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NATALIE M. JACKSON

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BY

Dr. Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Chair

Dr. Gary W. Copeland

Dr. William G. Jacoby

Dr. Carol L. Silva

Dr. Kevin B. Grier

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To my mom... my best friend and biggest fan

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Table of Contents

List of Tables & Figures	vii
Abstract	viii
Chapter 1: The Problem: How Do Moderates Form their Preferences?	1
1.1 Public Opinion Literature	5
1.2 Cultural Theory and Risk Perceptions	15
1.3 Purpose of the Dissertation	25
Chapter 2: Modeling Preference Formation	27
2.1 From Culture to Ideology: Institutions	28
2.2 Ideologies Communicated to the Mass Public: Preferences	39
2.3 Feedback Loops	41
2.4 Implications of the Cultural Preference Model	43
2.5 Research Design	47
2.6 Organization of the Dissertation	50
Chapter 3: Measuring Complex Concepts	53
3.1 Measuring Ideology	53
3.2 Measuring Culture	58
3.3 Expected Combinations of Culture, Partisanship, and Ideology	65
3.4 Observed Combinations of Culture, Partisanship, and Ideology	70
3.5 Discussion	81
Chapter 4: The Relationship between Culture and Ideology	83
4.1 Comparing Culture and Ideology	84
4.2 Modeling Culture and Ideology	85
4.3 Discussion	97
Chapter 5: Differences between Ideologues and Moderates	100
5.1 Ideology Recoding and Model Specification	101
5.2 Comparing Culture and Ideology	102
5.3 Modeling Culture and Ideology	104
5.4 Discussion	116
Chapter 6: Conclusion	120
6.1 Future work	123
References	125
Appendix: Survey Questionnaire	135

List of Tables

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Culture Measures	71
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Ideology and Partisanship Measures	75
Table 3.3: Bivariate Correlations between Culture, Ideology, and Partisanship	78
Table 4.1: OLS Regression Models on the Immigration Policy Preference Index	90
Table 4.2: Comparison of Path Model Effects	97
Table 5.1: Percent of Respondents in each Economic and Social Ideology Category within Ideologue and Moderate Groups	102
Table 5.2: Correlations between Social and Economic Ideology Measures and Triad Cultural Worldview Measures for Moderates and Ideologues Separately	104
Table 5.3: OLS Regression Models on the Immigration Policy Preference Index	106
Table 5.4: Tolerance Statistics for Key Independent Variables	110
Table 5.5: Comparison of Path Model Effects	114

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Grid-Group Typology	18
Figure 2.1: The Cultural Preference Model	28
Figure 3.1: Partisanship by Cultural Worldview	77
Figure 3.2: Ideology by Cultural Worldview	77
Figure 4.1: The Cultural Preference Model as a Causal Model	93
Figure 4.2: Path Analysis of the Causal Process from Culture to Policy Preferences	95
Figure 5.1: Path Analysis of the Causal Process from Culture to Policy Preferences for Moderates Only	113
Figure 5.2: Path Analysis of the Causal Process from Culture to Policy Preferences for Ideologues Only	113

Abstract

What factors drive the thoughts that come to respondents' minds at the particular moment that a survey question is asked about their policy preferences? We have a partial answer to this question from the long tradition of literature stemming from The American Voter -- those with strong ideological positions respond to policy questions with views that mostly concur with their ideology -- but we know very little about why moderates respond the way they do to policy questions. This dissertation develops a theoretical model of how preferences are formed and analyzes how mechanisms of preference formation vary based on strength of ideological views. The Cultural Preference Model put forth posits that while ideologues rely on political heuristics to respond to survey questions, moderates default to a more primitive source of their worldviews: culture. Further, the model states that ideology is simply cultural worldviews that have been forced to fit the specific setup of political institutions. The project uses an anthropological operationalization of cultural worldview, Douglas and Wildavsky's Cultural Theory, to analyze the relationships between culture, ideology, and policy preferences for all individuals, and then for moderates and ideologues separately. Results indicate that the model is supported: moderates rely more heavily on their cultural views when forming and reporting their policy preferences, whereas ideologues rely primarily on political heuristics.

Chapter 1

The Problem: How Do Moderates Form their Preferences?

The lynchpin of democratic theory is that the people have a voice in government. In a republican democracy such as the United States, the views of the public should be represented by those they elect. Political scientists have dedicated a substantial amount of research to the debate over whether policy decisions made by elected officials are in any way related to the policy preferences of the American mass public. Findings from this research have indicated that for many issues the policy decisions made by those in government are generally reflective of the preferences of the mass public and that policy makers are responsive to changes in public preferences over time (e.g., Bartels 1991; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Hill and Hurley 1998; Jacobs 1993; Miller and Stokes 1963; Monroe 1979, 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983, 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Weissberg 1976; Wlezien 1996, 2004; Wood and Hinton Andersson 1998). If decision-makers base policy decisions at least in part on the preferences of the mass public, it becomes important to know how the individuals that make up the mass public form their policy preferences. Two different sets of literature have developed to explain preference formation—the public opinion literature in political science that relies on ideology and partisanship to explain preferences, and the risk analysis literature in public policy that uses a specific conceptualization of culture as the primary explanatory concept for risk perceptions and policy preferences.

Public opinion literature relies on ideology and partisanship as the central components of individuals' "belief systems." Individuals should use these political

variables to determine their preferences about how the nation should operate according to this literature, but we also know from this literature that partisanship and ideology only dictate preferences for those who identify strongly with a political party or ideology (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Jacoby 1986, 1991; Zaller 1992; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). This literature offers little knowledge about how the majority¹ of individuals who fall in the “middle of the road” politically form their preferences, except that these individuals in the middle often dictate the aggregate direction of the national mood: they swing one way or the other to determine the general direction of opinion on policy preferences (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). It is well-understood why the strongly liberal Democrat and the strongly conservative Republican hold different policy preferences, but why do “moderate” individuals’ preferences vary? Ideology and partisanship simply do not explain variation in policy preferences among those who fall in the middle categories of each—those who do not identify with a political party and those who label themselves as “moderate,” “slightly” ideological, or respond “don't know” when asked about their individual ideological views. Clearly the political heuristics of ideology and partisanship are insufficient for explaining moderate views, thus it becomes important to look to non-political heuristics that are driving preferences for these individuals.

It is precisely the non-political heuristics of preference formation that the risk literature focuses on using the “Cultural Theory of risk,” initially developed by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982), to explain how individuals perceive risks and why some individuals are more willing to take certain risks than others. Empirical work

¹ In the 2008 American National Election Study, 68.9% of respondents categorized themselves as slightly liberal, middle-of-the-road, or slightly conservative. The middle-of-the-road category alone comprised 47.8% of the population.

has demonstrated that culture, as operationalized in this Cultural Theory, has a powerful effect on individuals' policy preferences (e.g., Braman et al. 2005; Gastil et al. 2005; Kahan and Braman 2006; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman 2010; Jenkins-Smith, Herron, and Ripberger 2010; Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Peters and Slovic 1996). The weakness in this literature is that it has not given adequate attention to the relationship between Cultural Theory and political belief systems. Many of the issues addressed in the risk literature have distinct political and policy implications, and as a result are inextricably tied to the political world of ideology, partisanship and trust (e.g., Davis 2007; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009), but these ties have been largely ignored by the literature. Early in its development, the Cultural Theory literature looked at correlations between worldviews and political variables (e.g. Dake 1991; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Peters and Slovic 1996), but these correlations offered little insight into how the concepts interact with political beliefs in individual decision-making processes. In more recent work, Cultural Theory and political beliefs have been treated as separate approaches to preference formation and competing foundations of belief systems (e.g., Kahan and Braman 2006; Jenkins-Smith, Herron and Ripberger 2010; Michaud, Carlisle and Smith 2009; Swedlow 2008; Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009). Setting culture and politics up as competing and mutually exclusive theories adds nothing to the understanding of how they affect one another or how they affect preferences *together* as components of belief systems.

The central argument of this dissertation is that in order to gain a better understanding of how individuals form their preferences, researchers need to

incorporate both cultural factors and political beliefs. This approach is particularly helpful for understanding preference formation among those who are not firmly dedicated to party or ideology, the “muddy middle.” These individuals form their preferences based on a combination of belief system constraints that features their cultural worldview as the primary determinant of their preferences, but they do not completely ignore political heuristics. The interaction of cultural worldview with ideology and partisanship could form cross-pressures for those in the middle who are not firmly committed to a political ideology or party (Treier and Hillygus 2009), or these individuals in the middle could simply be uninformed about or ambivalent toward politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Regardless of the reason for their self-placement in the middle of the ideological spectrum, these individuals create problems for researchers trying to study aggregate political belief systems since the links between their preferences and their reported political beliefs are weaker than those with strong ideological and partisan beliefs. Adding cultural factors to models of preference formation, as the risk perception literature has done, will clarify these relationships by accounting for the mechanisms that these middle individuals use to form their preferences.

This introduction will trace the history of each set of literature and the impacts each theory has had on understanding preference formation, as well as where the literature has left gaps. Then chapter 2 will develop the theoretical model that incorporates ideology, partisanship, and culture into one model of preference formation that can explain preferences for those who do rely on political heuristics to form their preferences as well as those who do not and lay out the structure for the rest of this

dissertation.

1.1 Public Opinion Literature

The ability and willingness of the public to use their voice to inform the government of their best interests has been a topic of debate among political philosophers for centuries. In the political science discipline, the debate about the capacity of the public to form preferences about policy and complex issues of governance began with Walter Lippman's 1922 book, simply titled *Public Opinion*. In this brief but seminal work, Lippman presents a damning critique of the public and its capacity to comprehend the issues that the American government faces. The individuals who make up the collective public, in Lippman's view, are wholly self-interested and often irrational in forming their preferences about political issues. People are simply incapable of comprehending the complicated demands on government, so their expectations of government will necessarily be confused and irrational. In 1925, Lippman discussed the more of the implications of an irrational public in *The Phantom Public*. Expanding on the arguments laid out in *Public Opinion*, he said that the so-called “public” is simply a collection of self-interested individuals living their individual lives—they have no sense of being part of a larger body that shares interests, needs, and goals. He claimed that modern society had become too complex for individuals to comprehend everything in their surroundings, and politics is the first thing to be ignored by most people. The implication of this conclusion is that democracy cannot hope to serve “the public” because this collective body is an illusion created by democratic theory. The best a government can hope for is to solve problems

efficiently.

In response to Lippman's harsh critiques of the public, in 1927 John Dewey published *The Public and its Problems*, a notably more optimistic view of the general public and its role in democratic governance. Where Lippman had argued that the public is irrational, Dewey argued that the individuals that make up the public simply have many aspects of their lives competing for attention, and therefore cannot be expected to pay close attention to political issues all the time. The public does not seem to exist as one cohesive unit because these competing interests cause individuals to split into smaller “publics” based on non-political concerns. The concerns of a complex modern society, in particular technological advances, distract individuals from political matters and occupy individuals' everyday lives, so that they cannot be expected to keep up with and form solid opinions on every political matter that their government faces. Dewey's solution to the problem of an absentee public is to improve communication about politics and look to local communities as the locus of democratic activity among the people. Society has become complex and the public has lost its political identity, but there is hope for the public to regain political interest and rationality in forming political preferences.

These theoretical arguments became the basis for the empirical literature on public opinion in political science. In the contemporary study of the public and its beliefs, researchers generally begin from one of two common viewpoints: either the public is (1) uninformed and lacks the ability or desire to construct sophisticated belief systems² regarding political issues according to the traditionalist view that can be traced

² This is not to say that they do not have belief systems—the literature is fairly consistent on the argument that people have belief systems, the question is whether those belief systems are coherent and

to Lippman's theoretical writing (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 1964, Zaller 1992); or (2) uninformed, but in a rational manner—people simply have too much going on in their lives to worry about forming coherent views on most political issues; most of the time mass political behavior is reasonable according to the revisionist view, which resembles Dewey's position (e.g., Key 1966, Page and Shapiro 1992, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).

In the 1940s and 1950s, survey methodology developed sufficiently to allow national implementation of opinion surveys, giving scholars a way to gather widespread data on the public and its political preferences for the first time. The first major work to be published using survey data was *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960), a seminal work which has shaped the path of public opinion and voting literature in political science ever since. The findings in *The American Voter* seemed to largely support Lippman's view that the general public does not seem to understand political issues: ideological views and policy preferences did not match up for a large portion of the respondents in the way that political science researchers would expect. Respondents who were labeled “ideologues” using the levels of conceptualization scheme³ had policy preferences that were quite consistent with what would be expected from their self-reported ideology and partisan identity. However, these “ideologues” were only a small portion of the sample. The majority of respondents fell into the other categories,

politically sophisticated.

³ The “levels of conceptualization” classification scheme was developed by the authors of *The American Voter* to classify people according to their responses to open-ended questions about their likes and dislikes of each political party. The scheme has five groups, in order from most connection between parties and policy preferences to least connection between parties and preferences: ideologues, near ideologues, group interest, nature of the times, and no issue content. Most individuals fell into the bottom three categories, indicating that they did not demonstrate an understanding of the ideological implications of party beliefs, but might have associated the parties with groups they represent (the group interest category), or based their opinions of a party on what was going on at the time (nature of the times).

in which ideological and partisan views were not so well correlated with policy preferences. In the lowest group, those with “no issue content,” respondents showed absolutely no cognitive connection between partisanship and ideology and their policy preferences. Their preferences seemed to be made up on the spot at best, or completely ad hoc and nonsensical at worst.

In response to the negative view of the public put forward by *The American Voter* and other works (e.g. Converse 1964), Key (1966) provided the argument that became the centerpiece of revisionist public opinion work. His argument was that individuals may not have coherent belief systems or logical voting patterns by the standards that political scientists impose on them. However, in the aggregate, when the whole mass public is considered rather than just individuals, the public makes rational and responsible choices. This rationale is the basis for an empirical application of Dewey’s earlier philosophical argument. Key examines the primary source of data available at the time on the political choices made by the public—the vote choice data provided by the first few American National Election Studies—and finds that when people vote contrary to their partisan identity, they overwhelmingly move in the direction that their policy preferences would predict. The connection between policy preferences and partisanship might not be apparent in abstract questions about preferences and general political views, but people generally make rational voting decisions. Key argues that given the quality and quantity of information provided to the public at the time, vote choice in the aggregate is as rational and responsible as one could expect of the public.

These two theories of public opinion became the traditionalist (Campbell et al

1960, Converse 1964) and revisionist (Key 1966) views that remain at odds in the literature at present. As the two veins of literature developed, a critical difference emerged: the traditionalists relied on individuals as the units of analysis, whereas revisionists focused on aggregate opinion, or “mood,” as the unit of analysis.

Unit of Analysis Problem

Most of the literature on mass preferences addresses partisanship and ideology and their effects on preferences, including vote choice, at the individual level. When the individual is the unit of analysis, the deficiencies of the concepts in explaining preferences are apparent, particularly for those in the moderate category who do not use ideology or partisanship to form their opinions. A shift in the revisionist literature to using aggregate public opinion measures as the empirical unit of analysis occurred in the early 1990s, starting with Stimson’s 1991 book that introduced the concept of “mood” in public opinion. Stimson argued that when one examines the public as an aggregate group, as opposed to a collection of individuals, the aggregate opinions of the group move in distinct, recognizable, and rational patterns. This aggregate-level opinion is referred to as the “national mood.” This argument is based on ideological and partisan views, just as the traditionalist arguments: Stimson found that the public generally shifts from favoring liberal policies to conservative policies, and vice-versa, when it appears that the current policies are no longer working. For example, the public shifts to favor liberal policies when it becomes apparent that conservative policies are not working, and as a result, they will also favor more liberal candidates in elections. Stimson argues that the public will pay attention to politics enough to make these

aggregate shifts when the difference between alternatives is large enough to be perceived as important and worth the costs of being informed and paying attention to politics.

This work was followed the next year by the publication of Page and Shapiro's *The Rational Public*. The very title of the book was an attack on traditionalist public opinion literature. Page and Shapiro focus on the process of information being passed to the mass public by elites. Again, looking at public opinion as an aggregate force instead of as a collection of individual preferences, they find that in the short-term, elites such as political figures and media commentators have tremendous ability to impact how the public thinks about issues—particularly in that the media personnel are in the position of interpreting events and passing the information to the public. Public opinion does, however, operate as an independent force:

“the collective policy preferences of the American public are predominantly *rational* in the sense that they are ... generally *stable*, seldom changing by large amounts and rarely fluctuating back and forth; that they form *coherent* and mutually consistent (not self-contradictory) patterns, involving meaningful distinctions; that these patterns *make sense* in terms of underlying values and available information; that when collective policy preferences change, they almost always do so in *understandable* and, indeed, *predictable* ways, reacting in consistent fashion to international events and social and economic change as reported by the mass media; and finally, that opinion changes generally constitute *sensible* adjustments to the new conditions and new information that are communicated to the public.” [Emphasis in original.]

This defense of the public as rational and responsive to the political environment, accompanied by empirical evidence of these patterns, provides tremendous support for the revisionist view of public opinion.

In the last ten years, the focus of revisionist literature has been on why the aggregate public seems to be rational. In *The Macro Polity* (Erikson, Stimson, and MacKuen 2002), the law of large numbers is invoked: in the aggregate mass public, those who do not pay attention or know what is going on in the political world cancel each other out—their views are negated by someone equally inattentive who holds the opposite views. By this logic, the relatively small proportion of the people that do pay attention to politics are actually driving public opinion (Erikson, Stimson, and MacKuen 2002; Surowiecki 2004). The same principle holds for those with far extreme views—the extremists on each side of the continuum cancel each other out. Surowiecki (2004) adds that in any group that is larger than one person, the decisions made by the group will necessarily be better than the decisions of the individual on average. The group will not make better decisions than a given individual all the time, but over time the group will be better at making rational decisions than most individuals.

Some important caveats come with these macro-level arguments in favor of mass public rationality. A sufficiently high number of individuals must exist in the informed category to have an impact on opinion and voting patterns for the law of large numbers theory to work. The macro-level analysis done in these works does not show how many individuals fall into each category. In addition, the supposition that individual opinion or voting irrationalities cancel each other out in the aggregate relies on the assumption that the irrationalities are random and not the systematic response to some signal in politics. The

aggregate analyses in these works do not establish random irrationality at the individual level. Most importantly, comparisons between these revisionist works and the traditionalist literature are rendered much less meaningful by the critical difference in the unit of analysis—the traditionalists focus on explaining preferences at the individual level using individuals as the unit of analysis, and these revisionist works focus on the aggregate public over time using aggregations as the units of analysis.

The unit of analysis difference is the primary reason that the two sides remain at odds with one another. Revisionist literature that argues in favor of a rational public does not extend the arguments to individual rationality, so explaining preferences at the individual level remains problematic. Recent individual-level literature has continued to support the original traditionalist findings: in an update of *The American Voter*, Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) analyzed data from the 2000 and 2004 American National Election Studies to retest the findings of the original work, and found that the patterns had remained quite similar over time but with some increases in levels of conceptualization—most likely due to higher levels of education among the population in 2000 and 2004 than existed in 1952 and 1956. In an earlier, but very influential work, Zaller (1992) argued that individuals get their information about politics from elites in society and form their opinions based on four factors: their attentiveness to politics, knowledge of politics, values, and the information they get from elites. When respondents are asked to form opinions on issues in survey questions, these four factors compete, and the response given is dependent upon the

context of the question and the immediate concerns and surroundings of the respondent. Zaller's theory implies that measures of public opinion are mostly ad hoc and created on the spot at the individual level, another heavy blow for the rational public theory.

The answer to reconciling the patterns of individual irrationality and aggregate rationality rests on looking beyond the traditional belief system variables of ideology and partisanship. If the public is rational at the aggregate level, surely there must be something that explains decision-making at the individual level. Of Zaller's four factors, political attentiveness and knowledge are already used as variables in much of the literature that addresses individual-level opinion formation, and the immediate context that the individual is in while answering questions is impossible to know. This leaves the values factor as the sole unaccounted for factor that can be reasonably measured. In a series of survey questions asking respondents about their value preferences, Jacoby (2006) demonstrated that individuals' core political values—in this case liberty, economic security, equality, and social order—are hierarchically structured and quite consistent. Respondents were asked to choose which value was most important out of a pair of the four values, and they were asked all possible pairs of the four values. The result was remarkable consistency in choosing certain values over others, and the ability to form a hierarchical structure of value preferences for each individual respondent out of the choices. These value hierarchies are quite useful for explaining individuals' policy preferences, and

offer a significant boost to the revisionist idea that the public is somehow rational while keeping the level of analysis focused on the individual.

The improvement in explaining individual preferences that is found by accounting for value structures is an illustration of why the individual-level preferences of the mass public have been difficult to empirically explain: the literature focused on ideology and partisanship as the primary explanatory variables. Not all individuals identify with a political party or use ideology as a decision-making heuristic for political preferences. The tendency of political scientists, until recently, has been to assume that the failure of partisanship and ideology to explain preferences means that people are uninformed and even, according to some, unsophisticated, at the individual level. However, most individuals' preferences make sense to them if you ask them—if they have an opinion about something, there is usually a reason behind that opinion even if it is not what political scientists would consider a “good” reason. What most of the behavioral political science has failed to look at are the non-political variables in individuals' lives that structure how that person wants to live in the world more generally, not just how they think politics should work.

Some recent work has explored how individuals' preferences are shaped by personality factors and genetics (e.g., Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2008; Hatemi et al 2009, 2010; Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008; Mondak et al 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Smith et al 2011). These works have found interesting links between the psychological and biological factors and preference formation and are certainly part of the overall picture of preference formation,

but these factors skip over another plausible explanation for preference formation: how people view the world they live in overall. Ideology focuses on how individuals think the political world should work, but often does not address the non-political context. This dissertation argues that individuals who do not rely on partisanship or ideology to form their preferences rely on a broader conceptualization of how they want the world to work in order to form their preferences. It is this more primitive idea of how the world should work beyond the political realm that has been explored with considerable success in the risk analysis literature in the form of Cultural Theory.

1.2 Cultural Theory and Risk Perceptions

Cultural Theory (CT) has its origins as an anthropological theory that describes how individuals want to live in the world and how they want the world to react to them. This conceptualization of culture serves as a filter through which individuals comprehend their surroundings and generate meaning from the world they live in (Douglas 1978; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Wildavsky 1987). The question driving Douglas to begin developing the theory was why certain societies perceive certain actions as posing more or less of a risk than other societies faced with the same situation. The answer to this question is that different societies have different accepted ways of life, and Cultural Theory was developed to classify these ways of life. Even though the theory is broad and applicable to almost any set of circumstances, most of the scholarship that utilizes CT is focused on risk perception since the original question involved risk in society. But, before the literature that uses CT to describe risk

perceptions is discussed there needs to be a solid understanding of the assumptions and typology of CT.

What is “Culture”?

Culture provides a very broad social constraint on individuals’ belief systems by setting the parameters of what is an acceptable way of life to each individual, organization, or society (Douglas 1978; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Wildavsky 1987). Cultural types can be measured at three different levels: the individual’s culture, the organizational level of culture, and the macro level of entire societies (Hendriks 1994). Some have argued that CT is more appropriate at higher levels of analysis—societies instead of individuals—because individuals do not hold to the strict categories set up by cultural theory (e.g. Rayner 1991). However, as originally devised by Douglas and Wildavsky, cultural theory seeks to explain the connection between individual preferences, beliefs, actions and the institutions of society (Douglas 1978; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). A full understanding of how individual preferences and societal institutions are related requires exploration at all three levels: the individual, the institution or organization, and society. However, for this dissertation, the focus is on individual preference formation.


The assumptions of CT explain how preferences are linked to the institutions of society by providing critical information about the context of those preferences. The most important assumption is that individuals are not isolated in the world, and therefore any preferences they develop about how to interact with society will be developed based on previous interactions with society, and they will react in predictable

ways to similar sets of situations (Eckstein 1997). Cultural Theory also assumes that individuals will have to deal with situations outside of what is considered common to their worldview, and so a worldview cannot be inferred from a single situation.

Individuals do, however, learn from situations they have experienced using Bayesian updating: incorporating the new situation into their pre-existing set of beliefs.

The number of different cultural worldviews could be as high as the number of individuals in a society, so in order to study culture empirically there needs to be some sort of classification mechanism, or typology, to guide the theory. Cultural worldviews, and any typology that would be constructed from those worldviews, stem from cultural biases that make up an individual's point of view (Douglas 1997). Thus a typology of cultures needs to provide a parsimonious way of describing diverse individuals' ways of life by grouping certain characteristics together. In the case of CT, this typology is set up as a graph with two axes representing the two dimensions of "grid" and "group," with the dimensions usually presented as orthogonal (shown in Figure 1.1). In Douglas's original description of the dimensions, "group" was described as a continuum with complete incorporation into the groups of society at one end, and at the other end there are no boundaries at all, the individual rejects groups and prefers to be solitary (Douglas 1978, p. 16). "Grid" was defined as the extent to which individuals are classified by their social environment; how much individuals feel constrained or allow themselves to be constrained by their social situation. At one end of the grid dimension individuals view their lives as completely constrained by their social situation, and at the other end individuals actively reject the restrictions that society would place on them. Douglas designed this sort of typology partially because it had the advantage of

Figure 1.1: Grid-Group Typology



discouraging sharp distinctions between cultures—the dimensions were designed to be continua, not dividing lines (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).

Scholars have interpreted the grid-group dimensions in different ways since Douglas and Wildavsky initially constructed the types of market, hierarchy, and sect, but have generally agreed that there are four empirically measurable types that emerge from the group-grid typology: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism.⁴

People who are both high grid, meaning that they feel very constrained by the rules of society, and high group, meaning that they see themselves as very integrated into the

⁴ Ellis, Thompson, and Wildavsky (1990) discuss the hermit, or autonomous cultural type, but since hermits by definition do not participate in society, they cannot be empirically studied.

groups of society, fall into the hierarchy cultural type⁵, a worldview that embraces the fact that everyone must live together in society but accepts and even values the social order that exists in society based on social characteristics. The egalitarian cultural type, high group and low grid, similarly accepts that everyone lives together in a society, but rejects hierarchical structures and instead believes that resources should be evenly divided among all people. The low group, low-grid worldview is described by the individualist cultural type in which individuals adhere to an every-man-for-himself way of life. The high group, high grid worldview is the fatalist cultural type. Fatalists believe that people exist as individuals, rather than in a community, and there is a hierarchy inherent to social life that individuals are unable to change even if they try. In accordance with Douglas's original exposition of the theory⁶, these categories do not form distinct groups separated from one another, but are constantly moving, fluid constructions within each individual (or organization or society) defined by the current context and opposition to the competing ways of life.

Each worldview competes with the other three worldviews because each makes different assumptions about the natural state of the world (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, p. 34-35). All individuals begin forming preferences and ways of life from a set of assumptions about how the world works, referred to in cultural theory as a "myth of nature." Cultural Theory borrowed the concept of myths of nature from ecology: the myths comprise simple models of how nature and ecosystems work and explain why those who believe a particular myth act in a certain way—belief in the

⁵ The terms "cultural type" and "cultural worldview" are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation.

⁶The reference here is to the original exposition of the relationship of the dimensions, not Douglas's original categories. There were only three cultural types in the initial exposition of the types—market, hierarch, and sect (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).

myth rationalizes behavior (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, p. 26). Each of these “myths” correctly describes the world part of the time, which is the source of the stability of the myths. Cultural theorists simply took the myth of nature theory from ecology and adapted it to explain social situations.

These cultural types and their corresponding “myths of nature” that describe how individuals wish to live in and with society exist *prior* to any other information or factual beliefs that individuals may be exposed to about political issues (Kahan and Braman 2006). Egalitarians view nature as fragile and easily disrupted and believe that humans are fundamentally good but have been “corrupted” by the institutions of society. The answer is to create an egalitarian society in which all individuals are equal and live in a non-coercive group. Individualists, on the other hand, believe that nature and human nature are resilient and stable; individuals are self-seeking and cannot be expected to change. Thus, individualists build a life based on the every-man-for-himself principle, which leads to a competitive society. Hierarchs believe that nature and humans need to be regulated in order to avoid bad things happening. Humans are born “sinful,” and their “redemption” is found in institutions and institutional constraint. Fatalists believe that both nature and humans are unpredictable and random, and their solution is to simply not trust anyone and let nature do what it will.

By adopting any of the views of human nature, individuals are adopting a way of life that constrains their belief systems. The constraint may not be conscious—individuals do not necessarily think about how they want to live in the world and their view of human nature when presented with new information—but the underlying cultural worldview will determine what are acceptable preferences. Empirical work has

demonstrated that culture has a powerful effect on individuals' policy preferences (e.g., Braman et al. 2005; Gastil et al. 2005; Kahan and Braman 2006; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman 2010; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Peters and Slovic 1996). Since culture is a broader concept, it often provides a clearer explanation for how people are able to form opinions on broad ranges of political views and political values than ideology or partisanship. Individuals cannot avoid their own cultural orientation in forming opinions; it is how they live in the world, and their opinions on political issues must be consistent with their way of life in order to avoid causing unnecessary internal conflict.

Studies of Risk Perception using Cultural Theory

As a relatively new theory, the literature on Cultural Theory and preferences is not as vast as the ideology and partisanship work on preference formation. However, there is a significant body of work that develops the theory and applies it to cognitive preference formation. Much of the early work on CT focused on developing the theory, as described above, and the early applications to empirical policy problems focused on obvious risk issues at different levels of analysis, such as environmental damage at the institutional and individual levels (e.g., Rayner 1991; Ellis and Thompson 1997) and nuclear energy (e.g., Peters and Slovic 1996). In the last ten years, however, CT has been used to explain preferences on an increasing number of policy issues at the individual level, and the theory has been pushed beyond explaining risk perceptions to a theory of how individuals think about their preferences. In addition to continued work on the environment and nuclear energy, several more policy areas have been added to

the repertoire of issues studied using the CT framework: security issues, including the balance between preserving liberties while protecting security (e.g., Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009; Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006; Jenkins-Smith, Herron, and Ripberger 2010), gun control (e.g., Braman, Grimmelman, and Kahan 2005; Braman and Kahan 2003), nanotechnology (Kahan et al 2007, 2009), and vaccination issues (Jenkins-Smith, Silva, and Song 2011; Kahan et al 2008).

A large body of work on Cultural Theory and how it drives preferences in general and with respect to specific policy positions has come from the Cultural Cognition Project (CCP) at Yale Law School, led by Professor Dan Kahan. The work of Kahan and his colleagues deviates somewhat from the grid-group structure with four cultural worldviews by redefining the continua as hierarchy to individualist instead of grid, and egalitarian to communitarian instead of group (e.g., Kahan and Braman 2006; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman 2010). Despite this operational deviation from the original theoretical structure, the work produced from this group of scholars has contributed significantly to the understanding of CT and its effects on individual risk perceptions and policy preferences. This “cultural cognition” work assumes that culture exists prior to any individual preferences, as this dissertation does, and that the impact of culture on preferences is twofold: individuals might choose policy preferences based on what is more in sync with their cultural view than based on the actual implications of those policies, *and* that what individuals believe about certain policies will be biased by their cultural worldview (Kahan and Braman 2006). Kahan’s group has projects currently using CT to investigate gun risk perceptions, nanotechnology risk perceptions,

gay and lesbian parenting, and mechanisms of cultural cognition.⁷

Another large body of work on Cultural Theory applications to public policy has come out of the Center of Applied Social Research at the University of Oklahoma under the leadership of Professor Hank Jenkins-Smith. The scholarship from this group does not compete with the CCP work; in fact, there is considerable overlap in the two groups. The main difference in the scholarship coming from the two groups is that Jenkins-Smith and his colleagues have kept the original grid-group operationalization of CT in its analyses. As with the CCP studies, this work builds from the idea that cultural worldview exists prior to any policy preferences, but unlike the CCP work, the studies from the CASR group focus on the relationship between culture and political issues, such as national security (e.g., Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009; Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006; Jenkins-Smith, Herron, and Ripberger 2010). Members of the group also focus on environmental issues (e.g., Jones 2010) and vaccination risk (e.g., Jenkins-Smith, Silva, and Song 2011). Additionally, the CASR group studies the relationships between culture and political views such as ideology and partisanship (e.g., Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009; Jenkins-Smith, Herron, and Ripberger 2010; Song et al 2011), but as will be discussed in the next section, the mechanism of connection between culture and political views has not been fully developed—which is the gap that this dissertation fills.

Why Culture Alone is not Enough

As noted above, many of the issues addressed by the risk literature have important political and policy implications. Governments are faced with proposals and

⁷ From the Cultural Cognition Project website, <http://www.culturalcognition.net/>

legislation about these issues, which means that elected elites have to take positions on the issues, often in accordance with their partisan membership. While the debates about vaccination and nanotechnology are not necessarily high-salience issues to the elites and the public, the remaining issues discussed above have been highly politicized and have well-defined partisan and ideological positions associated with each side of the debate. For example, the risks involved in trading security for liberty are especially political since the government is charged with both securing the nation and protecting citizens' liberties. Liberals and Democrats tend to fall on the side of protecting liberties, even at the expense of some degree of security, whereas conservatives and Republicans lean toward protecting security even if it means forfeiting a few liberties. The debate between liberty and security and individuals' views on the debate cannot be discussed without incorporating these partisan and ideological valences.

It is very likely that partisanship, ideology, and culture are interconnected, and all three concepts work together as heuristics for making decisions about how an individual wants the world to work. Political and cultural views should not be treated as competing explanations for preferences; rather, they should be used together to get a more complete picture of how individuals form their preferences. Unlike ideology and partisanship, however, culture is relevant to all aspects of life and society, not just the political world. The concept of culture as it relates to political behavior has been largely immune to popular manipulations and lacks the definitional and conceptual baggage that ideology carries in American politics. Culture, in the way it is operationalized in CT, has not permeated popular culture discussions of politics or life, and therefore remains a mostly academically-defined term.

Where the concept of “culture” has come into play in political behavior is through the “culture war” debates in the literature, which is quite effectively laid out in the book *Culture Wars* (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005). The essential argument made in *Culture Wars* is that the bulk of the American public is moderate in their political views, but the nation's politics have been hijacked by extremely partisan elites, which was contrary to emerging literature that argued that the public was also becoming more polarized along ideological and religious lines. Similarly, Layman and Green (2005) argue that the cultural conflict brought about by ideological and religious differences depends on the context of the issue under consideration—some issues are affected by more religious and ideological polarization, others are not. On the side of increasing polarization, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) demonstrate that ideological differences have increased since the 1970s among the mass public, indicating that elites are not the only group that has experienced polarization. None of these studies, however, define “culture” beyond a general reference to ideological and religious views, and so culture in the sense of an overarching worldview remains missing from analysis of political preferences in this literature. Cultural Theory offers a specific operationalization of culture that can be utilized to explain preferences; these broad references to “culture” in the culture wars literature are useless in that respect.

1.3 Purpose of the Dissertation

This dissertation proposes that incorporating culture, partisanship, and ideology into a unified model of preference formation offers a clearer, more powerful explanation of how individuals form their preferences. Integrating the three concepts with a

particular focus on how ideology and culture work together will fill in gaps in both sets of literature. With respect to the public opinion literature, culture will explain how individuals form their preferences when ideology and partisanship are not used: for these individuals, Cultural Theory will provide the basis for their policy preferences by accounting for the individuals' non-political and pre-political views of how society should work. For those who do use ideology and partisanship to form their preferences, Cultural Theory still plays a significant role: culture shapes the partisan and ideological identities that an individual is likely to adopt. In the risk literature, the mechanism of moving from cultural worldviews to political beliefs will explain how cultural types and political views, which often seem to be competing explanations, both contribute to policy preferences. Empirically verifying culture as the origin of political views will provide more credibility for CT in mainstream political science. The next chapter explains the model of exactly how culture, partisanship, and ideology are connected, and how those connections are expected to impact individual-level beliefs.

Chapter 2


Modeling Preference Formation

In order to discuss the relationship between culture, ideology, and institutions in the context of the mass public, we must have a model of what the relationships look like at the societal level. This chapter introduces and discusses the Cultural Preference Model and develops testable propositions from that model.

The basic setup of the model begins as most other models of political behavior: the American political context is driven by ideology, which has been filtered through and defined by the institutions of government, most notably the political parties (Downs 1957). But, as research has shown, not all individuals' political beliefs line up along the liberal-conservative continuum (e.g. Converse 1964, Jacoby 1991). Other models of political behavior stop here, but the Cultural Preference Model argues that individuals start with a more primitive type of worldview to arrive at their preferences, culture, which is closely connected to ideology in many ways but not filtered through institutions as is ideology and existing prior to ideology. Culture and ideology are similar concepts, but there are tensions between the more primitive worldview and the institutionalized, political worldview that result from their relationship with one another and the nature of the United States political system. The relationship between culture, ideology, and institutions is one composed of shifting meaning created by feedback loops, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

The discussion will begin with the process of transforming culture into ideology via party institutions, then address the various definitions of ideology and how ideological views are transmitted to the mass public, and briefly discuss the feedback

Figure 2.1: The Cultural Preference Model



loops depicted in the model. Once the model is fully developed, the attention will return to the relationship between culture, partisanship, and ideology to develop propositions that describe how the three concepts interact from the model. Finally, the last sections will discuss the research design and layout of the remaining chapters.

2.1 From Culture to Ideology: Institutions

The conceptualization of culture used for this project was described in Chapter 1. At the individual level, everyone has an idea of how they want to live in the world and how they want to live with other people. The two dimensions of grid and group provide a parsimonious but effective classification scheme to describe how individuals

want to live in the world and how they interact with the world around them. This typology also works at the organizational and systemic levels—there are general patterns of how life works and how units interact that create a general constraint on how organizations and systems make decisions (e.g., Wildavsky 1987; Rayner 1991). At the societal level, the dominant ways of life, as categorized by grid and group, will define how the society makes decisions, how the individuals in the society are expected to behave in the aggregate, and how the values of the dominant ways of life will be protected. This influence over society that the dominant cultural worldviews exercise is perhaps most important at the beginning of a new society when the society is creating the rules and norms that it wants to guide and constrain life.

In order to protect desired ways of life and mediate disputes between conflicting ways of life that will undoubtedly occur among individuals, the society will set up institutions designed to guide and direct life according to the dominant cultural worldviews. An “institution” in this sense is an organization that is specialized to sustain the society, protect the interests of the members of that society, and sufficiently bounded so that it can be recognized as an institution (Polsby 1970). Institutions add a much-needed structure to the desired ways of life since in the “state of nature,” as Locke ([1690] 1980) refers to the pre-institutionalized society, humans will be in constant conflict over how to live with one another. There must be mechanisms in place to solve these conflicts, and in a society that values the opinions of individuals such as a democracy, there must also be mechanisms in place to allow individuals to influence the institutions that run the society. These institutions that “govern” life in the society become the society’s government and wield power over society’s interactions and

norms. This power over social relations and attempts to gain this power are the very definition of “politics” in a society, which means that institutions are the mechanism through which culture becomes politicized. The institutions created to govern the society and protect its desired ways of life are, by definition, *political* institutions. The primary political institutions that make up the United States federal government are Congress, the Presidency, the court system, and the political parties that vie for power in the institutions.

Individual cultures become part of the institutions at the point in which a group of individuals transform from the disorganized state of nature into a society with legitimate governing institutions. Cultural Theory is consistent with this theory—to adopt a cultural worldview means that “the unavoidable void of formlessness... is replaced by social constraint,” (Wildavsky 1987, p. 7). It is this cultural concept of how individuals want to live together that drives the initial formation of institutions, and institutions are continually affected by shifts in how individuals want to live together as well as shaping these individual desires (Wildavsky 1987).

The central role that culture plays in the formation of societal and political institutions brings about the inevitable question of why political life is not directly organized according to worldviews—why do parties and ideologies develop in political institutions that are correlated with cultural worldviews but not the same as the worldviews? The answer to this question is found in the institutions themselves. Cultural Theory argues that individuals seek to institutionalize their beliefs and rules of societal relationships, but also that there are four different worldviews competing for power. In a homogenous society, there might be one dominant worldview that holds

power in the institutions, but in heterogeneous societies, such as the U.S., there is no single worldview around which society can be organized. In order for a society to have structure and a center of power, often two or more of the worldviews must work together to develop and sustain institutions. The institutions themselves in turn shape the ways that the worldviews work together. These coalitions of worldviews have made concessions and compromises with one another in order to gain institutional power become the political parties and ideologies that dominate political institutions. Therefore parties and ideologies stem directly from the cultural types—so the concepts are clearly correlated—but parties and ideologies are distinct from cultural types in that they are coalitions of various cultural types. The next two sections will provide more detail on partisan institutions and ideological concepts in order to highlight the differences from cultural worldviews.

The Institution: Partisanship

A major piece of individual belief systems in the public opinion literature is partisanship. Political parties are closely tied to ideology in American political discourse and must be included in any analysis of political belief systems because of their role in organizing beliefs and preferences. There has been some controversy in the literature about the nature of partisanship and its effects on preference formation, but it is undisputed that parties are formal institutions with stated beliefs, or platforms, and organized structures. It is how individuals align themselves with a party institution that is debated.

When asked, many individuals will align themselves with one of the two major

parties, even if only slightly or “leaning” toward the party, and partisanship often takes the form of a social identity: individuals will say “I am a Republican” or “I am a Democrat” (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002). Those who do not claim membership in or identification with one of the major parties are not assumed to have any preference orientations stemming from partisanship. Among those who do identify with a political party, this partisan identity has been shown to remain very stable over time, and has proven to be a very strong, and perhaps the strongest, predictor of individual vote choices (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Converse & Markus 1979; Miller & Shanks 1996; Goren 2005; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Given the fact that partisan identities and rhetoric are institutionalized and deeply embedded in American politics, elections, and discussions of issues, party labels are one of the most obvious and simplest heuristics that individuals can turn to in considering their political beliefs.

Downs (1957) defined political parties as a team, or coalition, of individuals seeking to control the government by getting elected into positions of power. These individuals are unified by common goals and beliefs about how government should work, as well as by their desire to win elections and gain the benefits of the office. The creation of national parties as institutions that set up official platforms that define the party’s preferences and that organize electoral campaigns that appeal to the public is driven by the desire to win elections. Competing parties focus on their differences in their appeals to the electorate, but in a two-party system such as the United States system, Downs (1957) observed that many of the actual policy views held by the parties and the elected members of the parties overlap, covering broad ranges of issues and alternatives.

What parties do to attract the attention and support of individuals in the general public is package views and beliefs differently in their appeals to the electorate even if there is not much actual difference between the parties.⁸ Individuals are presented with electoral choices for which the party label indicates a loose construction of the candidate's goals and policy views, thus creating a useful political decision-making heuristic (Hinich and Munger 1994). Additionally, when new issues that require action emerge parties generally take positions on those new issues, providing individuals that identify with the party cues about what their opinion should be on the new issue. Goren, et al. (2009) demonstrates that partisan attachments can influence broader political values: if individuals are uncommitted on certain political values, partisanship provides valuable cues that can alter individuals' opinions about those values.

Political parties are institutions operating in American politics, and because parties produce written platforms of their ideals and preferences there is less ambiguity in the relationship between party identification and preferences than there is between ideology and preferences. However, partisanship does not fully explain all preferences (Carsey and Layman 2006)—if partisanship explained everything, there would be no debate about political belief systems because we would know that all beliefs are determined by partisanship. Some issues, such as abortion, cut through the parties—the party lacks a clear stance on the issue, and therefore contains some members that support abortion rights and some that oppose abortion rights. The parties do not claim positions on every possible policy issue; since there are only two major parties in the

⁸ The amount of difference between the American Republican Party and Democratic Party has been the subject of controversy in the literature. The reference here is to Downs's theoretical argument that in a two-party system, the parties will be closer to the ideological center of the country than they would be if more than two parties existed.

United States, the platforms must be sufficiently broad as to attract a large, diverse following for the party (Downs 1957).

Although party identification appears to be highly accurate in predicting voting behavior, the degree to which policy preferences are explained by party identification depends on how committed the individual is to that party (Carsey and Layman 2006). Those who consider themselves strongly aligned with the Republican Party or Democratic Party will have preferences most resembling the party platforms. For the significant portion of the public that does not identify with either of the major parties, the picture is much less clear. The situation exists in which many individuals do not use party heuristics to determine their preferences, or they are cross-pressured by a combination of considerations. For partisanship, however, this situation is less of a problem than for ideology: a lack of partisan affiliation simply reflects rejection or ignorance of the party institutions, not a lack of political belief system as is implied by the lack of ideological affiliation.

The Political Worldview: Ideology

On its face, ideology is not a concept that lends itself to easy operationalization and empirical use. According to the original definition of the term, ideology is an individual's view of how society should work, and in the specific case of a political ideology, it is a view of how politics and government should work (Roucek 1944). As Rosenberg (1988) defined it, ideology is “not simply a set of learned preferences. More basic, it is a way of making sense of politics—of defining who and what is involved, what they do, and how they relate to one another.” The terms most often associated

with ideologies in American politics, “liberal” and “conservative,” are ingrained as part of common language, and the labels carry basic concepts of what it means to be “liberal” or “conservative.” When the labels are applied, everyone who is at least minimally aware of politics should have a general understanding of the preferences and ideals implied by the use of the label: “liberals” favor big government and more public programs; “conservatives” favor smaller government and less government interference in their private lives (e.g., Poole 2007).

This liberal-conservative continuum is closely tied to partisanship and the beliefs of political parties (Minar 1961). Downs (1957) argued that political parties will intentionally develop ideologies to attract support from like-minded individuals and groups and to determine which policy position will most benefit the party. Different ideologies emerge among different parties because no one can be certain which ideology will gain the most support among the public and result in votes for party candidates. In the terms of the liberal-conservative continuum, we generally see that in the United States the Democratic Party adopts a liberal ideology, and the Republican Party adopts a conservative ideology. These ideologies have varied over time and as the historical context of politics in the U.S. changes, plus there is ideological variation within each party—some Democrats are more liberal than others, and some Republicans are more conservative than others. At present, however, in the most general terms Democrats are liberal and Republicans are conservative.

In academic research, the liberal and conservative labels are mirrored by placing the liberal-conservative divide on a continuum and labeling individuals along the single dimension from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. The labels can then be used to

explain political beliefs and policy positions, and in many cases ideology proves to be a very useful predictor in modeling preferences. By assigning labels to sets of beliefs in a way that is commonly understood, ideology provides a useful link between political institutions and how individuals believe those political institutions should work. In this way, ideology has remained a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved (Erikson & Tedin 2003; Jost et al. 2009), but labels have been added to packages of those beliefs to make distinction between those beliefs easier.

Individuals do not necessarily adhere to the packages of beliefs implied by the labels when forming their preferences or adopting one of the ideological labels, however, which is why ideology fails to explain political belief systems except among those who have strong liberal or conservative beliefs. The traditionalist view of public opinion stops here—people do not think about their views in ideological terms, so they must not comprehend politics well. The revisionist view recognizes that individuals hold beliefs that make sense to them as individuals, but those beliefs do not necessarily correspond to the liberal-conservative continuum, resulting in groups of individuals that appear to have crystallized, coherent beliefs at the extreme ends of the continuum and a cluster of individuals in the middle who appear to lack ideological sophistication.

Some scholars have attempted to justify the apparent lack of ideological sophistication by arguing that this disconnect exists because people think of ideology in different ways: some portion of the population may consider ideology to be a belief system related to policies and issue positions, as assumed by traditionalists (e.g., Campbell et al 1960; Converse 1964; Peffley & Hurwitz 1985), whereas others seem to consider ideology to be a symbolic political identity related to social groups (e.g., Sears,

Hensler, & Speer 1979; Sears et al 1980; Conover & Feldman 1981). Other works have suggested that there are multiple dimensions of ideology. The most common dimensions discussed have been economic ideology as compared to social ideology. Evidence across many studies seems to show that in conceptual and factor-analytic terms, political ideology has distinct economic and social dimensions (Feldman & Johnston 2009; Jost et al. 2009). Yet another set of literature has shown that individual belief systems will often incorporate parts of a particular ideology, but not the entire ideology (e.g., Hinich and Munger 1994).

When ideology alone is relied upon to construct political belief systems, the inevitable conclusion is that the public as a whole does not seem capable of having coherent belief systems; however, the more accurate statement seems to be that some individuals think in ideological terms and make more use of the liberal-conservative continuum to organize their political beliefs than others (Jacoby 1991, 2002). The literature demonstrates quite effectively why problem of defining and explaining ideology and its origins in the mass public is difficult to study: ideology as a political belief system is a complex concept with as many different interpretations and levels of understanding as there are individuals in a society.

Cultural-Ideological Coalitions

As the context of society changes, the coalitions of cultural type that make up the existing power structure can change, altering how cultural types and the political structures relate to one another. This change in the cultural coalitions within the political institutions over time means that culture remains distinct from political parties

and ideologies, unlike what some scholars have claimed (Michaud et al 2009; Swedlow 2009; Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009). Parties and their ideologies will be different from cultures because of the compromises that two or more cultural types have made with one another in order to have power within the institutions. These differences could be small at times for some cultural types and large at other times or for other cultural types.

As an illustration of how institutions shape culture, in the American case institutions were created that required the eligible voters to elect representatives to do work in the institutions. The method of electing these representatives was designed such that individuals are divided into districts, and each district would send the one candidate who receives the most votes to be the district's representative in the institution; a single-member district plurality electoral structure. According to Duverger (1951), the nature of competition for power in this type of election results in a two-party, and therefore two-ideology (one ideology per party, Downs 1957), institutionalization of cultural types. There is no consolation prize for second place since only the top vote-getter gains power, so the four cultural worldviews⁹ form coalitions that are likely to win the most votes. As the context of the society changes over time the coalition capable of winning the most votes might change, which would result in the emergence of a different coalitional structure among the cultural types. This relationship between cultures and political institutions would be slightly altered in multi-party democracies in which more than two coalitions exist, or in authoritarian regimes in which a set of institutions is forced upon the people, but the basic causal path remains the same: cultural worldview precedes political institutions, and the institutions

⁹ Primarily the hierarch, egalitarian, and individualist types; fatalists are presumed to not participate in determining the direction of society since they believe everything is a result of fate or luck.

transform cultural worldviews into political worldviews.

The consequence of the interaction between cultural worldviews and political parties and ideologies for individuals is that there is always some degree of tension between an individual's cultural worldview and their political views. Political views are passed down from the institutions to the media and the masses as partisanship and ideology *after* the institutional processing and coalition formation described above, and so the differences between cultural worldview and political partisanship and ideology are apparent at the individual level. Since cultural worldview is the individuals' underlying concept of how they want to live in society, cultural worldview will remain a more powerful heuristic for individual preferences than the political views *except* when individuals are highly invested in the political structures and feel a strong connection to a political party and ideology. Evidence of this relationship is seen in public opinion literature reviewed in the previous chapter that shows how ideology and partisanship are not significant predictors of preferences for those who do not identify strongly with a party or ideology.

2.2 Ideologies Communicated to the Mass Public: Preferences

Ideological language, rhetoric, and the content of a particular ideology are passed from institutions to the masses through the filter of the media. At this point, ideological terms become part of popular culture and are subject to interpretation by media elites. The linguistic uses of ideological terms, and the perceptions of those terms by the masses, feed back into the meaning of the ideology itself: government elites are ultimately representatives of the mass public, so their views and preferences

must be defined in a way that the public understands and in a democracy should, theoretically, reflect the preferences of the public. One implication of this process is that ideological development and change can happen outside of the institutions, so the ideologies themselves constantly feed back into the institutions and parties to either confirm or reform the existing coalitions of ways of life. Most importantly for arguments regarding preference formation, this media-filtered view of ideology is what individuals use to determine their preferences, *if* they use ideology to form their preferences.

Preferences at the individual level are the judgments that people make about political issues—how they would prefer a specific issue to be determined or solved. Preferences come from the interests that people have, and interests are the result of social interactions and shared meanings within society—what people prefer and are interested in comes from how they want to live (Wildavsky 1987). Cultural Theory thus accounts for the most basic level of preferences and interests by explaining how individuals want to live together in society. In the political context, these needs and desires have been filtered through institutions, as discussed above, and have taken on a liberal-conservative ideological structure. Political preference options that are given to the public by the media and elites, therefore, are conceptualized within this ideological structure rather than a cultural structure. Individuals' choices among these preference options are what need to be explained, and they are explained quite effectively if individuals conceptualize their political preferences using the ideological structure.

As described in the previous chapter, individuals' preferences often seem to not make sense by the political standards of ideology and partisanship that political

scientists have typically used as explanatory variables. However, if researchers were to talk in-depth with each individual, they would likely find that in most cases the individual believes that their preferences are quite rational based on their life and experiences. “Rational” is simply defined as coherent and based on an argument that is logical to that person—and as such, what is rational varies from person to person. To put it in Cultural Theory terms, “an act is culturally rational, therefore, if it supports one’s way of life,” (Wildavsky 1987, p.6). When thinking about political matters, the “way of life” referred to could be an ideological belief about how the political world should work, or it could be an overarching cultural belief about how the world should work. An important addendum to this definition of rationality when the term is being used to describe individual preferences is that the *outcome* of the preference does not have to actually support the way of life in order to be rational—it is merely the *intent* of the preference: “To be culturally rational by bolstering one’s way of life is the intention, not necessarily the accomplishment,” (Wildavsky 1987, p. 8).

This theory implies that there is usually some logical, rational argument guiding individuals’ preference formation even when the traditional political variables of partisanship and ideology fail. The Cultural Preference Model explains preferences for every individual, regardless of whether they use partisanship and ideology to form those preferences or not, by incorporating culture as the more basic conceptualization of how individuals think the world should work that drives preference formation.

2.3 Feedback loops

The preferences of the masses will feed back into and inform their desired

cultural way of life, creating a continuous loop in which changing circumstances could alter both preferences and culture. Mass preferences will also feed back into the institutions of government since the parties need mass preferences to be on their side via elections and voting in order to gain and maintain power within the institutions. These changes would most often occur in the form of abrupt shifts in attention and preferences in the form of shocks to the system, or “surprises” (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990), which can trigger changes in ideologies, how institutions respond to situations, and individuals' desired ways of life. As individuals' desired ways of life change, the coalitions of those ways of life in the institutions would be forced to respond in their efforts to gain or maintain power. Shocks to the system will have a direct effect on the institutions when the shock or surprise requires an institutional response. Any changes in the institutional coalitions that form the parties will result in ideological shifts, which would be passed through the media and popular culture to the masses. Individuals would ultimately react to ideological changes by altering their preferences if needed *if* they use ideology as a heuristic for preference formation.

By this logic, culture and ideology are not static; individuals' desired ways of life could change, which would by definition alter their ideology. Ideology is less stable than culture, however, because the institutions force multiple worldviews to form coalitions to fit the two-dimensional political structure. Even if individuals' worldviews do not change, the potential for the makeup of the cultural coalitions that form ideologies to change in response to surprises means that ideologies have the potential to be fluid and change dramatically over time. Evidence for the fluidity of ideologies can be seen in how the political preferences under the broad umbrella terms of “liberal” and

“conservative” have changed over time—and how labels such as “progressive,” “neo-conservative,” “New Deal coalition,” “Great Society,” and many others have been used to describe specific ideologies that have emerged and disappeared over the political history of the United States. These various ideological groups that have dominated politics from time to time were the result of different cultural types forming coalitions in order to gain or maintain power in the political institutions, often in response to a crisis or political disturbance.

2.4 Implications of the Cultural Preference Model

At the core of the concepts, cultural worldview, ideology, and partisanship are all measuring the same basic idea—how individuals connect their lives to the society they live in. Stated another way, all three belief system components are linking mechanisms between individual preferences and the institutions of society. A critical assumption of viewing culture, ideology, and partisanship as linking mechanisms is that individual preference formation is contextual and based on social constructs. By this standard, the social context that the individual is in matters greatly in determining how they get along with their environment. All interactions will be filtered through the individual’s preexisting beliefs about society, their cultural worldview, and those interactions will in turn either reinforce or undermine the individual’s belief system. Strong ideological views and partisanship identities can then further constrain the belief system if an individual adopts ideological and partisan identities, but these ideological and partisan identities must be somewhat consistent with the individual’s cultural worldview. Weakly held ideological and partisan identities, however, allow individuals

to be cross-pressured by competing cultural, political, and institutional interests. The preferences formed by cross-pressured individuals are best understood by accounting for all three linking mechanisms—culture, ideology, and partisanship. Individuals with no ideological views or partisan identity are likely to rely solely on their cultural worldview to form preferences.

Propositions derived from the model

While the components work together to form a belief system if individuals use ideology and partisanship to think about politics, not all combinations of cultural worldview, partisanship, and ideological views are viable. Similar to the impossibility theorem in cultural theory which states that not all possible worldviews are compatible with a given society, some of the combinations of the three political belief system components are more likely to exist than others:

Proposition 1a: Fatalists will not care about politics, not think about the world ideologically, and not have strong partisan ties because they are disengaged and think that whatever happens is out of their control. They might select an answer on a survey question to be socially desirable, but there will be little substantive support for any ideological or partisan response given.

Proposition 1b: Egalitarianism does not lend itself toward conservatism; most egalitarians are liberal and much more likely to be Democrats than Republicans if they have a partisan identity.

Proposition 1c: Individualists are likely to be cross-pressured between liberal and conservative views, and less likely to use one particular label to describe themselves. They will see government as a threat to their livelihood and seek to keep government out of their lives. They will be less likely to pick a party id, and more likely to report independent.

Proposition 1d: Hierarchs can be on either end of ideology and partisanship, but by their nature are more likely to align with conservative views. Either party position would work though—both parties need hierarchs to survive.

It is very important to note that these propositions do not say that other combinations cannot exist, only that these relationships are more likely than others. The extreme leftist hierarch, for example, would be an outlier in the analysis, according to Proposition 1d.

The ordering of the components is critical, however, particularly between culture and ideology since these two concepts are intangible belief systems. The Cultural Preference Model argues that culture is the core of any individual belief system, and political heuristics enter the picture only after cultural worldview is accounted for:

Proposition 2: Cultural worldview exists prior to ideology, and as such is the most basic constraint on belief systems. Cultural worldview determines which combinations of the belief system components are most likely to be compatible for a given individual.

The primary implication of demonstrating how these relationships work and how culture and ideology work together to link individual preferences through the party institutions is that the individuals that make up the “muddy middle” majority that Converse (1964) initially identified as lacking coherent ideological views, and others later labeled as politically unsophisticated (Luskin 1987, 1990), does, in fact, have identifiable political belief systems. Those in the middle ranges of each category are cross-pressured between the different constraints on their belief systems—culture, ideology, and partisanship—and all three constraints must be analyzed in order to understand how those individuals form their political beliefs and preferences. The literature on American public opinion and belief systems has concentrated on using ideology and partisanship as the main explanatory variables, but those variables alone are not able to account for the variation in beliefs and preferences that is seen in the public. As a result, public opinion scholarship has been split between traditionalists and revisionists as to why the variation cannot be explained: traditionalists follow Converse’s general idea of the public being politically naïve at the individual level, and revisionists focus on the macro picture in which the public seems rational.

To some degree, the traditionalists and revisionists are talking past one another—as Luskin (1987) notes, sophistication is not the same thing as rationality—where the revisionists see rationality in preference formation, traditionalists argue that the preferences are not sophisticated. However, the line of research that led Luskin and many others to argue that the public does not have coherent belief systems rests on ideology and partisanship, and revisionists have provided few satisfactory answers to the disconnect between preferences and ideology at the individual level using the belief

system framework. When all of the constraints on individual belief systems are accounted for, however, the roots of preferences and the cross-pressures that lead to preference inconsistency across ideology and partisanship become clear and there are two different relationships at work:

Proposition 3: Among ideological moderates cultural worldview will have more influence on preferences than it will for those who hold strong ideological views, and ideology will be less important for moderates than for ideologues. This means that the relationships are clearest when moderates and ideologues are analyzed separately.

Culture, in combination with ideology and partisanship, is the missing link that enables a more complete explanation of preference formation for all individuals, but especially among moderates.

2.5 Research Design

Since this dissertation is dealing with individual political belief systems, the unit of analysis is clearly the individual, and the data collection will be done through surveys of individuals. The surveying was done by web and was conducted using the internet panel collected by Survey Sampling International. The questionnaire was programmed and hosted on Zoomerang survey software. Since the survey was conducted using a web-based opt-in panel inferences to the general U.S. population are limited due to the bias of these types of web panels (Malhotra and Krosnick 2007). However, valuable information can still be gleaned from opt-in web samples that produce much higher quality data than convenience samples, and are being used with increasing frequency in

social science research (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2011; Berinsky, Huber and Lutz 2010). The sample for this survey consisted of 772 respondents residing in the United States, and is generally evenly split between genders, has similar income and geographic distributions to the full population, and is just slightly more educated than samples obtained using probability-based survey methods. No incentive was offered to respondents beyond what they earn for being part of the SSI panel. The full questionnaire is in the appendix, and the dependent and independent variables of interest are operationalized and measured as follows:

Culture: The definition of “culture” for this dissertation is how individuals view the world and themselves in it—meaning that their cultural view defines how they would prefer to live in the world and interact with others. “Grid” and “group,” as discussed in chapter 1, are the two dimensions of culture that have been developed to operationalize how individuals want to live in the world, and these dimensions form the four worldviews of fatalism, egalitarianism, individualism, and hierarch. Many questions have been developed and tested in the cultural theory literature to get at these four measurable cultural worldviews and will be used to measure the types in this survey as well. These questions have typically relied upon rating structures that make distinct differentiation between the four types difficult, however. An innovation in the measurement of cultural worldviews will be that this survey will ask respondents to rank their preferences on cultural items in addition to the rating scales typically used in order to obtain more specific information about which cultural worldview an individual “defaults” to when a decision has to be made. The measurement issues will be fully discussed in chapter 3.

Ideology: Consistent with previous survey-based research, measures of ideology will be obtained by asking respondents to place themselves on a 7-point liberal-conservative scale, on which one and seven are the “strongly” liberal or conservative positions and four is the moderate position. The exact meaning of the terms “liberal” and “conservative” will not be specified. As with culture, the measurement of ideology in this survey will feature some innovation based on recent research indicating that there are multiple dimensions of ideology that should be measured in order to get the most explanatory power possible out of the concept (e.g., Feldman and Johnston 2009; Jackson 2011; Treier and Hillygus 2009). Respondents will receive survey questions that ask them to place their ideological views on two dimensions—one asking for their economic ideology, one asking for their social ideology, and a third question asking for a general ideological placement. The order of the first two questions will be randomized so that half of the sample is asked for their social ideology before their economic ideology question and the other half will be asked for their social ideology after the economic question.

Partisanship: Since the partisanship measure of interest to this project is how individuals identify with a political party, the measurement for partisanship will consist of two questions: the first asking if respondents are Republican, Democrat, or something else; and the second asking how strongly the respondents are aligned with the specified party. The combination of these two questions will allow for a 7-point partisanship scale to be constructed ranging from strongly Republican to strongly Democratic.

Policy preferences: The substantive policy topic of the survey is immigration

issues; the survey was conducted as a cooperative effort between the author and the University of Oklahoma Public Opinion Learning Laboratory, and researchers at OU POLL were interested in survey research on immigration policy. Questions for the survey were taken from a variety of polling and research organizations that have asked about views on immigration policy and adapted where necessary. Some original questions were written as well to supplement the borrowed questions. Since immigration policy is not a topic that has previously been asked about on most large-scale political research surveys such as the American National Election Study, the questions were carefully pretested to ensure reliability and validity. The specific questions used in analysis will be described in detail in Chapter 4.

Demographic variables: Standard demographic variables will be included as with any model of individual behavior. Gender, education level, income, race, geographic region, and age will all be measured in the survey.

2.6 Organization of the dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation will focus on empirically testing the propositions derived from the model and the hypotheses that result from the propositions. Chapter 3 will discuss the survey methods used to collect data and the measurement of the various concepts briefly before focusing on how the theoretical relationships laid out in Propositions 1a-1d correspond to the observed relationships in the data. Measurement discussions will include the various methods of measuring cultural type that have been used, and debates about measuring ideology. Various measures of cultural worldview will be tested using the data collected for this

dissertation and compared to theoretical understandings of the types in order to identify which items best measure the concepts. The multidimensional ideology measures used in the study will also be discussed and justified. Once the measurement issues have been satisfactorily dealt with, the chapter will use descriptives and other basic statistics to show the most likely combinations of culture, ideology and partisanship and compare these observed relationships to Propositions 1a-1d. Again, the propositions do not preclude the existence of other combinations of culture, ideology, and partisanship, but they do represent the *most likely* combinations of the concepts among individuals.

Chapter 4 will take a closer look at the relationship between culture and ideology, as indicated by Proposition 2, since these two concepts are theoretically closely related. Ideology is the institutionalized form of culture according to the Cultural Preference Model, which means that culture and ideology should be moderately correlated, with culture temporally preceding ideology. Models will explore whether culture and ideology are accounting for the same variance in policy preferences, as well as tease out how much influence culture has over ideology. These models are not expected to produce clear answers because the model predicts that ideologues and moderates think about their preferences differently, and that culture matters more than ideology among moderates. These parts of the theory indicate that any aggregate models will be ambiguous with respect to the causal order of culture and ideology.

Chapter 5 will pick up on the ambiguity in Chapter 4 and offer some clarity by replicating the same models for ideologues and moderates as separate groups, addressing Proposition 3. If moderates and ideologues form their preferences

differently with respect to culture and ideology, those differences should be apparent in the empirical models. The seven-point ideology question is used to split the sample: those who reported their ideological views as “liberal,” “conservative,” “strongly liberal,” or “strongly conservative” are grouped together as ideologues, and those who answered “slightly conservative,” “slightly liberal,” “middle of the road,” or said that they do not think of their views in liberal-conservative terms are grouped together as moderates. The models show clear differences in what factors contribute to individuals’ policy preferences between the two groups, as well as differences in the relationship between culture and ideology. The causes and implications of these differences are discussed.

Finally, chapter 6 will synthesize all of the findings and discuss the implications of the models developed in the preceding chapters and discuss what these findings add to the literatures on cultural theory, ideology, and the traditionalist-revisionist divide in the public opinion literature. This dissertation covers a wide swath of issues, going from measurement of the complex theoretical concepts to the relationship between the theoretical concepts, and finally to how those concepts work together to inform individual-level preferences, particularly among those individuals who do not use the explicitly political constructs of partisanship and ideology to form their preferences. The conclusion will summarize these parts and indicate directions for future work beyond the dissertation.

Chapter 3

Measuring Complex Concepts

Before any analysis that explores the relationships theorized in the Cultural Preference Model, the concepts that the model revolves around must be measured at the individual level in the context of a survey. There is general consistency in the American politics literature about how to measure partisanship—simply ask respondents whether they consider themselves aligned with a political party. But for the other two main concepts in the model, this is no small task: there has been considerable controversy about measuring ideology, and even what ideology is in the mass public (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Campbell et al 1960; Conover & Feldman 1981; Converse 1964; Feldman and Johnston 2009; Jacoby 1991, 2002; Lewis-Beck et al 2008; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Sears et al 1979; Sears et al 1980; Swedlow 2008; Treier and Hillygus 2009). The measurement of culture is far from widely accepted as well, even within the confines of the Douglas and Wildavsky Cultural Theory model (see Kahan 2008 for an explanation of the various measures). This chapter will explore the controversies surrounding the measurement of ideology and culture and why specific measures were chosen for inclusion on the survey. It will then describe the theoretically expected most common combinations of culture, partisanship, and ideology compared to the combinations of the three traits that are observed in these data.

3.1 Measuring Ideology

Measuring self-reported ideology has been done in much the same manner for

quite a long time. The traditional operationalization of self-reported ideology in survey research asks a single question to get respondents to place themselves on a 7-point unidimensional continuum from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. The measure is often a significant predictor in models that seek to explain policy preferences, but this dissertation exists because, as previously stated, research in mass behavior indicates that individuals who have moderate views and fall in the middle of the continuum do not appear to think in terms of the liberal-conservative continuum in forming their political preferences (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Hinich and Pollard 1981; Jacoby 1988; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Luskin 1987). In order to discern why this is the case, it is not sufficient to simply assume that more variables should be added to the models—the measurement of ideology should be questioned in order to conclude that the problem is not due to measurement error.

Some scholars argue that ideology simply will not explain policy preferences for everyone no matter how it is operationalized. Other scholars believe that part of the problem is the unidimensional measurement of the concept: maybe political ideology consists of more than one dimension when the concept is used to explain policy preferences. To support this argument, scholars have explored policy preferences by way of factor analysis, item response theory, and a host of other dimension-reduction techniques that derive individuals' placements on the latent ideological dimensions from a battery of policy preference questions. The general finding is remarkably consistent: there are at least two dimensions of the liberal-conservative scale at work with respect to policy preferences—most frequently social and economic dimensions (e.g., Altemeyer 1998; Feldman and Johnston 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Jost et

al. 2009; 2003; Layman and Carsey 2002; Swedlow 2008; Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009; Treier and Hillygus 2009; Zumbrennen and Gangl 2008). These two dimensions will be used to measure self-reported ideology in the remainder of this dissertation.

The decision to focus on the social and economic dimensions requires some explanation, which requires briefly revisiting the philosophical nature of ideology. When it comes to mass belief systems, ideology resembles a set of consistent attitudes that does not reach the level of a coherent “worldview,” but is more a package of political preferences and is therefore dependent upon the policies about which individuals form preferences. Any dimensions of ideology in the mass public will be defined according to the dimensions of the policies that are under consideration. Maddox and Lilie (1984) argue that these policy dimensions are “attitudes toward government intervention in the economy” and “attitudes toward the maintenance or expansion of personal freedoms.” By these definitions, the dimensions Maddox and Lilie (1984) use are similar to the dimensions of “capitalism” and “democracy” articulated by Chong, McClosky, and Zaller (1983): capitalism corresponds to government intervention in the economy, and democracy corresponds to the maintenance or expansion of personal freedoms. These terms are all defined in similar ways as the “social” and “economic” terms used in this survey. Later work that refers to “liberalism” or “communitarianism” (e.g., Swedlow 2008; Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009), uses those terms to refer to the categories created by using two dimensions of ideology in a Cartesian space; the dimensions that divide the space are social and economic ideology.

In a study using policy preferences to define ideology, Feldman and Johnston

(2009) used the social and economic dimensions of ideology as the jumping-off point to factor-analyze the structure of individuals' issue positions into more precise categories. They found that a two-factor model of ideology was a better fit for the data than a one-factor model, and the two factors were identified as economic and social dimensions of ideology. Treier and Hillygus (2009) also analyze policy preferences in terms of ideology, arriving at the same conclusion—there are distinct cultural and economic dimensions of ideology. Since the literature seems to conclude that the two primary dimensions of ideology are roughly equivalent to the dimensions of social and economic issue areas, these are the two dimensions of ideology measured on the survey used to gather data for all of the following analyses.

This two-dimensional structure of ideology could explain some of the ambiguity in the relationship between ideology and policy preferences among the ideologically moderate. The people who place themselves in the middle of the ideological continuum, whose policy preferences are not well-explained by the unidimensional measure of ideology, might be cross-pressured between different views on different types of political issues. As a result of this cross-pressuring, individuals may consider themselves conservative on one set of issues, but liberal on another set of issues. However, the unidimensional measure of ideology on most surveys completely ignores any cross-pressures between different issue dimensions as they relate to ideological placement. The consequence of using a unidimensional measure of ideology to describe these individuals is that anyone who might be cross-pressured is likely to respond in the middle or don't know categories since “liberal” and “conservative” fail to describe all of their views (Treier and Hillygus 2009). This response pattern contributes to the “muddy

middle” group whose policy preferences are unexplained by ideology.

An experimental design addressing the question of whether ideology can be measured better in multiple dimensions has demonstrated that this cross-pressure hypothesis holds true and tests experimental ideology questions designed to measure social and economic dimensions of ideology separately (Jackson 2011). Specifically, this study found that those two-dimensional measures of ideology significantly improved the explanatory and predictive power of ideology for policy preferences among moderates and “slight” ideologues. When the experimental measures were used to explain the preferences of those who are ideologically moderate, models incorporating the experimental measures consistently performed better than models using the traditional unidimensional (control) measure of ideology. Since this middle group of individuals that are moderate or only “slightly” ideological is of particular interest in this dissertation, these two-dimensional measures of ideology will be used as the primary indicators of self-reported ideology. The measures consist of two questions asking respondents to place themselves on the liberal-conservative continuum for economic issues and social issues separately. The answer options were the traditional seven-point scale from strongly liberal to strongly conservative, and the questions were worded as follows:

On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. When thinking about your views on *economic* issues, which of the following categories best describes your views? “Economic issues” are questions of how to distribute resources among people within a society.

On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. When thinking about your views on *social* issues, which of the following categories best describes your views? “Social issues” are problems that affect many or all members of society, and often involve cultural or moral values.

The order of these two questions was randomized to avoid any question order effects, and a third question followed asking respondents to place themselves on the liberal-conservative scale for their overall views.

3.2 Measuring Culture

There have been a few different sets of survey questions proposed to measure the four cultural worldview types, as well as the underlying “grid” and “group” dimensions. The distinction between sets of questions seems to be whether the researcher wants to measure the four worldviews separately or the two dimensions of grid and group. The dominant approach to measuring Cultural Theory has been to measure the four types separately, as initially developed by Dake (1990; 1991; 1992). This approach to measurement involves asking survey respondents to respond on a Likert-type agree-disagree scale to various statements that represent a particular cultural worldview. For example, the statements “Private profit is the main motive for hard work” and “I support less government regulation of business” were representative of the individualist worldview in Dake’s original measures. Dake included eight statements for each of the three dominant cultural worldviews (hierarchy, egalitarian, and

individualist), and later developed an additional set of five statements for the fatalist worldview. These sets of statements suffer from a few key weaknesses, however. The first complaint lodged against Dake's scales was that the items do not have the high level of internal validity that one would expect from items that are measuring the same concept (Kahan 2008; Sjöberg 1998; Marris, Langford & O'Riordan 1998). The second complaint is that the scales allow individuals to score highly on multiple worldviews that are not consistent with one another; it becomes very difficult to pick out which worldview respondents lean most toward if the researcher wants to discretely categorize individuals (Kahan 2008; Marris, Langford & O'Riordan 1998).

Two different approaches have been taken to address the criticisms of Dake's scales: some scholars have rejected the scales altogether, while others have worked to refine the scales into better measures of the worldviews. The Cultural Cognition approach, utilized mostly by Dan Kahan and his colleagues at Yale University, rejects the Dake scales altogether and replaces them with two attitudinal scales that correspond with the grid and group dimensions. The two scales are called "hierarchy-egalitarianism," which corresponds to grid and comprises 13 statements, and "individualism-solidarism," which corresponds to group and comprises 17 statements (Kahan 2008). By calculating where respondents fall on each of these dimensions, a single point can be identified that represents the individual's location on the Cultural Theory map. However, this approach to pinpointing an individual's *one* location in the grid-group space can be viewed as somewhat contradictory to the theory as it was originally articulated. The worldviews, and individuals' locations within the grid-group space, were never meant to be static positions—rather, Mary Douglas believed there to

be constant tension and fluidity among the types. Boundaries between worldviews were not meant to be stark divisions, but rather flexible approximations of concepts that are difficult to measure (Douglas 1978; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). So while the Cultural Cognition approach resolves the issue of respondents scoring highly on more than one cultural type, its push to pinpoint individuals in one static location on the grid-group space is theoretically questionable by the standards of the original theory.

The other approach to resolving the problems with Dake's original scales has been to revise the scales so that they are better representations of the worldviews (Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009; Silva & Jenkins-Smith 2007; Jenkins-Smith 2001). Any mentions of government or politics that might introduce non-cultural noise into the measures were removed, and the scales were shortened to three items per worldview to reduce the burden on survey respondents. Measures of internal reliability for these scales are much improved over the original scales that Dake used, indicating that the items are much more precise. The problem of individuals scoring highly on multiple worldview scales still exists, but since the theory originally discussed the types as fluid over time and dependent on context, this criticism is not viewed as a conceptual problem. Therefore, these modified versions of the Dake scales are used as one of the measures cultural worldview in this dissertation. All of the response options are Likert scales with a range of one to seven, with one meaning strongly disagree and seven meaning strongly agree. The statements for each worldview are as follows:

Hierarch

--The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard to do what you are told to do.

--Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority.

--Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those who break the rules.

Egalitarian

--What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.

--Society works best if power is shared equally.

--It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor.

Individualist

--Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on their own.

--Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world.

--We are all better off when we compete as individuals.

Fatalist

--Most important things that happen in life occur by chance.

--The course of our lives is largely determined by forces outside our control.

--Succeeding in life is mostly a matter of luck.

Even though there are theoretical and conceptual advantages to allowing respondents to score highly on multiple worldviews, there are also theoretical reasons to pinpoint respondents into one and only one worldview. One of the

arguments made by this dissertation is that when individuals do not form their policy preferences using partisan or ideological cues, they “default” back to their cultural worldview in order to form preferences. Analyzing how that process works requires knowing which worldview respondents will default to—which worldview they prefer above others when forced to make a decision or answer a survey question. The Cultural Cognition scales allow the respondents to be pinpointed into one cultural worldview, but since the measures are based on rating scales there is no way to concretely say that one individual definitively prefers one worldview over the others. The four worldview scales used in this project, the grid-group dimension scales, only allow analysts to say that a respondent “agrees” or “disagrees” more or less with a specific cultural type than another. Agreement or disagreement does not necessarily correspond to a forced-choice preference and does not provide the “default” worldview.

In order to measure respondents’ default positions among the cultural worldviews, forced-choice triad questions are developed. Essentially, triad questions force respondents to choose their most preferred and least preferred cultural type for all possible combinations of three of the four types. By setting up combinations of three types and asking respondents to choose their most and least preferred type, each triad results in a preference order of the three types used in that item for each respondent. Repeating this process for all possible combinations of three questions offers a critical advantage over simply asking respondents to rank-order all four types in one item: there are repeated measures of the preference ordering that allow analysis to determine whether respondents

are consistent in their preferences. With four worldviews, there are four different combinations of three that can be used, and so there are four different rank order measures for each respondent. Within those ranking measures, pairs of worldviews can be analyzed to see how consistently respondents chose a particular worldview over another. This method provides not only a rank-ordering of the worldviews for each respondent, but a measure of how strong those preferences are as well. If respondents are consistent in their choices, that is, if their preferences are transitive, their preferences are more consistent than respondents who show intransitive choices. Those with transitive choices are expected to adhere more closely to their most-often chosen worldview; those with intransitive choices can be expected to have more variance in how worldview affects their lives.¹⁰

The first step in developing this set of triad questions was to create a single statement to represent each cultural worldview. This was done by synthesizing the three statements used for each type, listed above, and simplifying it down to the most concise and accurate description of the worldview possible. The statements used are as follows:

Hierarch: Everyone in a society should work hard to obey the rules set out by those in authority.

Egalitarian: Everyone should be given equal consideration and resources in a society.

Individualist: Everyone in a society should compete as individuals to succeed or fail on their own.

¹⁰ See Jacoby 2011 for an application of the triad method to values.

Fatalist: Everyone's place in society is a matter of luck or fate and cannot be changed.

At first glance, these statements appear to violate standards of survey question design by combining multiple concepts into each statement. However, because these are not designed to measure attitude toward each statement but rather provide enough information for respondents to choose the most and least appealing statement, they are able to provide what is needed—an accurate picture of the worldview that can be ranked in comparison to the other worldview statements.

Grouping the statements into all possible combinations of three produces four combinations: Hierarch-Egalitarian-Fatalist, Hierarch-Egalitarian-Individualist, Hierarch-Individualist-Fatalist, and Egalitarian-Individualist-Fatalist. Respondents saw two questions for each combination: the first asking them to select the statement that appeals to them most, and the second asking them to select the statement that appeals to them least. These eight questions produce rankings that can be analyzed to find respondents' most preferred worldview when they are forced to make a decision among worldviews, as well as simply calculate how many times one worldview is chosen over any others. This method gets much closer to finding respondents' "default" position—what they would return to when forced to make a decision on policy preferences if they do not use partisanship or ideology. In combination with the 12-item rating scale battery discussed above, these measures thoroughly assess respondents' cultural worldviews and the degree of certainty or ambiguity that surrounds their

individual worldviews.

3.3 Expected Combinations of Culture, Partisanship, and Ideology

The previous chapter briefly laid out four propositions regarding how culture, partisanship, and ideology are likely to combine in the mass public. Before analyzing how the measures discussed above capture those relationships, these propositions will be discussed in more detail to justify why these particular relationships should be observed in the mass public.

Proposition 1a: Fatalists

Fatalists will not care about politics, will not think about the world ideologically, and will not have strong partisan ties because they are disengaged and think that whatever happens is out of their control. They might select an answer on a survey question to be socially desirable, but there will be little substantive support for any ideological or partisan response given. The responses that fatalists give to party identification and ideology questions are perhaps the easiest to justify. By definition, fatalists believe that they cannot do anything to change the world around them, and that belief includes the ability to influence politics in any meaningful way. The purpose of parties is to gain or remain in elected office in order to affect the political system (Downs 1957), but if an individual believes that affecting the system is not possible, then parties and any affiliation to a party loses relevance. Both parties and ideologies are heuristics for organizing political beliefs, but fatalists are unlikely to have well-developed beliefs given their tendency to think that everything happens by chance. If

everything happens by chance, then no policies are likely to change that—rendering policy preferences irrelevant to the fatalist. Thus most fatalists are expected to report that they have no partisan affiliation and little attachment to an ideological view when asked about these things on a survey.

Proposition 1b: Egalitarians

Egalitarianism does not lend itself toward conservatism; most egalitarians are liberal and much more likely to be Democrats than Republicans if they have a partisan identity. Egalitarians have a much clearer political position than fatalists. The egalitarian beliefs of protecting nature and sharing resources fit well with the liberal ideology that is often adopted by Democrats. Liberal Democrats favor more socialist-style policies that spread wealth and encourage social responsibility: welfare, progressive taxes, protecting the environment and protecting civil liberties are examples of critical issues on which liberal Democrats tend to focus. There is considerable variation within the Democratic Party and among liberals on the degree to which resources should be shared and how much influence the government should have over individuals' lives, but politically-minded egalitarians will likely find themselves favoring the liberal side of the ideological continuum and most at home in the Democratic party. There are exceptions to this statement, however. Egalitarians are low-grid individuals, and those egalitarians who find themselves particularly pitted against the constraints of society could interpret liberal ideologies and the Democratic Party as too much enforcement of constraint through government intervention. These egalitarians would be more attracted to the small government views of the Libertarian

Party, which is often absorbed into the Republican Party and associated with conservative ideologies.

Proposition 1c: Individualists

Individualists are likely to be cross-pressured between liberal and conservative views, and less likely to use one particular label to describe themselves. They will see government as a threat to their livelihood and seek to keep government out of their lives. They will be less likely to pick a party and more likely to report independent.

Individualists are a difficult group to classify politically since their worldview often straddles the political fence, depending on what issue is under consideration (Jenkins-Smith, Herron and Ripberger 2011). Elements of both major political parties and both ends of the ideological continuum fly in the face of individualism—liberals and Democrats favor government regulation of business and welfare programs that support people using tax money from other people, while conservatives and Republicans favor moral restrictions, such as limiting homosexual marriage and abortion, all of which are anathema to individualists. The core of individualist belief is that everyone should have to make their own way in life and that everyone should be left alone so that they can make their own choices. Given these beliefs, individualists are likely to be torn between the parties and ideologies—they favor liberal social views that allow freedom to live how they want, but they favor conservative economic views that force everyone to support themselves with their own skills and labor.

Previous research has found that many individualists tend to shift toward the conservative Republican side (Jenkins-Smith, Herron, and Ripberger 2011), but

theoretically speaking the expected survey response from individualists on questions about partisanship and ideology is that they will be uncomfortable placing themselves in any category and take the middle ground of independent and moderate. Exceptions to this pattern will occur where an individualist views either social or economic views as more important than the other. An individualist who believes that social policy is most important will side with liberals and Democrats; the individualist who believes that economic policies are most important will side with conservatives and Republicans.

Proposition 1d: Hierarchs

Hierarchs can be on either end of ideology and partisanship scales, but by their nature are more likely to align with conservative views. Either party position would work though—both parties need hierarchs to survive. Similar to the individualists, hierarchs could affiliate with either major political party and swing toward either end of the ideological spectrum. However, the most likely directional leaning is toward conservatism and Republicanism given the hierarchs' attachment to social order. Hierarchs believe that the strata and classifications of order in society should be strictly adhered to, and conservative Republican policies that reject the redistribution of resources and reject the idea that some groups need preferential treatment are highly appealing to hierarchs. However, a minority of hierarchs could affiliate with liberals and Democrats if they strongly believe that the government should take a strong role in enforcing the social and economic arrangements of its citizens. Conservative Republican views often argue for small government, which means that if hierarchs prioritize the belief that the government should actively work to maintain order in

society they will be more at home with the liberal Democrats.

The common thread throughout these propositions regarding the combinations of cultural worldview, partisanship, and ideology that are expected to exist among the mass public is that issue domains are critical. Different issue domains are associated with different cultural orientations even within the same partisan set of beliefs: Republican views on topics such as welfare and traditional marriage are attractive to hierarchs, whereas their views on small government and little business regulation appeal to individualists. Similarly, Democratic views on social freedom appeal to egalitarians and individualists, but their views on government enforcement of societal norms can make them appealing to hierarchs as well. The fact that both parties attract individuals from multiple cultural types demonstrates that the parties must form coalitions of people from various cultural worldviews in order to allow members of the party to attain power or remain in power via elected office.

In ideological terms, these propositions highlight the importance of the difference between social and economic issues. Social conservatives attract hierarchs and economic conservatives attract individualists, and on the liberal side social liberals attract individualists and egalitarians while economic liberals attract egalitarians. Individualists seem to be the most conflicted and divided by this ideological setup, and could constitute the “muddy middle” people whose self-reported moderate ideology often does not seem to drive their political preferences. The structure of the political system is such that individualists are split between conservative and liberal beliefs that depend on what issues are under consideration at that time. Individualists favor

universal freedom from interference, and their ideological view depends on which set of freedoms is most important to the individualist—social or economic—to determine which side of the divide they will fall on. Hierarchs can be divided between conservative and liberal ideologies as well, but there should be many fewer liberal hierarchs than liberal individualists.

3.4 Observed Combinations of Culture, Partisanship, and Ideology

In order to evaluate these propositions, the measures discussed in the first part of this chapter are put to work. The survey used to collect the data analyzed for the remainder of the dissertation was described in chapter 2: briefly, the survey was conducted using an online opt-in panel from Survey Sampling International, and 772 individuals from across the United States completed the survey. Since this was done using an online volunteer panel, respondents were selected randomly from within the panel, but are not necessarily representative of the entire U.S. population. The sample distributions for race, gender, and income are essentially reflective of the whole U.S. population, but since the sample was not drawn at random from all possible respondents, inferences will be restricted to the data itself. The frequencies of culture, ideology and partisanship as separate concepts are discussed first, followed by the observed combinations of ideology and partisanship within each cultural worldview.

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show descriptive statistics for the measures of culture, ideology and partisanship. The cultural worldview measures are laid out in Table 3.1, and ideology and partisanship are reported in Table 3.2. The cultural worldview measures presented in Table 1 are summary versions of the Likert and triad measures

described above. The 12 Likert scale questions have been factor-analyzed and rotated using a promax rotation¹¹ to produce scores for the each individual on each of the four worldviews. The range, mean and standard deviation for each factor are shown on Table 3.1, in addition to the percentage of respondents who fall into each category when only the highest factor score of the four factors is considered. Taking only the highest score throws away a lot of information in the other factors, which is why the last column reports the average distance that the highest factor score is from the second highest factor score within each type. The distances between most preferred and second

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Culture Measures

	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation	Percent when forced type	Mean distance 2nd type
Hierarch factor score	-2.51, 2.06	~0	0.79	15.47	0.50
Individualist factor score	-2.30, 1.99	~0	0.84	26.30	1.25
Egalitarian factor score	-2.17, 1.95	~0	0.89	28.27	1.19
Fatalist factor score	-1.79, 2.43	~0	0.84	29.96	1.04
					Percent completely transitive
Hierarch triad number of choices	0-3	0.90	0.96	19.02	45.13
Individualist triad number of choices	0-3	1.07	1.11	33.00	67.86
Egalitarian triad number of choices	0-3	1.15	1.16	43.10	63.28
Fatalist triad number of choices	0-3	0.22	0.52	4.88	20.69

¹¹ The promax rotation allows the factors to be correlated, and although Cultural Theory argues for a theoretically uncorrelated structure between the grid and group axes, empirically the four worldview types are correlated with an r of 0.3, so a promax rotation is more appropriate.

most preferred cultural type are generally well over one standard deviation with the exception of the distance between scores when the hierarch score is the highest. This means that individuals who agree most with the hierarch statements tend to agree more with their second-choice type statements than individuals who agree most with one of the three other worldviews. Cultural Theory argues that the types are fluid and there are not stark differences between the types (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982), and these differences provide a measure of that fluidity. Hierarchs are clearly the most fluid group, whereas the other types seem to have purer worldview preferences as indicated by the larger distances to their second most preferred worldview.

The triad summary measures are simply the number of times the statement representing that worldview was chosen over any other statement. Each worldview could be chosen over another worldview a total of six times—for example, hierarch can be chosen over individualist twice, egalitarian twice, and fatalist twice. A particular worldview is only counted as being chosen over another worldview if it is consistent, that is, the hierarch over individualist choice is only counted as a choice for hierarch if the hierarch statement is chosen *both* times that the pair appears. Once repeated across all types and possible combinations, this creates a scale from 0 to 3 in which 0 means that the respondent never favored that worldview over any others, and 3 means that the worldview was consistently chosen over all others at every opportunity. For these measures, the mean is the average number of times the statement representing that view was *consistently* chosen over any others. The mean and standard deviations are provided for each scale, as well as the percentage of respondents who fall into each worldview when they are forced to belong to only one. The final column shows the

percentage of the respondents who fall into a particular worldview whose choices were completely transitive—that is, they consistently chose that worldview over *all* other types. Roughly two-thirds of those whose dominant worldview is individualist or egalitarian were consistent in their choices across the board. Not quite half of hierarchs demonstrate transitive choices, and only one-fifth of fatalists are consistent in their responses. The fatalist number is not surprising; these individuals are expected to be inconsistent because of their belief that everything happens by chance. However, the percentage of hierarchs demonstrating transitive choices is somewhat lower than expected. As noted several times, Cultural Theory states that worldviews should be somewhat fluid, meaning that the 30-35% intransitivity among egalitarians and individualists is understandable. Hierarch preferences, however, seem to be fairly unstable.

When determining whether to use the triad or factor indicators to measure cultural worldview in any analysis of preferences, there is not much information to go on. The measures seem generally the same—hierarchs are the most fluid by both sets of measures, and fatalists show a lot of variation. However, some indication of which measures work best is found in the fourth column of Table 3.1 which shows the percentage of individuals who fall into each category when they are forced to only have one worldview based on the factor or triad measures. Oddly, of the factor measures the fatalist worldview has the highest percentage of individuals when the forced worldview is determined by the highest factor score on the four factors obtained with the factor analysis. The hierarch type has a notably lower percentage of members than the other three types.

When the forced type is calculated on the highest number of times a statement representing that worldview is chosen in the triad measures, the distribution is much different. Egalitarian is the most common worldview, and individualist comes in next. The percentage of hierarchs in the triad measure is only four points higher than the factor measure, but the percentage of fatalists is much lower. The less than 5% fatalist outcome is much closer to what would be expected from Cultural Theory: fatalists are not likely to answer surveys due to their belief that they cannot change their situations (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). The percentage of fatalists in the factor types indicates that there could be some measurement error occurring among the measures in this particular sample. Additionally, since the indicators for the factor scores are measured on agree-disagree scales they could be heavily influenced by positivity bias, which would contribute to the error (e.g., Bond and Anderson 1987; Krosnick, Holbrook and Visser 2006; Ye, Fulton, and Tourangeau 2006). For these reasons, the triad measures that show a more reasonable distribution of worldview in the sample and avoid the potential positivity bias from the agree-disagree scales will be used for most of the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.¹²

Table 3.2 reports the distribution of self-reported ideology and partisanship. All three measures of ideology are shown, and there is not a lot of difference among the three in terms of frequencies. The utility of using the different measures of ideology will come when the concept is used as a predictor of specific policy positions in the next chapter. The most apparent patterns in the ideology and partisanship distributions are

¹² The correlations between the triad and factor forced type measures are: hierarchs 0.13, individualist 0.47, egalitarian 0.42, and fatalist 0.25. As these low scores indicate, there are differences in the analyses that follow in chapters 4 and 5 based on which set of scores are used. These differences do not change the critical conclusions, however, and given the concerns about error surrounding the factor measures, the triad measures are the best variables to use for cultural worldview.

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Ideology and Partisanship Measures

	Overall Ideology	Economic Ideology	Social Ideology		Partisanship
Strongly Liberal	5.86 (45)	6.23 (48)	7.92 (61)	Completely Democratic	11.84 (88)
Liberal	12.24 (94)	11.43 (88)	12.47 (96)	Somewhat Democratic	19.92 (148)
Slightly Liberal	10.94 (84)	11.04 (85)	9.22 (71)	Slightly Democratic	4.58 (34)
Middle of the Road/Don't Know	40.23 (309)	39.87 (307)	39.48 (304)	Independent/ No Party	34.72 (258)
Slightly Conservative	9.38 (72)	9.87 (76)	10.13 (78)	Slightly Republican	4.31 (32)
Conservative	13.93 (107)	13.51 (104)	12.99 (100)	Somewhat Republican	17.36 (129)
Strongly Conservative	7.42 (57)	8.05 (62)	7.79 (60)	Completely Republican	7.27 (54)
Total	100.00 (768)	100.00 (770)	100.00 (770)	Total	100.00 (743)

the clusters at the center— moderate or no ideology, and independent or no party.

Nearly 40% of the sample falls into the moderate or no ideology category, and almost 35% responded that they have no party or are independent. The “somewhat” partisan categories, as well as the “liberal” and “conservative” categories also contain substantial percentages of the respondents. Generally these distributions are similar to what is found on most surveys that measure political affiliations.

Proposition 1a: Fatalists Observed

The fatalist proposition posits that they will not have strong partisan or ideological ties, and Figures 3.1 and 3.2 confirm that this is what the data indicate.

Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of partisanship within each cultural worldview, as measured by the triad measure that forces respondents into one and only one worldview. The majority of fatalists fall into the independent or no party category with very few Republican or Democratic fatalists, although there are more Democrats than Republicans among those who do fall to one side or the other. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of ideological self-placement within the worldviews and tells much the same story: over 50% of fatalists said that their ideology was either moderate or non-existent, and of those who did report a liberal or conservative ideology there are a few more on the liberal side than on the conservative side. The information in Table 3.3 also supports the proposition that fatalists are nonpartisan and moderate or non-ideological—the correlations among all of the ideology measures, partisanship, and the measure for fatalism are very low and indicate no relationship. These statistics indicate that proposition 1a is supported in these data: in most cases, fatalists do not have directional partisan attachments or ideological views.

Proposition 1b: Egalitarians Observed

Egalitarians should theoretically lean toward the liberal ideology and the Democratic Party, and indeed this is the case. In Figure 3.1, the modal category for egalitarians is still independent or no party, but this is the modal category for the entire sample and for every worldview; what is interesting is how the rest of the sample is split. Many egalitarians identified with the Democratic Party to some degree, mostly in the completely or somewhat Democratic categories. Fewer than 15% of egalitarians claimed any degree of identification with the Republican Party, compared to almost

Figure 3.1: Partisanship by Cultural Worldview




Figure 3.2: Ideology by Cultural Worldview




Table 3.3: Bivariate Correlations between Culture, Ideology, and Partisanship

	Overall Ideology	Economic Ideology	Social Ideology	Partisanship
Partisanship	0.55	0.54	0.53	--
Fatalist triad number of choices	-0.04	-0.00	-0.04	-0.02
Egalitarian triad number of choices	-0.18	-0.14	-0.17	-0.17
Individualist triad number of choices	0.27	0.34	0.27	0.23
Hierarch triad number of choices	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.15

50% that identify with the Democratic Party. In Figure 3.2, the difference between how many egalitarians reported a liberal ideology versus a conservative ideology is smaller than the Democrat-Republican difference but the liberals maintain the edge.

Approximately 40% of egalitarians reported that their ideologies are slightly liberal, liberal, or strongly liberal, compared to only 16.5% of egalitarians reporting any form of conservative ideology.

The correlations reported in Table 3.3 support these findings as well. The negative directions indicate that as the number of times individuals chose the egalitarian statement over any others goes up, their ideology and partisanship move in the liberal and Democratic directions, respectively. These correlations are not huge, but are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. The chi-square statistics for the crosstabs depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are also statistically significant. Proposition 1b is confirmed in these data.

Proposition 1c: Individualists Observed

Proposition 1c posits that individualists should be difficult to classify, and that comparable numbers of them should be liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans because each side appeals to individualists on different issue areas. Interestingly, this is not the pattern that is evident in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. In Figure 3.1, the individualist distribution is essentially bimodal with the independent or no party category as the highest mode, but with somewhat Republican as a very close second mode. Nearly 50% of individualists align with the Republican Party, compared to only 20% who identify as Democrats. The distribution for individualists in Figure 3.2 is bimodal as well, showing the same pattern toward conservatism. Over half of individualists state that their ideological views fall toward the conservative end of the continuum, and only 17% place their views on the liberal side. The correlations in Table 3.3 support the figures: not only are the correlations in the conservative direction, but the correlations are considerably stronger than those between any other worldview and the partisanship and ideology measures. It appears that this relationship is the most clearly linear of the concepts among the four types. The correlations and chi-square statistics are again significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

In theoretical terms, what this pattern likely means is that individualists in this sample view economic individualism as more important than social individualism. The economic principles that individualists identify with are classic Republican and conservative values. Individualists could shift over time, however, meaning that sometimes they will align with different coalitions depending on the political climate of the time or the specific issues being considered (Jenkins-Smith, Herron and Ripberger

2011). The timing of the survey is important if this shifting hypothesis is accurate, and since this survey was conducted in the spring of 2011 it makes sense that individualists would fall toward the conservative and Republican side. The nation has recently experienced an economic downturn, and as a result economic issues have been highly salient since 2008. Politically, the Democrats had held the presidency and Congress from January of 2009 until January of 2011, which alone could be cause for a shift back in the other direction: the government favoring the more liberal, socially individualist side of politics will often cause the public to swing in the opposite direction, in this case becoming more conservative (Stimson 1991; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). There was also widespread disappointment with President Obama leading up to the 2010 elections that was apparent in the campaigns that could have shifted individualists away from liberal Democratic affiliations. As proposition 1c stated individualists are a difficult group to classify theoretically, but in this sample they are firmly skewed toward the conservative ideology and Republican Party.

Proposition 1d: Hierarchs Observed

Hierarchs are expected to have a wide range of ideological and partisan positions but overall favor conservatives and the Republican Party. Figure 3.1 shows that hierarchs are indeed affiliated with both parties, and the percentage of hierarch Democrats (approximately 35%) is almost equal to the percentage of hierarch Republicans (37.5%). The presence of hierarchs in both parties is good for the continued existence of the parties—hierarchs will adhere closely to the organizational structures of the party institutions and the government in general in order to maintain

order and keep the parties intact. The nearly even split is unexpected, however, and is not the pattern seen for ideological placement among hierarchs in Figure 3.2. In terms of ideology, there are noticeably more hierarchs on the conservative side of the distribution than the liberal side: the number of conservatives nearly doubles the number of liberals (40% compared to 23%). Chi-square statistics for these crosstabs illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are significant at the $p < 0.05$ level even though the split in figure 3.1 appears to be almost even.

The correlations in Table 3.3 confirm that choosing the hierarchy statement more often is related to conservative ideology and Republican partisanship, but the relationships are not very strong. The correlation between partisanship and hierarchy statement choice is considerably smaller than the correlation between ideology and hierarchy statement choice, as would be expected based on the information in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Hierarchs exist in both parties and all parts of the ideological continuum since no party or ideology expressly argues against the organization of society, but the distribution skews slightly toward conservatives and Republicans. Certainly some liberal and Democratic views on economic issues are more egalitarian in nature than most hierarchs would like, which is why more hierarchs gravitate toward conservatism than liberalism. But these differences are not sufficient to force hierarchs firmly into one category or another.

3.5 Discussion

The propositions regarding the distributions of ideology and partisanship within each cultural type are largely supported; however, a consistent pattern seems to be that

ideology and cultural worldview are more closely related than partisanship and worldview. The relationships illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are stronger with respect to ideology than partisanship, particularly among hierarchs, and the correlations between partisanship and worldview are consistently lower than the correlations between overall ideology and worldview in Table 3.3.

This evidence of a closer link between cultural worldview and ideology than exists between cultural worldview and partisanship is precisely what the Cultural Preference Model predicts. If individuals do not have an ideology or hold a moderate ideology, they are likely to rely on their cultural worldview to form preferences. Adding partisanship into this model is redundant, since most moderates and non-ideologues will not have partisan affiliations. But, more importantly, parties are not conceptually the same as cultural worldview and ideology and empirical evidence supports this theoretical statement. Parties are intervening institutions that mold the worldviews into ideologies but are fundamentally different from cultural worldviews and ideology in that parties are institutions rather than ways of viewing the world. Therefore, it is the relationship between cultural worldviews and ideology that matters most in the Cultural Preference Model, and this relationship will be the focus of the remainder of the dissertation.

Chapter 4

The Relationship between Culture and Ideology

Chapter 3 described the most common combinations of culture, ideology, and partisanship that exist in these data, demonstrating that there are close relationships among culture, ideology, and partisanship. The key to these connections is the relationship between culture and ideology, as described in the Cultural Preference Model. As the model demonstrates, individuals will form their views of how they want to live in the world and how they want others to live by interacting with one another in society. In order for those who adhere to the various ways of life to protect their desired worldview they must have enough support to gain and maintain power within the social and political institutions that are put into place to guide a society, which usually means that coalitions must be formed across cultural types. As they are organized at a particular period of time, these coalitions are institutionalized as parties, and each party adopts an ideology that describes its desired package of policy preferences (Downs 1957). Thus ideologies are direct extensions of culture, but because the cultural types have been forced to form coalitions within the constraints imposed by institutions, ideologies will very rarely look like “pure” cultural types. Parties are important in that they are the institutional mechanism through which culture passes to become ideology, but as demonstrated in Chapter 3, parties are fundamentally different from culture and ideology because they are institutions whereas the other concepts are ways of viewing the world in which individuals live.

This chapter will test the Cultural Preference Model in two ways: first, basic statistics and regression models will show the effects of culture and ideology on one

another and on a policy preference dependent variable. Second, the challenge of confirming the temporal order of culture → ideology → policy preferences will be undertaken by reconceptualizing the regression model as a path analysis model. Given the nature of the data, it is impossible to decisively determine whether that is the causal structure of the concepts—panel data or qualitative interviewing would offer more insight into the structure—but the measures of direct and indirect effects that are produced by path analysis should offer considerable insight into the relationships.

4.1 Comparing Culture and Ideology

Table 3.3 showed the correlations between all three of the ideology measures and the cultural type measures that result from the triad question measures. Of the cultural types, the individualist measures are most highly correlated with the ideology measures, and hierarchs and egalitarians have slightly weaker but still statistically significant correlations with the ideology measures. Fatalists, of course, show no association with ideology. The directions of the correlations are as hypothesized: scoring higher on the hierarch and individualist scales is correlated with more conservative self-placements on all of the ideology measures, and higher scores on the fatalist and egalitarian scales are correlated with more liberal self-placements on the ideology measures.

These correlations are mentioned again in order to demonstrate the basic linear relationships among the measures of culture and ideology before putting them into a linear regression model. Strong correlations would indicate that the cultural and ideological measures are closely related, and since most of these correlations are

between 0.15 and 0.35, these moderate correlations indicate that there could be some empirical overlap in the concepts that the cultural and ideological measures are attempting to explain. The rest of the chapter will investigate this question—whether culture and ideology are measuring the same basic concept or if there is a clear difference between how culture and ideology account for preferences.

4.2 Modeling Culture and Ideology

The Dependent Variable

In order to explore whether the concepts are measuring the same variance in preferences, the models need a dependent variable that covers a fairly broad, salient policy topic. The survey described in Chapter 3 focused solely on immigration issues—there are 21 questions regarding immigration policy in the survey, providing many potential dependent variables. Among these 21 items are seven items that ask respondents to rate their level of support for various policy alternatives on a five-point Likert scale of strongly favor, favor, don't know, oppose, and strongly oppose.¹³ These seven items can be combined into a simple additive index that describes respondents' overall views on immigration (Cronbach's alpha of 0.83) with a range of 28 values that can be used as a continuous dependent variable. The advantage of creating the index of the items is that no one policy alternative is driving the results of the analysis: the index

¹³ The items are introduced as follows: "Would you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose the following proposals?" Respondents were also given a "don't know" option, creating the middle category. The seven specific proposals asked about are: building a 700-mile long fence on the border with Mexico; creating a program that would allow illegal immigrants already living in the United States for a number of years to stay here and apply to legally remain in this country permanently if they had a job and paid back taxes; Imposing fines of tens of thousands of dollars on employers who hire illegal immigrants; Sending employers who hire illegal immigrants to jail; Putting more Border Patrol and federal law enforcement agents on the U.S. border with Mexico; Using National Guard troops to patrol the U.S. border with Mexico; and Putting more Border Patrol and federal law enforcement agents on the U.S. border with Canada. The order of the proposals was randomized.

provides a general overview of respondents' views on illegal immigration policy alternatives and eliminates the error that might exist by using just one of the seven measures.¹⁴ Lower values represent more “conservative” views on immigration—restricting access to the country for illegal immigrants using fences, troops, deportation, and consequences for employing illegal immigrants. Higher values represent more “liberal” views on immigration, which means opposing these restrictive policies. The overall distribution of index scores is nearly normal, but with a slight right skew: the mean value on the scale is 10.9, which is slightly toward the conservative end of the scale, but the standard deviation of 6.1 indicates a fairly broad range of scores along the index.

Since this chapter is more concerned with the structure of the models than it is explaining a particular policy position it is not necessary to delve into the details of immigration policy, only a brief discussion of why the issue is appropriate. Illegal immigration is a salient political issue with specific partisan and ideological implications: liberal Democrats tend to favor pathways to citizenship and more lenient policies, whereas conservative Republicans generally favor more restrictive policies that punish illegal immigration and deportation for those in the U.S. illegally (Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sanborn 2011). These specific ideological and partisan positions make immigration an ideal policy arena for exploring how political and cultural views interact, especially among moderates. Those who adhere to strong ideological views will simply most likely report their preferences as their partisan and ideological views would suggest. Those who identify as moderate, however, will have little guidance

¹⁴ Constructing a simple index also keeps the variable in easily interpreted units of measurement, and in this case complicating the units by using factor analysis to combine the measures offers no advantages over the index—the substantive results are the same whether using factor scores or the index.

from the political world since liberal and conservative ideologies are associated with specific sides of the policy debate. Since moderates do not side with liberals or conservatives, there is no *political* heuristic to help them make their preference decisions. Cultural worldview will be the guiding force behind their preferences in the absence of ideological cues.

Model Specification

All of the models include the typical explanatory variables that are generally used in models of policy preferences and political behavior¹⁵: gender, age, education, income, partisan identification, measures of government trust, and respondents' assessment of the state of the U.S. economy.¹⁶ Since immigration policy questions are most commonly associated with immigrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries, it is expected that Hispanic respondents might view immigration issues differently from respondents of other races (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011), so a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent identifies as Hispanic is included. A binary variable indicating whether the respondent lives in a state along the Mexican border is also included, since the proximity to the border makes the issue more salient and could lead to systematically different views on immigration issues (Branton and Dunaway

¹⁵ Political interest and attention variables are not included in the final models because they were consistently insignificant, likely due to the salience of the immigration issue.

¹⁶ Party identification is measured by asking respondents to first indicate whether they consider themselves members of any party, then asking how strong that affiliation is. Republican Party and Democratic Party responses to these two questions were combined into a 7-point scale from strong Republican to strong Democrat. Two questions are used to assess government trust: "How much can people like you affect what the government does?" with answer options of a great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, and not at all; and "How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government to do what is right?" with answer options of always, most of the time, about half of the time, once in a while, or never. The state of the U.S. economy question asks respondents: "On a scale from one to seven, where one means very poor and seven means very good, how would you rate the performance of the United States economy?"

2009; Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010).

The independent variables of interest are the ideological and cultural measures. Ideology, as discussed in chapter 3, is measured in three different ways: economic and social ideology are asked as separate questions, and then the overall ideology question is asked. Immigration policy has both social and economic policy implications. Socially, people are concerned about the impact of immigrants on border security, jobs, and educational systems. Economically, immigrants, particularly illegal immigrants, affect the system by using resources such as healthcare, and by possibly not paying taxes on the income they make in the United States. Even though most of the questions that are included in the dependent variable index address social aspects of the problem and how to respond to it, such as building fences and putting troops on the borders, because there are economic impacts inherent in immigration debates, both social and economic ideology are used in the model.

The measures of culture were also discussed in the previous chapter, and the triad question measures are most appropriate for the following analysis. The most-preferred type is likely to be what respondents default to in making decisions if there are no other cues present, and it is the triad questions and their resulting measures that best capture this default position. For the remainder of this chapter, the cultural worldview measures resulting from the triads are used in all of the models. These measures indicate how many times a respondent consistently chose the statement for a particular cultural worldview over any other statements. The scale of these variables runs from zero to three, as described in Chapter 3.

An additional measure is added to the models to indicate the score of how many

times respondents chose only their *most favored* worldview statement over any other statements. For example, if respondent A had the highest score for hierarchy, then the value in this most important type variable is their score for hierarchy, but for respondent B, whose highest score was on the egalitarian variable, their egalitarian score is the one in the most important type variable. What this measure does is provide a measure of strength of worldview preferences without being correlated with any of the individual cultural worldview measures. A respondent with a higher value on this variable, regardless of which worldview is most favored, chose their most favored worldview more often than those with lower values on this variable. It is expected that those with higher values for their most favored type will have stronger cultural preferences, which should increase the impact of culture on preferences.

Predicting Immigration Policy Views

In order to begin comparing the effects of culture and ideology on policy preferences, an OLS regression model is run using the variables discussed above. Table 4.1 shows the results from this model. The demographic variables perform roughly as expected: age, education, gender, and whether the respondent lives in a state along the U.S.-Mexico border are significant in the expected directions. Older individuals, those with lower education levels, men, and *not* living in a border state indicate more conservative preferences on the immigration policy items in the index. Among the political variables, economic performance, party identification, and the two variables indicating feelings about the government are significant predictors of immigration policy preferences. Those who rate the U.S. economic performance highly, who believe

Table 4.1: OLS Regression Models on the Immigration Policy Preference Index

	Coefficients	T-score	Tolerance
Social Ideology	-0.95	-3.64	0.27
Economic Ideology	0.51	1.84	0.26
Hierarch	-0.50	-1.94	0.76
Egalitarian	0.55	2.38	0.66
Individualist	0.14	0.57	0.61
Fatalist	-0.20	-0.46	0.93
Most Important Type Score	0.03	0.27	0.50
Age	-0.06	-4.07	0.86
Education	0.38	2.08	0.83
Female	1.49	3.31	0.95
Income	0.01	0.20	0.83
Hispanic	1.28	1.28	0.90
Border state	1.21	2.07	0.96
People can affect what the government does	0.60	2.88	0.80
The government is fair most of the time	-0.74	-2.68	0.59
US economic performance	0.35	1.80	0.66
Party identification	-0.29	-1.93	0.64
Constant	20.40	12.11	
Adjusted R²		0.17	
N		634	

Bold face indicates that $p < 0.05$, one-tailed.

that they can affect what the government does, but who generally think the government cannot be trusted have more liberal preferences on the items included in the scale. The party identification variable confirms what was stated above: Democrats favor more liberal, less restrictive immigration policies.

Turning to the explanatory variables of interest, culture and ideology, there are few surprises. Both the social and economic measures of ideology are significant. Social ideology has a stronger effect on the index than economic ideology—a one-unit move toward the more liberal side of social ideology moves the immigration index almost one full unit toward the liberal end of the scale, whereas there is only half a unit difference when moving economic ideology. The direction of ideological effects also changes between the two measures: a one-unit move toward the liberal side of economic ideology pushes individuals half a unit in the *conservative* direction on the immigration scale. This finding makes sense in the context of immigration policy since economic liberalism means that resources should be shared equally, and immigrants place a burden on the system to share resources among more people. Social liberals want everyone to have equal opportunity, including immigrants, but economic liberals want to control the number of people that resources are divided among.

Two of the cultural worldview measures, hierarch and egalitarian, are significant in the expected directions. Those who choose egalitarian statements more often than other statements favor more liberal immigration policies, but choosing the hierarch statements over other statements more often predicts more restrictive immigration policy preferences. The individualist and fatalist measures fail to achieve any level of statistical significance, likely because of the ambiguity of preferences on


immigration policy among individualists and a lack of preferences in general among fatalists. The ambiguity of preferences among individualists is likely due to cross-pressured views immigration issues: some individualists would prefer to ignore or do nothing about illegal immigration as long as it does not directly affect them, but others see illegal immigration as a threat to their success. This is much the same cross-pressure pattern as is seen in the sign-switching between social and economic ideology.

In order to assess whether the moderate correlations between the four cultural measures and the ideological measures are measuring the same concept—that is, explaining the same variance in the dependent variable—the tolerance measures for the variables are provided in the third column of Table 4.1. The ideology measures indicate some moderate multicollinearity with one another, but since no other diagnostics indicated problems these tolerances are acceptable. The more important question is whether the ideology and culture measures appear to collectively have low tolerances, which would indicate that each measure is not accounting for much variance on its own. The tolerances for the cultural measures demonstrate no problems in this respect. All of the tolerance levels for the cultural measures are above 0.6, indicating that the variance the cultural measures are measuring is between 61% and 93% independent of any other variables in the model. The lower tolerances for the ideology measures likely indicate that the two ideology-specific variables are accounting for much of the same variance, which is expected when using the social and economic variables together and has no impact on the cultural measures.

The model provides a nice look at the basic effects of ideology and culture on the immigration scale dependent variable and demonstrates that there is not too much

overlap between the concepts. What this model cannot provide is any insight into the causal order of how the concepts affect immigration policy preferences. The model also provides no insight into how ideology and culture are related since the measures are clearly not accounting for the same variance in the dependent variable. In order to examine the causal process at work and hopefully illuminate the relationship between culture and ideology, the Cultural Preference Model can be adapted into a causal model of how ideology and culture work together with respect to a specific policy preference. In this case the preferences being predicted are related to immigration policy, but the model could be applied to any policy area on which individuals are asked to form preferences.

Figure 4.1: The Cultural Preference Model as a Causal Model



Consistent with the societal-level model, this causal model shows that culture exists prior to ideology, but culture will still have an effect on the policy preference independent of ideology. The path model is specified to show the direct effects of the four cultural worldviews on both social and economic ideology *and* on the policy preference, but the effects on immigration preferences should be smaller than the effects on ideology. Ideology, as an institutionalized version of culture, should have stronger direct effects on the preference variable than the cultural worldviews. The coefficients to be estimated, then, are the effects of the four cultural worldviews on ideology, the effects of the worldviews on the preference variable, and the effects of ideology on the preference variable. The Stata “pathreg” package was used to estimate the coefficients for this simple path analysis model.¹⁷ For the two separate models predicting economic and social ideology, only the four cultural worldview measures are put in as independent variables. The model predicting respondents’ scores in the immigration policy index is specified exactly as the OLS models described above are specified, using all of the ideology and cultural worldview measures as predictors of the immigration index score in addition to all of the demographic and attitudinal measures. Figure 4.2 shows the causal model with all the relevant path coefficients added. In the ideology models, all of the coefficients from cultural types to each type of ideology are statistically significant¹⁸ except for the fatalist measure. This indicates that the other three cultural types do have a strong influence over individuals’ ideological views. However, the contributions are not large—the R² for the economic ideology model is 0.17, for social ideology it is 0.14, and the residual path coefficients are 0.91 and 0.93,


¹⁷ The model is fully recursive, so in this case the pathreg commands simply run all of the regressions simultaneously. The same models could be done using simple OLS commands.

¹⁸ At the p<0.05 level.

respectively. As expected, cultural worldview has an impact on both social and economic ideology, as indicated by the significant coefficients, but much of an individual's ideology comes from sources exogenous to the model.

Figure 4.2 only shows the coefficients of interest in the preference model: the effects of cultural worldview and ideology on the immigration index. The coefficients for both types of ideology and the cultural worldview measures for hierarch and egalitarian are significant at the $p < 0.05$ level; as with the OLS regression models above, the individualist and egalitarian measures fail to reach statistical significance in the fully-specified model. The R^2 for the preference model is slightly higher at 0.19, but the

Figure 4.2: Path Analysis of the Causal Process from Culture to Policy Preferences



residual path coefficient remains high at 0.90 indicating that there is a substantial amount of variance in the model left unexplained.

Comparisons of the various coefficients shown in figure 4.2 tell much of the story that was predicted: the cultural measures do have strong direct impacts on the policy preference variable, but there are also strong effects on ideology which indicate that part of the effect of culture on policy preference is *through* ideology. This provides support for the theory that ideology is the institutionalized version of culture—three of the four cultural worldviews significantly influence an individual’s ideology, and the fourth one may only fail to reach significance because of a lack of variation in the variable itself.¹⁹ The hierarch and egalitarian paths that run directly to the immigration index have coefficients that are a good bit larger than the effects of the hierarch and egalitarian measures on ideology, but this does not negate the theory that culture operates on policy preferences through ideology—it simply means that there are both direct and indirect effects.

Table 4.2 shows the calculated indirect effects of culture on preferences—the effects of cultural worldview on immigration preferences *through* ideology—compared to the direct effects shown in Figure 4.2. All of the indirect effects are substantially smaller than the direct effects, but they do add to the total effects. With the exception of the individualists the direct and indirect effects work in the same direction. Again, the sign change between direct and indirect effects for individualists indicates that individualists are cross-pressured regarding their views on immigration issues, as described above. Clearly some of the influence of culture on preferences is filtered

¹⁹ The distribution of the fatalist variable is clustered toward the low end of the scale: nearly 60% of individuals never chose a fatalist statement over any others. This distribution does not have a lot of variance, and so is more difficult to use as a predictor.

Table 4.2: Comparison of Path Model Effects

	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects
	Culture on preferences	Culture on Ideology
Hierarch	-0.50	-0.15
Individualist	0.15	-0.11
Egalitarian	0.55	0.18
Fatalist	-0.20	-0.05

through ideology, but is it enough to claim that the concepts are accounting for the same variance? This does not seem to be a logical assertion at this point. Given the substantial independent effects of culture on immigration preferences, the concepts do not appear to be accounting *completely* for the same variance, but there is some shared variance that remains unexplained in all of these regression models.

4.3 Discussion

The hallmark of the analysis in this chapter is ambiguity. There is no clear answer to the question of whether culture and ideology account for some of the same variance or whether culture and ideology are related in the hypothesized way. The OLS regression models do not indicate much, if any, overlapping variance: the model shows no signs of problems with heterogeneity or multicollinearity among the ideology and culture measures, even though the ideology measures are somewhat collinear. The path analysis model attempts to shed more light on the causal order of the relationship between culture and ideology: both concepts have strong direct effects on immigration policy preferences, but the culture measures also have nontrivial direct effects on ideology that indicates that ideology stems at least in part from culture. Clearly these aggregate analyses do not offer simple answers to the questions asked; it is no wonder

that there is ambiguity in the political science literature about how ideology relates to policy preferences. Putting the two-dimensional social and economic measures of ideology into the model improves the model fit and adds significant variables, demonstrating the value of having a multidimensional conceptualization of ideology, but does not offer much help in sorting out the relationship between culture and ideology. Adding cultural worldview to the models does not satisfactorily improve the clarity of the models, although it does obviously add something of value that is separate from, but still related to, ideology.

This conundrum brings the problem back to what is known and unknown in public opinion literature. As discussed fully in Chapter 1, it is known that ideology directly and substantially affects policy preferences for those who hold strong ideologies, but the relationship between ideology and preferences is unclear for those who do not hold strong ideological beliefs. Although there is no such assertion regarding cultural worldviews, perhaps these patterns in the public opinion literature indicate that ideological moderates should be analyzed separately from ideologues. The Cultural Preference Model describes the relationship between ideology and culture primarily for those who use ideology to form their political opinions, and the subsequent proposition was that those who do not rely on ideology to form their preferences rely instead on cultural worldview. If this proposition is true, then analyzing the relationships among all individuals could be the source of the muddiness in the models in this chapter rather than any specific measure or variable. Separating the individuals into two groups defined as those who are strong ideologues compared to those who are moderates should demonstrate that the relationship between culture,

ideology, and preferences is different for each group as hypothesized in Chapter 2. The next chapter will do exactly that—replicate these analyses for ideologues and moderates separately, and discuss the new patterns that emerge.

Chapter 5

Differences between Ideologues and Moderates

This chapter replicates the analysis done in Chapter 4 but will treat ideologues and moderates as separate groups in order to examine how cultural worldview and ideology affect preferences within each group. The first step in this process is to define which respondents are “moderates” and which are “ideologues.” For this purpose, an “ideologue” is defined as any respondents who placed themselves as conservative, liberal, strongly conservative or strongly liberal (points 1, 2, 6 and 7) on the seven-point ideology scale. The moderate group consists of those who reported their ideology as moderate, slightly liberal, or slightly conservative (points 3, 4 and 5), or responded that they do not think of their views in liberal-conservative terms. The overall ideology measure was used for this coding rather than either the economic or social ideology measure since it is the most general measure and does not have the economic or social definitional valence that the other two measures carry.

The chapter will proceed in a very similar fashion to the previous one: first, baseline bivariate comparisons of ideology and cultural worldview will be presented and discussed for the ideologue and moderate groups separately. From there, the analysis will proceed to the multivariate case to demonstrate that the cultural worldview and ideology variables predict ideologues’ and moderates’ preferences differently when the two groups are separated. Path analysis models will be used to demonstrate how the causal structure of preference formation differs between the two groups. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of what is learned by analyzing these two groups separately as compared to the aggregate analyses, and how the analysis of these

two groups inform the Cultural Preference Model.

5.1 Ideology Recoding and Model Specification

Restricting ideology to scores of 3-5 in the moderate group and widened to 1-7 in the ideologue group, as the grouping described above does, is not an appropriate comparison if ideology is used as an independent variable in models predicting policy preferences. Since ideology is one of the critical variables in question, the overall ideology measure was recoded as a strength measure after being split into the ideologue and moderate groups: in the ideologue group points 1 and 7 are coded as 1, and points 2 and 6 are coded as 0; in the moderate group points 3 and 5 are coded as 1, and point 4 and those who don't think of their views in liberal-conservative terms are coded as 0. Using this folded scale means that the measurement of ideology is consistent across the two groups and eliminates any effects that would come from different measurement within groups—1 means more ideological, and 0 means less ideological; it is only the baseline of the measure that differs. For moderates, the baseline is don't know or moderate, and for ideologues the baseline is "liberal" or "conservative."

However, the economic and social ideology measures can be used in their original form in the models. This is because, as Table 5.1 shows, even though the variance of overall ideology is restricted by making the moderate and ideologue categories, the variances of the social and economic measures are *not* restricted. There are observations across all seven categories of social and economic ideology in both the moderate group and the ideologue group, and even though some of the counts are very small the categories are represented by at least a few respondents. Since there is

Table 5.1: Percent of Respondents in each Economic and Social Ideology Category within Ideologue and Moderate Groups

	Economic Moderate	Economic Ideologue	Social Moderate	Social Ideologue
Strongly liberal	1.28 (6)	13.73 (42)	1.07 (5)	18.30 (56)
Liberal	3.85 (18)	22.88 (70)	4.71 (22)	24.18 (74)
Slightly liberal	14.13 (66)	6.54 (20)	14.13 (66)	1.96 (6)
Moderate/don't think of views in these terms	62.31 (291)	5.88 (18)	62.74 (293)	4.25 (13)
Slightly conservative	14.99 (70)	1.96 (6)	13.49 (63)	4.90 (15)
Conservative	2.57 (12)	30.07 (92)	3.43 (16)	27.45 (84)
Strongly conservative	0.86 (4)	18.95 (58)	0.43 (2)	18.95 (58)
Total*	100.00 (467)	100.00 (306)	100.00 (467)	100.00 (306)

*Totals may not equal exactly 100.00% due to rounding.

variation across the full range of the variables, there is no need to recode the social and economic measures of ideology. The remaining variables in the models are the same: the measures of cultural worldview and all other independent variables are measured and specified in the models just as they were in Chapter 4.

5.2 Comparing Culture and Ideology

The Cultural Preference Model posits that ideology is the institutionalized and politicized version of cultural worldview, so those who have strong ideological views will have merged their worldviews into their ideology simply by adhering to that ideological view. This means that among those who rely primarily on ideology to form their preferences, the ideologues, their worldview and ideology should be closely

related. Conversely, moderates' worldviews have not been institutionalized into ideological views since they do not adhere to a specific ideology, regardless of whether the lack of ideology-cultural worldview congruence is due to cross-pressures between different views on different types of issues or simply because they do not pay attention to politics. The outcome is the same regardless of the reason: the relationship between cultural worldview and ideology should not be as close as it is for ideologues.

Since the full scale of responses to the social and economic ideology questions can be used without bias in both the moderate and ideologue groups, these measures can be correlated with cultural worldview measures to replicate the correlation analysis from Table 3.3. The cultural worldview measure used in Table 5.2 is the triad measure indicating how many times the statement representing that cultural worldview was chosen over all other worldview statements, as it was in the Table 3.3. In the aggregate case, only the individualist measure correlated with the economic and social ideology measures above a 0.2 threshold,²⁰ but the correlations for the hierarch and egalitarian measures were quite close to that threshold. Table 5.2 shows clear differences from the aggregate comparisons: within the moderate group most of the correlations are very low, and the only one that reaches the 0.2 threshold is the correlation between the individualist measure and economic ideology; no others even come close. The pattern is strikingly different within the ideologue group—all of the correlations are well above the 0.2 threshold, except for the fatalist correlations, indicating very strong associations between cultural worldview and ideology. The correlations in Table 5.2 provide initial evidence that the hypothesized patterns are accurate descriptions of the relationships in

²⁰ As in chapter 4, the 0.2 threshold level for the correlations is not indicative of statistical significance; most of the correlations are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level, so the value 0.2 is used as an indication of a particularly strong correlation in comparison to the other correlation values.

Table 5.2: Correlations between Social and Economic Ideology Measures and Triad Cultural Worldview Measures for Moderates and Ideologues Separately

	Moderates: Economic Ideology	Moderates: Social Ideology	Ideologues: Economic Ideology	Ideologues: Social Ideology
Hierarch	0.08	0.07	0.28	0.28
Individualist	0.21	0.05	0.45	0.41
Egalitarian	-0.01	-0.03	-0.25	-0.27
Fatalist	-0.00	-0.11	0.02	0.01

Bold face highlights correlations in which $r > 0.2$ and is *not* an indication of significance levels.

these data. The next step is to examine how these patterns play out in multivariate models that seek to explain policy preferences.

5.3 Modeling Culture and Ideology

As in the previous chapter, the policy preference dependent variable used in the models that follow is a scale created from seven immigration policy preference questions. The questions each have four answer options indicating level of agreement or disagreement with each policy alternative, so the additive scale created from these items has a range of 28 points. The model specifications are exactly the same as in chapter 4, with the minor difference of the recoded overall ideology measure that was explained above.

Predicting Immigration Policy Views

Table 5.3 shows the results of three different OLS regression models: the

column labeled “Moderates” only includes those classified as moderates according to the coding described above, the column labeled “Ideologues” only includes those classified as ideologues by the same criteria, and the “Aggregate” column shows the results for all respondents, replicated from Table 4.1. All three forms of ideology are included in the moderate and ideologue models—social, economic, and the recoded strength of ideology score. The recoded overall ideology score is included in order to pick up any strength of ideology effects that would not be captured by the social or economic ideology measures. Since the groups are restricted based on the overall measure of ideology and the full range of values on social and economic ideology are present in both the moderate and the ideologue groups, the regression coefficients and standard errors for these variables are not affected by limiting the analysis to only one group or the other. This clarification is important because the first critical difference between the moderate and ideologue models that stands out in Table 5.3 is the magnitude and significance of the various ideology measures. Social ideology becomes completely irrelevant to moderates, but it is a strong predictor of preference among ideologues. The opposite is true for the economic ideology measure, and in the aggregate model both social and economic ideology are significant. This pattern indicates that moderates form their preferences based on more of the social aspects of immigration policy, and ideologues tend to focus on the economic aspects of immigration policy. Strength of ideology does not matter for moderates or ideologues.

In all cases, a more liberal social ideology indicates more permissive immigration policy views whereas a more liberal economic ideology indicates more restrictive immigration policy views. This finding indicates that the issue of

Table 5.3: OLS Regression Models on the Immigration Policy Preference Index (T-scores in parentheses)

	Moderates	Ideologues	Aggregate
Social Ideology	-0.38 (-1.03)	-1.07 (-2.46)	-0.95 (-3.64)
Economic Ideology	0.91 (2.39)	0.45 (1.02)	0.51 (1.84)
Overall Ideology (recoded measures)	0.93 (1.57)	-0.41 (-0.51)	--
Hierarch	-0.91 (2.88)	0.20 (0.44)	-0.50 (-1.94)
Egalitarian	0.57 (2.03)	0.56 (1.39)	0.55 (2.38)
Individualist	-0.24 (-0.76)	0.72 (1.61)	0.14 (0.57)
Fatalist	-0.07 (-0.13)	-0.36 (-0.47)	-0.20 (-0.46)
Most Important Type Score	0.11 (0.70)	-0.17 (-0.70)	0.03 (0.27)
Age	-0.05 (-2.73)	-0.08 (-3.33)	-0.06 (-4.07)
Education	0.49 (2.05)	0.17 (0.58)	0.38 (2.08)
Female	1.33 (2.37)	2.07 (2.75)	1.49 (3.31)
Income	-0.11 (-1.12)	0.20 (1.81)	0.01 (0.20)
Hispanic	2.48 (2.01)	0.47 (0.28)	1.28 (1.28)
Border state	1.73 (2.25)	0.95 (1.04)	1.21 (2.07)
People can affect what the government does	0.21 (0.78)	1.01 (2.79)	0.60 (2.88)
The government is fair most of the time	-0.85 (-2.50)	-0.36 (-0.73)	-0.74 (-2.68)
US economic performance	0.36 (1.53)	0.24 (0.72)	0.35 (1.80)
Party identification	-0.01 (-0.03)	-0.73 (-3.02)	-0.29 (-1.93)
Constant	16.93 (7.07)	20.99 (7.43)	20.40 (12.11)
Adjusted R²	0.12	0.27	0.17
N	381	252	634

immigration policy has distinct social and economic considerations, and more importantly for this project it indicates that the social considerations are most important for ideologues whereas the economic considerations are most important for moderates. This finding supports the hypothesis that moderates and ideologues use different heuristics to form their preferences: social aspects of the policy area are more important to ideologues, but economic aspects of the policy area are more important to moderates.

Moving on to the cultural measures, in order for the Cultural Preference Model predictions to be accurate moderates and ideologues should continue to show differences in how the cultural worldview measures affect their preferences on immigration policies. As in the aggregate model, the individualist and fatalist measures are irrelevant for both moderates and ideologues, so no extended discussion of these effects is necessary. The fatalist measure is not expected to be a predictor of policy preferences, and since individualists are likely torn on immigration issues between the desire for cheap labor and the potential for immigrants to become burdensome to society, the lack of strong effects for that measure is also logical.

The hierarch and egalitarian measures are interesting, however. The hierarch measure, which is significant in the aggregate model, remains significant and even increases in magnitude in the moderate model but then drops out of the ideologue model altogether. Among moderates, favoring the hierarchy statement over any other worldview statements is predictive of more restrictive immigration preferences—they generally favor penalties for illegal immigrants and anyone who employs them, building walls, and putting more troops on the borders. The same is true among ideologues, but the effect is very small and insignificant. A logical, although untested, explanation for

this difference between moderates and ideologues is that for ideologues, the concept of hierarchy has been wrapped into their ideological views and so the second measure of hierarchy is unnecessary. Any variation that the hierarchy measure would account for among ideologues might have already been accounted for by the ideology measures.

Interestingly, the measure for the egalitarian worldview is significant among ideologues but not among moderates. It is expected that the measure would be significant for the moderates since cultural worldviews are generally expected to impact preferences a great deal among moderates, but the significance among ideologues is somewhat unexpected. This indicates that the concept of egalitarianism is *not* tied into ideological views. A look back at Figure 3.2 confirms that this is the case—egalitarians are more concentrated on the liberal side of the liberal-conservative continuum, but there are also many conservative egalitarians. It appears that egalitarianism carries no particular ideological valence, but it does strongly affect preferences on immigration issues since egalitarians view the world as one common group that should have equal access to resources. Respondents in the ideologue group who choose the egalitarian statement over any other worldview statements are often more lenient about immigration policy issues—the opposite preferences of the examples listed for hierarchs above.

The variable that provides the triad score for the cultural worldview that each respondent chooses most often over all other types described in Chapter 4, the “most important type score,” remains insignificant in all of the models. Interestingly, however, the sign of the coefficient changes between the moderate and ideologue models: in the moderate model, stronger preferences toward the favored cultural type

lead to more permissive views on immigration issues, whereas in the ideologue model stronger preferences toward the favored cultural type indicate more restrictive views. This pattern, although statistically insignificant, highlights two things that are supported by the findings in Chapters 3 and 4: first, that moderates and ideologues likely have different cultural worldview leanings, and so the higher scores are occurring among people with systematically different cultural worldviews, which causes the sign of the coefficient to change. Earlier analysis demonstrated that some worldviews are more consistent with certain ideological views and preferences than others, so this finding is not surprising. Second, the pattern provides more evidence for the hypothesis that cultural worldview affects moderates and ideologues in different ways, a pattern that will be discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter.

There are some interesting differences between moderates and ideologues with respect to the other independent variables in the model as well. Age and gender are consistently significant predictors of immigration policy attitudes, and U.S. economic performance is insignificant for the individual groups despite being significant in the aggregate model. Education, identification as Hispanic, residence in a border state, and assessments of fairness of the U.S. government are significant predictors of immigration policy preferences for moderates. For ideologues those four factors are insignificant, but income, whether people think they can affect what the government does, and party identification are significant predictors of immigration policy preferences among ideologues where they are insignificant for moderates. These differences support the idea that moderates and ideologues form their preferences based on different criteria and would be interesting to delve into in a future project. For now, however, these

variables are of little concern to the relationship between cultural worldview and ideology that drives the Cultural Preference Model.

The tolerance statistics in Table 5.4 indicate that ideology maintains much more of its own variance independent of the cultural measures among moderates than among ideologues and even among all individuals in the aggregate. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that cultural worldview and ideology are explaining much of the same variance among ideologues, but not among independents. In the ideologue model tolerances for the social and economic ideology variables are low enough to cause concern for multicollinearity problems in the model, and the low tolerances are not due to the addition of the overall ideology strength measure since that variable maintains 91% of its variance independent of any other variables. The low tolerances must be due to correlations with the cultural measures. The tolerances for social and economic ideology are *much* higher in the moderate model—the two types of ideology maintain over two-thirds of their variance independent of any other variables. Clearly multicollinearity is not a problem in the moderate model. The Cultural Preference

Table 5.4: Tolerance Statistics for Key Independent Variables

	Moderate model	Ideologue model
Social Ideology	0.76	0.12
Economic Ideology	0.68	0.13
Overall Ideology	0.90	0.91
Hierarch	0.77	0.69
Egalitarian	0.68	0.58
Individualist	0.70	0.46
Fatalist	0.90	0.89

Model states that this is because culture has not been absorbed into ideology among moderates as it has among ideologues.

Since there appear to be differences in how ideology and cultural worldview relate to preferences between moderates and ideologues based on the OLS models, the path model presented in Figure 4.1 will be different for moderates and ideologues as well. Additionally, since the OLS model failed to pick up much significance among the cultural worldview measures as they directly relate to preferences, path models are useful in showing whether the worldviews have indirect effects on preferences via ideology. If these indirect effects are found, the path models will also demonstrate whether the indirect effects are the same across ideologues and moderates. The theory developed thus far would predict that since ideologues have integrated their cultural worldview into their ideology, the effects of cultural worldview on ideology (the indirect effects of culture on preferences) will be stronger than the direct effects of culture on preferences among ideologues. Among moderates, the direct effects of the cultural worldviews on preferences should be higher than the indirect effects.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show how this pattern plays out in the path analysis models when the four cultural worldviews are used to predict economic and social ideology and then all of the measures are used to predict immigration policy preferences. The aggregate model in Figure 4.2 showed moderately-sized effects of cultural worldview on ideology, and larger effects of culture and ideology directly on immigration preferences. After splitting the sample into groups of moderates and ideologues, however, the models show quite different patterns. As mentioned in the OLS model above, the economic and social ideology measures predict preferences differently and

are not both significant at the same time in either model as they were in the aggregate model. Most notably, however, the effects of cultural worldviews on the ideology measures are quite different between Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. The ideologue model in Figure 5.2 generally looks similar to the aggregate model in Figure 4.1, but the moderate model in Figure 5.1 is quite different.

In the moderate model (Figure 5.1) the effects of cultural worldview on ideology are quite small, indicating that there is little relationship between cultural worldview and ideology for these respondents. The direct effects of the cultural worldviews on immigration preferences are uniformly higher than the effects on ideology, except among fatalists. Not only are the effects of culture on ideology much smaller than in the aggregate or ideologue models, but the direct effects of ideology on immigration policy preferences are smaller for moderates than they are in the other two path models as well. Economic ideology by itself has a higher direct effect on preferences than it does in the other models, but when combined with social ideology the absolute value²¹ of the total effects of ideology are lower than in the other models (1.29 compared to 1.52 for ideologues and 1.48 in the aggregate model). Immigration preferences among moderates stem mostly from their worldviews and somewhat from economic ideology, but not from culture through ideology—moderates' cultural worldviews appear to be separate from their ideological views, with the exceptions of small significant impacts of individualism on economic ideology and fatalism on social ideology. The comparison of direct and indirect effects in Table 5.5 confirms this pattern: when the total indirect effects of each cultural variable are calculated, the effects on ideology

²¹ Absolute values are reported here because the concern is not the direction of the relationships, but the magnitude of the relationships.

Figure 5.1: Path Analysis of the Causal Process from Culture to Policy Preferences for Moderates Only




Figure 5.2: Path Analysis of the Causal Process from Culture to Policy Preferences for Ideologues Only




Table 5.5: Comparison of Path Model Effects

	Direct Effects Culture on preferences	Indirect Effects Culture on Ideology
Moderates only		
Hierarch	-0.91	-0.00
Individualist	-0.24	0.14
Egalitarian	0.57	-0.00
Fatalist	-0.07	0.06
Ideologues only		
Hierarch	0.20	-0.36
Individualist	0.72	-0.40
Egalitarian	0.56	0.44
Fatalist	-0.36	-0.06

In the direct effects column, **bolded coefficients** are significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. In the indirect effects column **bold face** indicates that *all* of the cultural coefficients in the calculations are significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

remain very small. The indirect effects are calculated using both pathways to preferences through economic and social ideology: the coefficients for each path from cultural worldview to ideology were multiplied by the coefficient for the corresponding path from ideology to preferences, producing two scores for each worldview that were added together to get the total value of the indirect effects. After these calculations, the hierarch and egalitarian measures round to zero, essentially indicating that they have no impact on ideology among moderate respondents and highlighting how little culture affects ideology among moderates.

The opposite is evident in Figure 5.2: ideologues' cultural worldviews appear to be very closely connected to their ideology. With the exception of the fatalist measure, all of the cultural worldview measures have strong, significant influences on both economic and social ideology. The indirect effects of cultural worldview are very

strong in this model, and consequently the total effects of social and economic ideology on preferences are stronger than in the moderate model or the aggregate model (an absolute value of 1.52 compared to 1.29 among moderates and 1.48 for the aggregate model). As shown in the OLS model above, social ideology now has a larger effect on immigration preferences than economic ideology, demonstrating again that moderates and ideologues systematically differ from one another in cultural worldview and how they form their preferences. *None* of the cultural measures have significant direct effects on immigration preferences among ideologues, which means that any influence cultural worldview has on preferences is filtered through ideology. The strong effects of cultural worldview on ideology confirms that this is true—culture does indeed influence preferences among ideologues, but it influences preferences by informing their ideological views rather than directly informing preferences.

The bottom half of Table 5.5 shows the comparisons between the fully-calculated indirect effects and direct effects of cultural worldview on preferences. In this case, the magnitude of the indirect effects is not necessarily larger than the direct effects, but none of the direct effects coefficients are significant. Conversely, all of the coefficients that are used to calculate the indirect effects for the hierarch, individualist, and egalitarian worldview measures are statistically significant. Since the indirect coefficients are significant where the direct ones are not, the indirect coefficients are considered much more informative than the direct coefficients. Culture is clearly more closely related to both economic and social ideology among ideologues than among moderates—precisely as hypothesized.

Comparing the direct and indirect effects between the moderate and ideologue

models is also informative. In the column of direct effects, the only significant coefficients are in the moderate model. The opposite is true regarding the indirect effects—the only calculated effects for which all of the coefficients in the equations are significant are in the ideologue model. Not all of the worldview measures significantly affect preferences among moderates, but that pattern is observed due to the specific policy topic under consideration. Immigration policy divides individualists, as discussed in Chapter 4, and fatalists are not expected to have well-defined policy preferences. The worldviews of particular salience to moderate preference formation will likely vary depending on the policy issue—a hypothesis that this dissertation is unable to test at this time due to the focus of the survey. However, three of the four worldviews significantly affect both social and economic ideology among ideologues, indicating that all of the worldviews are important to ideological preferences. Again, the fatalists are not included in this group due to their uniquely ambivalent characteristics, but all of the other worldviews have a role in determining ideological positions among ideologues. Combined with the differences in the indirect effects of culture on preferences via ideology between moderates and ideologues, these patterns provide substantial additional evidence that the Cultural Preference Model was accurate in predicting that the relationship between culture and ideology is systematically different for moderates and ideologues. Ideologues appear to rely on ideology to form their preferences, while moderates rely on the most relevant cultural worldviews.

5.4 Discussion

The aggregate models in Chapter 4 were markedly ambiguous and failed to

provide answers to the question of how an individual's culture and ideology work together to form preferences. Cultural worldview and ideology did not appear to account for the same variance in the models, but it was impossible to determine how exactly culture and ideology explained different variances. Analysis in Chapter 3 indicated that the concepts are closely related, but how they could be closely related and yet *not* explain the same variance in policy preferences could not be explained well with the aggregate analyses. By disaggregating the sample, this chapter has illuminated the differences between cultural explanations for preferences and ideological explanations for preferences. Ideologues and moderates form their preferences differently because cultural worldviews are integrated into ideology among ideologues, but moderates do not integrate the two sources of preferences.

As predicted by the Cultural Preference Model, ideologues have processed their cultural worldviews through the political context to the point that their worldviews are closely related to political ideology. This is not to say that culture is completely subsumed by ideology—it is possible that culture could still be highly influential over preferences when a cultural worldview is particularly salient to the policy area. However, for the most part, culture plays a secondary explanatory role to ideology among ideologues because they have incorporated the former into the latter.

The opposite is true for moderates: they have *not* merged their cultural worldviews into their ideology, in large part because many of these respondents have no clear ideology. So in the absence of a strong ideological view to act as a heuristic for policy preference formation, moderates rely on their cultural worldviews to form an opinion. The superiority of the effects of their worldviews over their ideology is not

clearly seen in the OLS regression model that is reported in this chapter, but when the indirect effects of culture are illustrated using a path model it becomes clear that culture is the dominant heuristic used by moderates to form opinions. The path model makes it evident that while much of the effect of culture on preferences is direct, some of the moderates' cultural worldviews are subsumed into ideology, which means that both the direct and indirect effects via ideology are needed to get the full picture of how culture affects preference formation among moderates. When that full picture is presented, it becomes clear that the total effects of culture are the driving force behind preferences among moderates.

The OLS models also pointed to some variation in how demographic variables and other attitudinal factors beyond ideology and culture affect preferences differently between moderates and ideologues. These differences were not discussed at length or incorporated into the path model diagrams because the primary focus of this project is on the cultural and ideological effects, but these other differences in preference formation based on perceptions of the government, demographics, and geographic location support the theory that moderates and ideologues simply form their preferences in systematically different ways based on different criteria. Age and gender are consistent predictors of immigration policy preferences, but little else is consistent—magnitudes of the coefficients and their significance levels differ quite a bit between the moderate and ideologue models.

The immediate implications of these findings are twofold: first, modeling individual-level policy preferences using aggregate models can be confusing or even misleading; and second, perhaps moderates are not quite as uninformed about politics as

previous literature has assumed when moderates' policy preferences do not align with their self-reported ideology. Most research dealing with policy preferences relies on aggregate models to explain individual-level preferences with a plethora of independent variables put into the models in an effort to account for all the variations in what drives individual opinion formation. If this existing approach leads to confusion and blurs the actual differences in how opinions are formed, what should be done? Is the split between ideologues and moderates the most important split to consider, or are other ways of grouping individuals more appropriate? These are a few of the many questions that arise from the findings in this chapter. The final chapter will address these questions and the implications of differences in opinion formation among groups. It will also explore the implications of this particular grouping of individuals and what the relationship between culture and ideology means for public opinion and public policy research.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The preceding chapters have walked through the relationship between cultural worldview and self-reported ideology as described in the Cultural Preference Model. The findings range from completely ambiguous to reasonably clear, and the difference between ambiguity and clarity seems to be the same as the difference between aggregate analysis and dividing the sample into theoretically relevant groups for analysis. In the Cultural Preference Model, and indeed in most behavioral political science literature, the difference between how ideology affects policy preferences depends on the individuals' ideology views. Specifically, those who report that they hold strong ideological beliefs will use ideology to form their policy preferences, whereas those without strong ideological beliefs will report being moderate or "slight" ideologues and will not use ideology as the primary factor in forming their policy preferences. For these individuals, a more primitive source of worldviews is driving their preference formation.

The Cultural Preference Model illustrated that the more primitive source of individual preference formation is their cultural worldview, as operationalized in Cultural Theory. Every individual has a cultural worldview, but the degree to which it influences their political preferences differs because culture has been molded and shaped by political forces and institutions. Party institutions have created coalitions of cultural worldviews in order to attract voters and gain power in elected office. The parties create ideologies based on the coalitions of cultural types, and these ideologies become the worldviews for the political parties. Individuals who are attentive to politics and adhere to one of these ideologies will use that ideology to form their policy

preferences, and if they do not have a preference they will use that ideology as a heuristic to quickly form a preference when they are asked a question on a survey. Individuals who are not attentive to politics, or who are attentive but simply do not adhere to one of the political ideologies, will use their cultural worldview to form their preferences.

The methodological challenge in exploring the relationship between culture and ideology is this: if the two concepts are essentially the same thing, do they account for the same variance in policy preferences? Chapter 3 illustrates that the cultural worldviews, partisan identity and ideologies do not necessarily line up—for example, all hierarchs are not conservative Republicans—which indicates that the concepts are different. However, the correlations and patterns of individual worldview, party, and ideology combinations indicate that the concepts are related and general patterns emerge. The analysis in Chapter 4 continues to demonstrate that culture and ideology are clearly related, but that the concepts do not seem to account for all of the same variance in immigration policy preferences. The aggregate models are unable to distinguish the effects of culture from the effects of ideology on the dependent variable, however, so Chapter 5 splits the sample into the theoretically relevant groups of moderates and ideologues. This sample split makes all the difference; in the ideologue models preferences are driven almost completely by ideology with culture informing ideological views, whereas in the moderate models preferences are driven by cultural worldview and somewhat by ideology, but culture has no effect on ideological views.

As suggested at the end of Chapter 5, however, splitting the sample into theoretically relevant groups can become problematic. The first major consideration is

that the split *must* be determined by theory as it was in this case—political science literature has long demonstrated that ideology explains preferences very well for those who report having strong ideological views, but ideology has not explained preferences well at all for those who report having moderate views. Thus the sample split that is necessary to explore why this difference exists is the division between ideologues and moderates. This way of splitting the sample is only one possible method of analyzing similar questions, however. In a closely related project, DeSante (2011) splits a similar sample by partisan identity and analyzes how Democrats and Republicans differ with respect to their policy preferences and how values, as defined by Schwartz’s theory of values, can override partisanship in some cases. DeSante uses the same theoretical approach: that political science does not explain preferences well among all individuals, but he uses the partisan split to explain differences due to his focus on how values and partisanship have been related to one another in the political science literature. This project finds that values often have different effects on policy preferences among Republicans as compared to Democrats.

These projects both show that aggregate analysis can result in misleading or even incorrect assumptions about a sample or groups within a sample. Traditionalist political science literature has assumed that those who do not use ideology to form their preferences are uninformed, uninterested, or at worst completely unsophisticated in their political views. Revisionists have offered the suggestion that the “irrational” individuals cancel each other out and that public “mood” moves as if all individuals did form their preferences using logical political heuristics, using aggregations of public opinion over time as the units of analysis and treating the public as one indivisible

group. Both literatures have focused on aggregate analysis, and revisionists have focused on long-term aggregate analysis. What this project demonstrates is that by relying mostly on aggregate analysis, both traditionalists and revisionists have missed critical differences in preference formation. Rather than being uninformed, uninterested or unsophisticated, this dissertation has demonstrated that moderates simply base their preferences on a different, nonpolitical heuristic: their cultural worldview.

6.1 Future work

The work on this topic is far from complete. There are two major areas in which the research will be expanded in moving forward: applying the model to more policy areas, and investigating how these patterns work over time.

Due to the restrictions of the survey used to collect these data, only immigration policy preferences were available for use as dependent variables. As stated in Chapter 5, the Cultural Preference Model should describe preference formation in any policy area; however, this assertion needs to be tested. A wide variety of policy questions need to be used as dependent variables to solidify the relevance and accuracy of the Cultural Preference Model, as well as to show how each cultural worldview affects policy preferences differently depending on the issue. Since the triad questions used to measure cultural worldview were created for this survey, they do not appear on any other surveys that could be used. Major surveys in political science such as the American National Election Study and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study currently do not ask cultural worldview questions, so these are not usable sources of data for this project. For this reason, the analysis in this dissertation is restricted to

immigration policy. More surveying will be done in order to test these questions in other policy areas.

These data were collected in a one-time cross-sectional survey, which means that the findings reported are relatively time-bound. The Cultural Preference Model is expected to describe preferences accurately over time, but again, this proposition needs to be tested. The coalitions of cultural worldviews that result in ideologies are expected to change over time, and as these coalitions shift the relationship between ideology and preferences should change. Unfortunately, the resources for a panel or repeated cross-sectional study were not available, nor have cultural worldview questions been asked on surveys earlier than 1980 that would allow long-term analysis, so this component will be done in the future as well.

Despite these shortcomings that will be explored in future research, the Cultural Preference Model and the supporting analysis in this dissertation adds substantially to the literature on preference formation in political science. Theories of public opinion formation and risk perception are united to show how ideologies emerge from core values of how the world should work, and this combination of theories sheds light on the mystery of moderate preference formation that moves the literature beyond the traditionalist-revisionist debate. Moderates and individuals without ideological positions no longer have to reside in the “muddy middle” area of public opinion—their preferences are explained by their cultural worldviews.

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Appendix: Survey Questionnaire

Q1:

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- 1 - Elementary or some high school
- 2 - High school graduate/GED
- 3 - Some college/vocational school
- 4 - College graduate
- 5 - Some graduate work
- 6 - Master's degree
- 7 - Doctorate (of any type)
- 8 - Other degree [verbatim]

Q2:

How old are you?

Q3:

Are you male or female?

- 0 – Female
- 1 – Male

Q4:

What county do you live in?

Q5:

What is the zip code at your primary residence?

Q6:

Are you registered to vote?

0 – No

1 – Yes

Q7:

If you had to choose from the following categories, what would you say is the single, biggest issue facing people in the United States today? Is it:

- 1 Jobs
- 2 The economy
- 3 Crime
- 4 Education
- 5 Drugs & Alcohol
- 6 The Environment
- 7 Health care & Insurance
- 8 Poor moral values
- 9 Ethics in government
- 10 Illegal immigration
- 99 DK/NA
- 77 Dropout

Using a scale of excellent, good, fair, or poor, how would you rate the performance of each of the following:

Q8:

The performance of your state's legislature

Q9:

The performance of your state's Governor?

Q10:

The performance of the U.S. Congress?

Q11:

The performance of the President of the United States?

Q12:

How well do you understand the important political issues facing our country?

EXTREMELY WELL, VERY WELL, MODERATELY WELL, SLIGHTLY WELL, or

NOT WELL AT ALL? (ANES preE10b)

1. Extremely well
2. Very well
3. Moderately well

4. Slightly well
5. Not well at all

Q13:

How much can people like you affect what the government does? A GREAT DEAL, A LOT, A MODERATE AMOUNT, A LITTLE, or NOT AT ALL? (ANES preE10d)

1. A great deal
2. A lot
3. A moderate amount
4. A little
5. Not at all

Q14:

How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington to make decisions in a fair way? ALWAYS, MOST OF THE TIME, ABOUT HALF THE TIME, ONCE IN A WHILE, or NEVER? (M1a2)

- 1 = Always
- 2 = Most of the time
- 3 = About half the time
- 4 = Once in a while
- 5 = Never

Q15:

Now I would like to ask you some questions about economic issues.

On a scale from one to seven, where one means very poor and seven means very good, how would you rate the current performance of the United States economy?

Q16:

Generally speaking, do you think the nation is moving in the right direction these days, or do you think things are moving in the wrong direction?

Q17:

On a scale from one to seven, where one means very poor and seven means very good, how would you rate your family's current economic condition?

Q18:

Overall, would you say that you and your family are financially better off, worse off, or about the same as you were a year ago?

Q19:

Turning to the issue of immigration in the United States, on a scale from zero to ten, where zero is not a problem at all and ten is an extreme problem, how serious a problem do you think the issue of **illegal** immigration is for the country right now?

0 – Not a problem at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 – An extreme problem

Q20:

Thinking about border security, do you think the country's borders are more secure, less secure, or about as secure as they were five years ago?

1 – Less secure

2 – About the same

3 – More secure

Q21:

Do you favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens?

1 – Favor

2 – Oppose

3 – Undecided (volunteered)

Q22:

As you may know, there was a proposal in Congress last year to allow foreigners who have jobs but are staying illegally in the United States to apply for legal, temporary-worker status. Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this proposal?

Q23:

Do you think immigration reform should primarily move in the direction of integrating illegal immigrants into American society, or in the direction of stricter enforcement of laws against illegal immigration?

- 1 – Integrate illegal immigrants into American society
- 2 – Stricter enforcement of laws
- 3 – Undecided (volunteered)

Q24:

As you may know, under our constitution and current laws, all children born in the United States are automatically granted citizenship. Do you think we should continue to grant citizenship to all children born in the U.S., or do you think this should be changed so children of illegal immigrants are not automatically granted citizenship?

- 1 – Continue to grant citizenship
- 2 – Change the laws so that citizenship is not granted
- 3 – Undecided (volunteered)

Q25:

Would you vote for or against a law that would allow illegal immigrants brought to the U.S. as children to gain legal resident status if they join the military or go to college?

1 – For

2 – Against

3 – Undecided (volunteered)

Q26:

As you may know, the state of Arizona passed a law last summer that gives the police the power to question someone they have already stopped, detained, or arrested about their legal status in the country. The law requires people to produce documents verifying their status if asked. Do you think this law goes too far in dealing with the issue of ILLEGAL immigration, doesn't go far enough, or is about right?

1 – Law goes too far

2 – About right

3 – Doesn't go far enough

Q27:

On a scale of zero to ten, where zero is not a problem at all and ten is an extreme problem, how much of a problem do you think discrimination against Hispanics is in Arizona due to this law?

0 – Not a problem at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 – An extreme problem

Q28:

Would you want your state to pass a law similar to Arizona's immigration law or not?

1 – No

2 – Yes

3 – Undecided (volunteered)

4 – Arizona resident, N/A

Q29:

What should be the main focus of the U.S. government in dealing with the issue of illegal immigration: developing a plan that would allow illegal immigrants who have jobs to become legal U.S. residents, or developing a plan for finding and deporting illegal immigrants already here?

1 – Developing a plan for illegal immigrants to become legal residents

2 – Stopping the flow of illegal immigrants and deporting those already here

3 – Undecided (volunteered)

Would you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose each of the following proposals: (randomized)

Q30:

Building a 700 mile long fence on the border with Mexico

Q31:

Creating a program that would allow illegal immigrants already living in the United States for a number of years to stay here and apply to legally remain in this country permanently if they had a job and paid back taxes

Q32:

Imposing fines of tens of thousands of dollars on employers who hire illegal immigrants

Q33:

Sending employers who hire illegal immigrants to jail

Q34:

Putting more Border Patrol and federal law enforcement agents on the U.S. border with Mexico

Q35:

Using National Guard troops to patrol the U.S. border with Mexico

Q36:

Putting more Border Patrol and federal law enforcement agents on the U.S. border with Canada

Q37:

In general, does the number of illegal immigrants currently in this country make you feel angry, dissatisfied but not angry, satisfied but not pleased, or pleased?

Q38:

In general, do you think people who favor tough new laws against illegal immigrants feel that way mostly because they are concerned about the effects of illegal immigration on economic conditions and law enforcement in this country, or mostly because they dislike Latinos?

1 – Dislike Latinos

2 – Concerned about effects

3 – Undecided (volunteered)

4 – Some other reason (specify)

Q39:

Approximately how many illegal immigrants do you think live in the United States

today? [verbatim]

Q40:

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about your general political views.

On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. When thinking about your views on *economic* issues, which of the following categories best describes your views? “Economic issues” are questions of how to distribute resources among people within a society.

1 – Strongly liberal

2 – Liberal

3 – Slightly liberal

4 – Middle of the road

5 – Slightly conservative

6 – Conservative

7 – Strongly conservative

8 – I don't think of my views in these terms

Q41:

On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. When thinking about your views on *social* issues, which of the following categories best describes your views? “Social issues” are problems that affect many or all members of society, and often involve cultural or moral values.

Q42:

Now, considering your responses to the previous two questions, which of the following categories best describes your views overall?

Q43:

With which political party do you most identify?

- 1 - Democratic party
- 2 - Republican party (or GOP)
- 3 – Independent/no party
- 4 - Other party (Please Specify)

Q44:

Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with the <Q43>?

- 3 - Completely
- 2 - Somewhat
- 1 – Slightly

Q45:

How do you rate the security of the United States today?

- 0 – Not at all secure
- 1
- 2
- 3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 – Completely secure

Q46:

Do you think the government is doing enough or too much to ensure the nation's security against terrorism and other threats?

1 – Not enough

2

3

4 – About right

5

6

7 – Doing too much

Q47:

On a scale from zero percent chance to 100 percent chance, how much chance do you think there is that another terrorist attack will occur on US soil in the next 5 years?

Q48:

Do you think the government is doing enough or too much to protect the liberties of citizens?

1 – Not enough

2

3

4 – About right

5

6

7 – Doing too much

Q49:

If you had to distribute 100% of resources only between the liberty of Americans and the security of Americans, what percentage would you use for protecting the liberty of Americans?

Q50:

What percentage would you use for protecting the security of Americans?

Q51:

Again, using 100% of resources on the liberty of Americans and the security of Americans, what percentage do you think the government is currently using to protect liberties?

Q52:

What percentage do you think the government is currently using to protect security?

Thinking about society in general, please answer the following questions on a scale from one to seven, where one is strongly disagree and seven is strongly agree.

(randomized)

Q53:

What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.

Q54:

Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on their own.

Q55:

The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard and do what you are told to do.

Q56:

Most important things that happen in life occur by chance.

Q57:

Society works best if power is shared equally.

Q58:

Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world.

Q59:

Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority.

Q60:

The course of our lives is largely determined by forces outside our control.

Q61:

It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor.

Q62:

We are all better off when we compete as individuals.

Q63:

Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those who break the rules.

Q64:

Succeeding in life is mostly a matter of luck.

For each set of three statements, please select the statement that is most desirable and least desirable. (question order and statement order randomized)

Q65:

Please select the **most** desirable statement from this set of statements.

- 1 - Everyone in a society should work hard and obey the rules set out by those in authority.
- 2 - Everyone should be given equal consideration and resources in a society.
- 3 - Everyone's place in society is a matter of luck or fate and cannot be changed.

Q66:

Please select the **least** desirable statement from this set of statements.

- 1 - Everyone in a society should work hard and obey the rules set out by those in authority.
- 2 - Everyone should be given equal consideration and resources in a society.
- 3 - Everyone's place in society is a matter of luck or fate and cannot be changed.

Q67:

Please select the **most** desirable statement from this set of statements.

- 1 - Everyone in a society should work hard and obey the rules set out by those in authority.
- 2 - Everyone should be given equal consideration and resources in a society.

3 - Everyone in a society should compete as individuals to succeed or fail on their own.

Q68:

Please select the **least** desirable statement from this set of statements.

1 - Everyone in a society should work hard and obey the rules set out by those in authority.

2 - Everyone should be given equal consideration and resources in a society.

3 - Everyone in a society should compete as individuals to succeed or fail on their own.

Q69:

Please select the **most** desirable statement from this set of statements.

1 - Everyone in a society should work hard and obey the rules set out by those in authority.

2 - Everyone in a society should compete as individuals to succeed or fail on their own.

3 - Everyone's place in society is a matter of luck or fate and cannot be changed.

Q70:

Please select the **least** desirable statement from this set of statements.

1 - Everyone in a society should work hard and obey the rules set out by those in authority.

2 - Everyone in a society should compete as individuals to succeed or fail on their own.

3 - Everyone's place in society is a matter of luck or fate and cannot be changed.

Q71:

Please select the **most** desirable statement from this set of statements.

- 1 - Everyone should be given equal consideration and resources in a society.
- 2 - Everyone in a society should compete as individuals to succeed or fail on their own.
- 3 - Everyone's place in society is a matter of luck or fate and cannot be changed.

Q72:

Please select the **least** desirable statement from this set of statements.

- 1 - Everyone should be given equal consideration and resources in a society.
- 2 - Everyone in a society should compete as individuals to succeed or fail on their own.
- 3 - Everyone's place in society is a matter of luck or fate and cannot be changed.

Q73:

Now, using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important is religious faith in your life?

0 - Not at all important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 - Extremely important

Q74:

Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? More than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, seldom, or never?

1 - More than once a week

2 - Once a week

3 - Once or twice a month

4 - A few times a year

5 - Seldom

6 - Never

Q75:

With which of the following major religions do you most identify?

1 - Buddhism

2 - Christianity-Protestant

2a-Christianity-Catholic

3 - Hinduism

4 - Islam

5 - Judaism

6 - Something else

0 - None

Q76:

Would you describe yourself as either a “born-again” or evangelical Christian?

0 - No

1 - Yes

Q77:

Shifting to another issue, approximately how often do you access the Internet?

0 - Never

1 - Less than once a month

2 - Several times a month

3 - About once a week

4 - Several times a week

5 - Once or twice most days

6 - Several times almost every day

Q78:

Which of the following best describes your race or ethnic background?

1 - American Indian

2 - Asian

3 - Black or African American

4 - Hispanic

5 - White non-Hispanic

6 - Something else [verbatim]

Q79:

Was the estimated annual income for your household in 2007:

1 - Less than \$50,000 [Go to Q79A]

2 - At least \$50,000 but less than \$100,000 [Go to Q79B]

3 - At least \$100,000 but less than \$150,000 [Go to Q79C]

4 - \$150,000 or more? [Go to Q79D]

Q79A

Was the estimated annual income for your household in 2007: [all responses skip to end of survey]

1 - Less than \$10,000

2 - \$10,000 to less than \$20,000

3 - \$20,000 to less than \$30,000

4 - \$30,000 to less than \$40,000

5 - \$40,000 to less than \$50,000

Q79B

Was the estimated annual income for your household in 2007: [all responses skip to end of survey]

- 6 - \$50,000 to less than \$60,000
- 7 - \$60,000 to less than \$70,000
- 8 - \$70,000 to less than \$80,000
- 9 - \$80,000 to less than \$90,000
- 10 - \$90,000 to less than \$100,000

Q79C

Was the estimated annual income for your household in 2007: [all responses skip to end of survey]

- 11 - \$100,000 to less than \$110,000
- 12 - \$110,000 to less than \$120,000
- 13 - \$120,000 to less than \$130,000
- 14 - \$130,000 to less than \$140,000
- 15 - \$140,000 to less than \$150,000

Q79D

Was the estimated annual income for your household in 2007:

- 16 - \$150,000 to less than \$160,000
- 17 - \$160,000 to less than \$170,000
- 18 - \$170,000 to less than \$180,000
- 19 - \$180,000 to less than \$190,000
- 20 - \$190,000 to less than \$200,000
- 21 - \$200,000 or more

