coming. Non-governmental organizations therefore may be unable to make decisions which will affect the impact of these attacks on their organizations. Another difficulty may arise, as ameliorative steps may be counterproductive to the NGOs stated goal. Thus, even given the ability to divine a possible threat, the only recourse of a given NGO would be to cease in its primary mission, thus allowing threats to win without the application of resources.

CHAPTER 2: TERRORISM: ITS GOALS, TARGETS, AND STRATEGIES

There are two major difficulties which face researchers working in the field of terrorism. First is a definitional problem. Second, is the fact that the literature in the field of terrorism seems to be a regurgitation of the same information. Once early pioneers in the field published their seminal works, very little new research has replaced it. That is not to say there is not interesting and exciting research being done in this field. Research into the “new terrorism” or terrorism conducted by fundamental groups is necessary as well as timely. However, due to recent events, anyone feeling they had anything to say relating to terrorism was able to publish a supposedly ‘definitive’ work on terrorism. This study cites the original research rather than the later iterations.

Intrinsic to this study is the concept of terrorism itself. One of the difficulties facing researchers in the field is the fact that there is considerable disagreement as to the very definition of terrorism. A quick review of the literature shows that there is no accepted definition in government or in academia. Kushner notes, “There are as many definitions for the word *terrorism* as there are methods of executing it; the term means different things to different people, and trying to define or classify terrorism to everyone’s satisfaction proves impossible.”³² The U.S. government itself has ten different definitions of terrorism.³³ This leads to confusion and misuse which only makes the study of the phenomenon more difficult. Louise Richardson noted:

The widespread usage of the term terrorism, in many contexts, has rendered the word almost meaningless. Today, it’s only universally

³² Harvey W. Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, (London, U.K.: Sage Publications, 2003), pg. xxiii.

³³ Alex P. Schmidt and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), Appendix B.

understood connotation is so pejorative that even terrorists don't admit to being terrorists any more. A glance at the current usage reveals child abuse, racism, and gang warfare all incorrectly described as terrorism.³⁴

Given this confusing state, it is not surprising that the study of terrorism has struggled over the very definitional aspect of the central topic of research.

A clear definition of terrorism is essential to this study for many reasons. First, in any systematic study of a phenomenon, it is necessary to have discreet definitions of the items being studied in order to ensure consistent and valid conclusions. It is especially important to have a concrete definition when there is no clear consensus as to what is or is not terrorism. To that end, the definition used in this study focuses on what distinguishes terrorism from other phenomenon. Each aspect of terrorism, then, is accompanied with a related aspect of other; similar phenomenon and the distinguishing or differentiating traits are explicated. The result is a clarification of what is and is not terrorism as it relates to this study.

SCOPE OF DEFINITION

For the purposes of this study, terrorism is defined as the threat or use of violence on non-combatant populations or property with the express goal of creating or exploiting fear in a larger audience for political or ideological reasons. This definition consists of four primary points. First is the threat or use of violence. Second is the use of that violence on non-combatant targets. Third is the creation or exploitation of fear in a larger audience than the specific target group. And last is the political or ideological reason for which this violence is being committed. To better

³⁴ Louise Richardson, "Global Rebels: Terrorist Organizations as Trans-National Actors", *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, (Guilford, Connecticut: McGraw Hill, 2003).

explicate this definition, each aspect of the definition will be treated separately. The reasoning for including each of the definitional characteristics will also be explained. Additional characteristics of terrorism will also be explicated and explored.

DEFINITION AND ILLUSTRATION OF TERRORISM:

DEFINITION

USE OF VIOLENCE

First and foremost, terrorism is a sub-classification of political violence, which in turn is a sub-classification of violence. This relationship is illustrated by *Figure 2.1*. Political violence can be defined as the use or threat of violence for political purposes. As such, terrorism and political violence have two common defining characteristics. Terrorism and political violence are different in the choice of targets and the creation and exploitation of fear. While all terrorism is political violence, not all political violence is terrorism.




Figure 2.1: Concentric Violence

The use or threat of violence is integral to the definition of terrorism. The threat of violence is all that is necessary for an act to be terrorism. For example, a threatened bombing which is done to create fear in non-combatants for political reasons need never explode for the act to be considered terrorism. In a similar vein,

the initial violent act need not be successful for the strategic goal to be accomplished and terrorism to have occurred. In other words, if the September 11 planes had all crashed into Pennsylvania fields, the acts would have been successful due to the threat that hijackings posed on the security of the United States as well as the safety of the transportation system. This aspect will be further explored in a later section.

If the defining point of terrorism were the creation or exploitation of fear alone, then Stephen King would be a terrorist. Hoffman notes this in his criticism of the *Oxford English Dictionary's* definition of terrorism, "While accurately communicating the fear-inducing quality of terrorism, the definition is still so broad as to apply to almost any action that scares ('terrorizes') us."³⁵ The carefully orchestrated and directed use of force is more than just the vehicle by which people are terrorized. It is the means by which the terrorists demonstrate the powerlessness of governments to keep order. In other words, since governments cannot keep violence from the citizenry, they lose credibility and legitimacy. The violence against citizens further destabilizes the social fabric of society; furthering the basic goals of terrorist groups.

The use or threat of violence is also important as a defining characteristic due to the heavy reliance of terrorism on bringing the act before the world stage.³⁶ The use of violence and the press coverage that it garners become integral to the terrorist act. Indeed, recent work seems to indicate a ratcheting up of the level of violence in order to capture the media attention. The goal is to shock and provoke, thus calling attention to the cause of the perpetrators. This then differs from other political dissent

³⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pg. 14.

³⁶ Brian Jenkins, *The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems*, P-6563, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, June 1981).

by literally becoming ‘propaganda of the deed’. This aspect of terrorism will be further explored in the target section of this work.

Certainly, the threat or use of force does not, *a priori*, constitute terrorism. As Weber noted, a state is the entity with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.³⁷ Government power, then, is the exclusive threat or use of force on its own citizens. While governments may engage in terrorism against their own population or other state’s citizens, clearly, the use or threat of force alone does not constitute terrorism.

The threat or use of force can also be used to define a criminal act. Threatening force in order to gain money is the hallmark for such criminal activities as armed robbery or extortion. While these activities may threaten force and even terrorize the victims, they do not reach the critical definitional aspects of terrorism. Clearly, something else is needed to reach that benchmark.

TARGETS OF TERRORISM

The target of the terrorist act is also an important distinction in creating the definition of terrorism used in this research. This definition states that the target must be people or property that are non-combatant. At the heart of this distinction is the central aspect of terrorism—creating or exploiting fear through violence in a population greater than that specifically targeted by the act. If the target of the attack were only combatant personnel or property, then it would limit the scope of violence and inhibit the generation of fear in the general population. An astute student put it this way, “there are no innocents to a terrorist.” If a French tourist happens to die in a mass attack bombing of a bus in a public square in Jerusalem, it is justified by the

³⁷ Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation*, from a speech given in Munich in 1818 and later published in 1919, paragraph 4. Also in *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; edited (Oxford University Press, 1947), pg. 156.

terrorists that the tourist was equally as “guilty” because he or she was supporting the Israelis by visiting. Certainly the perpetrators of the terrorism consider those they attack to be legitimate targets. Common acceptance, however, does not.

The non-combatant distinction is important when faced by the ever-present statement in terrorism: one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist. Many definitions of terrorism would include all involved in guerrilla warfare or insurrection as terrorists. Indeed, using that definition, the Americans fighting the British in the Revolutionary War would have been terrorists. This seems too expansive. Therefore, the definition utilized in this work will exclude those actors who are carrying out violence against government combatants as in revolution and civil disobedience.

The question still remains, what about those people who carry out violence on combatant personnel or property, but also hurt civilians in the process? Timothy McVeigh targeted a government building full of government employees. Whether the occupants of the building consisted of combatants is the central question. Despite this problem, the acceptance of collateral damage casualties may constitute terrorism. To McVeigh, the civilian casualties, including the children in the daycare, were an unfortunate byproduct or collateral damage.³⁸ While the primary target may have been government property, the willingness of McVeigh to create the sheer amount of collateral damage which then created an environment of fear in the general public moves the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building from a guerilla act of revolt to an act of terrorism. Further, while the Murrah Federal Building was owned by the government of the United States housing arguably combatant personnel, it was not

³⁸ Timothy MacVeigh, “An Essay on Hypocrisy,” (Media Bypass, 1998).

just a government building. The building housed a credit union as well as the much-publicized childcare center.

Brian Jenkins noted, that the act of terrorism is similar to a play acted out on a stage.³⁹ People may be watching the action from different perspectives including those on the stage itself. However, the primary message is for those who are indeed in the audience rather than those whom the actors are interacting with physically. This relationship is illustrated by *Figure 2.2*. Drake pointed out that in the course of a terrorist attack, there may be many targets of attack: the physical target and perhaps many other psychological targets.⁴⁰ Indeed, the definitional characteristic of terrorism for Drake is that “the succession of attacks is meant to create a psychological reaction in a person or group of people—the psychological target or targets—to make them act in a way that the attacker desires.”⁴¹ Certainly both state and non-state actors may wish to create and exploit fear in non-combatant populations. When doing these acts, both would be engaged in terrorism. The fact that a government commits a terrorist act does not remove the labeling of the act. Stalin was a master of creating and exploiting fear in the agrarian population of Russia. His acts were most certainly terrorism.

³⁹ Brian Jenkins, *The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems*, P-6563, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, June 1981).

⁴⁰ C.J.M. Drake, *Terrorist' Target Selection*, (New York: St: Marten's Press, 1998).

⁴¹ Drake, 1998, pg. 2




Figure 2.2: Physical and Psychological Targets

When state actors engage in war, they may elect to try to create fear in the non-combatant populations of their adversaries. The central question of motivation now becomes important. In most cases, states engage in this type of exercise in order to gain economic or military advantage. The goal is not necessarily the creation and exploitation of fear, but of military or economic advantage. This type of activity could be labeled terrorism. While non-state actors may also engage in this type of behavior, the motivation in the target selection and attack becomes defining in terms of labeling an act terrorism. Thus, both states and non-state actors can engage in terrorism. This concept will be explored later.

If the war of ideas is centrally important to the perpetrators of terrorism, then the selection of targets becomes paramount. Too much violence and wanton destruction could, in fact, erode support for the cause, while too little may not garner the necessary publicity to carry the act before the larger stage and create fear in the larger population.⁴² Targets are selected carefully for symbolic or ideological effect. It is important to note that the rationale for selecting a certain target need not make sense to the general public. The rationale need only make sense to the members. The rationality of terrorist acts will be addressed later.

⁴² Hoffman, pg. 162

C.J.M. Drake notes that there may be many types of targets for terrorists. In other words, people or property may be targeted for a number of different goals. The types of targets in Drake's targeting typology are distinguished by purpose of the attack. The typology includes symbolic targets which are meant to trigger a psychological reaction in the greater audience. Also included are functional targets; the existence of which constitutes a threat to the organization. Drake next includes logistical targets which protect or provide logistical assets to the terrorists' movement. Drake's final target type is an expressive target which is an emotional response to events rather than a planned strategy.⁴³ An act selected to accomplish one goal may also accomplish other goals at the same time. An example could be the kidnapping of American businessmen in Colombia by FARC insurgents. While the immediate goal might be logistical (fundraising), this kidnapping could also accomplish other acts such as discrediting the Columbian government and their ability to keep order as well as dissuading American businessmen from coming to Columbia (symbolic and expressive targets).

Drake's targeting typology is most helpful in research such as this. However, it is relatively new in the literature. Martha Crenshaw also created a targeting typology based on the psychological response the act is hoping to evoke in a larger, secondary target population. Until recently, that has been a benchmark in targeting literature. Drake classifies his typology in terms of strategic targeting. Crenshaw's first category in her typology is the elimination of threats which is analogous to Drake's functional targets. The second is compliance or the attempt to force a target population to act in a certain way. Next is disorientation which is aimed at

⁴³ Drake, 1998, pp. 8-15.

eliminating the stability of everyday life through the removal of stabilizing institutions. Also included in the typology are attrition attacks or the removal of targets with a psychological value in order to wear down the will of the target population. Provocation is also a targeting imperative that attempts to make the psychological target act in a way that alienates the target from sympathizers. Advertisement is attempted by groups who wish to call attention to their movement through the act itself. Finally, the endorsement imperative is the attempt to garner support from potential sympathizers through the action.⁴⁴

Terrorist organizations are also constrained by the tactical environment within which they are operating. The relative danger of carrying out the attack in terms of the threat the attack poses for the perpetrators certainly affects the target selection. Also, the relative ease in terms of cost, resources, and target hardening helps to determine who or what is targeted.⁴⁵

In the end, the final target selection is made through a series of constraints forced upon the terrorists by their ideology, strategy, and tactics.⁴⁶ If those constraints force an attack on non-combatants for ideological reasons, then the attack reaches the benchmark for terrorism. As was discussed previously, terrorism and political violence share the use or threat of violence for a political or ideological purpose as defining attributes. One of the aspects of terrorism that separates terrorism from the larger grouping of political violence is the choice of targets. Political violence can be perpetrated against any target—combatant or non-combatant alike.

⁴⁴ Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria 1954-1962*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 41-85.

⁴⁵ Drake, 1998, pp. 175-182.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

However, terrorism can only be committed on non-combatants. This concept will be enormously helpful in creating a definition of terrorism that is discreet and testable.

USE/EXPLOITATION OF FEAR

Another important aspect of defining terrorism is the creation or exploitation of fear. This becomes an additional differentiating factor between terrorism and political violence. Terrorism is the use or threat of violence on non-combatant populations to create and exploit fear in a larger population for political or ideological reasons. However, political violence is the use or threat of violence on any target for political or ideological reasons. Certainly both are conducted by groups for ideological or political reasons. The distinction emerges when considering the targets and the methods. The target aspect was considered above. The more problematical of the defining aspects of terrorism will now be considered.

The distinction between terrorism and political violence is in the methods employed by the perpetrators. Specifically, terrorists conduct their violence or threat of violence in order to create and exploit fear in a larger population than the specific target groups. However, political violence has no such requirement. The secondary and psychological targets that are created and exploited in a terrorist act have been discussed in previous sections. The difficulty lies in determining the motivation of the perpetrators. It is extremely difficult to know if the goal of the violence is the creation and exploitation of terror on a larger audience. Because of these difficulties, this study will treat all violence on civilian targets by groups for a political or ideological reason the same as terrorism. While it is true that terrorist groups often claim responsibility for the act of terrorism, thus reinforcing their ideological message

and heightening media exposure, it is not always the case. The difficulties inherent in assigning motive to actors was explained by Fowler:

One major difficulty in creating a rigorous and consistent operational definition of terrorist acts is the necessity of attributing certain motives to violent acts. What distinguishes a political bombing from a bombing by, say, someone who is simply criminally insane is the motivation of the bomber.⁴⁷

IDEOLOGY

One of the difficulties of defining terrorism is determining whether the act was terrorism, spurred by an ideological strategy, or an act of violence, perpetrated by simple criminals, for other causes. It is for this reason that ideology plays such an important role in the definition. Terrorism is intrinsically linked with politics. While there are many definitions of politics, each definition captures an aspect of terrorism. Often politics is described by the control of state structures. Insurgent terrorists may be engaged in terrorism in order to gain control of those state structures. Another definition is that of Laswell: “who gets what, where, when, and how.”⁴⁸ Terrorists may strive for control of the allocation of resources. A third definition of terrorism is Easton’s: “the authoritative allocations of values within a society.”⁴⁹ Terrorists may be engaged in the struggle to control the social, cultural or religious values of a population.

The random attacks by snipers John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, except for the lack of ideological foundations, could be labeled terrorism. However,

⁴⁷ Fowler, William Warner, “Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods and Systems.” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND publication, 1981), pg. 12; also Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, “International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974,” R-I597-DOS/ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publication, 1975).

⁴⁸ Laswell, Harold. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936).

⁴⁹ Easton, David, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965).

without the ideological roots, the shootings were simply the criminal acts carried out by two criminal outcasts of society. Laqueur again notes that this definitional problem has existed throughout the history of terrorism in his explanation of the *sicarii*, “Josephus doubted their idealistic motivation and claimed that they were *listai*, robbers, out for personal gain and manipulated by outside forces, with patriotism and the demand for freedom a mere ideological cloak.”⁵⁰ While the terrorist act is, *a priori*, a criminal act, both governments and scholars have struggled over whether terrorism should be treated as a criminal act or as an act of war.

Certainly, groups that have engaged in terrorist acts have also engaged in criminal acts for gain and tried to justify the acts through ideology. Recent kidnappings by FARC and Abu Sayyef may have crossed the line from terrorism and have become criminal acts for gain. These groups have been financing their insurrections through the proceeds of ransoming hostages. It is certainly up to debate whether this, then, crosses the line into terrorism. However, when the acts of violence are perpetrated solely for the purpose of getting money, the ideological underpinnings of the movement are eroded. The war of ideas is central to most terrorist movements.

Money itself may also be important to the ideological movement. A terrorist campaign requires logistical support. As such, terrorist groups may engage in activities designed solely to obtain money. Johan Most noted that money was a more potent and essential weapon than dynamite.⁵¹ As discussed previously, there can be many goals of a single terrorist act. The act may not only secure logistical support

⁵⁰ Hoffman, pg. 8

⁵¹ Johann Most, *Freiheit*, January 12, 1884; September 13, 1884.

but also erode a financial system's stability. The difficulty is once again determining the goals of the act itself. As a result, violence perpetrated on non-combatants as a means of gaining logistical support such as money for ideological reasons, may be characterized as terrorism.

Essentially, terrorism is the means by which some organizations pursue a political or ideological end. The end is important enough to justify means that would typically be taboo to groups within society. Thus the murder of innocent children could be justified as the only means of accomplishing a political end for groups that may not have the resources to accomplish the end in any other way.

TERROR FOR HIRE

In a similar but subtly different vein, some groups have engaged in what may be termed, "terror for hire". As was previously discussed, one of the classes of the targeting priorities for terrorist groups are those targets which will provide logistical support to the terrorist organization. The funding of an ideological movement through criminal acts for hire may attain the definitional criteria of terrorism. Terrorist groups have commonly funded their violent activities through extortion, kidnappings and bank robberies.

The difficulty arises when the line between funding an ideological movement and funding the individual actors gets blurred. As mentioned previously, the activities of the Abu Sayyef Group in the Philippines may have gotten muddled to the point that they exist as an organized crime syndicate. The Japanese Red Army may have become a mercenary group, willing to carry out terrorist attacks for whomever,

regardless of ideology. Kirk actually creates a whole separate type of terrorism for those who conduct it for economic profit.⁵²

CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM:

TERRORISM OR TERRORIST

An additional aspect of terrorism that is related to the target of the violence is the pitfall of defining the act by the perpetrators. Terrorism is defined by the act itself. Laqueur notes, "Terrorism is no more than one of several strategies, and usually a subordinate one."⁵³ Brian Jenkins argued, "Terrorism should be defined by the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause."⁵⁴ In other words, terrorism is "a kind of weapons-system."⁵⁵ While a group which engages in terrorism may be labeled terrorists, any group can engage in terrorism. Conversely, all actions engaged in by groups or organizations that are labeled as terrorists may not necessarily be terrorism. A good example of this may be the terrorist group Hamas. Hamas may engage in acts of political violence on non-combatants with the express goal of creating fear in a general populace for political purposes. These acts would, according to the definition used in this research, be terrorist acts. However, Hamas engages in more than terrorist acts. The organization known as Hamas also provides food and monetary relief supplies to the poor. While critics of Hamas might classify this type of behavior recruiting for later terrorist engagements, an argument can be made that Hamas is simply trying to serve the humanitarian needs of a people that has no other protector.

⁵² Richard M. Kirk, "Political Terrorism and the Size of Government: A Positive Institutional Analysis of Violent Political Strategy," *Public Choice*, Spring 1983, vol. 40, pp. 41-52.

⁵³ Hoffman, pg 7.

⁵⁴ Jenkins, pg. 2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Further explanation is necessary. Entities that primarily are tasked with non-terrorist types of behavior, such as governments, may engage in terrorism if they commit violence on non-combatant populations with the express purpose of creating fear for political goals. Indeed, much of the terrorism committed in the history of conflict has been state sponsored. The term terrorism is derived from the systems of intimidation engaged in by the French government led by Robespierre during the time following the French revolution. “The system or *regime de la terreur* of 1793-4— from which the English word came—was adopted as means to establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprisings of 1789...It was designed to consolidate the new government’s power by intimidating counter-revolutionaries, subversives and all other dissidents whom the new regime regarded as ‘enemies of the people’”.⁵⁶ Hoffman also notes that by including this aspect into the definition of terrorism, it becomes difficult to distinguish the acts of terrorism and the acts of governments while fighting wars. He equates the “allied fire bombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and the atomic bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War, and indeed the countervalue strategy of the post-war superpowers’ strategic nuclear policy, which deliberately targeted the enemy’s civilian population—with the violence committed by substate entities labeled ‘terrorists’ since both involve the infliction of death and injury on non-combatants”.⁵⁷

The violence or threat of violence, further, need not be overt. Regimes such as that of Stalin quickly learned the effectiveness of famine and starvation as a means

⁵⁶ Hoffman, pg. 15.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* pg. 33

of establishing political control through fear. H.E. Vanden documented this phenomenon with regards to Central and South America, “The culture of violence is not new to Central America. The masses have been brutalized since the time of the conquest, if not long before. Violence, if not terror, became a means of ensuring the domination—or at least the acquiescence—of the common people...it is employed by governments and guerillas alike, but not always to the same degree.”⁵⁸

Because the term terrorist has become such a value laden term which has far reaching connotations for the success of both state and non-state actors, it is important that care be taken to separate the actor from the act. Both state and non-state actors can engage in terrorism. However, it seems that only non-state actors receive the terrorist label. Care must be taken to separate terrorists from acts of terror. The value-laden aspect of the word terrorism will be addressed in the next section.

USE OF THE TERM TERRORISM: VALUE STATEMENT.

Another definitional problem is the fact that terrorism has become a pejorative word which has been used by various groups to win ideological cachet through its use. Vanden addresses this point. “Terrorism lends itself to subjective definition. It can be ‘used entirely as a pejorative term to refer to the actions of some opposing organization,’ or it can be used as a means of identifying certain types of action irregardless (sic) of who is committing them.”⁵⁹ Thus labeling or mislabeling an act as terrorism may afford governments tremendous political capital.

⁵⁸ H.E. Vanden, “State Policy and the Cult of Terror in Central America,” *Contemporary Research in Terrorism*, Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart, editors, (Aberdeen, U.K.: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pg. 259.

⁵⁹ Vanden, pg. 267.

This is an important aspect to the study of terrorism as the communicative properties of a word can lend or erode the legitimacy of that phenomenon.⁶⁰ Indeed this is most certainly a case of whoever controls the discourse gains an enormous advantage. This can impact a group's ability to recruit, obtain logistic resources, and usher in a political change. Further, when part of the purpose of the terrorist act is the gaining of notoriety or publicity, it could be said the act itself is a struggle for the control in the discourse.⁶¹

TRANSNATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

This study focuses almost totally on international and transnational terrorism. As this research seeks to gauge the interaction between terrorism and primarily international non-governmental organizations, the international or transnational aspect to terrorism will be stressed. That is not to say that terrorism is only transnational. Certainly, the Oklahoma City bombing was terrorism, and the fact that it was carried out domestically or without international or transnational influence, does not reduce its impact as terrorism. Terrorism can exist anywhere in any number of contexts. In order to clarify this study, the characteristics of international and transnational terrorism as opposed to internal terrorism will be elucidated.

For the purposes of this research, and to simplify the terms used, both transnational and international terrorism will be referred to as international terrorism. Certainly there are differences in the two terms. Strictly speaking, transnational terrorism is terrorism that is perpetrated against targets that are not of the same

⁶⁰ R.D. Crenlinden, "Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled" *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, (Aberdeen University Press, 1987). pp 16-17.

⁶¹ See also discussions by Alexander Wendt on constructivism.

nationality of the perpetrators.⁶² Actual physical crossing of borders is not necessary. The acts can be committed against ex-patriates within the borders of a state as well as attacks by foreign groups on citizens of a different state all fall within this category.

Transnational terrorism can also be terrorism that has its causes or consequences based in another country. The aggressors or victims need not necessarily be from different states. However, there must be an extra-national component. Attacks on people of the same nationality due to an extra-national association e.g. employees of a foreign owned company, would also be transnational terrorism.

Technically, international terrorism is terrorism that requires a state actor.⁶³ Typically it is perpetrated by one state upon the citizens of another. The act itself is typically not carried out by the state, but by non-state surrogates. International terrorism can also be more indirect. Funding or providing resources from international sources may also make terrorism international.⁶⁴ Like the term terrorism, itself, what really constitutes international, and what constitutes transnational terrorism is up to some debate.⁶⁵

For the purposes of this research, international terrorism can occur in any state or system for any of a multitude of goals. International terrorism can be differentiated from other types of terrorism by the addition of any international aspect. For example, if the immediate, physical target is a citizen of another country,

⁶² Laqueur, 2001.

⁶³ Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Stephen Sloan, "International Terrorism: The Nature of the Threat," In *Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management*, edited by Richard S. Shultz and Stephen Sloan, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 1-17.

⁶⁴ Wilkinson, pp. xii

⁶⁵ Kent Layne Oots, *A Political Organizational Approach to Transnational Terrorism*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 9-12.

then the terrorism becomes international. Similarly, if the perpetrators or secondary psychological targets of the terrorism were from a different country then that too would become international. An attack “carried out across international frontiers” would also be considered international terrorism”.⁶⁶

It is important to note that this study does not eliminate cases based on the domestic aspect of an act. Indeed, some of the central data used in this research have been acts of domestic terror. However, it must also be conceded that the databases used primarily for this research are databases containing information on international terrorist attacks. As such, the results may be skewed toward groups which act internationally.

NON-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Another typical aspect of terrorism seems to be the willingness of terrorists to ignore the established rules of warfare. Certainly, if the terrorist group had the weapons, resources, and or people able to meet its foes on an even ground in open warfare, they probably would. However, most often, terrorism is typically carried out by groups that have no hope of winning a conventional engagement. This is why terrorist groups often engage in asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare has also been known as unconventional warfare or low intensity conflict. If a continuum exists with conventional war on one side and peace on the other, asymmetric warfare exists somewhere in between. This concept is illustrated by *Figure 2.3*.

⁶⁶ Paul Wilkinson, *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, (Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pg. xii.




Figure 2.3: Continuum of Violence

This is a concept that has deep historical roots. Sun Tsu noted the worth of what would later become known as guerrilla warfare.⁶⁷ Wilkinson noted the non-conventional methods utilized by terrorists as a defining aspect of terrorism, “Political terror can be differentiated from other forms of violence, agitation, intimidation and coercion by virtue of its extreme and ruthlessly destructive methods.”⁶⁸ This study disagrees with Wilkinson. The method does not make the terrorism.

Many of the terrorist groups go beyond unconventional warfare and are willing to ignore the recent conventions of warfare. Indeed, the definitional aspect of terrorism, the targeting of non-combatant populations, goes against the modern conventions of war. The psychological implications of an enemy that is willing to ignore the rules of war help to put terrorist acts on the public stage as well as heightening the creation and exploitation of fear. It is important to note, however, that the ignoring of the “rules of war” alone does not necessarily constitute terrorism.

It is also important to understand that states can and do engage in unconventional warfare. States may be hesitant to openly engage in conventional war and thus use unconventional means. The use of unconventional warfare is a

⁶⁷ Sun Tsu, *The Art of War*, Translated by Thomas Cleary, (Boston, Massachusetts: Shambhala, 1988); also Kushner, pg. 55, and Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study*,

⁶⁸ P. Wilkinson, “Pathways Out of Terrorism for Democratic Societies,” *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, (Aberdeen University Press, 1987).

characteristic of terrorism, not a defining aspect. Thus the fact that unconventional methods are used alone does not constitute terrorism. Terrorism requires all of the definitional aspects in order to reach that benchmark.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE TERM

Part of the difficulty in defining terrorism may stem from the fact that the nature of terrorism has changed through time. Walter Laqueur, in his seminal work on the history of terrorism notes that writing a comprehensive history or a general theory of terrorism is all but impossible.⁶⁹ Indeed, as discussed previously, one of the central problems to the study of terrorism is the fact that the term terrorism has meant so many different things. Laqueur noted, “the term terrorism...has been used in so many different senses as to become almost meaningless, covering almost any, and not necessary political, act of violence.”⁷⁰

The definition which is used in this study has some important distinctions from those used by previous authors. The distinction requiring the violence be perpetrated on non-combatant targets or property has historically not been included in many definitions. Indeed, the first group typically labeled with the term terrorist, the *sicarii*, often targeted Roman soldiers as well as civilians. This definition would label those attacks against civilians as terrorism, but the attacks on soldiers as warfare, albeit unconventional.

The Hindu cult known as the *Thuggee* is often referred to as an historical terrorist group.⁷¹ While it is true that the *Thuggee* did use and threaten violence on non-combatant populations, it was not done for political reasons or for a larger

⁶⁹ Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism*, (Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Walter Laqueur, 2001; also Kushner, pg. *xxiii*.

audience (aside from *Kali* herself). Granted, the worship of *Kali*, the goddess of death, may have been an ideological motivation, but that ideology was inward based, rather than outward based. Further, taking the discussion of means and ends described previously, the strangling deaths of innocents was essentially a sacrament for the *Thuggee*; the end rather than the means for accomplishing their religious goal. Using the definition put forth in this work, the lack of a political ideology meant for a greater audience relegates the *Thuggee* as a non-terrorist entity.

RATIONALITY

It may seem that terrorism, or the use or threat of violence on civilians for ideological reasons with the goal of creating and exploiting fear is, *a priori*, irrational.⁷² Indeed, some have studied the phenomenon of terrorism from the perspective that terrorism is a psychological or sociological pathology.⁷³ However, this work echoes Martha Crenshaw's 1998 article which treats terrorism and terrorist justification as a rational phenomenon utilizing a strategic choice model.⁷⁴

Specifically, this work assumes that terrorists resort to terrorism as a product of "willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than as the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors".⁷⁵ The assumption of rationality is also important when investigation of the goals and objectives of terrorists as the terrorists' pursuit of strategic goals is, in essence, a rational process.

Indeed, historical analysis of terrorist action "reveals similarities in calculations of

⁷² Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1977*, 2nd edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978)

⁷³ Annamarie Oliverio, *The State of Terror: SUNY Series in Deviance and Social Control*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).

⁷⁴ Martha C. Crenshaw, "the Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a product of Strategic Choice," 1998; also Denardo, *Powers in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

⁷⁵ Crenshaw, 1988.

ends and means.”⁷⁶ Hoffman noted in his definition of terrorism that, “it is a planned, calculated, and indeed systematic act.”⁷⁷

Indeed, the early terrorists attempted to justify their actions based on rational arguments. Laqueur used Hassan Sibai, the first leader of the Assassins, to illustrate this point, “Hassan Sibai seems to have realized early on that his group was too small to confront the enemy in open battle but that a planned, systematic, long-term campaign of terror carried out by a small, disciplined force could be a most effective political weapon”.⁷⁸ In this case, terrorism is non-conventional warfare, or low intensity conflict that allows the terrorist group to fight a war with an opponent against whom it has no hope of winning if the engagements are fought utilizing open, traditional methods. This concept is further illustrated by Sun Tzu in the *The Art of War*, “If you are equal, then fight if you are able. If you are fewer, then keep away if you are able. If you are not as good, then flee if you are able.”⁷⁹ Certainly this is a rational concept. Hoffman also described this concept,

Terrorists further argue that, because of their numerical inferiority, far more limited firepower and paucity of resources compared with an established nation-state’s massive defense and national security apparatus, they have no choice but to operate clandestinely, emerging from the shadows to carry out dramatic (in other words, bloody and destructive) acts of hit-and-run violence in order to attract attention to, and attract publicity for, themselves and their cause. The bomb-in-the-rubbish-bin, in their view, is merely a circumstantially imposed ‘poor man’s air force’: the only means with which the terrorist can challenge—and get the attention of—the more powerful state. ‘How else can we bring pressure to bear on the world?’ one of Arafat’s political aides once enquired. ‘The deaths are regrettable, but they are a fact of war in which innocents have been involved. They are no

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*; see also Crenshaw “the Strategic Development of Terrorism” APSA 1985.

⁷⁷ Hoffman, pg. 15.

⁷⁸ Lacquer, pg. 8.

⁷⁹ Sun Tzu, pg. 75.

more innocent than the women and children killed by the Israelis and we are ready to carry the war all over the world.’⁸⁰

This concept of strategic choice is again demonstrated by Sun Tzu, “kill one, frighten ten thousand.”⁸¹ This form of conflict is rational for those that lack the resources to fight a war conventionally or who wish to control large populations of people without a leadership mandate. The concept of terror as taken from the French Revolution was a way to control populations through the exploitation of fear. “The word ‘terrorism’ derives from the era of French Revolution and the Jacobin dictatorship which used terror as an instrument of political repression and social control.”⁸² Stalin also used this concept of control masterfully. This use of terror in Central America actually became institutionalized as the method of controlling the peasant population in rural areas.⁸³

Showing rationality is also important for the terrorists themselves, expressly for the reason that ideology is a definitional aspect of terrorism. As a result, justification of the reasons for violence becomes essential. Narodnaya Volya was very careful to publish the justification for its use of violence. They claimed that the acts of the tyrant justified their use of violence. Romanenko, described this when he explained, “It was wrong to regard systematic terror as immoral, since everything that contributed to the liberating revolution was *a priori* moral.”⁸⁴ In the end, while the

⁸⁰ Hoffman, pg.34., quoting Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman et al., *political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature* (new Brunswick, NJ: Transaction books, 1988), pg. 12

⁸¹ Sun Tzu.

⁸² Robert A. Friedlander, “The Origins of International Terrorism,” in Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger (eds.), *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, New York: John Jay Press, 1977, pg. 31.

⁸³ H.E. Vanden, “State Policy and the Cult of Terror in Central America,” *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, (Aberdeen University Press, 1987).

⁸⁴ Romanenko as cited by Laqueur, pg. 36.

logic may be suspicious, the perpetrators of terrorism justify their actions by displacing the responsibility to the entity they are trying to attack. Timothy McVeigh's attempt to justify the killing of children in the Murrah Federal Building as "collateral damage" and his further attempt to blame the government for their deaths by saying it was "family convenience" that led the government employees to put their children so close to a legitimate target is an example of this kind of displacement.⁸⁵ Most explained that it was the fault of the civilian women and children when they were hurt by terrorist attacks. "Some 'innocents' were bound to get hurt but this did not bother him unduly, it was not their business to be in places where a bomb was likely to explode."⁸⁶

Finally, the fact that terrorism entails violent or criminal behavior alone does not necessarily equate it with irrationality. Sandler *et al* created an economic method of studying terrorism based on rational choices made by the terrorists. They conclude that a rational, economic model provides valuable insights into the way terrorists operate. They note that the willingness of terrorists to put their lives at risk does not prove, *a priori*, irrationality, "Policemen and firefighters, to name but two groups, are willing to face an increased probability of death, provided that their remuneration compensates them for the added risks that employment entails."⁸⁷ Sociologists have further concluded that criminal behavior can be rational.⁸⁸ In the end, the justification

⁸⁵ Timothy McVeigh, "An Essay on Hypocrisy," Media Bypass, 1998.

⁸⁶ Most, Johann, *Freiheit*, January 12, 1884; September 13, 1884.

⁸⁷ T. Sandler *et al*, "Economic Methods and the Study of Terrorism," in Contemporary Research on Terrorism, (Aberdeen University Press, 1987).

⁸⁸ Gary S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 78, March/April 1968, pp. 169-217. M.K. Block and J.M. Heineke, 'A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 65, June 1975, pp. 314-325. Issac Erlich, "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 81, May/June 1973, pp. 521-565.

used to show that a fundamentally violent act is rational, relates primarily to the justification that the means adopted to achieve an end are acceptable.

SYSTEMATIC vs. ONE TIME ACTS

Many of the definitions of terrorism include systematic violence as one of the definitional aspects of terrorism. This research does not. While systematic violence may be a facet of some terrorism, a one-time act should be considered also. The Murrah Federal Building bombing of April 19, 1995 in Oklahoma City most certainly attains the criteria of terrorism. While the Oklahoma City bombing was an isolated act (even considering the criminal acts that went into the preparation of the bombing), it meets all of the other criteria for a terrorist act and should be treated as such.

CONCLUSION

For the purposes of this research it has been established that terrorism is a political phenomenon by which attackers threaten or use violence on non-combatants with the intent of creating and exploiting fear. It is not a new phenomenon and has been practiced since antiquity. It is carried out as if on a stage, the targets in actuality not being the physical victims of the terrorists but rather the audience. The perpetrators can be either state or non-state entities and there may be any of a number of goals, from state control to the authoritative distribution of values to deciding who gets what, where, when, and how. The act of terrorism can be seen to be rational given the goals and objectives of the groups engaged in it. Terrorism is usually perpetrated by groups utilizing non-conventional warfare, due to the fact that they are unable to gain advantage while using conventional methods. This research is careful to distinguish between the act of terrorism and the perpetrator of the act itself due to

the value-laden meaning attached to the term. While terrorism may occur within a nation-state, it is also waged between national lines and boundaries.

CHAPTER 3: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THEIR GOALS, TARGETS, AND STRATEGIES

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: AN HISTORIC BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The first non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were established by religious groups and people of conscience who wanted to abolish the practice of slavery. They believed that the best way to achieve their goal of abolition was to form groups of like-minded people in order to gather the resources to accomplish it.⁸⁹ Similarly, groups met together to combat suffering brought about by wars, hunger and famine.

The largest change in the scope and number of non-governmental organizations has occurred in the 20th century.⁹⁰ Korten explained that within three time periods in the 20th century, there were specific events which have shaped non-governmental organizations: before World War II, the 20 years after World War II, and from 1980 to the present.⁹¹ NGOs before WWII were primarily charitable relief organizations. Often these organizations were religious in nature and related to missionary activities. After World War II, secular organizations began to spring up to bring aid to war ravaged Europe. Lindenberg and Bryant, however, credit globalization with the increased role and scope of NGOs.⁹²

⁸⁹ T.H. Fox, "NGOs in the United States," *World Development*, Vol. 15, 1987, pp. 11-19.

⁹⁰ Ronald J. Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920-1965; A Survey of the Literature," *Background*, May 1966, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-56.

⁹¹ D.C. Korten, "Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People-Centered Development," *World Development*, Vol. 15, 1987, pp. 145-159.

⁹² Marc Lindenberg and Coralie Bryant, *Going Global: Transforming Relief and Development NGOs*, (Bloomfield, Conn: Kumarian Press, 2001).

Increasingly, these organizations began to be associated with the development of countries. To pursue the goal of development, the focus of NGOs had to change their focus away from individual relief to a more state-centric view.⁹³ This was done primarily to attack the root causes of third world poverty.

There has been an almost exponential increase in the number and scope of NGOs in the latter part of the 20th century. This may be traced to a variety of factors. *Table 3.1* illustrates the growth in the NGO sector of the United States. This growth has been mirrored by that of NGOs in the rest of the world.

<u>Year</u>	<u>NGOs</u> [†]	<u>Revenues</u> [‡]	<u>U.S. Giving</u>
1970	52	\$.614	\$23.4
1994	419	\$6.839	\$129.8

[†] USAID, *Annual Reports on US Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs*, Washington D.C., 1985

[‡] American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel and the AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy

Table 3.1: Growth of development NGOs in the United States 1970-1994
(\$ in U.S. billions)

The United Nations has become more engaged in “humanitarian imperatives” which has led to an increased role for NGOs in what had been considered in the past to be sovereign domestic issues.⁹⁴ This aspect of NGO expansion of scope became widely publicized in UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* which described the duty of the international community, including NGOs, to become involved in, what in the past were, sovereign issues when matters of human

⁹³ Korten, 1987.

⁹⁴ Thomas G. Weiss, “Nongovernment Organizations and Internal Conflict,” *The International Dimensions of Conflict*, Michael E. Brown, ed. No. 10 (MIT Press, 1996).

rights or humanitarian interests are at stake.⁹⁵ Another reason for the growth of the scope of NGOs may be the increased influence of globalization. This has been accompanied by an increase in world actors. Among those actors are non-governmentals.⁹⁶

Based on the work that NGOs are undertaking, they have increasingly demanded a place at the table of international policy creation and execution. Further, the global community as well as sovereign governments have seemed willing to allow them that place.⁹⁷ Currently, NGOs have obtained consultative status on the Security Council of the United Nations through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) based on article 71, which grants ECOSOC the right to “make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.”⁹⁸ In this capacity, qualifying NGOs are granted the right to propose ECOSOC agenda items as well as the right to supply information in conferences and committee hearings.⁹⁹ The interaction between NGOs and the UN plays a prominent role in international relations literature.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, (New York: United Nations, 1992), and *Supplement to “An Agenda for Peace:” Position Paper by the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, Document A/50/60, S/1995/1, January 3, 1995.

⁹⁶ Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider, *Private Organizations in Global Politics*, (New York, New York: Routledge, 2000); also A.J.N. Judge, “NGOs and Civil Society: Some Realities and Distortions: The Challenge of necessary-to-governance organizations,” *Transnational Associations*, 47:156-80 1995.

⁹⁷ Peter J. Spiro, “New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-making Institutions”, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 45-46.

⁹⁸ United Nations Charter, Article 71.

⁹⁹ Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) pp. 19-25.

¹⁰⁰ L.C. White, *International Non-Governmental Organizations*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951); Also P.J. Spiro, “New Global Communities: Non-Governmental Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions,” *Washington Quarterly*, 18(1), 1994, pp. 45-56; P. Willetts, ed., *Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations*, (London: Pinter, 1982).

The question must be asked, why the increase in the scope and size of NGOs? The answer lies more in the accepted assumptions that as private, non-state entities, which must compete for resources, NGOs are more efficient and effective than government programs. In addition, NGOs typically spotlight on one specific sector of policy, which allows them to focus on and amass greater information and expertise than governments, with budget constraints and bureaucratic sclerosis, would be able to accomplish. The reliance of governments and IGOs on expertise lent them by NGOs creates other problems, as NGOs might be biased in their collection and advice on policy specifics.

As stated previously, Lindenberg and Bryant point to global reasons for the increase of NGOs. Specifically, they point to the economic collapse and restructuring that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, Soviet client states were destabilized and Western client states received less money. At the same time, the number of failed states was on the rise. There was an increase in anarchy and social conflict. There was also more space for civil society based on an increase in democratic regimes. The influence of the state was also diminishing due to less social spending and an increase in privatization. During this time, NGOs were able to fill the vacuum left by the diminished state due to an increase in giving to NGOs as well as incentives created by intergovernmental organizations.¹⁰¹

Weiss and Gordenker also note that the increased influence of NGOs can also be traced to a 'representative' function that they provide to governments and IGOs. It is thought that governments and IGOs obtain their legitimacy not only from the democratic governments that participate in their organizations, but also through the

¹⁰¹ Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001, pg. 10.

participation of NGOs which represent another form of citizenship.¹⁰² “In sum, the direct participation of private organizations lends a democratic quality to the management of intergovernmental organizations and is, therefore, an indispensable contribution to global politics.”¹⁰³

This creates an interesting problem for non-governmental organizations. Part of what allows them to accomplish their mission is the fact that they are non-state actors. Increasingly, in order to compete for resources in the world market, NGOs have had to create relationships with governmental or intergovernmental entities. Much of the recent literature on NGOs has focused on whether NGOs really are independent, as well as their accountability to their benefactors.¹⁰⁴ Doctors Without Borders, a humanitarian aid organization which values its independence from government sources, prides itself on only receiving 81% of its funding from government sources.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, according to Edwards and Hume, NGOs have begun to be known as agents for specific governments or policy positions. Not only are they seen as agents, but as the preferred method by which states can provide services to other countries due to the common belief that NGOs are more efficient than states can be.¹⁰⁶ While this belief is not universal, the explosion in the number and scope of NGOs cannot be disputed.

Often, the NGOs are private organizations that are created and controlled by individuals or groups with specific interests. As such, NGOs create their own rules

¹⁰² Ronit and Schneider, 2000, pg. 13.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Michael Edwards and David Hume, *Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Accountability in the Post-Cold War World*, (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996).

¹⁰⁵ 2002 Doctors Without Borders Annual Report,

<http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/i2003/factsandfigures.pdf>, August 12, 2004.

¹⁰⁶ Edwards and Hume, 1996, pp. 2-3.

and guidelines and finance their own activities, making them responsible to their stakeholders. However, NGOs sometimes struggle for recognition and resources from state entities. This can create problems of ‘mission creep’ and may indeed affect the operations of an NGO. Alexander Cooley and James Ron also postulate that NGOs come into competition in their scramble for resources. They argue that due to market forces, NGOs may not necessarily act in accordance with their stated mandate. Indeed, many NGOs become inefficient and self-serving as they compete for resources in an increasingly saturated marketplace.¹⁰⁷ This competition is acknowledged by Ronit and Schneider, “These (NGOs) typically have few resources, engage in specific policy fields, and often struggle for recognition by public authority.”¹⁰⁸ It can be seen that the competition for resources among terrorist groups might bring them into conflict with competing NGOs.

There are additional difficulties for the operation of an NGO’s goals: that of keeping on mission and being responsible to stakeholders, while attempting to be relevant in the world environment. Schmitter and Streeck describe that NGOs must balance between the “logic of membership” and the interests of their constituency and the “logic of influence” which is the influence exerted on an NGO by the political environment.¹⁰⁹ In some cases, the message of the group might become compromised by the necessity of presenting that message in a manner that will be acceptable to the world stage.

¹⁰⁷ Alexander Cooley and James Ron, “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action,” in *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 5-39.

¹⁰⁸ Ronit and Schneider, 2000, pg. 7.

¹⁰⁹ W. Streeck and P.C. Schmitter, eds., *Private Interest Government: Beyond the Market and the State*, (London: Sage, 1985).

NGOs do not necessarily exist only at the behest of the state. And it may not be the case that NGOs have increased in order to fill the vacuum left by a receding state. Indeed, Susan Strange theorizes that the power of the state is being eroded due to the influence of non-state actors.¹¹⁰ Keck and Sikkink note that NGOs are helping to create international civil society. They do this by creating advocacy networks that define new issues and control international dialogue. After the issues are defined and promoted on the world stage, NGOs interact with state and intergovernmental organizations to adopt action that addresses the newly defined issues. Finally, NGOs monitor the success of the implementation of the policies designed to address those issues. In other words, non-state actors help to create civil society in a world where the power of the state is diminishing by helping to create, advertise and enforce international norms.¹¹¹

NGOs have come to be seen as a vehicle not only of development, but also as a vehicle of social and political change.¹¹² Increasingly, a larger portion of official aid is being channeled through non-governmental organizations. Indeed, a new

¹¹⁰ Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 75. James Rosenau makes a similar claim in *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 353; also Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider, *Private Organizations in Global Politics*, (New York, New York: Routledge, 2000).

¹¹¹ Similar work has been done by John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999); Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001); David Holloran Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Society: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-1989*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993); Thomas Risse, et al, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconsidering World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1992), pp. 389-240; and Paul Kevin Wapner, "The Normative Promise of Nonstate Actors: A Theoretical Account of Global Civil Society," in Wapner, Lester Edwin Ruiz, and Richard Falk, eds., *Principled World Politics: The Challenge of Normative International Relations*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

¹¹² Edwards and Hume, 1996, pg. 2-3.

subset of NGO has been created: the QUANGOs or quasi-nongovernmental organizations. These are non-governmental organizations that “receive the bulk of their resources from public (or state) coffers.”¹¹³ Further, states as well as interstate organizations have begun to rely on NGOs for their problem solving ability as well as their ability to advise and consult with state structures in areas where the NGO holds informational expertise. This begs the important question: Are non-governmental organizations really non-governmental? This basic question is one that that will be addressed in chapter 4.

There is a growing literature that looks at the growth and impact of NGOs in the international system due to their increasing significance as players on the world stage.¹¹⁴ They are taking upon themselves roles that were, in the past, solely in the purview of state entities.¹¹⁵ Further, NGOs with similar foci are coming together and pooling information and resources, which allows for much effective goal attainment. Keck and Sikkink label these NGO networks “transnational advocacy networks.”¹¹⁶ These TANs combine NGOs’, individuals’, and state entities’ resources and creates informational linkages in order to accomplish common goals and solve collective problems.¹¹⁷ This is significant when looked at in the light of NGO associations that will be discussed in chapter 4.

The study of international NGOs accompanied the increase in the numbers of NGOs that began in the 19th century. International organizations began to be studied

¹¹³ Weiss and Gordenker, 1996, pg. 21.

¹¹⁴ Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

¹¹⁵ Weiss, 1996.

¹¹⁶ Keck and Sikkink, 1997.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

as a sub-discipline at the start of the 20th century.¹¹⁸ White pioneered the focus on non-profit international organizations in 1933. He looked specifically at both economic and non-economic private organizations as groups with political interests.¹¹⁹ With the creation of the United Nations and the recognition that the U.N. granted NGOs, the definition of NGOs as non-economic groups became more accepted. The role of NGOs as a partner with intergovernmental organizations became established and the study of NGOs in that context began to dominate the field.¹²⁰

Currently, literature on non-government relations reflects the difficulties endemic to the study of international political phenomenon. There have been myriads of ways to look at various phenomenon based on the perspective from which the researcher has wished to approach them. The study of NGOs is no different. The way NGOs have been studied varies based on the traditions of the discipline of those doing the studies. This has helped to make defining NGOs a difficult proposition. Ronit and Schneider note, “It is not surprising that private organizations are given various labels within studies on international relations, international political economy and transnational relations.”¹²¹

¹¹⁸ L.S. Woolf, *International Government*, (London, U.K.: George Allen and Unwin, 1916); Also P.B. Potter, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organizations*, (New York, New York: Century, 1922).

¹¹⁹ L.C. White, *The Structure of Private International Organizations*, (Philadelphia, PA.: Ferguson, 1933).

¹²⁰ L.C. White, *International Non-Governmental Organizations*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951); also J.J. Lador-Lederer, *International Non-Governmental Organizations and Economic Entities. A Study in Autonomous Organization and Ius Gentiu*, (Leden: A.W. Sythoff, 1962).

¹²¹ Ronit and Schneider, 2000, pg. 3.

In international relations, where dominant theories in the field have been state-centric, “little room is left for other actors.”¹²² In fact, non-state actors have been minimized as less significant than other inputs.

The existence of private organizations is not denied, but they are, *a priori*, considered of minor importance and, accordingly, solid investigations are hardly worth the effort. However, even from a strong state-centric perspective, it makes sense to study private organizations to demonstrate how states influence the formation of private actors, or how they instrumentalize them in their rivalries with other states.¹²³

That is not to say that there have not been those that study non-state entities from a state-centric perspective. Certainly some have looked at phenomenon as varied as terrorist groups to environmental and human rights organizations. Usually, they are studied from the perspective of the non-governmentals acting as a linking institution between foreign policy and domestic policy.¹²⁴

There have been contributions to the literature of non-governmental organizations in terms of the study of non-state actors.¹²⁵ These non-state actors include traditional non-governmental organizations. However, the category also includes supra-state organizations that include intergovernmental organizations as well as sub-state actors such as “...multinational enterprises, cartels, and criminal, religious and ethnic networks.”¹²⁶ These studies have helped to move the study of

¹²² Ronit and Schneider, 2000, pg. 3.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R.D. Putnam eds., *Double Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Policies*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); also R.O. Keohane and H.V. Milner eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Policies*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹²⁵ T. Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹²⁶ Ronit and Schneider, 2000, pg. 11.

international relations away from a dedicated state centric view and opened the horizons to include these supra-state and sub-state actors.

International political economy, with its emphasis on states and markets, has often ignored the role of non-governmentals. However, studies, which stress the roles of unions, private banking institutions, and for-profit companies in helping to regulate the market, have also contributed to the literature in international political economy. Indeed, some studies looking at the corporatist models of state economies give non-profits an equal share with the state in regulating market forces. Much of this emphasis is limited to multi-national corporations, cartels, and trade regimes.¹²⁷ As a result, “non-economic players generally fall outside the paradigms of international political economy.”¹²⁸ Most often, these actors are profit seeking, and as such usually exempted from the typical definition of NGO.

The transnational or civil society approach looks at the role of non-governmental groups in creating structures of society beyond the state and the market. This approach emphasizes the connections and structures created by society to solve the problems of society. As such, the role of non-governmental groups, especially those engaged in creating civil society, is emphasized in both high and low politics.¹²⁹ Much of the literature on NGOs focuses on specific interests such as the environment, women’s issues, and human rights.¹³⁰ For the study of non-governmental organizations, the transnational or civil society approach seems the most appropriate.

¹²⁷ S. Steinmo, “Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the U.S., Sweden, and Britain,” *World Politics*, 41-4, (1989), pp. 500-535; also Compston, “Union Participation in Economic Policy Making in France, Italy, Germany, and Britain,” *Politics and Society*, 26-1, (1995), pp. 35-67.

¹²⁸ Ronit and Schneider, 2000, pg. 5.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pg. 6.

¹³⁰ Paul Wapner, “Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civil Politics,” *World Politics* Vol. 47 (April 1995), pp. 311-340; Ronnie Lipschutz, *Global Civil Society and Global*

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A DEFINITION

A similar difficulty arises when addressing non-governmental organizations as when addressing terrorism: namely there is no universally accepted definition. Strictly speaking, any organization that is not an official state entity could be considered an NGO. Indeed, many multinational corporations (MNCs) and religious organizations that cross state boundaries could qualify as NGOs. Ronit and Schneider describe the dilemma:

The field does not employ a consistent vocabulary and a range of concepts are employed to describe different private organizations. Studies of non-governmental organizations encompass a very broad group of actors, and a huge glossary of acronyms has been created to account for the variety in the organization of private interests.¹³¹

This difficulty in defining non-governmental organizations relates to the term itself. Non-governmental only defines what it is not. Therefore, it can be determined that NGOs are precisely that, not part of government. Accordingly, any organization, such as a quilting bee, that is not governmental, would fit into this category.

This 'non-definition' can also be broadly expanded to differentiate NGOs from intergovernmental organizations as well. Much of the international relations literature that deals with NGOs focuses on the interaction between NGOs and IGOs. Weiss notes the importance of this relationship in the international relations literature. "Much of the literature is legalistic and focuses on the formal relationships of those

Environmental Governance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); and Anne Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstetler, "The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights and Women," *World Politics*, Vol. 51 (October 1998), pp. 1-35.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pg. 6.

one thousand or so NGOs that have official UN consultative status.”¹³² This does not, however, further distinguish NGOs from the myriad of organizations that exist in the world.

The current trend in non-governmental organizations research suggests that part of the definitional aspect of NGOs is the role that they play. Ronit and Schneider expand on this:

Multinational and transnational corporations are treated as global, profit seeking organizations and therefore usually excluded from the group of non-governmental organizations mainly described as non-profit organizations. The same applies to various international federations of political parties, which are associated with governments because they seek political office and, consequently, are not of a genuine private character. In a similar vein, national liberation movements aspiring to political power fall outside the concept of non-governmental organizations. Consequently, political and ideological movements, such as workers’ internationals or the Zionist movement...cannot be treated properly within the existing framework of non-governmental organizations.¹³³

Uphoff argues that most NGOs belong in a sub-sector of the private sector.

According to him, the distinguishing characteristic of an NGO is its not-for-profit nature.¹³⁴ While this differentiates NGOs from MNCs, there remains considerable fuzziness to what constitutes a non-governmental organization. This fuzziness is described by Thomas Weiss: “Confusion persists about the precise definition of a ‘nongovernmental organization.’ Theoretical explorations are few in number and

¹³² Thomas G. Weiss, “Nongovernmental Organizations and Internal Conflict,” *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael E. Brown, editor, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996), pp. 436.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pg. 7.

¹³⁴ Norman Uphoff, “Why NGOs are not a Third Sector,” in Edwards and Hume *Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Accountability in the Post-Cold War World*, (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996).

specialized by sector, traditionally for economic and social development and more recently for the environment.”¹³⁵

Korten focuses on the characteristics of an organization as the definitional factor: An NGO is “an independent, nonpolitical private agency.”¹³⁶ This definition is especially interesting given the political roles that many NGOs have accepted. For the purposes of this research, an entity will be considered an NGO when it is a private organization that is non-profit in nature.

In order to better quantify between the different organizations that can be included in the larger definition of non-governmental organization, a host of acronyms have evolved. A complete listing of the different sub-types of NGOs is beyond the scope and necessity of this research. However, some of the main sub-types will be explained. Certainly the INGO or international non-governmental organization is important to this research and will be addresses later, as will the religious non-governmental organization (RINGO).

Korten differentiates NGOs based on accountability. This is especially pertinent when understanding the motivation for action of NGOs. Governmental non-governmental organizations (a contradiction in terms) or (GONGO), are NGOs “that are the creations of government and serve as instruments of government policy.”¹³⁷ Voluntary Organizations (VO) are organizations that “pursue a social mission driven by a commitment to shared values.”¹³⁸ Public Service Contractors (PSC) are

¹³⁵ Weiss, 1996, pg. 436.

¹³⁶ David C. Korten, *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda*, (West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press, 1990).

¹³⁷ Korten, 1990, pg. 2.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

“market-oriented non-profit businesses serving public purposes.”¹³⁹ According to Korten, these PSCs, while nominally non-profit in nature, seem to function in the market for the purpose of exploiting the need for contractors in the service market.¹⁴⁰ Finally, peoples’ organizations (PO) are organizations that “represent their member’s interests, have member accountable leadership, and are substantially self-reliant.”¹⁴¹ Weiss and Gordenker introduce the donor organized non-governmental organization (GONGO). This type of organization is created by donors (either governmental or non-governmental) for a specific purpose or policy need.¹⁴² Examples of this type of organization are the various UN NGOs created for specific needs.

INTERNATIONAL NGOs (INGO)

NGOs need not be transnational or international in nature. Indeed, the majority of NGOs are grassroots or domestic—containing people from one country working in their own country for the benefit of that country or locality. The transnational/international nature of this research biases the scope of the definition of NGOs used, and as such, the primary focus is on organizations which are transnational in nature.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TREATED AS NGOS (RINGO)

The question remains as to whether religious organizations should be considered NGOs. As mentioned previously, the first NGOs were religious groups. Most religious groups are not-for-profit in nature. In the colonial era in Africa,

¹³⁹ Korten, 1990, pg. 2.

¹⁴⁰ Paul B. Firstenberg, *Managing for profit in the Nonprofit World*, (New York, New York: The Foundation Center, 1986).

¹⁴¹ Korten, 1990, pg. 2.

¹⁴² Weiss and Gordenker, 1996, pg. 21.

churches were the primary mechanism for education and healthcare.¹⁴³ NGOs have traditionally engaged in charitable relief. However, NGOs have also been involved in the creation of civil society or environmental causes. While religious organizations have traditionally been neglected in NGO literature, there is no sound explanation as to why.¹⁴⁴ Clearly churches cannot be removed from the category of non-governmental organizations. For the purpose of this research, religious organizations have been included within the umbrella of non-governmental organizations.

One additional factor must be addressed, that of intrinsic characteristics of NGOs that make them especially attractive targets for terrorist attack. Chapter 1 introduced the basic targeting imperatives which terrorist use to select targets and chapter 4 will explore and expand on them. These imperatives include general ideological as well as strategic and tactical reasons. The terrorist groups are engaged in the use of violence in order to create and exploit fear in a larger audience for a political reason. NGOs may be associated with an outside political entity. An attack on the NGO will be seen as an attack on the larger audience. Thus, an attack on a Jordanian truck driver in Iraq is perceived as an attack on the American company that he worked for. This associative attack is not exclusive to NGOs. As the attack is meant to create fear in a larger population, however, and as NGOs are at least perceived to be altruistic and “innocent” by the larger audience, the horrific attack on an NGO might actually garner more attention than one on a more traditional target. Thus the goal is better served through an attack on an NGO.

¹⁴³ Korten, 1990, pg. 116.

¹⁴⁴ A.J.N. Judge, “Organizational Hybrids. Transnational Network of Research and Service Communities,” *Transnational Associations*, 29 (7-8), 1977, pp. 306-311;

NGOs may also be especially vulnerable to terrorist attack due to the nature of the operations in which they are engaged. Randolph Martin described why this may be the case:

The overall increase over the past decade in the number and duration of conflicts in which aid workers are employed; a general absence of rules of war or rules of conduct among the belligerents themselves, many of whom are irregular fighters and may also include criminals and bandits interested as much in plunder as in the realization of a particular political agenda; and the general rush to arrive on the scene of conflicts or humanitarian crises most needing help without adequate prior security preparation or thought.¹⁴⁵

All of these factors combine to make the operations of many NGOs especially dangerous. Martin also describes another reason that NGOs make good targets: they are generally 'softer' than other targets.

(There is) a prevailing perception of aid organizations as particularly 'soft' targets (that) leads terrorists and other malefactors to conclude that such organizations and especially their employees can be 'attacked with impunity.' (There is also) a conspicuous lack of security among many NGO workers combined with a skeptical, if not averse attitude towards the need for security and other protective measures.¹⁴⁶

TERRORIST GROUPS AND NGOS

The question might rightly be asked if terrorist groups should also be included within the rubric of non-governmental organizations. Certainly, as discussed above, they are non-state actors. While fundamentally political in nature, does that fact remove them from the NGO equation? If so, then many traditional NGOs must also be removed. For example, Amnesty International is an internationally recognized human rights NGO. They are fundamentally engaged in political action. Similarly,

¹⁴⁵ Randolph Martin, "FMR 4 April 1999: NGO Field Security," (New York: International Rescue Committee, 1999).

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Greenpeace, an established environmental NGO, is also engaged in political processes.

Perhaps terrorist groups separate themselves from their non-state NGO brothers by their fundamentally malignant message and methods. This also is a dangerous distinction. Who is to say what message or methods are acceptable. Is the fact that Greenpeace often resorts to action that borders on the violent enough to remove them as an NGO and put them into the terrorist category? Certainly the ELF (Environmental Liberation Front), which engages in bombings and arson to further the environmental cause, should be categorized as a terrorist group. But where is the line between Greenpeace and the ELF? Is the fact that Hamas engages in violence and terror negate the fact that they also carry out education and human rights work? How can such distinctions be made?

The fact that terrorist groups are, indeed, non-governmental organizations must be acceded to. However, in the same way that non-governmental organization is a large umbrella for many disparate types of organizations (for-profit businesses, non-for-profit groups, church organizations, etc.), terrorist groups are treated the same way MNCs are treated. Thus, terrorist groups are not addressed as NGOs for the purposes of this research. That is not to say that terrorist groups do not use NGOs as funding mechanisms or mechanisms of support. The use of charitable NGOs as funding mechanisms for Al Qaeda has been the subject of much attention since the September 11 attacks. Similar NGOs existed to support terrorist activities in Northern Ireland and the Far East. While some NGOs might have been wholly engaged as a front for terrorist groups that has not necessarily been the case for all of

the NGOs with ties to terrorists. Some groups may have been unwitting dupes to the funneling of resources to terrorist organizations. Others may have legitimate agendas and only divert portions of their resources to such groups.

However, the classification of terrorist groups as NGOs is especially salient in this discussion of terrorism and NGOs. While the definition of NGOs used in this research specifically exempts terrorist groups, they are, unequivocally, non-state actors. If the power of the state is eroding and non-state groups are competing to control the dialogue on the world stage, then terrorist groups may certainly come into conflict with other state and non-state actors in this endeavor. Indeed, this seems to be an explanatory factor in the rise of terrorism. This conflict for the control of the dialogue on the world stage will be expanded on later in this research.

INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS—A CAVEAT

Non-government organizations need not be international in nature. Indeed, most NGOs are domestic groups of varying form and function. This research does not ignore these groups. However, due to constraints forced by the nature of the data used in this research, it does focus primarily on international groups. As stated previously, if there is one weakness of this research, it is the fact that it is biased towards acts of international terrorism. It must be noted that the selection of an NGO case for the second portion of this study follows in this bias. This was done for many reasons, not the least of which were for research design and accessibility purposes. These reasons will be more fully explored in chapter 5. Constraints also forced a limitation on the focus of NGOs. As this chapter has just pointed out, there are countless types of NGOs and each has its own emphasis in a specific policy or

geographic area. This research was unable to fully explore the different types and extent of NGOs in this format.

CONCLUSION

Non-governmental organizations have increased in numbers and in scope. It has been theorized that this increase is due to the rise in intergovernmental organizations and their need for representational legitimacy as well as the need for efficient information and distribution of services. Another reason cited for the increase in NGOs is the retreat of the state. It is thought that as states' roles have decreased, non-governmental organizations have stepped up to fill the gap, creating civil society.

NGOs are decreasingly engaged alone in their fight for their policy goals. They are combining resources and expertise to form networks by which more can be accomplished. NGOs are also considered an efficient way for states to pursue policies without overt action. As a result, an increasing number of NGOs are associated with states, becoming clearinghouses for government money. It can be seen that as the number of NGOs has increased, they have had to compete for resources in a scarce marketplace. NGOs may have to change their goals in order to obtain necessary resources. As a result, questions have arisen about the accountability of NGOs to stakeholders.

Like terrorism, the study of non-governmental organizations has been difficult due to the lack of a consensus with regard to an accepted definition of what is actually a non-governmental organization. The common definitions of NGOs as private, non-political organizations that are not-for-profit in nature and working for a public good

may be lacking. Many NGOs are associated with governments. Furthermore, not-for-profit organizations may, in actuality, be in the business of making a profit. Finally, public good certainly does not have an agreed upon definition. For the purposes of this research, much of the conventional definition of a non-governmental organization is accepted: a non-state, privately created and directed, not-for-profit organization. Religious organizations are also included within the NGO umbrella. However, while terrorist groups are definitely non-state entities, they do not meet the rubric of a non-governmental organization.

CHAPTER 4: TERRORISM AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COLLIDE

If the notion that terrorism is a rational action pursued by rational individuals, then there must be a reason that terrorist groups might use to justify the targeting of non-governmental organizations. As stated previously, Hoffman noted that NGOs were targeted because of tactical reasons: specifically that the nature and operations of NGOs make them easy targets. However, if terrorist groups are rational, one must go beyond just the relative ease of carrying out an attack on a given target. As stated before, there must be a rationale.

INTRODUCTION TO/REVIEW OF THE DATABASE

This chapter will create and justify the framework as to why terrorist groups might target non-governmental organizations. In other words, it establishes the terrorist's targeting rationale. In order to institute this framework, a comprehensive study of attacks on NGOs was carried out. For the purposes of this study, various databases that contained records of these types of attacks were consulted. After consulting the various databases, the central data for this research was compiled. It contains approximately 500 cases of terrorist attacks on NGOs and religious groups from 1970 to 2000.

Determining the actual process by which targets were chosen is a task fraught with intellectual pitfalls. Obviously, it is impossible to know exactly what the terrorist groups were thinking or what emphasis they placed on which targeting parameters to finally arrive at the selected target. However, after careful study of the databases, various patterns emerged. The purpose of this study was not to create

empirically testable statistics. This is a preliminary study in the field of target selection which focuses on NGOs in particular. While a database is typically used to statistically test hypotheses, the database compiled for this study has a primary purpose of providing a large pool of like phenomena through which patterns could be divined. As such, readers should not be disappointed when statistical testing is not conducted for each of the framework parameters.

The main source materials used are the RAND/Saint Andrews Terrorism Database as well as the RAND/MIPT Terrorism Database, both of which have been compiled primarily from news publications worldwide. These databases include information as to number of deaths; number of injuries; the nationality(s) of the target; the alleged perpetrator(s); the incident date; the tactics used; the country that the attack occurred in; the source of the information; and finally a brief summary of the attack. These databases "...were compiled by the RAND Corporation, of which the RAND Terrorism Chronology Database records international terrorist incidents occurred between 1968 and 1997, while the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database records domestic and international terrorist incidents occurred from 1998 to present."¹⁴⁷ Information used as secondary sources include the U.S. government reports *Political Violence Against Americans*, *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans*, and the *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000-2002*, which are government reports of violence against Americans. All of these sources are in the public domain and readily obtainable by the general public.

RAND is a non-profit think tank originally set up by the Air Force to undertake contract research. This research is often conducted for the U.S.

¹⁴⁷ <http://db.mipt.org/index.cfm>. August 2, 2004.

Government but not necessarily so.¹⁴⁸ The Rand database contains over 8,000 cases detailing acts of international terrorism in general, and since 1998, it has detailed incidents of domestic terrorism as well. From this database, approximately 500 cases of terrorist acts on NGOs and religious organizations since 1978 have been chronicled.

This database is important in that it provides large numbers of data which can be compared and examined to see if similarities and differences exist between attacks. In other words, the data set can be examined for correlations between the variables, which could then be hypothesized as “cause-effect relationships.”¹⁴⁹ Again, while theory testing will not be executed, this database analysis will be conducted as a controlled comparison.¹⁵⁰

One of the benefits of the data retrieved from the RAND/St. Andrews and the RAND/MIPT databases is the fact that much of the data was retrieved from journalistic sources. As a result, much of the information is “thick” in nature. In other words, the database contains descriptive information rather than just names and dates. This is especially helpful in the task of creating the theoretical framework. Specific details as to the actions of the victims, the tactics of the attackers, as well as other relevant information is contained within the database.

The sourced available databases have received both positive and negative reviews. On the positive side, Edward S. Herman describes the RAND database as “a

¹⁴⁸ Hoffman and Hoffman, 1994.

¹⁴⁹ Van Evera, pp. 25-27.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

relatively large and scholarly operation for the terrorism field.”¹⁵¹ Work testing the internal validity and correlation of available databases found all to be highly correlated and internally valid.¹⁵²

On the negative side, Herman comments on how the disparate definitions serve to create a weakness in the database:

(It) exhibits a fundamental bias that fits and supports the Western model of terrorism. It focuses on terrorist incidents of ‘violence waged outside presently accepted rules and procedures of international diplomacy and war...designed to attract worldwide attention to the terrorists and to inspire fear.’ Incidents are included only if information is ‘publicly available.’ As government acts of violence very often are not designed to ‘attract worldwide attention *and* inspire fear,’ but only to inspire fear (and decimate an opposition), the RAND principle of selection excludes a large part of wholesale terror from the start. Furthermore, government violence very often does not yield ‘publicly available information’ (e.g., the work of death squads and government torturers), and is claimed (often falsely) by the terrorist states to be within the ‘presently accepted rules’ of warfare.¹⁵³

Thus instances of state terrorism against their own citizens are excluded based on the definition of terrorism used by RAND.¹⁵⁴ Similarly, instances of “terrorist events taking place on the frontiers of neighboring states at war are excluded.”¹⁵⁵ Another criticism of the RAND database is the fact that it ignores the greater number of domestic terrorism acts.¹⁵⁶ RAND itself concedes to these weaknesses. In a RAND

Note dated March 1981, William Warner Fowler stated: “The major problems in the

¹⁵¹ Edward S. Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan, *The Terrorism Industry: the Experts and Institutions that Shape Our View of Terror*, (New York, New York: Random House, 1989).

¹⁵² Jeffery Scott, “Terrorism Databases: An Empirical Comparison,” Working paper, December 2003.

¹⁵³ Herman, 1989, pg. 86.

¹⁵⁴ See also James David Ballard, “A Preliminary Study of Sabotage and Terrorism as Transportation Risk Factors Associated With the Proposed Yucca Mountain High-Level Nuclear Facility,” Working paper, July 1998.

¹⁵⁵ Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*, (White Plains, New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1994).

¹⁵⁶ Ballard, 1998; See also Hoffman and Hoffman, 1995; Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “The Impact of Economic, Political, and Social Variables on the Incidence of World Terrorism, 1970 to 1997,” NIJ Grant Proposal 1-41, (2002); and Philip Windsor, “Book Review of Current Perspectives of International Terrorism,” in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1:272-276, (1989).

collection of terrorism data are the definition of terrorism itself and the determination of the scope and content of the data.”¹⁵⁷ Fowler also admits that the RAND database might also have the weakness of a “lack of rigor in incident sampling.”¹⁵⁸ Neither would justify using other available databases to rectify the problem. The RAND database, similar to other terrorism databases, is a chronological database. Most of the other databases are also chronological. Fowler notes:

For the most part, data-gathering efforts are centered on the development of chronologies of recent terrorist activities. This means that there is an overlap in the information content of the currently available data bases (sic). It has been estimated that there would be 90 percent agreement among the chronologies containing data on any given sample of incidents.¹⁵⁹

Another weakness relates to the difficulties in assessing motivation to perpetuate violent acts. Brian Jenkins explained, “The borderline separating political motives from highly personal motives and purely criminal motives is not always clear. Where all of the details of an incident were not known, it was included if it had the earmarks of an international terrorist incident.”¹⁶⁰ Jenkins allows that some incidents might not necessarily be terrorist acts. Conversely, there may be instances where acts were not included:

Terrorist data bases (sic) are more like census data bases (sic) (which attempt to collect data on every person) and less like public opinion

¹⁵⁷ Fowler, William Warner, “Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods and Systems.” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND publication, 1981), pg. v.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pg. vi.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pg. 1; also Richard Falkenrath, “Analytic Models and Policy Prescription: Understanding Recent Innovation in U.S. Counterterrorism.” *Journal of Conflict and Terrorism* 24:159-181 (2001); Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature*, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988); Jongman, Albert J., “Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968-1988” in *Western Responses to Terrorism*, edited by Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (London: Frank Cass, 1993); and Hoffman, 1998.

¹⁶⁰ Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, “International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974,” R-I597-DOS/ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publication, 1975).

polls (which generally select a specially defined ‘sample’ of individuals that represent a larger universe). This means that sampling methods have not been used and missing incidents have been inadvertently omitted. Detailed data-selection criteria are not usually publicly available, so precise estimates of omission rates can not (sic) be calculated.¹⁶¹

The RAND database also suffers from limitations in data collection. As a non-governmental database intended to be available to the general public, classified information available only to government sources is missing from the database. Furthermore, the primary data sources were journalistic news sources. As such, there might be an emphasis on incidents that are “newsworthy.”¹⁶²

There are also difficulties with the RAND database inherent in all databases. When using secondary data, mistakes made by the data collectors are passed on to the researcher. This weakness was noted by Ballard, “...such analysis extends any faulty methodology originally done by the data collection agencies and compounds these mistakes.”¹⁶³

That is not to say that the RAND and other similar databases should be abandoned. Weimann and Winn minimize the RAND weaknesses:

No database can ever be fully above question. It is fair conjecture to wonder if the RAND data might overrepresent slightly incidents involving U.S. victims and/or interests as a result of the unintentional omission of incidents not involving U.S. Nationals or interests. The dataset is exceptionally large. For this reason, any omissions are apt to be proportionally very small in number. However, nonrandom or skewed they might be, any conjectured omissions are therefore unlikely to exercise a trifling impact, if any, on overall conclusions.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Fowler, 1981, pg. 14.

¹⁶² Falkenrath, 2001.

¹⁶³ Ballard, 1998.

¹⁶⁴ Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*, (White Plains, New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1994).

Certainly there are problems with the RAND and other databases. However, the advantages such tools provide, justify their use, warts and all.

JUSTIFICATION OF CASES IN THE DATABASE

The use of secondary information available in the RAND/St. Andrews and RAND/MIPT databases for the purpose of this research is invaluable. However, it must be conceded that these databases were not created for the explicit use in this research. Data was initially gathered for a purpose other than the specific research that is being conducted herein. As such, the weaknesses described above relating to definitions of terrorism and the inclusion of incidents within the research database may perhaps be exacerbated. Fowler concedes that an inherent bias enters data when being collected due to the “organizational mission for which the data are collected...the availability of sources of information and budgetary constraints.”¹⁶⁵ As a result, there are undoubtedly incidents that were included in the original databases that do not fit the definition of terrorist acts used in this research. Further, there must also be incidents that were not included in the original databases that would have been included in this research had that data been available. So as to be clear, the following explanation of the definitional criteria has been included:

Terrorism: For the purposes of this database, terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that

¹⁶⁵ Fowler, 1981, pp. 10-11.

will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.

Terrorist Group: A terrorist group is defined as a collection of individuals belonging to an autonomous non-state or sub-national revolutionary or anti-governmental movement who are dedicated to the use of violence to achieve their objectives. Such an entity is seen as having at least some structural and command and control apparatus that, no matter how loose or flexible, nonetheless provides an overall organizational framework and general strategic direction. This definition is meant to include contemporary religion-motivated and apocalyptic groups and other movements that seek theological justification or divine sanction for their acts of violence.

International Terrorism: Incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel or equipment.

Domestic Terrorism: Incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target.¹⁶⁶

The following is also included with the RAND/St. Andrews/MIPT databases to clarify what is and what is not considered to be a terrorist act:

1) A member of a known terrorist organization (e.g., the Hamas) bombs a mall, a bus stop, a grocery store, etc. (i.e. any privately owned property not associated with the government). This would be considered a terrorist act against private citizens and/or property and the weapon involved would be explosives. These types of acts are usually intended to cause fear among the population, or to impel them to take actions they would not ordinarily take.

2) A member of the Hamas attaches a bomb to himself and detonates it in a mall, a bus stop, a library, etc. (i.e. any public or privately owned property not associated with the government). This would also be a

¹⁶⁶ http://db.mipt.org/rand_tc.cfm. August 2, 2004.

terrorist act against private citizens and/or property, but the weapon would be classified as a “suicide bombing” in order to delineate the fact that the bomber also killed himself.

3) A member of the Hamas bombs the house, office or property of a government official. This would be considered a terrorist act against the government, with the intention of causing fear among the government and/or the general population.

4) A bomb is accidentally detonated in the basement of a home. It is later learned that the owner of the home was a known member of the Hamas, and was planning to use the bomb to destroy a public or private place. This would not be considered a terrorist event, because the incident never actually occurred.

5) A member of the Hamas opens fire in a crowd of innocent people (in a restaurant, in the street, etc.) This would be considered a terrorist act against private citizens and/or property and the weapon would be considered an assault rifle. The act would be intended to cause fear among the population.

6) A member of the Hamas shoots a government official, even if there is no apparent motive for the killing. This would be considered an act of terrorism against the government, it is usually intended to cause fear among government officials and the general population.

7) The Hamas attacks military or police forces in order to make a political statement. This would be considered a terrorist act against the military or police for it is intended to coerce the police/military/government to take actions they would not otherwise take.

8) The Hamas attacks a livestock farm, infecting the animals with a biological agent designed to kill them or designed to pass the agent onto humans when they are consumed. This would be considered a terrorist act for it creates fear among the population and holds the possibility of affecting the economy.

9) The Hamas kills a journalist who has been tracking the organization's movements and writing about them in a daily paper, or a journal. This would be considered a terrorist act against a journalist or against the media for it is intended to send a message to the media world in general.

10) A gunfight between the Hamas and another terrorist organization erupts, killing members of the Hamas. This would not be considered a

terrorist incident because there is no intent to cause fear among the general population nor is it designed to coerce the general population and/or government into actions.

11) The Hamas breaks into a prison, with the intention of freeing some of their imprisoned members and inciting riots in the prison. This would be considered a terrorist event, especially if it carried a broader political message.

12) Members of the Hamas are found to be distributing drugs, gaining illegal proceeds through some other manner. This would not be considered a terrorist event because these events merely support the terrorist group itself.¹⁶⁷

THE FRAMEWORK: WHY NGOS BECOME THE TARGETS OF TERRORISTS

As was introduced in chapter 1, this research assumes that terrorist groups are rationally constructing targeting imperatives for both strategic or ideological reasons as well as tactical reasons. Drake creates a targeting funnel with the total available targeting options at the top or widest point of the funnel. A hypothetical group would have options ranging from mass attacks on the general public to specific attacks on government or symbolic targets. The targeting options are first refined based on ideology.¹⁶⁸ The ideology "...sets out the range of people and things which it is legitimate for the terrorists to attack."¹⁶⁹ Let us suppose the hypothetical group is a French ethnic separatist group operating in Quebec. Their basic ideology is based on creating a Quebec independent from the rest of Canada. They would refine their targeting options based on their ideology. They might assume that an attack on a massed civilian population might be counterproductive to their cause, as French Canadians might become casualties. This might alienate the general populace of

¹⁶⁷ http://db.mipt.org/rand_tc.cfm. August 2, 2004.

¹⁶⁸ Drake, pp. 175-176.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Quebec and slow the creation of an independent Quebec, thus being counterproductive to the group's cause.




Figure 4.1 Targeting Constraints¹⁷⁰

A religious fundamentalist group, which considers all who are not members of the group to be infidels and hence, fair game, might be more willing to inflict mass casualties as it is not concerned with alienating a large, external population. A good example of this type of group is the Aum Shinrikyo, which carried out the Sarin Gas attack in the subway system of Tokyo. The Aum sect's main goal was the bringing about of Armageddon, or the end of the world. This nihilism and desire to inflict mass casualties opened options that might be taboo for other political terrorist groups. As a result, the Aum carried out attacks on the general population with weapons of mass destruction hoping for indiscriminate and mass casualties.

The targeting selection is next refined based on the strategy of the group. In other words, what attack would bring about a reaction that would be beneficial to the group's cause? Drake noted, "A terrorist group's strategy can be quite crude and simple. However, by determining what the terrorists wish to achieve by their use of

¹⁷⁰ Adapted from Drake, pp. 176.

violence, it provides a further refinement to the framework for target selection set by the group's ideology."¹⁷¹ The strategy of a group can be determined based on the group's internal dynamics as well as the role of external opinion in accomplishing their goals.¹⁷²

After the targeting parameters have been delineated by the group's strategy, the targeting selection would be further restricted based on tactical reasons. These reasons might include the group's capabilities; the security environment, and the protective measures used by potential targets. The manufacture and deployment of Sarin as a means of inflicting mass casualties is, thankfully, beyond the capabilities of most terrorist groups. Indeed, it was beyond the capabilities of the Aum sect, despite their own judgment of their capabilities. Certainly the ability of a group to hijack a plane and fly it into a skyscraper became much more difficult after the security measures put into place following the attacks of September 11th. That is not to say that a hijacking and suicide collision is impossible, just that the security environment changes the relative difficulty of successfully carrying out a given attack. The protective measures taken by potential targets must also be taken into account. If a government building campus is designed to make a truck bomb attack impossible (through use of barriers and parking lot placement), a terrorist group which has decided to use the truck bomb tactic must find a target that is less hardened. All of these refinements affect the final target selection. It is also understood that the attack

¹⁷¹ Drake, pg. 176.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

itself will bring a reaction which will then bring about a change in the targeting criterion for the next attack.¹⁷³

The framework advanced by this research expands on Drake's targeting process due to the fact that it contains ideological, strategic and tactical reasons that terrorist groups might target non-governmental organizations. It is an expansion on Drake's targeting refinement process in that it identifies 5 terrorist targeting imperatives relating to non-governmental organizations specifically. These imperatives are first, that terrorist groups perceive a real or imagined association between the non-governmental organization and a political entity (whether state or non-state); second, that the NGO, or its agents, engage in political activities that bring them into conflict with the terrorist group; third, that the non-governmental organization either actively or solely by virtue of being what it is represents a threat to the social, cultural, or religious environment considered important to the terrorist organization; fourth, that NGOs become competitors for resources that the terrorists desire; and fifth, that NGOs are relatively soft in terms of ease of attack, and as such, desirable targets.

ASSOCIATION

The first targeting imperative that might explain why terrorists target non-governmental organizations is that terrorist organizations may perceive that an NGO has an association with a political entity. It is important to point out that this association need not necessarily exist in real life, only that the terrorist group perceives that it exists. A terrorist group may target an American business based on the fact that it is American and as such has political ties to the United States. It may

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

not matter that the business is multinational as long as the terrorists associate the business with the United States. This association may be even more tenuous when looking at religious or humanitarian NGOs. The fact that the NGO may be based in the United States creates a relationship to the United States. American students traveling outside the United States have understood this association for years. Occasionally, American students will sew a Canadian flag onto a backpack in order to avoid ill will that may be associated with Americans. Hoffman noted this kind of terrorist threat: “Clearly, then, a variety of American citizens traveling, living and working overseas—but who have no ostensible or official connection with the U.S. government—are indeed already firmly in the terrorists’ cross-hairs.”¹⁷⁴

Shaffert captured this targeting imperative when he noted that a terrorist victim is, “representative of a target group that is strategically involved in the terrorist’s political goals.”¹⁷⁵ Shaffert cited the 1985 murder of a U.S. Serviceman on TWA’s flight 847. He noted that the target was not necessarily the serviceman, but “the American public who observed the atrocity through the international media.”¹⁷⁶ As long as an association can be established linking the immediate target with the larger audience, then the targeting selection is justified in the mind of the terrorists. Indeed, perhaps the more “innocent” the better as an innocent victim might garner more of the attention of the larger target audience.

¹⁷⁴ Hoffman, Bruce, “Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses and Non-Governmental Organizations”. Testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, April 3, 2001, pg. 10.

¹⁷⁵ R. W. Schaffert, *Media Coverage and Political Terrorists: A Quantitative Analysis*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992, pg. 44.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

In order to demonstrate this associational parameter, cases contained in the database will be introduced. Specifically, terrorist attacks on the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in Latin America will be studied. Latin America during the 1980's was rife with terrorism and political violence. During that time and in that area, there were 211 attacks against NGOs or religious organizations recorded in the database. By far the majority of the attacks (66.8% or 143) targeted the people or property of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is an international church based in Salt Lake City, Utah in the United States. The church is expressly apolitical, going to great lengths to proclaim itself politically neutral. Indeed, instruction to general authorities of the church as well as local leadership expressly emphasizes that political activities for or against any given issue by church officers in their official church capacity will not be tolerated, nor will the church take a political stand on political issues except in cases of moral questions such as the abortion issue or legalization of gambling. If this is the case, then the question must be asked as to why the majority of the terrorist attacks in Latin America targeted the LDS Church. This research theorizes that the LDS Church was targeted due to the perceived association by terrorists groups between the church and the United States rather than for political activities engaged in by the church or its officers.

The database helps to explain some of the attacks on the LDS Church. Twenty-six percent of the attacks on the LDS Church were accompanied by either literature in the form of pamphlets or slogans painted on buildings proclaiming the attack as an attack not necessarily on the church but one on the United States.

Interviews of church officials who were present after some of the attacks confirm that in most of the cases, anti-US literature or slogans were left at the sites.

Examples of this type of attack include 1983 attacks executed by the National Liberation Army (ELN) of Columbia. In those attacks, the ELN conducted dynamite attacks on entities associated with the United States in Bacaramanga. The entities were the Columbo-American Cultural Institute, the International Bank of Columbia (an affiliate of Citibank), and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.¹⁷⁷ A series of incendiary attacks in 1985 in Chile had pamphlets left at the scene proclaiming, “Yankees get out of Easter Island”.¹⁷⁸ A slogan painted on a wall after a 1987 molotov cocktail attack in Santiago, Chile stated, “Out of the common people’s territories Yankee invaders.”¹⁷⁹ A 1989 attack conducted by the Tupac Amaru group warned “Mormons and DEA agents” to leave the upper Huallaga Valley.¹⁸⁰ The terrorist groups associated the LDS Church with the United States and launched attacks on that basis alone.

Indeed, attacks seem to increase based on United States foreign policy. If the attacks on the LDS Church in Latin America are studied, it can be seen that attacks increased after significant US foreign policy action. This is described by *Figure 4.2*.

¹⁷⁷ Database.

¹⁷⁸ Database.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*




Figure 4.2 Terrorist Attacks on the LDS Church in Latin America

Terrorist attacks on the LDS Church prior to 1983 are relatively rare. However, after 1983, attacks on the LDS Church significantly increase. It can be theorized that the US invasion of Grenada as well as US activities with the Contras in Nicaragua were behind the increased attacks which occurred in 1984-89. Similarly, attacks on the LDS Church increased significantly after the US invasion of Panama. The graphical illustration also shows that the attacks diminish three to four years after the foreign policy action.

Statistical analysis of the database tends to confirm that the terrorists increased attacks on the LDS Church after the Panama invasion. Prior to the Panama invasion, attacks on the LDS Church made up 54.8 percent of all terrorist attacks in Latin America. After the Panama invasion, attacks on the LDS Church made up 74.4

percent of all terrorist attacks in Latin America. The LDS Church engaged in no significant changes in policy or doctrine during that period of time. It can be theorized that the increase was due to some other reason.

To help derive causation for the increased attacks, the evidence of the attacks themselves must be studied. In the two years following the US invasion of Panama in 1989, 26.5 percent of the LDS Church attack sites in Latin America had evidence left by the attackers which contained references to the recent US invasion.¹⁸¹ In these cases, the terrorists gave voice to why the attacks were occurring. In their own words, the attacks were meant as a means of conveying a message to the US government, “US out of Panama.”¹⁸²

Examples of this type of attack include the 1989 assassination of two LDS missionaries. In that attack, the Zarate Wilka Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), sent a letter to the local newspaper denouncing, “Yankee invaders and their lackeys.” The attack coincided with the arrival of U.S. military personnel in Potosi who would be constructing a new airport.¹⁸³ Six attacks on LDS buildings following the U.S. invasion of Panama claimed the attacks were in retaliation for the invasion.¹⁸⁴ Similar attacks were conducted against LDS buildings following the attendance of President Bush at the Cartagena Drug Summit in 1990, the first Gulf War, the invasion of Haiti, and the deployment of U.S. Army Engineers to Columbia in 1994.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ This number is based on recorded details in the database.

¹⁸² Database.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Certainly, recent events in Iraq seem to bolster the theory that at times, terrorists select targets simply based on the nationality of the victim and that the victim's actual connection to the government of his or her home nation irrelevant. If, in fact Jenkins supposition is correct, that terrorists are conducting activities for a larger audience in an attempt to use the media attention garnered by the act to influence the larger population, then the more "innocent" the victim(s), the better.¹⁸⁶ The graphic representations of an "innocent" journalist or truck driver being beheaded to the cries of "God is great," make much more of an impact on a watching audience than the execution of a captured soldier or government official.

This associational danger seems to be acknowledged by the U.S. government. After the September 11th attacks, embassy officials told one U.S. expatriate "to refrain from doing anything that would label him American."¹⁸⁷ Missionaries are having to be careful to avoid 'looking American.' This is especially true since September 11th and the call to attack Americans wherever they are located.

An association need not be solely be with a government entity. Indeed, if an NGO is associated with a non-state entity such as the United Nations, any assumptions made about the general organization may be transferred to the NGO associated with that organization. Eighty four percent of all attacks on NGOs associated with the United Nations or the Red Cross occurred in the time period following the US and coalition invasion of Iraq in the First Gulf War. Before that time, attacks on NGOs associated with the UN or Red Cross made up 3.8 percent of

¹⁸⁶ Brian Jenkins, *The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems*, P-6563. (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, June 1981).

¹⁸⁷ Erik Tryggestad, "Missionaries More Conscious of Being Americans Abroad," *The Christian Chronicle*, October 22, 2001.

all terrorist attacks. After the Gulf War, attacks on UN or Red Cross NGOs made up 17.9 percent of all terrorist attacks. Certainly, by their own propaganda, many fundamentalist terrorist groups have begun to associate the Red Cross and the United Nations Security Council with Western domination.

Some NGOs rely on the real association that exists with government entities. As discussed in Chapter 3, many NGOs rely on government funding in order to accomplish their goals. Clearly, as Edwards and Hume documented, many NGOs are beholden to governments for their existence. The question must then be raised, “can an NGO really be non-governmental if a government is a stakeholder in the NGO?” As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, beyond association due to the need for resources, some NGOs rely on governments for security as well. Additionally, governments provide NGOs with legitimacy and ideological capital with which to carry out missions. In these cases, an NGO may reap positive benefits from a government association, but the negative aspects cannot be ignored.

As stated at the beginning of this research, it would not be the purpose of the database to construct statistical tests with which to measure the ability of the framework to predict the targeting priorities of terrorist groups. However, 15.38 percent or 68 incidents had explicit statements by the terrorist groups that the attacks were committed on targets associated with a political entity. Additionally, incidents where details allow the inference of the targeting strategies allow the researcher to determine that an additional 196 attacks or 59.7 percent of terrorist attacks have an associational component.

It can be seen that NGOs have been targeted based on perceived associations with states, supra-state organizations and sub-state entities. There is other important information that can be gleaned from the data. Of the 211 separate terrorist incidents against the LDS Church in Latin America, only 2 or less than one percent of the attacks involved attacks where church members or officers were killed. This is astounding when compared to the total rate of fatal terrorist attacks of 23.5 percent. Clearly this deserves further attention.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY

It must be noted that terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon. As such, political motives must help guide a terrorist group in selecting targets. Hence, the second way that NGOs might be brought into the crosshairs of terrorist groups relates to activities that an NGO might be engaged in that are in conflict politically with the terrorist group. The difficulty arises in actually defining what political activity is. Some definitions focus on the mechanisms of government—the apparatus of state. As such, terrorists might target NGOs in order to gain control of the mechanisms of government.

While many NGOs are apolitical in the way they organize and carry out their various missions, many are not. A group engaged in political struggle might be moved into the “legitimate” target category. It is important to note that political activity might bring about terrorist attacks by both traditional non-state terrorists as well as state sponsored terrorism.

The general political activity category can be divided into two general sub-types. The first is traditional political activity, which might be considered work for or

against governments or programs by an NGO. The second type is much more nebulous. This political activity is any activity, which may not be political in nature, but one that subverts the terrorists program for control. Put another way, the first type is traditional political activity that goes against the terrorist group's ideological or strategic plans. The second type is any activity that goes against the terrorist group's strategic or tactical plans. The first type is at the top of the funnel; the second is farther down.

Overt political activities will be considered first. NGOs may engage in the traditional political process. This may put them at political odds with terrorists. For example, an NGO, which chooses to promote a free market, democratic form of government, may find itself afoul of a Marxist terrorist group. Once again, the database is illustrative for this concept. 7.6 percent or 34 terrorist incidents out of all terrorist attacks were on targets engaged in overt political activities.¹⁸⁸ Certainly the definition of overt political activity is open to interpretation. This study defines overt political activity as an NGO working for or against one political entity that is engaged in political struggle. For example, an NGO working in a country engaged in civil war, which chooses to support, either by material or endorsement, one of the combatant sides would be considered to be engaged in overt political activity. This type of situation was cited by Randolph Martin when describing the threats to NGOs. Adding to the threat level is “the erosion of the accepted neutrality of aid groups, who

¹⁸⁸ Database.

are seen by some belligerents as partisan, interventionist and generally an undesirable presence.”¹⁸⁹

Perhaps a good example of this type of activity is another religious organization, the Roman Catholic Church. Compared to the first example, the Catholic Church is vastly larger in terms of total membership as well as demographic proportion of the population. This is especially true in Latin America where much of the terrorist activity took place until the mid-1990s. By virtue of its population and history in Latin America, the Catholic Church has become part of the Latin culture and society. However, of the total number of terrorist attacks in Latin America, 11.4 percent were against the agents or property of the Catholic Church. All told, 78.2 percent of all terrorist attacks against NGOs in Latin America were against the LDS and Catholic Churches. One of the factors, which sets the Catholic Church apart from the LDS Church, is the fact that the Catholic Church and or its agents have been willing to engage in political struggle.

In order to understand the justification that terrorists might use to bring the Catholic Church into the crosshairs, it is important to understand the history and policies pursued by those of the Catholic Church. Initially, the Catholic Church was seen as a bastion of conservatism, oftentimes providing legitimacy to governments. Anciently, the Church was the means by which kings could claim divine right, and thus, justify any action; good or bad. Claiber notes that, “the church legitimated the colonial order.”¹⁹⁰ He goes on to point out that, “The church was the only colonial

¹⁸⁹ Randolph Martin, “FMR 4 April 1999: NGO Field Security,” New York: International Rescue Committee, <http://www.irc.org>.

¹⁹⁰ Jeffrey Klaiber, *The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1998. pp. 4.

corporation that could confer religious legitimacy on persons and institutions, and that legitimacy in turn gave those persons a privileged status.”¹⁹¹ In modernity, the support of the church provided similar legitimacy.

Berryman recognizes that political leaders in Latin America were sometime seen as “holy men,” granting legitimacy beyond politics.¹⁹² A recent news article by Kevin G. Hall, a Knight Ridder correspondent, reinforces this concept. In his story dated August 21, 2004 titled “Sites of Che’s Death Now a Tourist Draw,” he discusses the transformation of Che Guevara from revolutionary to Saint.

Revolutionary Ernesto (Che) Guevara, an atheist, has almost been reborn a saint in the desolate Bolivian village where he was captured and executed nearly 37 years ago... Today his handsome mug appears on the walls of homes and in market stalls in remote La Higuera, where he died, and in Vallegrande, where he was secretly buried. In many homes, his face competes for wall space with Jesus, the Virgin Mary and a host of Catholic saints. ‘They say he brings miracles,’ said Susana Osinaga, 70, who was a young nurse on Oct. 9, 1967, when she washed the blood off Guevara’s corpse in Vallegrande’s small hospital... ‘It’s like he is alive and with us, like a friend. He is kind of like a Virgin for us.’ We say, ‘Che, help us with our work or with this planting,’ and it always goes well,’ said Manuel Cortez, a poor La Higuera farmer who lived next door to the schoolhouse where Guevara was executed.¹⁹³

In recognizing the legitimizing power of the church, terrorist groups seek to harness that power for themselves and against those they are fighting. In 1977, two French nuns were kidnapped in Buenos Aires, and communiqués by the Montonero guerrillas demanded that the Catholic Church repudiate the military government of

¹⁹¹ Jeffrey Claiber, 1988, pg. 4.

¹⁹² Phillip Berryman, *Stubborn Hope: Religion, Politics and Revolution in Central America*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1994.

¹⁹³ Michael G. Hall, “Site of Che’s Death Now a Tourist Draw,” http://www.freep.com/news/nw/che20e_20040820.htm. August 27, 2004.

Argentina.¹⁹⁴ Clearly, the terrorists felt that the support given by the Catholic Church to the military government was integral to legitimizing the government in the eyes of the general population. The kidnapping was meant as a means of forcing the church to withdrawal support for the government, thus reducing the government's power.

A brief discussion of legitimacy is appropriate. Weber discusses legitimacy and authority in *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. He first defines authority as legitimate domination, or domination where the subordinates accept the domination of those exercising power. Weber outlines three types of legitimate authority: traditional, charismatic and rational or legal.

Traditional authority is where authority is vested in traditionally dominant or powerful groups or individuals. These groups gain their legitimacy through the consent of the subordinates over time. The acceptance by the subordinates and the exercise of authority by the dominants over time creates the legitimacy. Often, these types of legitimacy are bound together with sacred or religious entities, tribal or clan structure, or established culture. In addition, the legitimate authority is exercised by patriarchs, clan leaders or priests. As Weber noted, the authority "rests upon a belief in the sanctity of everyday routines."¹⁹⁵

The second form of legitimate authority is charismatic authority. Charismatic authority is where the authority of those exercising power is derived from extraordinary gifts, talents, sanctity or nature of a specific person. Weber stated:

The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must perform

¹⁹⁴ Database.

¹⁹⁵ Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1958. H33 W3613 1958

miracles; if he wants to be a war lord, he must perform heroic deeds. Above all, however, his divine mission must 'prove' itself in that those who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. If they do not fare well, he is obviously not the master sent by the gods.

The subjects may extend a more active or passive 'recognition; to the personal mission of the charismatic master. His power rests upon this purely factual recognition and springs from faithful devotion. It is devotion to the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is strange to all rule and tradition and which therefore is viewed as divine.¹⁹⁶

The third form of legitimate authority is rational or legal authority. In rational or legal authority, those accepting the authority believe in the rationality of following and obeying a structure of laws or rules. As Weber stated, this type of authority was derived from “rational grounds – resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issues commands.”¹⁹⁷ In all of these cases, legitimacy lies with those being governed or those that are being dominated. Thus, if those being governed refuse to accept the authority of those governing, there is no legitimacy.

In the case of Latin America, the Catholic Church exercised traditional authority. Over time, they had exercised power, and therefore were looked to as a legitimizing influence. For example, the Catholic Church played a legitimizing role with rightist governments. Tan notes that the Catholic Church was willing to support rightist governments in order to protect its preeminent religious position within the state.¹⁹⁸ Indeed, he cites the willingness of the Catholic Church to condone the actions of the Marcos government in the Philippines to protect its tax-exempt status.

¹⁹⁶ Gerth and Mills, 1958, pp. 249-250.

¹⁹⁷ Weber, Max, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, (New York, Bedminster Press, 1968).

¹⁹⁸ Michael L. Tan, “Religion and Politics, Faith and Government,” http://www.inq7.net/opi/2004/may/05/opi_mltan-1.htm. July 17, 2004.

There also seemed to be an ideological conflict between the Catholic Church and leftist governments. Marxist governments stressed the concepts of solidarity and class struggle over religion. Indeed, Marx's labeling of religion as the "opiate of the masses" was seen as a direct attack on the power of the church.¹⁹⁹ As a result, many leftist groups and governments found themselves at opposition to the church.

Finally, the Catholic Church provided means by which the powerful, conservative, upper classes could remain in power over those in the lower classes. This is the argument proposed by Phillip Berryman. He states, "The war in Central America is a religious and theological war, a struggle between gods situated on both sides of the conflict."²⁰⁰ It is between the "powerful (who) seek to prevent God's realm from arriving...(and) the poor (who) have discovered that 'the God of Western Christian Society was not the God of Jesus, but rather an idol of the Empire.'"²⁰¹

That is not to say that the church remained the central legitimizing influence. Indeed, as the concepts of democracy and human rights began to flourish and the church did not respond, it began to lose this divine legitimizing authority.²⁰² Indeed, "the church came seriously close to finding itself marginalized in the wake of these great changes, which were sweeping over Latin America."²⁰³

In order to bring the church back to the center of its people's lives and avoid marginalization, the church changed. "It ceased to be a bulwark of the established

¹⁹⁹ Marx, Karl, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*: Introduction," in Tucker's *Marx/Engels Reader*, 1978. pp. 53-54

²⁰⁰ Phillip Berryman, *Stubborn Hope: Religion, Politics and Revolution in Central America*, (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1994). pp. 206.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

²⁰² Klaiber, pg. 5.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

order and turned into a force for social change.”²⁰⁴ This change did not occur quickly. However, by 1968, and through such conventions at the Second Vatican Council and the Episcopal Conference in Medellin, the Catholic Church had transformed itself into an organization which championed democracy, social and human rights.²⁰⁵ Indeed, this change has come to be known as “liberation theology.” In a Doctrinal Note released by the Vatican, the Catholic Church explains the implications of Vatican II and Medellin:

Democracy must be based on the true and solid foundation of non-negotiable ethical principles, which are the underpinning of life in society. As the Second Vatican Council teaches, the protection of ‘the rights of the person is, indeed, a necessary condition for citizens, individually and collectively, to play an active part in public life and administration’. In addition, there is the right to . . . the development of an *economy* that is at the service of the human person and of the common good, with respect for social justice, the principles of human solidarity and subsidiarity, according to which ‘the rights of all individuals, families, and organizations and their practical implementation must be acknowledged.’²⁰⁶

In this way, the Catholic Church moved from conservative to liberal, which was to have a profound affect on its status as a terrorist target. The Catholic Church changed the traditional stance where it had lent its legitimizing power to rightist governments and began to legitimize leftist or democratic governments.

Under the system that saw the Catholic Church as the conservator of upper class power and right-leaning dictatorships, it is not inconceivable that revolutionary terrorist groups might have targeted the Catholics as a way of attacking the legitimacy

²⁰⁴ Klaiber, pg. 5.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ Joseph, Cardinal Ratzinger, “Doctrinal Note on some questions regarding The Participation of Catholics in Political Life,” Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith. Approved by John Paul II November 21, 2002, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20021124_politica_en.html. July 17, 2004.

of the regime they were trying to undermine. Marxist groups might have targeted the church for ideological reasons. But in the end, it was the church after Medellin that entered the gun sights of terrorists. The Catholic Church changed the traditional stance where it had lent its legitimizing power to rightist government and began to legitimize leftist or democratic governments. This change on the political spectrum was significant in that revolutionary terrorist who had previously looked at the Catholic Church as an enemy now saw it as a potential ally. However, regimes, which had seen the church as an ally, now saw a potent tool for building legitimacy now eroding it.

Attacks on Catholic personnel in general did come about. However, attacks on specific agents who took the counsel of Medellin to heart and who became activists for human rights and social change now found themselves in danger. In 1998, Bishop Juan Gerardi was, “beaten to death two days after presenting, as coordinator of the Archbishop’s Human Rights Office, a report on human rights violations and crimes committed during the 36 year domestic conflict that concluded in 1996.”²⁰⁷

In some cases, the political activity is the actual advocacy of one side or another in a political struggle. In 1997, A Canadian priest was killed while officiating in a Mass, apparently in retaliation for helping Tutsis escape the massacres in 1994.²⁰⁸ Father Timothy Majic was sent a letter bomb after contributing to a Croatian language newspaper, which advocated a free Croatia in 1979. In 1987, Father Guido Peeters, a parish priest of the worker’s district of La Legua, one of the poorer slums in

²⁰⁷ Database.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

Santiago, was kidnapped, stripped naked, beaten, threatened and photographed. His parish has been the site of frequent demonstrations against Pinochet's government. Father Peeters' parish was also fired upon in 1985. Father Stanley Rother was executed by people dressed in the uniform of the Guatemalan Army after sending letters to the government documenting atrocities conducted by the army on people in the village in which he worked. Father Rother, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, stated that he was on a list of people that would be killed. The choosing of one side in a civil war (or even a genocide), led these priests to be targeted by the other side.

The political action need not be so clear. Neither need the choosing of sides be involved. In some cases, the political action could be involvement as an intermediary. In 2000, the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) kidnapped soon-to-be ordained Jesuit priest, Alejandro Matos Castro as he was trying to negotiate the release of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) captives.²⁰⁹ The Ecuadorian Bishops Conference was letter-bombed in 1998 after they took on the task of preparing the census, which, in turn, would determine who got subsidies. In 2002, the parish priest of Nuestra Senora de la Asuncion was killed. He had been the President of Florencia's Peace Board and had "helped with efforts to release hostages and to avoid killings by both guerrillas and paramilitary groups."²¹⁰ Also in 2002, the home of Caracas Archbishop Ignacio Velasco, who was advocating talks between the Chavez government and the opposition, was bombed. In these

²⁰⁹ Database.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

cases, involvement in nonpartisan political endeavors brought agents of the Catholic Church into the gun-sights of terrorists.

The second type of political targeting is the result of activities which may not seem be political in nature. However, a return to the competing definitions of politics may be useful. Harold Laswell's definition of politics being "who gets what, where, when, and how,"²¹¹ describes activities that are much less traditionally "political" in nature. Indeed, NGOs may be engaged in activities, which may seem expressly non-political, such as humanitarian aid or human rights promotion. However, those activities may bring an NGO into political conflict nonetheless. An explication of this principle may be helpful. Certainly much of what a terrorist group is concerned with is political power. Indeed, it is one of the definitional characteristics of a terrorist group. Terrorist groups attempt to change power dynamics through the threat of violence. Any other phenomenon that has the ability to change the power dynamics, or even reinforce the old dynamic, can bring itself into conflict with a terrorist organization which is trying to do the same in an opposite direction.

One of the methods that insurrectionist terrorists use to gain political power is the subversion of governmental power. One of the chief means by which governments maintain power, especially in difficult times, is through legitimacy.²¹² This aspect of political legitimacy goes directly to the heart of terrorist goals. If the terrorist group can convince the general population that the current regime type is not able to handle the current situation, or that it is not the, "most appropriate or proper

²¹¹ Harold Laswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936).

²¹² Lipset, Seymour Martin, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, No. 53, 1959. pg. 86.

ones for the society,”²¹³ then it has seriously weakened the government. A terrorist group might reduce government power by reducing the legitimacy the citizenry feel the government possesses. If a terrorist group can make the citizenry feel that the government cannot maintain order or basic rights, then this can help to reduce the legitimacy of the government. An NGO working to establish peace and prosperity thus might work against the aims of a terrorist group bent on de-legitimizing government. Hence, the NGO becomes a target for the terrorist group.

Political power can also be put in terms of influence. It can be theorized that terrorist groups might target NGOs that threaten the terrorists’ influence with a group of people. It can be seen that NGOs have also been targeted because of a struggle for influence over non-state ethnic entities. The power of an ethnic group or subgroup to influence its members cannot be overstated. Thus, when NGOs work with ethnic groups, tribes and other sub-state actors, they place themselves at risk due to competition for the influence of that group. For example, in 1999, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) kidnapped and later killed three Americans who had been working for an NGO dedicated to working with the U’wa, a tribal community that had resisted outside interference or development.²¹⁴ Similar attacks by FARC have targeted the NGO Maya Foundation as well as other groups working with indigenous peoples. The terrorist group Tupac Amaru has attacked groups in Peru working with Amazon tribes as well as indigenous peoples of the Andes.²¹⁵

NGOs could put themselves at risk if they become the agent of stability.

Starvation, famine and terror have been used effectively by dictators in order to keep

²¹³ Lipset, 1959, pg. 8.

²¹⁴ Database.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

control of potentially restive populations. This concept is captured in the historical foundations of terrorism. As mentioned previously, the very word terrorism is derived from the French state sponsored program of inducing fear among the population in order to control it.²¹⁶ Stalin's programs against the peasant populations of Russia are another good example of this concept. Controlling the food supply or mechanisms for basic sustenance guarantees the ability to control the population that depends on it to survive. Thus, NGOs dedicated to humanitarian aid and simply feeding starving people may find themselves at odds with governments willing to engage in terrorism.

NGOs engaged in non-political efforts such as humanitarian aid or human rights promotion, may find themselves targeted by terrorists because they become a threat to the strategies or tactics used by the terrorist group. If the goal of terrorists is to promote a chaotic environment, then those that are engaged in stabilization operations become targets. 197 terrorist incidents or 44.6 percent of NGOs targeted by terrorists were involved in stability operations. While examples of this type of target selection are legion, a few examples may help to understand this targeting imperative. Three nuns and an American lay volunteer were kidnapped, raped and shot to death in 1980 in El Salvador. They had been working to help feed the poor in the countryside. The brutal rapes and executions could not but send a message to any considering helping the poor in the area to cease and desist.²¹⁷ In 1991, Sendero Luminoso guerrillas killed an Italian priest who had been running social programs in

²¹⁶ Laqueur, 2001.

²¹⁷ Database

Northern Peru.²¹⁸ The sole “crime” of this Catholic Priest was providing poor Peruvians with access to job training, clean water and limited access to healthcare.

Perhaps the best illustrations of this targeting imperative in action are those attacks that only disrupt the humanitarian activities of NGOs rather than attacking the personnel or property of the NGO specifically. These attacks are especially illustrative in that the attacks were directed at the relief supplies themselves rather than at the workers or their organization. In 1993, the United Revolutionary Front attacked a Red Cross convoy and burned the trucks carrying aid.²¹⁹ Similar attacks in Iraq in December of 1992 destroyed 8 U.N. aid trucks, and implanted bombs were discovered planted in several more.²²⁰ Again, attacks in Ethiopia in 1985 specifically targeted the trucks carrying food supplies, and in one attack, 24 trucks carrying almost 450 tons of food were burned.²²¹

This tactic is often successful. Attacks on aid agencies or humanitarian groups have led to well known and well respected groups such as the Red Cross, various U.N. humanitarian agencies, and Action Aid to completely suspend operations and withdraw personnel from the regions or countries in question. In fact, this type of withdrawal due to terrorist attacks occurred 7 times in the 10-year period from 1985 to 1995. In one case in 1996, attacks against UNICEF in Afghanistan caused a halt to a vaccination campaign.²²²

Clearly, there was some strategic or tactical reason the terrorists targeted the food supply as well as other humanitarian projects. In these cases, it is hypothesized

²¹⁸ Database.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² *Ibid.*

the terrorists were trying to capitalize on the chaos caused by the lack of basic necessities. It can be theorized that the terrorists hoped that this chaos would evolve into either decreased legitimacy for those in power or an increase in power for those who would be able to control the access to food and basic humanitarian needs.

Finally, terrorists may find some actions carried out by NGOs politically unacceptable. Once again, the fictitious Marxist group could find entrepreneurial infrastructure building activities politically objectionable, and as such may target NGOs engaged in such activities. This type of targeting can be illustrated by the 1988 incident in Peru, where the Sendero Luminoso took control of an isolated village in the Andes. The Sendero Luminoso then arrested “lackeys of imperialism and enemies of the revolution” which included a young French man and woman who were working in the village with the Committee for the Development of Agriculture. The young French workers were then executed along with three other villagers by having their throats cut.²²³ Another attack occurred in 1991 where the Sendero Luminoso attacked a Canadian-financed alpaca-breeding project’s vehicles and killed 8 people.²²⁴ The Sendero Luminoso, a Marxist group opposed to private enterprise, foreign aid and investment, targeted foreign NGOs promoting those things.

Similar attacks have also been carried out by other terrorist organizations. In one case, a Mexican National attached to the International Labor Organization of the U.N. was kidnapped, beaten and left to die on a roadway in the Guatemalan countryside. This young lady had been previously threatened due to her work with a group that marketed local crafts. Another Maoist group attacked the Asian

²²³ Database.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

Development Bank in Kerala, India in 1992, destroying computers and files.²²⁵ In these cases, NGOs were attacked for activities which were politically contrary to those of the terrorist group. However, in a 1978 attack in which Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU) Guerillas shot and killed a German Jesuit Priest for not providing a higher education to locals, almost a case of damned if you do, damned if you do not.²²⁶

STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES

Returning to the definition of politics, some activities may bring an NGO into the targeting crosshairs based on a third definition of politics: conflict over scarce resources. While this is related to the other definitions of politics, and as such, aspects of terrorist targeting strategies, there are some subtle but important differences. This targeting imperative draws more on the work of Cooley and Ron, which describes the conflict that has emerged among NGOs as they strive for resources in an increasingly scarce marketplace.²²⁷ Cooley and Ron argue that due to the constraints forced on NGOs by a scarce resource marketplace, NGOs may act in ways that are in conflict with their stated mission.²²⁸

Granted, terrorist organizations are not typical non-governmental organizations. However, as discussed in chapter 3, there are certainly characteristics of terrorist groups that allow for that characterization. Drawing on the work of Cooley and Ron, it can be theorized then, that terrorist groups must also compete for

²²⁵ Database.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ ²²⁷ Alexander Cooley and James Ron, "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action," in *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 5-39.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

resources in an increasingly scarce marketplace. The marketplace for resources for terrorist groups must be scarce indeed, as countries combine to limit the resources terrorist groups can access. In the post September 11 world, the major powers have combined to target and remove the financing pipelines that terrorists counted on for support. Further, countries that supported terrorism in the past have frozen that support due to outside pressure. It can thus be theorized that as the scarcity increases, attacks for resources will also increase. The very struggle for resources may lead terrorist groups into conducting attacks in which they might not typically engage.

The targeting imperative that causes terrorists to conduct attacks for the purpose of gaining resources may be analogous to Drake's logistical strategy. Indeed, Drake defines logistical targets as: "Those which are attacked in order to provide or safeguard the group's resources."²²⁹ Resources can be defined in many different ways. In order for a terrorist group to be successful, it requires many things. Most important are money and weapons. However, like most things, if you have the money, you can get anything else you need.

In chapter one, painstaking steps were taken to differentiate between terrorists and organized criminals. However, conducting a terrorist campaign can be costly. Further, money is definitely a scarce resource. While an attack solely for the purpose of garnering money is not a political act, and as such, not terrorism, combining an attack in a way that allows a terrorist organization to further one or more of its political goals while still obtaining resources is simple multitasking. The purity of the "politicalness" may be in doubt, but it fits the definition on those grounds. The domestic terror event perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh began with criminal activities

²²⁹ Drake, pg. 12.

intended to procure financing and supplies.²³⁰ Without the supplies, the actual attack meant for the broader stage could never have occurred. Again, while many operations meant to obtain financing for an actual attack are not terrorism, some of them may be.

If terrorist groups may select targets based on the ability of the attack on that target to obtain resources, then it stands to reason that terrorist might target NGOs on the basis that the NGO has access to resources that the terrorists want. Kidnappings by the militant Muslim Abu Sayyef Group (ASG) in the Philippines have targeted competing religious groups, driving away heretical or infidel influences. However, they have also tapped into the monetary resources that those religions or the adherents of the religion can access. That these types of attacks also have an associative and political result is icing on the cake. To the victim, the differentiation of groups between terrorist and criminal is purely academic; the result is the same. As far as the ASG is concerned, the majority of their attacks entailed kidnapping for ransom. Indeed, 27 attacks or 6.1 percent of all attacks on NGOs were accompanied by demands for ransom.

Financing for executing operations is not the only resource needed by terrorist groups. For an organization to be successful, groups need safe havens and access to recruits. Often, NGOs are targeted because they put terrorist's access to these resources at risk. How NGOs engaged in humanitarian work might incur the wrath of terrorist groups has been previously described. Cragin and Chalk, in their work on how social and economic development can reduce support for terrorists describe another aspect of terrorist resource scarcity. Terrorist groups thrive in an

²³⁰ Peter Chronis, *The Denver Post*, <http://63.147.65.175/bomb/bomb353.htm>, July 12, 2004.

environment of chaos, lawlessness and poverty. Poor, hopeless, starving people might feel less inclined to support those in power. They, in fact, might be inclined to support terrorists in their attempts at overthrowing the status quo. As a result, terrorists rely on these types of populations for recruits, safe houses (concealment), and other resources.²³¹ Takeyh and Gvosdev document the recent movement away from terrorists' reliance on strong state support towards failed states precisely for those reasons.²³² If NGOs are working to eliminate this kind of environment, terrorists might target the NGO in order to protect its lines of supply.

There is evidence that terrorists conduct some operations precisely due to their need for recruits. Alcides Jimenez, a parish priest in Columbia, was killed while saying mass. He had advocated neutrality to his parishioners in the Columbian civil war.²³³ In this case, the advocacy of neutrality, or Jimenez telling his people not to support either side, could reduce the likelihood for those parishioners to support the terrorists. Another example is perhaps more illustrative. In 1977, 3 Jesuit Priests and 4 Dominican nuns at the Masumi Catholic Mission in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) were killed when gunmen attacked the mission seeking recruits. The mission was a boarding house for four hundred students. The terrorists took three hundred of the students across the border to Botswana after the attack.²³⁴ Thus it can be seen that if NGOs put resource supply lines at risk, threatening finances, safe havens, or recruitment, those NGOs could find themselves in the crosshairs.

²³¹ Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, "The Role of Social and Economic Development," <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.08.02/role.html>. June 22, 2004.

²³² Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:3, Summer, 2002, pp. 97-108.

²³³ Database.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, OR CULTURAL CONFLICT

Another strategy, which helps to explain why terrorists might target NGOs, relates to Easton's definition of politics, "the authoritative allocation of values for a society."²³⁵ While Easton's definition used values to denote goods and services of value to a society, this research will expand the use of the term value to include personal world-view and structure of belief. In this case, the terrorist groups desire to control the "authoritative allocation of values" for a given population. In other words, the terrorist groups desire to set the agenda for what a population thinks, what they should believe, and how they should live. This type of targeting could be described as the cultural/social/religious imperative.

Cultural/social/religious targeting is especially good at explaining the actions of fundamental terrorist groups. Many of the fundamentalist groups are promoting a value system, and they will brook no dissent or argument when it comes to those values. In the case of fundamentalist terrorists, they desire to control the religious beliefs of a population, which then becomes associated with the structures of government to include interpretations of human rights as well as the judicial structure. Particularly in the case of fundamentalists, any incursion by someone bringing a culture or viewpoint different than that of the fundamentalists could be considered to be a polluting influence. In the case of communities where standards of dress and morality are highly regulated, simply the presence of those living a different standard could be considered to be threatening.

Let us consider the example of the GIA's attacks on non-Algerian 'polluters' during their campaign to eject all foreign influences from Algeria. From their

²³⁵ David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965).

perspective as fundamentalist Muslims, all foreigners, whether they be non-governmental organizations with personnel from the West, or Western press not only represented evil, but were evil. The Westerners, by the fact of who they were, brought non-Muslim influences which were antithetical to the GIA. As a result, the GIA then went on to cleanse the rest of the country of those influences: education, music, literature and drama. Westerners listen to popular artists on their stereos; they wear Western clothing that does not cover the body the way clothes should; they promote ideas like equal rights for women, and separation of church and state that go against the fundamentalist interpretations of the Koran. Foreign personnel, even those working for a cause that is nominally acceptable, were polluting their country.

Often, traditional authorities within a society decry the corrupting influence of outsiders. This is especially true of Western outsiders due to the spread of the dominant world culture. This research chooses to call this “cultural imperialism.” Often, NGOs are the vehicle by which Western culture is transmitted. This is the case both overtly, through organizational goals and covertly, by means of unconscious messages sent by the personnel themselves. The replacement of traditional food, music, and clothing by those from outside the country are all part of what some societies might term cultural imperialism.

In the end, anything that goes against the accepted conception of the world could pose a threat to groups attempting to authoritatively control the distribution of values in a society. Thus, NGOs that champion human rights may challenge the terrorist’ world-view. Groups trying to empower women in areas where fundamentalists wish to limit women’s rights may incur the terrorists’ ire. There are

specific examples of this type of targeting in attacks which were perpetrated on Afghani women in late 2002. In three cases in two months, terrorists targeted Afghani women who were working for international NGOs. Statements left at one site warned all women to abandon working for Western Aid groups.²³⁶ Women who worked for foreign aid groups had subjected themselves to foreign influence and polluted themselves. In those cases, terrorists were willing to take action to halt this kind of cultural pollution.

Terrorist groups can target non-governmental organizations, especially religious non-governmental organizations, if the terrorist groups feel that the NGO is supplanting the religious values that the terrorist groups are espousing. Certainly one aspect of the GIA offensive against the French in Algeria was the “polluting” influence that was encroaching on the religious as well as cultural world-view of Algerians. This targeting imperative is illustrated by the attack by the GIA attack on four Catholic priests killed in their mission in Tizi-Ouzou. In claiming credit for the attack, the GIA stated the attack was part of their campaign of “annihilation and physical liquidation of Christian crusaders.”²³⁷ The murder of a Catholic nun and priest who had run a library inside Algiers was justified by the GIA as part of their effort to rid Algeria of “Jews, Christians, and miscreants from the Muslim land of Algeria.”²³⁸ In 1994 alone, 74 foreigners were killed. The GIA justified the killings by closing the “main coronary artery” of the colonizing influence of “non-Muslim unbelievers.”²³⁹

²³⁶ Database.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ “Algerian Islamists Admit to Killings”, *The Independent*, May 16, 1994.

²³⁹ “Muslim Extremists Target Foreigners in War of Unbelievers,” *The Times*, December 27, 1994.

This phenomenon is not unique to Algeria. The Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) has attacked Catholic missionaries and nuns charging them with “spreading Christianity.”²⁴⁰ Attacks in 1992 in Afghanistan and 1994 in Somalia also targeted Christian NGOs on the basis that they either were infidels and were polluting holy land or that the NGOs promoted Christianity.²⁴¹ As will be documented in Chapter 4, Mormon missionaries were persecuted because they were the vehicle by which many converts were seduced not only away from a religion, but also away from a dominant social and cultural world-view.

Formal religion aside, terrorist might target anyone challenging their social or cultural views. Indeed, the GIA targeted anyone that deviated from their version of proper thought. Drake documents the murder of feminists, educators, entertainers and writers.²⁴² The GIA was especially concerned with the role education played in forming the worldview of students in Algeria. Again, Drake documents “over eighty teachers were killed and 600 schools had been attacked...three universities and nine training institutes were burned...three heads of Algerian universities and over fifty academics were killed.”²⁴³ This phenomenon is also evident in recent events in Iraq. Nancy A. Youssef documented recent attacks on hair salons, music stores, in short, anything that the fundamentalists considered to be inappropriate under their version of correct thought and action.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ Database.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² Drake, pg. 51.

²⁴³ Drake, pg. 52.

²⁴⁴ Nancy A. Youssef, “Day at the Salon Turns Dangerous,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, Posted on Fri, Sep. 03, 2004.

Beyond traditional values, the prevalence of Northern NGOs engaged in work in the global South has led some to question the motives of the Northern NGOs. Skjelsbaek describes this phenomenon when third world countries feel pressures to adapt to Northern influence. Indeed, he labels the phenomenon “neo-colonialism.”²⁴⁵ Certainly, groups in the global South might feel the need to resort to violence to protect their way of life. The NGO database records 73 attacks or 16.5 percent of all attacks on NGOs, which can be attributed to attacks on the culture, religion or society that the attacked NGOs represent.

SOFT TARGETS

The final reason why terrorist might target non-governmental organizations is the reason that Hoffman noted when discussing this topic: it has to do with the relative ease of carrying out an attack and the security environment within which the NGOs and terrorists reside.²⁴⁶ Drake theorizes that, “where there is a number of potential targets, attacking any of which would yield a roughly equivalent strategic benefit, there is a likelihood that the terrorists will choose to attack the softest target, as carrying out such an attack represents the least risk to the terrorists.”²⁴⁷

Recent anti-terrorism programs have served to “harden” or increase the difficulty of successfully carrying out an attack. Hoffman describes the recent security environment as being a much more difficult place for terrorists to target indiscriminately. He notes that while the primary target of terrorists had been

²⁴⁵ Kjell Skjelsbaek, “The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century,” PRIO publication 22-14.

²⁴⁶ Bruce Hoffman, “Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses and Non-Governmental Organizations”. Testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, April 3, 2001, pp. 7-8.

²⁴⁷ Drake, pg. 179.

government official and installations, as security increased and protective measures were engaged, terrorists began to shift targets. Hoffman stated:

The main problem that we face in this critical area of protecting American citizens and interests abroad from both current and future threats rubs up against one of the fundamental axioms of terrorism: hardening one set of targets often displaces the threat onto another ‘softer’ target. In other words, security measures may successfully thwart planned or actual terrorist operations or even deter terrorists from attacking: but they do not eliminate the threat entirely, which may mutate into other, perhaps even more deadly forms. Determined terrorists, accordingly, will simply identify another range of vulnerabilities and hence potential targets; perhaps in turn adjusting or modifying their means and method of attack and executing a completely different kind of operation that still achieves their goal

As we harden the range of American diplomatic and military targets long favored by terrorists—hardening existing embassies and consulates world-wide and building stronger, less vulnerable structures in particularly dangerous foreign posts while increasing the force protection afforded to our military personnel deployed overseas—we doubtless will not eliminate the terrorist threat completely, but risk displacing it onto ‘softer,’ more vulnerable and accessible, unofficial, non-governmental targets—e.g., ordinary American tourists and travelers, business people and otherwise ordinary citizens.²⁴⁸

The shifting of targeting from hardened targets to softer targets may be abetted by NGOs themselves. Given the mission of most NGOs, taking measures to reduce the exposure to terrorism may be counter-productive to their goals. Religious non-governmental organizations may feel it necessary to welcome all-comers to organizations and facilities. Humanitarian groups may need to be working away from cities with the poor and suffering.

The end result is that many of these organizations find typically prudent security measures hard to adopt. Martin notes that for many NGOs there is, “a conspicuous lack of security among many NGO workers combined with a skeptical,

²⁴⁸ Hoffman, 2001, pp. 7-8.

if not averse attitude towards the need for security and other protective measures.”²⁴⁹

Added to this, is the fact that given the nature of the missions for many of these groups, they conduct their work in places that are generally more dangerous and thus, present more of an opportunity for attack. Again, Martin notes that in many of these locations, there is, “a general absence of rules of war or rules of conduct among the belligerents themselves, many of whom are irregular fighters and may also include criminals and bandits interested as much in plunder as in the realization of a particular political agenda.”²⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

It has been shown that the permutations of target selection carry factors from ideology to tactics. Drake delineated a selection process by which terrorists start at all possible attack permutations and then refine and limit the target through ideological, strategic, and tactical inputs. In the end, target selection is a process with many inputs, and the final selection may simply be the easiest target to attack out of many possible.

Terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon. As was stated previously, there are no innocents to terrorists. It seems that there is nothing apolitical to a terrorist either. Due to the many selection inputs, non-governmental organizations can enter the target selection environment of terrorists. They can be targeted based on a perceived association with a government or intergovernmental entity. NGOs can be targeted due to political activities in which they are engaged. It must be emphasized that any activity, overtly political or not, can have political

²⁴⁹ Martin, 1999.

²⁵⁰ Martin, 1999.

ramifications, and as such, can provide the political motivation for a terrorist attack. Hence humanitarian aid or infrastructure building has the potential of affecting the political environment of a given area. These too, then, could be considered political activities. Terrorists could target NGOs based on a perceived threat to the social, cultural or religious environment considered important to the terrorist group.

Terrorists could target NGOs based on the fundamental scarcity of resources in the environment in which the terrorists operate. NGO activities that put the resources of safe haven and an ample recruit pool at risk could put NGOs in danger of terrorist attack. The scarcity of financing to terrorist groups might also lead terrorists to attack NGOs as a means of securing money and resources. Finally, the apparent “softness” of NGOs in terms of ease of attack might lead terrorists to attack non-governmental groups.

Certainly the targeting imperatives are not equal in priority. Neither are they considered independently of each other, for an attack will ideally accomplish more than one goal at the same time. They are also not necessarily considered at the same point in the target determination process. Often they are considered as the refinement process ensues. Again, in the targeting process, refinements are continually being made. As such, one or more of the NGO targeting imperatives might move back or forth along the timeline.

The framework proposed is heuristic and is derived from the data. However, it has not been tested empirically. The purpose of this research is to introduce a specific topic and present a potential theory as to the phenomenon. However, for a

theory to be credible, it must make sense. In that vein, by using the database inputs, a simple test was performed by which the theory can be judged.

Based on the limited information in the database, variables were created for attacks in the database in which a ransom demand was made. It is theorized that in these cases, the terrorist group is engaged in activities designed to obtain scarce resources. An additional variable was created for attacks in which the terrorist group left evidence which indicated they were targeting the NGO based on an association with another country or governmental entity. In this case the evidence was usually statements in which the groups themselves explained the attacks were against a government entity that they associated the targeted NGO with. Variables were also created for attacks on groups engaged in stabilization operations (humanitarian aid/infrastructure building) as well as groups engaged in overtly political activities. While there may certainly be coder bias as to what indeed meets the criteria for overt political activities or any other of the variables, in most cases coding was relatively easy. If an NGO representative was actively protesting a government policy—that case was considered political activity. Some of the cases could have been interpreted many ways.

This research attempted to be conservative and did not attribute motive that did not seem clearly evident. This is especially true for the associative variable. Only cases where the terrorist groups left an indication towards motive were cases included. In some cases, the data entry had more than one variable indicating influence. In those cases, a blended category was created. The theoretic framework lent itself to these variables. However, the targeting imperative dealing with the

relative softness of a target could not be accounted for. Despite this fact and as illustrated by *Figure 4.3*, the framework accounted for 81 percent of all attacks on non-governmental groups. This seems significant especially given the missing variables.




Figure 4.3 Attacks Accounted for by Framework

If this is the targeting rubric used by terrorist groups when refining their targeting selections, then perhaps measures can be taken which would lessen the threat to these non-governmental groups.

CHAPTER 5: TERRORIST ATTACKS/POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON THE LDS CHURCH

INTRODUCTION TO THE LDS CHURCH

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a hierarchical organization with a central leadership based in Salt Lake City, Utah. The church is headed by a first presidency, which is made up of the church president and two counselors. The presidency holds all the authority for the church's administration. The First Presidency is drawn from a second body called the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, which works in concert with the First Presidency. The president of the church is typically the most senior apostle. When a president dies, the First Presidency is dissolved and all power and authority for the church devolves on the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles until a new First Presidency can be established. The calling to be an apostle is a lifelong calling and release is only granted for reasons of transgression.

The First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve are assisted in the administration of the church by six groups called the Quorums of the Seventy. The Quorums of the Seventy are headed by the seven presidents of the seventy drawn from the First Quorum of the Seventy. Callings to the first two Quorums of the Seventy are made indefinitely until the leader's seventieth birthday, when the leader is made an emeritus member of the quorum. Callings to the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Quorums of the Seventy are flexible and the service typically lasts for up to six years.

The First Presidency and the Quorum of the Twelve, as well as the First and Second Quorums of the Seventy are referred to as General Authorities of the church,

meaning they have authority over all of the areas of the church. General Authorities are unique within the church in that they are the only group of ecclesiastical leaders who work full time—and are paid by the church. When a call is made for a leader to take a position as a General Authority, that leader is expected to give up their employment and serve wherever they are assigned. Leaders are called and drawn from the general membership of the church. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Six Quorums of the Seventy are referred to as Area Authority Seventies and only have the authority to work in their specific area of the church. Area Authority Seventies donate their service to the church and are typically working full time in jobs unrelated to the church to provide for themselves and their families. The Third Quorum of the Seventies is made up of Area Authority Seventies in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. The Fourth Quorum of the Seventy is made up of Area Authority Seventies in Mexico, Central and South America. The Fifth and Sixth Quorums are made up of Area Authority Seventies in Canada and the United States.

Administration of the church is subdivided into 30 geographic areas administered over by an Area Presidency (a president and two counselors) composed of General Authorities and Area Authorities. Area Presidencies are responsible for the administration of all the units within that area and are given direction from the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles. In many cases, Area Presidencies reside in the area over which they preside.

MISSION ORGANIZATION

Within each area there are two distinct types of administrative entities. One is geographically located and focused on the missionary effort of the church. These are

known as missions. Missions are headed by Mission Presidents who is called from the general membership of the church along with their families to serve in the capacity where they have been assigned for a three-year period. During this period, they are expected to give up their employment and donate their time. In some cases, mission presidents are granted a stipend and living facilities. Mission Presidents are given a short training session (typically two weeks) before their term of service begins. While many Mission Presidents speak the language native to the areas over which they will preside, many do not. As a result, many Mission Presidents must rely on more accomplished missionaries and local leaders for translation and interpretation.

There are often many missions within one area of the church. For example, the Asia North Area covers all of Korea and Japan. There are 11 missions in Japan alone, not considering the rest of the countries in Asia. Missions are outside the regular line of authority of the church and will typically not influence the administration of local units. The only exception to this pattern is where there is no local leadership. In that case and under direction of the area presidency in that area, the mission president may call district and branch presidents to preside and administer over smaller, local units. In these cases, districts are typically found in areas of the world where the church is less established and there is a lack of local leadership able to direct the affairs of the church. Typically, District and Branch Presidencies are made up of local members of the church donating their time and supporting themselves and their families through unrelated employment. In few cases, however, where there are no local members experienced to lead the church, a missionary

serving in the area may be called as a Branch President. While there is no set tenure for District and Branch Presidencies, the leadership will often rotate after six to eight years.

The missionaries are called up from the general body of the church membership. Young men from the age of 19 to 26 make up the largest part of the missionary force. The young men must be at least 19 years of age and be unmarried. Young unmarried women of at least 21 years of age may also serve as missionaries. Older retired couples may also elect to serve missions. Young men serve missions for a period of two years; young women for 18 months; and older couples may have a more flexible term of service. All missionaries must meet stringent requirements for worthiness, health and conduct. Prospective missionaries that have committed major transgressions are not eligible to serve missions.

Missionaries donate their time while on missions. They also pay for their room and board from their own funds while a missionary. Missionary assignments are extended from the church headquarters and missionaries do not have the opportunity to request where or how they would like to serve. There are many types of missions that a missionary can serve. They can be called to proselytizing, welfare, church service or leadership missions. Missionaries are expected to donate all of their time while missionaries and to adhere to stringent rules of conduct. They are expected to get up early and study scriptures and the language of the land if they are non-native speakers. They then spend the rest of the day serving in the capacity they were called. They are expected to give up all social life and entertainment while on their missions. For example, missionaries cannot watch television or listen to popular

music. Also, missionaries are forbidden from carrying out any contact with the opposite sex in any personal, social context.

Missionaries are given a two-week training session (eight weeks if a foreign language is involved) before being sent to a given mission. The session includes training in language, culture and anything specific to their call (e.g., church doctrines, genealogy, etc). Any additional study relating to language or church doctrine is to be conducted personally after arriving in their assigned area. Missionaries are assigned a companion with whom they spend all of their time—living, eating and working together. Typically the most senior companion is responsible for the work in a given area. Occasionally, a companionship may include a third missionary. Missionaries are allowed a period of time during one day a week to take care of personal duties (shopping, laundry, etc.).

Missions are subdivided into smaller zones and districts for the purposes of administration. Missionaries are drawn from those within a given mission to serve as assistants to the president, zone leaders and district leaders. District leaders typically administer over two to four sets of missionaries in a geographic location.

Missionaries take on the leadership responsibilities in addition to the regular missionary duties. This mission organization is described in *Figure 5.1*.




Figure 5.1: Missionary Table of Organization.

ECCLESIASTICAL ORGANIZATION

The second administrative entity within an area is the regular means of ecclesiastic organization of the church. Each area is also subdivided into smaller geographic entities called stakes. Stakes are focused on administering to the local units of the church and are presided over by local lay church representatives who are drawn from the general membership of that location. Stake Presidents are selected and called by a General Authority of the church, and the Stake President will generally select two counselors with approval from the General Authority. Within each stake are several smaller geographical units called wards. A ward is generally established around a city, but depending on number of members in a given area, many wards can exist in the same city or a number of cities can be contained in one ward. A ward will typically have between 250 to 750 members.

A ward is presided over by a Bishop and two counselors. The Stake President will generally select and call a Bishop who then selects two counselors. A Bishop and counselors will reside within the geographic confines of that ward. A Bishop's call must be endorsed by the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles or a visiting General Authority. Typically there will be 9 to 11 ward or branch units within a stake. Like

the Stake Presidency, Bishops donate their time and support themselves and their families with unrelated outside employment. Bishops will generally serve for no more than five years and Stake Presidents for no more than ten. Within a stake, Stake Presidents may elect to establish a Branch where there are not sufficient numbers for a ward. *Figure 5.2* describes the basic administration organization of the church.




Figure 5.2: General Organization of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

In all cases with leadership in the church, there are no schooling or other requirements aside from worthiness to serve in any position. Ability and fitness to serve is determined by those making the calls (subject to approval from the Quorum of the Twelve). Leaders of the church are trained by other church leaders as they perform in their calling.

There is a uniformity throughout the units of the church that may be considered unusual for a worldwide church. This can be explained through the organization of the church and by official church doctrine and policy. As seen above,

there is a specific line of authority through which the directives of the church can be disseminated and established. This line of authority creates an organization wherein every leader has a clear superior through which they gain training as well as approval for specific programs. No organizational unit is self-contained. While local church leaders are given authority to conduct the affairs of the church in their area, doctrines and policies are established by the General Authorities of the church and dissent and/or teaching of doctrines that are not approved by the church is not tolerated. Indeed, those that take it upon themselves to change policies or doctrines of the church locally are reprimanded and if the dissent is not stopped, expelled from their positions and sometimes expelled from the church entirely. There is also a rigorous auditing and reporting mechanism. Units of the church regularly report on their progress and programs. The result is a church wherein there is doctrinal and policy homogeneity.

JUSTIFICATION OF CASE

As has been established, there are thousands of examples of international non-governmental organizations. Many have been subjected to terrorist attack. However, given the scope and resources of this research it was impossible to focus on more than a few. While all of the types of NGOs currently in existence could be examined, it would be impractical to do so in this type of endeavor. Similarly, this research was unable to focus on specific regions of the world beyond what was done here. It is the hope of the researcher that this study will spur interest in future research which can address these permutations.

As discussed above, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a hierarchical organization with a central leadership based in Salt Lake City, Utah. Administration of the church is also subdivided into smaller areas, stakes/districts, and wards/branches. While the church is based in the United States, more than half or 6,083,920 of the total membership of 11,394,518 reside outside of the United States. Every year, roughly 35,000 missionaries are sent out to serve two-year missions; so at any given time, there are approximately 65,000 missionaries serving worldwide in 142 countries.²⁵¹ In addition to proselytizing missionaries, there are 137,629 volunteers in non-proselytizing activities such as health, humanitarian and other activities donating the equivalent of 15,174 full-time employee hours worldwide.²⁵² As of 2004, the church was conducting operations in 160 nations.²⁵³ The church also has extensive humanitarian projects outside the United States which provide monetary as well as in-kind aid, infrastructure projects and general welfare projects.²⁵⁴ These humanitarian projects rendered aid in cash and in-kind assistance in the amount of 351.8 million dollars during the 15-year period from 1985 to 2000.²⁵⁵

It may be helpful to compare the LDS Church with other churches and organizations engaged in similar work. The Seventh-Day Adventist Church has a similar total membership of 12,894,005 and carries out an extensive mission program which includes both proselytizing and humanitarian aid. In 2002, The Seventh Day Adventist Church had 17,140 licensed missionaries and counted their total mission

²⁵¹ Deseret News, 2003 Church Almanac.

²⁵² <http://www.lds.org/newsroom/filler/0,15856,3899-1-374-,00.html>, October 31, 2003.

²⁵³ <http://www.lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,15367,3899-1--30-2-376,00.html>, October 31, 2003.

²⁵⁴ <http://www.lds.org/newsroom/displaytopic/0,15343,3898-1-612-42,00.html>, October 31, 2003.

²⁵⁵ <http://www.lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,15367,3899-1--19-2-408,00.html>, October 31, 2003.

pioneers as close to 30,000 in 229 countries worldwide.²⁵⁶ Their humanitarian efforts, including relief and development projects, amount to a total of \$110,059,120.00.²⁵⁷

The Baptist International Mission Board, which, similar to the LDS Church, cites an overseas membership of 7.04 million, has 25,099 volunteers engaged in mission work as well as 5,380 field personnel under appointment.²⁵⁸ Certainly, when compared to other religious organizations, the LDS Church is among the largest in terms of a religious organization engaged in international missions/welfare work.

When compared to some of the major humanitarian relief organizations, the LDS Church is much smaller in terms of relief work. In truth, no church compares to the major relief NGOs aside from perhaps the Catholic Relief Charities organization. In 2002, the International Red Cross had a yearly operating budget of \$212.9 million dollars.²⁵⁹ In 2003, World Vision, a Christian charitable aid organization, contributes \$1,014.7 million dollars in cash and in-kind donations towards humanitarian programs.²⁶⁰ Doctors Without Borders International donated \$341.8 million dollars in 2002.²⁶¹ New York based International Relief Committee donated \$136.3 million dollars in goods and services in 2003.²⁶² Clearly, these humanitarian aid

²⁵⁶ <http://www.adventistarchives.org/docs/ASR/ASR2002.pdf>, March 25, 2004, also <http://www.global-mission.org/htdocs/html/10yrs.html>, July 23, 2004.

²⁵⁷ http://www.adventist.org/world_church/facts_and_figures/index.html.en, July 23, 2004.

²⁵⁸ <http://www.imb.org/core/fastfacts.asp>, March 25, 2004.

²⁵⁹ <http://www.ifrc.org/where/appeals/index.asp>, March 25, 2004.

²⁶⁰ 2003 World Vision Annual Report, http://www.wvi.org/wvi/about_us/annual_reports.htm, July 28, 2004.

²⁶¹ Doctors Without Borders Annual Report 2002, <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/i2003/factsandfigures.pdf>, August 12, 2004.

²⁶² International Relief Committee 2003-04 Annual Report, <http://intranet.theirc.org/docs/IRC2003AR.pdf>, August 12, 2004.

organizations aid dwarfs the yearly budget of \$23.5 million dollars that the LDS Church spent on humanitarian aid in 2003.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of all terrorist attacks on NGOs or religious organizations in Latin America were on the LDS Church. This fact alone makes the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints an appropriate case. It is hoped that by focusing on the specific threat of terrorism and political violence on non-government organizations and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints specifically, the targeting priorities of groups who attack non-governmental organizations can be determined. That threat risk, along with the concrete actions that are apparent in the case study, should allow for a determination of how the general threat of political violence and terrorism to non-governmental organizations can be reduced.

REVIEW OF METHODS OF CASE ANALYSIS

Face to face interviews with central church leadership was attempted to determine the church's official policy and threat assessment of political violence and threats of terrorism. As this portion of the study deals with the official church position, only one interview with a central church official was needed. While cooperative, the church declined to discuss official policy relating to security matters. Relevant information was therefore obtained from official church informational sources which included official public correspondence, official websites, and official publications.

Questionnaires containing similar questions were sent via mail to church administrators at the Area level as well as the Stake/District and Ward/Branch levels

(questionnaires attached). Questionnaires were be sent by mail to Area Presidencies, Stake/District Presidents and Bishops/Branch Presidents in areas deemed to be at-risk for political violence or terrorist attack. At-risk is defined as an area which has sustained an act of political violence or terrorism in the past. All of the questionnaires were one page, and should have taken less than 30 minutes to fill out.

Finally, former missionaries of the church who have served in areas of the world where there was heightened risk of political violence or acts of terrorism were interviewed. These interviews were face-to-face and last about 30 minutes. The interviews consisted of 16 specific questions which were designed to elicit open-ended responses. Former missionaries were recruited through a review of former missionary websites that are maintained voluntarily by the former missionaries themselves. A posting was made on the message boards of the websites requesting interviewees. Preference was given to those in locations which would facilitate interviewing (proximity to interviewer). The recruitment posting is enclosed in Appendix I. These sites are in the public domain and participation was voluntary. The identities were kept confidential in order to ensure that no deleterious affects would accrue to the research subjects.

In all cases, whether in face to face interviews or by questionnaire, advised consent was obtained. As this topic deals with the security matters and the safety of church members or agents, the interviews were not recorded. Further, in order to assure the church of the confidentiality of any such security members, special permission was obtained from the dissertation committee that all such security related matters be discussed exclusively with the researcher and his chair. Further, any such

matters were also withheld from the printed dissertation. These security measures were disclosed in the initial cover letters to all participants. Given the timing of this study, most of the former missionary respondents were missionaries who served their missions in the time period leading up to the September 11 attacks.

The method used for data gathering in this section is clearly a non-experimental design. The author understands that an experimental design would be the most desirable for establishing causality and generalizability of the findings of this research. However, constraints forced by the subject of the research limit the choices of design. Further, the purpose of this research was to introduce theory, and will leave the testing of those theories to later research.

Collecting primary data from terrorist groups might be a formula in futility as well as potentially dangerous. Difficulties also arise in gaining data from non-governmental organizations. As this research deals specifically with the security of these groups; and the breach of that security might very well put the organization or its agents in danger, non-governmental organizations are understandably hesitant to discuss security measures “out of shop”. Nevertheless, measures have been taken to accomplish the research in a manner that provides reliable data leading to generalizable findings while being sensitive to its subjects.

These types of non-experimental designs have many inherent weaknesses. In order to ameliorate the design difficulties and strengthen the design by using multiple data sources with multiple data types, data was collected from multiple sources within the case group. Specifically, data was collected from not only the official church organization, but also from agents of the church at all of the various levels of

organization. This allowed the researcher to determine if the policies of the church relating to security threats of terrorism and political violence are executed in a like manner throughout the organization. It also allowed for the researcher to supplement the collected data with perceptual or subjective data that will help, it is hoped, ameliorate any weaknesses of the design. This kind of subjective/normative input addition will further help to establish the validity of this study.

INTERVIEW/QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

GENERAL CHURCH RESPONSE/AREA RESPONSE

While generally cooperative, General Authorities of the church were not willing to discuss anything relating to security matters. This was both the case at church headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah as well as area leaderships. Similarly, few local leaders responded. The church's general policy is that all inquiries about the church be directed to church headquarters. However, much of church policy is publicly available. Between all sources, an adequate picture of church security measures was obtained.

The LDS Church is highly sensitive to the physical wellbeing of its missionaries as well as its general membership. Certainly serving in some areas of the church may bring an increased risk of terrorism and political violence. The church is determined never to have a missionary actually have to weigh whether their life or the work they are engaged in is more important. There are plenty of places in the church that missionaries can serve safely. If it is felt that the danger level is too high, missionaries will be removed. If the church learns of a potentially dangerous situation, actions are taken to ensure the security of its people and property.

Missionaries, specifically missionaries from North America, have been reassigned to different missions when their safety could not be ensured. In one case, all North American missionaries were removed from Columbia due to the threat of terrorist attack. Indeed, one General Authority noted that at one point, he was the only North American church official in all of Columbia. Similar actions were taken in Peru for a time due to actions of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). The mission was then staffed with Latin missionaries from other Latin American countries. One respondent was actually called to Columbia for his mission work, but then due to violence his orders were changed to Mexico.

The church has also suspended academic and cultural exchanges based on heightened risk of terrorism and violence. Typically, the Mormon Tabernacle Choir as well as Brigham Young University's many performing groups travel outside the United States. There have been occasions where tours have been rerouted and sometimes cancelled based on the world security situation and specific treats in some countries. As further example of this policy, the study abroad exchange program at the church's Jerusalem Center has been suspended pending a reestablishment of stability in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.

While church officials admit that there may be an association between the church and the United States, they are quick to note that while there are many members of the church in North America, the majority of the church's membership resides outside of the United States. They also note that as soon as is possible, local members constitute the leadership of the church in their areas. Local members are encouraged to work and serve their local populations. As a result, members of the

church in established areas quickly become known for their local members rather than visiting authorities or North American missionaries. The LDS Church has General Authorities from all around the world. While it is true that the majority are from North America, as the church grows outside the United States, so too will church leadership. The Third and Fourth Quorums of the Seventy are made up of Area Authority Seventies from outside of North America. The church leadership feels confident that the church will be associated with its members rather than any one country.

The LDS Church also believes in advance planning. Each unit of the church, including missions, is encouraged to develop an emergency plan. Those plans are to include preparation for any contingency. They include communication procedures as well as means for feeding and caring for populations in an emergency. The responsibility for developing emergency plans lie with each individual unit, thus they are able to gauge the most likely scenarios and plan accordingly.

Certainly the most visible and vulnerable church members are foreign missionaries, most notably missionaries from North America. Great care is taken for the welfare and safety of all missionaries. As noted previously, missionaries are always to be in companionships (two or more missionaries at all times). Obviously, danger can strike a companionship as well as individuals, but there is usually safety in numbers. Missionaries are also given specific rules of conduct that help ensure their safety. In all cases, missionaries have a curfew and depending on the area, there are places that are off limits. Again, attacks can happen in broad daylight on a crowded street, but as one official put it, “nothing good is going to happen after curfew”.

Mission Presidents are encouraged to advise missionaries to avoid public places if they feel that there is an increased risk of danger.

The church is also concerned with the safety and wellbeing of the general membership of the church. Specifically, the church is concerned for the safety of converts to the church. Minors are not allowed to join the church without parental permission. In those areas of the church where conversion may bring about hazardous consequences to converts, such as some Islamic areas as well as situations of potential abuse (from spouse or family), their teaching and baptisms require special permission from Mission Presidents, Area Presidents and sometimes the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles.

There are some places where the church voluntarily limits the scope of its operations. The church has a large educational facility associated with Brigham Young University in Jerusalem. In the case of Israel, the church has agreed with the Israeli governments not to proselytize in Israel. The LDS Church has a policy of good citizenship. Indeed, one of the church's 13 Articles of Faith written by the church's founder, Joseph Smith stated, "We believe in being subjects to kings, presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and sustaining the law."²⁶³ This precept for the membership of the church also applies to the organization itself. The LDS Church will not conduct any operations within a country without the official permission of its government. In this way, the church keeps good relations with most governments while also limiting repercussions on it and its agents from harassing government entities.

²⁶³ Joseph Smith, "Articles of Faith of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints", *History of the Church*, Vol. 4, (Salt Lake City, Utah: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints), pp. 535-541.

The church will also not conduct any operations until it feels that the safety of its members can be ensured. For example, the only church presence in Iraq currently is the meeting of LDS servicemen currently stationed in Iraq by the militaries of their respective countries. It will not sanction official church work in places that the safety of its representatives cannot be ensured. In the case of humanitarian aid, the church uses its own local organization to distribute aid. Where there is no local organization, the church often engages other non-governmental agencies such as the Catholic Relief Charities organization or the Red Cross to distribute humanitarian aid and supplies.

While the church is not affiliated with any one government or country, if the occasion arises, they are certainly willing to take advantage of any benefits of citizenship that any of its members might be entitled to. This includes help from embassies for any of its citizens, as well as input from influential members of government that might be inclined to help the church. There are members of the House of Representatives as well as the Senate that are members of the church that have interceded on the church's behalf in cases of kidnapping and ransom. Influential businessmen and women have also been willing to work on the church's behalf.

Church officials declined to discuss specifics related to hostage taking and ransom policies. Similarly, they also declined to discuss specifics related to building construction and layout. They declined based on the fact that they relate to security issues, specifically, the hardening of buildings and creation of safe zones within church buildings in hazardous areas. Interviews with construction workers employed by the church do indicate unusual building practices in all church construction,

whether it is for temples, church meetinghouses or other church buildings. They indicated that the church has stringent requirements for building materials as well as construction requirements. One official noted that a church building has six nails for every one required by typical construction code. As such, church buildings are exceptionally sturdy. One church contractor who was not a member of the LDS Church noted, “If a tornado hit in this area, I know where I would be.”²⁶⁴ While it is unclear whether the church takes extra building precaution due to security policies, it is clear that church buildings are sturdier, and therefore safer than typical buildings.

LOCAL CHURCH RESPONSE

Responses from former local church leaders were limited but valuable. Local, non-U.S. leaders of the church confirmed that the LDS Church was indeed seen as a “United States’ church.” However, many noted the growth pattern of the church and also pointed out the increase in native missionaries serving locally. Many of the responses stated the belief in divine leadership of the church and were not concerned with the fact that so many of the leaders are from the United States.

Both stake/district and branch/ward leaders confirmed that they were required to develop response plans for any kind of emergency. The plans were to be specific for their likely threats and tailored to their unique needs. Respondents stressed that the response plans should be for any eventuality and not just for terrorist attacks. One official who had cause to implement a plan commented that the biggest problem was “people not following the plan as outlined and instead trying to help any way they could. It was good intentions, but sheer chaos.”²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Interview response.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Local church representatives did describe one unusual phenomenon. Many respondents from completely disparate parts of the world described the spreading of rumors among the local population that the church's representatives were attempting to "carry off our daughters" as it were. One such description went on to outline the belief that there was an underground tunnel beneath the ocean whereby missionaries were able to take their daughters to Salt Lake City. While local leaders and reasonable people knew that this was not the case, some individuals in local populations harbored bad feelings against the church for this reason. This goes a long ways to describe the willingness of some groups to attack the church, if not physically, then by smear campaign.

Other local leaders also described the fact that there was often organized resistance to the LDS Church by other religious groups. One Branch President noted, "I think they were afraid that we were stealing their members. I guess in a way we were."²⁶⁶ Another leader documented activities that were meant to stir up trouble. "Some churches actually brought in people to address the 'evils of Mormonism'. Some bad things happened after that."²⁶⁷

FORMER MISSIONARY RESPONSE

Interviews among former missionaries were more fruitful. A slight majority of the former missionaries responded that they felt safe as missionaries. However, among former missionaries who felt that there was danger as well as those that felt safe most responded that there were occasions and areas that were definitely dangerous. Many former missionaries noted that they felt they were safe as long as

²⁶⁶ Interview response.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

they avoided certain areas and “followed the rules.” Most of the missionaries felt similar to one missionary’s sentiments, “It didn’t occur to me to feel scared or in danger until afterwards.”²⁶⁸ Most of the missionaries also indicated that they felt divine protection due to the fact that they were “doing the Lord’s work.”²⁶⁹

Many of the missionaries attributed the danger to general criminal activity. One former missionary explained, “In many of the areas we stood out because the area was so poor. We were considered rich just because we were Americans.”²⁷⁰ Many of the missionaries had the experience of being mugged. Again, many of the missionaries responded that there were areas they “knew just not to go into.”²⁷¹ One young lady noted that the local members would warn the missionaries what areas were safe. She said, “There were cases where we were told the guerillas were active in a certain area. We always stayed out of those places.”²⁷²

All of the respondents felt that the local population equated the church with the United States. In fact, many former missionaries recalled definite anti-American sentiments. Many times the sentiment carried over into violence. One missionary serving in Chile during 1988 recalled an incident relating to grape imports into the United States. For a period of time during 1988 Chilean grapes were banned in the United States due to a contaminated cargo. The missionary related, “For about a month, any time I went outside, people threw grapes at me because they knew I was American. There was an organized effort to get the people riled up. They would drive big trucks full of grapes around town blaring on loudspeakers the ‘injustice of

²⁶⁸ Interview response.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² *Ibid.*

America'. We knew that if we heard the loudspeakers, we should hide."²⁷³ A missionary serving in Russia noted many times when "thugs" would get drunk and grab whatever was handy in the way of weapons and go looking for trouble. "They knew we were American, so we made a good target."²⁷⁴

Some of the female former missionaries felt that they were targeted by local males due to the fact that they were American women. One missionary stated, "We had some people stalking us in my last area."²⁷⁵ It is impossible to determine from the context whether the young women were targeted due to their being American or due to the fact that they were Caucasian, with blond hair and blue eyes in an area where dark hair and eyes were the rule.

The responses to questions relating to "Which was more important, the mission work or your personal safety?"²⁷⁶ was quite surprising. In almost all of the cases, former missionaries responded that often they had not thought about it in those terms, but if they had to choose, their mission work would be more important than their personal safety. Many responded that they had actually ignored mission rules, going into forbidden areas or traveling after hours in order to accomplish their work. In a few cases, missionaries felt that the fact that they were doing something dangerous for a greater cause made them feel like they were actually "doing the right thing, like the early saints, putting their lives on the line,"²⁷⁷ a modern day martyr complex.

²⁷³ Interview response.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁶ Interview questionnaire.

²⁷⁷ Interview response.

When pressed, many of the missionaries responded that presented with a specific threat, they would place their safety ahead of the mission work. However, in a few cases, missionaries related incidents where they faced a specific threat and continued the mission work anyway. In one case, a young woman missionary had a knife held to her throat and was warned never to come back again. She stated, “I went back the next day.”²⁷⁸

In every case, the former missionaries stated that there were procedures and practices designed to safeguard the missionaries. The former missionaries noted that they were required to carry a “little white handbook” which contained specific rules and procedures at all times. This handbook contained the rules of conduct as well as specific practices which the missionaries were supposed to follow. For example, the handbook required all missionaries to travel with a companion at all times. It required missionaries to be back in their dwellings by a certain time. It also forbade ‘risky behavior’ such as mingling with the opposite sex in a one-on-one type situation, even in the course of their mission work. The missionaries also noted that they had knowledge of missionaries in their area that did not follow all of the rules.

Beyond the procedures outlined in the white handbook, former missionaries related rules and guidelines specific to their missions that they were to follow. These rules included specific times when they were to stay in their dwellings (e.g. New Years Eve, etc.). Some missionaries were told not to wear their nametags as the nametags confirmed their identity as missionaries and often as Americans. Some missionaries were abjured from certain kinds of mission work such as knocking on doors in order to find new contacts.

²⁷⁸ Interview response.

Some interesting instruction also discovered. For a time in Argentina, missionaries were forbidden to carry backpacks as backpacks were identified with the United States. Some missionaries were also told not to carry cameras or expensive personal items as well as large amounts of money in order to reduce the perception that the missionaries were “rich”. Missionaries were also forbidden to carry on political conversations. This included any kind of criticism of the government or type of government. They were also forbidden from attending any kind of political gathering, rally or march. Some missionaries were told not to wear certain types of clothing, as certain colors or styles were associated with the CIA or with mobsters. One missionary in Venezuela was told to “shift his routes, avoid setting habits” in terms of travel or conduct.

Along with rules and regulations that forbade certain action, there were also directions for positive action. Missionaries were required to perform four hours of public service weekly. When asked why they thought the requirement was there many answered that they were in the service of their fellow man, and that the public service was just another aspect of that service. One former missionary who later became a U.S. Marine officer stationed in Iraq after the Second Gulf War noted the public service was similar to “hearts and mind” work that U.S. servicemen performed to win over the general population and create general good will. He felt that the public service was a positive force in the community and helped convince the general populace that LDS missionaries were indeed good people and truly concerned about the communities in which they served.

Many of the former missionaries also indicated that they were told to stay in their dwelling in response to specific threats or events. One missionary who served in Russia during the coup attempt on President Yeltsin described the event. “During that whole time, we had to stay in our apartments.”²⁷⁹ Similar stories were related by missionaries serving in South America and the Philippines during coup attempts in the countries in which they were serving. Others were instructed to stay inside during large soccer games or during elections. One former missionary serving in Bulgaria during the U.S. invasion of Iraq was required to stay inside for the first two weeks of the invasion. Similarly, missionaries in Venezuela were required to come home at seven instead of nine during the First Gulf War.

Many of the respondents recalled being the victims of political violence, though few experience true terrorist attacks. More common were threats of bodily harm or harassment based on the missionaries being American. One missionary serving in Latin America explained that it seemed to be a game, “People would lean out of passing cars, shouting anti-American stuff, and try to hit you as they passed.”²⁸⁰ Many missionaries related experiences of being assaulted by gangs spouting anti-American epithets and being pelted by rocks.

Many former missionaries related incidents of political harassment from government bureaucrats or police. One missionary related a government policy in Seville, Spain which required the missionaries obtain a ‘work permit’ that they could not legally obtain as they were engaged in volunteer service. In this case, the former missionary stated that the bureaucrats deliberately impeded the paperwork in order to

²⁷⁹ Interview response.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

harass the missionaries. One stated, “Half of the missionaries did not have the correct paperwork or visas due to stringent requirements and or impossible restrictions.”²⁸¹

Other former missionaries related that it was common to be arrested “for no reason other than being who we were”²⁸² and spending the night in jail. In one city, the missionaries were “kicked out” by the police.

Many of the respondents also related that while they were never personally victims of political violence or terrorism, many of them recalled that church buildings or property in their areas was vandalized or graffiti was left stating “Gringo go home!” One female missionary served in Chile during 1988 through 1989. She had one of the church buildings in the city where she was serving bombed. Another serving in the Philippines recalls an attack on the Temple in Manila. Both describe an environment where they knew and understood there were people hostile to the church doing violence against the church, however, there was nothing they could do about it.

In all of the interviews, the former missionaries indicated that they felt the church did “everything it could to reduce the exposure or risk of terrorism and political violence.”²⁸³ One young woman noted, “They seemed very concerned about us—especially us sisters. Some of the elders (young men) were put in more dangerous spots.”²⁸⁴ Another missionary explained that a zone conference meeting was dedicated entirely to safety. A few of the former missionaries indicated that the church could do a better job of “fostering a culture where personal safety and cultural

²⁸¹ Interview response.

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

sensitivity were more important.”²⁸⁵ While he noted that culture was taught in the training period before his arrival in the country, these things were, “not part of the missionary mindset.”²⁸⁶

The emphasis that the church places on the language skill of those serving on missions is also important. Many missionaries commented that local people were often impressed that they had taken the time and effort to learn the language, and often, learn it well. One missionary noted that the locals often asked where he was from, “I told them I was from the United States. They did not believe me. They said that Americans only spoke English.”²⁸⁷ This emphasis on language helps to span the gulf between missionary and the local populace not only in terms of communication but also in terms of respect.

Many of the former missionaries related that their missions had contingency plans in place should emergencies arise. Some told of instructions to the missionaries in their areas to keep a good amount of money and food secreted away but available should they need to move quickly. They also documented informational calling trees designed to disperse information quickly. Others told of instructions complete with code phrases which would warn the missionaries of impending problems and if need be, send them to assigned meeting places for evacuation. Routes and schedules were pre-planned and updated at general mission meetings. One respondent outlined the contingency plan for Bulgaria. In that plan, code words informed missionaries of the specific routes to take out of the country. Missionaries in Bulgaria were also told to

²⁸⁵ Interview response.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

carry a list with hospital information, the names of church affiliated attorneys, and embassy contact information.²⁸⁸

The former missionaries did indicate that there were policies in place to protect converts should joining the church cause problems. One of the missionaries served in Seville, Spain. While no mission work was being conducted in Morocco proper, the Seville mission was responsible for that country. For the first year of his mission, they were allowed to teach Muslims about Christianity, using special lesson plans designed to be sensitive to Islamic beliefs. During the second half of his mission, they were forbidden to teach Muslims even if requested due to the danger that would put the potential converts into. They were informed that some Muslims became Christian at their personal peril.²⁸⁹ This prohibition seems to have been in place in some areas of the world but not others. Many Latin American countries prohibited the teaching of Muslims altogether. Venezuela also prohibited the teaching of certain indigenous tribes. This was done in an attempt to protect an endangered culture. Some areas only allowed the teaching of Muslims if the Muslims approached the missionaries. Other respondents noted that there were rumors that some ethnic or religious groups were off limits (Gypsies and Muslims for example). However, because they were not officially notified, they taught those groups anyways.

Many missionaries expressed concern for those that became affiliated with the church through their efforts. Often, in Latin America, those in the dominant religion treated people that converted to the LDS Church poorly. Missionaries serving in

²⁸⁸ Interview response.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Eastern Europe reflected similar sentiments. One former missionary stated that many converts were rejected by family and friends and considered “traitors to their family, culture and traditions.”²⁹⁰

One interview was conducted with an LDS member that had been affiliated with the Jerusalem Center in Israel. He described the great care the church takes with Muslims who leave their faith to join the LDS Church and potentially put their lives in danger. An Islamic Spanish citizen who had been investigating the church with his wife in Spain moved to the West Bank just prior to joining the LDS Church. He assumed that because the church had the Jerusalem Center and a Branch in Israel he would be able to join there. However, there was a ban on all teaching and baptizing in Israel at the time. The local leader (Branch President) in Jerusalem appealed the no conversion policy in place in Israel through the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles and finally to the First Presidency. The Spanish Muslim was finally granted permission to join the church.²⁹¹ Other interviewees that had been affiliated with the Jerusalem Center stated that the Jerusalem Center took great pains not to take sides in the Palestinian/Israeli question. “Equal instruction was given to both Arab and Israeli culture, language and history. In fact, the Jerusalem Center’s Christmas Concert was one of the few places where the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem and the Chief Imam in the city could be seen sitting next to each other.”²⁹²

Students were instructed to avoid any kind of taking sides in the struggle to the point of not buying maps which could show disputed borders. They were also instructed not to discuss the LDS religion even when asked. The Center boasted

²⁹⁰ Interview response.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² *Ibid.*

equal numbers of Palestinian and Israeli employees and students were encouraged to “be good customers to both groups.”²⁹³ Students attending the Jerusalem Center were actually required to sign a conduct agreement which contained these types of rules and regulations. If students abrogated the agreement they were subject to being sent home.²⁹⁴

Many respondents, both former missionaries and officials of the church mentioned the unofficial help embassies played in helping to bolster the security of individual members of the church. Security officials in U.S. embassies would often advise members of the church acting for the church of specific security threats. This relationship was especially close when the embassy officials were also members of the LDS Church. One missionary commented that he had “a member embassy official’s card in my pocket in case something came up that required ‘official’ help.”²⁹⁵ Another respondent noted that, “There seemed to be a member in the embassies in whatever country I visited.”²⁹⁶ This unofficial relationship between the U.S. embassy and American employees or agents of NGOs is not limited to the LDS Church. Indeed, a security official affiliated with another religious NGO stated, “That is one of the advantages that American NGOs have. We can rely on the U.S. embassy to act as our intelligence and security arms.”²⁹⁷ While the help that embassies provide may indeed be an advantage, perhaps in light of the associational threats outlined in chapter 4, it may be a disadvantage also.

²⁹³ Interview response.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE

Chapter 4 created a framework that helps to explain the targeting imperatives used by terrorist organizations when selecting targets. It would seem appropriate to apply that framework to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to see if the church perceives the threat of terrorism similarly. Further, the framework can be measured in terms of the church's experience as an NGO that has been targeted by terrorist groups.

The first targeting imperative of the framework is targeting based on a perceived association by the terrorist group between an NGO and another political entity. The case that was used in Chapter 4 to illustrate this principle was the LDS Church. By their own actions and indications left at the scenes of attacks on the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, terrorist groups consider the LDS Church to be associated with the United States. Responses from respondents at all levels of the church indicated an acceptance that the LDS Church is perceived to be an "American" church. The church has taken steps to change this perception both through the use of media as well as changes in policy, which stress the local nature of the church and its leadership. Attacks on the LDS Church have been reduced significantly. While it would be irresponsible to credit the church's changes for reducing the attacks, the fact remains that currently, attacks occur at a rate of less than one a year.²⁹⁸

The second targeting imperative in the framework is attacks due to political activities. Again, those activities may not necessarily be overtly political in nature.

²⁹⁸ There are other reasons attacks may have been reduced, such as the change in the general political climate.

Simply engaging in humanitarian activities could be construed to be a political act as it may change the political environment. Whether for this reason or others, the LDS Church prohibits its personnel to engage in overt political activity while acting in an official capacity. That is not to say that church personnel or members are apolitical. In fact, church members are encouraged to be active in the political processes of their country, albeit in a private capacity. However, the fact remains that the LDS church refrains from overt political activity. The motivation for such a policy is not clear. However, the ramifications equate to an organization that is much less of a political danger to anyone, insurgent or government alike. The end result may be a reduced exposure to terrorist attacks due to overt political conflicts.

While the LDS Church is engaged in other activities, which include humanitarian aid work that might meet the expanded definition of political activities, the LDS church has adopted policies that reduce the threat due to this targeting imperative. In cases where the LDS Church does not have a local infrastructure by which to carry out the work, it will either use other local NGOs to carry out the operations or will refrain from operations in that area. Again, it is not clear as to the reason of these policies, but the net effect is a reduction in the exposure to terrorist attack.

The third targeting parameter relates to the struggle by terrorist groups to obtain resources in an environment of scarce resources. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a resource rich organization. The budgets of the LDS Church are not open to public scrutiny. The fact remains that it has extensive properties and holdings throughout the world as well as controlling interest in various business

enterprises. These facts are shrouded in privacy. While the church continues to conduct an aggressive building strategy, its meetinghouse buildings are modest in form. As such, the financial resources of the church are much less evident. Given its resources, the church might make an attractive target of terrorist groups wishing to take advantage of it. This research did uncover the fact that the LDS Church meetinghouses are often targeted for burglary given the equipment that is common in most LDS buildings. The LDS Church will not discuss its security policies, especially those regarding payment of ransoms. However, policies meant to provide for individual security help to mitigate against that threat. Given these circumstances, it is difficult to evaluate the LDS Church's vulnerability to this targeting parameter.

The LDS Church seems to recognize the damage that can be created by personnel not sufficiently sensitive to the culture and social environment of the place wherein they are serving. All prospective missionaries are required to undertake training prior to arriving in country. This training regimen includes language training as well as cultural training. Representatives of the church's university traveling performing groups are also required to complete a semester-long culture course prior to the tour. All church representatives are required to dress conservatively and refrain from objectionable behavior. While the reasoning behind this training and restrictions on behavior is unclear, the end result is a personnel force more sensitive to the local culture.

The church may be exposed when it comes to religious conflict as one of the three stated missions of the LDS Church is to "proclaim the gospel." Certainly proselytizing in areas where there is one dominant religion could create conflict with

the dominant church. The LDS Church seems to be aware of the potential for problems. In areas where proselytizing would be dangerous or detrimental, the church has committed to the government and local officials that they will not proselytize in that specific area. Such is the case in much of the Arab world as well as in Israel and the People's Republic of China. In areas where the government has sanctioned missionary work and the LDS Church feels it is safe for its people, other policies are in place to reduce the possibilities of conflict. Minors are prohibited from joining the church without parental permission. Members of specific religions are limited in joining if it is felt that it will put their lives at risk. The church also attempts to foster good will through media programs and joint programs conducted with other faiths. In this case, the LDS Church seems not only to be aware of the threat of cultural, social and religious clashes, but also takes steps to reduce any such problems.

The final targeting parameter of the framework related to the relative 'softness' of NGOs as targets. Again, it is difficult to determine the LDS Church's perception of this threat. However, what is evident is that there are policies in place with a result of the church and its personnel being somewhat hardened. Members of the First Presidency of the church travel with an extremely competent security detachment. Such security precautions include the use of chase vehicles and personal security vetting. Travel is done modestly so as not to attract attention. Church personnel always travel in groups. This is true for missionaries as well as local bishoprics depositing tithes and offerings in the bank. Church personnel are limited in where and when they travel. There are places that are considered off-limits as well

as curfews when missionaries must be home. Church buildings are well constructed. They are sturdy and relatively safe. Certainly, as a church it would be severely limiting to harden the LDS Church so as to be immune from attack. However, many precautions have been employed with the effect of moving the LDS Church up on the hardness scale.

In the end, it seems that the LDS Church bolsters the theoretical framework. They seem to have an instinctual understanding of the threats facing them. This is most true for the associational and cultural, social, and religious targeting imperatives. Not only does the LDS Church understand these threats, but they have also taken actions to reduce the threats—actions that seem to be fairly effective. The application of the framework to the LDS Church has enabled the researcher to identify threats that may not have necessarily been dealt with. As such, the framework seems to be successful in its purpose.

CONCLUSION

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a worldwide organization engaged in mission work throughout the globe. Due to their extensive international work, which includes both humanitarian aid and proselytizing, as well as their worldwide membership, they are at risk to terrorist attack. Indeed, in the three decades spanning the 1970s through the 1990s, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was the most targeted religious organization or non-governmental organization for attack by terrorists in Latin America. Despite this fact, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints only lost four people to fatal attacks. Clearly, a

closer look at the LDS Church may provide insight as to why they were attacked and what policies are in place to ameliorate those attacks.

It is important to note that during the study period, church policy evolved to combat the terrorist threat. Certainly criticism could be directed at the use of the case study as a positive example of threat avoidance: if the LDS Church were such a good example of target avoidance, then why were they the most attacked religious organization in Latin America? The answer to this question lays in the fatality statistics cited previously as well as the fact that attacks against the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has dropped to almost nothing. These data could perhaps be explained by other factors. However, the fact does remain that an organization so targeted must surely take steps to eliminate the threat of attack against its personnel and property. As such, it is an appropriate case to study the phenomenon of terrorist attacks on non-governmental organizations.

While official responses from the church were limited, this research was able to obtain critical information. The church sees itself as an international church, with more members outside of North America than inside. However, at all levels of the church's organization, there were acknowledgements that it is perceived to be an American church. While the majority of the church's central leadership is made up of U.S. citizens, local leadership is conducted by members of the local communities wherever possible.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a very hierarchical organization which tolerates little dissent in terms of policies or doctrine. However, local leaders are encouraged to tailor church programs for their areas in order to best

take care of any problems or needs specific to that location. Local church leaders are further drawn from the local population of church membership and serve for a limited time before being returned to the general church population. Church leaders are not professional clergymen, but serve as volunteers while carrying on their usual employment. This emphasis on local leadership of local units may help ameliorate that “American church” label that seems to be present.

The LDS Church’s missionary force is a group of volunteers who serve for a limited amount of time before returning to their local congregation and employment. It is made up primarily of young men and women with a smattering of older, retired couples who receive a limited amount of training in language, the subject of their missions, and culture. The missionary force is led by volunteer, lay clergy who serve for a limited time with a limited amount of training. Some of that training, however, is training in cultural sensitivity and language. That sensitivity is reinforced by mandatory community service. Such sensitivity is rewarded by locals as well as other government officials.

The church is sensitive to other religions and cultures and endeavors to promote this sensitivity to its leaders and missionaries. The church limits the teaching and conversion of certain ethnic and religious groups. They are also sensitive to governments and restrict all mission work to areas where governments have given permission. The LDS Church teaches that its members should be good citizens, supporting and defending their country. The church is arduous about the fact that it takes no political stance aside from moral questions like gambling or abortion and regularly reminds its general and local leadership that political activities by

church leaders in an official capacity is not tolerated. This non-political attitude is extended to other organizations of the church to include activities by Brigham Young University's many traveling groups and exchange programs.

The LDS Church is concerned about the welfare of its agents as well as that of the general population. It has an extensive humanitarian aid program that is distributed by the local leaders of the church. In cases of emergency or humanitarian crises where the church has no organization to facilitate distribution, they engage other well-known organizations like the International Red Cross as well as the Catholic Relief Charities organization to distribute the aid.

The LDS Church will not risk its people. The mission and humanitarian work of the church are closely regulated. Only those that have followed the church's guidelines are able to conduct work in its name. As a result, the church is able to provide its full support for all sanctioned activities. Local units are not supposed to conduct unofficial aid or mission activities without official church permission. Since the church will not send its people to places where there is a definite risk, the security of its personnel is buttressed. Another implication of the closely regulated mission work is that it will only take place in areas that have local government approval and adequate organizational infrastructure. This cuts down on unofficial trips and ensures that only well-researched and provisioned excursions are carried out.

In order to protect the welfare of its agents, the LDS Church and its agents plan extensively. Church buildings are well built and extremely sturdy. Missionaries are often instructed to stockpile food and money necessary to provide for any

probable emergency situation. There are plans formulated to provide for orderly evacuation should that be necessary.

The end result is that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a highly regulated organization with sufficient resources and planning to carry out an extended international program. The control it exerts over its organization coupled with an apolitical policy of obtaining its goals helps to insulate it from many political acts. The local leader emphasis and the cultural sensitivity it shows further insulate it from potential violence. Finally, the policies of the church help to harden it as a potential target for terrorists. These conclusions will be further explored in the final chapter.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

At the heart of any good research, there should be the answer to the basic question: so what? This research might be interesting just for the consideration of the phenomenon of NGOs being targeted by terrorist groups. However, in the tradition of asking the big questions, the “so what” question is to be addressed by this research.

So what? This research has looked at the phenomenon of terrorist attack on NGOs and developed a framework as to why terrorists might engage in such attacks. So what? By understanding the terrorists’ target selection imperatives, prescriptions by which the threat to NGOs can be reduced were created. So what? In a very real way, lives can be spared. Not only the lives of those working for the NGOs but also all of the lives that are enriched through the work they do.

This research is advancing prescriptions toward the reducing of the terrorist threat to NGOs. It is understood that in some cases an NGO is targeted for many of the imperatives advanced by this research. Reducing or eliminating all threats may be impractical or impossible. However, eliminating one of the reasons a terrorist group might target an NGO may be the one thing that removes that NGO from the targeting equation, or, at the very least, moves them down the target list. Prescriptions to each of the imperatives advanced by this research are offered: association, political activity, social/cultural/religious reasons, competition for resources, and soft targets.

RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDY IN LIGHT OF THE FRAMEWORK

ASSOCIATION

The first targeting imperative was the perceived association by the terrorist groups between NGOs and a government or intergovernmental entity. In the example

used in Chapter 4, the LDS Church was targeted in Latin America due to the perception that the church was associated with the United States. While the implication of this targeting imperative is striking, the prescription is simple. NGOs can reduce their targeting profile by reducing either their association with a government or governments or by reducing the perception of that association.

The LDS Church certainly seems aware of the perception of association. So, in their case, they have taken actions to reduce the perception of “Americanness” of the church, due to the fact that there is no official association between the LDS Church and the government of the United States. The LDS Church has stressed the worldwide aspect of their organization in press releases and media opportunities. Local church members are moved into leadership roles as soon as is possible, making the local churches self sufficient in terms of leadership.

In some cases, these methods are not enough. An example is what happened to the church in Columbia. Terrorist activities conducted by FARC and the ELN in Colombia made operations by North Americans dangerous. In this case, the church removed all North American personnel from Columbia, leaving local Columbians or other Latin Americans to direct the affairs of the church in that area. While the perception of association may have continued, the fact that the church in that area is totally directed by local leaders helps to lessen that particular perception.

In some cases, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there is, in actuality, an association with governmental or political entities and many NGOs. Many NGOs receive their funding from governments, making them, essentially, clearinghouses for governmental resources and policies. In many of these cases, the simplest

prescription would be to eliminate any ties with the government entity(s). However, many non-governmental organizations cannot exist without the patronage of these entities.²⁹⁹ As Cooley and Ron demonstrated, there is a scarcity in the market for resources for non-governmental organizations.³⁰⁰ Further, as discussed previously, many NGOs rely on this association for political leverage on the government where they wish to conduct operations or for other associational benefits. Consequently, it is doubtful that NGOs are going to sever ties with their stakeholders.

What remains, then, is similar to the LDS Church's tactic: reduce the perception. This may be accomplished by name changes or personnel changes. Certainly misdirection could possibly work. The tactic employed by many traveling students who sew Canadian flags to their backpack could be effective. Perhaps media could be employed to reduce any such perceptions. The fact exists, however, that a competing NGO may scarcely be able to spend resources on a media campaign when it is struggling to accomplish its central mission.

Another tactic employed by the LDS Church seems promising. The requirement that its volunteers spend four hours a week on public service may serve the purpose of replacing one association with another. As NGO volunteers spend time interacting with the public, the stereotypes and general perceptions fall away to be replaced by the direct perceptions of people that make up the general population. If the perception of the Mormon Church is associated with "those guys cleaning the neighborhood" or "those people that helped teach reading in the library," any general associations with the United States can be minimized.

²⁹⁹ Edwards and Hume, 1996.

³⁰⁰ Cooley and Ron, 2002, pp. 5-39.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY

As discussed in Chapter 4, NGOs seem to be damned if they do and damned if they do not with regard to political activity. If NGOs engage in overt political activity, i.e. supporting one side in a political struggle or promoting one political point of view, they cross the event horizon and become “legitimate” targets. Conversely, if they engage in non-political activities such as humanitarian aid or infrastructure building, they become targets due to the changes they are attempting to make to the general political environment of the area.

Again, the prescription seems simple: stop engaging in these kinds of activities. However simple, stopping all activities is feasible only if the NGO is willing to shut down operations and concede defeat. Certainly, NGOs have taken that option when losses exceeded the benefits of their work. Others, in other locations could be helped, and the NGOs simply went to a place where they could accomplish their mission without incurring terrorist attack on themselves or those they were trying to help.

Certainly, NGOs could cease all overtly political activities. At the heart of this option is the very foundation of the mission of the NGO. According to this research, the Catholic Church became the target of both state and insurgent terrorist attacks in Latin America while pursuing “liberation theology.” Central to many of these attacks were the positions that individual personnel as well as general Catholic policies pursued. The question remains, could the Catholic Church have continued to exist as the dominant spiritual institution of Latin America while ignoring basic questions such as fundamental human rights and individual freedoms? Could

Amnesty International continue its agenda if they gave up their pursuit of fundamental human rights and ignored the locking up of political prisoners or gave up their protests against capital punishment? Clearly the answer is no.

Korten argues that NGOs need to actually get more involved in political endeavors. He feels that many NGOs are wasting their time treating symptoms rather than trying to cure the disease. Without actually addressing the development issue, simply feeding the hungry is actually counterproductive in terms of long-term welfare of the global South.³⁰¹ This being the case, should NGOs be willing to put personnel and volunteers at risk?

For some groups, innately political questions are not fundamental to their mission. The LDS Church, while concerned about the freedom of the world and human dignity, is more concerned with proselytizing and humanitarian aid. As a result, they can minimize those political questions and focus on their stated goals. This, then, is one option. The prescription is, if possible, for NGOs to minimize any overtly political operations in which they are engaged. As stated previously, this may not be an option for groups whose causes are innately political, but for those with other goals, it is an option that can be considered.

Limiting the scope of an activity that is not overtly political and yet fundamental to an organization's cause is much more complicated. Any action which may affect the political environment, even activities in which such an environmental change is not the organization's goal, could serve to focus the attention of a terrorist group. The goal of many terrorist groups is the creation of instability, which, in turn,

³⁰¹ David C. Korten, *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda*, (Kumarian Press, Inc.: West Hartford, Connecticut, 1990), pg. 188.

lessens the legitimacy of government. Traditional NGO activities, which include stabilization efforts and infrastructure building, often bring NGOs into conflict with terrorist groups. The obvious prescription—halting such activities—is often antithetical to many NGOs. Clearly, this is one targeting imperative that cannot be ameliorated. The hope is that sufficient gains can be made on other imperatives so as to reduce the threat horizon and move the NGO down on the target list.

STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES

In Chapter 4, it was established that terrorist groups might target NGOs in an effort to secure resources. Those resources could be financial or relate to safe haven or recruiting. In many cases, NGOs are juicy targets due to their financial resources and their status as a “softer target”. The difficulty in creating a prescription that limits the ability of NGOs to provide financial resources in the event of a terrorist attack is entangled in problems of policy.

Certainly, NGOs could adopt a policy that prohibits negotiations and payments relating to ransom. While adopting a “no negotiation for ransom” policy may deter attacks in the long run, attacks will still occur in the short run. Further, this type of policy can only be successful if all NGOs in an area adopt the same measure. Maintaining a “non negotiation” policy is also difficult when people’s lives are literally on the line. Another difficulty in creating an effective prescription meant to limit kidnapping and ransom attacks is the fact that this type of attack has proved so successful in that past. As long as the perception that a terrorist group can make money through kidnapping exists, these types of attack will also persist.

Similar to the imperative discussed in the last section concerning non-political work that changes the political environment, the fact that much of the work that NGOs engage in also limits the access to safe haven and recruiting by terrorist groups. This may lead to terrorist attacks on those NGOs. As stability operations are among the most common operations engaged in by NGOs, a prescription on this type of activity is impractical. There only remains work on other targeting imperatives in order to reduce the threat to NGOs.

CULTURE/SOCIAL OR RELIGIOUS REASONS

If Easton's premise that politics is "the authoritative allocation of values for a society"³⁰² is accepted, then attacks meant to reinforce a certain set of values or eliminate other values that are introduced by NGOs can be reduced. The prescription is simple: either make the values the NGO advances less threatening, or control the values that are portrayed.

Making the values an NGO advances less threatening may be difficult. If an NGO advances a free market economy or a democratic form of government that is opposed by a terrorist group, how can those values be made less threatening? Again perception must be addressed. What is requisite is an understanding of the terrorist group's aims and objectives. With understanding comes the ability to present the NGO message in a way that is less offensive to the terrorist groups. Certainly there is a limit to the 'spin' an NGO can engage in without changing the mission completely. However, there may be room for dialogue and communication, which promotes mutual understanding. This research is not advocating the adoption of terrorist views

³⁰² Easton, 1965.

or transforming a central mission value. It is advocating understanding and respect of values so as to avoid confrontation.

This leads to the next prescription: controlling the values that an NGO portrays. Aside from the dissemination and adoption of values an official mission seeks to accomplish, an NGO might be disseminating other values. A brief explication is needed. A group that seeks to feed the hungry in a famine wracked country certainly wishes to spread the values of individual worth and humanitarian aid to all in need. By working to feed the hungry they accomplish their goals. However, the volunteers are also disseminating other values as well. This dissemination of other values may not necessarily be conscious or overt. As peoples from different cultural backgrounds come together, inevitably there will be instances of cultural clash. This is especially true when the NGO is made up of Western volunteers. Many non-Western countries are sensitive to “cultural imperialism” or the overtaking of traditional culture by popular Western culture. This cultural imperialism can be as innocuous as food selection or dress habits, music selection or souvenir collection. However, many cultures feel that they are in a battle to protect their endangered culture.

This cultural imperialism imperative can be reduced in ways that are similar to those meant to lessen the terrorist threat due to overt value substitution. Namely: education and understanding. NGO personnel should be thoroughly indoctrinated in the dominant culture of the area they are going to be doing their work. Such training will increase the sensitivity of NGO personnel and make them less likely to accidentally spread values to which the terrorist group is opposed. The LDS case is

again a good example. LDS missionaries receive cultural and language training prior to arriving in country. This training is meant to lessen possible clashes that might otherwise occur. Further, NGO personnel who speak the language of the area in which they work are going to be more likely to understand and be sensitive to the culture of the people around them.

Restrictions on the LDS missionaries' activities can also lessen the danger of cultural clashes. LDS missionaries are prohibited from listening to popular music. The spread of Western music is often cited as one of the key areas that traditional authorities condemn westerners. LDS missionaries are prohibited from dating or otherwise socially engaging anyone. Often, traditional authorities fear the corruption of their youth through social interaction with westerners. As was documented in chapter 5, there is often a fear that their sons or daughters will be seduced away to leave the society that they hold so dear. The prohibition against dating or social interaction also combats the feeling that the LDS are out to "carry off their daughters." Missionaries are required to wear conservative dress. As such, they are less likely to offend those with conservative dress mores. These types of prohibitions can go a long way to stem fears of cultural imperialism that may lead to retaliation by groups opposed to Western values and ideals.

Prescriptions against teaching of values, especially religious values may be impossible for groups with the express purpose of "sharing the gospel." In these cases, local religious officials can only try to spread common understanding and esteem. However, even in these cases, fundamentalist groups that are opposed to the

religious values being spread may not be dissuaded from taking violent action.

Again, in those situations, target hardening may be the only option left.

Another prescription that may reduce the threat of terrorism due to the social/cultural/religious imperative as well as the associational imperative is to take advantage of something similar to Keck and Sikkink's advocacy networks. If the goal of the organization is indeed the accomplishment of a certain mission, then working with local groups may be the ideal answer. This is a strategy that Korten emphasizes for reasons of effectiveness and relevancy.³⁰³ By utilizing a local NGO as the means of carrying out an operation, the dangers due to association as well as offending social, cultural or religious traditions can be reduced. This is similar to what the LDS Church does when conducting humanitarian aid in places where there are no local operations. In these cases, the LDS Church utilizes other NGOs that do have operations in the area as the means of distribution.

TARGET HARDENING

Drake theorized, "Where there is a number of potential targets, attacking any of which would yield a roughly equivalent strategic benefit, there is a likelihood that the terrorists will choose to attack the softest target, as carrying out such an attack represents the least risk to the terrorists."³⁰⁴ NGO targets are notoriously soft, especially given the recent efforts to harden other traditional targets of terrorist groups.³⁰⁵

Many of the prior targeting imperatives could explain attacks on NGOs. The difficulty in advancing prescriptions on many of the imperatives stem from the fact

³⁰³ Korten, 1990, pg. 197.

³⁰⁴ Drake, pg. 179.

³⁰⁵ Hoffman, 2001, pp. 7-8.

that following the prescriptions would invalidate the very mission many NGOs seek to accomplish. NGOs engaged in infrastructure building, which are targeted by groups seeking to destabilize an area for the purpose of either reducing the legitimacy granted the local government or to establish an environment conducive to acquiring safe haven and recruits, cannot abandon their missions and continue to be what they are. For these types of groups, there remain two options: find a place where there is a need that is safer or harden themselves as targets.

Clearly, one of the easiest ways of avoiding terrorist attack is simply to abandon the work in the area, removing the target altogether. This is similar to the tactic that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints employed when Columbia and Peru got too dangerous. However, as discussed above, the LDS Church had a luxury that many NGOs do not, namely, local leadership and personnel able to carry on the work. In those cases, the work did not suffer; the actors just changed.

The question remains, what if handing the work off to local leadership and personnel is not possible? What if the organization does not have the local resources or training necessary to carry out the mission without international personnel? Is it acceptable to simply stop the work and allow the people in the area to suffer? The answer to this question must be answered by each NGO after carefully weighing their goals and objectives. Perhaps the goals of the organization are so overpowering that the organization is willing to sacrifice personnel and supplies in order to carry out their mission.

Responsible consideration must be given to the opposite perspective. As has been pointed out in other sections of this research, the world is a market of scarce

resources. Is subjecting personnel and supplies to potential attack the best use of resources? Certainly many NGOs recognize that they are filling a necessary niche. They recognize that they are working in areas that are, by definition, dangerous places.³⁰⁶

The author would submit that in a marketplace of scarce resources the responsible allocation of resources would take into account not only the chance that personnel and resources may be destroyed, but also that the work itself may prove counterproductive to those that the NGO is trying to help. In that scarce marketplace, are there not other people or areas that are in great need? Perhaps the responsible administrator might allocate the work to a less dangerous area in the hope that they can be more effective to the people in that area. Further, does not one who lives to run away, live to conduct missions another day? Certainly the people in the area forgone might suffer without the work that NGOs could give. However, those people may be in a better situation without the NGOs attracting terrorist attacks in their midst.

As noted by Randolph Martin of the International Rescue Committee, many NGOs simply are not concerned with security, as security is so alien to their missions.³⁰⁷ One former missionary put it this way, “How are we supposed to know whether the guy walking in the front door is a terrorist or whether he is simply, genuinely in need?” Often, as interviewed former missionaries illustrated, NGO workers either are willing to sacrifice themselves to a greater good or rely on divine protection. Perhaps they simply do not wish to entertain the thought of potential

³⁰⁶ Martin, 1999.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

terrorist attack. While this research cannot comment on the efficacy of divine intervention into the security of NGOs, simply burying ones head in the sand will not eliminate the terrorist threat to non-governmental organizations. In order to reduce the threat of terrorism to NGOs this “ignoring a threat and hoping it will go away” can no longer happen. The security of personnel and supplies must be addressed before an NGO commits resources to a mission. Much of the consideration for security would not be a costly endeavor. The hardening steps may be simply the education of the personnel in prudent security measures. However, it is more likely that the NGOs will have to invest some of their resources to security. Regardless, as other potential targets harden, there will certainly be an increase in terrorist attacks on NGOs if they do not.

Again, the LDS case is illustrative. Perhaps the restrictions placed on the volunteers also serve to harden the targets. Simple rules and regulations that all missionaries must follow limit travel and proscribe other potentially dangerous activities such as going out late at night or doing anything alone. These regulations allow for operations to continue without limiting the workers or requiring the allocation of important financial resources. This, then, is the final prescription: limit the actions of the NGO personnel in a way that serves to harden the target.

FUTURE RESEARCH

The need for additional research seems to be one of the mantras common to political science research. So too, this research opens the door to much needed further research opportunities. Given time and resources, the theoretical framework advanced in this research should be tested empirically to determine its validity and

generalizability across cases. As this research looked specifically at one NGO case, additional NGOs should be considered.

In Chapter 4 this research discussed the amazingly low rate of death for Mormon personnel—less than 1% of all attacks against the church resulted in a fatality. This is especially significant when compared to the general rate of fatal attacks of 23.5 percent. Perhaps attacks using the associational targeting parameter need not be fatal to accomplish its objective. This seems unlikely when the fact is considered that 21.25 percent of attacks with an associational marker in the database included attempts on a life. Neither does the low loss of life seem to be due to the fact that it is a religious endeavor. Fatal attacks on personnel of the Catholic Church occur at a rate of 28.5 percent.

Those that have been targeted using the political imperative, however, have a much more somber distinction. Political attacks are often lethal in nature. While the associational type of target is diffuse and general in nature, the political actor type are much more discreet and specific. As such, people engaged in political activities often find themselves the victim of fatal attack. Future research will, hopefully find the characteristics of targets and terrorist groups that make for fatal attacks.

Given the timeliness of this research and the growing role that NGOs play in the international community, the value of this research topic cannot be overstated. Further, the increased activity of terrorist groups and their search for targets makes this research topic one that will not fade away over time. The hope is that with further research, the instances where NGOs come under the crosshairs of terrorist groups will be reduced. The end result of a reduction in the terrorist threat to NGOs

would undoubtedly be saving of human lives—both those of the NGO personnel, and those that have their lives enriched through the works that NGOs conduct.

There is another ramification that this research can have on the field of terrorism. Certainly, research that focuses on the targeting strategies of terrorist groups are few in number and limited in scope. This research, however, expands on the work of Crenshaw and Drake in that it gives a concrete framework that can be applied to other cases. From a theoretical perspective this is significant in that it is a concrete framework with a specific typology. It treats the phenomenon of terrorism as a rational act and attempts to divine the true motivation by studying the selection of who is targeted. From this perspective, this research is potentially groundbreaking in terms of attacking the causes of terrorism. Terrorism as a phenomenon will not be eliminated without a greater understanding of the motives of the perpetrators. This study has the potential for at least partially opening the door to this type of understanding.

APPENDIX I: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Interview Questions: Asked in face-to-face interviews.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
Church Headquarters
Missionary Committee Representative
Salt Lake City, Utah

1. When assigning missionaries to missions world-wide, does nationality/citizenship preclude service in some high-risk areas?
2. Are there missions in the church where only native missionaries may serve?
3. Have North American missionaries been removed from missions where they may have come under increased risk of attack?
4. Do you feel that local peoples equate the church with the United States?
5. Do you think that the church is targeted for political violence because it is “American”?
6. Is there a plan in place to ensure the safety of missionaries should they come under increased threat of political violence/attack.
7. Are there activities that missionaries engage in which lessen their susceptibility to risk or attack?
8. Do missionaries do anything to reduce their exposure/visibility when there are heightened risks of political violence?
9. Is the safety of the missionaries or spreading the gospel the paramount goal within the missionary program of the church?
10. Are the missionaries serving throughout the world safe?
11. Does the Missionary Department have a plan to respond to violence perpetrated on missionaries should that violence occur?
12. Are you concerned with the safety of converts to the church?
13. Are some populations/ethnicities/religions off-limits?
14. Is that due to political or safety concerns?
15. Given that there might be repercussions to conversion; does the church actively proselytize to Muslims?

Additional Interview Questions: To be asked in face-to-face interviews.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
Church Headquarters
General Authority Representative
Salt Lake City, Utah

1. One of the reasons why the church could be targeted for political violence is a link between the church and the United States of America. Does the church do anything to emphasize the international aspect of the church or to de-emphasize the fact that the church is based in and seen as an American church?
2. Does action by the United States government place the church at heightened risk of political violence?

3. When attacks against the church occur, does the church enlist U.S. government aid in prosecuting perpetrators or recovering church assets/people?
4. Does the church negotiate with terrorists/hostage takers?
5. In some areas of the world, terrorists have engaged in hostage taking as a means of financing their organizations. Does the church pay ransom?
6. Has the church closed down operations in some areas of the world due to heightened threat of political violence or terror attacks?
7. Does the structure of the church organization increase/decrease the exposure to political violence/terrorist attacks?
8. Do local members of the church resent “foreign” leadership?
9. Do you feel safe when visiting areas where there may be a risk of political violence/terrorist threats?
10. At what level are safety concerns decided? (i.e. missionary population safety, local safety, safety of church assets).
11. Does the church have a central plan to respond to violence should it occur?

Additional Interview Questions: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
Church Headquarters
Physical Facilities/Architecture Representative
Salt Lake City, Utah

1. Does the church attempt to “harden” buildings in areas of the world where there may be heightened threats of political violence or terrorism?
2. Are church buildings designed to provide avenues of escape or protected enclaves should an attack occur?

Questionnaire: Sent via mail to Area/Regional headquarters.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
General Authority—Area Presidency Representative
Area/Regional Headquarters

The following is a questionnaire relating to the threat of political violence or terrorism to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in the _____ Area. Please fill out the questionnaire using the space provided or attach additional pages as necessary. Please feel free to explain or expand your answers. Your cooperation is appreciated.

1. How much latitude are you given to develop responses to increased risks of political violence or terrorist threats?
2. Do you feel safe when administering the church in countries where there is increased risks of political violence/terrorist threats?
3. Do you feel that local members of the church are under increased risk of violence due to their affiliation with the church?
4. Do you have a plan to respond to violence should it occur?
5. Are any such plans dictated by Salt Lake or developed locally?
6. Do you feel that the local populations equate the church with the United States?
7. Do you think that the church is targeted for political violence because it is “American”?
8. Have you administered the church when there was an act of violence perpetrated against the church in your area of authority? If yes, please give the details.
9. How did you respond to that act?
10. Was that response dictated by church headquarters?
11. Did you feel the church did everything it could to reduce the risk or ameliorate the damage of attacks in that case?
12. Was there anything else the church could have done to reduce the risk?

Questionnaire: Sent via mail to local church headquarters
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
Local Leadership—Bishop/Branch Presidents/District
Presidents/Stake Presidents
City/State Areas

The following is a questionnaire relating to the threat of political violence or terrorism to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in the _____ Branch/Ward/Stake/District. Please fill out the questionnaire using the space provided or attach additional pages as necessary. Please feel free to explain or expand your answers. Your cooperation is appreciated.

1. Do you feel safe as a leader of the church in this area?
2. Do you feel that the church is sensitive to heightened threats of political violence/terrorism in this area?
3. Are you given direction to reduce the threat of political violence?
4. Does your membership in the church increase your risk to political violence/terrorism?
5. Do you have plans in place to deal with violence should it occur?
6. Are those plans dictated from Salt Lake or developed locally.
7. Do you feel that local citizens equate the church with the United States?
8. Do you think that the church is targeted for political violence because it is “American”?
9. Have you witnessed violence against the church or were you serving in an area that sustained violence against the church? If so, what were the circumstances?
10. What did you do to reduce your/the church’s exposure/risk?
11. Were those actions dictated by the church?
12. Was there anything the church could have done to reduce the exposure/risk?

Interview Questions: To be asked in face to face interviews.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
Former missionaries who served in high-risk areas.

1. Did you feel safe as a missionary?
2. Was your safety or was spreading the gospel more important?
3. Were you aware of any procedures or practices that you were instructed to engage in that might reduce the threat of political violence to you or other members of the church in that area?
4. Were you ever instructed not to proselytize due to an increased risk of violence?
5. Were you ever the victim of political violence?
6. Did you ever witness political violence against the church or were you serving in an area that sustained violence against the church? If so, what were the circumstances?
7. What did you do to reduce your exposure/risk?
8. Were those actions dictated by the church?
9. Do you feel that the church did everything it could to reduce the risk?
10. Was there anything else the church could have done to reduce the risk?
11. Do you feel that the local population equated the church with the United States?
12. Were you ever instructed not to proselytize to one group/ethnicity/religion?
13. Why do you think that was the case?
14. Do you think that locals might increase their risk of political violence by joining the church?
15. Do you think that the church was sensitive to heightened threats of political violence/terrorism threats in the area?
16. Do you think that the church was targeted for political violence because it is "American"?

INTERNET POSTING

Attention all returned missionaries!

I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Stephen Sloan in the Department of Political Science, a unit of the University of Oklahoma College of Arts and Sciences. I invite you to participate in an interview as part of a doctoral dissertation research study being conducted under the auspices of the University of Oklahoma-Norman Campus and entitled "NGO's in the Crosshairs: Non-Governmental Organizations and the Terrorist Threat". The purpose of the study is to determine the potential threat to non-governmental organizations, such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, posed by terrorist groups.

Your participation will involve a short interview (in person, if possible) and should only take about 30 minutes. Your involvement in the study is voluntary, and you may choose not to participate or to stop at any time. The results of the research study may be published, but your name will not be used. Further, in the published form, results that deal with specific security matters will be withheld and the findings will be presented in summary only. All information you provide that deals with security matters will remain strictly confidential.

The findings from this project will provide information on how the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints deals with the threat of terrorism and political violence with no cost to you other than the time it takes for the interview.

The only risks that may result from the participation in the study relate to sensitive security protocols that may increase the risk to the participant's organization, its agents or property should that information be released. However, steps have been taken to ensure that such disclosure will not occur. The dissertation committee has agreed that such sensitive material be disclosed and discussed with the committee co-chairs only. Further, such sensitive material will not be made public and disseminated in the final dissertation. Because your identity also will remain anonymous in the dissertation itself, no individual risk, political or professional, can accrue.

If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact me at (405) 325-6418 or cjstap@ou.edu or Professor Sloan at (405) 325-5910 or carlos@ou.edu. Questions about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the project should be directed to the Institutional Review Board at the University of Oklahoma-Norman Campus at (405) 325-8110 or irb@ou.edu.

Thanks for your consideration!

Sincerely,

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