THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

# CONFUCIAN THEORY: ITS APOLOGIA, CRITIQUE, AND PROBLEM OF "DEMOCRACY"

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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Norman, Oklahoma

1970

CONFUCIAN THEORY: ITS APOLOGIA, CRITIQUE,

AND PROBLEM OF "DEMOCRACY"

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is grateful to the graduate faculty of the University of Oklahoma for providing a great deal of inspiration, assistance, and many pleasant memories during his graduate work at Norman.

More specifically, in preparing this study, he is deeply indebted to Dr. John Paul Duncan, David Ross Boyd Professor of Political Science, who has rendered invaluable advice, assistance, criticism, and patient reading and correcting and editing this manuscript which was an especially demanding task. The writer must express his appreciation for the generous contribution of time and efforts which made this study complete at this time. In the latter part of this study, the writer freely used Professor Duncan's words and comments without giving the cited credit on every occasion. Suffice it to say that such guidance is responsible for the merit this study may possess.

The author also wishes to acknowledge the aids and suggestions accorded him by other members of the dissertation committee. He is especially indebted to Dr. Oliver E. Benson, George Lynn Cross Research Professor of Political

Science, for reading the entire early draft of this study and for his advice and suggestions of inestimable value, especially on Chinese theory. Of course, it goes without saying that all those aids enabled the finished product to be better than would otherwise have been the case.

Sincere gratitude of the author must be expressed to Miss Kathleen A. Mach for her aids in editing and typing the entire first draft of this work; to Dr. Mildred E. Hartsock, chairman of the English department at Atlantic Christian College, for her kind reading and correcting Chapters V and VI at one stage of revision; and to Atlantic Christian College for its faculty summer research grants in 1968 and 1969. A special note of thanks goes to Mrs. James Murphy who typed the final copy on time.

Finally, the author would like to take this opportunity to recall the memories of his father, Dr. Don Sang Suhr (1911-1969 A.D.), who sent his son abroad for advanced work, and waited many years hoping to see the completion of the formal study. . . The sad news from home seemed so unreal, and this study was briefly interrupted. However, the author's phrenetic effort to fulfill his father's wish was chiefly responsible for the unfaltering devotion to this work while he was doing full-time teaching.

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## CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Confucianism has been the most persistent, persuasive and influential teaching in East Asian history. More than any other thought, it has molded the minds and behavior of the people in China, Korea, and Japan for many centuries. Confucianism has provided these people with their ethical and moral norms as well as suggested methods of government, and the impact of this Confucian theory and its ideology upon their political and social life is still discernible today.

### The Man and His Time

For any meaningful study of Confucianism, it is necessary to understand Confucius as a person and the time in which he lived, since the ideas of Confucius are about twenty-five hundred years old.

K'ung Fu-tzu (551-479 B.C.), known in the West as Confucius, was born in the state of Lu, a portion of north-eastern China, roughly corresponding with the modern province of Shantung. It is generally understood that Confucius was a remote descendant of the imperial family of the Shang dynasty (1766?-1122 or 1027 B.C.), but the exact social status of his personal and contemporary family remains in doubt.[1] They might have been distantly related to the nobility, but he and his immediate family seem to have been relatively poor. His father died when Confucius was about three years of age, and his mother reared him. When he was about twenty Confucius received a minor political appointment in the state of Lu, at which position he seems to have worked faithfully. He was later promoted to a higher position. By that time he became known all over Lu because of his honest work and his knowledge of the classics.

However he was eventually forced to go into exile due to a political intrigue in Lu. Confucius is known to have then drifted around various parts of China for eight years and not to have returned to his home state until the age of fifty-three. Since the old enemy who caused his exile

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[1]H. G. Creel, Confucius: The Man and the Myth (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951), p. 30ff.

was no longer in power, he was employed again by the Lu government. Due to his influence it is said that the Lu government subsequently became the least corrupt government in China, a fact which later endangered the position of the ruling classes of neighboring states. Thus jealous neighboring rulers helped stage a coup to eliminate Confucius; once again he was stripped of his position and began the second long period of wandering in his career. During this period Confucius travelled with a small group of followers and was known to have maintained his subsistence by tutoring a number of students. This period provided an excellent opportunity to acquaint himself with politics of different parts of China. After fourteen years of wandering Confucius returned to his homeland and seems to have spent the rest of his life in teaching. He died at the age of seventy-two or three.[2]

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[2]The life and teachings of Confucius have quite naturally attracted a vast quantity of hagiographic writings, most of it highly fanciful. This brief account of Confucius' life is based on the following sources: James Dyer Ball, The Celestial and His Religions or the Religious Aspect of China (Hongkong: Kelly and Walsh, 1906), pp. 36-40; Augustus W. Loomis (ed.), Confucius and the Chinese Classics (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1882), pp. 44-49; Chi-yun Chang, A Life of Confucius trans. Shih Chao-yin (Taipei: China Culture Publishing Foundation, 1954), pp. 11-13; Carl Crow, Master-Kung: The Story of Confucius (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938); H. H. Dubs, "Political Career of Confucius," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXVI (October, 1946), pp.

Confucius lived during the time known as the Spring and Autumn period, which is the latter period of Chu dynasty (1127-403 B.C.). Many centuries before Confucius, the Shang, China's first historical dynasty, was established. In 1122 B.C. the Shang dynasty of China is known to have been attacked by a coalition of tribesmen from the west.[3] The conquerors established the Chu dynasty. They expanded their territory so much that they had great difficulty in ruling the vast land with their highly centralized structure of government. Their empire later began to disintegrate, and China became divided again into numerous kingdoms, ruled by the former members of the Shang ruling class. There then grew up a feudal system in China, and each vassal had absolute power and ruled autonomously in his area.

In the course of years the descendants of the early feudal lords gradually lost their closeness. Consequently, power struggles among feudal rulers were increasingly evident, and political power was gradually usurped by the

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274-82; Wu-chi Liu, Confucius: His Life and Times (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), Chaps. III, V, & VI; Shigeki Keizuka, Confucius trans. Geoffrey Bownas (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 42-65; and H. G. Creel, op. cit., pp. 29-71.

[3]Kenneth S. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, Vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), pp. 40-42.

families who provided candidates for the highest offices of the various feudal states.[4] The ruling classes had little interest in common people's welfare, and there were more sycophants in politics than at any other previous time in history. Among the states internecine strife, treachery, and intrigues predominated. To make matters worse, not only were the Chinese states constantly fighting each other, but barbarians from the north frequently invaded the Chinese states.

The state of Lu where Confucius lived was relatively weak and small. Despite this it suffered comparatively little from the wars, probably because of its location. Internally, however, the politics of Lu were as chaotic as those of her neighbors.[5] Most of the ruling class were morally corrupt; nepotism, adultery, incest, and bribery abounded. Meanwhile amorality reigned in the relationship among states, and the rulers often had to undertake intrigues and secret pacts for survival.[6] Describing the political situation of that period, Mencius said:

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[4] Ibid., pp. 42-51, et passim.

[5] The Analects reveals the nature of politics in Lu. See also Shigeki Kaizuka, op. cit., pp. 14-19; Sang-eun Lee, Hyndae wa Dongyang Sasang [Modern Times and the Oriental Thought] (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1963), pp. 187-89.

[6] Kenneth S. Lautourette, op. cit., pp. 48-56.

> Again the world fell into decay, and principles faded away. Perverse speakings and oppressive deeds waxed rife again. There were instances of ministers who murdered their sovereigns, and of sons who murdered their fathers.[7]

The prevailing conditions of his day greatly influenced Confucius' teachings. Confucius believed that only a personally virtuous ruler could save the world and that moral cultivation of the rulers was the only way to reestablish security and order. The purpose of Confucius was well described by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145?-90? B.C.), a prominent historian, in his Introduction to the Memoires Historiques.

> When the authority of the emperor of Chu declined, the princes severely flaunted their powers. Confucius, regretting the general neglect of the rites and the decline of music, attempted to revive the classical tradition with a view to popularizing the kingly way, to giving direction to an unruly age on the right track of development.[8]

## Development of Confucianism

The teachings of Confucius were not very widely known during Confucius' lifetime, although he was much respected as a great teacher.[9] As a political reformer Confucius

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[7] Mencius, Bk. III, pt. II, Chap. IX, sec. 7.

[8] Quoted in Chi-yun Chang, op. cit., p. 3.

[9] One of Confucius' contemporaries, for example, said: "Great indeed is the Master K'ung! His learning is so extensive, and yet he does not render his name famous by any

accomplished little when he was alive, and his teachings did not attract many people. It was not until many years later that his teachings were recognized and he was highly honored by his countrymen.

It was during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) that the Confucian doctrine became the official government theory and ideology and that Confucianism, for the first time, acquired prestige, and under the protection of the government Confucius' teachings began to be widely known. A corollary of this newly acquired prestige was the proliferation of many Confucian scholars. After the fall of the Han dynasty, however, the study of Confucius' teachings gradually waned.

Although Confucianism was accepted as an official theory for political institutions during and after the Han dynasty, it had shown little ideological development. Beginning about the eleventh century, however, a strong revival of Confucianism occurred. At that time, Confucian scholars' intellectual activity was stimulated and even determined by the speculations of Buddhism and Taoism. Scholars began to consider problems dealing with nature, with the

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particular thing." [The Analects, Bk. IX, Chap. II, sec. 1.] Confucius was regarded as China's first private teacher in history; see Yu-lan Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Derk Bodde (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 39.

external world, and with man as a part of nature. According to one authority in the field, Chinese philosophy passed from its ancient to its modern period with the emergence of these concerns.[10]

The best known scholar in this movement was Chu Hsi (1130-1200 A.D.), and the movement is known as either Chu Hsi-ism or Neo-Confucianism. It was mainly because of the genius of Chu Hsi that the unorganized ideas of his predecessors were "welded into a coherent, all-inclusive system of thought, which speedily became accepted as the basis of Chinese orthodoxy,"[11] especially in politics and government.

According to Neo-Confucianism, the universe is dual. There is a physical world of concrete matter on the one hand and a metaphysical world made up of abstract "essence" or principle (li) on the other. Any object of matter or any phenomenon has a corresponding principle or li which manifests itself and gives order (direction) in this world. In other words, according to the illustration given by Bodde, it is the metaphysical principle that pertains to boats that

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[10]Ch'u Chai, "Neo-Confucianism of the Sung-Ming Periods," Social Research, XVIII (September, 1951), p. 370.

[11]Derk Bodde, "Chinese View of Immortality: its expression by Chu Hsi and its relationship to Buddhist thought," Review of Religion, VI (May, 1942), p. 369.

causes such boats (as found in our physical world) to move only on water and not on land, just as it is the principle pertaining to carts that causes carts to move only on land.[12]

Thus there are individualized principles in all phenomena. The highest activity of the Confucian scholar is to search constantly for these objective principles and to cultivate himself so that he might transcend the phenomenal world and perceive the relationship between matter and principle.[13] In human beings, principle manifests itself through the mind, which acts as a temporal container for li. An example of Chu Hsi's exegesis follows:

> Confucius spoke of "the conquest of self and return to propriety." The Doctrine of the Mean says: "Advance toward equilibrium and harmony"; or again: "Prize the virtuous nature and pursue the path of inquiry and study." The Great Learning speaks of "The mind of the body is unstable; the mind of the spirit is but small. Be discriminating; be undivided, that you may sincerely hold fast to the mean." The teachings of the sage, whether they be a thousand or ten thousand words, are only that men should preserve Heavenly Principle and extinguish human desire.
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> Man's nature is originally clear, but it is like a pearl immersed in impure water, where its luster cannot be seen. Being removed from the dirty water, however, it becomes lustrous of itself as before. If each person could

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[12] Derk Bodde, loc. cit., p. 370.

[13] Chu-tzu Yu-lei [Classified Conversations of Chu Hsi], XII, 8, cited in Yu-lan Fung, op. cit., pp. 559-60.

> himself realize that it is human desire that causes this obscuring, this would bring enlightenment. It is only on this point alone that all one's efforts must be concentrated.[14]

The importance of Neo-Confucianism in East Asian life cannot easily be exaggerated, for this highly abstract theory dominated the academic world until the end of the nineteenth century. On the one hand, it revolutionalized earlier Confucianism by introducing metaphysical speculation with which classical Confucianism had little concern. On the other hand, however, it did not change basic institutions, methods and theories of government inherited from the classical teachings of Confucius.

## Confucian Persuasion in Korea and Japan

The Confucian system of thought, society, and government has a long history in Korea. It was probably during the early days of the Koguryu dynasty (37 B.C.-668 A.D.) when the teachings of Confucius were introduced.[15] For many centuries Confucianism continuously influenced Korean society, but it did not really dominate Korean life until

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[14] Ibid.

[15] According to a reliable book, Samkuk Sagi [Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms], a king of Korea established a national university to teach Confucianism in 372 A.D. Thus it might be said that the introduction of Confucianism to Korea took place before that date.

the establishment of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910 A.D.). The founder of Yi supported such scholars as Chong Do-jun (?-1398 A.D.) who criticized Buddhism in light of Confucianism.[16] This government promotion of Confucianism eventually led to the situation where Confucian literature was the only object of study throughout the period. Any slight deviation from Confucianism was quickly labelled heresy.[17]

From the beginning of the Yi dynasty in Korea, Confucianism dominated almost completely the thought and philosophy of the nation; hence it is virtually impossible to separate the politics of Yi Korea and Confucianism. The Confucianism that eventually dominated the Yi dynasty was Neo-Confucianism, which had been introduced to Korea in the late Koryo (918-1392 A.D.), and which became the official ideology of government and of the yangban class.

The reasons for the adoption of Neo-Confucianism in the late Koryo were manifold. Some maintain that, among

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[16]Chong was actively engaged in the promotion of Confucianism as a political ideal and as a practical code of ethics. His first attempt was a revision of the legal code in accordance with Confucian ideal. See I-sop Hong, "Political Philosophy of Korean Confucianism," Korea Journal, III, No. 9 (September, 1963), p. 12.

[17]Tuk-hwang Kim, Hanguk Sasang-sa [A History of Korean Thought] (Seoul: Namsan-dang, 1958), pp. 111-12. For a Confucian criticism on Buddhism at this time, see Chong-hong Park, "Historical Review of Korean Confucianism," Korea Journal, III, No. 9 (September 1, 1963), pp. 6-8.

other reasons, there had been a lack of intellectual stimuli and that traditional Buddhism was somehow identified with the invading Mongols.[18] Whatever the reasons may have been, with its cosmogonic presumptions and metaphysical speculations Neo-Confucianism provided an effective substitute for Buddhism. It predominated in the formulation of ethics in Korea as well as in intellectual and political assumptions.

The teachings of Confucius also influenced Japan, and it was one of the chief cultural factors that have molded the Japanese character. Since its introduction, Japan "has made [Confucianism] become gradually the most important part of her cultural heritage, not even equalled by its influential rival, Buddhism,"[19] and her political and social institutions were shaped after the pattern of Chinese, i.e. Confucian, organizations.

It is generally known that Confucianism was brought to Japan in 404 A.D. by a Korean scholar,[20] but it appears

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[18]K. P. Yang and Gregory Henderson, "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism," Journal of Asian Studies, XVIII, No. 1 (November, 1958), p. 86.

[19]Joseph John Spae, Ito Jinsai: A Philosopher, Educator, and Sinologist of the Tokugawa Period (Peiping: The Catholic University of Peking Press, 1948), p. 11.

[20]W. G. Aston, "Nihongi," Translations and Proceedings of the Japan Society (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,

to have evoked little interest at first. Probably the earliest literary product of Confucianism in Japan is found in prince Shotoku's Seventeen Article Constitution (604 A.D.) and the Taika Reform edicts (645-650 A.D.). From about the seventh century Confucian teachings had increasingly visible influence upon Japan, especially among the learned class.[21]

However, it was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century that Confucian ideology was adopted as the official governing creed. In 1608, Ieyasu, the first shogun of the Tokugawa, appointed Hayashi Razan, a renowned Confucian scholar, to the Shogunate, thus rendering official support to a movement which within a few years was to make Confucianism "the strongest intellectual and ethical force in Japan."[22] After a century of power struggles, the early rulers of Tokugawa hoped Confucian scholarship would bring

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Trubner & Co., 1896), I, pp. 261-62. See also, Basil H. Chamberlain, Translation of Kojiki, annotated by W. G. Aston, 2nd ed. (Kobe, Japan: J. L. Thomson & Co., 1932), pp. 305-6.

[21]Sadao Kiyohara, Gairai shiso no Nihon-teki hattatsu [Japan's Development of Imported Ideas] (Tokyo: Syobunkan, 1944), p. 146. Joseph J. Spae says fifteen out of the seventeen articles quote, more or less verbally, passages from the different fundamental books of Confucianism, op. cit., p. 18.

[22]Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: Past and Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 87. Emphasis added.

a historical and ethical justification for their government and pacify the country.

The adoption of Confucianism served useful purposes for the Tokugawas. Not only were its standards of conduct chiefly concerned with loyalty, but also the devotion to scholarship itself served to transform bellicose warriors into peaceful scholars. Especially for the latter purpose the Tokugawas endorsed and promoted Neo-Confucianism. In addition, the implications of Neo-Confucianism that cultivated men should instruct the common people in behavior and that good government is dependent upon the ruler's wisdom and the subjects' obedience also served the Tokugawas' purposes.

## The Scope and Problems of Inquiry

Although "Confucianism" has been undoubtedly the most important ideology that has molded social and political life in East Asia, it cannot easily be defined. For one thing, branches such as Han Confucianism, Sung Confucianism (Neo-Confucianism), Yi Confucianism, Tokugawa Confucianism, etc., vary in the emphasis they place on various aspects of Confucianism. In addition, during the course of its evolution it has acquired so many concepts and ideas from other schools such as Taoism and Buddhism that some parts of

Confucian philosophy would hardly be recognizable to its progenitor.[23]

Furthermore, countless individual Confucian scholars offered varying degrees of emphasis as well as varying interpretations. To some it is primarily family ethics and ancestor worship; to others it is a guiding principle which determines social status between men of "superior quality" and men of "inferior quality." Still to others, it is primarily a method of government, or the relationship which should exist between the ruler and the ruled. It is even considered as the metaphysical speculation that will supposedly lead to the realization of the ultimate truth of the universe. Hence, there is no way of describing simply and clearly the full shape of "Confucianism"; the term is indeed amorphous. All in all, it is a loosely organized body of ideas that have been applied almost indiscriminately to phenomena scattered over vast reaches of time and culture.

This does not mean to say that the study of Confucianism is impossible because of the difficulty of defining it. A great deal of study and research has been done, for example, in such subjects as Platonism, Christianity, logical

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[23]Wu-chi Liu, A Short History of Confucian Philosophy (London: Whitefriars Press, Ltd., 1955), pp. 13-14.

positivism, and other inclusive philosophic and theologic systems. Those and other economic-political systems as Marxism and democracy are equally difficult to define. Thus the difficulty of definition cannot be too great a barrier to a serious inquiry.

This study will concentrate on the thoughts and ideas that derive from the basic texts of Confucianism. Confucian thoughts about human nature, the social order, and government are contained in the Four Books and, to some extent, in the Five Classics.[24] Since these books remained the basic sources for political method and theory of all branches of Confucianism, this study will treat the thought in them and will not be concerned with minor differences in the interpretations of the various schools.

One can hardly overemphasize the importance and the magnitude of Confucian theory for the understanding of traditional as well as modern East Asian politics and political

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[24]The Four Books is composed of the Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Work of Mencius. The Five Classics is composed of the Book of Poetry, the Book of History, the Book of Changes, the Book of Rites, and the Spring and Autumn Annals. Almost all Confucian scholars for over two millenia simply re-interpreted or elaborated on these materials. Historians generally agree that many of those materials are not the works of Confucius because some of them were in existence before Confucius' time. Despite the fact, the materials have been closely identified as the core of Confucianism.

culture, as one might have noticed above in the discussion of the development of Confucian thought and its impact upon Korea and Japan. However, one must realize by way of caution that Confucianism does not of course compose the entirety of Chinese thought or East Asian thought. There have been many other schools of thought. Confucianism, however, is more easily understood by the majority of East Asians, though few study it today. Confucianism has become a way of life, and it has been a basic concomitant of East Asian culture which colored the values of nearly all fields of human endeavor, particularly those concerned with political, social, and intellectual activities.

At this point, a comparison can be made with Judeo-Christianity in the West by way of illustrating the position and the nature of Confucianism in East Asia. To many Asians Confucian persuasion is unconscious by now like the Judeo-Christian ethics and precepts which are partially followed by many who do not consciously accept them. Also, in the West, the Christian precepts are often stated--though not lived--by those who do not know the origin. To an extent, the nature of Confucianism is very much like that of Judeo-Christianity in the West.

The purpose of the present study is to examine the

nature of Confucian theory. Especially the study focuses on the Confucian treatment of social order, method of government, and the political leadership. In all fairness, it must be said at the outset that the following two chapters are dealing with the apologetic and "happy" side of Confucian theory of social order and politics. Contrary to the common notion that Confucianism is primarily a personal ethics and decorum, it contains a strong flavor of political thought and ideology.

Confucian theory of government and its ideology has enjoyed a remarkable length of life span, but in the late nineteenth century this seemingly viable and flexible thought was seriously challenged for the first time. Confucian nations confronted Western imperialism at that time, and Confucianism was unable to explain the kinds of problems Western industrial and commercial technologies were posing. Under the circumstances, Confucianism suffered a severe decline. Many began to question the validity of Confucian doctrine, and some even condemned it, calling it anachronistic. This controversy was particularly intense in China in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Thus it seems quite pertinent to a study of Confucian theory to investigate and analyze some of the important and typical arguments raised

against Confucianism at that time in order to uncover the critical and "unhappy" side of Confucianism. More often than not, those arguments advanced by the iconoclasts under national stress provide valuable insights to the true nature of Confucian life.

Also, an attempt will be made to compare and contrast Confucian theory with modern theory of democracy. Such an effort seems relevant because Confucianism was the dominant ideology in China, Korea, and Japan before these countries changed to Western political systems. Furthermore, it has been one of the major "concerns" of the United States since World War II that such Asian nations build lasting and genuine democratic systems of government.

Finally, this study will present further critical views of Confucianism and examine its weaknesses not treated by the Chinese leaders and the intellectuals earlier in the chapter. Here it is argued that Confucianism has failed in the modern world in the sense that the ideals of Confucius are no longer subscribed to by East Asians (at least officially) and since Confucian nations have adopted Western systems of life and government. Hence it will be judiciously argued also that there exist in Confucian thought characteristics that hindered adaption to technological modernization. An attempt will be made to analyze some of these characteristics.

## CHAPTER II

## THE NATURE OF MAN AND SOCIAL ORDER

Chinese philosophy, more specifically Confucian philosophy, differs basically from that of the West. While Western philosophy has by and large aspired to abstraction, Confucianism tends to express itself in an extraordinarily concrete way. A convincing reason for this will probably never be found. Fung Yu-lan advances the thesis, however, that Chinese philosophy, being primarily rural in its nature, does not concern itself with metaphysics as does Western philosophy, which developed in the Greek city-state and in the various urban centers of Europe.[1] The Chinese people have always been preoccupied with concrete relational norms that govern the conduct of individuals, and they have paid little attention to metaphysics, epistemology and logic. They seem not to have been bothered by numerous logical contradictions within their philosophy.

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[1]Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, Derk Bodde, ed. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959). See also Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), pp. 269-71.

As it is generally understood, some predominant conception of the nature of man and the meaning of human existence underlies every political system. Most of the great Western political theories have, more often than not, quite explicit discussion of the nature of man. Confucian teachings, especially classical ones, center around ethics, family life and government, because these concerns were inseparable in Confucian thought. To understand the Confucian system of orderly life and government, it is necessary first to examine how Confucius conceived of human nature.

## The Nature of Man

Confucius seems to have had a strong belief that human nature is basically good, but unfortunately his theoretical explication is somewhat less than adequate. It seems that his approach to the question is mainly normative.

> Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness, and yet live, his escape from death is the effect of mere good fortune.[2]

This is the most frequently quoted passage on the subject,

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[2] The Four Books, Analects, Bk. VI, Ch. XVII. The English versions of Confucian literature in this paper are derived mainly from the work of James Legge, which was done about a century ago but which is still regarded as one of the best translations. Some quotations came from Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, eds. and Trns., The Humanist Way in Ancient China: Essential Works of Confucianism (New York: Bantam Books, 1965).

but it does not explain why Confucius considered man good. The purpose and meaning of man's existence is found only in his striving for uprightness. Confucius emphasized that the primary duty of man is to perfect himself in moral terms.

It was Mencius who elaborated upon and expanded Confucius' theory of human nature. In fact, Mencius was the first to enunciate distinctly the doctrine that the nature of man inclines him to goodness. Mencius said:

> Now by striking water and causing it to leap up you may make it go over your forehead, and by damming and leading it, you may force it up a hill; -- but are such movements according to the nature of water?
>
> The tendency of man's nature to good is like the tendency of water to flow downwards. There are none but have this tendency to good, just as all water flows downwards.[3]

Mencius believed that man's basic nature is good regardless of individuals' social positions and morality. However, he offered no empirical evidence to substantiate this. According to Mencius, therefore, human beings are basically equal. Mencius' conversation with an officer of Chu illustrates the way in which he held all men equal:

> Master. the king sent persons to spy out whether you were really different from other men.

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[3] Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. II.

> How should I be different from other men! Yao and Shun were just the same as other men.[4]

Mencius based his theory of human equality not only on his belief in man's basic goodness but also on observable biological likenesses. To him there is no difference between ordinary men and sages:

> Therefore I say. -- Men's mouths agree in having the same relishes; their ears agree in enjoying the same sounds; their eyes agree in recognizing the same beauty: -- shall their minds alone be without that which they similarly approve? What is it, then, of which they similarly approve? It is, I say, the principles of our nature, and the determinations of righteousness. The sages only apprehended before me that of which my mind approves along with other men. Therefore the principles of our nature and the determinations of righteousness are agreeable to my mind, just as the flesh of grass and grain-fed animals is agreeable to my mouth.[5]

For Confucianism man's nature is such that he is capable of leading the good life, which means living in accordance with his basic nature. If a man falls into evil ways, it is not because there is any defect in his nature, but because he did not develop and utilize the goodness which is intrinsic to all human beings.[6] Thus Confucianism

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[4]Mencius, Bk. IV, pt. V, Ch. XXX. Yao and Shun are the legendary emperors who ruled the country for the best of the people.

[5]Ibid., Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. VIII, sec. 2.

[6]For a detailed explanation see Reginald F. Johnston, Confucianism and Modern China (London: Victor Gollancy, Ltd., 1934), pp. 17 et seq.

believes that in society some men become of ill nature because of bad environment; men are thus subject to environment. It does not, however, deal with the question of the origin of bad environment or evil. Since the universe is moral, environment here seems to mean the influence from bad fellows. But then it may be asked how did the latter become bad in the first place? Confucianists do not answer. They ignore the question and simply do not argue that man has capacity to do evil within himself.

Mencius speculates, however, that prosperous and lean years may have an influence upon young men because of "the circumstances through which they allow their minds to be ensnared and drowned in evil."[7] He uses barley-growing as an analogy. After one plants the seeds of barley one does not always harvest exactly the same quality of barley. This, according to Mencius, is because of the differences in soil, unequal distribution of rains and dews, etc. In other words, it is not due to the difference in the seeds but due to the environment.[8] Mencius quickly added:

> Thus all things which are the same in kind are like to one another; -- why should we doubt in

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[7] Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. VII, sec. 1.

[8] Ibid., sec. 2.

> regard to man, as if he were a solitary exception to this.[9]

Mencius illustrates the ways in which the original nature of man can degenerate with a simile of a virgin forest:

> The trees of the New Mountain were once beautiful. Being situated, however, in the borders of a large state, they were hewn down with axes and bills; -- and could they retain their beauty? Still through the activity of the vegetative life day and night, and the nourishing influence of the rain and dew, they were not without buds and sprouts springing forth, but then came the cattle and goats and browsed upon them. To these things is owing the bare and stripped appearance of the mountain, which when people see, they think it was never fully wooded. But is this the nature of the mountain?[10]

Thus Mencius is quite unequivocally and firmly convinced that human nature is basically and innately good and that evil is the result of environment, but he still leaves the question of whether all men have equal capacity to be good.

Confucius seems somewhat contradictory on this point. At one time he said:

> By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice they get to be wide apart.[11]

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[9] Ibid., sec. 3.

[10] Ibid., Bk. VI, pt. 1, Ch. VIII, sec. 1.

[11] Analects, Bk. XVII, Ch. II.

This would seem to imply that the differences between men in terms of degree of goodness are caused by man's behavior and the environment in which he lives. On the other hand, Confucius is also quoted as saying:

> Those who are born with the possession of knowledge are the highest class of men. Those who learn, and so readily, get possession of knowledge, are the next. Those who are dull and stupid, and yet compass the learning, are another class next to these. As to those who are dull and stupid and yet do not learn; -- they are the lowest of the people.[12]

From this statement, one gathers that Confucius himself believed there existed some innate inequality among men which causes trouble. In conclusion the mainstream of Confucianism, however, held men equal in the sense that their basic nature is gocd and that it is the environment which generally makes men different.

Yet in terms of process of personal and social development Confucianism teaches that those who possess knowledge are superior, and they have to instruct those inferior to them so that the latter will be able to carry out the proper social relationships. Fortunately, Confucianism also believes, human nature is such that men of inferior knowledge instinctively emulate the examples of men of superior knowledge.

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[12] Ibid., Bk. XVI, Ch. IX.

Furthermore, men, regardless of their level of knowledge, are superior to any animal.[13]

More specifically the road to goodness and superiority is knowledge, which consists primarily of understanding nature. Thus the concept of nature in Confucianism is of great importance for an understanding of human nature. Confucius provided the following definition:

> What Heaven has conferred is called THE NATURE; an accordance with this nature is called THE PATH of duty; the regulation of this path is called INSTRUCTION.[14]

In the work of Mencius, "Kao Tzu said: 'That which comes with life is natural.'"[15]

Nature in Confucianism is the product of the will of heaven, and heaven is moral and teleological. Nothing is left to whim or chance. The Confucian heaven is also impersonal and naturalistic and encompasses no personal image or god.[16] Confucius, in fact, was reluctant to discuss the

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[13]Confucius was quoted as saying, "It is in accordance with the nature of things that of all beings on earth Man is the noblest."

[14]The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. I, sec. 1. The term "path" is synonymous with Tao.

[15]Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. III.

[16]"Heaven" is used both in the physical and supernatural sense, and some writers often interpret it as "God."

other world. Once he was asked by his disciple about how to serve the spirits; Confucius replied: "While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?" The same disciple then asked about death, and Confucius responded: "While you do not know life, how can you know about death?"[17]

According to Confucius, knowledge is understanding nature and the will of heaven. A man of knowledge understands nature and acts in accordance with its principles. Knowledge of the moral universe would direct men to live according to the assigned nature of things and to obey Tao or the Way in tune with the law of nature.

The Confucian teachings saw heaven and moral law closely related in origin and aim. Heaven bestowed morality upon man, and man thus has a moral obligation to it. Alfred

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For this reason some students were led to consider Confucianism a religion. It is not. Confucius has been regarded as a great sage, not as a god. Confucianists have no personal god and do not appeal to any external object in order to be inspired in their moral life. See, among others, Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., pp. 3-5; Reginald F. Johnston, op. cit., pp. 76-99; Yi Sang-un, Hyundae wa Dongyang Sasang [Modern Times and Oriental Thought] (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1963), pp. 91-96; D. T. Suzuki, "A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy," Monist, XVII (April, 1908), pp. 242-85; C. K. Yang, "The Functional Relationship between Confucian Thought and Chinese Religion," John K. Fairbank, ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 269-90; and Derk Bodde, "Dominant Ideas," China, H. F. MacNair, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946), pp. 18-28.

[17] Analects, Bk. XI, Ch. XI.

Doeblin describes this Confucian relationship between the moral universe and man as follows:

> Nature does not consist merely of physio-mechanical forces; observation, admiration, and mere reckoning also do not approach her true essence. Only together do humanity and Heaven build the universe, of which man is an integral part, not just any. In this combination, it is only humanity which can cause disturbances so that it becomes man's duty to preserve permanently the balance of cosmos. We have here a mystically real connection. Humanity is continually under influences flowing from the stars and from the earth itself; these influences, the natural events of the year, and atmospheric phenomena are manifestations with which man must bring himself into accord. Tao means the law of natural events which, at the same time, regulates human action. To act in obedience to this law is to act humanely and to give and take in social relationships.[18]

The Confucian concept of nature and the universe is directly related to yet another concept, that of Ming.[19] Confucius once said: "If my principles are to advance, it is so ordered. If they fall to the ground, it is so ordered."[20] He believed there were certain forces that

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[18]Alfred Doeblin, The Living Thoughts of Confucius (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1940), p. 22.

[19]The Chinese word Ming is difficult to translate into English. It has been rendered literally as fate, destiny, or decree, but the actual meaning of the word is equivalent to the will of Heaven. Thus the relationship between the concepts of nature and ming is clearly discernible. See Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 45.

[20]Analects, Bk. XIV, Ch. XXXVII, sec. 2.

control the order of the universe, and man's duty in this teleological and immutable universe is to conform to the Way (Tao) of the universe. Man cannot alter his role as a man.

This fatalism permeates the whole of Confucianism, and it has shaped the Confucian outlook significantly. According to the concept of Ming, life and death are predestined, and one should accept his lot in life. Confucius emphasized the importance of Ming, and the man of knowledge must understand it. One should do his best without worrying whether or not he is succeeding. To act in this way is to know Ming, and knowing Ming is an important requisite of a superior man. "Without recognizing the ordinances of Heaven, it is impossible to be a superior man."[21] This Confucian concept of Ming is very similar to Calvin's. To Confucianists, however, the purpose of life of man is, unlike Calvin's glorification of God, to conform with nature.

Confucius believed that if man does not conform to nature or the will of Heaven, i.e., to Ming, he will undergo "calamities" and great misery.[22] Thus the right way of living is in accordance with nature; as Confucius was quoted:

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[21] Ibid., Bk. XX, Ch. III, sec. 1.

[22] Ibid., Bk. VI, Ch. XVII.

> to love those whom men hate, and to hate those whom men love;--this is to outrage the natural feeling of men. Calamities cannot fail to come down on him who does so.[23]

As evidenced in the preceding quotation, men in the Confucian world are expected to follow the accepted way of life, and anyone who acts against tradition will incur misery. Confucius said at one time:

> Let a man who is ignorant be fond of using his own judgement; let a man without rank be fond of assuming a directing power to himself; let a man who is living in the present age go back to the ways of antiquity;--on the persons of all who act thus calamities will be sure to come.[24]

It is thus virtuous for man to know his own nature and Ming and to act accordingly; so long as a man understands his nature and his station in life Heaven will offer him its protection. Confucius said in a strain of fatalism:

> If Heaven wished to let this cause of truth perish, then, I, a future mortal, should not have got such a relation to that cause. While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of K'wang do to me?[25]

Mencius was unruffled when someone informed him that a court sycophant had thwarted his opportunity of employment by the

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[23] The Great Learning, Ch. X, sec. 17.

[24] The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XXVII, sec. 1.

[25] Analects, Bk. IX, Ch. V., sec. 3.

prince of Lu. He said:

> A man's advancement is effected, it may be, by others, and the stopping him is, it may be, from the efforts of others. But to advance a man or to stop him his advance is really beyond the power of other men. My not finding in the prince of Lu a ruler who confide in me, and put counsels into practice, is from Heaven. How can that scion of the Tsang family cause me not to find the ruler that could suit me?[26]

If Ming governs human life, how does one understand one's own destiny? Confucianists believe that study and moral cultivation reveal the role of each individual. A man of superior knowledge is quite capable of discerning the will of heaven. Confucius according to himself seems to have had little trouble in acquiring such understanding:

> At fifteen I set my heart upon learning. At thirty, I had planted my feet firm upon the ground. At forty, I no longer suffered from perplexities. At fifty, I knew what were the biddings of Heaven. At sixty, I heard them with docile ear. At seventy, I could follow the dictates of my own heart; for what I desired no longer overstepped the boundaries of right.[27]

## Familial Model for Social Order

Viewing human nature as basically good, Confucianists had enormous faith in man's capacity for social order.

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[26] Mencius, Bk. I, pt. II, Ch. XVI, sec. 3.

[27] Analects, Bk. I, Ch. IV.

However practically they thought human relations within a family provide the ultimate model for man's fulfillment and for social order. Though this feature of Confucianism obviously never can be fully accounted for, some have attempted to give at least a partial explanation. The Chinese were primarily farmers who needed help from every family member. Their social relationships therefore grew out of family relationships. Chinese socio-economic conditions formed the basis of Confucianism, and it in turn expressed the ethical significance of these conditions. As Fung Yu-lan explains, "a great deal of Confucianism is the rational justification or theoretical expression of this social system."[28] Confucianists held that the family was the ideal pattern for all forms of human association, because within a family the members do not claim their rights but rather seek to perform their mutual obligations.[29]

Man therefore is a social animal, and the position or meaning of the individual is found only in his relation or his relative status in such social units as the family and more broadly the community. Confucianists did not

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[28]Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 21.

[29]John Pratt, "Confucian China," Contemporary Review, Vol. 186 (November, 1954), p. 267.

conceive of man as a physio-biological being apart from other men. Order in society can be maintained only through identifying one's obligations and meeting them faithfully, because a man is not just an individual--a neutral, class-free, equalitarian being; but rather, he is a corporate-implied being, such as a superior man, an ordinary man, the ruler, the subject, father, husband, friend, son, etc. By identifying with the proper roles, a man acquires his meaning, and social order ensues from such identification. As Wittfogel put it, "Confucianism presents the socio-political aspect of the matter with unusual clarity."[30]

Confucius and his followers believed that only the principles of family relationships can provide peace and order in the state:

> From the loving example of one family a whole state becomes loving, and from its courtesies the whole state becomes courteous, while, from the ambition and perverseness of the One man, the whole state may be led to rebellious disorder--such is the nature of the influence.[31]

The family life in Confucianism is the primary source of good social behavior. Confucius is quoted from

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[30]Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 320.

[31]The Great Learning, Ch. IX, sec. 3.

the Book of Poetry about an ideal family and its harmonious relationships:

> Happy union with wife and children is like the music of lutes and harps. When there is concord among brethren, the harmony is delightful and enduring. Thus may you regulate your family, and enjoy the pleasure of your wife and children. In such a state of things, parents have entire complacence.[32]

Peaceful and harmonious family life should therefore be lessons for all men. And these lessons should be applied in man's political and social life because family structure alone provides the highest model for harmony and order. Confucius said:

> Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy.[33]

The most important relationship insofar as social order is concerned is that between father and son. This relationship is the basic guide to all especially in their political life. Confucianists regard filial piety the chief

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[32] The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XV, secs. 2 & 3.

[33] The Great Learning, The Text of Confucius, sec. 5.

cornerstone of the entire social structure, and it diffuses its influences through all the behavior of human life. Thus it has functional and social effect beyond the family.

For Confucius filial piety therefore originates with the bonds of common parentage and extends to all other human relationships. It must be observed with certain accepted rules of rites. Extolling filial piety, he said:

> To gather in the same place where they earlier have gathered; to perform the same ceremonies which they earlier have performed; to play the same music which they earlier have played; to pay respect to those whom they honored; to love those who were dear to them; in fact, to serve those now dead as if they were living, and those now departed as if they were with us still. This is the highest achievement of filial piety.[34]

One of his disciples asked Confucius exactly what is this filial piety he puts such a great emphasis upon. Confucius answered: "Filial piety is seen in the skillful carrying out of the wishes of our forefathers, and the skillful carrying forward of their undertakings."[35] "It is not being disobedient."[36] He elaborated by saying "that parents, when alive, should be served according to propriety; that, when

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[34]The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XIX, sec. 5.

[35]Ibid., sec. 2.

[36]Analects, Bk. II, Ch. V, sec. 2.

dead, they should be buried according to propriety; and that they should be sacrificed to according to propriety."[37]

Filial piety is universal, and without it there can be no proper human relationships. It precedes all other human obligations. When Confucius was asked by his disciple about not serving government, he harked back eloquently to the importance of filial piety:

> What does the Shu-ching say of filial piety?--You are filial, you discharge your brotherly duties. These qualities are displayed in government. This then also constituted the exercise of government. Why must there be THAT--making one be in the government.[38]

All other virtues emanate from filial piety, the highest virtue:

> Filial piety is the basic principle of Heaven, the ultimate standard of earth, and the norm of conduct for the people. Men ought to abide by the guiding principle of Heaven and earth as the pattern of their lives, so that by the brightness of Heaven and the benefits of earth they would be able to keep all in the world in harmony and in unison.[39]

Asked if there were any virtue superior to filial piety, Confucius responded:

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[37] Ibid., sec. 3.

[38] Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XXI, sec. 2.

[39] The Book of Filial Piety, Ch. VII. Quoted from Chu Chai and Winburg Chai ed. & trans., The Humanist Way in Ancient China: Essential Works of Confucianism (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1965), p. 329.

> It is the nature of Heaven and earth that man is the most honorable of all beings. Of all human conduct none is greater than filial piety. In filial piety nothing is greater than to revere one's father. In revering one's father, nothing is greater than making him a peer of Heaven.[40]

Confucius continued:

> The tao of father and son is rooted in the Heaven-endowed nature, and develops into the equity between sovereign and ministers. Parents give one life; no bond is stronger. They bring up and care for their child; no kindness is greater. Therefore, one who does not love one's parents, but others, acts to the detriment of li. Should the rules of conduct be modeled on such perversity, the people would have no true norm by which to abide.[41]

## "Superior Man" vs. "Ordinary Man"

As has been seen earlier, men are nearly alike by nature, but they grow apart in practice. In Confucianism one finds a dichotomy among human beings. Those who learn the nature of things and abide by the principle of filial piety are the superior men; those who do otherwise are ordinary men.[42] The superior man is governed by jen

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[40] Ibid., Ch. IX, p. 330.

[41] Ibid.

[42] "Superior man" is a translation for Chun-tzu, which has been rendered in various ways. The most common translations other than "superior man" are "gentleman," "princely man," "noble man," "ideal man," etc. "Ordinary

(benevolence), yi (righteousness) and li (rites or propriety), whereas the ordinary man is governed by appetite and desire.[43]

Naturally Confucius preferred the superior man, and one central idea of Confucianism is based on the premise that an ordinary man cherishes the aspiration to become a superior man. The superior man continues to advance himself through cultivation and education. As Confucius said, "The superior man learns, in order to attain to the utmost of his principles."[44] And also, "The superior man seeks to develop the admirable qualities of men and does not seek to develop their evil qualities. The ordinary man does the opposite of this."[45]

The moral and intellectual qualities of the superior man are crucial in the sense that the whole system is completely dependent upon them. Confucius extolled the qualities of the superior man so much so that the entire

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man" is a translation of Hsiao-jen, which has also been translated variously as "inferior man," "common man," "mean man," "average man," etc. Chun-tzu originally and literally means the "lord's son" or "prince's son," and Hsiao-jen, the "small man."

[43] Analects, Bk. XV, Ch. XX and Bk. IV, Ch. XI.

[44] Ibid., Bk. XIX, Ch. VII.

[45] Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XVI.

Confucian literature is replete with references to them.[46] The following is a partial list of the superior man's qualities:

> The superior man, in his thoughts, does not go out of his place.[47]
>
> What the superior man seeks, is in himself. What the mean man seeks, is in others.[48]
>
> The object of the superior man is truth. . . . The superior man is anxious lest he should not get truth; he is not anxious lest poverty should come upon him.[49]
>
> The superior man is catholic and not partisan; the ordinary man is partisan not catholic.[50]
>
> The superior man in the world does not set his mind either for anything or against anything; what is right, he will follow.[51]
>
> The superior man thinks of virtue; the ordinary man thinks of comfort.[52]

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[46]For a discussion of the ideal qualities of the superior man, see Shigeki Kaizuka, Confucius, Geoffrey Bownas, trns. (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1956), pp. 96-100.

[47]Analects, Bk. XIV, Ch. XXVII.

[48]Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XX.

[49]Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXXI.

[50]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XIV.

[51]Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. X.

[52]Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. XI.

The superior man is affable, but not adulatory; the ordinary man is adulatory, but not affable.[53]

The superior man is distressed by his want of ability; he is not distressed by men's not knowing him.[54]

The superior man cannot be known in little matters but may be entrusted with great concerns.[55]

The superior man does not promote a man simply on account of his words, nor does he put aside good words because of the man.[56]

Therefore the superior man does not use rewards, and the people are stimulated to virtue. He does not show anger, and the people are awed more than by hatchets and battle-axes.[57]

The superior man conforms with the path of the mean. . . . The superior man accords with the course of the mean.[58]

The superior man in everything puts forth his utmost endeavor.[59]

The superior man must be watchful over himself when he is alone.[60]

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[53] Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XXIII.

[54] Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XVIII.

[55] Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXXIII.

[56] Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXII.

[57] The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XXXIII, sec. 4.

[58] Ibid., Ch. XI, sec. 3.

[59] The Great Learning, Ch. II, sec. 4.

[60] Ibid., Ch. VI, sec. 2.

It is apparent from the above that the superior man is gentle, impartial, careful, open-minded, dedicated, sincere, unpretentious, etc. The significance of the superior man in Confucian society is that he alone can provide social order and justice. The ordinary man, being not so capable of ruling himself, must be subservient to the superior man. However, despite Confucianists' emphasis upon the qualities of the "superior man," they do not show any intention to institutionalize those qualities. Instead they simply wish to depend on the "superior man" as an individual in the government, and on the influence of his examples.

## The Three Cardinal Principles

Confucianism posits three crucial principles of virtue, the cultivation of which is the right way--and the only way--to attain the status of superior man. These three principles are jen, yi, and li.

The concept of jen (benevolence) is the most fundamental; the whole Confucian system is saturated with this concept.[61] As Liang put it, jen is the root of all Confucian

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[61] Jen's ideograph is composed of two characters meaning "man" and "two." Jen is the product of the proper relationship between human beings. Though, as are many other Oriental expressions, it is difficult to translate into English, it has been translated as "humanity,"

theory, and without understanding it, it is not possible to understand Confucianism.[62] It is the sum total of all virtues, and it is the central thesis from which the whole system was developed. The ideal of Confucian life, ethics and politics flows from this principle of jen. It is "the characteristic element of humanity."[63] Kaplan explains the concept as follows:

> The basic virtue which a man is to cultivate Chinese call jen or human-heartedness. . . . Now jen or human-heartedness plays the part in Confucian thought of righteousness in Judaism, charity in Christianity, detachment in Buddhism, and so on. It is the fundamental quality of character on which all else depends. "What is virtue?" Confucius once asked. "To love your fellow man." Man is everything; jen is just being wholly a man. . . . It is the quality of humanity in its full sense. Jen is humane, love, justice. All three is jen.[64]

Jen, or benevolence, not only expresses the ideal

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"human-heartedness," "love," "goodness," "perfect virtue" in addition to "benevolence." For detailed discussions of the concept of jen, see George K. C. Yeh, The Confucian Conception of Jen (London: The China Society, 1943), and Huang K'uai Yuen and J. K. Shryock, "The Meaning of Jen in Confucianism," Open Court, Vol. 44 (December, 1930), pp. 745-50.

[62]Liang Chi-Chao, History of Chinese Political Thought during the Early Tsin Period, L. T. Chen, trns. (London: Paul Kegan, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1930), p. 38.

[63]The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XX, sec. 5.

[64]Abraham Kaplan, op. cit., p. 273.

quality of the superior man but also is necessary for the good life. Confucius discusses the importance of jen in the Analects:

> If a superior man abandon benevolence, how can he fulfill the requirements of that name? The superior man does not, even for the space of a single meal, act contrary to benevolence. In moments of haste, he cleaves to it. In seasons of danger, he cleaves to it.[65]

> Jen is more essential to man than fire and water. I have seen men die from stepping into fire and water, but I have never seen a man die from stepping into jen.[66]

> I have not yet seen a man who loves jen nor a man who detests what is contrary to jen. He who loves jen esteems nothing else above it. He who detests what is contrary to jen seeks to be jen-minded so that he will not let anything contrary to jen appear in his person. Is there anyone who is able even for a single day to apply his energy to jen? Well, I have not seen a man whose energy was not equal to it. Should there be any such man, I have never met him.[67]

Although jen is known to encompass all human virtues, Confucius and his disciples did not enumerate its specific qualities in great detail. At one time Confucius said five virtues constitute jen. They are respect, magnanimity,

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[65] Analects, Bk. IV, Ch. V, secs. 2 & 3.

[66] Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXXIV.

[67] Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. VI, sec. 1.

sincerity, earnestness and kindness:

> With respect, you will avoid insult; with magnanimity, you will win over the multitude; with sincerity, men will trust you; with earnestness, you will have achievements; and with kindness, you will be fitted to command others.[68]

Jen also seems to include the virtues of filial piety and proper observance of the rites.[69] Courage is part of jen because Confucius said: "though a courageous man need not have jen, one who has jen will, ipso facto, be courageous."[70]

Confucius himself seems to have had difficulty in explicating the exact ingredients of jen. However, he did indicate the way by which jen might be approached. A simple and fundamental way of having jen is to love one's fellow man. (Jen consists of loving others."[71]) Also,

> He who hated what is not jen, would practice jen in such a way that he would not allow anything that is not jen to approach his person.[72]

One must thus desire jen. As Confucius said, "Is jen really

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[68] Ibid., Bk. XVII, Ch. VI.

[69] Ibid., Bk. XIV, Ch. V.

[70] Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XXII.

[71] Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XXII.

[72] Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. VI, sec. 1.

so far away? I desire jen, and see, it is by."[73]

Loving one's fellow man and desire for jen are fundamental in the attainment of jen, but they are by no means complete for that purpose. One must also practice all other humanly virtues, make an effort to have the right attitude and cultivate his mind constantly:

> One who is firm of spirit, resolute in character, simple in manner, and slow of speech is near to jen.[74]

> The mechanic, who wishes to do his work well, must first sharpen his tools. When you are living in any state, take service with the most worthy among its great officers, and make friends of the most virtuous among its scholars.[75]

When a disciple asked about the method of attaining jen, Confucius answered:

> Now the man of perfect jen, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. That may be called the way to practice jen.[76]

The attainment of jen is achieved through the cultivation of the other cardinal principles, i.e., yi and li.

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[73] Ibid., Bk. VII, Ch. XXIX.

[74] Ibid., Bk. XIII, Ch. XXVII.

[75] Ibid., XV, Ch. IX.

[76] Ibid., Bk. VI, Ch. XXVIII, sec. 2.

The concept of yi is understood by the man of jen, for it means the appropriateness to a situation or the "oughtness" of a situation. As Fung Yu-lan said, it is a "categorical imperative."[77] An action that is appropriate or imperative is said to conform to yi, or righteousness. Yi implies an obligation which is unconditional and absolute. Confucianists believe there are certain things that should be done for their own sake because they are morally obligatory or appropriate in themselves. It is the right thing to do at the right time and in the right place without any thought of profit or personal interest. At this point, Confucianists are very much like Kant in the West: the moral duty of man is known a priori, rejecting utility as a basis for duty or action. "The superior man comprehends righteousness; the ordinary man comprehends profit."[78]

Yi therefore is the extremely important moral force and a prerequisite of the superior man. Confucius is quoted as saying:

> The superior man holds righteousness to be of highest importance. A man in a superior situation, having valor without righteousness will be guilty of insubordination; one of the

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[77] Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 42.

[78] Analects, Bk. IV, Ch. XVI.

> lower people, having valor without righteousness, will commit robbery.[79]

Yi as a categorical imperative is, however, different from Tao (the Way), which is universal and applicable to all. Yi, though not inconsistent with Tao, is an individualized action, manner, or duty to each person, place and social status.[80]

Li is another cardinal principle for social order in Confucianism.[81] In fact it seems to spell social order itself of a kind. "By li is meant not only the sacrificial, court and social ceremonials and the rules of personal conduct, but also the social and political institutions."[82] Fung Yu-lan agrees, saying li signifies "in addition to its usual present-day definition of 'politeness' or 'courtesy,' the entire body of usages and customs, political and social

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[79] Ibid., Bk. XVII, Ch. XXIII.

[80] H. G. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Way (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 134-35.

[81] Li is perhaps one of the more difficult words to translate into English. It has been translated as "rites," "rituals," "ceremony," "propriety," "politeness," "courtesy," "etiquette," etc. Li Chi (The Book of Rites) contains detailed descriptions of ancient rites and proprieties for the whole gamut of human situations, such as birth, marriage, burial and mourning.

[82] Francis C. M. Wei, The Spirit of Chinese Culture (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 59.

institutions."[83] Still, li does not seem to be an institutionalization of such virtues as politeness, propriety, courtesy, etc. It is largely consisted of ceremonial and ritual codes on various social and political occasions. It is apparent that Confucius believed the observance of li has not only personal and ethical values but also will bring about social and political order by reducing confusion.[84] Confucius is quoted as saying:

> To subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under Heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him. Is the perfect virtue from a man himself, or is it from others?[85]

In fact, Confucius thought that li was a measure of civilization. For him, it represents one of the essential requirements of the superior man because li is "the outward expression of inward feeling," and "it is rooted in Heaven and comes to flower in man."[86] The concept of li means in

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[83] Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Derk Bodde, trns. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 68.

[84] "When rulers love to observe the rules of propriety, the people respond readily to the calls on them for service." (Analects, Bk. XIV, Ch. XLIX.)

[85] Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. I, sec. 1.

[86] Ibid., Bk. XVI, Ch. XIII.

actuality, according to Weber, "to control activities, physical gestures, and movements as well with politeness and with grace in accordance with the status mores and the command of 'propriety.'"[87] Fung believes that the performance of li acts as a catharsis for the emotions and also that it prevents emotions from running to excess by serving as a fixed ritualistic framework within which emotions can be expressed.[88]

Li thus is a means of expressing one's feelings in a way beneficial both to the individual and to society. In order to avoid social disorder, it is necessary that there be certain socially acceptable patterns of actions through which emotions can be expressed. Rites establish standards of behavior; man can easily conform his behavior to what is socially desirable. Li is a necessity for the Confucian good life.

> Respectfulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes laborious bustle; carefulness without the rules of propriety, becomes timidity; boldness, without the rules of propriety becomes

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[87]Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, Hans Gerth, ed. and trns. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), p. 156.

[88]Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, I (Peiping, 1937), Ch. 14, esp. pp. 344-46.

> subordination; straightforwardness, without the rules of propriety, becomes rudeness.[89]
>
> Without an acquaintance with the rules of propriety, it is impossible for the character to be established.[90]

Li is also important for the preservation of social status and hierarchy of order in society. The absence of li reduces the degree of self-understanding, thereby bringing about confusion in identifying yi. In other words, meticulous adherence to rituals and propriety remind a person of his status and duties. Therefore li aids a person in developing righteousness, or yi. The Analects present an anecdote in which Confucius insisted upon following formality and propriety at the time of his favorite disciple Yen Yuan's death:

> When Yen Yuan died, Yen Lu begged the carriage of the Master to sell and get an outer shell for his son's coffin. The Master said, "every one calls his son his son, whether he has talents or has not talents. There was Li (Confucius' son); when he died he had a coffin but no outer shell. I would not walk on foot to get a shell for him, because, having followed in the rear of the great officers, it was not proper that I should walk on foot."[91]

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[89] Analects, Bk. VIII, Ch. II.

[90] Ibid., Bk. XX, Ch. III, sec. 2.

[91] Ibid., Bk. XI, Ch. VII.

Despite Confucius' emphasis upon rites and propriety, the underlying moral principles and good social behavior are more important than mere observance of li. Observance of li simply secures good social behavior. In other words, li is designed to develop correct habits and to establish a person's character. It is a means by which one may carry on proper social relations. Thus li is an objective system of order but although representing a state of mind, a "superior man" can attain it through study and self-cultivation. It is in a sense the objective form of civilization for a person.

## Hsun Tzu's View

There was another great Confucianist whose view was in some ways quite different from that of Confucius and Mencius. Hsun Tzu (ca. 312 B.C. - ?)[92] in some respects turned Confucianism in directions which Confucius and Mencius would have deplored. The basic reason for this would seem to be that Hsun Tzu had little faith in humanity and took a completely different view on human nature. Hsun Tzu's writings also produced Han Fei Tzu, the founder of the Legalist

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[92]Hsun Tzu seems to have had little impact upon the actual social and political life of East Asians. His influence was chiefly on academicians.

philosophy in China, and his works "have a strongly realistic strain on which some of the Legalist writings build." In spite of this, Hsun Tzu is classified as a Confucian.[93]

Hsun Tzu generally takes the same views on society and social order as do Confucius and Mencius, with exceptions in certain areas. One of the most striking differences is found in the concept of human nature. While Mencius argued that human nature is innately good and evil is the result of environment, Hsun Tzu believes that human nature is evil, artificial, and the good is something acquired. Hsun says:

> The nature of man is evil; his goodness is acquired. As to his nature, man is born, first, with a desire for gain. If this desire is followed, strife will result and prudence will disappear. Second, man is born with envy and hate. If these tendencies are followed, injury and cruelty will abound; loyalty and good faith will disappear. Third, man is born with the lusts of the ear and eye, leading to the love of sound and beauty. If these lusts are followed, lewdness and disorder will spring up; li and yi, together with good manners, will disappear. Hence, if man gives rein to his nature and follows his passions, he will strive and grab, leading to a breach of order and confounding of reason, and culminating in violence. Only under the restraint of teachers and laws and the guidance of rules of li and yi, does man conform to prudence,

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[93]Oliver E. Benson, "Classical International Systems: Four Models of Power Politics," (unpublished manuscript), n.d., p. 12.

> observe good manners and yield to order. From all this, it is evident that the nature of man is evil and that his goodness is acquired.[94]

For Hsun Tzu, human nature does not contain such virtues as jen, yi, and li. These virtues are consciously created by the ancient sages by restraining such emotions as love, anger, joy, hate, etc.[95] Thus it is clear that man cannot have harmonious and orderly life if he is governed by his innate nature.

Since Hsun Tzu has very little faith in human nature for social order, he turns to emphasize the importance of laws and teachings of the sages. Thus, for him, social order can be obtained not through the innate goodness of man but through scrupulous following of the regulations laid down by the ancient sages. Those regulations demand that each man must adhere to the social differentiation, i.e., a functional specialization in the Platonic sense.

Thus, in order to build social order, Hsun Tzu advocates a class society in which the superior men who are governed by Tao and li should check the inferior men who are

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[94] The Work of Hsun Tzu, Ch. XXIII. Quoted from Essential Works of Confucianism trans. & ed. Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, op. cit., p. 232.

[95] Ibid., pp. 235-36.

governed by appetite, desire, and emotion. Social class is necessary because men are not able to be skilled in everything. Hsun Tzu says, "if there is no distinction of occupation, then people will have difficulty in getting work done."[96]

However, social order will not arise simply from people who have been placed in various grades and classes according to their abilities. Hsun Tzu believes that many people would not be happy with their assigned classes and stations in their lives. Since it is the nature of man to seek comfort, fame, and wealth, there ought to be certain laws and regulations to curb those. For Hsun Tzu, li and yi are those that lead to harmony in class divisions. One of the most important functions of li is to restrain and set limits on man's desires by indicating what is proper for him. Yi acts very much along this line, and also checks on desires by making people shameful and morally wrong for them to seek things that do not belong to them.[97] Though Hsun Tzu seems to believe in an institutionalized system of order by emphasizing li, his conception of li is not different from that of Confucius and Mencius. In other words, it is largely

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[96] Ibid., p. 239.

[97] Ibid., p. 235.

consisted of custom, decorum, and various rites governing marriage, burial, etc.[98]

In summary, Confucianism believes that the nature of man is basically good and that evil in man's nature is the result of environment although it did not explain the evil there. Man can be morally perfectible. Moral perfection is to be accomplished through understanding and conforming to the pattern of nature and the will of Heaven. The order of society should be built after the familial model, and family virtues must be extended into social life. Superior men must be exemplars of such qualities as jen, yi, and li, among others. Confucianism is extremely rationalistic in its theory of order and does not resort to the supernatural or to a supramundane diety. Rather, it seeks an orderly society through moral cultivation of individuals. Hsun Tzu is the only Confucianist who takes a completely opposite view on human nature. However, Hsun seems to be not so different in his view on the method for social order except for his greater emphasis upon li. Hsun Tzu believes that social disharmony is not caused by environment but rather by man's innate evil.

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[98]Hsun's view on politics and government will be examined in the following chapter.

# CHAPTER III

## CONFUCIAN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Confucianism seems largely preoccupied with the nature of man and the cultivation of human virtues which supposedly would produce an orderly life of the individual man. Many believed that Confucian teachings were primarily concerned with ethics and with how a man should conduct himself in relation to other men. Bertrand Russell, for example, believed that Confucianism is "largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette," and that its "main concern is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions."[1]

Russell's statement contains a certain amount of truth. From a modern point of view, Confucianism seems somewhat apolitical, and its comments on politics appear incidental and peripheral. Confucius, indeed, was not too concerned with politics apart from other aspects of human life. During most of his life Confucius was preaching to his disciples and

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[1] Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China (New York: The Century Co., 1922), p. 190. Russell admitted he could not appreciate the merits of Confucianism.

counseling princes about attaining the good and virtuous life. He believed that the highest quality of morality should be the basis of all human interaction and that political disorder could be cured only through the development of the innate quality of men--especially of the ruler--and through acting according to lessons learned from family life. For Confucius, therefore, politics is basically a part of ethics. Yet it might very well be that the Confucian emphasis on ethics is designed primarily to have political intent. In other words, the Confucian "ethics" does not seem to have so much function of improving the "internal" and "subjective" qualities of men as attaining socio-political order.

For although the line between its ethical and political theory is not at all clear, Confucianism does provide a good deal of theory on politics and government. Thus it is the purpose of this chapter to examine specifically Confucian political theory on the nature of the state, methods of governing, the problem of leadership, political legitimacy and the nature of justice and law. Even though Confucianism embraces more than these aspects of political theory, they shall be the center of focus since they are the major items of Confucian political thought and since they are the subjects of significance in comparing Confucianism with modern political life and particularly with democracy.

## Origin and Organization of the State

Confucian literature suggests that the state is a product of slow social development.[2] It is a natural product of social intercourse among a large number of people. Confucianism posits no contract among men or between the people and the sovereign. There is no room for any theory of man in the original state of nature because in Confucianism it is assumed that man has always lived as a member of the family and that there have always been human relationships.[3] There was no concept of an individual or an early man all by himself devoid of any sort of familial relationships with other men. In Confucianism the very existence of man presupposes family relationships and concomitant duties and obligations.

Since Confucianism views social life as an extension of family life, political relationships are merely one phase of social relationships. The state is thus an

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[2]The term "state" here is used in the broad sense, which might include such concepts as "nation," "kingdom," "country," etc. Confucian literature seems to make no clear distinction between the terms "state" and "government"; they seem to be used interchangeably.

[3]The Book of History, which appeared long before Confucius lived, describes the five relationships which were meant to portray social phenomena as contrasted with natural phenomena.

outgrowth of human relationships and a part of society.[4] The following quotation reveals rather succinctly this evolutionary concept of society:

> Heaven and earth existing, all material things then got their existence. All material things having existence, afterwards there came male and female. From the existence of male and female there came afterwards husband and wife. From husband and wife there came father and son. From father and son there came sovereign and subjects. From sovereign and subjects there came high and low. Following the distinction between high and low came the arrangements of propriety and righteousness.[5]

Confucius thus viewed the state as only a larger household, having all the ethical and authority relationships found in the smaller household, i.e., the family. To Confucianists, a state is not, as Aristotle argued, a combination of well run families; and family is not an atomic unit. The state simply came into being as a result of increase in population and the necessity for economic cooperation and defense.

Confucius seems to have had little concern about the organization of the state, but he did assert that there

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[4]Leonard Shih-lien Hsu, The Political Philosophy of Confucianism (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1932), p. 29.

[5]From The Book of Change. Quoted in Leonard S. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

were certain elements basic to a state. Answering a question raised by his disciple Tsze-kung,

> The Master said, "The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler."
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> Tsze-kung said, "If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be foregone first?" "The military equipment," said the Master.
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> Tsze-kung again asked, "If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which one of them should be foregone?" The Master answered, "Part with the food. From the old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the state."[6]

For Confucius, therefore, food, weapons, and a sovereign are the essential ingredients that compose a state, but the qualified sovereign (right form of government) is the utmost in importance. The first two are national economy and defense, and the last one is a type of government. Thus Confucianists believe that when there is the right form of government (a qualified sovereign) the essential functions of the state as such government--economy and defense--will be achieved automatically. When a man of virtue occupies the highest post in the government, people below him will be influenced by his good behavior, and his

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[6] Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. VII.

virtuous qualities will be propagated throughout the state. In effect, that is, the question of the institutional structure of government has little meaning in Confucianism. Confucius simply took the existing monarchial government for granted.

Under the monarchy Confucianism then subsumes a hierarchial form of society which is patterned after the hierarchial form of the family. Confucianism believes that it is most natural to have government organized in such a way as the family is organized since it views the family as a microcosm of the sociopolitical order.[7] The family is part of nature, and since nature, to Confucianists, is seemingly harmonious and orderly, it provides an excellent model for the structure of government. One Confucian classic claims the ancient rulers built political institutions based upon a model of natural phenomena.[8] Confucius himself thought nature and the family objects worthy of study in developing the structure of government and state.

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[7] Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XXI.

[8] The Book of Change, Hsiang Chuan, pt. 2, hex. XXII. Confucius was known to be extremely sensitive to natural phenomena, for they would teach him the principles of orderly life. See Analects, Bk. X, Ch. XVI.

## Purpose and Method of Government and Political Leadership

For Confucianism the ultimate goal of government is to attain a moral and orderly life, both of which should be based again upon the virtue of the ruler. Though Confucianists do not make it very clear, it seems that moral life is orderly life and vice versa. People's welfare and defense are important but they are really secondary. As Confucius said at one time:

> When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of When a country is ill governed, riches and honor are things to be ashamed of.[9]

Again, as the following passage illustrates, Confucius, with a strain of Taoism, felt that moral, esthetic development is more important than the materials.

> With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow; -- I have still joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honors acquired by unrighteousness are to me as floating clouds.[10]

The Confucian ideal should be achieved through the advancement of man's innate moral quality, and the means to reach the professed goal of government is to teach people

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[9] Analects, Bk. VII, Ch. XII, sec. 3.

[10] Ibid., Bk. VII, Ch. XV.

how to cultivate their innate morality. The purpose of Confucian politics is therefore educational. The educational task should begin at the top with the sovereign because he is the most influential man in the state. As Confucius said:

> He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it.[11]

It was understood therefore that the most important function of government is the cultivation of the mind, and for that purpose the role of the sovereign is vital.

> From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides.[12]

> It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that what should spring from it will be well ordered. It never has been the case that what was of great importance has been slightly cared for, and, at the same time, that what was of slight importance has been greatly cared for.[13]

Confucius believed that the primary task in regard to government is what he called the "rectification of names." He meant by this that the actuality should be made to accord

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[11] Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. I.

[12] The Great Learning, The Text of Confucius, sec. 6.

[13] Ibid., sec. 7.

with the essence attached to the name. To Confucius, "to govern means to rectify."[14] On one occasion Confucius was asked what he would do first if he were to rule the country. His reply was most Platonic: "What is necessary is to rectify names."[15] He meant that everything in the universe should act its given role:

> There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.[16]

Vice versa, one should use the correct terms for the correct roles in order to maintain and govern the nation, or a name must agree with the ideal essence the name implies. The essence of the ruler is what the ruler ideally ought to be--as in Plato--the "real" ruler; the ruler therefore must act as the true ruler in fact as well as in name. Confucius is quoted as saying:

> If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If

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[14] Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. XVII.

[15] Ibid., Bk. XIII, Ch. III, sec. 2.

[16] Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XI, sec. 2. Name in Confucianism refers to a concrete object and is considered more than a semantic symbol. It should be an essence as well as an existence. Thus they believe that a prince is not a prince if he fails to live up to the standard of prince as expressed in the ideograph. The rectification of names therefore must be understood in this manner.

> language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, people do not know how to move hand or foot.[17]

But who decides what is the essence of each name? Although the question is extremely important, Confucius does not give a direct answer. However, it is generally believed that the function of assigning duties and responsibilities to each name is in the hands of philosophers and historians who have studied the nature of the universe. It is not the function of kings, superior men, or fathers.[18] Thus the function of a ruler is not so much in creating values in society but rather in seeing to it that the values (the essence of name) defined by the philosophers and historians are well applied and administered throughout the nation--especially by himself as model.

Confucius, however, realized that the rectification of names was not accomplished by simple belief in it.[19] The moral forces that lead to the rectification of names stem

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[17] Ibid., Bk. XIII, Ch. III, secs. 5 & 6.

[18] Leonard S. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[19] Analects, Bk. XIII, Ch. XV, sec. 2.

primarily from familial virtues. The most important principle of governing therefore again derives from the family.

> What is meant by "In order rightly to govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate the family," is this: -- It is not possible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the ruler, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the state. There is filial piety; -- therewith the sovereign should be served. There is fraternal submission: -- therewith elders and superiors should be served. There is kindness: -- therewith the multitude should be treated.[20]

For the purpose of rectification of names government leaders must have abilities to govern their families, which in turn come from humanly virtues acquired through the cultivation of the mind. Vice versa, Confucius emphasized the vital importance of family virtue in developing leadership by citing numerous examples of the past:

> Yao and Shun led on the kingdom with benevolence, and the people followed them. Chieh and Chau led on the kingdom with violence, and the people followed them. The orders which these issued were contrary to the practices which they loved, and so the people did not follow them. On this account, the ruler must himself be possessed of the good qualities, and then he may require them in the people. Never has there been a man, who, not having reference to his own character and wishes in dealing with others, was able effectually to instruct them. Thus we see how the government of the state depends on the regulation of the family.[21]

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[20] The Great Learning, Ch. IX, sec. 1.

[21] Ibid., Ch. IX, secs. 4 & 5.

The most influential person in administering the rectification of names (after the definition is made) is thus the ruler of the state who should possess virtue and knowledge of the universe. That is, Confucius believed that the virtuous ruler is the most important person in terms of immediate government.[22] For Confucius, the direction of influence is downward, and government is more important than the family in terms of influence, because a virtuous ruler who acts as ruler will influence the entire population within the nation.

In The Book of Rites he said: "As men are constituted, the thing most important to them is government."[23] The good life is dependent upon the government and the quality of the sovereign.

> Chi K'ang, distressed about the number of thieves in the state, inquired of Confucius how to do away with them. Confucius said, "If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal."[24]

> Chi K'ang asked Confucius about government, saying, "What do you say to killing the unprincipled for good of the principled?" Confucius replied, "Sir,

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[22] Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. VII. See also The Great Learning, Ch. X, sec. 1.

[23] The Book of Rites, Bk. XIV, sec. 6.

[24] Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. XVII.

> in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it."[25]

The ruler's virtue is so vital in the attainment of good government that Confucius places more emphasis upon it than upon anything else. No institutional arrangement is more necessary for efficient and effective government. As Confucius believed, rulership would be accomplished if the ruler "gravely and reverently occupy his royal seat."[26] The ruler most give examples by living up to the expectation. Confucius said:

> When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed.[27]

The same principle applies to other high-ranking officials of government. Confucius rhetorically asked, if a top-ranking official cannot rectify himself, "what has he to do with rectifying others?"[28]

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[25] Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XIX.

[26] Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. IV.

[27] Ibid., Bk. XIII, Ch. VI.

[28] Ibid., Bk. XIII, Ch. XIII.

The way a ruler becomes virtuous does not differ significantly from that of other men. A ruler must possess such cardinal virtues as jen, yi, and li, attained through the cultivation of the mind and the study of nature. A good part of his study consists of reading classics and history of the past. In fact, Confucianism stresses that no amount of governing is possible if the ruler does not possess these virtues. Confucius is quoted as saying:

> When a man's knowledge is sufficient to attain, and his jen is not sufficient to enable him to hold, whatever he may have gained, he will lose again. When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and he has enough jen to hold, if he cannot govern with dignity, the people will respect him. When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and he has enough jen to hold; when he governs also with dignity, yet if he try to move people contrary to the rules of propriety: -- full excellence is not reached.[29]

In politics therefore leadership is the most, and probably the only, quality of importance. Good leadership is the panacea for all problems of governing, and it is the root of everything within the state:

> Possessing virtue will give him the people. Possessing the people will give him the territory. Possessing the territory will give him its wealth. Possessing the wealth, he will have resources for expenditure.[30]

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[29] Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXXII.

[30] The Great Learning, Ch. X, sec. 6.

Yet virtuous political leadership stems immediately from the personal qualities of the ruler, defined ultimately from the nature itself as in turn discovered by the philosophers. This amply attests again to the fact that politics and ethics are inseparable in Confucian thought.

Aside from the ruler's personal qualities, Confucius offers two other recommendations for good government, and these two are more specifically intended to help the ruler in the operation of government. First, Confucius advocates the rule of li, i.e., propriety of rites; second, he advises the ruler to employ competent ministers and superior men.

Concerning the rule of li, Confucius asked:

> Is a prince able to govern his kingdom with the complaisance proper to the rules of propriety, what difficulty will he have? If he cannot govern it with that complaisance, what has he to do with the rules of propriety?[31]

The rules of propriety here may be construed as following formalism and precedents, for it is a characteristic of Confucianism that formalism is stressed in the whole gamut of human relationships.[32] It seems that Confucius here is trying to routinize men's way of life and their relationships.

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[31] Analects, Bk. IV, Ch. XII.

[32] See for example Analects, Bk. XI, Ch. VII.

The Confucian emphasis upon formalism and rites is apparent in the following passages:

> Yen Yuan asked how the government of a country should be administered. The Master said, "Follow the calender of Hsia; ride in the carriage of Yin; wear the cap of Chou. Adopt the music of Shao with its pantomime; banish the songs of Cheng; and keep away from glib talkers. For the song of Cheng is licentious and glib talkers are dangerous."[33]

> Without the rules of propriety and distinctions of right, and the high and the low will not be wealth sufficient for the expenditure. Without the great principles of government and their various business, there will not be wealth sufficient for the expenditure.[34]

Since the ruler's virtue is so important in terms of influence on others, Confucius advised that the head of state should not only conform to the rules of propriety but that he should also recruit the virtuous men in the country for governmental positions. Confucius said: "Employ the upright and put aside all the crooked; in this way the crooked can be made to be upright."[35] On another occasion Confucius said on the subject:

> The duke Ai asked, saying, "What should be done in order to secure the submission of the people?"

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[33] Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. X.

[34] Mencius, Bk. VII, pt. II, Ch. XII.

[35] Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. XXII, sec. 3.

> Confucius replied, "Advance the upright and set aside the crooked, then the people will submit. Advance the crooked and set aside the upright, then the people will not submit."[36]

The upright man can best serve in the administration of the state. He is the man who "in his conduct of himself maintains a sense of shame, and when sent to any quarter will not disgrace his prince's commission" and "whom the circle of his relatives pronounce to be filial, whom his fellow villagers and neighbors pronounce to be fraternal."[37]

Logically, Confucius disapproves strongly of illegal or corrupt means of obtaining government offices. One must rise to power by the proper method.[38] Wealth and birthright have no place in appointing high officials. In selecting the ministers of state, Confucius admonished the ruler to exercise great care.

> The superior man does not promote a man simply on account of his words, nor does he put aside good words because of the man.[39]

The ruler should employ his ministers by methods which conform to the rules of propriety; such rules can be construed

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[36] Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XIX.

[37] Ibid., Bk. XIII, Ch. XX.

[38] Ibid., Bk. XV, Chs. VI & IX and Bk. XVII, Ch. I.

[39] Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. XXII.

here as objective principles and standards.[40]

Ministers and other lower officials are to be faithful and loyal in the administration of public affairs.[41] Confucianism rejects, however, any sort of blind loyalty. Ministers are expected to act for the country, not for the ruler or prince, and even if it is against the prince's interest ministers should do what they think right for the country.[42] Being a superior man first, the minister should serve the ruler with Tao. Thus governmental affairs must be handled according to the Higher "law" of ethics. On the other hand, Confucius believed that if serving the ruler with Tao should bring about friction the minister should retire instead of compromise.

> What is called a great minister, is one who serves his prince according to what is right, and when he finds he cannot do so, retires.[43]

## Political Legitimacy and the Mandate of Heaven

Probably the highest ideal of Confucianism is that man should be in harmony with heaven and earth so that

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[40] Ibid., Bk. III, Ch. XIX.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid., Bk. XIV, Chs. XVII, XVIII, XX & XXIII.

[43] Ibid., Bk. XI, Ch. XXIII, sec. 3.

peaceful life among people can be achieved. The study of nature and the cultivation of the mind reveal that to achieve a peaceful life people need government and that government should ultimately and practically be run by one man at the top--shades of the Western Dante. "There are not two suns in the sky, nor two sovereigns over the people."[44] Of course this does not preclude a ruler from having ministers or assistants. Confucius therefore recognized the importance of central authority in society. The king or prince as head of state and government constitutes the source of all political authority, and he has virtually no limitation in the exercise of power.[45] The extent of the sovereign power is very much the same as that of Bodin.

Legitimacy of political authority is derived from the "orderly life" of the state, which is the manifestation of the heavenly mandate. Mencius is quoted as saying:

> When right government prevails in the empire, princes of little virtues are submissive to those of great, and those of little worth, to those of great. When bad government prevails in the empire, the princes of small power are submissive to those of great, and the weak to the strong. Both these cases are the rule of Heaven. They who accord with Heaven are

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[44] Mencius, Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. IV, sec. 1.

[45] Book of History, pt. II, Bk. IV.

> preserved, and they who rebel against Heaven perish.[46]

Political legitimacy is granted to the one who has the mandate of Heaven. It seems that this mandate is bestowed upon the man of highest virtue. Confucianists do not make at all clear how the mandate is granted to a specific man. A powerful man can become a ruler through conquest, but this does not mean that he is necessarily granted the mandate of Heaven.

> When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, because their strength is not adequate to resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their heart's core they are pleased, and sincerely admit, as was the case with the seventy disciples in their submission to Confucius. What was said in the Book of Poetry,
>
> "From the west, from the east,
> From the south, from the north,
> There was not one who thought
> of refusing submission."
>
> is an illustration of this.[47]

Legitimacy of the sovereign is rather based upon the ruler's virtue, and the most virtuous and cultivated person is--or should be--the true head of the country.

> E Yin said, "Whom may I not serve? My serving him makes him my sovereign. What people may I not command? My commanding

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[46] Mencius, Bk. IV, pt. I, Ch. VII, sec. 1.

[47] Ibid., Bk. II, pt. I, Ch. III, sec. 2.

> makes them my people." In a time of good government he took office, and when confusion prevailed, he also took office. He said, "Heaven's plan in the production of mankind is this: -- that they who are first informed should instruct those who are later in being informed, and they who first apprehend principles should instruct those who are slower in doing so."[48]

Confucian literature insists also that the most knowledgeable man should become the ruler, although it is somewhat less than clear about how the mandate of Heaven operates in fir[redacted] such a sovereign. That is, it does [redacted]en actually guides and directs a ma[redacted]n such a way as to become a ruler[redacted] approbation to a ruler who happens to [redacted]. The question apparently did not distu[redacted] of Confucianists; however, since a ruler who wins the mandate can later lose it, it seems more probable that the latter is the case.

The mandate of Heaven may also be granted to the person who served the ruler most faithfully. Thus a ruler's son does not automatically succeed his father unless he is worthy and served his father with fidelity.[49] Mencius

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[48] Ibid., Bk. V, pt. II, Ch. I, sec. 2.

[49] Ibid., Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. VI.

> makes them my people." In a time of good government he took office, and when confusion prevailed, he also took office. He said, "Heaven's plan in the production of mankind is this: -- that they who are first informed should instruct those who are later in being informed, and they who first apprehend principles should instruct those who are slower in doing so."[48]

Confucian literature insists also that the most knowledgeable man should become the ruler, although it is somewhat less than clear about how the mandate of Heaven operates in finding and in keeping such a sovereign. That is, it does not discuss whether heaven actually guides and directs a man it had in mind to act in such a way as to become a ruler or whether it gives its approbation to a ruler who happens to be the most virtuous. The question apparently did not disturb the minds of Confucianists; however, since a ruler who wins the mandate can later lose it, it seems more probable that the latter is the case.

The mandate of Heaven may also be granted to the person who served the ruler most faithfully. Thus a ruler's son does not automatically succeed his father unless he is worthy and served his father with fidelity.[49] Mencius

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[48] Ibid., Bk. V, pt. II, Ch. I, sec. 2.

[49] Ibid., Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. VI.

addresses the question of how heaven bestows empire in interpreting the example of the legendary kings, Yao and Shun. Shun served Yao faithfully for twenty-eight years, and when Yao had to retire, heaven supposedly gave Shun the empire. To Wan Chang's challenge that Yao gave Shun the empire and that heaven had little to do with it, Mencius explained:

> The empire can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the empire. A prince can present a man to the emperor, but he cannot cause the emperor to make that man a prince. A great officer can cause the prince to make that man a great officer. Yao presented Shun to Heaven, and the people accepted him. Therefore I say, Heaven does not speak. It simply indicated its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs.[50]

It is true that Confucian literature places a good deal of importance on the people. As Mencius said:

> The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign the lightest.[51]

Nevertheless, the people have no function in selecting their ruler. Presumably they need have little fear of having a bad ruler, though, because the mandate of Heaven is never granted to such a person. In the words of the Great Declaration and the Book of History:

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[50] Ibid., Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. V, secs. 4 & 5.

[51] Ibid., Bk. VII, pt. II, Ch. XIV.

> Heaven sees according as my people see;
> Heaven hears according as my people hear.[52]
>
> Heaven loves the people. Whatever the people desire, heaven gives them.[53]

There is, however, the admission that a ruler can take over the state without heaven's mandate or that a ruler with the mandate later may not act according to the people's wishes. In either case the people are justified in removing him physically.[54] Revolution as a means of removing the non-virtuous ruler is in fact highly praised.[55] Confucian literature explains that heaven's will and mandate are manifested in the minds of the people and that if a ruler is removed it is Ming, i.e., Heaven's decree.

## Law and Justice

As has been discussed in the preceding chapter, Confucianism holds that there exist laws that govern nature. They saw an "orderly nature" and believed that the order was due to a principle, or nature's law. Principles governing

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[52] Ibid., Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. V, sec. 8.

[53] Book of History, Pt. V, Bk. I, sec. 1.

[54] Ibid., Pt. IV, Bks. I & II; Pt. V, Bks. I, II, & XIII.

[55] Book of Change also devoted a full chapter to revolution.

man and man's social relationships form a part of natural law. Mencius quoted the Book of Poetry as follows:

> "Heaven, in producing mankind,
> Gave them their various faculties and
> relations with their specific laws.
> There are the invariable rules of nature
> for all to hold,
> And all love this admirable virtue."
>
> The marker of this ode knew indeed the principle of our nature! We may thus see that every faculty and relation must have its law, and since there are invariable rules for all to hold, they consequently love this admirable virtue.[56]

Confucianism recognizes two kinds of law. One is heaven's decrees and the principles of nature, and the other is positive law.

> When the prince has no principles by which he examines his administration, and his ministers have no laws by which they keep themselves in the discharge of their duties, then in the court obedience is not paid to principle, and in the office obedience is not paid to rule. Superiors violate the laws of righteousness, and inferiors violate the penal laws. It is only a fortunate chance that a kingdom in such a case is preserved.[57]

Since nature is moral, its laws are not only moral but superior to all other human or positive laws. It is therefore not too difficult to see why Confucianism minimized the importance of positive laws. Furthermore, it is the most

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[56] Mencius, Bk. VI, pt. I, Ch. VI, sec. 8.

[57] Ibid., Bk. IV, pt. I, Ch. I, sec. 8.

important duty of man to cultivate himself in order to apprehend nature and its laws. Because human nature can be perfected, ideally there should be little need for positive laws.

However, Confucius did realize the necessity of these laws as long as some men remained imperfect. Although most of the people can become good under the influence of the good example the ruler sets, the virtuous leader alone cannot easily rectify some incorrigibles. Confucius said, "There are only the wise of the highest class, and the stupid of the lowest class, who cannot be changed."[58]

In Confucianism precedents and the ruler's decrees on criminal matters largely comprised positive laws. Still, although positive laws are necessary, government by law is far from the Confucian ideal. The exercise of law is the least effective means of maintaining political order.

> If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good.[59]

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[58] Analects, Bk. XVII, Ch. III.

[59] Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. III.

A ruler who depends on law is a man of poor qualification. Rule by man is more desirable than rule by law; the ruler therefore should possess the requisite moral qualities. Rule by man in Confucian cultural context is not the rule by arbitrary whim. Rather, it means rule by the virtuous man who is in turn governed by Tao and natural law. As Confucius asked, "If you lead on the people with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?"[60] "When the rulers love to observe the rules of propriety, the people respond readily to the calls on them for service."[61] Positive laws are thus somewhat disdained, and government should be run by the example of personal conduct rather than by man-made laws.

Especially does the Confucian concept of justice entail acting in accordance with the rules of nature and performing one's duty in relation to others. Yet man has different moral obligations to different people: affection between father and son, righteousness between sovereign and subjects, distinction between husband and wife, precedence between the old and the young, and faithfulness between

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[60] Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. XVII.

[61] Ibid., Bk. XIV, Ch. XLIV.

friends. All these relations should be harmonious yet different according to the functional stations.

But again, the virtuous ruler is pivotal for achieving justice. People will follow the good example the ruler sets, and thus justice will be maintained. Here, justice for Confucius is equivalent to righteousness. "Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the worthy."[62] Attainment of justice is thus possible if the ruler acts and is treated as ruler, father as father, superior as superior, inferior as inferior, and so on. The virtuous ruler must see to it that this is effected. One man's misfortune or wrongdoing is the concern of the whole society because that misfortune or wrongdoing would disturb the social equilibrium which is the ultimate goal of politics.

Hsun Tzu is again not too greatly different from Confucius and Mencius in his writings on politics and government. However, Hsun Tzu emphasizes certain areas far more than Confucius and Mencius. This makes him appear to be closer to the Moists and the Legalists.

As was seen earlier, Hsun Tzu wished to have social distinction to have harmony. Thus a class society is the

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[62] The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. XX, sec. 5.

answer to disorder. "When division is equal, there is no distinction; when power is equal, there is no unity; when the multitude is equal, there is no order."[63] For Hsun Tzu, therefore, the most important function of government is the ability to assign each man within the state to his proper position in life. He too seems to believe that the essence of position or name should be determined by the philosophers (ancient sages according to him).[64]

A ruler should not only be virtuous but also be capable of performing the governmental function of assigning and keeping people at their right position. Hsun Tzu said:

> The ruler is one who is good at organizing men in society. When society is properly organized, then all things will find their place, the six domestic animals will breed and flourish, and all living beings will fulfill their allotted span of life.[65]

Another important area of difference in terms of emphasis is the concept of rewards and punishments. Hsun Tzu did not see those as a means of enforcing laws and regulations as the Legalists thought. Rewards appear to him as a means of controlling the man who is about to stay out

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[63] Essential Works of Confucianism, supra, p. 277.

[64] Ibid., p. 233.

[65] Hsun Tzu, Basic Writings, tr. by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 46.

of his assigned position. Hsun Tzu is quoted as saying:

> Encourage them with rewards, discipline them with punishments, and if they settle down to their work, then look after them as subjects; but if not, cast them out. . . . If anyone is found acting or using his talents to work against the good of time, condemn him to death without mercy. This is what is called the virtue of Heaven and the government of a true king.[66]

Hsun Tzu believes that if rewards and punishments are not employed by the ruler people will not stay in their class and thus chaos will ensue. Also, he seems to have a good deal more faith in law, and assigns larger roles to law in governing than Confucius and Mencius. But, unlike the Legalists, Hsun Tzu concedes the inadequacy of laws in dealing with every situation. Law cannot administer by itself, thus Hsun Tzu recognizes the necessity of a virtuous and benevolent ruler.

Hsun's realistic view of the ruler's ability, and appropriate use of rewards and punishment, and the rejection of total reliance on force as the political method seem to be a valid contribution to Confucianism.[67]

In summary, Confucianism takes an ethical approach

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[66] Ibid., p. 34.

[67] Oliver E. Benson, op. cit., p. 21.

to the problem of government. If good government--the sine qua non of the good moral life--is to prevail, the ruler should be the most virtuous man in society and he in turn should promote and grade men by standards based on virtue. The moral and superior man is able to govern his family and to perceive the principles of heaven and is therefore qualified for political leadership. Like Plato, politics for Confucius is conducted primarily for educative purposes, i.e., for teaching a person to accord his social title with its real essence. Government is viewed as the largest and most important household in the nation, and it should be organized hierarchically so that the good examples set by the virtuous man at the top flow down to the bottom. Heaven sanctions rulership. The sovereign is not responsible to the people, albeit the people's importance is emphasized. The goal of Confucian politics and government is to attain social harmony, which is possible through the cultivation of man's innate moral quality. This in turn leads to the realization of each man's socio-political role.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE TRIAL OF CONFUCIAN IDEOLOGY

It is difficult to determine with great accuracy the extent to which Confucian political and social ideology was effectuated in the actual life of Confucian nations, nor is it within the scope of this inquiry. As was discussed in the introductory chapter, general observation informs that the depth of application of Confucian theories on ethics and politics varied from nation to nation and from period to period. It is, however, an undeniable fact that for centuries Confucianism provided East Asia with its major political and ethical theories and provided the ruling classes of East Asia with virtually their only governing principles and rationalizations. Furthermore, the political ideology of Confucianism was rarely challenged throughout the millenia in all the Confucian nations.

It is now known, however, that intellectuals gradually started questioning the traditional theory of government from about the latter part of the nineteenth century as

massive political, social, economic and military confrontations with the West began to occur.[1] When Confucian nations repeatedly failed to expel the "barbarians" and suffered humiliations because of Western gun power, intellectuals were naturally quite apprehensive about their countries' futures, and the dominant classes unsure of their traditional apologetics.

Still, intellectual reaction to the West in China, Korea and Japan was not precisely identical, although the focus of argument in the three nations was the validity of traditional culture versus the utility of Western civilization. Facing the tremendous tide of the Western impact, especially political leaders of the Confucian nations began to question their traditional mores and the validity of Confucian assumptions. Controversies over traditionalism versus westernization reached their high point around the turn of the century. Meanwhile debates about the traditional ideology were produced against each country's background and socio-political circumstances.

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[1] See for a work that uses extensive Chinese documentation to the understanding of the Confucian state and its responses to domestic and foreign crises, Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ungchih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).

In Japan newly emerged leaders after the Meiji Restoration had ample time and opportunity to discuss the problems posed by Western science and political theory because Japan faced no immediate military threat from the West. Particularly after the Restoration, Japanese leaders attempted to compromise between Confucian teachings and the Western knowledge Japan acquired.[2] Compromise was comparatively easy and encountered little opposition partly because of the Japanese people's strong loyalty to the emperor. They could accept nearly any foreign doctrine if it continued support for the emperor and the nation. Thus Confucianism--itself foreign in origin--could be discarded with little difficulty. Thus, too, Confucianism, the official ideology of the Tokugawa shogunate, gradually declined after the collapse of the Tokugawa regime.[3] Since there was virtually no significant opposition to westernization, it is quite understandable that Japan produced little systematic examination of Confucian ideology and that she was able to

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[2]Warren W. Smith, Jr., Confucianism in Modern Japan: A Study of Conservatism in Japanese Intellectual History (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1959), pp. 55-88.

[3]Ibid., pp. 41-42. See also George B. Sanson, The Western World and Japan: A Study of the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 310-19.

adjust to changing circumstances.

Korea had comparatively little opportunity to discuss the Western way of life and to reexamine the ideology of Confucius in the light of the new economic and social circumstances. Before any attempt to examine Confucian ideology could be made, Japan annexed the country. Consequently Korea produced little critical analysis during its political crises between the time of its being opened to the West and its annexation.

It was China that produced the most serious debates on the validity of Confucianism and the problem of modernization. Influential governmental officials and scholars began either to voice skepticism of traditionalism or to assert the basic soundness of the traditional outlook and way of life. Many intellectuals who had learned Western thought directly or indirectly began to develop and formulate their own remedies for China's problems. These intellectuals became deeply disillusioned with the traditional Chinese life that had been so long cherished becoming deeply troubled over their country's emasculation by the West.[4]

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[4]So much has been written about the intellectual, social and political problems of China at that time that it

Therefore the present chapter will examine Chinese intellectuals' and government officials' reactions to Western political systems, in the hope of putting Confucian political theory in a better perspective. Through examination of their reactions it is possible to ascertain how they felt Confucianism was or was not adaptable to China's need for modernization and to the concomitant need for reform of the political system. It is also hoped that their attempted analyses of Confucianism will help give considerable insight concerning negative and critical views of Confucian ideology. Their views are particularly important because it was the first time Confucianism was challenged on a national scale.[5] The scope of this study will be limited to the "great debate" which occurred in China from the late nineteenth century to *circa* 1920.

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is almost invidious to cite any particular study. Special recognition, however, must be given to one study that deals most directly with the subject: Chow Tse-tung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). For a documentary survey of the subject, see Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).

[5]Some thinkers such as Wang Ch'ung (27-97 A.D.) and Li Chih (Li Tso-wu, 1572-1602 A.D.) had shown anti-Confucian inclinations, but the government quickly suppressed them. See Chow Tse-tung, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

## Defense of Confucianism

Though many intellectuals assailed Chinese civilization and its Confucian assumptions, a few defended that civilization and what they conceived as its superior qualities. These latter generally believed that there was nothing wrong with China as far as spirit, thought and ideology were concerned: what China needed was materials, technological skills, and guns. Yet it is interesting to observe that all the intellectuals, regardless of their positions on the question, conceded that China was in trouble. Some advocated all-out reform; others, however, saw the need for only slight modification of Confucian traditions. In general, the Confucian apologists were not as strongly engaged in the defense of Confucian ideology per se as in attacking or criticizing Western democratic assumptions and civilization. However, the purpose of their assault on Western way of life is to defend Confucianism explicitly and implicitly.

Although the problems facing Chinese intellectuals and officials were certainly larger in dimension than merely Confucian ideology, many made attempts to resolve China's problems within the Confucian framework. One of them was Chang Chih-tung (1837-1909 A.D.), a leading figure in the last period of the Ching dynasty. Chang, who was known for

his brilliant scholarship and for his strong sense of patriotism, was born into a family of the official class and had the opportunity to receive a superb classical education. After obtaining the chin-shih degree in 1863, Chang Chih-tung entered the civil service and served as governor-general in several provinces. Through his impeccable loyalty and dedication to the Ching government, he eventually became one of the leading elder statesmen in the capital. In 1898 Chang published a widely read and quite influential book, Exhortation to Learn (Ch'uan-hsueh-p'ien). The book was hailed by the reformers then in power and was distributed with the emperor's blessing.

The essential ideas of Chang Chih-tung are contained in that book. In it he formulated his position in relation to the "Confucian controversy": "Chinese learning for substance, Western learning for function." Basically, therefore, Chang was a moderate who wished to avoid any extreme. To do this, he admitted the necessity for reform while upholding Chinese, especially Confucian, virtues. Substance meant, to Chang, Chinese moral values and principles, and function meant utility and practical application of those values and principles. He believed that if the Chinese wished to be strong and to preserve Chinese knowledge, they must study Western

knowledge.[6] He did not esteem Western political philosophy, but he was willing to make use of Western science and technology. At this point Chang did not make it clear why he accepted Western science and technology while rejecting Western political theory and values. Although he did not explicate his basic argument, it seems that Chang was interested only in Confucianism, and thus he wanted to use Western science to defend Confucian ethics.

Thus under the heading of "Rectification of Political Rights," Chang Chih-tung is especially critical of Western political systems and exalts Confucian ideology. Chang was apparently addressing the Ching dynasty's opponents when he rejected the idea of people's rights. Such rights, according to Chang, would bring the people "not a single benefit but a hundred evils."[7] If political rights are given to each man and a parliamentary system is established in China, "foolish people will assuredly be delighted; unruly people will rise up; the laws will not be carried out; great disorder will arise on all sides."[8]

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[6]Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 169.

[7]Ibid., p. 167.

[8]Ibid.

Chang continued, claiming that the term "people's rights" is a misnomer and a mistranslation from the English language. He argued that people in the West were only allowed to express themselves. The "people's rights" idea, he argued, did not envision that all the people actually could wield power and govern themselves. It bothered him that such a concept was construed to mean that each person is the master of himself.[9] Chang explained the absurdity of that interpretation by saying:

> Each Western state definitely has a government, and a government has laws. Officials have administrative laws, soldiers have military laws, workers have labor laws, and merchants have commercial laws. The lawyers learn them, and judges preserve them. Neither the ruler nor the people can violate the law. What is suggested by the executive may be argued by the members of parliament, and what is decided by the parliament may be dissolved by the ruling dynasty. To say that nobody has the right to be his own master is correct, but how can we say that every person is his own master?[10]

The concept of the rights of man is not only nonsense but also is utterly incompatible with Confucian ideology, which is, according to Chang Chih-tung, necessary for "saving

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[9] It is interesting to note that these have been Western critics of subjectivism who argue similarly. See E. Jordan, pp. 159 *et seqq*.

[10] *Ibid*., p. 168.

China" in its crisis. If one recognizes the importance of the bonds between ruler and minister and father and son, the doctrines of democracy and human equality are untenable.[11] Chang, using such arguments thus strongly attacked Western political systems and their political ideology in order to preserve the Manchu dynasty. To him Confucianism was the best solution for China's problems because he considered it superior to Western theory:

> Our sage represented the highest ideal of human relationships. He established in detail and with clarity rules of decorum based on human feelings. Although Westerners have such rules only in abbreviated form, still foreigners have never abandoned the idea of decorum. For the norm of Heaven and the nature of man are about the same in China and in foreign countries. Without these rules of decorum no ruler could ever govern a state, and no teacher could ever establish his doctrine.[12]

There can be no doubt of the genuine traditionalism of Chang Chih-tung. Yet at the same time he wanted to preserve Confucian assumptions and values he also called for reform in Chinese life by learning and adopting Western science and technology.[13] His conviction was that, even though

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[11] Ibid., p. 165.

[12] William Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan and Chester Tan (compilers), Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 84.

[13] Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 169-70.

Confucian ideology and Western political systems are not compatible, science and technology are not only acceptable to the Confucian frame of mind but should be sought vigorously.

He may be quite correct in that the Confucian mind has a room for science and technology. Nowhere in Confucian literature is scientific exploration condemned. By science and technology Chang Chih-tung meant simply the ability to produce military hardware. Chang, however, failed to see the fact that Western science and technology were very much the product of Western commercialism and the Industrial Revolution. He thought that the ability to produce military weapons could be acquired independently of other Western values and the way of life. Also, Chang did not take into account the fact that the development of science and technology inevitably entails the emergence of urbanized and industrialized society and thus ignored the problem of how an industrial society would be maintained by the Confucian moralism or how it would affirm the traditional ethics in personal relations. A virtuous ruler is not the only answer to problems posed by a technological and industrial society.

Probably no Chinese intellectual made as great an

effort as K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927 A.D.) to solve China's problems by attempting to work out answers in terms of the Confucian ideological framework. K'ang was born near Canton, a scion of a distinguished gentry-official family. Throughout his younger days, K'ang witnessed the agonizing effects of the Taiping Rebellion. Though he was provided with an excellent education along traditional lines, he began to develop a distaste for mastering the "eight-legged essay" which was indispensable to success in the civil service examination. At seventeen years of age, K'ang is known to have come across translated materials dealing with the West, which aroused his curiosity. He subsequently became a voracious reader of materials on Western history, politics, and geography.[14] By 1895 he earned the highest regular degree (chin-shih).

K'ang formulated through the study of the West as well as Chinese classics his general philosophy which became the basis of his two most famous works, the Grand Unity (Ta t'ung shu) and Confucius as a Reformer (K'ung Tzu kai-chih k'ao). He wrote these in his late twenties. K'ang's persuasive arguments, his popularity among a large number

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[14]Jung-pang Lo, K'ang Yu-wei: A Biography and Symposium (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967, pp. 7-9.

of Chinese intellectuals and the gloomy political situation after the Sino-Japanese War eventually convinced the young emperor to adopt K'ang's plans for reform. After the fiasco of the radical Hundred Days Reform in 1898, however, K'ang was forced to seek exile for many years to save his life. During this time he toured Japan and several European nations. The countries impressed him a good deal, yet he remained Chinese throughout.

Even though K'ang Ku-wei seems to have modified his views to some degree during his lifetime, as China's political and social circumstances changed, his views were increasingly considered conservative and anachronistic.[15] Earlier a radical and outspoken reformer, K'ang became an opponent of the republican government after it was established in 1911. He remained intensely loyal to the old dynasty and continued to defend Confucian ideology.

It was K'ang Yu-wei's chief argument that China must reform or perish and that moderate reform would not accomplish much. Yet while favoring constitutionalism and limited monarchy, K'ang rejects democratic philosophy and

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[15] Hidemi Onogawa, "K'ang Yu-wei's Idea of Reform," Kindai Chugoku Kenkyu [Studies on Modern China] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1958), pp. 112-13.

westernization.[16] In his discussion of Eastern and Western civilizations, K'ang asserted there was absolutely no necessity for learning anything from the West, though again like Chang he conceded the importance of Western science and technology for strengthening China.

For K'ang traditional Chinese civilization is simply the most ideal civilization for the Chinese, and he felt it should be preserved. While deploring the popularity of things Western in his country, K'ang said:

> In recent years, the whole country has gone mad. Everything in Chinese politics, religion, and customs is being discarded without questioning whether it is right or wrong; and everything European and American is being adopted without finding out whether it is good or bad. The wild illusionists see the strength and prosperity of the West, but they fail to see their cause. They ape the superficial and follow their footsteps, and they think by so doing, they will be Americans and Europeans themselves. Little do they know that they are fundamentally different, and they can never attain the strength of the West by aping. On the other hand, they are losing the excellencies in politics, religion, and customs that our nation has accumulated in many millennia, and are the refined products of the wisdom of our sages.[17]

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[16] K'ang's general philosophy is briefly and well summarized in John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 157-59.

[17] K'ang Yu-wei, "The Trouble with China Lies in the Total Disregard of National Excellencies and All-Out Aping of the West," Pu-jen, VI (July, 1913), pp. 1-2.

K'ang Yu-wei also believed that Confucian nations could absorb the merits of non-Confucian nations without losing their identity. What he meant was that Confucian countries could effectively utilize Western science and technology, and modify defects in their intellectual life without losing the general system of Confucianism.

> If there are weaknesses in our politics, religion, and customs, there should be no reason why we should not rectify our shortcomings by adopting the merits of others. . . . But our own politics, religion, and customs should retain their place as a host, and whatever is added to it is to supplement and improve it. . . . This is to utilize the merits of others for our own sake; our country will thus be benefited, and our people become prosperous. If we discard outright our politics, religion, and customs in favor of aliens' without considering whether it is beneficial or not, we are volunteering to assume the status of a slave.[18]

The approach in solving China's problems is therefore to be extremely selective about adopting Western features, and K'ang did not consider it advantageous for China to embrace Western political systems. Basically the Confucian system is sound. To K'ang Western political systems are inferior to the Confucian system because those were simply not created for the Chinese. K'ang gives two reasons Western political systems should not be imported into China.

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[18] Ibid., VII (August, 1913), p. 1.

First, he believed any political and institutional system must be compatible with the temperament and customs of the people. To him Western political systems are totally incompatible with the Confucian system and therefore are detrimental to the Chinese.[19] But nowhere does he show why these two are incompatible and he merely insists on the incompatibility. Second, K'ang argued that becoming familiar with Western systems and especially understanding their merits would take almost an indefinite amount of time; furthermore, hastily discarding the Confucian political system might cause a political vacuum and confusion.[20] Though K'ang's thesis here seems to be too vague and too general, it was very persuasive to his countrymen. The earlier point is very much of Montesquieu, and the latter is of Burke. He simply believed that the Western way of life does not fit to the temperament of Chinese, and if any change has to be made, it must be done on a piecemeal basis after careful study.

Thus, study of the West and East both through books and first-hand experience led K'ang to the conviction that the only prescription for curing China of its ills was

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[19] Ibid., p. 2.

[20] Ibid., p. 3.

reviving the ethical teachings of Confucius. K'ang proceeded to advocate establishing Confucianism as a state cult. Two years after the Republic was proclaimed K'ang wrote:

> Now human virtues have degenerated, while customs are being corrupted. The sense of shame has been lost, while moral courage is strictly absent. Laxity has even surpassed that of Ch'in and Wu-tai; indeed, the situation has never been so serious in many millennia. Those who have any knowledge at all know well that no nation could establish itself except on the basis of morality. Yet those so-called scholars of new learning who in reality have neither knowledge of foreign or Chinese institutions, nor insight of the fundamentals of administration, are dazzled by the present strength of the West, and despise China for being weak today. They are so deluded that they mimic the discarded trash of the Europeans and Americans with undaunted passion, and they are so senseless that they trample underfoot even the essence of Chinese ethics that we have for thousands of years honored and respected. They discredited Confucianism for being out-of-date and impractical. How absurd! Granting that formalities may vary somewhat from time to time, could there be any difference in new and old, Chinese and foreign morality? How the new scholars actually have the audacity to advocate that the old morals should be replaced by the new. Alas! the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, loyalty, sincerety, modesty, and a sense of shame are ingrained in human nature; could there be distinction between the new and the old.[21]

On the other hand, increasingly K'ang sought to explain the trend toward westernization in terms of the

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[21]K'ang Yu-wei, "On the Adoption of Confucianism as a State Religion and Equalizing the Worship of Confucius to the Worship of Heaven," Pu-jen, III (April, 1913), p. 2.

Confucian context. That is, he felt that the problems facing China stemmed not from any inadequacy of Confucian ideology but rather from inadequate understanding of the "real meaning" of the Chinese sages. He insisted that all the so-called foreign virtues are not foreign after all. The Western concepts of humanity, equality, liberty, popular sovereignty, etc., according to K'ang, could be found in the works of Confucius and Mencius.[22] To K'ang, only those ignorant of their cultural heritage could think they had discovered a new panacea for the nation's weaknesses. He wrote:

> The blind talks of the illusionists, who are ignorant of Confucius' Analects and attempt to attack Confucian morality as out-of-date, need not worry us. But the fact that troubles us is that the whole nation is drinking from "the spring of insanity," and actually mistakes sanity for insanity.[23]

K'ang thus felt Confucianism must be preserved because other cultures contained nothing new. If anyone wished to save the nation, he "must first of all save the spirit of

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[22] Ibid., p. 5. He does not cite Confucian source to prove his point. As was seen in the preceding chapters, Confucianism does contain the conceptions similar to Western humanism, equality, and popular sovereignty. But it is difficult to see "liberty" concept in Confucianism.

[23] Ibid., p. 6.

the nation, i.e., teachings of Confucius."[24]

Yet as a great defender of Confucianism, K'ang Yu-wei began to attempt to resolve China's immediate problems with the modern age by reinterpreting Confucian texts. For that purpose he launched a movement, the so-called "New Text School" of textual criticism. K'ang was apparently not interested in a strictly scholarly interpretation of Confucianism but rather in attempting to demonstrate that the institutional reforms China required were perfectly compatible with the "spirit" of Confucianism. As de Bary and others put it, K'ang's intent was "rather than permit the sphere occupied by the Confucian Way in Chinese life to be further narrowed and displaced by Western 'methods,' he would redefine the Way and enlarge its scope so as virtually to include the latter. Instead of making more room for Western institutions alongside Confucianism, he would make room for them inside."[25]

Thus in his celebrated book, Confucius As A Reformer, K'ang developed his own theory of history through an explication of Confucian documents. It is quite obvious in the

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[24] Ibid., p. 5.

[25] William Theodore de Bary et al., op. cit., p. 65.

following passage that his real intent was to provide justification for reform. He explained:

> The meaning of the Spring and Autumn Annals consists in the evolution of the Three Ages: the Age of Disorder, the Age of Order, and the Age of Great Peace. . . The Way of Confucius embraces the evolution of the Three Sequences and the Three Ages. The Three Sequences were used to illustrate the Three Ages, which could be extended to a hundred generations. . . . For as customs are handed down among the people later kings cannot but follow the practices of the preceding dynasty; yet since defects develop and have to be removed, each new dynasty must make modifications and additions to create a new system.[26]

Believing that every creature, including a nation, is subject to evolution, K'ang asserted that a nation must adjust to changing circumstances and that Confucius envisaged change.

> When Confucius prepared the Spring and Autumn Annals, he extended to embrace the Three Ages. Thus, during the Age of Disorder he considers his own state as the center, treating all other Chinese feudal states as on the outside. In the Age of Order he considers China as the center, while treating the outlying barbarian tribes as on the outside. And in the Age of Great Peace he considers everything, far or near, large or small, as if it were one. In doing this he is applying the principle of evolution.
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> Confucius was born in the Age of Disorder. Now that communications extended through the great earth and changes have taken place in Europe

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[26]K'ang Yu-wei, "Confucius As A Reformer," in William Theodore de Bary et al., op. cit., pp. 69-70.

> and America, the world is evolving toward the Age of Order. There will be a day when everything throughout the earth, large or small, far or near, will be like one. . . . With this uniformity will come the Age of Great Peace. Confucius knew all this in advance.[27]

There is a good deal of similarity between K'ang Yu-wei and Chang Chih-tung in the sense that both conceded the necessity of reform, yet both repudiated Western political theory and systems. K'ang went further by saying that Confucius emphasized all along the importance of reform. He simply felt that Confucianism was better for Chinese, and did not make any effort to adjust Western concepts to Confucian concepts or vice versa. As many of his contemporaries, K'ang was interested mainly in modernization without westernization.[28] In formulating solutions to China's problems, he refused to go beyond the framework of

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[27] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[28] "Modernization without Westernization" was one major theme of Chinese political leaders and intellectuals in the early days. The way they used the term modernization probably means an atmosphere in which a nation can produce and effectively utilize machines, weapons and technical know-how. Chinese leaders wanted to have the Western tools without accepting Western values. Of course, this later proved to be a disaster. They learned rather painfully that the Western tools and machines could not be produced and used effectively without having Western type of education and specialized and industrialized social structure.

Confucianism and eventually became a captive of tradition and prejudice.

The last defense of Chinese civilization as ideal was perhaps that of Ku Hung-ming (1854-1928), who was born in Malaya of Chinese ancestors. Ku went to China for study and subsequently went abroad to further his education. At the University of Edinburgh he studied Western philosophy. Upon his return to China he worked under Chang Chih-tung for many years and also taught English at the University of Peking.

Ku Hung-ming was basically a strong conservative. He detested and ridiculed Western culture and its political theory and systems, despite the fact that he probably knew more about the West than most of his countrymen. He defended the monarchy and all the traditional Chinese customs, often with whimsical remarks.[29] In 1915 Ku published his book, The Spirit of the Chinese People, both in English and German.[30] Presumably this work was published for the purpose of "saving" Europeans by introducing them to the

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[29]Teng Ssu-yu and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 149 and 232.

[30]This book was originally published in German with the title, Der Geist des chinesischen Volkes und der Ausweg aus den Krieg (Jena: Diederichs, 1917).

"ideal" civilization, i.e., Confucian ethics and morality.

According to Ku, the Western religion, Christianity, had degenerated and is no longer an effective moral force to maintain order and peace. Thus Europeans are fighting each other to obtain peace--World War I is the result. He believed that physical force to maintain civil order leads to militarism, which in turn leads to war. War is wasteful and inhuman. The real dilemma is that Europeans cannot eliminate militarism, because if they did anarchy would destroy their civilization.[31]

To resolve this dilemma, Europeans should study Chinese civilization and Confucianism, which teaches a "religion of good citizenship." That is the moral force which makes militarism unnecessary.[32] Ku urged Europeans to visit China to learn Confucian ethics in order to avoid so much trouble and bloodshed.[33]

Ku was almost blindly idealistic about Confucian culture; he held the firm conviction that the ethical theory of Confucianism provided the solution and key to the good

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[31] Ibid., p. ii.

[32] Ibid., p. iii.

[33] Ibid., p. vii.

life, though he failed to explain exactly why Confucian culture is superior to other cultures. As Chang's and K'ang's, his exaltation of Confucian ideology contains nationalistic overtones.

## Assaults on Confucianism

Of the many thinkers of the time, few were probably more critical and outspoken toward the Confucian way of life than Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942 A.D.). Although he received an excellent traditional education in the classics, Ch'en was deeply influenced by the West. Probably no Chinese of Ch'en tu-hsiu's stature disparaged and denounced Chinese culture and Confucian assumptions as much as he. Ch'en was an ardent member of a revolutionary group before the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. After the Republic was proclaimed, he actively supported the new literary movement. During this period, Ch'en derided Confucian customs and ethics and wholeheartedly endorsed the Western way of life.

In 1916 Ch'en became dean of the School of Letters of Peking University and played a leading part in the intellectual revolution which occurred *circa* 1920. Ch'en was also chief editor of, and a frequent contributor to, an influential magazine, *The New Youth* (*Hsin ch'ing-nien*), which

came to be a vanguard organ for a new generation no longer satisfied with Confucian ideology. After the Versailles Peace Conference, however, as many other intellectuals of his day, Ch'en lost faith in Western liberalism and democracy. Out of his disillusionment, Ch'en felt more and more inclined to Marxism, and he soon became the founder of the Chinese Communist Party.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu deplored greatly nearly every aspect of the Chinese way of life, which invariably meant to him Confucianism. Nearly all his recorded assaults on Confucianism occurred during Ch'en's pre-Communist period. While praising the West for its combativeness, individualism and utilitarianism, Ch'en attacked the decadence of the traditional ethics and Confucian values which he considered responsible for China's backwardness and weakness. In numerous articles in The New Youth Ch'en exhorted the young men of China to be individualistic, progressive, cosmopolitan, utilitarian and scientific and urged them to abandon the evils of the traditional life.[34] Though a good deal of Ch'en's arguments are quite cogent, he seems very

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[34]Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 240-45. See also Collected Works of Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Shanghai: Oriental Book Co., 1922).

indiscriminate in his choice of words describing the West. Anything that is closely or loosely identified with the West seems to be the object of admiration. The chief merit of his writings lies in his critical view of Confucianism.

Ch'en made the most seriour straightforward assault on the Confucian way of life and politics. In his article entitled "The Way of Confucius and Modern Life" which appeared in The New Youth, Ch'en argued that Confucianism is totally incompatible with modern-day life and that its ideology is completely anachronistic.[35] He wrote:

> Confucius lived in a feudalistic period; therefore what morality he promoted, what decorum and teaching he handed down, what pattern of living he exemplified, and what form of government he advocated were all of a feudalistic period. Such morality, decorum, teaching, pattern of living and form of government were formulated for the benefits and honors of princes and nobles; and had nothing to do with the welfare of the masses.[36]

Ch'en extolled the virtues of individualism as found in Western liberalism,[37] and he believed that Confucian

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[35]"The Way of Confucius and Modern Life," The New Youth, II, No. 4 (December, 1916) in Wm. Theodore de Bary et al., op. cit., p. 153 et seq.

[36]Ibid., p. 156.

[37]His concept of liberalism was essentially that of Manchester liberalism. Freeing man from the bond of tradition, Ch'en felt, man could have liberty in law and pursue

culture is not conducive to the growth of individualism and independent thinking. He charged that when a son is blindly filial and when a wife is entirely submissive to her husband, there is no room for individualism since they can have no independent status.

More than any other aspect of Confucianism, Ch'en bitterly attacked Chinese customs and ethics evolved from the Confucian classics. He enumerated many Confucian ethical norms of conduct and attempted to show how absurd and restrictive they were in the modern context. For example, one Confucian text said: "The wife's words should not travel beyond her apartment," and "A woman does not discuss affairs outside the home" (Book of Rites, I:24); "Men and women do not sit on the same mat," or "Brothers- and sisters-in-law do not exchange inquiries about each other" (Book of Rites, I:24); "Women must cover their faces when they go out" (Book of Rites, X:12); "Except in religious sacrifices, men and women do not exchange wine cups" (Book of Rites, XXVII:17); "In giving or receiving anything, a man or woman should not

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enlightened self-interest. By individualism he meant socially and economically motivated one of Manchester liberalism, no nihilistic or romantic individualism. See Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (New York: Harper and Row, Publisher, 1963), p. 195 et passim.

touch the other's hand" (Book of Rites, XXVII:20). Customs such as these Ch'en considered totally unsuited to the mode of life in Western society and thought modern day China should discard them.[38]

Ch'en also argued that the principles of Confucianism and those of republicanism are totally and absolutely incompatible.[39] He believed that, because Confucianism placed heavy emphasis upon the cultivation of human virtues and the "proper" relationship with others, it essentially excluded the concept of equality, a concept Ch'en considered basic to the republican form of government and to democracy. Confucianism also denies freedom of thought and speech. For example, it enjoins sons to accept their parents' beliefs, at least until three years after their death, and it compels women to obey their fathers and husbands. Ch'en cited such standards as evidence that popular elections and representative government are contrary to Confucian ideals.[40] For Ch'en, Confucian ethics and Western democracy cannot co-exist without conflict.

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[38] Ibid., pp. 154-55.

[39] "Constitution and Confucius," The New Youth, II, No. 3 (November, 1916), pp. 1-5.

[40] Ibid., pp. 3-5.

Confucian ideology is not only unsuitable to the democratic way of life, but also its teachings have made the Chinese highly intolerant and prejudiced because it dominated their national life and tended to preclude other systems of thought. Intolerance and prejudice, Ch'en insisted, have no business in a democracy.[41] He believed that Confucianism, in the final analysis, must be extricated if the Chinese wished to have democracy.

As was mentioned earlier, Ch'en Tu-hsiu later became a Marxist, but after the failure of the first United Front Movement he was purged from the Chinese Communist Party, which he had founded only a few years earlier. It would have been extremely interesting to see Marxist Ch'en Tu-hsiu's reaction to Confucianism, had he written much on the subject. However, he did not seem to have changed his view on Confucianism, nor did he attack Confucianism particularly from a Marxist point of view.[42]

Chinese Communists do attack Confucianism, but few

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[41] Ibid., II, No. 5 (January, 1917), p. 4.

[42] Ch'en Tu-hsiu, like many other leaders in the under- or developing countries, was a nationalist, patriot, and iconoclast first. Although it would be difficult to say how thoroughly he was sold to Marxism, it seems that he became a Marxist to combat or overcome the weakness of China and the strength of Western imperialism.

have made an attack on Confucianism as devastating as that of Ch'en Tu-hsiu did in pre-Marxist stage, and few have come up with any new line in denouncing Confucianism. In other words, there has not yet been produced a new theoretical analysis of Confucianism by leading Communists that is worth investigating here. Probably this is due to the fact that many Chinese Communists are still somewhat Confucian, and they twist it and at times quote the Confucian apothegms for their own cause. It would be extremely fascinating to study the Confucian influence upon Communist China's internal power structure or upon China's behavior in regard to foreign affairs. But, quite obviously, this is far beyond the scope of this study.

While Ch'en was busy making his forays against vestiges of Confucianism, another scholar joined the fray. He was Wu Yu (1871-1949 A.D.), who was born in Chengtu, Szechwan. Wu went to Japan and studied law and political science. Returning to China, he published a book and began editing a magazine in his home town.[43] He became acquainted with The New Youth and subsequently enjoyed the intellectual

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[43]The Ching government banned his book, Discussions of the Intellectual Trends in Sung and Yuan Dynasties, because of its anti-Confucian nature.

companionship of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Wu's anti-Confucian articles were published in The New Youth from February 1917 on. Wu also began to teach at Peking University in 1919 and later at Chengtu University and at the National Szechwan University.

Among other reasons, Wu attacked Confucian ideology because it upheld the traditional family system which sanctioned paternalism and filial piety and loyalty. The principle of filial piety, according to Wu, had provided the basis for the doctrine of absolute loyalty to the sovereign, thus producing the tyrannical nature of Chinese politics.[44] In his view, the ruling class interpreted Confucian literature in a way to enable them to perpetuate their power. Wu said, "because filial piety and fraternal duty are virtues of obedience," a Sung Confucian scholar was able to maintain that "those who possess these virtues will not offend their superiors, and there will be of course no rebellion."[45] With this Sung interpretation in mind, Wu said, "The effect of the idea of filial piety has been to turn China into a big factory for the manufacturing of obedient subjects."[46]

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[44]"The Old Family and Clan System is the Basis of Despotism," The New Youth, II, No. 6 (February, 1917), pp. 1-2.

[45]"On Filial Piety," Collected Essays of Wu Yu (Shanghai: Oriental Book Co., 1929), pp. 15-16.

[46]Ibid., pp. 1-2.

There is little wonder that Confucianism had enjoyed official sanction and that the ruling class effectively used its teachings, said Wu.

Not only is Confucianism responsible for China's despotic government, but also, Wu charged, it is chiefly responsible for the caste system and social inequality in China. Confucius, Wu explained, upheld the distinction between superior and inferior. Superior things are heaven, the sovereign, fathers, husbands and older men (or brothers); inferior things are the ministers, sons, wives, younger men (or brothers), subjects, etc.[47] Wu Yu argued that Confucius never failed to see men in terms of superiority and inferiority and that the result of this type of ideology is that Chinese society lacks the concept of equality.

Probably the most thorough westernizer of all was Hu Shih (1891-1963 A.D.), one of the most prominent thinkers and intellectuals of modern China. Hu studied at Cornell and Columbia and became a leading Chinese follower of John Dewey. While openly acknowledging his intellectual indebtedness to J. S. Mill and Thomas Huxley, among others, Hu Shih became professor of philosophy and later the dean of the College of

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[47]"Disadvantages of Confucianists' Advocacy of the Caste System," The New Youth, III, No. 4 (June, 1917), p. 1.

Arts and Science of Peking University.

Hu was a close friend of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, and he worked for The New Youth and also wrote quite extensively. Rejecting Confucian doctrine as impractical and absurd, Hu took more interest in the literary reform movement and in expounding European philosophy and the pragmatism of James and Dewey than in Confucian theory.

Hu's treatment of Confucianism is contained in his general discussion on Chinese and Western civilizations. Hu found virtually nothing to boast of in Chinese civilization, including of course Confucianism.[48] He saw in it nothing useful for the reconstruction of Chinese society: the traditional culture, to him is decadent, non-progressive and illogical. He wrote:

> Its past glories belong to the past; we cannot look to them for solution of our problems of poverty, disease, ignorance, and corruption. For these four evils are what remain of the Chinese civilization to-day. What else is there? Has the country produced during the last hundred years a painter, a sculptor, a great poet, a novelist, a musician, a dramatist, a thinker, or a great statesman? Poverty has snapped the life of the people, and opium and disease have killed their creative faculties and made them sluggish and slovenly. Shall

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[48]"Conflict of Cultures," China Christian Yearbook: 1929 (Shanghai: Christian Literature Society, 1930), p. 119.

> we postpone any longer the coming of the civilization of science and technology which alone furnishes the only tools for combating our deadly enemies and supplies the only possible foundation for a new and living civilization.[49]

Hu Shih did not treat Confucian ideology more specifically. He was not much concerned with the content of Confucian texts. Rather, he denounced the whole of the traditional culture on an empirical and utilitarian basis. He felt that the old traditions could do nothing for China today.

## Syncretism

While Confucianism was on trial, with the parties divided between those who asserted the relevancy of Confucian ideology and those who considered it useless in solving China's problems or at least as hampering the process of modernization, a sober compromise of this great controversy appeared. The significance of this compromise is that it was advanced by a man of great influence and knowledge.

That man was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929 A.D.), who had a thorough knowledge of both Eastern and Western cultures. Liang became one of the best known followers of K'ang Yu-wei and showed a great deal of interest in the reform movement.

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[49] Ibid., pp. 119-20.

After the 1898 fiasco he was exiled to Japan. There he became one of the most knowledgeable Chinese scholars and journalists and one of the prolific writers of modern China. Many Chinese intellectuals and students read Liang's writings, which dealt with a wide range of political, social, and cultural issues. A major work of Liang is entitled A History of Chinese Political Thought.[50] Liang became a source of inspiration and a patriotic hero, and he was no doubt an intellectual giant towering over most Chinese in modern times.[51] Returning to China after the Republic was proclaimed, Liang taught at several colleges. His last ten years were spent as a professor at Tsing Hua University.

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao conceded that Confucius was the center of Chinese civilization and that his influence on the Chinese way of life had been and continued to be tremendous. Liang therefore felt that the teachings of Confucius and Confucian ethics should be effectively utilized in the Chinese educational system. However, he called any attempt to mimic foreign religions in creating a Confucian church for worship

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[50] L. T. Chen, trns. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1930).

[51] Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 2-6.

and in establishing Confucianism as a state religion ridiculous.[52]

In his earlier days Liang thought that Confucius, though certainly not the only one, was one of the great thinkers of the past.[53] While praising the West, Liang despised the Chinese way of life because of what he considered its ignorance, backwardness and conservatism.[54] In his later years, however, Liang began to emphasize eclecticism and selectivity in his approach to the study of comparative civilization. For example, he said of Confucianism:

> What we need to learn is the essential spirit of the system and not the conditions under which it was produced, for once we come to the conditions, we shall not be free from the restrictions of time. For example, Confucius said a great deal about ethics of an aristocratic nature which is certainly not suitable today. But we should not take Confucius lightly simply because of this. Shall we cast Plato aside simply because he said that the slavery system should be preserved? If we understand this point, we can study traditional Chinese subjects with impartial judgment and accept or reject them judiciously.[55]

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[52] Ibid., pp. 104-08.

[53] Ibid., pp. 121-22. See also Teng Ssu-yu and J. K. Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 220-23.

[54] Ibid., pp. 142-44.

[55] Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Travel Impressions of Europe," in Wm. Theodore de Bary, op. cit., pp. 186-87.

On borrowing from the West, Liang recommended:

> If we want to expand our civilization, we must borrow the methods of other civilizations because their methods of study are highly refined. [As Confucius said:] "If one wants a job well done, he must first sharpen his tools." For what other reason was it [than the failure to do this] that while everyone in the past read Confucius and Li Po, no one got anywhere? I therefore hope that our dear young people will, first of all, have a sincere purpose of respecting and protecting our civilization; secondly, that they will apply Western methods to the study of our civilization and discover its true character; thirdly, that they will put our own civilization in order and supplement it with others' so that it will be transformed and become a new civilization; and fourthly, that they will extend this new civilization to the outside world so that it can benefit the whole human race.[56]

After his return from a tour in Europe, Liang no longer admired the West as he once did. He now deemed Western civilization as decadent and declining, the victim of its own obsession with science and materialism. The failure of science and materialism demonstrated that China should not accept them blindly. To Liang, the West overemphasized materialism and lacked spiritualism. China's challenge was to solve the problem of how to apply the Confucian ideal of equilibrium so that every man might live a balanced life. Liang wrote:

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[56] Ibid., p. 187.

> What is our duty? It is to develop our civilization with that of the West and to supplement Western civilization with ours so as to synthesize and to transform them to make a new civilization.[57]

Thus one of Liang's solutions to China's problems was to adopt a constitution, a feature of his syncretism. Liang used both Chinese and Western materials to support his argument for adopting a constitution. On the Confucian side of the argument, Liang thought that constitutional government is the form of government most compatible with the welfare of the people. Confucianism, insisting upon a benign rulership, argues that a ruler who himself does not follow the law cannot expect his subjects to obey him. According to Confucius, the best qualified man should be the ruler, and this man should be a model citizen whose behavior people should emulate. A model citizen is also one who best obeys the laws, and hence, Liang contends, the Confucian rulership of virtue and benevolence presupposed the necessity of a constitution since constitutionalism means the rule of law.[58]

On the Western side of the argument, Liang thought there was much evidence to support his preference for

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[57] Ibid., p. 185.

[58] Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, China and the League of Nations (Peking: Society for the Study of International Relations, 1918), pp. 29-34.

constitutionalism. Throughout history, the nations that did not have constitutions always suffered from lack of freedom and poor living conditions. Examples Liang cites are Latin America, Russia, Turkey, etc.[59]

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was in many ways quite different from other leading intellectuals of his time. He did not denounce and reject Confucian ideology completely in favor of Western models, nor did he simply attempt to accomodate Western science and technology in a rigid Confucian framework. Liang envisioned a new world with virtues extracted from both Confucian ethics and Western cultural constitutionalism. He was simply to constitutionalize Confucian "spirit."

Chinese intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were quite apprehensive about China's inability to "expel" the West and Western culture. When China's traditional values and assumptions were challenged from the outside, they commenced a great debate on the relative worth of Chinese and Western civilizations. Early leaders felt the necessity for reform, but they conceived the purpose of reform as being to preserve their traditional way of life. In the early part of the twentieth

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[59] Ibid.

century, however, Chinese intellectuals became increasingly sophisticated and knew more about Western culture. Thus the real trial of Confucian ideology was not conducted until that time.

After World War I, much of the critical analysis also revolved about the comparative worth of Eastern and Western civilizations. Confucianism, as the primary molder of Chinese civilization, was dealt with directly or indirectly. Those who deplored China's weakness quickly and mercilessly blamed Confucian ideology. To them Confucianism was the culprit. Those who defended Confucianism either were impelled by a strong sense of nationalism or suffered an almost reactionary complex of cultural superiority. The result was that they generally failed to make a strong case for Confucian ideology in the rapidly changing age. Many of them hated Western culture and democratic principles more than they liked Confucian way of life and government. Thus, they were more critical of West than defending their traditional ideology. And those who attacked Confucianism generally failed to recognize the fact that they could not depart from the Confucian cultural tradition overnight and they had to live with the past even after the Western-style republic was established in 1911.

Their analysis of Confucian theory, however, shed a new light on the nature of Confucianism. Apparently, Confucian "way of life" had never been the way it was described in the texts. Whether their re-evaluations were justified or not, they exposed some of its true and negative and "unhappy" side. Some of the defects of Confucian theory were, in the final analysis, inevitable results of the social, economic, and political conditions of the time, while others may have resulted from intellectual indolence and lack of self-reflection on the part of Confucianists.

The worth of the debate was, in view of subsequent events, more in raising yet unsolved questions than in problem solving: Can a "spiritualistic" state-of-mind ethical system offer a solution to an industrial and technological order that has no "mind" and no "heart"? For the growth of huge industrialized society has brought about the decline of the protestant ethic in the West; Confucianism may, too, face a similar destiny in the wake of modernization and industrialization.

# CHAPTER V

## CONFUCIANISM AND WESTERN DEMOCRACY

As has been discussed, the Confucian nations, such as China, Korea, and Japan, have adopted Western political structures and features at different times since the "debacle" of their traditional political systems based upon Confucian principles and tenets.[1] The present political institutions of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China have their prototypes in Europe, and modern political democracy in Asia is almost exclusively the product of the influence of Great Britain, France, and the United States.

Not only do the above mentioned Asian nations pretend to be developing democratic systems, but also the ideas of democracy seem to have a great deal of attraction and appeal elsewhere in the world. Thus many political and

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[1]The People's Republic of China is of course an exception. Comparison and analysis of modern Communist political systems is not within the purview of this study, albeit Communism claims to be "true democracy."

military dictatorships that have appeared in recent times have attempted to rationalize them as democratic or to pretend to be laying down the ground work for future democracy.

Problems, however, arise when non-Western nations adopt Western political institutions and ideology in the hope of having a western style of democracy. The importation of Western political values and assumptions raises the question of what will become of the traditional ideology and how it will interact with the new. These are problems of the first magnitude to many political scientists today.[2] Certainly it is assumed in this study that traditional beliefs, values, and attitudes persist for some time after the formal departure of traditionalism. It is also assumed that if a traditional ideology is compatible with the imported ideas and system of government, the political change toward desired goals can be accomplished much more smoothly.

The core problem of this chapter then is to consider how the traditional Confucian theory of government and its basic concepts can be compared with those of modern

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[2]For example, see Fred R. vonder Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964); Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963); and David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

democratic political systems. More specifically, it is intended to examine whether or not Confucianism is congenial to the ideas and theory of modern democracy.[3] A serious problem is posed at once, however, by the nature and meanings of democracy. As Dahl says: "One of the difficulties one must face at the outset is that there is no democratic theory--there are only democratic theories."[4] Thus one important question here is: with what theories of democracy should one compare or contrast the Confucian theory and ideals?

Thus in this chapter, a comparison is made first with an apologetic view of the classical concept of democracy. Although the view admittedly is considered by some to be "naive," "foolish," and "childlike," an examination of it nonetheless seems relevant to this study. That is, since to a great majority of the people today this view of democracy seems to mean equality of men, freedom, and certain basic

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[3] It should be reminded that this is a study of a hypothesis. Of course Confucian ideology is only a part of the political culture and it does not pretend to prove the actual Confucian nations are capable--or incapable--of the ideological change and transformation in order to have the Western style of democracy.

[4] Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 1.

rights, a government of, by, and for the people, an attempt is made to compare this "classical" view of democracy with the normative, apologetic ideas of Confucianism. This analysis will be followed by realistic and critical views of modern democratic theories and comparison and contrast with Confucian thought.

## Nature of "Democracy" and Confucian Thought

Several influential and widely adopted books on the American democracy and systems of government for college students written by modern political scientists freely admit the elusive nature of democracy. Then they proceed to say that "democracy rests on a belief in the fundamental dignity and importance of the individual, in the essential equality of human beings, and in the individual's need for freedom."[5] One work also contends that the concept of equality is "the most fundamental belief of democratic theory," and the concept of humanitarianism must be added to the concept of equality.[6]

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[5]James M. Burns and Jack W. Peltason, Government by the People, 7th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 8. Emphasis added.

[6]Marian D. Irish and James W. Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 62.

Democratic theory of government is also said to be based on "majority rule and minority right,"[7] and the ideal of democracy is "self-government." In a democracy the electorate chooses the major policy officials in "free and relatively frequent elections."[8] Not only does the majority govern through regular elections but also people have equal political power. Furthermore, democracy is bound up, according to these texts, with the principle of constitutionalism which in turn means "limited government." Such "authorities" agree with Thorson who says that "to see popular sovereignty, political equality, individual political rights, and majority rule . . . is to see four aspects of the same general principle . . . More than merely compatible with one another, they are necessary to one another."[9]

Equality.--The concepts of political equality and "dignity of man" are especially closely related to this idealistic notion of modern "democracy." Thus man's equality and dignity are "mouthed" a great deal by some of these

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[7] Ibid., p. 64.

[8] James M. Burns and Jack W. Peltason, op. cit., p. 9.

[9] Thomas Landon Thorson, The Logic of Democracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 143.

political thinkers and political writers as being synonymous with "democracy" even though they do not define either of these terms.

It may seem simple to describe the nature of human equality, but of course the word "equality" is quite confusing in actual application.[10] It is used when one makes comparisons, and a comparison can be made only when those things which are compared have some quality or attribute in common. However, "in social and political theory . . . equality is more often prescriptive than descriptive."[11] Thus the concept of equality has been stated by these political writers and speakers to imply that in Western democracies there is equal treatment and equal consideration in certain phases of political and economic life.

Again, the theory of natural rights is generally closely related to the concept of equality. Locke said that the state of nature is:

> . . . a state also of equality, where in all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no

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[10] See Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), pp. 289-92.

[11] S. I. Berns and R. S. Peters, The Principles of Political Thought (New York: The Free Press of the Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 124.

> one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection . . .[12]

And the law of Nature:

> teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.[13]

The Western concept of human equality, it is argued, therefore, involves some equal political and economic right as well as the equal moral worth of men as children of "God" or "nature."

When one turns to the Confucian conception of equality of man it may seem slightly different from that of Western democracy in terms of description; but, actually, one finds there seems on the surface little fundamental difference. As has been seen, Confucius believed that "by nature, men are nearly alike:"[14] i.e., human nature is

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[12] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, cited in William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 401.

[13] Ibid., p. 402.

[14] Analects, Bk. XVII, Ch. II. See p. 24.

virtually equal in its taste, desire, and appetite. There is almost no difference between the sages and the ordinary men in terms of nature.[15] However, Confucianists also believe that men are different and unequal in their "outward" expression such as ability to perform their functions, express their intelligence, and morality. They are also admittedly unequal due to social institution, practice, and mores. Apparently, Confucianists then seem to argue that men are by nature not alike in terms of ability, intelligence, and morality, although they are alike in terms of taste, desire, and appetite. Although this appears only confusing and contradictory it lays the basis for comparison with the democratic "prescriptive view."

That is, although there are differences (inequalities) in worldly possessions and wealth among men as a result of differences in abilities, these differences should not be socially important as Mencius said:

> If on self-examination, I find that I am not upright, shall I not be in fear even of a poor man in his loose garments of haircloth? If, on self-examination, I find that I am upright, I will go forward against thousands and tens of thousands.[16]

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[15] Mencius, Bk. IV, pt. V, Ch. XXX.

[16] Ibid., Bk. II, pt. I, Ch. II, sec. 7.

Confucius also said in a similar vein, while praising one of his disciples, that the disciple:

> dressed himself in a tattered robe quilted with hemp, yet standing by the side of men dressed in furs, and not ashamed.[17]

Thus the Confucian conception of man suggests that although men are not equal in outward conditions they ought to be seen and treated as of equal moral worth.

Thus man's equality and human nature as described by Confucianists have many similarities to the thought of Western democratic philosophers. For example, Aristotle, though not a democrat, had nearly the same view of man. Man is a rational animal and man's dignity consists in his rationality. Man's capacity to reason is above vegetative and appetitive faculties.[18] Much later, Godwin, the anarchist-democrat, suggests the Confucian view that human nature is not only originally good but also perfectible: "Man is not originally vicious."[19] (Confucius and Mencius,

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[17] Analects, Bk. IX, Ch. XXVI, sec. 1.

[18] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Introduction to Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeen (New York: The Modern Library, 1947), p. 330.

[19] William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, ed. & abridged by Raymond A. Preston, vol. II (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1926), p. 70.

as has been discussed, believed that human nature was innately good and man's ability to understand the law of nature would lead to good life.)

The Confucian view of equality as based on its own kind of "natural law," is also somewhat similar to the Stoic and Christian view of man. Lindsay says that the Stoics were the first (in the West) who conceived "the notion of an all-pervading supreme law of nature to which positive law should be subject."[20] The Greek Stoics thus made a vital contribution to the modern democratic system with their concept of the equality of man under a universal reason and based on "natural reason" of most men and thus with the subsequent development of the Roman jus gentium. This Stoic philosophy of natural law became wedded closely to Christianity, and through the teachings of Christianity the natural law conception of equality has been transmitted to modern times.

Also in an equally early period it is important to note that Confucianists in Asia were also arguing that men may be equal in moral capacity regardless of social, economic,

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[20]A. D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State, Vol. I (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 54-55.

and political positions. Put oppositely all men are according to Confucianists subject equally to a universal and eternal law of moral nature: the obligation to moral uprightness. The fact that all do not have the same capacity of reasoning and of intelligence is not as important as this equality in moral capacity and this moral worth. That is, all men are equal because they are governed by the natural law even though the nature of man in terms of rational capacity may be unequal. Moral worth based on moral capacity becomes a kind of sine qua non--as rationalist capacity does in the West.

Self-Government and Representation.--Modern democratic theory, of course, also claims that democracy essentially means self-government and this self-government is realized through representation; and democratic political systems rest upon the principle that no government is legitimate which does not derive its powers and functions from the consent of the governed in some sort of institutionalized express manner. Thus in "democratic" political systems, rulers are supposed ultimately to represent people and they are ultimately responsible to the people who are the ultimate sovereign.

Such a concept of representation did not exist in Athenian political life, for they had a more direct democracy and did not have the individualistic sense of "right." As the nation-state grew both in size and complexity after the Industrial Revolution, government through representation became necessary and desirable for the faster execution of governmental functions--i.e., for efficiency under technocratic conditions. Yet through representation people are still supposed to control their government. Hallowell says that in representative government "the people do not give their consent once and for all time, but the giving of consent is conceived as a continuous process. Consent is conceived, moreover, not as passive acquiescence but as active approval."[21]

As is known the concept of representation, however, poses a serious problem as a principle of modern democracy and of popular sovereignty. The notion that one person is being made present by another has metaphysical overtones which are quite perplexing. The idea that one mind can actually represent another mind let alone a number of minds is

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[21]John H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 49.

practically fallacious. Yet, Hobbes thought representation was an actual possibility. Thus, his entire conception of state and community rests upon the idea of representation. He wrote in 1651:

> A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative, every one--as well he that voted for it, as he that voted it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceable amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.[22]

On the other hand, Rousseau, who also gave serious thought to the nature of representation, rejected the concept as a sound basis of democratic government. Rousseau argued that no one can indeed represent the mind of another for a certain period of time, and democratic government must be operated according to the notion of the "general will," which is not necessarily the will of all but the "true" will of the entire populace.[23] Such a concept of course raises as many problems as it solves--i.e., how each mind can see a "general

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[22]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, quoted from William Ebenstein, 4th ed., The Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present, p. 378. Emphasis original.

[23]J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract. Quoted from William Ebenstein, ibid., pp. 453-59.

mind" even in Rousseau's town meeting government.

Although a number of other theories of representation have been advanced,[24] including those which have assumed that political representation must be of the people in its entirety, modern democratic political systems generally subscribe to the contradictory notion that a representative is both a microcosm and a deputy of the body of people he represents.[25] His role includes not just representing his constituents but also deliberating and making decisions in their stead on a basis of a "public" need, etc.

> The function of the legislative assembly is not only fairly to represent the people but to deliberate upon public policy and arrive at those decisions dictated by political prudence which will best promote the common good. The legislative assembly has both representative and deliberative functions.[26]

Since the representative organ is also the organ of deliberation, the concept of representation presupposes the

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[24]See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

[25]Carl J. Friedrich maintains that there are two types of representation: one is "purposive" and the other is "existential." Friedrich recognizes the difficulty of reconciling the mere representative with the leadership quality of representation. See op. cit., pp. 304-09. The notion of representation advanced by the "realist" school of contemporary political scientists will be examined later in this chapter.

[26]John H. Hallowell, op. cit., p. 59.

superior quality of some men within the society. Yet in democracy, rulers are supposed to be selected by the people. Thus Hallowell says that democracy "places its faith in the ability of the average man to select men of sound judgment and good character to perform the function of the legislator, but it does not demand that we regard every man as a competent legislator."[27]

Yet again since "self-government" is accomplished through the recruitment of the few, democracy faces another dilemma. Although the modern democratic political system and its concept of representation have been developed in support of the idea that rulership and government should not be exclusively in the hands of a few on the basis of wealth or birth, many commentators have claimed that an actual aristocratic system operates modern democracy, at least at the administrative level. Thus Holcombe says that democracy is a kind of aristocracy because many important offices are distributed according to merit:

> The further extension of the merit system and in general the better organization of the national planning mean the attraction of wiser and abler men into the public service and the development of the power of the whole system

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[27] Ibid., p. 60.

> of government. This is the essence of true aristocracy.[28]

The aristocratic character of democracy is further acknowledged by A. D. Lindsay when he states that "in a democratic state those who have power and expert knowledge are to serve the community and be controlled by the ordinary people who have neither power nor knowledge . . . Democracy is not, properly speaking, government by the people."[29] The idea of government by the knowledgeable few is also reflected in the words of Merriam: "Far from crushing out talent, democracy may place the highest premium upon it and strike at all artificial limitation."[30] Hallowell recognizes the existence of a kind of democratic elitism:

> To the extent that aristocracy means government by those who are wealthy or well-born, the principle of aristocracy is clearly incompatible with democracy; but to the extent that aristocracy means government by those best qualified by virtue and capacity to rule, it is not, I think, a principle opposed to democracy.[31]

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[28]Arthur N. Holcombe, Government in a Planned Democracy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1935), pp. 171-172.

[29]A. D. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 281.

[30]Charles E. Merriam, New Democracy and the New Despotism (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939), p. 19.

[31]John H. Hallowell, op. cit., p. 51.

> It does not deny the aristocratic principle that those best qualified should be in positions of public responsibility, but it removes any arbitrary definitions of quality and puts its trust in the judgment of the electorate.[32]

If democracy means popular sovereignty and self-government even though through the few competent representatives or administrative experts (without necessarily agreeing with these somewhat "happy" views of democracy), Confucian theory of government should seem by and large acceptable to them also at least as far as the ends of government are concerned. Thus, Confucianists believe that the people are the most important element in the nation and that the purpose of government is to promote the welfare and morality of the people, that is, of ordinary people, not just the superior men or even highly moral man.[33] It was also as it was seen earlier the Confucian ruler's foremost duty to look after the people's welfare.

> It was the lesson of our great forefathers: The people should be cherished and not looked down upon. The people are the root of a country. When the root is firm, the country is tranquil. When I look at all under heaven, even the little man and woman may surpass me in wisdom and virtue. If the king makes mistakes repeatedly in conducting

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[32] Ibid., p. 52.

[33] Mencius, Bk. VII, pt. II, Ch. XIV.

> government, dissatisfaction will prevail and dangers appear. Before they appear, they should be guarded against. In my dealing with the millions of the people I should feel as if I were driving six horses with a rotten rein. The ruler of men should have reverence for his duties.[34]

The concept of an ultimate popular sovereignty is also clearly evident in the Confucian equation of the will of the people with the "will of heaven." As has been seen previously, Confucianists maintained that Heaven sees according as the people see, and "Heaven loves the people. Whatever people desire, heaven gives them."[35] There is no raison d'etre for the ruler and political institution other than the good and harmonious life of the people. "Heaven," and the rulers here actually represent the people even in terms of their "desires." The rulers do not decide what the desires "ought" to be. This is about as anti-elitist as political thinkers--including anarchists--have been prone to go.

In Lockean vein, Confucianists also recognize the right of revolution to oust a ruler who misgoverns although in Confucianism this right is more implicit than

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[34] Book of History, pt. III, Bk. III.

[35] Ibid., pt. V, Bk. I, sec. 1.

explicit.[36] Locke claimed that "the reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property,"[37] and that if a ruler fails to provide security for private property and bodily safety there is no longer a justification for living in a civil society. Inasmuch as Locke's social contract was made to alleviate or even to eliminate some of the "inconveniences" under the state of nature, any action on the part of people is justified when those "conveniences" are not obtained. Locke argued that:

> . . . whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people . . . they put themselves into a state of war with the people . . . who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and violence.[38]

Thus, for Locke, people alone have the right to determine whether the trust has been violated, although he warns that people should not resort to a revolution over "every little mismanagement in public affairs." Only "great mistakes in the ruling part" warrant the people's action "to resume

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[36] Mencius, Bk. V, pt. I, Ch. V, sec. 8; and Book of History, pt. V, Bk. I, sec. 1.

[37] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Quoted from William Ebenstein, op. cit., p. 417.

[38] Ibid.

their original liberty."[39]

In the case of Confucian thought ruler and government officials are not representatives of the people in the modern Western democratic sense since they are not chosen by the people, even if they should have the people's welfare at heart. A person becomes ruler by virtue of his superior wisdom and high level of morality, and he is responsible only to "Heaven," from which he received the mandate. Furthermore, for Confucianists, revolution is still the will of Heaven manifested in the minds of people. Should revolution occur, it is the judgment of Heaven rather than of the people directly. Thus the people are not conceived of as directly the ruler's judges. At this point, it might seem there is a wide gap between Confucianism and Lockean theory of revolution. Yet Confucianists are quick to point out that Heaven and the mind of people are identical; people act according to the will of Heaven; and Heaven acts according to the wishes of the people.[40] They simply believe in this because nature is

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[39] Ibid., pp. 417-18.

[40] See for the Confucian nature of Heaven and its operation in human affairs, pp. 26-28 and pp. 73-78. Heaven stands for the people's welfare. Thus in one sense, the will of Heaven is the will of the people--an interesting parallel to the Western notion of vox populi-vox dei.

harmonious and it does not act in such a way as to cause disharmony among men. To act against the nature of man would bring about calamities. Thus a Confucian ruler who has failed to provide a harmonious society would sooner or later face a revolution by the people who have Heaven's approval. Furthermore, from the Confucian point of view, there is no distinction between peaceful change and violent revolution. Peaceful abdication and violent revolution are regarded simply as two different methods of replacing an immoral and incompetent ruler. Since both methods have Heaven's sanction, there is no essential difference.[41] Thus in the final analysis there seems to be no practical difference between the Confucian concept of the "loss of the mandate of heaven" by revolution of the people against a ruler who could not give security to the governed. Empirically and pragmatically, people only have the right of "successful" revolution for it alone is sanctioned by Heaven.

There are some other contrasts between the Confucian system and the modern democratic theories not mentioned earlier. Superficially Confucianists hold a more

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[41]See for a detailed discussion, Yuji Muramatsu, "Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideologies," The Confucian Persuasion, Arthur Wright, ed. (Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 241-67.

"aristocratic" view of government, although being committed presumably to the welfare of the people. Yet Confucius always exhorted rulers to employ the capable and virtuous for government posts and not to choose officials on the basis of wealth or birth. In this there is a parallel to Western government by administrative expertise.

Thus, Confucianists emphasized the fact that government by the people is not possible in immediate actuality. It is quite obvious, they imply, that the people, meaning all the members of society in all their multifarious relations, cannot govern, and government must be in the hands of a relatively small number of people. This Confucian aristocracy, moreover, is a non-representative aristocracy. Also unlike modern democratic systems, these political leaders are not directly accountable to the people since they are not subject to the electorate's judgment. The elite-rulers in Confucian politics occupy governmental positions by virtue of their superior knowledge and morality, and again they are responsible theoretically only to Heaven, even though this may mean the people's desires as seen earlier.

In this regard the nature of Confucian ruling-aristocracy is perhaps even more reminiscent of the aristocracy suggested by Edmund Burke than of administrative

experts since he, like Confucianists, asserted that political leaders and representatives should be the men of superior wisdom and moral standards. Confucianists like Burke also had a great respect for the wisdom of the past, and of social order and harmony. Furthermore, for Confucianists, superior men should not only govern by their wisdom but be good examples of the public interest as was true of Burke's notion of the standard for elected representatives. Also as Burke felt that although when elected representatives take their offices, they should have a careful regard for the people's interests and should even consider common people's opinions, yet those representatives should never be dominated by them, so did the Confucianists. This Burkean theory of representation is known as "virtual representation." Burke wrote in 1792:

> Virtual representation is that in which there is a communion of interests, and a sympathy in feelings and desires, between those who act in the name of any description of people, and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by then . . . Such a representation I think to be, in many cases, even better than the actual. It possesses most of its advantages, and is free from many of its inconveniences; it corrects the irregularities in the literal representation . . .[42]

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[42]Edmund Burke, A Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe (January 3, 1792), quoted from William Ebenstein, op. cit., p. 479.

Confucianists too discount political wisdom and capacity of the common man for immediate self-government. Government is the business of a knowledgeable few who have a farsighted view of the general interest, not that of a "hair-dresser" or a "tallow-chandler."

There are, however, some significant differences between the notions of political leadership in Confucianists and Burke. Confucius would not agree with Burke that a ruling class should be selected on the basis of ability, grounded in property and birth. Ability, including moral knowledge, according to Confucianists, may be found outside this realm. The difference is more than a matter of semantics, for Confucianists have much more faith in reason, a priori knowledge, virtue, and righteousness in the affairs of government, than prescriptive right and utility growing out of property and rank. In this regard Confucianism is more democratic than Burke.

Constitutionalism.--Finally, modern "democratic" political systems are characterized by the principle of constitutionalism. In a modern political system, political power is exercised through a series of publicly acknowledged and accepted relationships between the holders of power and the governed. In this relationship the definition and

distribution of political power is supposed to be limited and can be applied only in certain domains and according to known procedures agreed on prior to action. The framework in fact, which defines and limits political power is called a constitution, whether written or unwritten.

In fact, a political system that boasts a constitution does not necessarily have constitutionalism, because the spirit of constitutionalism goes beyond the mere possession of a document. The principle of constitutionalism means essentially the rule of law binding both ruler and ruled by which the functions of government are executed. As McIlwain says, "the essence of constitutional government is the recognition of the existence of 'a law that puts bounds to arbitrary will.'"[43] Thus a constitutional government is generally understood both as a "limited government," and "the rule of laws."

There is yet another significant dimension to this notion of constitutionalism and limited government. Modern constitutionalism has been profoundly shaped by the Hebraic-Christian tradition which emphasized a "human" person which

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[43]Charles H. McIlwain, "The Fundamental Law Behind the Constitution of the United States," in Conyers Pead, ed., The Constitution Reconsidered (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 3.

government must respect. As Friedrich says:

> Probably the most distinctive religious root of modern constitutionalism is the Christian belief in the dignity and worth of each person, each human being, no matter how lowly. For if we ask the political function of a constitution, we find that the core ofjective is that of safeguarding each member of the political community as such a person. Each man is supposed to possess a sphere of genuine autonomy. Constitution is meant to protect the self; for the self is believed to be the (primary and ultimate) value. This pre-occupation of the self, rooted in Christian beliefs, eventually gave rise to the notion of rights which were thought to be natural.[44]

Thus modern democratic government with the concepts of constitutionalism and limited government recognizes the certain rights of the individual and freedom from governmental interference in certain spheres of activity. In fact, Western constitutionalism itself is "an elaborate set of devices to subject the political freedom of the holders of political power to institutional limitations and legal controls."[45]

Constitutional democracy therefore is known to demand a great deal of freedom and liberty in terms of a so-called

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[44] Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America, Fourth Edition (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1968), p. 8.

[45] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Dilemmas of Freedom," American Political Science Review, Vol. LI, no. 3 (September, 1957), p. 717.

"human" self or person. Many modern political scientists argue that liberty and democracy are inseparable and that democracy, by very definition, includes a vast amount of liberty for this "self."[46]

However, this principle of constitutionalism and the doctrine of the rule of law in the modern "democratic" sense and the "freedom" of such an "individual self" are not found in Confucianism. There is no constitutional limitation on Confucian rulers save the mandate of Heaven, and their power can be applied in any domain without following precedents. The only limitation on the ruler's power is his own conscience and the fear of losing Heaven's mandate. The fact that Confucianists ignore this idea of the rule of law[47] and place most emphasis upon the ruler's personal virtue strongly supports the contention that Confucianism is not conducive to the principle of constitutionalism.

On the other hand, it may be argued that Confucianism does contain the spirit of modern constitutionalism in the sense that the ruler is bound by the true law, that is, by the impeccable moral quality he is supposed to have to be

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[46] See a discussion of this question, ibid., pp. 714-23.

[47] Analects, Bk. II, Ch. III.

a ruler. Because of this, the ruler would rarely violate the law of nature and universe.[48] Furthermore, Confucianists, although not bound "legally," do pay a great deal of deference to precedents, customs, and convention,[49] so that the procedure of government in Confucian culture is fairly well known. As has been seen earlier, there seem to be two types of law in Confucianism: one is immutable natural law in the Stoic sense, and the other is human law largely made up of penal codes. That Confucian rulers are bounded by the natural law seems to be compatible with the essential spirit of constitutionalism and limited government.

This does not mean to say that Confucian theory of government is completely agreeable with Western democracy. Certainly, Confucian theory is devoid of such modern "democratic" aspects of constitutionalism and limited government as specific guarantees of freedom and rights for "individuals."[50] Moreover, Confucian theory provides no specific institutionalized means to check the arbitrary exercise of power by a non-virtuous ruler. If democracy means an

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[48] Ibid., Bk. XIV, Ch. XXVII; Bk. IV, Ch. X.

[49] Ibid., Bk. III, Ch. XIV.

[50] The problem of freedom and individual rights will be discussed further later in the chapter.

objective and institutionalized system of order, the Confucian system, because it is completely at the mercy of the ruler's qualities and the power of revolt, lies far removed from so-called Western "democratic constitutionalism."

Thus far Confucian theory has been compared and contrasted with what some consider a "childlike" classical view of democracy. Since democracy is not exactly what Western classical writers say it is, it thus seems equally judicious to examine and contrast Confucianism with more realistic and critical views of democracy.

## Realistic and Critical Views of Democracy

As has been noted there seem to be few political words more than "democracy" that appeal to people throughout the world today. Most people, regardless of their political, social, economic, and even intellectual positions, feel that some social situation called "democracy" is somehow valid as well as desirable.[51] A number of very sophisticated defenses

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[51]See for the problem of uncritical acceptance of democratic ideas and their premises by the American political scientists, John Paul Duncan, "The Political Philosophy of American Political Scientists," a paper delivered at The Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, Texas (March 25, 1967).

or justifications of democracy have consequently been written and the list of important names or theories is extensive.[52]

Many students of political science and democracy, however, have simply assumed that "democracy" is good because it is presumably government "by the people" and thus assures self-governing. Furthermore, it is more conducive to the notion of man's equality and that each man can enjoy "freedom" and "liberty" whatever these mean to particular persons.

However, few theorists have examined the premises upon which much of Western democratic theory operates, that is, views of the nature of man and society and politics. It might be at least an easier task to justify democratic political systems if they were <u>really</u> controlled by people who are actually even politically equal and if so-called political "freedom" actually existed by which to achieve a better life. Unfortunately, much of the "classical" theory of democracy even in terms of what presumably exists is questionable and quite contrary to human personality, nature and

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[52]See for example, Charles E. Merriam, <u>What is Democracy</u>? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941); and <u>The New Democracy and The New Despotism</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939); Thomas Landon Thorson, <u>The Logic of Democracy</u> (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), etc. The list is by now <u>ad infinitum</u> and some of it <u>ad nauseam</u> according to Professor John Paul Duncan.

experience. True, it is an integral part of the American consensus that the United States is a democracy.[53] However, some American political scientists have abandoned the classical notion of democracy. Especially since World War II there have been several attempts to revise or reconstitute at least the "classical" theory of democratic political systems. These have by and large concentrated their attack upon the descriptive inaccuracy of the classical conceptions of democracy such as the role of citizens in terms of political influence, self-government through representation, etc.[54] These modern revisionists, generally referred to as "the realist school," have advanced a new theory known as "elitist theory" or "group theory" of democracy. Nevertheless, the scholars in this realist school essentially reaffirm the "democratic" nature of American politics and agree that democracy is still to a great extent the popular control of

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[53] James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, XXII, no. 22 (May, 1964), p. 276.

[54] See, for example, W. N. Chambers and R. H. Salisbury (eds.), Democracy in the Mid-20th Century (St. Louis: Washington University Press, 1960); Henry B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); Robert A. Dahl, op. cit., and Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961); and Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965).

important decision-making in the government. The realist theorists simply claim that people influence and control government policy basically through the electoral process. Thus in arguing that people participate in the policy-making process in a systematic way, they maintain that democracy is still self-government.

For instance, MacIver and Lipset argue that a citizen participates in governmental policy-making by selecting those rulers who he believes will advance his own views. "In every modern democracy," Lipset writes, "conflict among different groups is expressed through political parties which basically represent a democratic translation of the class struggle."[55] The purpose of political parties is to enable the people to use government for advancing their own interests.

> Party focusses the issues, sharpens the differences between contending sides, eliminates confusing cross-currents of opinion . . . In short, the party, in its endeavors to win the public to its side . . . is making the democratic system workable. It is the agency by which public opinion is translated into public policy.[56]

Yet if people only occasionally select their rulers

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[55]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1959), p. 220.

[56]Robert M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 213.

on the basis of issues and policy, and they are only passive judges of rulers except on election day, then the arguments of MacIver and Lipset do not sufficiently demonstrate the self-government character of American democracy.

The self-governing process of American politics as described by Dahl and Key seems to be more complex. They too believe that people influence government policy by supporting the political candidates who are most likely to advance their interests. But the crucial argument here is that most people belong to various interest groups in this country, and these groups exert a continuous influence on government policy.[57] In other words, they believe that the interest groups' influence upon government policy is felt not only through the regular electoral process but also through the other means of interest struggle between the

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[57] Group theorists including David Truman assert that there is no phenomena but group phenomena in politics. The role of individuals in politics is infinitesimal, and through group activity and group identification the voice of the individual can be heard in politics. Truman notes that controversy and conflict of group activities are the essence of politics. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 502-03. The group concept of politics was first advanced by Arthur F. Bentley, who wrote that society was the resultant of all interest groups' interactions. He viewed that "interest" is merely an attribute of a group, and society is "nothing other than the groups which compose it." See his The Process of Government (1903) (Evanston, Ill: Principia Press, 1935), p. 222.

elections.

The existence of free, competitive, and periodic elections is still considered however the crucially necessary precondition for insuring the responsiveness of the rulers to the wishes of the ruled.[58] At this point, the thesis of Dahl, Key and Truman is not too different from that of MacIver and Lipset. They maintain that elections are "the crucial process for assuring that political leaders will be somewhat responsive to the preferences of sorm ordinary citizen."[59] If rulers fail to live up to the expectations of the electorate, then the rulers would lose in their next election. Key wrote in his book published posthumously that:

> National elections . . . reflect teh electorate in its great, and perhaps principal, role as an appraiser of past events, past performances and past actions. It judges retroactively; it commands prospectively only insofar as it expresses either approval or disapproval of that which has happened before.[60]

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[58] Robert A. Dahl, A Preface . . . ., p. 131; V. O. Key, op. cit., Ch. 21; David B. Truman, op. cit., ch. 16.

[59] Robert A . Dahl, A Preface . . . , p. 131.

[60] V. O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate, with the assistance of Milton C. Cummings, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 82.

Despite their claim that elections are a "crucial device for controlling leaders," Dahl and Key concede that periodical elections as a means of popular control are somewhat inadequate. Dahl says, "in no large nation-state can elections tell us much about the preferences of majorities and minorities beyond the bare fact that of those who went to the polls a majority, plurality or minority indicated their choices for some particular candidate or group of candates."[61] If people are only passive judges of public events and if their will does not clearly emerge in the elections, then the "realist" theorists face enormous difficulty in explaining the self-governing process of democracy.

Dahl, Truman and Key at this juncture introduce "pluralism" to their theory-building of democracy. They feel that since election results do not clearly manifest the will of people but show only the preference for candidates in terms of majority and minority, the notion of self-government through representation has to be explained in terms of pluralism of the interest struggle, not exclusively in terms of the electoral process.

Those group theorists or pluralistic elite theorists,

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[61]Robert A. Dahl, A Preface . . . , p. 130.

under the influence of, or by the "rediscovery" of Bentley, thus assert that the visible components of society are groups, not atomic individuals, insofar as political life is concerned. Dahl says that "we can only distinguish groups of various types and sizes all seeking in various ways to advance their goals, usually at the expense, at least in part, of others."[62] Thus they argue that people could influence the policy of government which affects them as members of various interest groups.

As to the sensitivity of government and the political leaders to the interest-seeking activities of groups in American society, Dahl describes it first in terms of the nature of political parties. According to him, a political party is constantly engaged in the task of aggregating an electoral majority and seeking support from the various interest groups. People are in general inarticulate about political issues and there is virtually complete absence of a clear voice of the people. But the rulers of American society in their search for an electoral majority cannot ignore the demands of interest group leaders who are

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[62] Ibid., p. 131.

supposed to represent their group members.[63] To the pluralist elitists democracy is, therefore, government by the various group leaders, or "polyarchy" as Dahl calls it.

Realist theorists have also significantly modified the role of citizen. According to classical theorists, an average citizen in democracy is viewed as an active participant in political process and as deeply committed to basic democratic beliefs,[64] and finally, his political power or influence is about equal to that of any other fellow citizen. Realists argue that those "classical" views of citizens are simply not true empirically, although there is little to be alarmed about, for the United States is still very much a democracy.

"Homo civicus," as Dahl calls an average citizen, "is not, by nature, a political animal."[65] Unfortunately, Dahl does not delve into detail as to why an average man is apathetic. Dahl's only explanation for non-participation

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[63]See for detailed discussions on the subject, Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 307-308; and V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy, pp. 518-24.

[64]For a critical analysis of a citizen's "agreement on fundamentals," see Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government, op. cit., pp. 237-38 & pp. 345-46.

[65]Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 225.

of homo civicus is that an average man in America can attain his goals through non-political channels, and the political apathy is a typically middle-class phenomenon. These middle-class Americans are too busy to take advantage of the abundant opportunities provided by the affluent society.[66]

As to the questions of political equality, the pluralist elitist theorists try to be merely descriptive. Political power or influence is dependent upon such political resources as money, job, social standing, appearance, intelligence, education, etc.[67] Thus, by the very nature of political power and influence, people are not equal in actuality. However, Dahl insists that resources are dispersed and not cumulative. People can obtain political resources of one kind or another. "Virtually no one, and certainly no group of more than a few individuals is entirely lacking in some influence resource."[68] Thus people are potentially

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[66]Although Professor Dahl implies here that public participation is not necessary for democracy, he later admits that he would like to see more participation, "particularly among some segments of the population whose participation has been lowest." Robert A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" American Political Science Review, LX no. 2 (June, 1966), p. 301.

[67]Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 15-16.

[68]Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 226. Dahl believes that equality of political power is impossible to

equal to others and with some luck they can even be superior to others.

The absence of deep commitment to democratic ideals by large numbers of people is no threat to all pluralist-elitist theorists of democracy. Quite contrary to the "classical" view that democracy, being the product of public political consciousness, is supported by the people, they argue that the "intervening structure of elites" are far more committed to the democratic creed. Thus, Truman argues that the continuing existence of the democratic process depends on the "consensus of elites," as a necessary basis upon which established elites can repulse the threat of irresponsible demagogues.[69]

Key agrees with Truman that the chief responsibility for the survival of democracy rests with elites, not with the masses of the people. He states that "the critical element for the health of a democratic order consists in the

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realize in any large political system. Continuing to espouse it as a major democratic goal will simply further cynicism toward democracy. See his "Power, Pluralism and Democracy: A Modest Proposal," a paper delivered at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 9-12, 1964, p. 14.

[69]David B. Truman, "The American System in Crisis," Political Science Quarterly (December, 1959), pp. 481-97.

beliefs, standards, and competence of those who constitute the influential, the opinion-leaders, the political activists in the order."[70] Dahl also concludes that the skillful and active political leaders in the American political system are the true democratic "legitimists."[71]

Nevertheless, this "realist" theory of democracy as essentially self-government is far from persuasive. In general it fails to show what democracy ought to be in terms of ends. Democracy is thus viewed mainly in procedural terms.[72] They merely have taken the on-going political system for granted, and tried to show how American "democracy" and its self-governing aspect operate in terms of process. Not only have they "stripped democracy of much of its [the classical theory] radical elan and have diluted its utopian vision, thus rendering it inadequate as a guide to the

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[70] V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and the American Democracy, p. 558.

[71] Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 309-12. This work is a study of a city of New Haven, Conn., but Dahl says it applies to the entire United States.

[72] For critical examinations of the elitist theory, see Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), especially Chapters 4 and 5; Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," The American Political Science Review, LX, 2 (June, 1966), pp. 285-95.

future,"[73] but also many of the explanations offered by Truman, Key and Dahl are somewhat less than convincing.

For example, they argue that the majority of the people are politically apathetic and yet they maintain that the latter still somehow govern themselves by belonging to various interest groups and associations. As Walker puts it, they "generally accept the prevailing distribution of status in the society,"[74] and do not take into account a number of people who do not belong to any interest group. Moreover, there is no proof that all of the politically apathetic men join the interest group with political intent. Political apathy is not necessarily the product of middle-class content, as Dahl writes; but it may very well be the result of the repeated frustration and low degree of political efficacy among the people.[75]

Granted that people make use of their group affiliations as a means of participating in the policy-making of the government, the "realist" theorists cannot argue that leaders

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[73]Jack L. Walker, ibid., p. 295.

[74]Ibid.

[75]For a general discussion and comparative study of political efficacy, see Gabriel A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

of the various groups democratically represent the views of the members. For the internal structure of private interest groups is undemocratic almost without exception. The leadership recruitment of the interest groups in the United States is made through co-optation rather than through free, competitive and periodic election, which is one of the basic requirements of democratic theory according to Dahl and Key.[76] As nearly everyone knows, even the presidents of the American Political Science Association, A.M.A., A.B.A., etc. are not elected by all their respective members. It is thus difficult to argue that "interest" groups operate democratically.

The purpose of the foregoing discussion is not so much to make a thorough criticism of the realist theory, but rather to show how it too implicitly defends the democratic political system and believes that "governmental decisions are the resultant of access by various interests,"[77] thus "public interest" will emerge out of interest conflict within a society, despite their claim that modern "democratic" theory is above ideology.

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[76]An excellent discussion on the internal process of private groups is found in Henry S. Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1961), pt. I.

[77]David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, op. cit., p. 507.

This is because many contemporary American political scientists, according to Professor Duncan, have accepted a subjectivist definition of individuality, group theory, and interest as the ground of law growing out of philosophic positions, e.g., logical positivism or logical empiricism, or scientific empiricism, value-non-cognitivism or value relativism, metaphysical skepticism, scientism, naturalism, pragmatism, and naive realism.[78] More specifically, American political scientists:

> imply in one way or another that the best form of political society is democratic. We do not say we believe this because we like it or prefer it (or think we had better believe it due to our respective economic and social positions); we develop a defense of it from the foregoing primary and secondary premises. Thus we argue that democracy allows a maximum of freedom (demand flexibility) for our individual selves or interest groups to seek power and participate in the making and enforcing of rules (allocating values or supporting or opposing the demand flow). The implication is that this is good or valid because it results in peaceful (non-physical violence) competition (although it is not clear why this "fact" is good), acceptable compromise and accommodation, maximization of individual satisfactions and fluidity of struggle for "individuals" and classes in their desire (demand) for power and other goods. It is not always clear why these goals are valid either except as they are implicitly related to the nature of man and society (in turn assumed) and the utilitarian ethics that "each shall count for one . . ."[79]

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[78] John Paul Duncan, op. cit., pp. 3-5.

[79] Ibid., p. 8.

Thus the actual nature of modern democracy and its predicates--the subjectively defined "individual," indeed seems to contain far more paradoxes, inconsistencies and absurdities than some contemporary political scientists who "defend it" are willing to admit.

But another reason for this is that the ideological foundation of modern democracy is based upon several conflicting ideas that were simply useful to the rising middle class. They have come up with the notions of "will" in Marsilio and the "masterless man" of Machiavelli and the Renaissance, and blended them with the "soul" in Christianity which becomes moral soul and therefore it is supreme "worth and dignity." Although the new concept of man was indebted heavily to Stoicism for its inspiration, it is more than a reiteration of the Stoic idea which still retained an idea of an intimate connection with a "universe." The present ideas affirm the unique and atomic and autonomous individual. A man's "soul" is not obligated to God. His "soul" belongs to a man himself. This is comforting to the middle class. It is also useful when transformed to the final person of economics--the "wanting, producing animal," or the individual with natural rights in government and law.

Even Niebuhr, an apologist for this democratic

predicates admits that the religious ideal of "liberty" as freedom to choose God or evil was turned into a weapon of the middle and commercial classes who rose to power in Europe during the past three or four centuries. In fact, they turned freedom of the "soul" into freedom as the secularistic, humanistic natural right to seek happiness and property without governmental restraint or indeed often social moral restraint.

> The middle classes defeated the combination of economic and political power of merchantilism by stressing economic liberty; and, through the principles of political liberty, they added the political power of suffrage to their growing economic power. The implicit assumptions, as well as the explicit ideals, of democratic civilization were also largely the fruit of middle-class existence. The social and historical optimism of democratic life, for instance, represents the typical illusion of an advancing class which mistook its own progress for the progress of the world.[80]

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[80]Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defense (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 2. Emphasis added. Due to the paradoxical nature of the predicates of democracy, it has hardly been near its own alleged ideals, i.e., the equality of mankind, liberty and freedom for every individual, self-government through representation, and, above all, the emergence of social harmony and the "public interest." Contemporary democracy thus, despite the earlier influence upon it by Stoic natural law, operates actually under the principle of anarchic natural right of Locke and others.

However, absurdities and fallacies of contemporary democratic theory have nowhere been shown more clearly than by E. Jordan.[81] The tragic reality of democracy, according to Professor Jordan, is that it is grounded upon a subjectivist definition of personality objectified into the false principles of interest; thus by its very nature democracy is not pointed to social harmony nor is it conducive to "public interest."[82]

Briefly, Jordan feels that the ancient Greeks had appreciated the objective system of order and viewed man as having an "obligatory tie which bound him to his objective self in the 'nature' which embodied his purpose in final harmony,"[83] indeed to his polis as his very own personality. But, unfortunately, after the collapse of the Greek

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[81]Professor E. Jordan, 1875-1953, is rightly regarded as one of the most original social and legal philosophers in the history of American thought. It is far beyond the scope or possibility of this paper to describe Jordan's philosophy, but it seems quite necessary to note his criticism of democracy.

[82]In fact Jordan argues that by definition "interest can never become public nor serve validly for a harmonious or just society." See, John Paul Duncan, "The Normative Importance of the Concept of Interest," Oklahoma Law Review, Vol. 20, no. 3 (August, 1967), p. 272.

[83]E. Jordan, Forms of Individuality: An Inquiry into the Grounds of Order in Human Relations (Indianapolis: Charles W. Laut & Co., 1927), p. 93.

civilization including the polis, there emerged the religious concentration on the individual soul and its salvation, and individuality came "to mean a mass of inner, private, exclusive feelings centered around their own intensity."[84] As time went on, the subjectivity of individualism was more and more expressed in the doctrine of interest as a so-called objectification. Today subjectivity, as interest, contaminates all intellectual and practical concepts and discipline, i.e., ethics, law, economics, politics, and so-called "social" science. Thus it undermines the principles upon which a sound and just social order or intelligent approach to its problem must rest.

Interest, according to Jordan, is inevitably incompetent as principle, because it is synonymous with a state of mind and in terms of pure feeling. Thus orderly and harmonious life is impossible on its basis, for ". . . no organization of subjective phenomena is possible, . . . subjective facts do not submit to order," for "the order of mind is not the superficial juxtaposition of mental states."[85]

At this juncture, therefore, Jordan simply could not

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[84] Ibid., p. 95.

[85] Ibid., p. 20. Emphasis original.

agree with Truman, Key, Dahl, et al. to the effect that interest can serve as a basis of solution for social and political problems. They "simply identify interests as objective phenomena which can be found in the behavior of groups seeking something the members want,"[86] and see interest as the group-phenomena in the United States. Yet, although it has thus normative significance for them, the conflict of interest cannot really bring about compromise and "mutual" interest. For by the very nature of interest, according to Professor Jordan, it still retains its subjective character:

> The other case of interest, and the pure instance of subjectivity, is that which expresses the relation of individual subjective intent to the power which is conferred by the realization of the intent in overt forms. It is subjective in the sense that both of its terms are simple psychological facts, since intent as realized is here anticipated in idea . . .[87]

Empirically it is something private and subjective, a pure psychological state of mind. It has neither stability nor objectivity. Thus, Jordan argues that interest cannot really serve normatively, and therefore it cannot be the

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[86]John Paul Duncan, loc. cit., p. 269. E. Jordan's criticism on modern interest theory is heavily relied upon and drawn from this article by Professor Duncan.

[87]E. Jordan, Forms of Individuality, op. cit., p. 16. Cited from ibid., p. 280.

basis of law. The upshot of "democratic" theory of government on the basis of "interest" groups "becomes dissatisfaction subjectively."[88] "The 'harmony' that ensues is actually discord which, if expressed overtly, is suppressed by the force of law. In effect, the 'law' and the 'state' represent under this system, not harmonious adjustment, but military and police power."[89] Hence, democracy and its liberal ideals are here based upon subjectivity and discord.

Democracy defined in terms of interest is nothing but subjectivism. It becomes expressed in simply such subjective attitudes as liberty, equality, fraternity, self-government, "public welfare," i.e., representation reduced to state of mind and blindness. That is the greatest blunder of democratic theory in the assumption that "the realities of social and public life can be attained through and in states of mind."[90] However, since public reality is merely a state of mind of an individual, anything is supposed to be

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[88]E. Jordan, Theory of Legislation: An Essay on the Dynamics of Public Mind (Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1930), p. 126. Cited in John Paul Duncan's article in loc. cit., p. 282.

[89]John Paul Duncan, loc. cit., p. 282.

[90]E. Jordan, "The False Principle of Liberalism," Journal of International Ethics, XLVI (1936), p. 283.

able to be realized in democracy by the change of mind even though it has no competent instruments through which the state of mind can be actually implemented and realized.

Naturally, therefore, many democratic principles are not only subjective but also are false and self-contradictory. For example, the notion of representation, which is an offshoot of atomic individualism, is impossible because wills of individual men cannot be substituted for one another.[91] As Jordan points out, democracy supposedly means liberty and the rejection of authority, yet the democrat seems to accept authority created by himself, although the so-called self-authority is exercised by someone other than himself. The democrat, according to Jordan, is thus both a nihilist at heart and an authoritarian because he cries out for freedom and self-government, while realizing that they are not possible, calling for a strong government and liberty under law. Self-government is tantamount to no government or dictatorship.

> . . . since government implies the control of relations among persons, self-government means the absolutism of one great individual, as is realized in industrial society. And where there is no discipline there is no order, and where there is no order there is disorder--chaos.

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[91]Rousseau saw through this.

> Where there is nothing but discipline there is orderly stagnation. And democracy becomes an expression of the contradiction that is inherent between order and freedom.[92]

Again quoting Jordan from his last analysis of democracy and its principle:

> . . . thus, self-government becomes self-deception, and its principle is fraud. Fraud in this case, as subjective, is psychological force, propaganda; and political experience is the process of convincing yourself of the truth of what you know to be false.[93]

The fraudulent nature of democracy is not limited just to "self-government," "freedom," etc., but extends to much of democratic ethics, which is largely drawn from Christianity and liberalism. Sympathy, well-wishing, benevolence are nothing but "a state of wistful vacuity and empty yearning." As a state of mind it is not actionable, and "our moral relations to it can only be attitudinal and prepotential."[94] The good-will of man will simply transform into desire when it makes contact with reality, and thus lose all moral potentiality. So in the fields of law, economic and industrial life, this subjectivism and false principle of

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[92] E. Jordan, loc. cit., pp. 283-84.

[93] Ibid., p. 285.

[94] Ibid., p. 286.

interest and liberalism have resulted in "tragedy" beyond description.[95]

How could Confucian assumptions and system of government be compared or contrasted with either these realistic or the latter more critical views of modern democracy? Comparison with democratic theory advanced by the modern American political scientists, especially that of Truman, Key, and Dahl, or of Jordan's critical view, is indeed difficult to make. As was discussed earlier, Confucianism is actually close to the Greek and Stoic in its spirit and definition. It is in a way amenable to certain aspects of democracy as conceived in terms of equalitarian ends. Such Confucian virtues as man's equality in condition, modesty, humbleness, brotherly love, unpretentiousness, honesty, etc., are quite compatible with and implicit in democratic "aims" as well as in Stoic-Christian ethics.

Yet Confucian theory of government and politics is far removed from the modern democratic pluralism and its concept of interest. Confucianism does not fit modern democratic capitalism nor the "democratic process" of American political science. It seems quite obvious that the interest

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[95] Ibid., pp. 288-91.

theory cannot be applied to Confucian politics, because there is no pluralism of this kind in the Confucian familial society. Confucianists would have little regard for the competition of interests of American political scientists, and they would not agree with the pluralist elite theorists that the "public interest"--let alone social harmony--stems from the conflict of various subjectively defined "interests" within the society.

For Confucianists, politics is not simply "controversy and conflict" to achieve compromise but rather role-differentiation to attain harmony and social equilibrium. Thus it is an anathema to Confucianists that public policy and the end of society should be determined through the "interests" conflict. To them, neither the role of each man nor the "values" are created by the ruler or the ruled; but they are--and should be--created by philosophers and historians. Thus Confucianism does not fit the "self-governing" process of American democracy. Furthermore, Confucianists would not accept the subjectively defined "individual" and "freedom" for maintaining "self."

The Confucian rejection of interest theory would seem to agree with Jordan. Yet Confucianists could not agree with Jordan in criticising the state-of-mind approach

because Confucian theory depends on this extensively. That is, the most critical aspect of Confucian approach to politics would be, for Jordan, its heavy dependence upon the subjective attitudes of rulers and ruled. Confucianists believe that such qualities as benevolence, propriety, righteousness, etc. are extremely important for politics. But these are for Jordan still very much simply subjective virtues like sympathy, generosity, friendship and love, as long as they remain simply state of mind of subjective personality they mean little politically. Practically and politically, these subjective virtues are imperfect and limited insofar as building a system of order and good life is concerned. And it is true that Confucianists fail to provide any competent explanation by which those subjective virtues can specifically be implemented.[96]

Confucianism believes in the good man as the key to politics as does Western democracy. Yet critics like Jordan argue that good life is not possible as long as good will of man has no solid substance in which to embody itself. The state-of-mind approach of Confucian theory simply will lead to no practical solution. As Professor Jordan argues,

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[96]E. Jordan, The Good Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 432.

> the man who lives the good life cannot be identified by his state of mind. Men live equally good lives whose inner experiences are of exactly opposite characters so far as their feeling quality is concerned. The part of the man's mentality that is real is the part which becomes realized in what is not a state of mind in any sense.[97]

However, some of the Confucian thought does not seem to see virtues as completely subjective states of mind. Confucianists claim at least to set up a system of "objectified" or "generalized" values very much in Stoic and Greek manner as the will of Heaven for the rulers, and to insist that these mean objectively: material things such as food and defense for the people, as well as such attitudes as obedience for the subjects and filial piety of the ruler expressed in actual behavior, etc. Thus individuals are not considered the key as they are in modern democratic theory. Certainly Confucianists are not relativists and subjectivists in regard to ethics. Nevertheless, an objective ethics as the ground of politics is not necessarily democratic for the ethical values are not created by individuals and the result of implementation--"father-ruler," etc. is not a democratic system.

Thus in conclusion, Confucianism is not really

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[97] Ibid., p. 434.

democratic nor should anyone so twist it to be considered as such. It is quite explicable in view of recent trends that the "former" Confucian nations should wish to appear to develop Western democratic political systems even though democracy does not, as has been seen, operate in actuality according to the standard claimed by so many political speakers and writers who are proponents. However, as has also been seen, not only is the implicit defense of democracy by many contemporary American political scientists inadequate in many ways, as Professor Jordan points out, but many of the principles and assumptions upon which modern democracy are grounded are false and fraudulent. But this means that since Confucian theory, too, basically takes this subjective approach to the concept of social order and politics, many of its principles not only seem to be false in terms of effectiveness as to democratic ends but the result is a subjectivist elitist system of "paternalism," and both in terms of ends and means.

# CHAPTER VI

## CONFUCIAN ASSUMPTIONS AND IDEOLOGY: A FURTHER CRITIQUE

Confucianism as a political theory, like the theories of many past thinkers, is by no means beyond criticism, internally and externally, and empirically and logically. As was shown earlier in this study, the Confucian theory of the good life and of the functions of politics was attacked by many modern Chinese critics during the political and social stress accompanying the coming of Western influence. Some of their arguments may seem to be justified; but, on the other hand, other arguments of those early political and intellectual leaders of China are not always grounded on sound logic nor on extensive and valid empirical evidence.

Analysis of Confucian theory in the light of modern democracy in the preceding chapter has shown that some Confucian notions of government and its ethical foundation are to some extent amenable to the ideas of so-called modern "democracy" as propounded by some proponents. However, as

was also seen in the preceding chapter, this does not imply that Confucianism is basically "democratic."

The purpose of this chapter is to present a further critical view and evaluation of Confucian theory. More specifically, an attempt here will be made not only to examine some of the more apparent weaknesses of Confucianism but to present also a critical analysis of Confucian assumptions and ideology not covered by the leading Chinese intellectuals in chapter four. An attempt will also be made to examine the implications and empirical effects of Confucianism which are relevant to the question of the political and social development of Confucian nations toward modernization.

## Weaknesses of Confucian Theory

As in the case of most classical political theories, Confucian political thought makes certain assumptions about life, man, social organization, etc. which become the basis of its argument. Also, as is true of these other theories, Confucian theory is primarily normative. Thus it is difficult to validate empirically--at least in a fully satisfactory way to social "scientists." Here two Confucian assumptions are not only misleading but also attenuate the validity

of the entire theory.

The first of these assumptions of Confucian thought is the postulate that human nature is innately and basically "good"--good being defined in a special way. If the definition of goodness and the result could be validated empirically, inherently or logically, the ensuing theory of Confucianism might have greater amount of credibility. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to validate "objectively" such a "normative" concept of human nature. Confucian literature does present a number of examples which attempt to demonstrate that man's nature is basically good according to the Confucian notion of goodness, but these examples show merely that human beings express certain kinds of goodness at certain times.[1] In fact, they actually describe more <u>how</u> human nature is good in these ways than they explain <u>why</u> it is good. Thus the Confucian explanation of the postulated basic goodness of human nature is neither empirically validated nor adequate.

On the other hand, it seems unlikely that modern psychologists can prove or disprove this Confucian hypothesis. Even if a definition of "goodness" and "badness" could be agreed upon, human nature cannot be explained in such terms

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[1]<u>Mencius</u>, Bk. VI, pt. I, Chs. II & VII, secs. 1 & 2.

as a ground of the "political." Describing human nature in terms of certain ideas of goodness or badness is too simplistic an approach to a more complex question.

Even if one determines whether human nature is innately good or bad in certain ways, such a determination would not be of much practical help as far as political life is concerned. As Professor Elijah Jordan argues, "human nature" definitions of good or bad result only in describing states of mind,

> . . . we have only such knowledge of good and evil as we have from objective facts . . . Evil, . . . if it is real, is not a state of mind; or if it is only a state of mind, it is not real, and so is practically unimportant. The evil that we are concerned about, moral evil, evil that is defined by reference to action, lies in those objective conditions of existence and culture upon which the good life as an objective fact rests.[2]

Particular definitions of goodness or badness have little practical meaning in man's life except as expressed in practical realities as, for example, in institutions. "Inherent" good and evil definitions of mind as the ground of politics thus mean little.

The fact of the matter is that man has the capacity to do something that is considered by another or others as

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[2]E. Jordan, The Good Life, op. cit., p. 431. Emphasis original.

good or evil,[3] but that capacity need only be taken into account for political theory if the structure and function of government and other institutions are concerned. That is, it is the objectively structured and functioning "goodness" or "badness" that is important. As was said in another connection, benevolence, love or what is "in the heart" alone are trifling matters. "What states of mind or attitudes are connected with action are accidental; that is, circumstances of the actor's subjective history, and feeling qualities are even more remote than accidental and properly described as phenomenal."[4]

But a second doubtful assumption is that the particularly defined good behavior of rulers and government officials transfers to others. This assumption is simply not consistent with human experience. It has not been proven that others will necessarily emulate the good behavior of one man or of a few men on the institutional scale important to politics. It seems that Confucius dwelt so much on the qualities of virtue and benevolence as such (as so many philosophers do) that he ignored by default both the

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[3]David Hume would have said "painful or pleasurable."

[4]E. Jordan, loc. cit., p. 431.

frailties of human nature and the ephemeral qualities of states of mind. The ruling class's good beliefs and conduct may be an asset in enhancing legitimacy and maintaining power, but this alone hardly comprises the method and solution to the problems of government. It is highly probable that Confucianists' naive understanding of human nature and some of the resultant assumptions caused a serious deficiency in institutional elaboration.

As has been noted earlier, one serious weakness of the Confucian theory of government is that it failed to provide a "democratic" institutional device to implement its benevolent-welfare-ideology insofar as the latter had democratic tendencies in terms of "end." Instead, Confucian government is completely subject to possibly non-actionable subjective qualities of men, such as virtue, benevolence and righteousness. According to Confucianists, schemes of elaborate institutional arrangement are not too important since a virtuous ruler constitutes the panacea for the problems of governing. If the ruler provides a Burkean exemplary model, the people will be moral and orderly, and the problem of governing is thereby resolved. In fact, the concept of necessary institutions of government is so insignificant to Confucianists that the literature contains no discussion of forms

of government.

It may very well be, however, that Confucianists simply assumed that the family is the epitome of the state and government and that the structure of government would follow that of the family.[5] The family is also organized hierarchically, and, as in the family, it was assumed that government would be headed by one man, the most virtuous man in the country. That man would rule through his good behavior and knowledge for the people's welfare. At the very most, institutionally, the Confucianist government is merely an extension of the family, not an elaborate equalitarian institution created beyond the family model. By propounding further that the nation be operated as the family, Confucian political theory in a way negates the necessity of politics as it is known today when gentilism is relatively unimportant even under the influence of modern "nationalism." Without non-familial institutional structures, government is also to be conducted on a personal basis.

However, even if one accepts the proposition that the people will be moral and orderly under the virtuous ruler, an institutional mechanism is needed for removing the

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[5]Analects, Bk. II, Ch. XXI.

not-so-virtuous ruler, if peaceful change and responsible political rulership are preferable to their opposites.[6] Contending that man is innately good, Confucius placed the people completely at the mercy of a supposedly benevolent ruler or assumed "Heaven" or revolt would remove him. It seems that what Conficius sought in the ruler was a "philosopher-king," who is, as Plato painfully discovered, virtually impossible to find and who is very difficult to remove. The absence of institutional means (peaceful means) of political change is probably the most important cause for the autocratic nature of Confucian government.

Empirically, Confucian government has also not been compatible generally with the normative theory of Confucianism.[7] The latter is not a good explanation or rationalization

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[6]Most political speakers and writers feel that institutional mechanism is a must for good government and "democracy." Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, argues that democracy is an institutional device to check will-to-power and inordinate pride of man. This writer is aware that institutional devices, such as political participation by means of balloting, checks and balance, legislature, executive, etc., are not essential paraphernalia for good government.

[7]See Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957); David S. Nivision and Arthur F. Wright, eds., Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); and Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 1-92.

for the "facts." There have been numerous non-virtuous and not-so-capable Confucian rulers, but a negligible few have been removed from the post through violent revolutions. When there was no violent revolution, incompetent rulers stayed in power. The result was often a long period of misgovernment and people's suffering. The myth of heaven's sanction of revolution simply did not and does not constitute a mechanism for selection or removal of non-virtuous rulers. In fact, heaven's sanction is nothing but a belief in poetic justice: man's extreme desire for heaven's punishment of those who misruled led to the assertion that heaven will indeed condemn them.

Finally, the Confucian view of family and ideal social order on the basis of family virtue is probably the most fraudulent aspect of Confucian theory. Family provided, according to Confucianists, the ultimate model for harmonious human relationship and social order. One "loving example" of a family should be the lesson for community and the nation.[8] A "harmonious" family behavior would extend to social and political life. Most important of all, the concept of filial piety would be applied to government.

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[8]The Great Learning, Ch. IX, sec. 3.

Apparently, Confucianists were discussing the ideal and normative family life and ignoring the sometimes tyrannical nature of actual family life. The family was and is not an institution of love; the father often runs the family at will, demands obedience from all; and his wife is often treated as an object, ect. Thus social order on the basis of a familial model very often proved to be a sham for tyranny. Mao Tse-tung once said that he hated Confucius because his father quoted Confucius against him when he was a little boy.[9] But it does not really take a Marxist to see the whole "ideological" life of man in Confucian society serves the function of concealing man's self interest and animalistic nature, and the result is a system which does not consciously come to terms and deal with it. Confucian society was thus not "harmonious" and "loving" and "orderly" as Confucianists believed it to be; it was rather autocratic and tyrannical most of the time, and it failed to deal realistically with human nature.

## Ruling Class Ideology

Confucianism itself was not at all equalitarian, and it has always been promoted consciously or unconsciously

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[9]Robert Payne, Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Weybright and Talley, Inc., 1969), p. 31.

by the ruling class. One able Chinese emperor in the early eighteenth century said with rather unusual candor:

> Ordinary people know only that Confucius' teaching aims at differentiating human relationships, distinguishing the rights and obligations of the superior and the inferior, rectifying human minds and thoughts, and amending social customs. Do they also know that after human relationships have been differentiated, the rights and obligations of the superior and the inferior distinguished, human minds and thoughts rectified, and social customs amended, the one who benefits the most [from his teaching] is the ruler himself?[10]

Thus it is quite clear that Confucianism, despite all its emphasis upon virtue, benevolence, righteousness, morality, and social harmony, rather served an inequalitarian elite. Thus too, as someone aptly observed, when one is in power he becomes a Confucianist; when he is out of power he becomes a Taoist; and when approaching death he becomes a Buddhist. Confucianism is clearly an upper-class ideology as Mencius clearly pointed out the necessity and desirability of class division in society:

> Great men have their proper business, and little men have their proper business. . . . Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others

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[10] Quoted in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, ibid., pp. 14-15.

> are supported by them. This is a principle universally recognized.[11]

In accepting the above contention, but pretending to benevolence, etc., Confucianists demanded preferential treatment for and justified the positions of the ruling class. The traditional stratification of Confucian societies reflects a class division in line with the Confucian principle that a man of knowledge belonged to the ruling class and an ordinary man to a subservient class, analogous to ethnic divisions in the United States. In fact, historical evidence attests to the argument that traditional China, Yi Korea and Tokugawa Japan subscribed to the Confucian ideal at least partly to justify the ruling class's position.

Furthermore, inequality in Confucianism existed not only between the superior man and inferior man but also between the old and the young.[12] One of the Five Relations claims that there should be order in governing the relationship of the old and the young. This principle was not

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[11]James Legge, trans., Chinese Classics: The Life and Works of Mencius, Vol. II (London: Trubner & Co., 1875), pp. 125-26.

[12]In American political life the ideal of order between the old and the young in a sense exists in the form of the "seniority" principle.

applied to the length of service in employment; rather, it was extended far beyond the operation of government. It meant inequality among men in their social life. The older was to render wisdom and kindness, and the younger to show deference and to seek guidance. Although this principle did not apply to the relationship between the superior man and inferior man,[13] it provided a convenient "pecking order" in Confucian society, thereby denying the equality of man.

## Problems of Political Development

It is not an easy task to evaluate Confucianism and its ideology as such in terms of its usefulness in political development because any meaningful evaluation must be made against the background of a specific Confucian nation. It is, however, feasible to evaluate certain theoretical aspects of Confucianism in the light of political development.[14]

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[13]Tuk-hwang Kim, Hanguk Sasang-sa [History of Social Thought in Korea] (Seoul: Namsan-dang, 1958), p. 146.

[14]The term "political development" has gained general currency among political scientists today, yet definition of the term is not easy. For a discussion of the problem of defining the concept as well as for a variety of existing definitions, see Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), Ch. 2. In this study the term is used in the sense of an effort toward or a spirit of increasing political efficiency in utilizing the human and material resources of

One difficulty Confucianism presents in terms of political development and modernization is its ideal of morality. Confucianism places its highest value upon man's virtue and knowledge. However, although the ideal of the superior man may still be admirable today, most of the specific moral standards and rites prescribed for various occasions now seem quite ludicrous. As Ch'en Tu-hsiu argues in his attack upon Confucianism, most of the Confucian prescriptions for leading the good life are undoubtedly anachronistic. In addition to examples cited in Chapter Four, Confucian literature, especially the Book of Rites, is replete with such declarations as "To be a woman means to submit"; "No marriage after the husband's death";[15] and "The rules of decorum do not go down to the common people and penal statutes do not go up to great officers."[16]

The problems such customs and mores pose as the background of political life are quite obvious and need little explanation. The elaborate moral and ritual injunctions

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a country to attain goals. See A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 7.

[15] Book of Rites, IX:24.

[16] Book of Rites, I:35.

might have been designed to attain a good and orderly social life in a primitive state or technologically underdeveloped society, but such feudal and rigid arrangements inhibit exploration of new life-styles and political development in an age of science, technology and "invention." Comparatively less adherence to the Confucian ethical theory and the waning of Confucian influence in Japan during the post-Restoration period may well be a partial explanation of Japan's rapid political modernization and epoch-making development.[17]

Certain Confucian mentality and attitudes thus explain, at least partially, why Confucian nations had a poor level of rapid industrialization. From the ideological "good" point of view, the Confucian man of virtue is the man who has risen above the desire for material comfort and devotes himself to leisure and the cultivation of the mind. Confucianism prefers leisure to employment or to manual labor. As Confucius said, "The superior man concerns himself with righteousness, while the inferior man thinks only

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[17]For a discussion of the problem of Confucian ethics in Japan after the Restoration see Robert E. Ward, "Japan: The Continuity of Modernization," in Political Culture and Political Development, Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 39-49.

of benefit."[18] Mencius, agreeing with his teacher, seconded: "Those who rise at the first crow of the cock to do good are the people of Shun and those who rise at the first crow of the cock to seek benefit are the people of Chih.[19] The Calvinist business classes have little base in Confucianism.

The Confucian disdain for work and esteem for leisure were also reflected in the traditional social hierarchy. A man of ability and knowledge rarely sought a career in the commercial and artistic fields, which were left to those in the lower echelons of Confucian society.[20] Furthermore, those who occupied the upper social rungs did not concern themselves with the kind of study which might have created an atmosphere conducive to scientific investigation and increasing production and goods. As Fairbank argues, this is probably due to the ascendancy of neo-Confucianism.

> Chu Hsi had taught that sincerity of heart was to be approached by a study of external objects,

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[18] Analects, Bk. XV, Ch. XX.

[19] Mencius, Bk. I, pt. II, Ch. XVII, sec. 2.

[20] See for discussions on Confucian social structure, Tung-tsu Chu, "Chinese Class Structure and Its Ideology," in Chinese Thought and Institution, John K. Fairbank, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 235-42; Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 36-55; John W. Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu, 1719-1788: The Forerunner of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955).

> "the investigation of things," after which one might proceed to the understanding of oneself. This phrase, "the investigation of things," however, was interpreted to mean not scientific observation but rather a study of human affairs. Human society and personal relationships continued to be the focus of Chinese learning, not the conquest of man over nature.[21]

Confucian scholars thus contributed little to the improvement of material surroundings save some creature comforts for the few and to the development of mass production industrial societies. Certainly they did not provide the Calvinistic ethics which defied work. It may be concluded therefore that Confucian ideology was at least partially responsible for the lack of industrial development.

Another problem area of Confucianism involves the generalization that political development and modernization might be achieved more smoothly if the traditional ideology of a nation is susceptible to the spirit of experimentation and exploration. Yet it is not an easy undertaking to prove that Confucianism which was conservative in nature allowed dynamic change. It is true that some of Confucius' teachings ran quite contrary to the goal of preserving the old order. In advocating employing the capable and virtuous

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[21]John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (New York: The Viking Press, 1962), p. 64.

men in government, Confucius deplored the political corruption of the day and attempted to build a new society.[22] From another point of view, it can be argued that Confucius was interested in returning to the days of Yao and Shun, for he admired everything about them. Confucius said: "Chou has the advantage of viewing the two past dynasties. How complete and elegant are its regulations! I follow Chou."[23] Confucius thus displayed a Burkean reverence for the past and a desire to preserve the existing system. Thus although it may be argued either way, Confucius seemed to be quite adament about what he considered the nature and characteristics of the good life; and Confucianism generally lacked the experimental spirit.

Certainly considering Confucian theory, not as it is inscribed in the texts, but rather as it has been reflected in Confucian societies, the spirit of experimentalism and exploration has been notably absent. As discussed earlier, Confucianism has almost always been the ideology of scholars and the ruling elite. They were the first to accept the

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[22] See for a discussion on this subject, Sang-eun Lee, "On the Criticism of Confucianism in Korea," a paper delivered at XXVII International Congress of Orientalists, held at Ann Arbor, Michigan during August 13-19, 1967, pp. 18-20.

[23] Analects, Bk. III, Ch. XIV.

Confucian ideology, and they promoted its precepts because it provided a convenient explanation of and legitimization for the coveted social positions they occupied. It would seem quite contrary to the empirical theory of government that the ruling class would promote any set of beliefs that would endanger and undermine the power structure of their society.[24] It may indeed be difficult to prove that the reason Confucianism was originally adopted as the official ideology was to justify a ruling class, but it is not difficult to see the obvious benefits that would accrue to the ruling class with such adoption. It therefore seems futile to debate, as does K'ang Yu-wei, the original intention of Confucius. At least empirically analysis supports the argument that Confucianism was a hindrance to progress and modernization because it was little tolerant of adventurism and change.

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[24]K'ang Yu-wei's abortive attempt to give a Confucian justification for drastic reform is largely academic and polemic. K'ang's position adequately attests to the fact that the Confucian ruling class was reluctant, to say the least, to venture the much needed reform and was unable to accommodate itself to the changing political and social climate.

# CHAPTER VII

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The foregoing shows that Confucianism is a loosely organized body of thought that has been subject to the vicissitudes of time throughout East Asia for well over two millenia. The teachings of Confucius and those of his next standard-bearer, Mencius, subsequently wielded an enormous influence upon the political, social and ethical lives of people in China, Korea, and Japan throughout history even if only as rationalizations. Confucian theory served as the major subject of academic inquiry and as the standard for the moral and good man.

Confucianists, as has been seen, considered human nature innately good, though their explication of this was somewhat inadequate and they offered no empirical proof, nor did they clearly define "goodness." Also, Confucianists simply conceived that nature and the universe are moral, orderly, and harmonious, and since man was part of nature and the universe, he was thought to be moral and good. Yet

they argued that the evil of man was due to certain environmental factors. How could the universe then be good and moral, and yet certain environmental factors could be evil? Like St. Augustine and many Western religionists Confucianists at this point seemed to be quite mixed up. Thus although the original source of evil environment is not at all clear, one can only gather that they ignored that man does have evil within him or that the universe has the evil in it as an environmental factor. Naively they refuse to face the paradox.

Again, the nature of men is very much alike according to Confucianists, but here again they mixed up their thesis. At one point, they said that men were alike in terms of taste, desire, and appetite; but they also said that men were different in terms of morality, intelligence and ability. This is confusing, to say the least. All men are equal in the sense that their basic natures are innately good, but their equality seems to end right here. Some men are superior to others by virtue of their knowledge and morality. For Confucianists, a man of superior quality embodies three basic principles, i.e., jen, yi, and li, which can be acquired through the cultivation of the mind. The Confucian dichotomy of mankind into the superior and the

inferior contains the clear socio-political implication that men should not be treated equally because they are not equal, even though at times they seem to expect men to be treated as equal. In this regard, they are no better (or worse) than equalitarian democrats in the West today including "civil liberty" political scientist humanists.

Hsun Tzu of course saw human nature as evil but as to the problem of social order and the good life his conclusion was essentially the same as that of Confucius and Mencius. He showed little faith in man's capacity to have an orderly life because most people were governed by desire and emotion and in search for fame and wealth. Although he concluded very much the same as did Confucius and Mencius to the effect that people should perform their assigned roles, Hsun Tzu had more faith in li and rules and regulations. He also believed in employing rewards and punishments to keep people in their proper places instead of relying solely upon a ruler's virtues. Perhaps he is closer to a Western realist, positivist than most Confucianists.

Much in Confucian philosophy dealt with the nature of the good life and the possibility of the peace and order that would automatically follow if every man adhered to the highest ideals of his particular social role. This part of

Confucian theory is simple idealism more feeble than that of Plato who at least expected institution to channelize weaknesses. When a prince is a prince, a father is a father, and a son is a son in fact and practice as well as in essence, the Confucian ideal of equilibrium and a perfectly harmonious life supposedly can be attained. Like Stoics, Hebrews and Christians, Confucianists were extremely impressed with the idea of the "orderliness" of the universe. They also believed strongly that the family was a part of the universe and the most "natural" institution among men. After the "right think" by the individual the social and political order should be built after the familial model. The family should be the model for government, and the ruler should possess all the basic virtues which stem from family life.

Like Western idealists from Plato to medieval Christian thinkers, the goal of politics and government, according to Confucianists, was to consummate social harmony and orderly life. Like Plate again, the function of Confucian politics is educational and the government was a primary agency for moral inculcation. Although all men should make an effort to acquire virtue and knowledge and to fulfill themselves, the government and family should be the

channel and device. It was also most natural that the most virtuous--Hsun Tzu added "ability" to this--should be the ruler. Thus the most important method of government was to assure that the virtuous men occupy the government posts. Obviously, Confucianists felt that government was the most important agency in the country in terms of influencing the behavior of others. Confucian rulers therefore were supposed to govern the nation with their exemplary behavior, which would flow down to the lowest people and inspire others to emulate them: here Confucianism has not only shades of Plato but of Burke.

This traditional ideology of Confucianism was challenged wien the Confucian nations were unable to reject the Western nations' desire for trade and commerce in the last half of the nineteenth century. Intellectuals and governmental leaders in the Confucian societies, especially in China, began to re-examine the validity and utility of their traditional political and ethical theory and ideology. Without the Calvinist rationalization and religious concept of human Sin and an omnipotent God, some attempted to provide justification for the much-needed reform <u>within</u> the Confucian framework; others simply denounced Confucianism and ascribed all China's political and social problems to

Confucianism and its ideology. Still others made some effort to compromise the Confucian way of life and of government with the Western example, but again they lacked the Calvinist God or Marxist "devil" of capitalism.

More practically, the controversy over the nature of Confucianism centered around the question of the modern-day utility or superiority--or inferiority--of Confucian ideology to Western ways of politics and life, which might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove with some degree of objectivity. Here an argument could be made for any side, depending upon the individual's temperament and perception of the good life. Thus those who extolled Confucianism based their argument on the Confucian emphasis on moralism, and those who assaulted it pointed out its anachronistic formalities and rituals which they considered completely incompatible with and inconvenient in modern-day life.

Yet, even though some might be tempted to find a scapegoat in Confucianism for the unprecedented problems Confucian nations faced, Confucian ideology should not be blamed for all the ensuing problems. Some of the Confucian nations' problems posed by the Western imperialism and capitalism were not due to the traditional ideology but rather due to the social, economic, and political problems

caused by the spiritual indolence and intellectual lack of self-reflection and short-sighted views on the part of Confucian leaders. And the real fault lay in the incompatibility between Confucian morality and its state of mind solution as the answer to technology--just as is true in the failure of religion and "democracy" to solve the same problem in the West today.

The great trial of Confucian ideology, however, happily exposed much of its negative, critical, and "unhappy" side. Obviously, Confician political life was not "harmonious," "orderly," "benevolent," and humanistic. The rulers were not always the men of virtue, and even when a virtuous man governed, social order did not automatically or ever really follow. Both the assault on Confucianism and the frantic efforts to reinterpret the traditional ideology were probably a clear manifestation of unhappiness with Confucian theory and its inability to cope with both old and new problems.

Yet, few Chinese leaders and intellectuals made any attempt to analyze with objectivity Confucian theory in the light of modern democracy. When there was an analysis, it was invariably shallow and a biased publicist, political effort. However, those intellectuals cannot really be

faulted, because they were mostly political activists who probably had little luxury of academic repute at the time of national exigency.

One thing is certain and that is that despite the lip service Confucianism pays to humanism, benevolence, popular sovereignty and the people's importance, Confucian theory is considerably different from that of modern democratic political systems.[1] A perusal of Confucian literature reveals no real democratic theory even as muddy as the latter is in the West today. The Confucian concept of man, for instance, is not the same as modern democratic equalitarianism. Confucian literature is also devoid of the idea of the innate worth of man regardless of his capacity for reasoning, moral knowledge and social position. In fact, much of Confucian doctrine seems to contradict the "best" of the dichotomous ideas of modern democracy. Confucianists' insistence upon the rule of the virtuous man and their correlative neglect of the institutional device which some interpreters of democracy consider so important are quite contrary to the general principles of democracy as an end as well as a means.

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[1]However, certain comparison with historic "democratic" Western thought has been noted in p.

In addition, Confucianists envisioned the good life not so much as a "free" life in which the individual may pursue his own goals and fulfill his potentiality, but rather as an orderly and harmonious life in which a person should cultivate his own mind and scrupulously adhere to the principles that govern human relationships as well as to such trivial etiquettes and formalities as those enumerated in the Book of Rites.

When compared and contrasted with the "realistic" view of modern democracy, especially with that of American political scientists, Truman, Key, and Dahl, Confucianism is simply not democracy by any standard. In many areas of Confucian theory, the pluralist-elitist theory with its concept of interest simply defies any comparison. Also although some of Confucian ethics are compatible with democratic "aims," they are in general much closer to Greek and Stoic ideas of an ethical "place" in society.

One crucial problem in this study was not as much in the analysis of the "realistic" view of democracy by many contemporary American political scientists as in the implicit defense of democracy and its "self-governing" process by the same people. However, as has been seen, the latter generally failed to produce any convincing argument

as to why democracy is good. This not only dilutes the commonly held belief and assumption that Western democracy is good and should be imported by the Asian nations (including of course Viet Nam) but also the universal acclamation for democracy. That is an analysis of Western democracy showed that it also is grounded on many paradoxical and absurd notions which have been simply useful to the rising middle and commercial classes and their political puppets. It is grounded upon a subjectivist definition of the individual objectified into the false principle of interest. As Professor Jordan argued, democracy as identified with property as private is nothing but subjectivism, and its approach to the practical problem is based upon the states of mind and on divisiveness in social affairs. The contemporary theory of democracy obviously does not seem to bring about a harmonious or just social order. The recurring question here then is whether or not Western democracy is really the answer to Confucian societies, no matter how weak the latter may be because of the "errors" of Confucianism.

Yet Confucianism, too, seems to take this state of mind approach in political problem-solving. Thus much of the good life illustrated by the Confucianists is difficult to be realized. Furthermore, it has a number of logical

weaknesses and theoretical limitations within it. Confucianism and its ethical teachings also were advanced by the ruling classes, and they have been invariably employed by the rulers to consolidate and legitimize political power. Like natural law and democracy in the West, Confucian theory was easily employed to tyrannize the subjects, women, wives, the young, the "inferior" men, etc. This is amply corroborated by history.

From a practical point of view, then, Confucianism contributed little to--if it did not outright hinder--the political development and modernization of Confucian societies. If the adoption of Western industrialism and commercialism is desirable, then the Confucian mentality to a large extent would have to be overcome. Furthermore, Confucian ethics and its way of thinking seem totally incompatible with modern-day living. But then, none of the "way of life belief systems," philosophies or religions or ideologies which are posed as "social glue" upon a basis of individual attitudes and feelings appear to have much to contribute to institutional problem solving when the latter are all dependent on technical, industrial processes as the ultimate determinants of human life. These only "worked,"--even as rationalizations in agricultural, familial societies--not in an age such as ours.

## GLOSSARY

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|---|---|
| Chun-tzu | 君子 |
| Hsiao-jen | 小人 |
| Jen | 仁 |
| Li | 禮 |
| Li (Chu Hsi's principle) | 理 |
| Ming | 命 |
| Tao | 道 |
| Yi | 義 |

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